BackThe Social Order
Contents
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The Social Order
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lf1981_figure_fm1.jpg

Jacques Rueff

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The Social Order
Jacques Rueff
Translated from the French
by Jurgen Reinhoudt
Liberty Fund
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This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

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The English translation, translator’s note, editorial material, and index © 2025 by Liberty Fund, Inc.

The French text on which this translation is based is L’Ordre Social, originally published by Plon (Paris) as Volume 4 in Oeuvres Complètes de Jacques Rueff (1981), and is used by permission of Mrs. Passerose Rueff Pigeat.

Frontispiece photo by AFP via Getty Images; used by permission.

Cover photo by Henri Bureau/Sygma/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Rueff, Jacques author

Title: The social order / Jacques Rueff ; translated from the French by Jurgen Reinhoudt.

Other titles: Ordre social. English

Description: Carmel, Indiana : Liberty Fund, [2025] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “The Social Order argues that a strong relationship exists between economic order and social order. The book offers an important contribution to the philosophy of money and capital theory and novel normative arguments for prudent fiscal policy. In keeping with other “neoliberal” theorists, Rueff argues against adopting a centrally planned economic system, warning of both the economic and moral drawbacks inherent in such systems”— Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: lccn 2025021093 (print) | lccn 2025021094 (ebook) | isbn 9780865979369 hardcover | isbn 9780865979376 paperback | isbn 9781614872986 epub | isbn 9781614876755 kindle edition | isbn 9781614879459 pdf

Subjects: lcsh: Money | Prices | Economic policy

Classification: lcc hg221 .r7913 2025 (print) | lcc hg221 (ebook) | ddc 332.4—dc23/eng/20250617

lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2025021093

lc ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2025021094

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Contents

  • Translator’s Note, by Jurgen Reinhoudt ix
  • Note to the Reader, by Emil-Maria Claassen and Georges Lane xiii
  • Preface to the Third Edition xix
  • Introduction xxxi
  • Part I: Initial Considerations Regarding Prices
    • Chapter i: On the Nature of Dynamic Explanations 3
    • Chapter ii: Definition and Measure of Demand and Supply 8
    • Chapter iii: Theory of Variations in the General Price Level Index and the Total Sales Index 18
    • Chapter iv: The Price Scale 28
  • Part II: (Where We Get to the Heart of the Matter): A Picture of Economic Realities in a Universe without Money
    • Chapter v: Value in a Universe without Money 57
    • Chapter vi: Capital, Income, Production, Consumption, and Saving in a Universe without Money 59
    • Chapter vii: The Appropriation of Articles of Wealth 69
    • Chapter viii: Exchange and Price Formation 89
    • Chapter ix: Loans and Discount: Two Particular Modes of Exchange 98vi
    • Chapter x: Production and the Income Theorems 112
    • Chapter xi: The Special Status of Public Service Production 133
    • Chapter xii: Conclusion to Part II: The Birth, the Life, and the Death of Property Rights 156
  • Part III: Money and the General Price Level
    • Chapter xiii: Introducing Money 171
    • Chapter xiv: Necessary Cash Balances and Desired Cash Balances 187
    • Chapter xv: The Creation and Destruction of Money 193
    • Chapter xvi: The Principle of Variations in the General Price Level in Money 203
    • Chapter xvii: Monetary Regulation in Systems Where Only True Claims Are Eligible for Discount 211
    • Chapter xviii: Monetary Regulation in Systems Where False Claims Are Eligible for Discount 253
    • Chapter xix: Money in Light of the Theory of Rights: True and False Money 272
    • Chapter xx: Conclusion to Part III: The Subservience of Money 280
  • Part IV: Economic Life under a Monetary System
    • Chapter xxi: Purchasing Power and the Articles of Wealth to Be Bought 289
    • Chapter xxii: Internal Exchanges 296
    • Chapter xxiii: International Exchanges 335
    • Chapter xxiv: Journey to the Land of False Rights 373
    • Chapter xxv: Conclusion to Part IV: The Sovereignty of Rights Holders 401
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  • Part V: Economic Evolution
    • Chapter xxvi: Demand, the Offspring of Desire and a Fettered Sovereign 407
    • Chapter xxvii: The Evolution of Economic Realities, Independently of Monetary Appearances 421
    • Chapter xxviii: The Evolution of Monetary Appearances under a True Rights System. A Theory of Secular Movements and an Outline of a Theory of Cyclical Movements in the General Price Level 438
    • Chapter xxix: Aggregate Evolution under a True Rights System 467
    • Chapter xxx: Aggregate Evolution under a False Rights System 490
    • Chapter xxxi: Conclusion to Part V: The Sovereign Wills within the Rights They Govern; Causes of the Aggregate Evolution of Economic Universes 503
  • Part VI: The Social Order
    • Chapter xxxii: The Government of Human Societies 513
    • Chapter xxxiii: Two Kinds of Civilizations: Civilizations with True Rights or Free Prices; Civilizations with False Rights or Controlled Prices 574
    • Chapter xxxiv: Civilizations with True Rights, or Social Orders 583
    • Chapter xxxv: Civilizations with False Rights, or Social Disorders 618
    • Chapter xxxvi: Conclusion to Part VI: The Ethics of Human Societies 655
  • Part VII: Political Conclusions
    • Chapter xxxvii: Require Financial Order or Accept Slavery 663
  • Bibliography 675
  • Index 687
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Translator’s Note

The Social Order is Jacques Rueff’s magnum opus. I first had the pleasure of reading it more than a decade ago, in the course of performing research for my dissertation. Rueff was not only a brilliant economist but also a gifted writer who reflected deeply on the relation between social and economic order. This book retains an enduring importance, and it is my hope that this translation will allow the reader to follow Rueff’s argumentation in both its lucidity and its complexity.

The Social Order was first published in 1945, and a new preface was added by the author in 1966. The present translation is based on the 1981 edition published by Plon, including the note to the reader by Emil-Maria Claassen, professor of economics at the University Paris IX Dauphine, and Georges Lane, lecturer of economics at the University Paris IX Dauphine. German and Spanish translations of The Social Order exist, and an English translation was overdue.

It is important to note, however, that this translation marks the continuation of an earlier effort. Several decades ago, an initial effort to translate The Social Order into English was made by the Lehrman Institute, at the hands of the highly capable translator Roger Glémet. Although that initial attempt could not be completed, the Lehrman Institute generously made it available as a resource for the present effort.

In 2021, a second attempt was made to translate The Social Order into English, by Liberty Fund under the auspices of senior fellow Leonidas Zelmanovitz, and with the persistent support and encouragement of Stanley Stillman. The Lehrman Institute and members of the Rueff family have kindly lent their support to this second effort, as did Plon.

This translation, then, owes a debt to the effort initially undertaken by the Lehrman Institute. As significant sections of the original translation effort were either incomplete or illegible, however, the present translation required completing the missing sections as well as comprehensively revising all surviving x sections of the original translation for the sake of internal consistency and general legibility.

Editorial Conventions

There are three sources of notes in Rueff’s text: Rueff, the French editors of the Plon edition, and the translator. The French editors’ notes are preceded by symbols (*, †, ‡). Rueff’s notes and the translator’s notes are numbered sequentially within each chapter (1, 2, 3, etc.). The translator’s comments in the text and in notes are in brackets, and comments in the notes are followed by “—Translator.”

Rueff uses the French word “paragraphe” to refer to other sections of text. For clarity, these instances have been changed to “section” as appropriate throughout.

References in the notes and bibliography to frequently cited volumes in Rueff’s Collected Works have been translated directly into English, such as “Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory,” even though the Collected Works has been published only in French. For other books, in both the notes and the bibliography, where possible, I have provided the original title in French that Rueff cites and added the English translation of the title—for example, I translated the title of Lazard’s review “Voyage au pays des faux droits” into English (Journey to the land of false rights); or, if the work exists in an English translation, I have provided that. This way the reader can track down either the French original or the English translation (if applicable).

On the other hand, I did not translate those titles where their meaning appeared self-explanatory, such as Bucaille’s review “ ‘L’Ordre Social’ par Jacques Rueff.”

A Note on the Figures

For the “supply and demand” figures, I have translated the abbreviations given in the original French text in order to minimize confusion. For instance, “O” (offre) has been changed to “S” to refer to the supply curve, and “T” (taux) has been changed to “R” to refer to the rate curve; however, the abbreviation “D” (demande) was retained to refer to the demand curve. For supply and demand charts containing multiple shifting curves, the abbreviations deriving from these charts, such as “o2d′2” in the original French text, have been changed to their English versions, such as “s2d′2,” with a translation of the relevant legends xi provided for each chart. In addition, Rueff oriented the figures with quantity on a vertical axis and price on a horizontal axis, which is different from current convention.

For the vertical “exchange charts” and for abbreviations involving coal, wheat, gold, and silver—I also translated the abbreviations into English: pc for the price of coal, pw for the price of wheat, etc.

Over the course of this project, I have benefited from the keen eye, comments, and insights of Jean-Marc Daniel (professor of economics at ESCP Business School) and Leonidas Zelmanovitz. Laura Goetz, Patti Ordower, Melody Negron, Elizabeth Ploski, and Ashley Moore are thanked for their support in making the manuscript ready for production. Any errors are mine alone.

Stanford University Libraries’ Interlibrary Loan service was efficient and helpful in obtaining certain references that were difficult to find. I am thankful for the responsiveness and steady resourcefulness of its team members, Hilary Thorsen in particular.

Last but not least, I am thankful to my wife and our two daughters for their strong support in the course of completing this translation.

Jurgen Reinhoudt
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Note to the Reader

Jacques Rueff wrote two books concerning monetary theory: the Theory of Monetary Phenomena in 1927,1 and The Social Order, which appeared eighteen years later. These two books were intended to form a treatise on monetary theory, the first book having as its main area of inquiry “monetary statics” and the second book developing the foundations of “monetary dynamics.” “Monetary statics” deals with two fundamental subjects in monetary economics, the quantity theory of money and the purchasing power parity theory of exchange rates.

There are several reasons why Jacques Rueff preferred the title The Social Order over “monetary dynamics.” First, he is interested in economic theory and in monetary theory; the first and second parts of the book are essentially a theory of prices, value, and production, whereas the third and fourth parts are simply a development of issues dealt with in the Theory of Monetary Phenomena. Next, the book is more static than dynamic; it is only in the fifth part that an issue of dynamics is analyzed, the question of the cyclical and long-term evolution of an economic system. Finally, the two last parts, the sixth and seventh, address the socioeconomic implications of the theory developed at the beginning of the book and provide it with its title: The Social Order.

The contributions of Jacques Rueff to economic theory are spread out, as far as the most original contributions are concerned, between 1920 and 1945, twenty-five years that can be divided into three periods.

The first period is that of the 1920s. It is an account of his methodology and his contributions, of both theoretical and empirical nature, to the quantity theory of money, to the theory of the balance of payments, and to the theory of xiv unemployment; they have been reprinted in the second volume of the Collected Works, titled Monetary Theory.

The second period is that of the 1930s. Henceforth, Jacques Rueff emphasized economic questions of a normative kind: the best (market-based) organization of a national economy, of a war economy, of the European economic community, and of the international monetary system (see Collected Works, Vol. III: Economic Policy).

The third period is that of the first half of the 1940s and the publication of The Social Order. With the exception of the first six chapters, which Jacques Rueff broadly wrote at the end of 1933,2 it is really between 1941 and 1944 that he wrote this book. Published in 1945 in two volumes,3 it received favorable reviews from both economists 4 and journalists.5 Outside France, the readership of the work was less broad, even though authors such as R. G. Hawtrey and Wilhelm Röpke provided long reports on it.6 The initial print run of the book having been quickly exhausted, and Jacques Rueff having been urged to be brief—and more accessible to the general public—he wrote a version titled xv Sound Money or Totalitarian State, which was published in 1947.7 A second edition of The Social Order appeared in 1948,8 and a third edition, with a preface by the author, appeared in 1967.9 The present volume IV of the Collected Works takes up this third edition.

The broad outlines of this book having been presented by Jacques Rueff himself in his preface of 1967,10 our intention is mainly to reveal the fundamental idea of the book and to link the questions that are addressed in the book to his prior and subsequent works.

This book has as its starting point the idea according to which any exchange of goods is an exchange of property rights. There exists, however, a specific category of property rights that matters not because of the nature of these property rights but only because of the “volume of their contents”: this is the category of financial claims [créances] (both monetary and nonmonetary).

The state has the ability to manipulate this volume through “price controls.” If the price of a security is set at a level higher than its equilibrium value, the volume of the rights that the (ultimate, final) debtor can acquire in the form of real assets exceeds the volume of rights that the (ultimate, final) lender possesses: the security is (partly) a “false right.”

If we apply this concept of “false rights” to discount or open-market operations—in which monetary authorities purchase Treasury bills at a price higher than the market price and in this way create false rights—we can explain, in an uncommon light, the rise in the general price level.

In most cases, the reason for the creation of these “false rights” (or “false money”) can be found in the financing of budgetary deficits of the state. To the extent that the state issues more Treasury bills than economic actors wish to hold, the central bank is required to purchase these bills at a prescribed interest rate. As long, however, as the currency is convertible into gold, holders of securities have the possibility of converting these into real wealth at the expense xvi of the central bank; to protect the central bank from insolvency, the state decrees the inconvertibility of the currency. It is in this way that the state can exchange, without limit, “false rights” for goods that it needs. Finally, to repress the inflationary effects of these “false rights,” the state establishes price controls, then rationing, in order to conceal the erosion of the real value of its currency.

For Jacques Rueff, the deficit has, with time, effects on the social order itself. These find their origin in the efforts of the state to ward off or keep secret such consequences. He distinguishes, in this regard, between two types of governmental methods: liberal methods and authoritarian ones.

The former lead the government to levy, through taxation, the share of wealth of the country that it needs to purchase goods and services on free markets. The latter methods (authoritarian) leave wealth in the hands of the private sector but dictate to owners the manner in which their wealth should be utilized. Any government must blend these two types of methods. Its approach must be authoritarian no matter how liberal its economic institutions might be, but Jacques Rueff is opposed to the illegitimate extension of authoritarian methods. A government that falters in raising taxes to a level sufficient to meets its expenditures, and fills in the gap by means of false rights, will try to conceal the consequences of this by decreeing maximum prices: it is the end of the social order.

These concepts of true and false rights constitute the greatest originality of this book, and they even constitute a leitmotif. There is a second originality, namely the reformulation of the quantity theory of money starting from the demand for money—an idea that can be found in a text that Jacques Rueff wrote in 1928 titled “Undue Fluctuations of the Purchasing Power of Gold.” 11 There is a third originality, and that is the description of the mechanism of regulation of the supply of money under different monetary systems, from the perspective of the “real bills” doctrine—a subject that Jacques Rueff would subsequently explore in depth.12

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Lastly, this book deals with four other issues that Rueff had already written about: he writes briefly about purchasing power parity and the problem of transfers 13 but revisits in detail the functioning of economic systems (the market economy and the planned economy) and the gold standard.14

Emil-Maria Claassen and Georges Lane
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Preface to the Third Edition*

  • As long as I am above,
  • At times silence is my love.
  • When I am under,
  • I shall be able to keep quiet no longer.1

What I will say, at that time when I am enclosed in the realm of eternal silence, will be made heard by some of my books, especially this one, if there are still people to read it or teachers to disseminate the message that, while living, I had intended to entrust to it.

This book marked an important step in the development of my thinking. I am grateful to those who have been kind enough to give it some consideration. What has retained their attention, however, is not always that which I had intended to convey. I shall endeavor, here, to facilitate the task of possible future commentators, by emphasizing the lessons that The Social Order has taught me.

The central idea that permeates this book is that it is not articles of wealth that are “desired” by men but rather the ability to enjoy and dispose of [such] things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations.2 In terms of Article 544 of the French Civil Code, this means the right of “ownership” over such objects.

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This distinction in meaning is significant, because it implies from the outset that economics is not, as has often been said, the science of wealth, but the science of the relations between certain objects that are desired and all those who desire them. A member of the community, known as the “owner,” is guaranteed, by the judicial and police apparatus of the state, peaceful possession of, and control over, these objects; the same apparatus requires also that all others should keep away from the objects owned.

Certainly, I do not claim that these views are new. Many other writers have been faced with problems similar to those that have forced me to revise my prior ideas. The solutions that they have suggested often proceed from concerns close to my own and have certainly inspired me, whether unconsciously or not.

The solution for which I have opted retained my attention because of its fruitfulness and represents, with regard to many aspects of economic or legal theory, or even for the analysis of social structures, a genuine transformation, the main consequences of which are presented in this book.

A first such consequence relates to the very existence of economic science. There are no economic relations in an uncivilized society, because each individual, using his own might, stakes out the domain that he will be able to enjoy and dispose of, which will hence be beyond the scope of clashing human wills.

By contrast, economic relations emerge as soon as a coercive force—the police, organized and commanded by the social authorities—does, in fact, ensure for certain individuals the peaceful enjoyment of certain objects. The coercive power succeeds in so doing by preventing those who do not have standing to enjoy or dispose of an object from desiring to use or dispose of it, in consideration of the penalties that they would incur.

Thus, economic science is only a modest outgrowth of the legal structure that imposes social peace. The moment the police or justice vanishes, there are no longer any exchanges, gifts, loans, or salaries, but only violence and arbitrariness on the part of the strongest.

Thus, the institution of property is simply the means to social peace.

This assertion is abundantly borne out by the fact that the basis for the appropriation of wealth is to be found not in Article 544 of the French Civil Code but in the seventh and tenth commandments:

  • Thou shalt not take the goods of others,
  • nor knowingly keep them.
  • xxi
  • Thou shalt not covet the goods of others,
  • to have them unjustly.3

By distinguishing between one’s own property and other people’s property, by preventing any law-abiding citizen, or any man respectful of divine will, not only from laying hold of articles of wealth that do not belong to him but also from coveting them, the property right of ownership eliminates even the possibility of rival claims competing for the right to dispose of the same object.

Commentators who studied the first two editions of this book viewed with distrust—sometimes even openly criticized—a construction in which they saw a glorification of the right of property, which was quite unfashionable at the time.4

These critics, no doubt acting in good faith, failed to observe that, for me, the raison d’ être and the merit of the property right of ownership were to establish “a visible link, justifiable in the eyes of third parties, between a person and an object” and that “the property right of ownership was just as indifferent to the person as to the object, as indeed to the morality of the order that it established.”

“If the property right of ownership has been equitably allocated,” I added, “then the social order based on property is equitable but, if it has been allocated inequitably, then it is iniquitous, and Proudhon was justified in arguing that ‘property is theft.’ ” In either case, however, society will be policed, that is to say peaceful, if the police actually succeed in ensuring, for every person, the peaceful enjoyment of the domain that his “rights” delineate.

Such assertions are just as valid in a society where all property is nationalized as they are in an individualistic and liberal system. The only difference is that, in the first case, all property rights of ownership are vested in the legal entity that is the state, whereas, in the second, they may be those of private persons. It can even be observed that nowhere is the property right of ownership as firmly established and vindicated as in totalitarian states, where any attempt against state property is punished with the utmost severity.

In the above analysis, the property right of ownership has the same substance as the object owned; it envelops it in its entirety and attaches it to the person of xxii the owner. It is not any less distinct from the owner, however, just as a container is distinct from its contents. This is the case, for instance, of ownerless goods, which are not enveloped by any property right of ownership until the time at which they will have been appropriated.

Thus, the property right of ownership envelops the object owned in some kind of cover that bears a personal mark, that of the owner; it assigns it to a particular patrimony, just as a jockey’s silks “assign” his horse in a stable.

The “content” of a right is not, directly, the object that is owned, but the ability to enjoy it and dispose of it. It is this ability, sought by men, that constitutes ownership, and it is this ability that is valuable to them.

Now, value is this feature common to all the articles of wealth that, by means of exchange, can “fill” a same right.

Therefore, the value of the object owned determines the size of the right that encloses it. It enables us to distinguish, in any property right, two different features: its volume and the nature of its content. Its content is secondary and occasional, since it can be modified through exchange. By contrast, its volume is essential and definitive since, all things equal as far as prices are concerned, it sets ne varietur 5 the quantity of any articles of wealth that the holder of a right can obtain in exchange for those that he possesses.

In this way, the property right constitutes a genuine value receptacle, with a well-defined volume, that can be filled, in accordance with the holder’s desire, to the extent of that volume, with any of the articles of wealth supplied in the market, or, more precisely, with the value that ownership of such wealth represents.

The reason why I retained this concept of the property right as a value receptacle is that I felt it renewed the theory of the formation of individual prices and general price level indices, the aggregate demand theory, the theory of money, and—if I may presume to say so—the theory of the government of human societies. This present, anthumous, work has only partially succeeded in winning the argument for these very general teachings. I hope that any posthumous editions, if there are any, will succeed in making these teachings accepted by a larger section of enlightened opinion.

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a) Price Formation

Under the concept of a right as a value receptacle, knowledge of the price of an article of wealth determines the volume of the right that encloses it.

In the course of an exchange, which necessarily takes place on an equal value basis, everything happens as though each exchanger had retained his initial right and had simply modified its content. Exchange then no longer constitutes a dual transfer of property rights but a simple change in the contents of each of the exchanger’s rights, a change that does not affect these rights. Any property rights holder, wishing to change the content of a right, need only empty the article of wealth that constitutes it onto the market, where it can be exchanged for the one he wishes to acquire, and to fill with the latter the right that is thus vacated.

The volume of the right sets ne varietur, prices remaining constant, the quantity of all the articles of wealth with which it can be filled. Its holder finds himself in the position of buyers of leftovers who, in the olden days, were allowed for a paltry sum to dip a bowl into a cauldron of swill. The capacity of the bowl determined the volume of their right but not the nature of the article of wealth with which it could be filled.

Let us make no mistake, however, as to the nature of this comparison; it allows for an easy and meaningful analysis of the exchange operation, but this representation would distort the analysis beyond redress if it dissociated the joint operations of emptying and filling. It is only because of convenience of analysis that emptying and filling can be distinguished from each other, because they necessarily occur simultaneously and must be accomplished jointly, otherwise the exchange would not be achieved.

In this concept of exchange, everything happens as if the sum of the articles of wealth emptied onto each sector of the market had to be carried, in the course of the session when it was supplied, into the rights that their holders wished to fill with it. To this end, the articles of wealth supplied are, to some extent, pressure-pushed into the rights that will enclose them. It is the degree of pressure, the density of the wealth supplied in the rights into which it has been carried, that determines the level of the price on the market.

b) Variations in the General Price Level

The previous analysis, which applies to a market sector, is also applicable to the market as a whole. At each session of the market, the total volume, in money, of the rights that their holders wish to empty of nonmonetary content, whatever it xxiv may be, measures total supply; and the total volume, in money, of the rights that their holders wish to fill with any nonmonetary content measures total demand.

Everything happens, therefore, as though the general price level index established itself, at each instant of time, at a level such that the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market filled exactly the rights that their holders wished to fill with them, but filled only those. The general price level index is therefore, like an individual price, only the measure of the average degree of pressure necessary so that, at each market session, the totality of articles of wealth supplied can be carried into the rights that are intended to enclose them, regardless of the distribution of demand and supply among the various articles on the market.

c) Aggregate Demand and the Theory of Money

The preceding conclusion shows that the general price level can change only if, at a session of the market, the aggregate volume of the rights emptied of their contents diverges from the volume of the rights to be filled.

Yet any seller whose actual cash balance is at the level that he wishes to hold—in other words, his “desired cash balance”—will forthwith empty the right that enclosed the article of wealth sold of the money acquired as a result of the sale, and fill it with another, nonmonetary, article of wealth, which is obviously desired, because if he no longer desires money it is because he desires a nonmonetary article of wealth. The volume of the rights emptied on the market by the economic agent in question is identically equal to the volume of the rights filled by him.

Yet what is true of an individual is also true of the community considered as a whole. If, at a given session of the market, the aggregate amount of actual cash balances is equal to the aggregate amount of desired cash balances, then the aggregate volume of the rights to be filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth will be equal to the aggregate volume of the rights emptied of these same articles of wealth, regardless of the distribution of the rights emptied and refilled among the various sectors of the market. Where this is the case, individual prices may indeed change, but the general price level will remain unchanged.

Then Jean-Baptiste Say’s “law of outlets”6 will be verified—aggregate demand and supply will be identically equal.

xxv

By contrast, any excess or any deficiency in the aggregate amount of actual cash balances, relative to the aggregate amount of desired cash balances, will increase or decrease, proportionally, the aggregate volume of the rights to be filled, relative to that of the rights emptied during the market session considered. The general price level will change.

Thus, the general price level is indifferent to the supply of, and demand for, articles of wealth, and to the quantity of money in circulation as long as this quantity of money is desired; it responds only to any disparities likely to arise between total desired cash balances and total actual cash balances.

This conclusion is of great importance. It shows how fallacious the thesis is that sees in the increase in the quantity of money in circulation, or in an insufficient level of supply, the cause of a rise in prices. It shows how utterly unfounded the popular notion of inflation is, when it refers to changes in the quantity of money in circulation, without relating these changes to concomitant changes in desired cash balances.

As long as the actual cash balance is at the level of the desired cash balance, the volume of the rights to be filled is not, and cannot be, different from the volume of the rights emptied over the same period of time. If more articles of wealth are supplied, then there are more rights to be filled; and if fewer articles of wealth are supplied, then there are fewer rights to be filled.

The above analysis explains, and sheds light on, those strange cases where simplistic theories, like the quantity theory of money, found—without justification—that there was a reason why the general price level ought to change, whereas it remained unchanged simply because, notwithstanding individual price changes, actual cash balances remained equal to the level of desired cash balances.

Some people, who claim to be of the positive type of mind, will no doubt be surprised to see that the key theory of changes in the general price level is being based on as psychological a concept as that of the desired cash balance. This first contact with the realities of dynamic explanation ought not to surprise them, however. Economic phenomena have deep roots in the hearts of men, there where the wills that generate actions develop in the light of consciousness and, quite often, unconsciously.

Being surprised that the economist finds the causes that he is looking for in the desires of men is like being surprised that the astronomer should find in gravitational attraction an explanation for the motion of planets.

xxvi

Desire is, in the field of political economy, that which force is in the fields of astronomy or mechanics: the explanatory instrument that will convert into logical necessities the appearances that observation will have brought to light.

The preceding analysis shows that the sole condition for the stability of the general price level is that the quantity of money in circulation should be maintained, at any period of time, at the level of total desired cash balances. It shows that any form of inflation or deflation amounts to an excess or a deficiency in the quantity of money in circulation relative to total desired cash balances.

The preceding analysis provides the certainty that the whole secret, and the whole art, of monetary policy consists of ensuring, at all times, in as precise a manner as possible, equality between these two quantities.

The methods used in order to bring about such an equality reflect the—essentially contingent—principles on which the various monetary systems are based. In The Social Order, I have presented what is, to my knowledge, the first outline of the mechanisms through which, in our modern monetary systems—that is to say, based wholly or partly on credit—money creation is driven by changes in aggregate desired cash balances.

The problem appeared so important to me that, notwithstanding the degree of complexity and high abstraction with which it had to be analyzed, I studied it further in two specialized papers: “Influences Regulating the Amount of Currency and the Institutional Problem of Money,” in 1953,7 and “Elements for a Theory of the Discount Rate and the Balance of Payments,” in 1957.8

xxvii

The main ambition of the author of The Social Order is to bequeath these two studies to scholars who, when the author is departed from this world, will carefully study monetary mechanisms. The author is convinced that, however austere these studies may be, they lay the basis for research and reflection that is likely to give to monetary theory a seriousness and an effectiveness that it utterly lacks at present.

d) True or False Rights, Foundations of the Human Condition

The concept of a “right as a value receptacle” opens the possibility of introducing a distinction, one that I consider to be important, between “true” and “false” rights.

Article 544 of the French Civil Code promises the holder of a property right of ownership that he will have the ability to freely dispose of the object owned.9 For this ability to be real, however, it is not sufficient that it should be written into the law; the owner has to be able to actually exercise this right.

The owner of an object can actually dispose of it, however, only if he is certain, at the time when it pleases him to offer it for sale, to find a counterpart in the market, in other words a demand of equal value. This will only be the case if, in each sector of the market, the price fluctuates, at each instant of time, until the moment when the aggregate value of supplies has adjusted to the level of aggregate demand.

If, for instance, a price is maintained, by authoritative [legally binding] measures, above its level of [market] equilibrium, the volume of the rights that holders will want to empty of the article considered will exceed the level of the rights that, during the same session of the market, their holders will wish to fill with this article. Some of the articles of wealth supplied will not find a buyer. The ability to dispose of an object, an ability that the right of ownership had provided to its owner, will be correspondingly fallacious: the corresponding right will be a “false right.”

The concept of false rights is an effective instrument for the purpose of forecasting and explaining phenomena that are observed under all systems of auxxviiithoritative [legally binding] setting of prices. Even outside such systems, however, this notion casts light on, and facilitates, the analysis of the consequences resulting from the eligibility of Treasury bills for discount, or their direct purchase within the framework of open market operations, at a price above that at which they would find a taker in the market.

The “false rights” generated by either of these two methods, but more generally by the latter, increase by their amount the aggregate demand that originates in the volume of rights emptied onto the market. They explain nearly all inflationary disorders and bring to full light the methods that could avert them. In particular, they bring into relief the veritable transformation that false-rights-generating procedures inflict upon the legal structures of societies.

The Social Order has sought to emphasize the importance of this transformation by distinguishing between “civilizations with false rights” and “civilizations with true rights,” in the hope of fostering greater awareness of the conditions likely to reconcile monetary stability and economic expansion, therefore contributing to the solution of one of the main problems of our era.

e) The Technique of Freedom

In a society with true rights, man has the certainty that he can actually perform, within the domain he owns, all possible acts. Under the constant outward push of his desires, his imagination can run its free course; no obstacle will thwart the wills to which it gives rise. And his acts, however unpredictable they may be, will never bring about social disorders, or a rise in the general price level, or a depletion of metallic reserves.

In contrast, in a society with false rights the owner of an object can dispose of it only to the extent he finds a counterpart prepared to receive it. Every day certain rights holders—rights whose aggregate volume depends only on the level at which prices have been arbitrarily set—are forbidden from performing acts that they have the right to perform and that they wish to perform. Their disappointment, and their efforts to avoid it, brings about social disorder.

Quite rapidly and inevitably, such disorders, if allowed to continue for any length of time, will be felt to be intolerable.

In order to ward off such disorders—assuming that there is no intention or possibility of eliminating the causes that have given rise to them—it will be necessary to regulate through force of law the use that each individual will make of his rights. These will cease to be zones of freedom and will become “rations.” Man will only be able to perform, within his domain, those acts that others have xxix chosen for him. His appetites and desires will cease to be the only source of his will. He will no longer be a person striving for the ends that he has freely chosen, but rather an object controlled from the outside, like a slave commanded by his master or a piece of machinery controlled by its operator.

And in this way, the legal system acquires its full significance. In its original purity, it is the admirable instrument of human dignity, forged by thousands of years of painful experience, to provide men with the benefits of freedom without inflicting upon them its disorders.

Its mere existence does not, however, ensure its effectiveness. The jurist may decree it, but it remains illusory unless brought about by the economist. If the volume of a right is set a priori by immobilizing the price of the article of wealth it encloses, the effectiveness of the legal system will be irremediably compromised. The system retains the appearance of its virtues, but loses all of their substance. And man, upon whom the legal system had conferred the remarkable privilege of being, in the social order, a responsible and free being, is relegated to the status of cattle in the barn before being brought down to the level of a slave in a labor penitentiary.10

The legal system is the invisible foundation of the freedom of men. Anyone who jeopardizes its integrity, regardless of his underlying motives, is guilty of a crime that nothing can atone for: the crime against human dignity.

It is because it touches upon such matters that The Social Order has irresistibly led me to places where economists are usually reluctant to tread. I have put into this book all that I had been able to gather over fifteen years of solitary thinking, constantly diverted by the tugging of what is known as “action.” On heavy seas, it has been buffeted by waves. May this preface fasten the cargo back in place and help the reader to find all that the author, while living, had boldly hoped to convey.

xxx xxxi

Introduction

The title of this book was chosen at a very late stage, when the book was nearing completion.

Initially and during most of the period of preparation, I had intended to call it “Monetary Dynamics,” volume II of the “Theory of Monetary Phenomena,” following volume I, “Monetary Statics,” which had been published in 1927.* The main purpose was to provide a causal explanation of shifts in equilibria, hence a theory of economic evolution.1 The statement of the principles on which this theory rests is the subject of Part V. The first four parts were written simply to make Part V possible.

As the tree grew, however, it came to bear unexpected fruit. It became obvious that the theory of economic evolution shed light on the whole problem of the government of human societies and, in particular, on the mechanism through which social order was established and maintained under varied political systems.

At a time when the very foundations of our societies are being challenged, these findings appeared to be more significant than the conclusions of a more technical nature reached in the field of monetary dynamics. Crowning the edifice, the results arrived at provided a title for the work, but they would no doubt distort the work’s true purpose beyond recognition, if the consequence were that [the reader] lost sight of this dual aspect.

* * *

This book, being concerned with monetary dynamics, formulates a theory of economic movements, just as classical mechanics deals with the theory of the movement of solid bodies, or kinetic theory addresses the behavior of gases.

xxxii

The one feature common to all these attempts at explanation has been clearly formulated by Prince Louis de Broglie:2

The physical world surrounding us is exceedingly complicated, and a constant process of abstraction and schematization has been required of scientific research to enable it gradually to carve out from Reality groups of phenomena capable of being united under a single theoretical figure. It has thus been found possible to isolate series of facts in the surrounding Reality, and to make them correspond to series of relations or of ideas logically connected with each other. In this way physical theory was constructed, and it is certain that its success has demonstrated the possibility of arranging, at least roughly, a large number of categories of phenomena within the framework of certain logical systems constructed by human reason.3

It is the presentation of such a schema that comprises the first five parts of this book.

This presentation is based on a concept of the right of ownership that has made it possible to arrange in order a great number of empirical observations and thereby to assign a logical cause to hitherto unexplained phenomena.

If the defining quality of an exact theory is to be found in its ability to explain phenomena, I would take the liberty of drawing the reader’s attention to the explanation of secular [long-term] and cyclical price movements to which the principles of this monetary dynamics will unavoidably lead in Chapter XX–VIII. It seems to me that this explanation easily accommodates, within its general explanatory scheme, phenomena that had hitherto appeared particularly unamenable to scientific analysis.

* * *

Unfortunately, many passages in this presentation are of a technical nature, and I sincerely hope the reader will not let himself be discouraged by these.

xxxiii

I could, of course, have glossed over the difficulties that such passages resolve and made the book easier reading by giving up the rigor of the demonstration. I was, however, determined to avoid the demagogical pitfall of those university professors who are too easily tempted to bring their teaching down to the level that secures for them the large audience that is often considered to be the measure of success.

In the field of political economy, when one has an opportunity to show that there exist general principles that facts confirm, it becomes an overriding obligation to bring them out into full light, rather than conceal them in a kind of ease that seduces but misleads the reader as to the true nature of the methods capable of explaining empirically observed phenomena.

Every person who holds a [French secondary school] baccalaureate diploma knows full well that an assertion in the fields of mathematics and physics is true or false, and cannot be accepted unless and until it has been fully demonstrated. To a very large extent, however, public opinion will not acknowledge that there is room for systematic reasoning in the field of economics.

The general public also refuses to make the effort of attentional focus that such reasoning requires.

There is, in my office, an engraving by [Louis-Léopold] Boilly titled “Political economy” (L’économie politique). It shows a group of men gathered in a public garden, commenting in a lively manner on an article in a newspaper. A large section of public opinion still views the work of economists in this light. The common belief is that these painful efforts, through which man manages to impose his mind’s clarity on the confused mass of perceptible appearances, are totally unnecessary. Why require that students have a good command of the methods used to investigate and describe natural phenomena, since economics is a discipline that, in their view, is more relevant to fine talk than to conscious thought? It is in order to not run up against this general feeling that somewhat complex reasoning and rigorous analytical methods are excluded from lectures in political economy, and are almost viewed as improper.

And yet, think only of the effort of abstraction and reflection required for the discovery and teaching of theories without which it would not be possible to control the forces providing light and transportation to men. Imagine the concentration of mind necessary for the study of the electromagnetic theory of light, of the principles of thermodynamics, or the kinetic theory of gases. And, even without looking as high up in the hierarchy of human disciplines, are people who have visited a spinning mill or a tawery not amazed at the conxxxivsiderable efforts involved in the construction of the machines and the development of the techniques these machines use? In such matters, men did not hesitate to resort to complex methods of analysis, when it appeared that these would be useful, or to require that future engineers should know them. Is it acceptable that the effort required here should not be demanded of candidates whose intended career will be in the economic and administrative fields, if one considers it indispensable for the understanding and implementation of the phenomena through which wealth is created and distributed?

It is true that, as far as the physical sciences are concerned, everybody recognizes that an effort of rigorous thinking is indispensable, whereas many specialists claim in good faith that this is unnecessary in political economy.

An eminent friend recently confided in me that economics with scientific aspirations appeared to him to rely on a cumbersome device to reach conclusions that could be arrived at right away with plain common sense. Rigorous analysis in political economy would be like using a paving stone to kill a fly: a tool as heavy as it is unnecessary.*

This objection could be taken seriously, if only the conclusions that my eminent friend had reached on the basis of common sense had not been so radically different from those arrived at by no less eminent practitioners who also rely on common sense.

Besides, even if there are in political economy certain fundamental, unanimously accepted truths, the conviction that they give rise to is sufficient to turn them into subject matter for teaching, rarely into rules of action. And the uncertainties of monetary policies, the constant reliance on meaningless myths, do these not offer convincing evidence that it is the simplest truths that have to be demonstrated with the greatest care, if one wants them to inspire not only men’s speeches but also their actions?

This book is an attempt to provide explanations by what I believe to be the most effective methods.

It would, however, distort the book’s meaning and purpose and offend the author to view the work simply as an effort to systematically introduce mathematics into economic studies. Although some developments are demonstration xxxv oriented, few of them rely on mathematical language. In the only case where this has been indispensable, in analyzing the concept of the index, the methods resorted to have been translated into ordinary language to the greatest extent possible.

Any reader who might be discouraged by the notations that I have used will only need to accept the conclusions of Chapter III; these conclusions will enable him to follow and understand the developments of the subsequent chapters.

If I had to find, not so much an excuse, but at least some justification for the diagrams with which I have made my presentation heavier, I should like to invoke the opinion of Plato, of whom Cicero writes, in The Republic that, having been “cast by a tempest on some unknown and desert shore, which filled his companions with anxiety, he saw on the sand some geometrical figures and exclaimed: ‘Take courage, these are steps of men!’ ”

I only ask of twentieth-century economists to be as open-minded as Plato’s companions in accepting methods of scientific analysis.

* * *

Part VI of this book studies the functioning of human societies under the various political systems established by the legislator.

One will no doubt wonder that the same economic theory should explain such different systems as the liberal and the authoritarian ones.

The reason why this is so, notwithstanding commonly held beliefs, is that political systems only provide the frameworks in which men’s activities develop. They establish the form of social phenomena, but do not alter their nature. They are like automobile engines that convert chemical energy into mechanical energy. Such a transformation can be brought about in diverse frameworks, freely selected by the builder, in order to achieve his specific purpose. Regardless of the type of engine used, however, the phenomena that are brought into play are governed by the two principles of thermodynamics. These principles remain true in all cases, because they hinge on the very nature of gases, not on the contingent form of the device through which the transformation is effected.

In addition, science studies only the principles, because of their permanent and general nature; the engine, which makes use of the principles, only pertains to the skill of its manufacturer.

Similarly, in the social field, general principles remain true, regardless of the existing political system, because they derive from man’s unchanging nature, not from the framework in which it [man’s nature] manifests itself.

xxxvi

As regards the choice of a system, this is not a matter for economic science, but only a question of the art of politics. The legislator fulfills this on the basis of the ultimate purpose that he assigns to the society for which he bears responsibility.

Such purposes may be very varied; they may be of a collective, social, or ethical nature. The system that is established may be intended to produce maximum military power or maximum welfare. It may aim toward an egalitarian or hierarchical distribution of wealth. It may be oriented toward the preservation of a certain social class, or of a certain family or professional way of life.

If the system chosen is to be better than a fraud, however; if it is to truly lead to the ends for which it has been set up, then the builder must be cognizant of the mechanism of those phenomena that he intends to utilize.

The purpose of a theory of social order is primarily to make a set of principles available to statesmen and administrators, so as to enable them to direct their action effectively—in other words, to achieve what they intend to achieve, rather than the opposite, as is too often the case in practice.

* * *

The publication of a theory of social order at a time when prices are frozen, consumption rationed, and economic regulations so dense that they appear to thwart any attempt at forecasting is already, in and of itself, a highly presumptuous act. The audacity of the undertaking is made even greater, however, if one observes that this publication is the continuation of a previous book on monetary statics published in 1927, and that the first six chapters were written, almost in the form in which they are being published today, between September and December 1933.

If, notwithstanding the adversity to which the doctrines are being subjected, the publication of such a book appeared possible, it is precisely because it systematically disregards the outward shell of phenomena and simply studies their internal mechanisms, in an attempt to find a lasting explanation for the ephemeral appearances that characterize social occurrences throughout the diversity of existing systems. The justification of this book can only be found in the aptness of the explanations it provides. It is up to the reader to be the judge of this.

Regardless of the opinion that one may form in this respect, the book will still have imperfections of its own. This book could have been fully satisfactory only if the author had been a jurist, a psychologist, a moralist, and a theologian, all at once. I am none of these. I know full well that some specialists xxxvii will not put up easily with my occasional encroachments on their respective domains. I am aware that I have touched upon their subject matters with the clumsiness typical of the layman. May they forgive me for this. I am submitting a method to them, and shall be only too happy if there are people more highly qualified than I am who can apply it.

I also beg the reader to bear in mind that the views expressed in this book have not yet gone through the test of discussion or the lengthy refining process of teaching. Discussion and teaching will bring out errors, which will need to be corrected. The result will be a lightening of the presentation, and the pruning of numerous repetitions that, for the sake of rigor, I chose to retain in this first version.

Until this collective process of maturing and settling has been accomplished, I shall be glad if the reader can see in this work less a conclusion than a starting point for further reflection and research. The need for this will become clear over the course of the following pages.

xxxviii 1

Part I: Initial Considerations Regarding Prices

The first part of this work is somewhat alien to its true purpose. It merely seeks to work out concepts that will be essential for the tracing of causal influences that generate shifts in economic equilibrium. Its purpose is to provide a key to dynamic explanation. Within this context, it is relevant here.

If, however, the reader cares more to explain than to know about the method of explaining, then he may abstain from a close reading of the following four chapters. If he simply makes note of the conclusions, in particular those of Chapters III and IV, he will be able to understand the developments that, starting with Part II, constitute the true substance of the book.

2 3

Chapter I: On the Nature of Dynamic Explanations

Dynamics is the branch of mechanics that deals with forces and their relation to the motion and equilibrium of bodies of matter. Its main characteristic is the causal nature of the explanations that it provides. It tends to transform into rational necessities displacements revealed by observation.

In order to do this successfully, dynamics relies on the personal and direct knowledge we have of the causes that bring about the motions generated by us.

We know, for instance, that displacing a heavy body requires a certain effort.

Starting from this observation, dynamics generalizes and asserts that any change from rest to motion, or any change in motion, reveals the existence of a causal force. Thus, dynamics projects outside our field of consciousness a purely subjective notion, the concept of human effort. And, as we understand those displacements that we have generated—i.e., those of which we are personally the cause—so we believe that we also understand those that we have explained by creating, in the image of the causes that we come to know through our own consciousness, the causes that could have generated them, had they been the effect of a human will.

Economic dynamics relies on the same method of explanation.

Economic dynamics observes that, in the world that surrounds us, articles of wealth “circulate.” For an article of wealth, circulating does not mean being displaced through space but moving from one patrimony to another.1

4

The circulation of an article of wealth is measured by the number of times it changes hands, just as the movement of an automobile is measured by the number of kilometers traveled.

Yet the direct experience of all those who are familiar with markets teaches them that the circulation of articles of wealth, just like the change from rest to motion, is not a spontaneous phenomenon. They know that, just as a physical object is set in motion only if acted upon by a force, so an article of wealth that has been appropriated and is supplied in the market moves out of the patrimony in which it rests only if it is demanded.

5

Generalizing from this observation, economic dynamics asserts that demand is the cause of the circulation of wealth.

A force that is applied to a mass produces a motion, which is characterized by its specific acceleration. For a given force, the smaller the mass, the greater the acceleration.

Similarly, a demand, when applied to a given article of wealth, produces an exchange, which is characterized by the price at which it occurs. For a given demand representing a fixed amount in monetary units, the smaller the quantity of the article of wealth supplied, the higher the price.

The quantity supplied is therefore a resistance to a price rise, just as mass offers resistance to motion. In both cases, the “inertia” is proportional to the quantity of matter to which force is applied.

This introduces the concepts of demand and supply, on which we shall expand further in the following chapter. These two concepts will provide the instrument of analysis necessary for the understanding of economic phenomena, the “causes” from which their numerical characteristics can be derived.

* * *

Such a starting point will shock some people. They will see in it the absurd pretension of imposing a quantitative representation on states of consciousness, which are the ultimate cause of all economic phenomena.

Although the whole of Part V invalidates this criticism, we would like to show, at this juncture, that it is not warranted. We know that interventions in the market, like all human actions, are prompted by psychological motives, needs, desires, passions, which are not in any way measurable. We know that, if they are to be described, the subtle nuances that the psychologist can attempt to grasp—but which escape the rigor of the mathematician—are needed.

It is not, therefore, those states of consciousness that we intend to represent through the variables that will measure the supply and demand of an individual on the market.

We shall simply observe that the desires of men do not affect economic circumstances, unless they bring about supplies or demands onto the market. The need for food, or hunger (even in its most severe form), does not affect prices, as long as those who experience it do not “demand” that the market provide the means of satisfying these needs.

6

Yet, whereas hunger cannot be quantified, demand for bread is essentially measurable.

In investigating the links between shifts in equilibrium and variations in supply and demand, we therefore do not neglect the purely psychological nature of the causes that bring these shifts about but, being aware that such causes bring about economic consequences only to the extent that they bring about supplies or demands onto the market, we make it a rule to examine the causal sequence that they generate only from its first economic aspect onward, the measurability of which cannot be doubted.

People will indeed object that demand and supply variations can have “explanatory virtues” only to the extent that they themselves can be explained.

Explaining states of consciousness is, however, no more the domain of the economist than explaining force fields is the domain of the astronomer. Both regard their explanatory symbols as data, and leave to the psychologist and the physicist, respectively, the task of defining their nature and investigating the causes of their variations.

Thus, the concepts of demand and supply bridge the gap between the realm of intentions, which can be perceived only by those who experience them, and the realm of acts, which can be observed by other people—hence between the psychological and the economic fields. In this way, these two concepts make it possible to provide a systematic explanation of the phenomena that men’s needs and desires bring about.

Assuredly, the representation, by means of the quantitative concepts of demand and supply, of the behavior of men in the face of the infinite diversity of circumstances considerably impairs its content. When, however, we decide—for the purpose of economic explanation—to consider only the quantitative aspect of human decisions, we resort to the specific method of all attempts at scientific analysis, a method that Prince Louis de Broglie, in the study quoted earlier,2 describes in the following terms:

Whenever we wish to describe facts, whether of a psychological or an ethical nature, or belonging to the sphere of the physical or natural sciences, we are inevitably dealing with a Reality which is always infinitely complex 7 and full of an infinity of shades on the one hand, and on the other with our understanding, which forms concepts which are always more or less rigid and abstract.

People will be surprised, it is true, that the same methods of analysis can be meaningfully used in such widely differing fields as mechanics, physics or astronomy, and political economy.* It should be remembered, however, that, while sciences differ with regard to the fields that they investigate, they have one common feature, in that they are all the daughters of man’s intelligence, of which Pascal already said that it is “like the sun for the worlds it illuminates.”

8

Chapter II: Definition and Measure of Demand and Supply

There are four principal means of appropriating articles of wealth: through violence, through force of law, through gifts and bequests, and through exchange. Only the last of these—exchange—falls within the purview of economic science.

An exchange is a dual transfer of property rights, each of the transfers involved being voluntarily consented to, each in consideration of the other.1

In complex economic systems, such as those in which we live, it has become common practice (for reasons that will be discussed in Part III of this book) to introduce in all exchanges a common medium: money.

In a money system, one of the two transfers in such a dual exchange therefore always involves money. The seller parts with nonmonetary wealth and receives money; the buyer acquires nonmonetary wealth and parts with money.

The price in money of a certain nonmonetary item is measured by the number of monetary units that must be given up as ownership so as to acquire, through exchange, the quantity unit.

The value of a given quantity of this good is equal to its quantity multiplied by its price.

For an exchange to take place, of course, buyers and sellers have to be brought together: the market is the venue that is provided, and equipped, for this purpose.

Consider an individual who has certain monetary resources available. Given his needs and tastes, given the range of goods available in the market and the 9 prices at which these goods can be purchased, and given the rate at which his cash balance is replenished, this individual decides to set the amount of his expenditures and divide it among various possible uses. In this way, this individual will determine the volume of available funds in money that he will wish to exchange, at the prices of the moment, against each of the articles on the market.

In order to obtain the desired goods, our buyer will go to those sectors of the market where the goods he has selected are traded. He will “demand” them until his desires have been satisfied—that is to say, until he has exchanged, for each of the desired goods, the number of monetary units he intended to devote to their purchase. This number defines the demand of the prospective buyer, at the market price.

Generally, each buyer’s demand will vary with the price, so it is in most cases a decreasing function. Nonetheless, it has, at each price, a single value expressing the quantity that the buyer in question would actually demand at that price.

Similarly, consider an individual who holds property rights of ownership. If he feels that the quantity of any articles of wealth that he owns—and of a kind that is exchanged on the market—exceeds his needs, he will sell the undesired surpluses for money. To this end, he will “supply” them to the appropriate sectors of the market and exchange them for money. The quantities thus supplied define, for each article, the seller’s supply at the market price.

As in the case of demand, the quantity supplied by a seller will generally vary depending on the price, and most commonly it will be an increasing function. Nonetheless, one specific quantity will be supplied at each price, which represents the quantity that would be effectively sold by the seller in question at this price.

The quantities of each article supplied are measured in units: kilograms, liters, cubic meters, quintals, or tons, thanks to which the quantities of the aforementioned article can be measured. For each price, however, the market supply has a monetary value, which is equal to the quantity supplied multiplied by the money price per unit.

Now consider not one but all buyers and sellers operating in a given market sector.

If, at the opening of the market, the total of individual demands equals the total value of supplies, all would-be buyers are served and all would-be sellers satisfied. Demands and supplies, which until then had been statements of 10 intention, generate their effects, and bring about the dual transfers that characterize exchange.

The number of monetary units transferred, a variable that measures both the total expenditures of buyers and the total receipts of sellers, is in that case equal to the total demand and to the total value of supply expressed in the market.

If D represents the total value, in money, of demand, Q the total quantity supplied, p the market price, and EX the total expenditure of buyers, which is equal to the total receipts of sellers, we have:

D = pQ = EX

On the other hand, if total demand does not equal total supply, then it is not possible for all demanders and suppliers to be satisfied.

If total demand exceeds the total value of supply, then individual demands can be met at the market price only up to the limit of the total value of supplies; if total demand is lower than the total value of the supply, then supplies can only be absorbed up to the level of the quantities whose value does not exceed demand.

In other words, when total demand and the total value of supply are unequal, the lesser of the two amounts sets the limit of the exchange that can take place at the market price. In actual fact, however, this will not often be the case, because the disparity between total demand and the total value of supply will generate forces that tend to alter the market price.

The effects of these forces, however, will vary depending on the relative degree of freedom of market prices. We shall study such consequences within three different contexts, depending on whether prices are free and flexible,2 frozen, or administered so that they vary in a discontinuous manner as a result of authoritative decisions.

A. The Free Price System

If total demand exceeds the total value of supply, some “demanders” will fear that their wishes will not be fulfilled. They will try to secure preference over competing demands by offering to pay a price slightly higher than the market price. The competition that will in this way be established between demanders will bring about a price rise. This price rise will end only when the cause that has brought it about has disappeared—in other words, when no unmet demand 11 remains. Yet this will be the case only when the price rise has pushed the total value of supply up to the level of demand.

Generally, demand and supply will vary with the price; but they will also have, for each price, a clearly defined value and the price will cease changing only when, given the total value of demand and supply at the market price, the previous condition has been satisfied.

Similarly, when total demand is less than the total value of supply, then the price will fall and the price decline will stop only when, at the market price, the total value of supply has been reduced to the level of total demand.

Thus, in all cases, when the price is allowed to float freely, the price will move to a level such that all demands expressed in the market are satisfied and all supplies are taken up. Where this is the case, the total number of monetary units transferred (an amount that measures both the buyers’ expenditures and the sellers’ revenue) equals total demand, equals the total quantity of nonmonetary goods transferred, equals total supply.

A description of the price formation mechanism would be incomplete without a demonstration that, under a free price system, its functioning is irresistible in the rigorous meaning of this word.

This characteristic has been experienced by all those who are familiar with stock or commodity exchanges, or even with farmers’ markets. It is best described in the language of financial reporters, who speak of “the pressure of demand” or “the burden of excess supply.”

If, under a free system, the price mechanism is inevitably effective, it is because the force that sets it in motion—originating from a disparity between demand and the value of supply—will abate only when the price change that it tends to bring about has occurred.

Hence, and subject to the constraints discussed in the following section, the pressure that the force brings to bear persists and develops its effects until the moment when the disequilibrium from which it originated has disappeared.

The price level that this force establishes is related to the volume of demand and of supply by the following relation:3

d = qp

12

This formulation brings to mind the fundamental formula of mechanics, which relates force to mass and to acceleration:4

f = mγ

The symmetry, in the two formulas, between the symbols representing demand and force, on the one hand, and supply and mass, on the other, is another argument in favor of the analogy with mechanics mentioned in the previous chapter.

This equation demonstrates more than mere formal relations, however.

The formula f = mγ shows that a force, which expresses the cause that tends to generate a certain motion, exhausts all its acting potential through the acceleration that it imparts to the mass. So long as the acceleration has not reached its equilibrium level, the perturbing influence persists. Therefore, only a change in the acceleration extinguishes the effects of a force and brings about a state likely to endure.

Yet, demand generates transfer, just as force generates motion. The equation d = qp shows that the perturbing influence of demand will persist so long as the value of the wealth supplied has not been brought to the level of the demand. Thus, in both economics and mechanics, equilibrium is restored only when the action that tended to cause a shift has produced all its effects.

At that moment—at equilibrium—no perturbing causes, whether it be demand or force, remain that are not offset by the inertial resistance of the article of wealth to transfer or the inertial resistance of mass to motion.5

B. The System of Fixed Prices [prix bloqués]

Just as [those in the field of] mechanics [have to] study the problem of the equilibrium of a constrained point—that is to say, subject to certain linkages that force it to stay on a given curve or surface—so economics may be faced with the problem of prices that are fixed by legal or regulatory provisions, assuming that these are effective.

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In this case, an excess of demand over the value of supplies cannot generate a rise in prices. Demand will only be satisfied up to level of the aggregate value of supply at the market price. The excess of this demand will therefore remain in the form of unsatisfied demand.

If the fear of incurring relevant penalties for violating price regulations does not inhibit the desire of the buyer, the unsatisfied demands will seek satisfaction outside the controlled market. In this way, a “black market” will develop, where prices will adjust in such a way that the level of the value of supply balances out the value of the demands that will have moved to this black market.

If, on the other hand, enforcement measures succeed in preventing any black market transactions, then the unsatisfied demands will persist in the regulated markets. There, they will cause disturbances that any unsatisfied purchasing power generates. Lines of shoppers waiting on the street in front of stores are a characteristic feature of all frozen price systems and the most visible manifestation of these disturbances.

If the authorities wish to avoid both the social inequities that result from the existence of a black market and the disorders that unsatisfied demands bring about, then they must inevitably regulate demand. The authorities will thus tend to limit, in quantity, the right to demand to the volume of actual supplies, or—and this amounts to the same thing—to limit the amount of demand, in money, to the value, at controlled prices, of the articles of wealth supplied.

Regardless of whether it is applied through the allocation of ration coupons or through any other method of rationing, this procedure will—if implemented unerringly—do away with any disequilibrium between actual demand and the value of supplies. It will, however, generate a disequilibrium between “desired” demand and “authorized” demand. In this way, it raises the problem of the use of the buying power that has been outlawed from the market, a problem that we shall deal with further on.

If the value of supplies exceeded demand, the excess would generate, mutatis mutandis,6 similar effects. The fixed price would leave unsold supply equal to the difference between the aggregate value of supply and total demand.

Although the authoritative method of price fixing—assuming that it is effective—prohibits transactions at prices different from the fixed price, it does 14 not eliminate each individual item’s potential price, the price at which total demand and total value of supply would be in equilibrium.

This becomes obvious if we draw a diagram (fig. 1) representing the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied as a function of price.7

lf1981_figure_001.jpg

Fig. 1. [Q: Quantity; D: Demand; S: Supply; P: Price]

If the price is set authoritatively at p1, which is less than the equilibrium price, p, then only the p1 s1 part of total demand p1 d1, at this price, can be satisfied. The balance, s1 d1, represents unsatisfied demands, which will generate the disturbances associated with systems of price controls.

It is clear that, in addition to the [legally fixed] market price, there is a specific price, p, at which supply equals demand—in other words, a price at which all supplies will be effectively taken up and all demands satisfied.

Thus, the equilibrium price has, for each item, an objective existence, even when it is not the [legally established] price in the market.

C. The System of Selling under Administered Prices [prix imposés]

Between the two extreme systems—the free and flexible price system and the frozen price system—there are intermediate systems where prices, although not fully blocked, are more or less immobilized, either by sellers’ behavior or by the attraction of “round” prices.

15

To the extent that their prices deviate from equilibrium prices, such systems exhibit the same features as markets with frozen prices.

In practice, the most frequent instance is that of goods offered for sale at administered prices. What distinguishes administered prices from free and flexible prices is primarily the seller’s behavior. Rather than actively offering his goods for sale “at any price,” he will announce his price and passively await demand.

This attitude is that of most producers and tradesmen who are not willing to sell at a price lower than the cost price plus the usual markup. It is also the attitude of workers who refuse to accept salaries (or wages) other than those laid down in collective bargaining agreements. This is characteristic also of public utilities or semipublic corporations, the rates of which are regulated or set through professional associational agreements.

Administered prices, therefore, characterize the quasi-general system used for transactions that take place outside major commodity markets or capital markets. It is therefore a big mistake to assume that all exchanges (or transactions) take place in free markets.

The consequences of this system of administered prices are as follows: whereas in a free market, there cannot be supply offered for sale that is not sold (since the market price will decline until all the supply is absorbed by the market), to the contrary an administered price system leaves supplies awaiting sale, particularly merchandise “in inventory.”

The greater the difference between the administered price and the price that would have been freely established in the market, the greater the volume of such stocks. Hence, to avoid an unsustainable accumulation of stocks, sellers find themselves accepting to cut prices when their stocks increase. Administered prices are therefore not fixed [or blocked] prices, but prices that change from time to time, by leaps and bounds, and inversely relative to the volume of unsold stock (inventory).

If the administered price is set at a level at which demand exceeds supply, the opposite situation develops: unmet demand remains. Such a situation is less common than the prior scenario described above, however, because sellers are generally eager to avoid excess demand. Yet excess demand emerges fairly often in times of monetary depreciation, in particular with public utilities, the prices of which are administered and therefore only belatedly follow the decline in the value of money. In this way, during periods of rising prices, public 16 transportation tends to be crowded. Similarly, during times of rising prices, rent-controlled apartments cannot be found, whereas “apartment for rent” signs promptly reappear in cases where rents are decontrolled.

Of course, one may seek to set a price through state authority at the average level at which it would have spontaneously established itself, trying only to avoid fluctuations around the equilibrium level. Yet experience shows that such attempts are always thwarted by the unpredictable nature of events or by the errors of men who seek to forecast them. There is always a lead or a lag between the administered price and the equilibrium price; the result is the emergence of unsatisfied demands or excess supplies, which reflects the difference between the actual transaction price and the price that would have been established had the price been allowed to move freely.

In the following chapters we shall deal in a more detailed manner with the influences that affect supply and demand under the various economic systems. As of now, the above analysis reveals the existence of a fundamental difference between free price systems and controlled price systems.

Under the former, demand and supply mutually offset each other and are eliminated once the transfers they tend to generate are completed. Supply and demand can mutually absorb each other because price fluctuation has adjusted the one to the other beforehand.

In contrast, the immobilization of prices prevents any change in the value of supplies. The transfers desired by demanders and suppliers are limited by demand or supply at the fixed price, whichever is the lesser. The greater of the two will therefore be clipped, and the test of the market will leave unsatisfied demands or supplies—in other words, buying or selling abilities that have not been used in the way their holders wanted. We shall investigate the influence of these unsatisfied demands or unabsorbed supplies on the market.

The above analysis also shows how demand and supply translate into an aggregate factor, in each market, the behavior of all likely market participants. Total demand and supply, which result from countless individual wills, provide the immediate cause of shifts in economic equilibrium—the root cause being clearly psychological in nature.

Still, in order to express a demand, it is not sufficient to desire [something]; the ability to pay is essential. Similarly, in order to sell, is not sufficient to want to sell: possession of articles of wealth is necessary.

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Thus, the actual ability to spend and the actual ability to sell contain the expression of desires within narrow limits, which constrain the freedom of men.

Yet spending and selling abilities are not independent. The various monetary systems establish links of interdependence between them. These links, when they adjust the volume of possible demand to the value of wealth supplied, tend to perpetuate economic equilibria. The breaking, or loosening, of these links brings about shifts in equilibrium that generate grave social disturbances.

Researching the relationships between demand and supply abilities is therefore one of the main purposes of monetary dynamics. This research will specify the constraints that the various monetary systems impose on the free will of men, and, in this way, will reveal the laws to which they subject the economic evolution 8 of human societies.

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Chapter III: Theory of Variations in the General Price Level Index and the Total Sales Index

In the preceding chapter, we analyzed the relationship between the price of a given article of wealth and the demand and supply that apply to it.

In this chapter, we shall study the market as a whole, in an effort to uncover the laws that govern the variations in the general price level index and the total sales index.

But first, we will define these concepts and show that they are meaningful and can be defined with precision.

§1. The Concepts of the General Price Index and Total Sales Index

The general price and total sales indices were defined in Chapter II of our Monetary Statics.1

For the sake of completeness, we shall again begin with the definition of the indices and their fundamental properties. Readers interested in knowing how the formulae were derived should consult the previous volume.

An index is a value whose variations represent, over a given period of time, the variations within a large number of elementary factors.

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A price index, for example, will be representative if its fluctuations reflect the intuitive notion of general price movement.

To do this, the index must reflect, fully and exclusively, the impact of price variations on the average value of wealth exchanged.

To speak of an “average,” however, means choosing the formula through which the average is calculated. Many formulae of averages exist, however: these include the simple or arithmetic mean, the weighted geometric mean, and the harmonic mean, among others. In order to remove this ambiguity while staying as close as possible to common sense, let us try to specify the influence of prices on the value of goods exchanged.

Suppose that we put into a single basket all the articles exchanged during a given day, in the quantity in which they have been exchanged, and evaluate this quantity of goods thus gathered on the basis of today’s prices, and then again on the basis of the preceding day’s prices.

The difference between these totals, obtained in this way, isolates the influence of price variations, between the two moments under consideration, on the total value of the wealth exchanged. The greater the value of the basket, however, the greater in absolute terms the variation will be. Therefore the variation in the basket’s value will be more aptly expressed in terms of a percentage variation than by an absolute value. Dividing the variation in value by the total value of goods in the basket yields a quotient that gives a truthful picture of what is commonly known as average price change.

A good general price index, therefore, will have to vary like this quotient. Such variation defines the index except for one constant factor.

Similarly, let us see how an index can represent variations in total quantities sold.

To be accurate, such an index must reflect, fully and exclusively, the influence of the quantities sold on the aggregate value of the articles of wealth exchanged.

To state this requirement more precisely, imagine that we put into one basket all the goods sold during the day in the quantity in which they have been sold. Then, using the same prices, we assess the basket but assume that, instead of containing the quantities sold during the day, it contains the quantities of goods sold the day before. The variation in values thus calculated represents the influence of the quantities sold on the value of the goods exchanged.

The greater the value of the goods in the basket, however, the greater the variation in value. Dividing the variation in value by the value of the goods in 20 the basket yields a quotient that is a true representation of the variation in quantities sold between the two points in time considered. A good total sales index will fluctuate like this number, which provides the definition of the index, except for one constant factor.

§2. Definition of the General Price Level Index and the Total Sales Index

Our index formulae will simply express, in analytical form, the concrete notions brought out in the preceding section.

We hope the reader will not be frightened by the few symbols we must use. They merely represent the usual grouping and addition operations implied by these ideas.

We also hope that the differential notation will not deter the layman. For the sake of simplicity, we did not introduce any differential notations in our Monetary Statics, where we presented our indices in finite difference form. Experience showed that this simplification involved more drawbacks than advantages, by giving a different value to weighting coefficients pertaining to both indices.

In addition, the differential notation simply reflects the fact that our coefficients of variation measure the changes that have occurred between two instants of time that are very close to each other.

Moreover, an understanding of the following chapters does not depend upon the refinements necessary to compute the indices. The reader who is deterred by mathematical formulae should skip the rest of this section if he will accept as true the properties of the indices set forth in section 3 below. While common sense would suggest the existence of these properties, detailed knowledge of them is essential for the study of shifts in economic equilibrium.

A. The General Price Index

Let p and p1 be the price of an article at two different instants of time, t and t1 = t + dt, and let q be the quantity of that article sold during the time unit.

The product of the quantity sold and the price, qp1, represents the value of the sales of that article during the time unit for the period considered. The sum of the products qp1, relating to all the articles sold during this period, measures the total value of the goods contained in the basket referred to above, at prices prevailing at instant t1.

The sum of all products qp measures the same value at the prices prevailing at instant t.

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Let the Greek letter ∑ represent, as is customary, the summation of a series of analogous factors. The variation in the value of the goods in the basket between instants t and t1 is measured by the quotient:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_001.jpg

Since the general price index P must vary like this ratio, we must have:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_002.jpg

From which:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_003.jpg

But:

P1 − P = dP

p1 − p = dp

and therefore:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_004.jpg

This equation defines, except for one constant, a value that we will call the general price index, when the constant is fixed at a level such that the index is 100 during an initial period called the base period.

The concrete nature of this index is clearer when the index is presented in a somewhat different form.

In our formula, the quantities sold relate to units of unspecified quantity. Assume that the value of the units is unity when calculated at the prices at instant t. If, for example, the price of wheat is 100 francs per quintal [100 kg] at this instant, the quantities of wheat exchanged will be measured in kilograms. If the price of coal is 2,000 francs per ton [1,000 kg], then the value of the quantities of coal shall be expressed in half kilograms.

Using this system, all prices p at the instant t are equal to unity (1). The above formula becomes:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_005.jpg
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Assuming that the formula applies to two articles, A and A′, it is written as:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_006.jpg

Thus, in the unit system that has just been defined, the relative change in the index is a weighted average of the variations in all market prices, each of these variations having a weighting coefficient proportional to its importance in the volume of transactions during the time unit for the period under consideration.2

In the index formula, the more important an article in total transactions, the greater the “weight” given to variations in its price. Is this not essential if our formula is to meet the customary notion of the general price level and if the prices of wheat and coal, for instance, are to have a greater impact on the fluctuation of the index than, say, the price of pepper or mustard?

Observe here that differential notation must be used to define the index because its variation during a finite period depends not only on the prices that exist, and the quantities that are exchanged, at the beginning and at the end of this period; the index also depends on these prices and quantities at each of the instants of time within this period. Therefore, the variation in the index between two moments of time separated by a finite time interval can only be defined as a “sum” of elementary variations, hence as an integral. The integral is calculated by adding the variations in each of the very short time periods that constitute this entire time period. This procedure is well known to statisticians as the “chain” process.

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This formula is a differential notation version of the formula that was presented in finite difference form in our Statics.

With regard to the practical calculation of the index, we have shown in this book 3 that adequate approximations of the theoretical index can be calculated simply by using a limited number of prices and very crude weighting coefficients. We have also indicated that, generally speaking and for practical purposes, existing wholesale price indices are an adequate representation of the theoretical index. We specified that this paradox results not from the chosen formula but from the properties of this very special set of numbers that constitutes market prices as a whole.

Certainly, to track fluctuations in the general price level, it would be preferable to replace the wholesale price index with an index that comprised representative factors of all price categories—rents, salaries, interest rates, etc.—and endowing each of these with a weighting coefficient measuring, approximately, their relative importance in total sales. In practice, however, this refinement would not substantially alter the direction or the order of magnitude of major variations that are reflected in the wholesale price index.

Moreover, what matters most in the field of monetary theory is not so much knowing what we are able to calculate in the circumstances of the moment and taking into consideration the means at our disposal; it is more about what we wish to calculate. Once the index has been defined, increasingly refined approximations may aid efforts at empirical verification; but attempting to improve the calculation of an index without previously defining the index would be like choosing a route without knowing where one wishes to go.

B. The Total Sales Index

Here, as in the case of the general price index, we shall limit ourselves to translating into analytical form the concrete definition provided in section 1 of this chapter.

Let q and q1 be the quantities of a given article sold during the unit of time at instants t and t1 = t + dt and let p be the price at instant t.

The product pq1 represents the value of the sales of that article, during the time unit, at instant t1. The product pq represents the corresponding value at instant t.

The total value of the previously discussed basket is measured, at instant t1, by the sum of the products pq1 relating to all the articles that were sold during 24 the period under consideration. The corresponding value, at instant t, is measured by the sum of the products pq.

If we let ∑ represent the summation of all these analogous factors, the variation in the basket’s value between instants t and t1 is measured by the quotient:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_007.jpg

Since the total sales index Q must vary in the same way as this ratio, then it must be true that:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_008.jpg

Hence:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_009.jpg

But:

Q1 − Q = dQ

q1 − q = dq

And therefore:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_010.jpg

This equation defines, except for one constant, the total sales index when the constant is fixed at a level such that the index is 100 during an initial period called the base period.

Again, the concrete nature of this index is clearer when the quantities sold are measured under the unit system defined above, such that for each article, the value of the quantity unit is equal to unity at the price of instant t.

In this system, all prices p, at the instant t, are equal to 1.

The preceding formula becomes:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_011.jpg

Or yet:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_012.jpg
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The variation in the index between instants t and t + dt is therefore proportional to the variation in the total quantities sold at these two instants, each of these quantities being related to the unit defined above.

The general observations concerning calculation of the general price level index apply, mutatis mutandis, to the total sales index.

It should be noted that a satisfactory approximation of the index—an index that in theory should account for all articles on the market—may be obtained by including only the quantities sold of a limited number of articles sold on the market, representative of various market sectors. Last, we should note that our formula is also the one that Mr. Divisia had provided for the exchange activity index, in the previously cited articles.

§3. Properties of the General Price Level and Total Sales Indices

THEOREM I: The total value of the products exchanged during the time unit is equal, but for one constant factor, to the product of the general price index and the total sales index.

Indeed, on the basis of the preceding definitions, we can write:

lf1981_Ch03_DEQ_001.jpg

Going back to the primitives and letting k represent a constant factor, we can write:

log P + log Q + log k = log (∑ pq)

Hence:

lf1981_Ch03_DEQ_002.jpg

That which was to be demonstrated (QED).

It was of crucial importance to verify that our general price and total sales indices possess the property stated in the previous theorem, without which they could not be considered representative of intuitive notions of the general price level and the average of the quantities sold.

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Definition of Total Expenditure:

In the following pages, we shall call total expenditure the total value (∑pq) of the articles sold during the time unit for the period under consideration.

Total expenditure, thus defined, is equal to the amount of payments made when all purchases are settled in cash.

Equation (2) shows that total expenditure is identically equal, but for one constant factor, to the product of the general price level and the total sales index.

This being so, we can state the following theorem on the basis of equation (1) above:

TOTAL EXPENDITURE THEOREM: The relative variation in total expenditure between instants t and t + dt is identically equal to the sum of the relative variation in the general price level index and of the total sales index between these two instants.

This theorem is expressed in the following basic equation:

lf1981_Ch03_UEQ_013.jpg

A significant corollary of the total expenditure theorem is:

When the total sales index does not vary, the general price index can vary only when total expenditure varies. In this case, the variations in the index depend only on the variations in total expenditure and are indifferent to total expenditure’s distribution between the various articles in the market.

It is through this feature—the price index being unaffected, all else equal, by the distribution of expenditure 4 among various articles in the market—that we provided the definition of a good general price index in our Statics. At the time, we demonstrated directly that our formula possessed this property.

This statement shows that the value of the general price level index is not modified, quantities sold remaining equal, by a transfer of expenditure from one article to another, if total expenditure remains unchanged. If due to a change in fashion, for instance, ladies spend more of their resources on woolen goods and correspondingly less on silk—total expenditure remaining unchanged—the general price index does not vary.

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In any case, the general price index can vary only if total expenditure or the total sales index varies.

The three figures are thus linked by a necessary relation, regardless of the influences affecting any one of them.

If, therefore, we wish to uncover the influences likely to cause variations in the general price level, we must seek those that affect total expenditure and total sales.

Such a finding sheds light on all the problems of monetary dynamics. In this way, the finding is of fundamental importance for the rest of this study.5

§4. The Relations between Total Demand and Total Expenditure, and between Total Supply and Total Sales

The preceding chapter has shown that in any market where prices vary freely, expenditure is equal to demand, and sales are equal to the quantity supplied.

In such a case, total expenditure is equal to total demand and both of them are equal to the total value of the goods exchanged.

Similarly, total sales are equal to the total quantities supplied, and the total sales index is equal to the index of the total quantities supplied.

Theorem I can then be stated in the following way: Under a system in which prices can vary freely, the product of the general price level index and the total supply index is equal, except for one constant factor, to total demand.

The total expenditure theorem can be stated in the following way: Where prices fluctuate freely, the relative variation in the general price index between instants t and t + dt is equal to the difference between the relative variations in the total demand and the total supply index between those same instants.

If the total supply index does not vary, the general price level index varies in the same way as total demand.

Where prices are immobilized,6 total expenditure is still equal to the total value of sales. But these two figures are equal to the lesser of the two amounts of total demand and the total value of supply.

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Chapter IV: The Price Scale

The previous chapter set forth the theory of variations in the general price level index. This index is just an abstract number, an average that exists only in terms of the definition given to it. Economic reality, however, involves only specific individual prices. These are the substance of the index, but they are as different from the index as bees are different from the swarm that they constitute.

Nevertheless, the indifference of the index as to the distribution of total demand among the various articles in the market indicates that individual prices are not independent from one another. They constitute a system of interrelated numbers.

We shall not set forth here all of these links, but only one of them, one that is absolutely essential to an analysis of the monetary mechanism.

§1. The Price Scale in a Universe Where All Production Would Require Only Unskilled Labor

To present a simple outline of the desired relation, we shall envision first of all the simplified case of a universe where all production would require only unskilled human labor, exclusive of all capital services.

In such a universe, productive activities, being “all-purpose,” would be immediately transferable from one industry to another. Any product would require a certain number of hours of work, determined by the technical circumstances of production, but that is all it would require.

Let us assume that this number of hours is independent of the quantities produced, or, in other words, the existence of production conditions such that the quantity produced is in proportion to the labor input. Production will be said to be on a “constant returns” basis.

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More specifically, let us assume that it takes ten hours of work to produce a quintal (100 kg) of wheat, fifty hours to produce a ton of coal. The “production costs” of the quintal of wheat and the ton of coal will be, respectively, ten and fifty hours of labor.

In that case, the price of the ton of coal cannot deviate, over an extended period of time, from five times the price of the quintal of wheat.

Indeed, anyone wishing to obtain coal has the following option available to him: to extract it directly from the soil, or to produce wheat and exchange the money obtained from its sale against coal.

If the price of coal is less than five times the price of wheat, the second solution requires, for acquiring the same quantity of coal, fewer hours of work than the first solution. It will therefore be the preferred solution. It will create an additional supply of wheat against money, and an additional demand for coal against money, which will cause a drop in the wheat price and an increase in the coal price. This two-way movement will end only when the transaction ceases to be advantageous—that is, when the ratio of the two prices is equal to the ratio of production costs in terms of labor.

We could show, in the same way, that the price of coal cannot remain at a level higher than five times the price of the wheat for any length of time.

Thus, the price ratio between the two commodities must necessarily be brought back to the level determined by the ratio of their production costs.

The process that restores this level does not, however, bring about its effects immediately. It comes into play only when the price ratio has moved far enough away from production cost parity to bring about shifts in the labor allocation that will restore equilibrium. In reality, this movement will occur only after a certain time lag, but it will inevitably occur.

The labor cost of production will therefore have assigned to each specific price, for each value of the wages, a level of equilibrium around which it will be constantly maintained by a kind of pendular movement that will indicate a stable equilibrium.

Thus will be reestablished, for each wage level, an equilibrium price scale where the ranking of each item will depend only on its production cost in terms of labor. Once the wage varies, the price scale will shift, but the price ratios will remain unchanged.

In the foregoing discussion, we assumed that the costs of production for coal and wheat were independent of the quantities produced. In practice, this is rarely the case.

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Generally, production costs increase in proportion to the quantities produced, whether it is necessary, for example, to grow the wheat in fields that are less and less fertile or are located at higher and higher elevations, or to extract the coal from deposits that are increasingly depleted or are found at greater and greater depths. This is the “law of diminishing returns.”

Sometimes, to the contrary, the cost of production decreases as the quantity produced increases. This is the principle of “increasing returns,” which leads to mass production and concentration of industry.

The effective factor in the above example, however, in orienting demand one way or another, is the cost of one unit produced above or below production already obtained—that is, production costs at the margin of existing production, or marginal cost of production.

The previous conclusion must therefore be stated in the following terms:

In a universe where production requires only unskilled labor, the price ratios of the various articles on the market cannot deviate, for any extended period of time, from the ratio of their marginal production costs.

This conclusion demonstrates that, in the universe contemplated here, there will be a hierarchy of prices that is determined by the technical conditions under which the last units of the various articles of wealth supplied on the market have been produced. Any distortion in the price scale relative to the scale of production costs will cause shifts in the allocation of labor: the faster these labor shifts respond to the distortion that generates them, the sooner they will restore the natural price hierarchy.

Thus, we find that the price concept splits into two quite distinct notions: the notion of the instantaneous price or market equilibrium price, which—at each instant of time—brings the value of the quantities supplied to the level of the demand in money, and depends only on these two variables; and the notion of the “steady state” price,1 which ensures the permanence of the quantities 31 supplied and demanded on the market, and depends only on marginal costs of production. These two notions will be generalized and further specified in subsequent parts of this chapter.

It is true that our conclusion is valid only within the framework of the assumption under which it was established: the interchangeability of the resources necessary for the various types of production.

In practice, this assumption is not borne out. All production requires various services, some emanating from capital (mines, factories, tools, etc.), others from specialized workers (workers, foremen, engineers, etc.).

There is, however, a common thread running through all of these various services: the undesirability,2 for the person who owns or produces them, of the sacrifice that their transfer entails.

This sacrifice is the one common feature of all types of production, their true cost in the eyes of the producers. In developing the concept of its undesirability, we will succeed in broadening and generalizing the preceding conclusion and in demonstrating the existence, within each economic community, of a natural hierarchy of prices that is characteristic of this community.

In order to succeed in this endeavor, however, it is necessary for us to know the mechanism through which individual market prices are formed. Given that the study of this mechanism is somewhat unrelated to the subject of this present work, let us provide a brief overview.

§2. A Summary View of the Price Formation Mechanism

The price of an article of wealth in money measures the number of monetary units whose ownership must be transferred in order to obtain, through exchange, one quantity unit of such an article of wealth.

The price thus defined—when it is not set authoritatively—will, in fact, be determined in the markets. It will rise when demand exceeds supply and decline in the opposite case.

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To identify the influences that cause the price changes of a specific article is, therefore, to identify those influences that affect the demand for, and the supply of, that same article during a market session.

Under a system where transactions are unrestricted, however, supplies and demands are the expression of decisions freely arrived at by the individuals who express them. The influences that determine the size [of these supplies and demands] are those that determine these decisions. They are essentially psychological in nature; thus, it is only in the depths of consciousness, or perhaps even in the subconscious mind, in the unclear area where individual actions evolve more or less consciously (and often unconsciously), that one can hope to discover them.

Only a psychologist, however, can embark on such a task. The economist, instead, will simply assume, in principle, that every act has a known or unknown, conscious or unconscious, cause. In adopting the same approach as Molière’s character who infamously viewed the “dormitive virtue” of opium as the cause of the sleep that it induces, the economist is concerned only with finding an immediate antecedent for the completed act, an antecedent that he can consider the sole cause of the act, and which will combine in a single word—the meaning of which will, in fact, matter very little to him—the infinite variety of motives that determine men’s actions.

Thus, for our economist who is eager for explanations, the reason why the wheat producer exchanges part of his crop for coal is that the coal that he acquires is, to him, more “desirable” than the wheat he parts with.

Noting the existence of a qualitative preference, the economist forces himself to view it solely as a quantitative difference resulting, in the eyes of the exchanger, from the uneven distribution of a selfsame quality between the article of wealth surrendered and the article of wealth obtained. To this unique quality he gives a name, which embodies the essence of its reality: desirability.

It will then be sufficient to admit that the actions of individuals in the market are driven by the quest for maximum desirability, so that the uneven desirability of the various articles of wealth become the logical cause of exchanges.

As for measuring the value thus introduced, this can only be derived from the individual behaviors that it tends to account for. If, at a given price p, a certain individual demands a quantity q of a given article, the reason is that all the constituent parts that make up this quantity are to him more “desirable” than the money he must part with in order to obtain them. The reason he demands 33 no more, however, is that any additional quantity he could obtain would appear less desirable to him than the money he would have to part with.

In this way, each individual buys all that is more desirable to him than the money that he must give up in exchange. And, since desirability [of a certain article or good] declines as the quantity owned increases, everything happens as if, in the eyes of the individual concerned, the desirability of the last portion acquired was strictly equal to the desirability of the quantity of money he must part with in order to obtain it.3

It is this desirability of the last portion acquired, the desirability of one unit more or less, that constitutes the marginal desirability of the quantity owned.4

In order to dispel any possible doubt, a mathematician would observe at this point that the value that has just been defined here is indeed a measurable quantity.

In fact, any value whose equality and addition can be defined is measurable.

Now, for a given individual, the marginal desirabilities of two stocks of wealth, the last unit of both of which he is prepared—all things equal as regards the level of his cash balance—to exchange for the same amount of money, are equal.

For the same given individual, the marginal desirability of a set of articles of wealth, the last unit of which he is prepared—all things equal as regards the level of his cash balance—to exchange for a quantity of money equal regards the sum of the quantities of money that characterize the marginal desirabilities of the two other sets of articles of wealth, is equal to the sum of the other two.

Marginal desirability is measured relative to any desirability, taken as unity. Let us therefore agree to relate individual desirabilities to the desirability that the acquisition—all else equal—of one additional money unit 5 would represent to the individual experiencing such desirabilities.

Relative to such a unit, the marginal desirability, for a given person, of a certain quantity of an article of wealth is measured by the price at which, if he owned this quantity, he would cease to demand and would begin to supply such an article of wealth.

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Thus, knowledge of the behavior of an individual in relation to his various possible holdings would make it possible to draw a marginal desirability curve for each of his holdings, as a function of one single variable: the quantity owned. This curve, after all, is only the graphic representation of the rate at which satiation attenuates desire.

It is essential to note here that, in our definition, the desirability of an article of wealth is taken as a function of a single variable: the quantity owned. In actual fact, it depends on the quantity of all the assets that constitute a person’s patrimony. The influence of the existing stock 6 of the article of wealth—the desirability of which is being studied here—is certainly the predominant factor, however. For this reason, as a first approximation, it can be regarded as the sole factor.

If this assumption is accepted, then each article of wealth is characterized, for any person in a position to operate in the market, by a marginal desirability curve, which is a function of the quantity owned.

To know, for a given individual, the desirability curves relating to the various articles in the market would be to know his behavior with regard to the articles of wealth in his possession, and with regard to those that he can acquire. This would also be to know, in particular, the quantities that, at each market price, are less desirable to him than the quantities of money that he would obtain as the result of a sale and which, as such, he will supply, and the quantities that are more desirable to him than the quantities of money to be parted with as a result of a purchase, and which, as such, he will demand.

Yet each individual is confronted, at each instant of time, with a market price, which he does not appreciably influence by his supplies and demands. This price determines the quantity of the corresponding article that the individual concerned will supply or demand in the market, account taken of the quantities already owned.

Thus, at each price, a total demand and a total supply curve are established, which aggregate into two figures, individual demands and individual supplies, respectively.

When total demand exceeds total supply, the market price will rise. In the opposite case, it will fall. In each and every case, the price change will come to an end only when the two quantities are equal—that is, when, within the sum of all the individual patrimonies that make up the aggregate patrimony of the 35 community considered, the quantity of the articles of wealth of the type in question, whose marginal desirability is less than that of money, and which, as such, are supplied, is equal to the quantity of those same articles of wealth, whose marginal desirability is greater than that of money, and which, as such, are demanded.

The price change, therefore—all else equal—shifts the boundary between the supplying and the demanding patrimonies,7 thereby ensuring market equilibrium.

Thus, the concept of marginal desirability makes possible an explanation of individual prices, by relating them to psychological factors that determine individual behavior. In this way, [the concept of marginal desirability] assigns a logical reason to the various market prices and provides, veritably, the theory of price formation.

It is important, however, not to be mistaken about the nature of the explanation that is provided in this manner. In Part V of this book, we will philosophize on the mechanism of economic evolution. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, however, we should like to make it clear here and now that the balance of desirability, in which the economist sees the motive force, is only a rough and unimaginative caricature of the inner process that urges a hunter to pursue the game rather than go hungry, and the cow to graze rather than ruminate in the sunshine.

Nothing allows for a better understanding of the artificial and “created” nature of the causes in which science seeks an explanation of perceptible phenomena than the gap between the reasoned decision mechanism imagined by the theory of marginal desirability, in order to find there the logical cause of the action that it observes from the outside—the acts of others—and the irresistible maturation of the act that we are going to perform, a process of which we gain immediate and direct knowledge through conscious awareness.

The marginalist explanation, however, like all physical theories, is a useful explanatory instrument because, created by an effort of the mind to trace effects back to causes, it then allows the mind, quite naturally, to move from cause to effect. It therefore succeeds in demonstrating, deductively, the logical neces 36 sity of the factual situation that the market reveals, although the actions that combine in forming it are hardly ever the conclusion of a logical debate and even though, in most cases, the mind plays only a small part in the process by which, in the depths of individual consciousnesses, they [actions] are developed.8

§3. Whereas Marginal Desirabilities Are an Individual Fact, Their Hierarchical Structure Is a Social Fact, Characteristic of an Economic Community

When, with regard to a particular article, the market is in equilibrium, one can be assured that, for all the individuals who are in a position to participate in [the market], the desirability of possessing an additional unit is neither greater nor less than the undesirability of parting with the quantity of money representing its price. Indeed, if this were not so, there would be demand or supply against money, and the market would not be in equilibrium.

The market price is therefore such that, in the minds of all the individuals who constitute the community considered, there is an equivalence between the satisfactions that would derive from acquiring one additional unit and the sacrifices that would be involved in parting with the quantity of money matching the price.

Naturally, one wonders how countless individuals, whose characteristics differ so widely, some being poor, others rich, some free-spending, others frugal, different both in their tastes and in their respective positions, can possibly render a unanimous judgment as to the money value of the various goods supplied to them.

This is only an apparent paradox, however. To believe that the unicity of the price implies identical value judgments would be to misinterpret the preceding analysis.

The above analysis does not teach us, for instance, that coal has the same marginal desirability in the eyes of all those who can acquire it. To the poor man, as winter sets in, one additional bag of coal is more desirable than it is to 37 the rich man whose cellar is well stocked. All it teaches us is that, in a market in equilibrium, when the price of a bagful of coal is fifty francs, each individual feels that there is an equivalence between the benefit resulting from the acquisition of one additional bagful and the inconvenience involved in parting with the fifty francs that measure its value. And the reason why this is so is certainly not that the marginal desirability of coal and money is the same but that, if the market is in equilibrium, all individuals have previously and in full cognizance of the market price completed all the exchanges that they deemed desirable. This means that, if an individual had possessed a quantity of coal such that a few bagfuls more or less would have been either more or less desirable to him than their money value, he would have either bought or sold them.

In other words, before the market reaches equilibrium, each individual will have “adjusted” his holdings of all articles of wealth to market prices, in such a way that each article would only have, to him, a marginal desirability equal to that of the amount of money representing its value.

Mathematicians would say that the market will not be in equilibrium until, for all the individuals who constitute the market, the ratio of the marginal desirabilities of all the articles that can be bought or sold is equal to the ratio of their respective prices.9

The marginal desirability of an article of wealth is something purely personal, which has meaning only in the closed universe of individual consciousness. No common standard can be envisioned that would allow us to compare the desirability of an additional unit of any article of wealth for two different individuals, even though these two individuals may own the same articles of wealth.

What the preceding analysis does allow us to affirm is that when the market is in equilibrium, the relationships between the marginal desirabilities of the various articles that are exchanged in the market are the same for all the individuals who are in a position to participate in the market, and whereas the marginal desirabilities are an individual fact, their hierarchy is a social fact par excellence.

It can even be said that a society is a group of individuals whose needs remaining to be satisfied present the same ratios.

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To be sure, the drunkard desires wine more than the teetotaler. But the drunkard is prepared to make greater sacrifices to quench his thirst. And when he has finished drinking, when the market has reached equilibrium, it is certain that thirst for wine and thirst for money are in the same ratio for both the drunkard and the teetotaler, equal to the money price of wine.

The preceding analysis shows, in sum, that in a state of equilibrium, each individual has increased his holdings of all articles of wealth to a level such that the desirability of any additional acquisition is equal to the undesirability of parting with the money that the purchase would entail.

Because of this, if one takes as the quantity unit for each article that quantity whose price is unity, it can be said that, in a state of equilibrium, the composition of any individual patrimony is such that the various components have, for the owner, the same marginal desirability, which is equal to the undesirability of parting with one unit of money, taking into account the level of his cash balance.

We shall see further on that it is this equalizing of all marginal desirabilities that explains the functioning of all the productive elements that individual patrimonies constitute.10

§4. The Price Scale in the General Case

The market price not only draws a distinction between the desires that will be satisfied and those that will remain unsatisfied, but it also ensures that the exact amount of articles of wealth necessary to satisfy the former is produced.

The production process will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. For the time being, we shall only note that it requires various types of services: labor services (workers, foremen, engineers, etc.) and capital services (equipment, buildings, fields, mines, etc.).

Let us imagine a society that is in a steady state, with all its characteristics remaining unchanged.

Production entails, on the part of the producer, various sacrifices: if he provides labor, then he will sacrifice the leisure time that he could have enjoyed; if he provides capital services, then he will sacrifice the enjoyment that he could have derived from such services through consumption or exchange. In either case, therefore, there is a sacrifice in the form of parting with something desirable.

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Any producer who can act freely will consent to such sacrifices only if, in his sovereign judgment, he determines that the satisfactions he has renounced are compensated by an inflow of comparatively more desirable enjoyments.

Under a system where exchange is ruled out, that is to say under a system in which production is limited to the needs of the producer and his dependents, this inflow is that of the enjoyments provided by the product itself.

The producer will work until the degree of desirability of the benefits from additional production is, in his opinion, outweighed by the undesirability of the additional efforts required. He therefore “adjusts” his effort on his own scale of preference, which is determined by his personal tastes and by the various motives that determine his actions.11

As long as this scale of preference remains steady, the stability of production—all else equal—is ensured. Any decline in the rate of production would bring about a decline in stocks, hence an increase in their marginal desirability, and therefore an increase in the production effort. Any ramping up would have the reverse effect. Production is thus regulated and the steady state of the system is established.

In a system of market-oriented production, the producer’s return is no longer the output itself, but the money derived from the sale of this output. In this case, the desirability of additional (financial) returns associated with an increase in production has to be compared with the undesirability of the additional sacrifices that an increase in production would involve.

Now, the desirability of additional (financial) returns associated with a given increase in production depends on the desirability of money and on the money price of the article of wealth produced.

When a steady state has been established, it is clear that the producer has “adjusted” his productive effort to the money price of the article of wealth produced. In view of his personal tastes, he feels that the return to be derived from producing one additional unit has a desirability that is neither in excess of nor less than the undesirability of the additional sacrifice required (in terms of leisure or income). If it were more desirable, the producer would increase production. If it were less, he would reduce it. In either case, contrary to our initial hypothesis, the market would not be in equilibrium.

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Thus, all market-oriented producers will increase production to the point where the product has, for all of them, the same marginal undesirability expressed in money. Indeed, for each of them, the undesirability of the last unit produced is equal to the marginal desirability of the money unit, multiplied by the price of the product.

This being so, the market price of the products brings the undesirability of the last unit produced for all producers to a level such that total supply equals total demand—in other words, to a level where the quantity whose production is deemed less undesirable than the return yielded at the market price is equal to the quantity whose acquisition is deemed more desirable than the money sacrifice it requires at the same price.

If one takes as marginal cost of production the sacrifice, in terms of desirability, that production of the last unit requires of all market-oriented producers, then it is clear that the price becomes established at a level such that it covers the cost, in terms of desirability, of the last unit whose production, by each producer, is necessary in order for total demand, at the market price, to be met.

The concept of production cost in terms of desirability implies that every possible production, regardless of the inputs necessary, requires only “desirability” sacrifices, of a similar nature but in various forms. These renunciations of desirability can therefore be measured in terms of the same unit, which will be, for example, the marginal desirability of money for the producer considered, taking into account his cash holdings.

Introducing the concept of production costs in terms of desirability creates a situation similar to the one considered in section 1 of this chapter, where we posited a simplified universe where all production required only unskilled labor.

This leads, mutatis mutandis, to a similar conclusion: the price ratios between the various articles in the market cannot deviate for any prolonged period of time from the ratios between their marginal costs of production.

Suppose that an individual owns a coal mine and a field. The rate at which he will exploit one and the other is determined by market prices, since, over each period of time, the producer will produce all quantities of which the production costs are less than the price at which they can be sold.

Let pc and pw represent the money prices of coal and wheat, uc and uw the marginal undesirability, in terms of money, of the last unit of coal and the last unit of wheat produced.

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In order to obtain one additional ton of coal, our producer faces the following choice:

— produce it directly, which implies for him a desirability sacrifice, uc;

— produce an additional quantity of wheat, sell it, and use the proceeds to buy one ton of coal on the market. The quantity of wheat required for that purpose is

lf1981_Ch04_IEQ_001.jpg
. Producing it implies a desirability sacrifice
lf1981_Ch04_IEQ_002.jpg
.

Clearly, he will choose the least costly of the two solutions.

If uc exceeds

lf1981_Ch04_IEQ_003.jpg
in other words, if the ratio of the price of coal to the price of wheat
lf1981_Ch04_IEQ_004.jpg
is less than the ratio of marginal production costs
lf1981_Ch04_IEQ_005.jpg
he will choose the latter solution.

Since, for all market-oriented producers, the ratio

lf1981_Ch04_IEQ_006.jpg
is the same, the situation considered will affect all producers in the same way and will bring about, on their part, more supply of wheat and more demand for coal.

The increase in the supply of wheat will bring down its price, however, and the increase in the demand for coal will push up the price of coal. As this two-way movement will cease only when the price disparity that caused it has been quenched, the price ratio will necessarily be brought back to the ratio of marginal production costs. Similarly, the price ratio cannot be higher than the ratio of marginal production costs.

Where the marginal costs of production are independent of the quantities produced (in a constant returns situation), the preceding mechanism establishes constant price ratios, those of production costs, to which prices—no matter what their absolute value may be—are necessarily brought back when they deviate from it.

Where the costs of production increase or decrease in accordance with the quantities produced—in accordance with the general laws of diminishing or increasing returns—then the price relationships are determined by the marginal costs of production implied by the demands to be satisfied.

In either case, prices cannot deviate, for any prolonged period of time, from the level assigned to them by a hierarchical structure that is independent of their absolute values and is determined, all else equal, by the nature of things.

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If any event causes a distortion in the price scale, then the spontaneous reactions of the market will correct it and will reestablish a price structure similar to the structure of marginal production costs.

§5. The Concept of the Point of Production

a) Definition of the Point of Production

The above analysis shows that, at any value of the general price level, there is, for the price of each article, a corresponding and clearly determined place in the price scale, to which [the price] is spontaneously brought back, if a disturbance in supply or demand moves it away from [this place in the price scale]. This place ensures the physical equality between the quantities produced and the quantities demanded. The quantities produced are those whose production is desired because the undesirability of the effort required by the producer for the last unit produced is deemed to be outweighed by the desirability of the return it provides. The quantities demanded are those whose acquisition is desired because the desirability of the enjoyment derived from the last unit purchased is deemed by each buyer to outweigh the undesirability of the money sacrifice this purchase involves.

In this way, two distinct concepts are specified:

  • 1. the concept of the actual price or the instantaneous market price—which depends, at each instant of time, only on the demand expressed in money and the quantity actually supplied, and which ensures, per usual terminology, equality between supply and demand;
  • 2. the concept of the steady state price, which, at each period of time, brings the level of the quantity produced to the level of the quantity demanded and which, for this reason, we will call the point of production.

The market price is not necessarily at the level of its point of production. When, however, the market price exceeds the point of production, to each producer the undesirability of producing the last unit will be outweighed by the desirability of the resulting return, whereas to each purchaser the desirability of acquiring the last unit will be outweighed by the undesirability of the money sacrifice implied. Producers will increase their production and purchasers will reduce their demand. As this two-way movement will continue so long as the 43 price remains above its point of production, it will inevitably bring the former back to the level of the latter.

Similarly, one could demonstrate that no price can possibly remain below its point of production for any prolonged period of time.

Thus, no steady economic state can be established as long as prices are not at the level of their respective points of production. Whenever they deviate, they will spontaneously tend to move back to that level, under the influence of production and purchasing changes that these deviations will themselves have brought about.

b) The Location of Each Point of Production on the Price Scale

The products for which the point of production is high will be those whose production equals demand only when their price reaches a high level in the price scale. They will therefore be those regarded as highly undesirable to produce and highly desirable to acquire.

Now, when it comes to articles produced under the market system, the undesirability of production is measured by the cost of production. All things remaining equal with regard to the cost of the capital and service inputs, and in particular with regard to the level of salaries, the undesirability of production will depend on the technical circumstances of production. The less favorable these circumstances are, the greater the undesirability of production will be. The proximity and accessibility of sources of raw materials, the skill and efficiency of labor, the availability of manufacturing secrets protected by patents or guaranteed by know-how—in short, all the circumstances that increase or reduce the cost of production at an unchanged level of labor and capital costs—will contribute to determining the undesirability of production.

In particular, new inventions facilitating production, the discovery of new deposits that are less distant or less difficult to exploit, or improvements in the means of transport that lessen the cost of production reduce, all else equal, the marginal undesirability of production.

As to the desirability of the product for the purchaser, it will depend primarily on his tastes, on his desires, and on the quantities that are required to satisfy them.

In any case, marginal production cost and marginal desirability are functions determined by the quantities produced and acquired during the time unit. The point of production is the price at which these two values are equal.

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The cost of production will sometimes be independent of the quantity produced. This is the case of productions at constant returns; the point of production is then at a fixed level in the price scale.

Generally, the cost of production increases with the quantity produced per unit of time, because, if production is to be stepped up, it is necessary to exploit fields that are less and less fertile or more and more remote from consumption centers, or mines at ever-greater depths. This is the case of productions with diminishing returns.

As to the desirability of acquisition, it almost always declines with the quantity acquired per unit of time.

For these two reasons, the point of production of articles produced under conditions of diminishing returns is all the higher as, all else equal, the undesirability of their production and the desirability of their acquisition are themselves higher.

Thus, for each level of the general price index, each article will have a corresponding point of production that indicates the location of its price in the price scale. The level of each point of production will depend, on the one hand, on the technical circumstances of the production that pertain to the article and on the views of producers as to these circumstances and, on the other hand, on the desire of acquisition that this article gives rise to among those persons who are in a position to participate in the market.

The points-of-production hierarchy therefore results from the nature of things and from the nature of human beings. As long as both of these remain unchanged, the hierarchy structure will remain unchanged and will constitute a stable feature of the community under consideration.

c) The Indifference of the Points-of-Production Hierarchy to Changes in the General Price Level

Whereas the points-of-production hierarchy depends only on the nature of things and on the nature of men, the place of each point of production is determined, provided that natural circumstances and people’s attitudes and tastes remain unchanged, as soon as the general price level has been established.

As a matter of fact, one can easily imagine that a uniform change in all prices in the market, therefore in all the components that constitute the costs of production, has to leave unchanged the price ratios, which establish not only equality between supply and demand in the various sectors of the market but also a 45 lasting equilibrium between production and consumption of all the articles exchanged in the market.

This finding is only a generalization of the conclusion that was arrived at in the first section of this chapter, when we assumed that production required only unskilled labor, whose price played the same role [in that scenario] that the general price level does in a real economy.

Thus, variations in the general price level will not affect, all else remaining equal, the points-of-production hierarchy—in other words, the relationships between their respective levels on the price scale.

§6. The Location of the Interest Rate on the Price Scale

a) The Concept of “Rent”

The property right of ownership, from the moment it exists, entails that the holder of the right have the ability to “enjoy and dispose of”12 the object owned.

The holder of the right may, however, allow a third party to use the object owned until an agreed-upon date, called the due date. Such a commitment implies, for the property right, a genuine partitioning, since the ability to dispose of an object (which the right of ownership entails) is now split into two separate parts: the one that extends from the moment considered until the due date, and the one that corresponds to the period following the due date. The former is assigned to the borrower, the latter alone remaining the property of the lender.

Each of the two components of the property right has its own value: the value of the loan, which the owner’s consent to defer enjoyment of the object owned constitutes, and the value of the claim the lender holds on the borrower. The sum of these two values represents the value of the intact property right of ownership.

The former value constitutes the “rent” of a loaned object, for the duration of the loan.

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In order to avoid any misinterpretation, it is important to note that the borrower obligates himself to return the object in its original state. A loan, therefore, does not imply any right of consumption; it is only a right to hold something temporarily. This ability has a value, however, because it renders possible, for instance, the transformation that the production process implies and, thereby, the revenue it generates.

Rent is therefore just a particular type of price: that of the ability to hold the object loaned during the unit of time, but without consumption or damaging wear and tear.

Like all prices, rent is established at the level that brings the value of the quantities supplied to the level of demand in money terms. Let us consider the case of a building. The property right of ownership implies the right to enjoy the building and all its attributes, including the housing that it can provide. Let us suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that enjoyment of the housing does not involve any wear and tear, which is nearly true in practice. The owner may reserve the exercise of his full right by enjoying, he himself, the housing services that his building provides. He may also yield the right to enjoy these services for a specific period—say, three years—to a third party, in which case he agrees to defer his own personal enjoyment [of the building] over the same period.

In practice, everything happens as if the building were temporarily transferred from the assets of the owner to those of the tenant, the former receiving a claim on the latter with three years’ maturity. The property right of ownership has indeed been broken into two distinct parts: a right to temporarily use the object assigned, and a right of claim 13 to the object.

The rent is the price of the right of temporary enjoyment thus granted.

The price of this right will be determined in a sector of the market where persons offering housing (that is to say, landlords looking for tenants) and persons seeking housing (that is to say, tenants looking for housing) meet.

At each instant of time the rent, which is the price of renting out the object loaned, will be established at the level that will bring the value of the housing services supplied to the level of the money demand for housing.

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b) The Rate of Interest as the Measure of Renting Money

Hence, rent is only one price among many prices in the market. Rather than being expressed in terms of money, however, rent is often calculated in relation to the value of the loaned object. For instance, instead of saying that a building worth 100,000 francs has been let for a rent of 3,000 francs a year, one may say that it has been let at 3 percent a year.

In this case, rent sets the rate of interest for the loan.

Needless to say, this concept is not of practical use and can only be substituted for the concept of rent when the object loaned has a fixed money value, a condition that is fully satisfied only when the object loaned is a certain quantity of money.

Now, a loan of money is the most common form of a loan. For such a loan, the rate of interest will express its rent indirectly, but conveniently.

We have analyzed the concept of rent in detail because it sheds light on the nature of the rate of interest. It shows that a loan of money, like any other loan, can be viewed as the partitioning of the owner’s right to the sum loaned. Indeed, this right implies, from the moment it exists, the ability to enjoy the articles of wealth that the sum loaned enables the borrower to buy. The deferral of enjoyment accepted by the lender detaches from this ability that which applies to the loan period, it being specified that the assigned ability relates only to the holding, and not to the consumption, of the values that are loaned.

Within this context, the rate of interest measures the rent that would be paid for the loan of one hundred monetary units for one year.

c) Differences between the Properties of the Rate of Interest and of Rent

Although the rate of interest can be deduced from rent by relating rent to the value of the object loaned, they have widely differing properties when the general price level changes.

Let us consider the case of a house worth 100,000 francs, which is rented out at 3,000 francs a year.

Suppose that all prices double.

The house will then be worth 200,000 francs; its rent will be increased to 6,000 francs. But the rate of interest will still be 3 percent.

Thus, the immobility of a rent and the immobility of a rate mean quite different things. The former phrase refers to the immobility of a price in absolute 48 value, whereas the latter implies maintenance of a price at a fixed location on the price scale, regardless of its absolute movements.

If one assumes that the price hierarchy remains unchanged (in other words, that price ratios are unchanged—which is roughly the case in a community whose economic and psychological characteristics remain unchanged, despite movements in the general price level), then by immobilizing one price, one will immobilize the price scale, hence all prices in absolute value; whereas by immobilizing a rate, one will simply maintain an individual price—the rent under consideration—at the same place in the price hierarchy, while allowing the price scale as a whole (in other words, the general price level) to fluctuate freely.

Generally speaking, the functioning of monetary systems tends to immobilize one rate of interest, the rate for short-term loans, under an inconvertible currency system, and the same rate of interest as well as one price (the gold price), under a convertible currency system. The critical importance of this distinction for monetary analysis is clear.

d) The Formation of the Rate of Interest

The preceding analysis shows that the rate of interest, which expresses the rental rate on money, is formed in the same way as all market prices.

At each instant of time, and for each category of loan, the rate of interest will—in the market—be the one that will bring the total value of the rights of temporary enjoyment that loans supplied represent to the level of the demand in terms of money to which they are subject.

Through its changes, the rate of interest will therefore ensure the instantaneous equilibrium of the various sectors of the market where loans of various types are exchanged.

e) The Point of Production for the Various Categories of Loans

To the lender, a loan is an undesirable transaction because of the deferral of enjoyment that he must consent to, but a desirable one because of the interest payment he receives.

To the borrower, a loan is a desirable transaction because of the ability of enjoyment that it provides, but an undesirable one on account of the money sacrifice that the interest payment involves. When the borrower is an entrepreneur, the desirability of the loan is measured by the additional income the loan will enable to be generated, and its undesirability [is measured] by the increase in general costs that will result.

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Now, at each instant of time, both lenders and borrowers are confronted with the market rate, which their actions do not influence in any appreciable way. Each of them adjusts his behavior to this rate: the lenders, by supplying all the loans whose undesirability is outweighed by the desirability of the interest payment to be expected; and the borrowers, by demanding all the loans whose desirability outweighs the undesirability of the interest payment involved.

The sum of all individual supplies and demands will form, at each moment of time, the aggregate supply of, and the aggregate demand for, loans in the market.

Now, as any rise in the rate of interest attracts to the market loans whose undesirability to lenders outweighed the desirability of the interest payment resulting from the previous rate, but whose undesirability is outweighed by the desirability of the interest payment resulting from the new rate, the aggregate supply of loans in the market will be an increasing function of the rate (fig. 2).

lf1981_figure_002.jpg

Fig. 2. [R− r: refers to interest rate; see text]

Similarly, as any rise in the rate of interest discourages demands for loans that had provided to their borrowers income higher than the interest payment resulting from the former rate, but lower than the interest payment resulting from the new rate, the aggregate demand for loans will be a decreasing function of the rate.

Thus, at each instant of time, there will be only one rate, r, at which the quantity of loans produced by the lenders will match the quantity demanded. It is this rate that will determine the location of the point of production of the loan in the currency considered on the price scale.

The market rate might not be at the level of its point of production. A sudden increase in demand, for example, may push the market rate to a level 50 higher than its point of production. In this case, the movement of the rate will always bring the value of the loans supplied to the money level of the demand, thereby ensuring market equilibrium, but the resulting equilibrium will not be stable.

Indeed, as long as the market rate is greater than its point of production, the quantity of loans supplied, because the desirability of the return they produce outweighs for lenders the undesirability of the deferral of enjoyment that they entail, will increase, whereas the quantity of loans demanded will decline for the opposite reason. This two-way movement will continue as long as the cause that generated it has not disappeared, and it will inevitably bring the interest rate back to the level of its point of production.

Thus, the market can function at a steady economic state only when the rate of interest for each kind of loan is at the level of the corresponding point of production.

Any disturbance in the supply of, or the demand for, loans will cause a shift in the market rate, but the resulting distortion in the price scale will be eliminated the moment lenders and borrowers have adjusted their behavior to the new circumstances.

The specific point of production for each kind of loan will depend on the influences that determine, for lenders, the undesirability of the deferment of enjoyment that they agree to and, for borrowers, the desirability of the use they can make of the resources borrowed.

The undesirability of the loan to the lender and its desirability to the borrower therefore result, primarily, from the psychological dispositions of the individuals concerned and the technical circumstances of production; in other words, from the nature of human beings and the nature of things. So long as neither of these changes, the place of the point of production for each category of loan in the hierarchy of points of production, hence the absolute level of the rates of interest, remains unchanged. In particular, they are independent of the general price level.

We will, however, show that even though the rate of interest is determined by the psychological dispositions of individuals and the technical circumstances of production, the rate of interest remains at this level only to the extent that the general price level index remains stable, at whichever level this stability is established. During shifts in the general price level, the rate of interest is subject to a temporary variation through a mechanism, knowledge of which is essential to an understanding of monetary phenomena.

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§7. The Fundamental Relation between Shifts in the General Price Level and Interest Rates

The preceding analysis shows that the rate of interest, like any market price, remains unchanged as long as the nature of things and the nature of human beings remain unchanged—in other words, as long as all circumstances in the loan market remain the same. When the general price level varies, however, circumstances are temporarily altered. We shall show that then, a shift in the price scale, all other conditions remaining unchanged, causes a temporary shift of the interest rate in the opposite direction.

Take the case of a community functioning under steady state conditions.

At any period of time, each individual buys as much as he sells and, therefore, his cash balance remains unchanged.

Suppose now that, suddenly, all cash holders decide to reduce their cash balances. In order to reduce the undesired stocks of money, they will demand more than they supply. In the markets affected by additional demands, prices will rise, thereby generating a rise in the general price level.

As, however, the additional demands stem from the desire to use, at the instant of time considered, undesired cash balances, these [demands] relate only to spot markets.14 Therefore, the prices of goods in spot market transactions will rise, whereas the prices of goods in forward markets 15 will remain unchanged.

Prior to this movement, the market was in equilibrium because, in each sector of the market, the prices of forward transactions were equal to the prices of spot transactions plus the interest resulting from deferred payment during the period.

When spot prices go up and forward prices remain unchanged, this equilibrium is disrupted. Selling a good or article for cash and purchasing the same good for future delivery, temporarily investing the sale’s proceeds in the market while awaiting settlement, then becomes a profitable proposition.

In all markets, however, arbitrageurs are vigilant. As this kind of operation is profitable to them, they will engage in it until the parity between spot prices and forward prices—taking into account the rate of interest that is in effect—is restored.

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Such a transaction, however, implies an increase in the supply of capital in the short-term market, which was assumed to have been in equilibrium.16 This will cause a drop in the interest rate, which will remain at the lower level as long as the cause of this drop lasts—in other words, as long as selling for spot transactions and buying back through forward transactions remains profitable.

This buying will tend to push up forward prices and thereby restore parity with spot prices. When parity has thus been restored, the additional supply of capital will disappear, and the rate of interest will move back to its prior level.

Thus, the rise in the general price level will have generated a drop in the rate of interest, which will be all the more pronounced the more rapid the price rise is,17 but a drop that is temporary, since it ceases when parity between forward and spot prices has been restored.

One could demonstrate, in like manner, that any increase in desired cash balances generates, in a market that is in equilibrium, additional supplies for cash, thus a drop in spot prices and thereby a drop in the general price level. But if the decline in spot prices is not accompanied by a decline in forward prices, it becomes profitable to buy spot and sell forward, settling the former transaction with the proceeds of the discounted claim derived from the latter. The increase in the demands for discount would bring on a rise in the rate of interest, which would persist until parity between forward and spot prices is restored.

Thus, in each and every case, no change in the general price level can take place without causing a temporary variation in the rate of interest in the opposite direction.

Inversely, any change in the rate of interest, by disrupting the parity between spot and forward prices, will cause a movement in the general price level in the opposite direction.

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This proves the existence of a relation between the movements of the general price level and the rate of interest. The subsequent chapters of this book, in particular Chapters XVII and XVIII, will show that knowledge of this relation is essential to an understanding of monetary phenomena.*

The nature of the relation will be fully appreciated only if it reveals a link that common sense would lead us to expect. Indeed, there are only two ways of getting rid of undesired cash balances: buying articles of wealth properly speaking, which generates a rise in the general price level, or buying claims, which causes a drop in the interest rate. Our analysis was limited to bringing out the inevitable interconnection between the two processes.

The layman will wonder how a relation that rests only on the watchfulness of arbitrageurs can be deemed fundamental. He will observe that, in a good many markets, friction tends to be an insuperable obstacle to arbitrage operations and that the mere closing of the forward market would eliminate the link.

Neither of these observations is justified, however.

Although arbitrage is imperfect, if not nonexistent, in retail markets, it operates with considerable vigor and extreme sensitivity in capital markets and in major commodity markets. And numerous studies have demonstrated that there is a continuing link between prices in major organized markets—in particular capital markets—and prices in other markets.

Besides, it is mainly capital markets that determine the rate of interest. It is therefore to be expected that—all else equal—the rate of interest should be closely linked to the variations in the general price level, because of the existence of capital markets.

In addition, periods of overabundant cash balances—we observe it at this time in all the countries where there is a significant budget deficit and where there are fixed prices—are periods of rising prices, at least with regard to free prices, and of very low rates of interest. The general nature of this finding can 54 be deemed to provide, in and of itself, the experimental verification of the conclusions to which theory has led us.

Nevertheless, it would be useful to confront these theoretical considerations with the facts in a more precise manner. I wish to call the attention of researchers to this point. Obviously, the question is of interest to them, as researchers, particularly those at Harvard University, have already collected important and remarkable statistical data in this field.

That the closing down of forward [or futures] markets would abolish the above-mentioned relation is not relevant. If the forward [or futures] market is closed, it will reappear everywhere: foresight purchasing, settlement lags, attempts to take “short” or “long” positions, and engaging in borrowing or lending against real assets are some of the countless ways of taking, indirectly, a forward position. The closing down of forward [or futures] markets, particularly on securities exchanges, can therefore reduce the sensitivity of the link between price and interest rate movements, but it cannot eliminate its existence. On the contrary even, any lag in the market’s functioning, far from eliminating the movement in the interest rate resulting from a given price movement, will increase its scope.

Not surprisingly, changes in the general price level and the interest rate are interdependent and, although further investigational verifications would be worthwhile, the relationship should be considered a firmly established fact.

§8. Conclusion Relating to the Price Scale

At the end of this chapter, it appears that any economic community, as long as the psychological dispositions of the individuals and the technical circumstances of production remain unchanged, is characterized by an immutable hierarchy of its points of production, which is independent notably of the general price level.

Actual prices can deviate from the level assigned to them by the corresponding point of production, but the distortion in the price scale will always be temporary. The weaker the resistance to shifts in production resources, the more limited and more quickly corrected the distortion will be.

This two-sided conclusion will play an important part in subsequent chapters. It is because it was indispensable for us to be able to invoke this conclusion that the prior analyses, themselves foreign to the subject of our study, were introduced here.

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Part II: (Where We Get to the Heart of the Matter)
A Picture of Economic Realities in a Universe without Money

In our economic systems, reality is often concealed beneath the veil of monetary appearances. These appearances derive not so much from the phenomena themselves as from the unit in which they are expressed.

In order to distinguish between substance and accident,1 we will study, in the first place, economic life in a universe without money.

Such a universe differs from reality on only one point: wealth is exchanged, through the method of barter, against wealth, and not against money.

All actions that make up economic life—exchange, production, consumption, saving, borrowing, etc.—still exist. But they appear in their economic reality, instead of disappearing into their monetary appearances.

This economic reality will be the subject of our analysis in Part II of this book.

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Chapter V: Value in a Universe without Money

In a universe without money, articles of wealth are exchanged against articles of wealth. There are therefore no prices in money, but only prices in kind.

Under such a system, the price pB/A of article B in relation to article A is measured by the quantity of A that must be parted with in order to obtain one quantity unit of B.

The value of a quantity qB of article B, measured against article A, is qB pB/A, the product of quantity qB multiplied by the price pB/A, which is the price of B with regard to A.

Defined in this way, value measures the quantity of article A that can be obtained by surrendering the quantity qB of B—in other words, the purchasing power in terms of A that ownership of the given quantity of B provides.

* * *

Given the bilateral nature of value definitions in a universe without money, one might be inclined to consider the purchasing power of an article in relation to all other articles in the market taken individually.

This would be the case if all prices in a market were totally unrelated to one another.

Free prices, however, are not unrelated. They are linked by so-called arbitrage relationships that determine their mutual ratios.

Take three articles, A, B, and C. Let pB/A and pC/A be the prices of B and C in relation to A. Anyone who owns a given quantity of A, and who wishes to acquire one quantity unit of C, can do so: either directly, by exchanging it for a quantity pC/A of A; or indirectly, by exchanging it for a quantity pC/B of B, itself obtained in exchange for a quantity pC/B pB/A of A.

If the product pC/B pB/A were less than pC/A, purchase of C against A would be effected through the intermediary of B. All else equal, this would push up 58 prices pB/A and pC/B until their product equaled the value pC/A. This product cannot, therefore, be less than pC/A.

One can demonstrate in the same manner that it cannot be higher.

Therefore, we have:

pC|A = pC|B pB|A

or:

lf1981_Ch05_UEQ_001.jpg

Thus, under a free price system, the price of an article in relation to another is always equal to the ratio of their respective prices in relation to a third article.

This relation has an important consequence—namely, that in a market where prices can fluctuate freely, the value of any article can be known in relation to all others if we know its value in relation to a single one of them.

A mathematician would deduce from it that, under a free price system, two articles having the same value in relation to a given unit would keep equal values in relation to any other. He would add that, if the value of an article was equal to the total value of two other articles in terms of a given unit, this would also be true in terms of any other unit. From these relations, he would conclude that the values are magnitudes that can be equaled or added up—and therefore measured—and that any characteristic of value that exists in relation to a given unit remains true, no matter what the unit is in which values are reported.

In the following chapters, we shall therefore refer to the value of an article of wealth, knowing that it can only be expressed in terms of another, but without worrying about the article of wealth that is chosen as the measuring standard. We will also know that our conclusions remain valid, irrespective of the measuring standard, just as the laws of thermal expansion remain true, no matter what unit of length is used.

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Chapter VI: Capital, Income, Production, Consumption, and Saving in a Universe without Money

Allow us to place at the heading of this chapter the name of Irving Fisher. It is from his magisterial work The Nature of Capital and Income1 that the concept of income has been drawn, without which this dynamic theory could not have been attempted.

§1. The Concepts of Capital and Income

Economic life provides man with the goods that he wishes to possess. In order to understand the development of this, we need to know the nature of the satisfactions that human beings seek in the possession of articles of wealth.

If an individual desires a house, it is not—generally—because he is anxious to own the bricks that make up the house, but because the bricks, when properly arranged, provide him with the “service” of protecting him against inclement weather. That which gives the use of a house its desirable character is therefore the “housing service” that it is capable of providing.

Similarly, if a man wishes to own a garment, it is not in order to possess the fibers of wool or cotton of which the garment is made, but because these fibers, when arranged in the form of a jacket or a pair of pants, provide him the “service” of clothing, or of appearance, that he desires.

Similarly, too, if a ton of coal or two pounds of bread are desired, it is not for the atoms of carbon they contain, but because these, in the form of coal or 60 bread, can provide “heating services” or “nourishing services,” which are themselves desired.

This concept is a general one. It extends to the most varied types of objects, a testimony being the record player, which man desires, not in order to possess the wax of the phonograph record, but because it can provide man with the “service” of producing a desired musical sound.

Hence, in all cases, what man seeks through the possession of articles of wealth is always the “services” they can provide him by answering his needs or his wishes.

In the previous examples, it was through material objects that the sought-after services were produced. Services can also be produced through intangible objects, such as a piece of music or a book, which are made by the order of musical notes or letters that constitute it, an order capable of producing the desired listening or reading service; or a patent, which produces the service of making possible the production of the invented object; or goodwill,2 which provides the service of a profit-generating customer base.

The common feature of all these various services is that they are influences sought by men.

Any tangible or intangible object that can produce services is called capital.

A house is capital, and so is a ton of coal, a loaf of bread, a horse, a theater play, or goodwill.

The flow of services derived from capital, during a certain period, is called income from capital.

The yearly income from a house is the flow of housing services that it generates in one year. The aggregate income that it can provide is the total of all the housing services that it will produce during its entire lifespan.

Similarly, the income produced by one horse over a given period of time is the transportation service and, possibly, the feeding service that it will yield during this period.

From the point of view of economic theory—and without seeing in this analogy anything inhumane or degrading, because it does not take into account any moral or social concerns—a man who, as a result of his labor, produces intellectual or manual services should be considered capital. But this capital, 61 ever since the abolition of slavery, cannot be appropriated, or rather cannot be owned, except by the person who occupies the body in question. [The body] is even inalienable and exempt from seizure and it alone is entitled to dispose of the services that it produces.

It is, by the way, as owner of the capital that the body represents that any free man can sell his labor, just as he sells the services of any other capital that belongs to him. The work of a slave, to the contrary, can only be sold by the master, to whom the slave belongs, just like the slave’s body.

The total quantity of services that a capital can produce depends upon its condition but, in the absence of external intervention contributing to rebuilding the capital to the [same] extent that it uses itself up, this quantity is always limited. One ton of coal, for instance, will yield heating services only within the limits of its energy-producing value as fuel, and a loaf of bread will provide feeding services only within the limits of its nutritive value. A car will yield only a limited quantity of transportation services, because, after several tens of thousands of kilometers traveled, it will be out of order, as though the quantity of services it contained were depleted.

Even a house, which provides its services over a long period of time, does not escape the universal law of aging. The day when the house collapses, the last drop of housing services will have been provided.

Hence, everything happens as though income were the product of the disintegration of capital. Each item of capital would contain, within its structure, a certain quantity of services, just as an explosive contains energy. But these services are in condensed form and are released in consumable form only at their flow-out rate.

Generally, services only flow out of capital to the extent that they are used, like lake water that fuels a turbine. Coal that is not burned, clothes that are not worn, retain their full heating or clothing capacity.

For services to be released, and thus for capital to be depleted, the sluice gate has to be open. The owner of an object is the one who, by disposing of the object, determines its use and thereby its degree of wear and tear. He controls the rate of depletion, but not beyond the limits of physical utilization possibilities.

These possibilities are nearly always determined by technical circumstances, which leave the owner only a fairly narrow margin of choice.

A ton of coal, for instance, can be burned at various rates of speed, but only within the framework of possibilities that the furnace allows. The furnace determines the maximum disintegration rate of the capital that coal constitutes.

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Similarly, the rate of outflow of the transport services that an automobile can provide depends on the speed at which it is driven, but this speed cannot exceed a certain limit, which is dictated by manufacturing features beyond the driver’s control.

Sometimes, the margin of freedom left to the user is practically nil: capital releases its income at a rate that is almost independent of the use that one makes of it. Such is the case, for instance, of a house that, regardless of whether it is inhabited or not, yields housing services. Unused services are wasted in the surrounding air, just as the energy of an uncaptured waterfall is lost, or the electricity of a battery that, without being used, gradually self-discharges.

Man is subject to the same limitations as other kinds of capital. The volume of his services over a twenty-four-hour period does indeed vary depending on the intensity of his exertions, but the margin of choice is slim and is fairly narrowly determined by the limits of human capacities.

Thus, in all cases, the rate at which capital releases the income it is capable of producing, hence its disintegration rate, is always subject to a maximum limit that, for a given state of technology, is always dictated by the nature of things and not by the wills of human beings.

This is an important practical finding. It shows that the amount of satisfaction that men can derive from their capital over a given period is limited. They can increase their satisfaction only by increasing the volume of their capital (i.e., through saving); there can of course be technical progress, but technical progress itself can nearly always be regarded as an acceleration of the capital disintegration process.

The adjustment of consumption to the rate of capital disintegration raises an economic equilibrium problem, which theory will have to resolve. This problem will be dealt with further on.

The concept of income presented here is distinct from the usual one. The conventional concept is of a financial rather than economic nature, and takes as income the services provided by capital after provision has been made in order to maintain its value at a constant level. Thus, there would appear to be two constituent parts in the value of these services: one, which goes to depreciation charges, and compensates for the depreciation of the property; the other, which is the balance available after depreciation charges, and constitutes income, properly speaking.

It is hardly necessary to stress the conventional nature of this definition. Charging to depreciation is a type of service allocation that may appear com63mendable to the conservative manager but is only one among many possible types of allocation. Nothing in the nature of things leads to earmarking one part of income to replace capital or make good its gradual depreciation. Our definition of income is therefore different from the classical definition, because it views income not as a conventional magnitude, derived from rather arbitrary calculations, but as a physical reality—that is, the flow of services effectively released over a period of time.

Income taken in this sense is different from interest, with which it is too often confused. We have shown 3 that interest was the price paid for the renting of an item of capital, which one undertook to return in the state and condition in which it had been borrowed. Interest is therefore the price paid for the ability to hold, without wear and tear. This ability may be useful, for instance, to a producer who wishes to transform, but not use up, the capital borrowed, exclusive of any supply of services by such capital.

There is a profound difference between the concepts of capital and income, as defined above. Capital is something that exists at an instant of time, a “stock” whose state can be determined by an instantaneous photograph, whereas income can be likened to a flow over a certain period of time and, as such, is meaningful only over time.

§2. Production

The services sought by men are rarely the product of only one item of capital. In general, they are the outcome of a combination of services yielded by various types or items of capital. For instance, automobile transportation is a combination of services produced by the vehicle, the gasoline that it consumes, and the person who drives it.

Production is the process through which are generated the services sought by men, or the capital that can provide such services.

When the product is a service, the process of production consists mainly of amalgamating into one service various services provided by different items of capital. We just showed the example of the service of car transportation. Rail transportation, for example, is even more complex than automobile transportation: it amalgamates services provided by many items of capital (tracks, locomotives, cars, stations, energy, etc.) and by human beings (drivers, mechanics, 64 employees, engineers, business managers, etc.). The service provided by a hotel amalgamates the services yielded by the premises, the equipment, the employees fulfilling various functions, and the manager who runs it.

In the majority of cases, production generates not a service but a capital item that can produce the desired service. Agricultural production, for instance, combines the services provided by a field, a farmer, tools, and the working animals necessary for farming, and fertilizers and seeds. From the economic point of view, the manufacture of an automobile consists of incorporating into some items of capital, called raw materials, such as iron, steel, and aluminum, services produced by a factory and its equipment, by its workers, engineers, and managers, and by patents, all of which, when merged into one single article, will provide the “product” designed to generate the desired service.

Thus, although capital generates services, capital can also be considered an accumulator of services that participate in the production process, services that capital will return, in different form, during the period of utilization.

In the production process, one agent, the entrepreneur, plays an essential role. His “service” consists in bringing together the necessary capital and services and in directing the amalgamation process. The added value that the organizational work provides to the articles of wealth used is the entrepreneur’s “income.”

A tradesman is also an entrepreneur in his own way. The “service” that he provides, as a butcher or a grocer for instance, consists of moving products, bought for resale, to the point where they are wanted, in the desired quantities and forms.

This analysis will, perhaps, appear to be abstract and theoretical. We would like the reader to move beyond this first impression and seek to envision, following the same method, the production processes with which he is familiar. The activity of the farmer on his farm, of the craftsman in his workshop, of the sculptor, or of the musician will be found in the framework that this analysis constitutes, without forcing it to be so. And the reader will not be able to pejoratively dismiss as theoretical a theory that so closely fits the concrete realities of the economic process.

§3. Consumption and Saving

The consumption of services is the act by which their value is destroyed.

Consumption may be directed toward enjoyment or toward production.

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Consumption is directed toward enjoyment [consommation de jouissance] when man satisfies his needs or desires—for instance, when he consumes feeding, heating, or recreational services.

Consumption is directed toward production [consommation productive] when services are used up during a production process. In that case, the services are incorporated into the product, the resulting product being either a capital or a service. The value of the services is included in the product, in increased or reduced form, and is supplemented by the entrepreneur’s positive or negative income.

Productive use will be, for instance, the use of the services of workers, tools, or heating, by a business that produces cloth, automobiles, transportation services, etc., or the use of the feeding services provided by hay, for purposes of securing the hauling service produced by a draft horse, or the services provided by milling waste, for pig fattening.

Consumption directed toward enjoyment and consumption directed toward production differ, hence, in that the former incorporates services into an entity—the human being—which, ever since the abolition of slavery, is not assigned a value, whereas consumption directed toward production generates a product that can be sold and wherein the value of the constituent services can therefore be found again.

When a given service is used for production, it will be retained in the resulting product, whether capital or service.

Where the resulting product is capital and still exists at the end of the period during which the service has been obtained, the service is said to have been “saved.”

Thus, the saving effected over a given period consists of capital generated by services that have been produced but not used up, and are therefore “capitalized,” during this period.

§4. Aggregate Income and Acquired Wealth

The aggregate income of a community over a given period is the sum of the services supplied by the persons who constitute it (labor services) and by the capital owned by these persons (capital services properly speaking).

For instance, France’s aggregate income in 1942 was the sum total of the services produced throughout that year by all French people as a result of 66 their daily work and by the capital, fields, plants and equipment, etc., that they own.

It is this aggregate income that sustains domestic consumption, whether directed toward production or toward enjoyment.

Given a certain level of aggregate income, the more limited the enjoyment type of consumption, the greater the saving.

With regard to acquired wealth, it consists of capital assets—houses, factories, equipment, stocks [in the sense of supplies], etc.—accumulated prior to the time considered.

Such capital assets are reservoirs of services. During each period they are gradually depleted, by providing income. Depreciation is just the appearance and, as it were, the external manifestation of the depletion resulting, for each capital asset, from the loss of services it has provided.

It is as though capital were a sort of compressed tablet, or caplet, of services, which, in releasing these services, gradually melts away, just like a sugar cube dissolves in a glass of water.

It is true that, during each period, new capital is created through saving. We have seen that the portion of the services produced by capital that is allocated to making good or compensating for asset wasting is called depreciation charges. There is no reason, however, why saving should be limited to depreciation charges. In fact, in a community that develops [economically], saving always exceeds depreciation, so that acquired wealth continues to increase.

In addition, within a given community, the greater the acquired wealth, the higher—all else equal—aggregate income. It is therefore obvious that the accumulation of capital increases welfare or saving capabilities—on one condition, however: that the services produced by the capital saved correspond, by their very nature, to the wishes of those who could use them.

Affluent communities are those that have a considerable amount of accumulated capital, whose services they can consume if they do not save them. All else equal, they become wealthier to the extent that the part of their incomes spent on enjoyment-oriented consumption is limited.

In all cases, however, their wealth, at any point in time, will be limited to the amount of services condensed into existing capital, and their maximum welfare will never exceed the volume of income that existing capital can release during the period considered. These limits are absolute, regardless of the vicissitudes of income. They [these limits] evoke a principle of conservation, similar to that which directs conversions of energy, and which we hope to explore 67 in greater detail in a later work. They reveal at which sources the realities that sustain men are drawn.

These considerations must always be borne in mind, if we want to guard ourselves against the sophisms that arise, in a money system, from the complexities of existing structures and intellectual complacency regarding clever solutions that purport to somehow extract wealth out of nothingness.

The hollowness of such solutions is never more glaring than when exceptional needs call for substantial additional resources.

War, for instance, creates immense service needs: services from soldiers who fight; services from aircraft, from tanks, or from the explosive shells that they use; services from the men and the machinery that produce the equipment.

These services are to be found only where they exist: in the national income as a whole. All individuals assigned to military duties must be withdrawn from civilian employment. Thus, there are only two solutions in order to maximize the war effort: either maximize national income, or minimize consumption for enjoyment purposes.*

Among the methods that can increase national income, there is one on which we would like to insist, because it is often lost from view: it is the one that consists of speeding up the rate at which services are extracted from existing capital and of squeezing out of existing capital, down to the last drop, the services that it can yield.

In wartime, the accelerated wear and tear (or depreciation) of persons,4 of equipment, of stockpiles, constitutes a veritable “decapitalization” process and constitutes one of the main forms of the impoverishment brought about by war.

This analysis also shows that a community wishing to engage in an exceptional infrastructure drive, or introduce a policy of major “public works” [grands travaux], must either increase its national income or limit the part of national 68 income that it devotes to consumption for enjoyment purposes. Any other proposition is pure fantasy and sheer illusion.

These observations are so simple that one hesitates to state them. And yet, the practical conclusions to be derived have often been ignored or even questioned in the conducive obscurity of doctrinal discussions. Within the framework of a universe without money, these obvious findings shed light on the true nature of problems, which cease being perfectly clear only when they are transposed from the realm of economic reality into the realm of monetary verbiage.

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Chapter VII: The Appropriation of Articles of Wealth

§1. The Principle of a Policed Society

Owning an article of wealth means being master of it; it means being able to dispose of it at one’s discretion.

Thus, appropriation is a de facto situation, one in which an object is subjected to the will of an individual.1

Articles of wealth, from which the desired influences are derived, are however limited in quantity. Their appropriation will therefore be the object of competing claims. It can become established or be maintained only by repelling all rival claims—that is to say, by force.

An uncivilized society is a society in which each individual stakes out, by using his own force, the domain that will be subject to his will alone, and forbids access to competing wills.

A policed society, in contrast, is one in which a coercive police force, organized by, and under the command of, the social authorities, has the task of providing for certain people the peaceful enjoyment of a number of objects.

This coercive force, by the action it exerts or that it is capable of exerting, relieves those whom it protects of the task of defending their own property. A policed society is a club whose members can leave their guns in the cloakroom.

In order for the police agency to fulfill its mission, however, it must know what this mission is. In other words, the police have to be told with precision, with regard to each object, who is to be the person whose peaceful enjoyment must be safeguarded—in other words, the person who has the exclusive right to request the police’s protective intervention.

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This person will be the person who can justifiably claim to have a property right of ownership over a given object, since under Article 544 of the French Civil Code, “ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations.”2

The essential attribute of the right of ownership therefore consists of being a criterion that allows for police intervention. It is the conspicuous mark of the monopoly that a person has been granted to enjoy and dispose of an object.

The right of ownership will best fulfill its function if its existence can be proved easily to those who would contest it.

In the case of movable property, its existence derives from possession, which, as the old adage says, “is nine-tenths of the law.” In the case of other categories of goods, its existence is established by various rules, which, generally, retrace the origin of the right, thereby proving its validity.

Where the right is contested, the courts are called upon to settle the dispute. Saying what the law is, is essentially saying whom and what the police must protect.

Thus, a right establishes a visible link—one that can be justified to third parties—between a person and an object; it is as indifferent to the person as to the object concerned, just as it is indifferent to the morality of the order that it establishes. Whether just or unjust, a right is simply there to guide interventions by the police and direct their actions.

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If a right has been equitably allocated, then the social order is equitable; if it has been unjustly allocated, then the social order is iniquitous. In either case, however, the society will be able to be a policed society, and this will indeed be the case if the police effectively succeed in ensuring for any person the peaceful enjoyment of the domain that his “rights” delineate.

§2. The Property Right of Ownership, a Value Receptacle

a) The Property Right of Ownership Properly Speaking

The property right of ownership, as defined in Article 544 of the French Civil Code, provides to the person who is endowed with it the privilege of enjoying and disposing of an object in all its attributes, unless explicitly provided otherwise by the existing laws and regulations.

The property right of ownership has, therefore, the same substance as the object itself; it encompasses the object fully and attaches it to the person of the owner. It is, however, distinct from the object, just as a container is distinct from its contents. Ownerless property, for instance, is not enclosed in any property right, until appropriated.

The property right of ownership hence encloses the object owned in a kind of envelope that bears a personal mark, that of the owner; it “assigns” the object owned to a particular patrimony, as a jockey’s silks assign the horse in a stable.

The “content” of a right is not, directly, the object owned, but the ability to enjoy and dispose of it. It is this ability, sought by men, that constitutes property; it is this that holds value to them.

Now, value is the one feature common to all the articles of wealth that, by exchange, can “fill” the same right.

The value of the object owned therefore establishes the size of the right that encloses it. It allows us to distinguish, in any property right of ownership, two different characteristics: its volume and the nature of its contents. The latter is ancillary and contingent, because it can be modified through exchange. The former, in contrast, is essential and final since, all things equal as far as prices are concerned, it sets ne varietur3 the quantity of any articles of wealth that the 72 holder of the right will be able to obtain in exchange for the one that he possesses.

The property right of ownership is therefore a genuine value receptacle, of a well-defined volume, which can be filled, in accordance with the holder’s desire, and up to the limit of its volume, with any article of wealth supplied on the market, or rather with the value that ownership of such wealth represents.

The volume of a property right is determined by the value of the object to which it relates: for instance, 1,000 francs worth of wine, wheat, or coal. But a property right can also be measured by a certain quantity of a good at a given price: ten quintals of wheat at 100 francs per quintal, or two tons of coal at 500 francs per ton.

Generally, as every individual holds a property right of ownership to his labor and to the services generated by the capital that he owns, wealth is appropriated as soon as it is created. Thus, a property right of ownership is born at the same time as the article of wealth it encompasses, and perishes the moment this article of wealth disappears through consumption or destruction.

b) The Right of Claim4

Ownership, as defined above, is the ability to enjoy and dispose of an object. In general, this ability is a direct one and the object owned is an article of wealth properly speaking.

Ownership, however, can also be of the indirect type. In this case, it is the ability to obtain from a person, the debtor, a certain thing. This form of ownership is a claim.

The right that encloses it and assigns it to a given person is referred to as a right of claim and is simply one specific form of the property right of ownership. It is only by way of omission that it can be referred to as such; in reality, a right of claim provides its owner with the ability to enjoy and dispose of a claim, and would more precisely be referred to as a “property right to a claim.”

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The content of a right of claim is not, therefore, the value of the object to which the claim pertains, but the value of the claim on that object.

A right of claim may be on demand or at a date future and certain. It is on demand if it provides the holder with the ability of obtaining immediately the right to enjoy and dispose of an object; it is at a date future and certain if such an ability can only be enjoyed at a future date.

The due date is the date from which point on the right of claim can be converted into a property right, if the holder so requests.

The volume of a right of claim is that of the property right to the claim that it encloses. This volume is determined by the value of the claim. This value is usually less than the value of the article of wealth that can be obtained with the right of claim, the more so the further away the due date is.

c) The Difference between the Property Right of Ownership Properly Speaking and the Right of Claim

A property right of ownership, properly speaking, provides to the holder the ability to enjoy and dispose of an article of wealth, in all its attributes. This is why its content is sometimes confused with the article of wealth itself.

In contrast, a right of claim provides only the possibility of demanding the ability to enjoy and dispose of the article of wealth to which it pertains. Until the moment at which the holder will have exercised his right, this ability will not have been obtained. The article of wealth concerned, if it exists, will simply remain enclosed in the property right whose holder is the debtor.

A right of claim can therefore be regarded as a right devoid of wealth, a mere receptacle, which will receive its content only when the creditor has been given his full rights.

This interpretation should not mislead anyone, however. Although a right of claim does not contain the article of wealth to which it relates, it is, much like nesting boxes that children fit one into the other, filled with a claim on that article of wealth, which may be exchanged, in accordance with the holder’s desire, for any other value in the market.

Thus, everything happens as though the claim were a representation of the value that constitutes, in the debtor’s assets, the claim’s counterpart. Quite frequently, this representation is in the form of securities such as bonds, Treasury bills, bills of exchange, certificates of indebtedness, etc. Regardless of whether its representation materializes, however, the claim is the “object” that fills the creditor’s right and gives it its existence, while simultaneously defining its volume through its value. It is this object that the claim holder 74 supplies in the market, without waiting for the due date, whenever he wishes to modify the content of his right. The object is also what makes it possible to consider the right of claim as one particular form of the property right of ownership.

Thus, the value of the object that is the content of a right of claim is the value that the market assigns to the ability of obtaining, at the due date, the enjoyment of and control over the article of wealth to which the claim entitles the holder. With regard to the right of the debtor, it is filled similarly, with the value that the market assigns to the ability to enjoy and dispose of the same article of wealth between the instant of time considered and the due date. The value of the claim is therefore a veritable partitioning of the value of the object that is, in the assets of the debtor, the claim’s counterpart.

d) False Claims and False Rights

The preceding analysis shows that possession of a claim enables the holder to require the debtor to perform, on the due date, as provided under the contract, and, if he defaults, to resort to the enforcement measures available in a policed society.

The most accommodating debtor in the world can, however, only deliver the articles of wealth that he himself can enjoy and dispose of—in other words, those to which he holds a property right of ownership. Their value is the extreme limit of the value of the articles of wealth that the creditor can lay hold of, even with the assistance of law enforcement. The rights of claim, regardless of their nominal value, can therefore be filled only with the value of the articles of wealth that the debtor possesses on the due date.

If the value of the matured claims presented for payment exceeds the value of these articles of wealth, the claim holder will note that the part of his claim that exceeds the existing assets has no value, whatever the nominal amount of the claim may be. The situation is exactly as though the part of the claim that cannot be honored did not exist. One will say that the claim is a false claim.

The right that encloses the claim only provides the holder with the ability to enjoy and dispose of the articles of wealth that can “fill” it. To the extent that the claim that it encloses is false—whatever its nominal size may be—it cannot receive any content other than that particular claim. The situation is as though the ability that it provides—to dispose of the article of wealth—simply did not exist. One will say that the right is a false right.

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A false claim is therefore a claim that cannot provide the holder, on the due date, with the articles of wealth that such claim requires to be delivered. A false right is a right that encloses a false claim.

By contrast, a true claim is a claim that can be met normally on the due date, and a true right, a right that encloses a true claim.

On the basis of these definitions, a claim could be said to be true or false only when it is due. As we shall see further on, however, on the basis of accounting analysis, it is possible to specify the nature of claims yet to mature and to regard as false, as soon as they emerge, any claims maturing at a future date that cannot, in any case whatsoever, be filled.

§3. Reflections on the Balance Sheet

What matters to the creditor is whether, on the due date, his rights will be fully filled—i.e., whether he holds a true or a false claim.

To answer this question, it is not necessary to consider the consistency, in kind, of the debtor’s property rights or rights to claim. The point is that, if the debtor does not possess the article of wealth that he has undertaken to deliver, then he has to obtain it through exchange, against the articles of wealth that he holds.

In order to determine whether a claim is true or false, it is therefore enough to anticipate what the debtor’s net worth will be on the due date—that is to say, the value of his rights of property and of his rights of claim, [as well as] the value of the claimable debts he will have to reckon with.

The balance sheet describes this situation.

a) The Balance Sheets of Natural Persons and Legal Entities

The [traditional] balance sheet of a natural person or a legal entity is a table showing, on the assets side, the rights of property and the rights of claims of the person concerned and, on the liabilities side, the debts incurred.5

The table also shows the value of these various items.

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The rights and obligations included on the balance sheet can be grouped into various categories depending on the due date. Thus, by looking at the balance sheet one can compare the value of the assets and the value of the matured rights mentioned on the liabilities side and determine whether the latter are true or false rights.

A balance sheet provides a reliable and final picture of the present alone, at the very moment at which the present becomes the past, but it allows—at each instant of time—a determination to be made of the value of those assets that remain available after matured debts have been repaid, hence of the value of the rights of the patrimony holder. Now, all else equal, the resources necessary for the repayment of due debts will be extracted from the value of these available assets. Knowledge of the situation of available assets is therefore the critical factor for the forecasting of future situations; so long as the debts have not reached maturity, however, forecasting remains a matter of conjecture, because of the uncertainties inherent in decisions that could introduce new assets or liabilities into the balance sheet.

b) The Balance Sheet of the Patrimony of a Natural Person or a Legal Entity

One of the main practical purposes of balance sheets is therefore to determine the value of assets and how this value compares with the value of the debts that have yet to mature.

In order to facilitate this comparison, double-entry bookkeeping relies on a presentational device, with which one can identify immediately, from the balance sheet, the value of the holder’s own rights—in other words, the difference between the value of assets and the value of liabilities.

This device substitutes, for the balance sheet of the person proper, the balance sheet of the patrimony of a natural person or legal entity.

The patrimony of a natural person or a legal entity is an entity that is independent of that person, although controlled by him, and to which all his rights of property or rights of claim, and all his obligations, are deemed to have been transferred. The function of the patrimony is, at each instant of time, to ensure settlement of current liabilities and to make provision for the settlement of liabilities still to reach maturity, leaving at the disposal of the holder only those values that represent the excess of assets over liabilities.

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The balance sheet of the patrimony is the balance sheet of the entity thus set up. It shows, on the assets side, all the property rights of ownership and the rights of claim of the holder and, on the liabilities side, in two entries or groups of distinct entries, that part of assets which is required for settlement of debts and the balance left available.

Only this balance left available “fills” the holder’s rights, which are included under “equity,”6 or “equity and reserves.”

Thus, the holder of the patrimony finds himself, in relation to his patrimony, in the same position as the sole shareholder of a company that manages his assets and undertakes responsibility for his liabilities. He is only entitled to the balance available, after provision has been made for a reserve of values in order to “fill” third parties’ rights.7

This presentation uncovers any surplus—and possibly any shortfall—in the assets in relation to the recognized rights of third parties, and brings out the likelihood of the creditors receiving their full rights.

If the balance sheet shows that there is capital—in other words, if the value of the patrimony holder’s rights are not zero—the claims that appear on the liabilities side can become false claims only if and when the equity [cushion] has been fully used up.

As long as there is some equity [cushion], this will constitute the margin of guarantee protecting third parties against any insufficiency of assets.

The “patrimonial device” brings out the difference in nature between the patrimony holder’s own rights [equity] and third parties’ rights.

Third parties’ rights are rights of claim, whose size in terms of value is set ne varietur by the conventions that have given rise to them. They are of the same type as the rights of corporate bondholders.

By contrast, the patrimony holder’s rights are rights in kind: rights to the net balance available after provision has been made for settlement of third 78 parties’ claims. Their volume, at each instant of time, is equal to the excess of assets over liabilities toward third parties. They are comparable, in every respect, to shareholders’ rights.

Attributing an accounting personality to a patrimony—a management company that settles the rights and liabilities of its owner—turns the holder’s own rights into true rights of claim to his own patrimony. In a community where all accounting is of the double-entry type, the rights of a natural person or a legal entity would all be rights of claim, the rights that are commonly referred to as property rights only being, in reality, rights of claim to the patrimony of the person exercising these property rights. Among these rights of claim, however, third parties’ rights remain fundamentally different from the patrimony holder’s own rights, because third parties’ rights can be defined by their volume, whereas the volume of the holder’s [own] rights, whatever their nominal value, is only the volume of assets that are effectively available after provision has been made for third parties’ rights to be [appropriately] filled.

c) The Value of False Claims

Thus, at each instant of time, the patrimony holder’s own rights are limited to the volume of the assets, net of third parties’ claims, that remain available.

These assets themselves, however, may be insufficient to fill the claims of third parties at maturity that must be met with payment. Where this is the case, some such claims will have to be scaled down, since the value that could fill them does not exist and, no matter what procedure one might use, only that which exists can be seized.

The claims that are void of any value will be false claims.

Nevertheless, although the nature of things invariably determines the proportion of the matured claims that can be filled, in those cases where there is a shortfall it does not specify which of these claims will remain void of any value.

In the present state of French law, this is determined by the following rules:

In the absence of any specific provisions to the contrary, the assets available can only be apportioned between the matured claims. In case of bankruptcy, however, unmatured debts become due for payment.8

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If some claims are secured, the claims holder can fill them by drawing on the value of the security, whose available balance, if any, is assigned to assets. Then, privileged creditors will make their own drawings, in the order of creditors’ privilege ranking; nonprivileged creditors come last.

If the value of available assets is insufficient to fill a given category of claims, these [claims] will have to be scaled down. This can be done in three different ways.

The due date of some claims may be extended. The “consolidation” may be voluntarily consented to by some creditors, whether they relinquish exercising their rights—like government bond holders who neglect to present bonds for redemption—or agree to an extension of the due date or to a new loan to the debtor, such as government bond holders that renew their bonds. Consolidation may also be imposed upon creditors; in such a case, it is considered forced.

If the volume of the rights that have come due and have not been consolidated exceeds the value of assets, then these rights also have to be scaled down.

This may be done in a uniform manner, in which case these rights will be assigned a part of the assets proportional to their value, in other words a dividend. They will have been devalued.

On the other hand, some of them may be canceled in full, in order for those rights that continue in existence to be filled in full.

Forced consolidation, devaluation, and cancellation of claims are all violations of the contract that binds the debtor and the creditor. They are bankruptcy solutions. They eliminate all false rights, however, by reducing the level of third parties’ rights down to the volume of the articles of wealth capable of filling them. They [bankruptcy solutions] are the indispensable instrument that adjusts financial appearances to economic realities, realities from which men cannot escape.

The preceding analysis shows that a false claim and the false right that encloses it can only continue to exist to the extent that their holder agrees not to exercise them, [and] therefore—assuming that the claim has come due—if the holder agrees to extend his loan, unless another lender accepts to empty his rights to true articles of wealth into the debtor’s assets, and fills them with the false claims that the first lender wishes to part with. Thus, a false claim and a false right will not survive the test of collection, which is for them the hard contact with realities. The moment they are put to the test of collection, both are reduced to the size of the debtor’s assets. All that is false in them vanishes; only a true claim and a true right remain.

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d) The Meaning of Assets and Liabilities

In a universe where the accountant is king, all goods are appropriated. An article of wealth, therefore, will enter into a patrimony only if enclosed in an envelope of right or rights. The moment it becomes part of the patrimony, it is assigned to the assets [on the balance sheet]. The rights that enclosed it have therefore been emptied of their substance. They continue to exist, however. They remain with the transferor in the form of rights of claim, which can be filled, on the due date, with values drawn from the debtor’s assets.

Everything happens as if these articles of wealth, upon entering the patrimony, left behind in the cloakroom, on behalf of their respective holders, the rights in which they were enveloped.

Two details should be noted when describing the entry of a value into a patrimony: the compartment to which the patrimony holder assigns the value transferred to him, and the identity of the holder of the rights in which this value was enclosed at the time of entry. The rights holder may be the patrimony holder himself, or a transferring third party.

These two details are recorded in two separate columns: the first is recorded on the assets side of the balance sheet; the second, on the liabilities side. As, in both cases, the value entered is the same, the total values entered on the assets side will always be identically equal to the total values entered on the liabilities side.

Thus, assets appear to be a record of all the articles of wealth that have entered into a patrimony, and liabilities a record of the rights that enclosed them at the time the articles of wealth were transferred into the patrimony.

e) Accounting Cinematography

Under the above interpretation, the balance sheet can be regarded as a dual photograph of the patrimony at the time when it is established: a photograph of the wealth (either articles of wealth properly speaking or claims) that constitutes the assets, and a photograph of the rights (that is, of the value receptacles) that enclosed the articles of wealth when these were transferred into the assets of the patrimony.

The composition of the patrimony varies continuously, either through modifications in its structure—that is, as a result of changes or variations in the value of the articles of wealth making up the assets—or through modifications of the rights representing liabilities.

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Although the sum of the values entered on the assets side is always identically equal to the sum of those entered on the liabilities side, one should bear in mind that these are the values under which the various assets have been recorded for accounting purposes.9 The recorded values may be different from the true values of these assets, however, due to differences between the true value of some assets and the value figure at which they have been entered on the balance sheet, or as a result of changes in the value of these assets since they were recorded on the balance sheet (upon initial recognition).

If the balance sheet figures and the real figures are to be reconciled, the values entered on the assets side will have to be modified. Such modification may, however, lead to a difference between the aggregate values of assets and liabilities.

We have shown, in section (c) above, that, in order to avoid this discrepancy and ensure that the rights entered on the liabilities side remain true rights, the total value of the liabilities had to be adjusted to the value of the assets by modifying, in the first instance, the patrimony holder’s own rights, and second—but only in cases where the value of the holder’s own rights has been reduced to nil—third parties’ rights.

Thus, the balance sheet will be ever-changing. If one wanted to describe the changes in a patrimony over time, one would need to show a “film-reel motion picture” of its successive balance sheets, separated by very short time intervals.10

One would see the changes in the figures reflect the changes in the structure of assets and the changes in the value of individual items that make up the assets. At each instant of time, the liabilities side of the picture would show recognized third parties’ rights and the constantly revised value of the patrimony holder’s own rights.

In practice, however, the revision of the values recorded on the balance sheet, and the adjustment of the liabilities to the assets, occurs only at distant intervals, in general only at those times when detailed accounts are drawn up. In between these periods, only occurrences affecting the structure of the patrimony are recorded, such as the transformation, creation, or consumption of wealth. It must be said, however, as explained in section (f) hereafter, that these 82 are only recorded in suspense accounts, it being understood that their effects on the related items on the balance sheet will not be reflected before the next period at which detailed accounts are drawn up.

Balance sheets that are drawn up during these intervening periods are fictitious, in the sense that they assign to the various components of the patrimony the value under which they appeared on the balance sheet at the time when detailed accounts were previously drawn up; this value is usually different from the [various assets’] current value. Thus, the volume that the balance sheets assign to the patrimony holder’s own rights and, where the case arises, to third parties’ rights is different from what it would be on the basis of the true value of the assets. Where there is insufficiency of assets, the holder’s [own] rights—and sometimes third parties’ rights—may be false rights. In any case, they can be measured accurately only when detailed accounts are drawn up.

f) The Classification of the Patrimony Holder’s Own Rights: Capital Rights and Income Rights

Balance sheets that are drawn up in between the dates when detailed accounts are made up generally differ from the opening and closing balances established at the beginning or at the end of the financial year, due to the classification of some of the patrimony holder’s own rights.

At the beginning of the year, these are included under the heading “equity” or under the various “equity” or “reserve” subheadings into which equity can be broken down.

In all interim balance sheets, however, so as not to alter the value of such headings during the financial year, the corrections that would have to be made in order to adjust the value of the liabilities to the value of the assets are included under various suspense items. These interim reconciliation items mention the different possible causes of variation.

Changes may, however, occur as a result of:

  • — the capitalization of services provided by capital owned by the patrimony holder, or by his own person;
  • — increases or decreases in the value of items already included on the assets side, which are recorded when exchanges take place or detailed accounts are made up;
  • — extraordinary gains or losses.
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On the basis of this analysis, one would have to open three different suspense accounts: one for capitalized income, one for increases or decreases in the value of capital, and one for profits and losses, where all incomings and outgoings occurring during the financial year and altering the value of the patrimony holder’s own rights would be recorded.

At year end, the account of increases or decreases in the value of equity would be completed by recording the changes in value resulting from the updating of various items on the balance sheet, and the “equity” item or its components would be corrected so as to include the balances of the three above-mentioned accounts, in order to arrive at the true value of the patrimony holder’s own rights, which is the value that excludes any false rights.

The “capitalized income” account, however, should only include that part of the income provided either by the capital owned by the patrimony holder or by his own person that has not been consumed, lost, or wasted.

In order to arrive at a more complete description of factors affecting the patrimony, one tries to record in the “income” account all the services provided during the financial year either by the capital owned by his domain or by his own person, regardless of whether these have been capitalized or not.

The value of these services is recorded on the liabilities side, as if they had their full counterpart in the assets. Now, the services used up by the patrimony holder—or rather, the corresponding values—are not shown in the assets. In order to avoid the discrepancy that would otherwise result, a “consumption” suspense account is opened, showing on the assets side the value of the services produced by the patrimony holder’s capital or by the patrimony holder himself, during the period under consideration, which have been used up for enjoyment purposes. Throughout the year, the value of these services continues to be included on the assets side of the balance sheet, as though they had been capitalized. Only upon the closing of the financial year, when detailed accounts are drawn up and asset values revised, will economic truth be restored. This will be done by reducing the patrimony holder’s own rights by an amount equal to the value of the wealth used up, while at the same time eliminating this value from the assets.

In actual fact, one will always fail to catch some of the services produced by the patrimony holder that he uses up immediately, for instance those that he provides by traveling or reading, etc.

These will, however, be omitted from both the “income” and “consumption” accounts, so that there will be no discrepancies between the two sides of the balance sheet.

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The previous considerations cast light on the nature of the “income” and “consumption” accounts, on the liability and the asset sides of the ledger. They show that, in reality, there is no such thing as capital rights on the one hand and income rights on the other. There is capitalized income, which—from the moment income is such—will appear in the form of capital on the assets side, whereas income that is used up does not so appear. The rights that arise with capitalized income increase the patrimony holder’s own rights by a corresponding amount. Those that arise with income that is used up become extinguished immediately and do not affect the value of own rights.

It is clear therefore that the “income” and “consumption” accounts, just as the “capital value increases or decreases” and “profit and loss” accounts, are simply an accounting fiction purporting to trace the changes in the “capital” item or its components. They shed light on the origin of such changes, but are meaningful only at the instant of time when the changes occur.

Thus, saying that property rights are capital or income carries no specific implication as regards their particular nature, but simply gives a precise indication as to the origin of the articles of wealth that they enclose, in that this makes it clear that the services from which these articles of wealth have been derived were produced before or during the accounting period under consideration.

In view of the fact that human consumption, or consumption for enjoyment purposes, can only relate to services but does not necessarily use up all the services produced during the period under consideration—as part of these services may be capitalized—the preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the value of consumption expenditures effected over a certain period of time cannot exceed the value of the income generated throughout this period.

§4. On the Nature of the Property Right of Ownership

A property right of ownership is not, as its definition might lead one to believe, a legal abstraction. It is fundamentally a concrete concept, the substance of which we shall now try to define.

A property right of ownership is the ability, for the holder, to enjoy and dispose of an “object.” Enjoying an “object” means using at one’s discretion all that may be derived from it. Disposing of it means being able to transfer its enjoyment to any person of one’s own choice, in particular by means of exchange, hence against other objects of equal value.

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In order that a property right of ownership be effective, it is necessary and sufficient that the enjoyment and disposal abilities it provides be themselves effective, and to the sole benefit of the holder.

For this, three conditions must be met. If they are met, the right is a true right. If not, it will be a false right.

Suppose, for instance, that a person owns fifty bushels of wheat. For his enjoyment and free disposal abilities to be effective within the limits of the volume of his right, it is necessary:

  • — that there exist, in actual fact, wheat in the universe in which the owner lives; that the owner be in a position to force upon a certain quantity of this wheat the use or the assignment he chooses; and that the quantity of wheat thus subjected to his sole will be not fewer than fifty bushels.

With regard to the first condition, we will not go on at length about the mysteries of being and not-being. A child to whom one promises a cake knows perfectly well that it will only be able to get some if this cake actually exists, and he has no doubt whatsoever about the meaning of this condition.

The second condition implies setting aside, within existing stocks of wheat, a quantity that will be subjected to the sole will of the owner, within the margin allowed by the nature of things.

Now, each object is desired by many persons, who will all claim the right to enjoy or dispose of it. In order that the owner should be the only person enjoying this ability, its use must be made undesirable to all the other members of the community considered.

This can be done by imposing compelling sanctions, which nullify any claim to enjoyment or to free disposal made by persons other than the owner.

In modern societies, where power is exercised by civilian authorities, it is the police that enforce compelling sanctions. It is therefore the police that make the owner’s enjoyment and disposal ability effective, thereby fulfilling the second of our conditions.

The third condition requires that the amount of wheat subject to the sole will of the owner be the quantity stipulated by the right as expressed.

If this quantity were fewer than fifty bushels, the right, regardless of its nominal value, would only carry an enjoyment and disposal ability not exceeding this actual quantity. As regards any amount in excess, the promised enjoyment and disposal ability would be purely illusory. This ability could continue to 86 exist only to the extent that its holder accepted not to exercise it; the corresponding right would be a false right.

Let us now try to specify the influences that can generate false rights.

Although the volume of a right can be defined in terms of quantity, it is generally expressed in terms of value, for accounting reasons. For instance, rather than being the owner of a quintal of wheat, one owns 200 francs worth of wheat.

In order that the enjoyment and free disposal ability promised to the owner be effective, the quantity of wheat that is subject to his sole will must effectively be worth the money amount set forth by the right.

Now, the value of an article of wealth is equal to the product of the quantity by the price.

The price selected for the drawing up of the balance sheet is not necessarily the market equilibrium price, however. It may deviate from it under a free price system as well as under a controlled price system.

Under a free price system, the difference may result from a change in the market price that has occurred since the time when the article of wealth considered was entered in the books, or from overvaluation with fraudulent intent; this is what happens, in particular, when a tradesman overvalues his stocks or his claims, in order to conceal his insolvency.

Under a controlled price system, the deviation may result from the fact that an official price has been set at a level that is different from the market equilibrium price.

When, under a free price system, the price at which an article is recognized [entered in the books] is different from the market price, the aggregate volume of the rights recorded on the liabilities side can be maintained only to the extent that the rights remain filled with the overvalued article of wealth. The moment the rights holders wish to dispose of them, they will find that the overvalued article of wealth allows for an ability to dispose only to the extent of the article of wealth’s true value in the market. Their rights are therefore false and will become true rights again only after having been scaled down—by being subjected to the test of the market—to the level of their true contents.

Under a controlled price system, if, for instance, the legal price is set above the equilibrium level (see fig. 3), at each session of the market the volume of supply will exceed the volume of demand by an amount d1 s1. Part of the rights that the holders will wish to empty of the article of wealth whose price is controlled cannot be so emptied. Although the price level has been fixed, the con87tent of such rights will afford the owners no purchasing power whatsoever. The value of this wealth will be nil and the ability to dispose that is attached to the right that encloses it will be entirely illusory.

lf1981_figure_003.jpg

Fig. 3. [Q: Quantity; D: Demand; S: Supply; P: Price]

Thus, setting the price at a level in excess of the market equilibrium price will generate, at each session of the market, among the rights that the owners wish to empty of their contents, a volume of false rights d1 s1.

This is what happens, for instance, in the wheat market, when a minimum price is set without any arrangement having been made for a public or semipublic body, such as the French Wheat Office [L’Office du Blé], to buy the wheat surplus supplied but not demanded at the legal price. The producers who do not manage to sell their wheat realize that the rights pertaining to the wheat that cannot be sold are false rights, government decrees notwithstanding.

Similarly, systems under which, as a result of legal provisions or collective bargaining agreements that are effectively applied, the price of labor is set above the equilibrium level, while no arrangement has been made in order that the services supplied but not demanded should be bought (through a system of subsidies to unemployed workers), are systems that generate false rights. At each session of the market, the volume [of false rights] is the volume of the rights that some workers cannot empty of the services that they offer in vain. These workers, too, experience the tragic reality of the substantive nature of the difference between true rights and false rights.

The difference is, fundamentally, the one that exists between truth and falsehood.

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A true right is one whose volume matches the value that its content has, not in the eyes of some desk theorist or of a businessman seeking to deceive his creditor, but in the market, on the basis of effective supply and demand, and in such a way that the former be entirely absorbed by the latter.

A false right, in contrast, is one whose volume has been fixed a priori, regardless of the conditions that must be met for all the quantities actually supplied to be actually taken up in the market.

This distinction, which will cast light on all subsequent discussions, will prove particularly useful later on when we discuss the legal structure of human societies.

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Chapter VIII: Exchange and Price Formation

§1. Exchange in Light of the Theory of Rights

We have so far defined exchange, in accordance with common perception, as consisting of a dual transfer of property rights, each of these transfers being voluntarily consented to, and each taking place in consideration of the other.

Under this definition, the price of an article of wealth B in terms of an article of wealth A measures the quantity of A that must be parted with in order to acquire, through exchange, the quantity unit of B.

Knowledge of the price of an article of wealth in terms of the article of wealth taken as the measuring standard determines, in accordance with the concept discussed in the preceding chapter, the volume of the right that encloses it.

This being so, one finds immediately that the rights enclosing two articles of wealth that are exchanged for each other are of identical volume when the exchange takes place.

Let us consider again the preceding example of an article of wealth B, whose quantity unit can be obtained in exchange for a quantity, pB|A, of A. If one unit of A is taken as the measuring standard, the volume of the right that contains the quantity pB|A of A is pB|A; the volume of the right containing the quantity unit of B is also pB|A. The two rights, although their contents are different, have the same volume, as they would have in relation to any other unit.

Thus, in each exchanger’s patrimony, the dual transfers that make up the exchange replace the right relinquished with a right of a different content but of strictly identical volume.

Everything happens as though each exchanger had retained his initial right and had simply limited himself to exchanging its content.

Under this new concept, exchange is no longer a dual transfer of property rights, but a simple change in the contents of each exchanger’s rights, a change that 90 does not affect these rights. Any holder of a property right who wishes to change its content need only empty the article of wealth it constitutes onto the market, where it can be exchanged for the new one that he wishes to acquire, and to fill with this [new] article of wealth the right that has been emptied in this way.

The volume of the right emptied sets ne varietur, all things equal as regards prices, the quantity of all the articles of wealth with which it can be filled. Its holder finds himself in the position of buyers of leftovers who, in the olden days, were allowed for a paltry sum to dip a bowl into a cauldron of swill. The bowl’s capacity determined the volume of their right but not the nature of the article of wealth with which it could be filled.

No mistake should be made, however, as to the nature of this representation; it allows for a convenient and rewarding analysis of the exchange operation, but would distort the analysis beyond redress if it dissociated the dual operations of emptying and filling that constitute it. It is only for ease of analysis that these two operations are distinguished from each other, because they necessarily occur simultaneously and must be effected jointly, otherwise there would be no exchange.

In the next section, we shall demonstrate that this condition is always satisfied due to the price formation mechanism.

§2. The Price Formation Mechanism in Light of the Theory of Rights

This concept of exchange sheds light on the price formation mechanism.

Imagine a concrete case, such as an exchange of wheat for gold, and suppose that prices and values are expressed in gold. The volume of all rights is then related to the volume of the right enclosing the quantity unit, for instance one gram, of yellow metal. This latter volume is, by definition, equal to unity, as is the value of the metal that it contains.

At each market session, those who wish to exchange wheat for gold empty, in the appropriate sector of the market, the rights containing the wheat that they supply, and try to fill these rights with the gold that they demand. Similarly, those who wish to exchange gold for wheat empty, onto the same market sector, the rights containing the gold that they supply, and try to fill them with the wheat that they demand.

The aggregate volume of the rights that the holders wish to empty of wheat in order to fill them with gold, during each session of the market, constitutes 91 the supply of wheat to be exchanged against gold. The aggregate volume of the rights that the holders wish to empty of gold in order to fill them with wheat constitutes, during the same session, the demand for wheat to be exchanged against gold.

If, at the market price, these two volumes are equal, the wheat supplied fits exactly into the rights that suppliers of gold wish to fill with wheat.

One can verify immediately that, where this is so, the gold supplied fits exactly into the rights that suppliers of wheat wish to fill with gold.

Thus, emptying and filling are completed at the same time, in accordance with the wishes of all market participants, who have all obtained the exchanges they wished to make. The market is in equilibrium; the market price does not change.

If, on the other hand, at a given session of the market, the volume of the rights that holders wish to empty of wheat in order to fill them with gold is—at the market price—less than the volume of the rights that holders wish to empty of gold in order to fill them with wheat, the wheat supplied cannot, at this price, fill up all the rights emptied of gold.

The demand for wheat then exceeds the supply. Some of the demanders will fear they may not be able to fill with wheat the rights that they wish to empty of gold; the price of wheat in terms of gold will rise in the market.

But as the rise in the price of wheat in terms of gold increases the value of the wheat supplied, it also increases—all things equal as regards the quantity supplied—the volume of the rights that enclosed this value. And the rise will continue as long as its cause lasts—in other words, until the volume of the rights that holders wish to empty of wheat, in order to fill them with gold, has been brought to the level of the rights that holders wish to empty of gold, in order to fill them with wheat.

It is true that the price movement can cause changes in the supply of, and demand for, wheat or gold. No matter what these quantities may be, however, if the price can fluctuate freely, the price will be established at the level at which the rights to be emptied and the rights to be filled are equal.

At this level, the wheat emptied from the rights that holders wish to fill with gold fits exactly into the rights that holders have emptied of gold, in order to fill them with wheat.

One can verify immediately that, when this result has been achieved, the gold supplied in the market fits exactly into the rights that have been emptied of wheat, in order that they could be filled with gold.

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Thus, in spite of the initial disparity and as a result of the price movement, emptying and filling can be simultaneously accomplished, in accordance with the wishes of all market participants.

Under this concept of exchange, the price movement ensures market equilibrium by bringing to the same level the volume of rights to be emptied and the volume of the rights to be filled. Everything happens as if all the articles of wealth emptied onto each sector of the market, at the session when they are supplied, had to be carried into the rights that holders wish to fill with them. To this end, the articles of wealth supplied are more or less pressure pushed into the rights that will enclose them. It is the degree of pressure, the density of the wealth supplied in the rights into which it has been carried, that determines the level of the price in the market.

The above presentation of exchange casts light, also, on the mechanism of markets where prices are controlled.

If, in the preceding example, the price of wheat in terms of gold had remained fixed at an unchanging level, notwithstanding the excess of demand over supply, the wheat supplied could not have filled all the rights that holders wished to empty of gold, in order to fill them with wheat. As emptying and filling must be completed simultaneously, a part of these rights could not have been emptied of gold, in order to be filled with wheat. The ability to dispose, attached to ownership of the gold that cannot be exchanged for wheat, would have become illusory: the corresponding rights would have become false rights.

§3. The Effect of Exchanges on the Nature of Property Rights

Under a free price system, the volume of the rights to be emptied is, in all sectors of the market, at the same level as the volume of the rights to be filled; this is because the price fluctuates until the level of equilibrium has been reached.

But the price at which an article of wealth is accounted for [on the books], the price that determines the volume of the right enclosing it, is not necessarily the price that ensures market equilibrium.

It can deviate from the market equilibrium price and will in fact do so when, under a free price system, exchange takes place at a price different from the market price, or when exchange takes place at the market price, but the market price is maintained at a level that is different from the equilibrium level.

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A deviation of the first type will occur in the following situations:

  • — when the buyer is misled as to the nature or the quality of the article of wealth sold, for instance when an individual purchases a good that he does not know is damaged or spoiled;
  • — when, on the basis of demagoguery, the buyer accepts to pay a price higher than that at which his demand could have been met, or the seller agrees to receive a price less than that at which his supply could have been taken up. It is, for instance, the case of a state that purchases the wheat it needs to feed its troops, at a price higher than the market price.

A deviation of the second type will be found to exist in the following circumstances:

  • — when all market prices are maintained below their levels of equilibrium by effective authoritative decisions, for instance in systems of [state] controlled prices;
  • — when in the market there is a buyer ready to “take,” without limit, at a price higher than the equilibrium price. The Wheat Office is one such buyer, since it must “take” all the quantities supplied but not demanded at the legal price. Similarly, central banks buy at the discount rate all the bills supplied but not demanded in the market.

Exchanges that take place at a price differing from the price that ensures market equilibrium are therefore common. Such exchanges, however, alter the nature of the rights that they affect. It is their repercussions that we will now specify, by comparing their effects with those of exchanges transacted at equilibrium prices.

a) Exchanges at Equilibrium Prices, Preservers of True Rights

Exchanges at equilibrium prices are those that take place under a free price system, a system in which, at all times, there are only prices that ensure equilibrium in their respective markets.

Any exchange that occurs at the equilibrium price substitutes for the article of wealth that is parted with, in the assets of each of the two exchangers, an article of wealth of equal value.

Such an exchange does not affect the nature of the rights included in the exchangers’ liabilities. To the extent that such rights were true rights prior to the 94 exchange, they will remain so afterward: exchanges at equilibrium prices are preservers of true rights.

As such, they do not impair the exchangers’ ability to dispose. They can therefore be undone without loss and can be regarded as reversible.

Observe here that the preservation of rights through exchange does not in any way prejudge their future evolution. They will remain true rights as long as the value of their contents remains unchanged, but they will become false rights the moment this value disappears as a result of consumption or destruction.

Where an exchange is transacted on credit terms, a claim is substituted for the article of wealth surrendered in the assets of one of the exchangers. But if the exchange has been transacted at the equilibrium price, the claim has the same value as the wealth surrendered; the exchange has no effect on the nature of the rights entered on the liabilities side.

b) Exchanges at a Price Different from the Equilibrium Price, Generators of False Rights

Two different situations ought to be distinguished, depending on whether the market price is free [and flexible], or controlled.

In the first case, prices are at the level that ensures equality between the volume of the rights emptied and that of the rights filled in each sector of the market; but the exchange considered is supposed [for purposes of analysis] to be transacted at a price other than the market price.

Take a concrete example and suppose that wheat is exchanged for gold at a price higher than the market price: the wheat buyer, either out of ignorance or due to deception, agrees to delivering, in exchange for the wheat that he acquires, a quantity of gold greater than the market price would require.

If the exchange is settled in cash, the wheat that becomes part of the buyer’s assets is worth less than the gold for which it is substituted in these assets. Now, if the owner does not want to keep the wheat entered in the accounts at its purchase price, but instead wants to replace the wheat with other articles of wealth [through exchange], he will find that his assets no longer fill the total volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side. Some of these rights will therefore be false and their volume will equal the overvaluation of the wheat previously purchased.

These false rights will be assigned in accordance with the rules set forth in the preceding chapter. In general, they will be assigned to third parties only after the patrimony holder’s own rights have been used up.

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If the exchange is settled on deferred terms, the buyer enters, on the liabilities side of his balance sheet, in his seller’s name, rights that exceed the value of the wheat entered in his assets.

From the moment the purchased wheat is no longer accounted for [on the balance sheet] in terms of its [original] purchase price,1 the aggregate value of the assets can no longer fill the aggregate volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side. Some of those rights will therefore be false rights and their volume will also equal the overvaluation of the wheat previously purchased.

In either case, the transaction cannot be undone under the original terms: the exchange transacted will be irreversible.

If the exchange is transacted at the market price, but if the market price is maintained at a level different from the equilibrium price, the false-right-generating process will be more complex, but the outcome will be the same—with this caveat, that instead of affecting one exchange, [this process] will affect all the exchanges transacted in the market.

Consider, in the first place, a system under which the price of wheat is fixed by government decree at a level higher than that which would ensure market equilibrium, the fixed price being enforced by a police system that we assume to be effective.

To take a concrete example, suppose that, at each market session, the supply of and demand for wheat depending on the price are represented by the curves in figure 4, and suppose that the price of wheat is set, by government decree, at a level p1 that is higher than the equilibrium price p.

lf1981_figure_004.jpg

Fig. 4. [Q: Quantity; D: Demand; S: Supply; P: Price]

At each session of the market, the volume of the rights that holders wish to empty of wheat exceeds the volume of the rights that other holders wish to fill with this commodity. Since any transaction at a lower price is prohibited, only a fraction of the former, which is equal to the aggregate volume of the latter, can actually be emptied onto the market. The balance, of a volume d1 s1, will remain filled with wheat, notwithstanding the desire of its holders. The corresponding rights will provide their holders an ability to dispose that is merely illusory: they will be false rights.

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Thus, exchanges transacted in a market where the price is fixed at a level higher than the equilibrium price generate, at each session of the market, false rights whose aggregate volume equals the volume of the rights that enclose the articles of wealth that cannot be sold.

If the price had been maintained authoritatively below the equilibrium level, then it would be the volume of the rights to be emptied of gold and to be filled with wheat that would have exceeded the volume of the rights to be emptied of wheat and to be filled with gold. The outcome, mutatis mutandis, would have been the same: the rights filled with gold unexchangeable for wheat, despite the holders’ desire, would have been false rights.

Controlled price systems generate false rights, but do not, usually, provide specific rules for their assignment. False rights will then be held by those suppliers who lacked the opportunity or the skill to capture a counterpart from the insufficient demand expressed in the market. In the case of these suppliers, exchanges transacted at the market price can be regarded as irreversible.

Quite often, authoritative price-fixing systems include commodity boards, which are required to absorb any excess supplies or satisfy excess demands brought about by authoritative price fixing. In France, for instance, since 1936, the Wheat Office, or, more precisely, the cooperatives that it funds, has had the task of purchasing wheat that is supplied but not demanded at the legal price.

From the moment such an institution exists, there are no longer any rights in the market that cannot be emptied of their contents. If, however, the legal price is fixed above the equilibrium price, for instance at the p1 level in figure 4, the Wheat Office will purchase, at each market session, the quantity d1s1 of the wheat that is supplied but not demanded.

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Thus, the functioning of—say—the Wheat Office confers upon all rights that are filled with wheat the character of true rights, regardless of the excess of supply over demand.

The wheat purchased by the Wheat Office is unsalable, however; or rather, if sold, it would increase purchases by the Wheat Office during the same session by an amount equal to its value.

Therefore, everything happens as if, all else equal, ownership of such wheat did not provide any purchasing power to the Wheat Office. So long as there is no increase in demand or no decrease in supply, the rights containing such wheat will be false rights in their entirety.

It follows that the existence of a wheat office, or of any buying or selling agency of the same type, will not alter the volume of the false rights that are generated by authoritative price fixing. Their volume will depend only on the level at which the price is fixed. It is simply transferred in its entirety to the market-regulating agency or its creditors.

Observe further that, as in previous instances, the purchases made by this agency cannot, all else equal, be undone; they are irreversible.

In all cases, therefore, the transaction of exchanges at a price different from the market equilibrium price will always generate false rights, false rights whose aggregate volume depends, all else equal, only on the difference between the price at which the exchange is transacted and the market equilibrium price.

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Chapter IX: Loans and Discount: Two Particular Modes of Exchange

In this chapter, we will show that loans and discount are only specific forms of exchange. They nevertheless deserve a separate study because of the importance they hold in the functioning of monetary systems.

§1. A Definition of Loans and the Rate of Interest

A loan is an exchange in which one of the exchangers, the lender, transfers to the other, the borrower, the ownership of an “object” and receives, in consideration thereof, a claim—on demand or maturing at a future date—on the “object” that is loaned.

In light of the concept of exchange analyzed in the preceding chapter, a loan is an operation in which the lender empties the right that enclosed the object loaned, in order to fill the right with the claim on this object, which he acknowledges, while the borrower includes the object loaned in his assets and enters on the liabilities side of his ledger, among third parties’ rights, the right enclosing the lender’s claim, which the borrower acknowledges.

A claim is necessarily less valuable than direct ownership of an object, however. A claim cannot therefore fully fill the right that has been emptied as a result of the loan. If the right is to be filled, then the borrower must provide additional financial consideration to the lender. The greater the value of the object loaned and the further away the due date, the more substantial—all else equal—the additional consideration will be.

This additional financial consideration is the interest or the rent paid for the loan.

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But we know already 1 that, when the object loaned is a quantity of money, the rent or interest is generally expressed—for reasons of convenience—in the form of a rate. The rate sets the fraction of the object that will have to be added, by the borrower, to the compensation of the lender if the loan is for a length of one year.

Actually, interest can be paid according to two different procedures:

  • — the Treasury bill procedure, under which the lender’s acknowledged claim exceeds the volume of the object loaned by the amount of interest due for the duration of the loan;
  • — the loan procedure properly speaking, under which the claim relates specifically to the object loaned but is accompanied by a provision to the effect that additional financial consideration representing interest shall be paid.

The first procedure shows clearly how the rate of interest sets the price at which the exchange is transacted. When, as is generally the case, the loan relates to a quantity of money, the amount loaned is only the present value of the claim that the borrower parts with.

The second procedure presents interest more clearly as a rental price, rent to be paid for the loan of the object concerned.

Often, when the loan is a long dated one, the object loaned is to be returned in successive installments. Total installments are then equal to the value of the object.

When a capital loan is returned to the lender in installments, only that part of the loan that is still outstanding continues to bear interest. In such a case, transfers from the borrower to the lender then generally take the form of annual installments, including both interest and principal.

§2. The Economic Significance of a Loan

The essential attribute of a loan is that it implies the return of the object loaned or its equivalent. A loan does not therefore permit the borrower to consume services that the object can produce. The only privilege it provides is the abil100ity to hold without wear and tear. Interest is simply the price paid for this privilege: for instance, the rent of a dwelling that the tenant returns, at the end of this lease term, in the condition in which he received it.

To the extent that the loan does not provide the borrower with any consumption possibility, one is led to ask what benefits the borrower expects to receive and what the circumstances are that may prompt him to borrow.

We have shown that production simply consists of an amalgamation process of capital or services. This process requires a minimum period of time, which depends on technical considerations, during which the entrepreneur must have at his disposal the capital or services that he needs in order to produce the product. It is only at the end of this period that the product will be ready for sale. This period is the “production cycle” of the enterprise.

During the production cycle, however, the entrepreneur’s intention is to transform and not to consume the capital and services to be incorporated into the product. He will therefore simply need to hold them—or rather hold the value that they represent—without wear and tear, an ability that he can secure through a loan, in the event that he does not personally possess the resources necessary to acquire the capital and services required.

Thus, the loan enables an entrepreneur who does not possess [sufficient] capital of his own to undertake production.

But production generates a desired income for the entrepreneur. This income is the rationale for the sacrifice that he is prepared to make, in the form of interest payment, in order to obtain, for the duration of the production cycle, the necessary ability to dispose [of resources] “without wear and tear” that production depends on.

In the preceding example, completion of the product enables the borrower to return the wealth borrowed, in one single operation. But there are instances when the capital borrowed can only be repaid in successive installments.

Suppose, for instance, that an entrepreneur borrows a plant or equipment that he uses to produce the product. This factory and equipment are reserves of services, which they release at a certain rate. Each product incorporates a certain amount of services and as the value of the product becomes available, so does the value of the services incorporated.

Where this is the case, the capital borrowed will be repaid in successive installments, proportionally amounting, in each period, to the value of the services released—that is to say, to the “wear and tear” of the capital.

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§3. The Effect of the Loan on the Nature of Property Rights

To the extent that a loan is a particular mode of exchange, it must have the same consequences as an exchange on the nature of the rights that it affects, depending on whether the loan is made at the market equilibrium rate or at a different rate.

If transacted at the market rate, a loan will preserve true rights; if not, it will generate false rights.

Its effects can be complicated, however, due to the fact that one of the objects transferred through the loan may be a claim, and the right that contains a claim may be—either to the knowledge or unbeknownst to its holder—a false right, if the claim that it encloses is a false claim. In addition, although the right may not be false when the exchange takes place, it may become so before the due date if, at any time during its life, the claim assigned becomes a false one due to consumption or destruction of its contents.

Thus, a loan may generate false rights, not only if it is transacted at a price different from the market equilibrium price, but also if the claim to which it relates is a false claim.

The rights of one of the exchangers may therefore be debased in two different sets of circumstances, which we shall discuss separately.

a) The Effect of the Rate at Which a Loan Is Transacted on the Nature of the Rights That It Affects

The price at which a loan is transacted results from the interest rate charged for the claim assigned.

We have shown 2 that, when the rate fluctuates freely, it becomes established spontaneously and inevitably at the level that ensures market equilibrium.

Now, for any loan transacted at such a rate, the value of the claim that fills the right emptied of the article of wealth loaned is strictly equal to the value of that article of wealth. If the right was a true right before the loan was transacted, it will remain so afterward.

It may be, however, that the loan—like any exchange—is not transacted at the equilibrium rate, either because one of the exchangers so agrees (with or without much awareness) or because the market rate is itself maintained at a 102 level different from the equilibrium rate. This will be the case, in particular, when a rate imposed by the authorities is forced upon the market through effective enforcement action, or through the intervention of an agency—one that buys any claim that is supplied but not demanded, and sells any claim that is demanded but not supplied—at this rate.

Consider the former case and suppose that, in a market where the supply of and the demand for claims against money are represented by the curves in figure 5, the lender agrees to take up a claim at a rate r1, which is substantially lower than the market equilibrium rate, and which confers upon the claim a greater value than that at which it could actually be resold.

lf1981_figure_005.jpg

Fig. 5. [Q: Quantity; D: Demand; S: Supply; R: Rate; r: market equilibrium rate]

The claim acquired in such circumstances only partially fills the right that has been emptied of the article of wealth loaned. To the extent of the deficiency, the loan has turned this right into a false right. If the holder wishes to alter the content, or value it at its true worth, he will have to scale down the volume of his right to the level of the claim, therefore devaluing the right.

If the loan had been transacted at a rate r2, higher than the equilibrium rate r, the lender would have acquired the claim at a price less than that at which it could be resold. The borrower would only have included in his assets, in the form of the wealth loaned, a value less than that of the claim acknowledged by him. To the extent of the deficiency, the rights entered on the liabilities side of the borrower’s ledger would have become false rights.

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The market rate can be maintained at the level r1, which is less than the level of equilibrium, by measures of control, such as the imposition of a maximum ceiling rate of interest for claims of the type under consideration. Where this is the case, then at each session of the market, the demand for loans exceeds the supply by an amount s1d1. But a demand for loans is also a supply of claims against articles of wealth. A certain share of the claims suppliers are unable to empty their rights in the manner in which they would like. Thus, at each session of the market, the authoritative imposition of the rate has generated false rights in the amount of s1d1.

If, however, a specialized agency had been required to buy unrestrictedly all the claims of the type considered supplied to it at a rate r1, it would automatically have absorbed, at each market session, the claims s1d1 that were supplied but not demanded. As in the case of the French Wheat Office operating in the wheat market, the rights of claims suppliers would have become true rights, but those of the purchasing agency would have become false rights due to their being emptied of true articles of wealth so that they could be filled with unsalable claims.

We will now show that any central bank intervenes like an agency of this type whenever it sets its discount rate at a level lower than the market equilibrium rate.

Thus, in all cases, a loan at a rate different from the market equilibrium rate will always generate false rights whose volume will only depend, all else equal, on the difference between the rate of the loan and the market equilibrium rate.

The false rights thus generated present a very special characteristic, however, in that the overvaluation of the claim that fills them declines as the due date approaches. When maturity has been reached, the value of the claim equals its nominal amount, regardless of the rate at which the loan has been transacted: the lender’s right has become a true right.

Thus, the false rights generated by a loan made at a rate below the market equilibrium rate are essentially of a temporary nature and become true rights upon the claim reaching maturity. If, up until that point, the holder of the false right has agreed not to alter its contents—that is, if he does not exercise his ability to dispose before the due date—then the partly illusory nature of this ability will be of no economic consequence. It is only if the claim is supplied before its maturity, when its value in the market is less than its nominal value, that the false right will have to be brought down, through devaluation, to the volume of the wealth that it contains.

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b) The Effect of the True or False Nature of the Claim Transferred

In all the preceding scenarios that have been considered, the claim assigned to the lender is a false claim only because it has been acquired at a price higher than the market equilibrium price. At maturity, however, the claim becomes a true claim.

For this to be so, however, the lender’s claim must not become a false claim between the time when the loan was made and the time when it is repaid.

If it does—for instance because the wealth loaned is consumed or wasted—then the lender’s right becomes a false right, not in a temporary but in a final and definitive manner, to the extent that the value of the borrower’s assets falls short of what is necessary to fill the lender’s right.

If, at maturity, the lender or his substitute did not accept to renew the initial loan, then the illusory nature of a fraction of the rights included in the borrower’s liabilities would be revealed: these rights would then have to be brought down, through devaluation,3 to the level of the assets that could fill them, and they would therefore be, partly, false rights.

The false rights would be assigned under the rules described previously: they would be assigned to the borrower, so long as his own capital had not been entirely absorbed, then to third-party creditors, in the reverse order of their possible preferential or seniority ranking.

§4. Discount

A loan is an exchange of an article of wealth, properly speaking, against a claim; discount is an exchange of a claim against an article of wealth, properly speaking. The two terms therefore refer to the same operation, but viewed by different exchangers.

In banking terminology, however, the term “discount” generally applies to a loan of money against a short-term claim—usually of less than three months’ maturity—itself denominated in money. Discount is therefore of considerable importance for the analysis of monetary phenomena, which will be examined in Part III of this work.

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The discount market is characterized by the existence of an institution, the central bank, which “takes,” without any limitation, at a rate that it sets at its discretion, certain bills said to be “eligible for discount.”

If, at a session of the market, the discount rate is higher than the equilibrium rate—r2 in figure 5 4—the central bank will not buy any claims. The market rate is at the level r, which is lower than the discount rate. The bank has no “contact” with the market.

If the discount rate is at the level r1, which is lower than the equilibrium rate, then the market rate is at the same level. At each session, the central bank will buy all the paper supplied but not demanded at that rate; it will buy an aggregate amount s1d1.

We will see later on how the bank obtains the resources necessary for these purchases.

Let us observe, once again, that the central bank plays a role very much similar to that of the Wheat Office, in countries where the price of this grain is maintained above its equilibrium level by an agency that buys at the legal price any crop surpluses that are supplied but not demanded.

We will see that claims are weevilled even more easily than grains stored in silos.

Discounting, whether by a private person or by the central bank, is only one particular type of loan. Its effects on the lender’s rights will therefore depend on the discount rate and on the true or false nature of the discounted claim.

a) The System Where Only True Claims Are Eligible for Discount

All lenders eager to avoid losses seek to establish such a system, at least in all cases where no institution accepts, freely or under compulsion, to discharge the lenders, at their request, of the false claims that they would have discounted.

It is, particularly, the main concern of banks of discount to avoid bringing false claims into their assets. To this end, a whole series of practical banking rules exists. These rules are meant to reject for discount claims that would be false from the very beginning, because they would have arisen out of a loan without actual consideration—that is to say, a loan under which the claim assigned to the lender was not balanced by the inclusion of articles of wealth of equal value in the assets of the borrower. The rules also turn down claims that 106 could become false during the life of the loan, through disappearance of assets and insufficiency of the borrower’s own capital.

The first set of rules results in eligibility for discount being granted only to claims resulting from the supplying of goods, services, or money; the second set of rules results in requiring that the signatories of the discounted bills be personally solvent so that any false rights that may appear on the borrower’s balance sheet can be filled through a reduction of the borrower’s own capital, hence without any effect on third parties’ rights.

Let us assume that these precautions are effective: no claim will then be discounted unless it is, until its maturity, a true claim.

If the discount rate is higher than the market equilibrium rate—rate r2 in figure 5—then the market rate is at the level r, which, at each instant of time, ensures equilibrium between the supply of and the demand for claims eligible for discount.

Any claim transferred then has—at the time of transfer—exactly the same value as the wealth for which it is substituted in the lender’s rights. The lender’s rights are not affected by the loan and remain entirely true rights.5

If the discount rate is lower than the equilibrium rate—the rate r1 in figure 5—then the market rate remains immutably fixed at this level. The central bank is in “contact” with the market and, at each session, “takes” the excess s1d1 of the supplies over the demands of claims eligible for discount.

At the price resulting from the discount rate, however, these claims will be overvalued compared with the value that the market equilibrium price would give them. If the central bank were to supply them in the market, it would not be able to sell them, or rather, by capturing some of the demands expressed in the market—such demands being insufficient in order to absorb all the claims supplied—the central bank would only increase by a corresponding amount its total purchases, without lightening its portfolio in any way. Thus, everything happens as if the claims purchased by the central bank were unsalable claims. They will not provide the bank with any ability to dispose: the rights that enclose these claims are false in their entirety.

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If, however, the central bank keeps these claims in its portfolio until their maturity date, it will at that time be able to fill them with true articles of wealth by collecting payment from the debtor, since the assumption is that they are true claims. The rights that enclose them will, upon reaching maturity, become true rights. It is therefore only if holders wished to modify the contents before the maturity date that their nature as false rights would be revealed and their volume would have to be scaled down.6

Thus, discounting true claims at a rate that is less than the market equilibrium rate generates false rights to the extent of the overvaluation of the claims discounted, but the false rights thus assigned are essentially temporary. Their nature will not be perceived and will not have any economic repercussions unless the ability to dispose, which is provided by such rights, is exercised before the claims from which they derive have reached their maturity dates.

b) The System Where False Claims Are Eligible for Discount

As the maturity date approaches, maturation gradually transforms, into a true right, a right that encloses a claim bought at a rate lower than the market equilibrium rate—because at maturity, this right can be filled with true wealth, to the full extent of its nominal value, by laying hold of some of the debtor’s assets. This is what will happen whenever the claim discounted is itself a true claim.

Although originally a true claim, the claim may however have become a false claim during the course of its life if, prior to the claim reaching maturity, the debtor used up or lost the true wealth borrowed, without having been able to provide from his own capital the values necessary to replace it.

It is in this way, for example, that claims on a state running a deficit generally become false claims, because the state uses up the real wealth in exchange for which the claims have been assigned and does not draw from its own capital the values necessary in order to repay them at maturity. When such claims are discounted—and generally the discounting of these claims is imposed, by an act of sovereignty, on the central bank—the right that encloses them cannot be filled, at maturity, by drawing on the debtor’s assets. The right is false and will remain so indefinitely. If the holder of the claim wishes to exercise the right, its illusory nature will have to be noted and its volume will have to be proportionally scaled down to the level of the articles of wealth that are capable of filling it.

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The discounting of false claims therefore generates false rights, which, contrary to those that arise from the discounting of true claims, are definitive. Their true volume, which is less than the volume set by their nominal value, depends only on the volume of the false claims discounted.

These rights therefore have infinitely deeper repercussions than the former. We shall see how decisive these repercussions are when we study the same phenomena under a monetary system.

§5. The Relation between the Value of a Capital and the Value of the Services That It Holds

We have already seen that capital can be regarded as a compressed tablet, or caplet, of services and that these services are yielded [or released] at a rate that generally varies with the use that is made of it, but whose upper limit is dictated by the state of technology at a given moment.

The price of the capital and the price of the services that it is capable of providing, when these [prices] are not fixed by some authority, are determined in the market (like all prices) by the free interplay of supply and demand to which capital and services are subject.

Despite this autonomous determination, or rather because of it, these two prices are not independent of each other, however.

Consider, for example, the case of a house.

Anyone desiring to secure lodging over an extended period of time (which we assume to be the expected life of the house) has two choices: either buy the house itself—i.e., all the housing services that it is able to produce—or buy these services piecemeal, as they come out.

The first solution implies an immediate expenditure amounting to the value of the house.

The second only requires the payment related to each portion of housing services provided in the corresponding time period. If the buyer decides to set aside the money required for his successive payments, he may lend the amount to third parties, arranging for payments to be made so as to provide the amount of rental money he will need when he has to pay rent.

Each of the loans thus extended, however, will bear interest that—we assume—will be paid to the lender, on the due date, together with the principal.

The longer the term of the loan, the higher the rate of interest. In order to obtain, through repayment, the amounts necessary to pay rent in the future, the lender will therefore only need to lend declining amounts of money.

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The total loans to be made at the instant of time considered will represent the cost of the housing services secured at that instant with the second method. It will set their present value.

If, at the market price, the value of a house is appreciably lower than the sum of the present values of the housing services that it can yield, those who possess the necessary money will decide in favor of the first method. But their demands for houses will push up the prices of houses in the market, even as the abstention of demanders of housing to be paid for on a term basis will tend, all things equal as regards the rate of interest, to bring down rent levels.

Thus, it is clear that the value of a capital cannot be appreciably different from the total present value of the services that it can provide.

The value of a house that yields housing services over an extended period of time will therefore be notably less than the sum of the rents that it will allow to be collected.

By contrast, the value of a capital that, such as a ton of coal or a loaf of bread, can provide immediately and at the same time all the services it holds, will be the same as that of such services.

There therefore exists a necessary relation between the price of capital, the price of the services that it can yield, and the rate of interest.

This relation is generally loose, because the quantity of services that a given capital will yield can, generally, only be estimated.

It becomes a strict relation, however, when the capital considered is a claim denominated in money, which produces [financial] annuities whose values, amounts, and due date are specified in the loan contract.

In this case, the only uncertainty that remains in the present value of these annuities relates to the good completion of the contract. If this uncertainty is removed, the price of the claim in the market cannot be different from the sum of the present values, calculated at the market rate, of the annuities involved.

In any case, regardless of whether the relation is a loose or a strict one, ownership of a capital can be likened to the holding of a claim to the services that this capital can provide.

§6. True and False Loans

On the basis of the preceding analysis, it is now possible to describe with greater precision the effect of a loan on the patrimony of a borrower and on the value of the rights recorded on the liabilities side of his ledger.

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Any loan introduces into the borrower’s assets the borrowed wealth, and into the borrower’s liabilities the rights acknowledged in favor of the lender.

These rights are usually rights maturing at a future date whose successive installments constitute the loan annuities.

The loan will be a true or a false one, depending on whether or not, on the due date, the wealth borrowed fills the rights acknowledged to the lender.

Suppose, for instance, that Pierre borrows a house from Paul and, in return, acknowledges, in favor of Paul, value rights maturing yearly over a given period. The house will yield housing services, which will be included in Pierre’s patrimony, and from which he can, if he sells them, derive value in some form or another.

If, at each maturity date, the services yielded by the house since the previous maturity date have a value equal to, or in excess of, the value of the rights assigned to the lender for the same period, the loan will not have introduced any false rights into the borrower’s liabilities; it will be a true loan.

In the opposite case, some of the rights included in these liabilities will have become false and the loan will be said to be a false loan. The false rights will be rights of the borrower or rights of third parties, depending on whether or not the borrower owns personal assets.

There may, however, be a difference between the lifespan of the loan and that of the house, or between the frequency of the loan installments and the frequency of the services yielded by the house.

Any debtor of annuities can, however, through the market substitute for his commitments other commitments of identical present value.

The loan will therefore be a true loan if the present value—at the market rate 7—of the rights assigned to the lender is equal to, or less than, the value of the wealth borrowed; if it is greater, the loan will be a false loan.

In order to not give too broad a scope to this observation, however, it is important to note that whereas the rights assigned to the lender are set ne varietur by the loan contract, the value of the services that the wealth borrowed can render can change in an independent manner. It may therefore be that, during the payback period, the value of the wealth borrowed, which is the present value of the services that such wealth can yield, falls below the present value of the annuities still to be met. In this case, the loan will become a false loan; the borrower will suffer a loss, as a result of the decrease in the value of the capital borrowed.

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A loss will also occur if the borrower sells the wealth borrowed, or the services that he derives from it, against articles of wealth of lesser value.

A loan that is unable to fill the annuities in exchange for which it has been obtained is considered “uneconomic.”

The most typical example of an uneconomic loan is a loan that provides wealth whose services are used up forthwith. Such are, in particular, loans whose proceeds go toward the financing of a budget deficit, this budget deficit itself resulting from an excess of consumption expenditures over fiscal revenue.

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Chapter X: Production and the Income Theorems

§1. The Concept of Income: A Reminder

Income has a dual nature: economically, income is an “object”; legally, it is the right that encloses this “object.” As object, income from capital over a given period consists of the flow of services that this capital yields during that period. These services are released from capital, like juice is squeezed from a lemon.

In our modern societies, however, any capital that does not exist in unlimited supply in relation to existing needs is appropriated. Of course, the ability to enjoy and dispose of a capital implies the ability to enjoy and dispose of the services that it yields, because these services only make up a part of its substance, simply released and made available for consumption.

The patrimony holder will therefore hold a property right of ownership to the services provided by the capital that he owns.

To the extent that these services are not used up immediately, they will contribute to the formation of new capital and the value of the new capital will increase the assets side of the patrimony from which it has been derived.

If these services are consumed, their value will be represented, on the assets side of the patrimony, by a “consumption” item, which will remain until the next detailed accounts are drawn up.

In either case, if one follows the development of the patrimony under consideration over time, with the help of the film-reel motion picture balance sheet, one will observe that the value of the assets increases by an amount equal to the value of the services produced by the [various] capitals constituting the patrimony, while the rights enclosing such services appear on the liabilities side on the balance sheet of the patrimony holder. These rights will constitute the “income” item until the next detailed accounts are drawn up. At the end of the financial year, they will increase the “capital” item by an amount equal to their volume, just as the rights whose contents have been used up will reduce it.

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Income rights are therefore the cradle where new articles of wealth are born; income rights are the “garment” in which new articles of wealth enter the realm of appropriated objects. It is this enveloping pouch that income rights leave in the liabilities cloakroom when income rights are transferred to total assets; in the liabilities cloakroom, the “pouch” remains available and ready to be filled with some content of equal value, when the pouch’s holder claims it from the liabilities cloakroom.

In general, capital suffers a loss in value as it releases services. When using the film-reel motion picture accounting system, this loss—which measures capital’s wear and tear—would be recorded at the very instant of time when it occurs; but, under normal accounting procedures, it will only be recorded when the next detailed accounts are drawn up.

The decline in value linked to the secretion of a given income is generally less than the value of this income. The reason is that production of income, by eroding the capital that produces it, reduces the reserve of services still contained in this capital, hence the amount of services that the capital can still produce. But its decrease in value merely represents the present value of the services that it can no longer produce due to wear and tear. Now, if the capital still has a long span of life ahead of it, this present value is appreciably less than the value of these services.

Thus, for instance, the annual depreciation of a house is only a fraction of the value of the housing services yielded annually, because the housing ability lost by the landlord through wear and tear is one that would have been obtained long afterward, precisely during the years that have been cut off from the lifespan of the premises.

By contrast, in the case of capital holding services that can be used up immediately in their entirety, such as a ton of coal or a loaf of bread, any provision of services reduces the value of the capital that produces them by an amount equal to the value of these services.

§2. Production Viewed in Light of the Theory of Rights

a) An Accounting Description of the Production Process

We have shown 1 that production is a process amalgamating capital with services, sometimes only services with other services, with a view to the elaboration of a product, which can itself be a capital or a service. The person who 114 conducts this process is an entrepreneur and the organizational framework within which this occurs, a business enterprise.

Production, which implies the transformation of wealth, is essentially—as far as the entrepreneur is concerned—an act of having at his disposal the capital and services that production requires. The entrepreneur can only bring this about if he owns this wealth.

In actual fact, however, the entrepreneur rarely owns all the capital and services that are required for production.

When he does not, he will have to acquire them from whoever can supply them.

In particular, when production requires labor services other than those of the entrepreneur or of members of his family, they will need to be obtained through exchange because, in all systems where slavery does not exist, the body of the worker—a capital that generates the sought services—can only be appropriated by the very person supported by this body.

Let us consider the description of the production process under the film-reel motion picture system of accounting.

Regardless of whether the capital and services incorporated into the product are derived from the entrepreneur’s own capital or are acquired through exchange, they always have a market price, a price that sets their value at the time when they enter the production process.

It is under this value that they appear on the assets side of the balance sheet. The rights into which, on the liabilities side, this value will insert itself remain to be specified.

If the inputs used in the production process are capital that already belonged to the entrepreneur, they are included in the bulk of the rights entered on the liabilities side. If they are services produced by the capital belonging to the entrepreneur (for instance land, factory, equipment, patents of invention, etc.) or labor services produced by him personally, then they insert themselves in the rights entered on the liabilities side at the time when they become part of the assets—that is, when they are produced. These rights constitute the incomes, during the period considered, of the capital from which the services are extracted, capital income from capital if they stem from the entrepreneur’s own capital, and earned income if they stem from him personally.

If the whole or part of the capital or services used in order to make the product are obtained, through exchange, from third parties that own or produce them, there are two possibilities, depending on whether the entrepreneur’s purchases are settled in cash or on deferred terms.

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For a purchase to be settled in cash, the entrepreneur must have available articles of wealth that can fill third parties’ rights from which the capital or services required for production are withdrawn. Such articles of wealth, where they exist, are one element in the entrepreneur’s assets, which is known as the working capital fund. They fill, by an amount corresponding to their value, part of the rights entered on the liabilities side of his ledger.

The purchase, in cash, of the capital or services to be incorporated into the product substitutes them for the articles of wealth that make up the working capital fund, in the rights that enclosed these articles of wealth.

If the capital and services are bought on credit, they will be included in the rights entered, on the liabilities side of the entrepreneur’s ledger, in favor of third-party transferors.

Where the articles of wealth transferred are capital, the claim on the entrepreneur is substituted for them in the transferor’s assets and fills the right that enclosed them. When the articles of wealth are services yielded by the transferor’s own capital or by himself, the claim is then included in the rights that, in the transferor’s liabilities, constitute the income from his capital or labor.

Regardless of whether they are purchased in cash or on credit, the capital and services that make up the product will be entered on the entrepreneur’s balance sheet at the value that they held at the time when they were initially included in his assets.

But the moment these “raw materials”—in the broadest sense of the term—participate in the production process, they lose their initial status and undergo a gradual process of transformation whose outcome is the product itself. In the course of this transformation, their aggregate value—the value at which they could be sold at market prices—is constantly changing and becomes, upon completion of the process, the value of the product.

The difference between the value of the product upon completion of the production process and the value, at the same instant of time, of the capital and services that have been incorporated into the product is referred to as the entrepreneur’s income.

Where the price of such capital and services has not changed since they were purchased, their value upon completion of the production process is the value at which they were initially entered in the books. By contrast, where prices have changed, their value is the value initially entered on the balance sheet, plus any increase, or less any decrease, of value that has occurred since, and is known as “replacement value.”

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In general, the [final] product has a value higher than the replacement value of the capital and services that it incorporates: then, the entrepreneur’s income is positive. It may happen, however, that the value of a product is less than that of its constituent elements, in which case the entrepreneur’s income is negative. Production is said to show a deficit.

In this way, the entrepreneur’s income is representative of the value, as appraised by the market, of the service that he provides in initiating and organizing production. The greater the amount by which he increases the value of the articles of wealth used, the higher his income will be. If he has caused a decrease in value, his income will be negative.

The entrepreneur’s income will only be shown separately, on his balance sheet, if all the capital and services incorporated into the product are provided by third parties.

Generally, the entrepreneur owns some of these capital and services. This is the case, in particular, of an industrialist who owns his factory and equipment, of the craftsman who uses no labor other than that which he himself provides and combines the position of worker and entrepreneur, or of an owner-operator, who owns his land, livestock, implements, and seeds and does not purchase anything outside his own enterprise. In all these cases, the entrepreneur receives not only the remuneration of the services that he performs by managing the enterprise but also the remuneration of the labor services that he provides and of those yielded by the capital he owns. The fact that these various services are bundled up in the assets does not prevent separate entries being made, on the liabilities side, for the rights that enclosed them when they were emptied into the bulk of the assets. It is therefore possible to show separately the income earned by the entrepreneur in his capacity as a worker or as owner of capital, and the income that he derives from his activity as the initiator and organizer of production.

b) The Entrepreneur’s Income, the Key to the Preservation of the Value, in the Product, of the Elements That Constitute It

The description in terms of accounting makes it possible to trace, in the product, the filiation of all the value components that constitute it. The description assigns to each participant in the process of production a share in the value of the product that is equal to the relative share of the wealth contributed [to the product]. Thus, the description in accounting terms ensures the preservation of the value, in the product, of all the capital and services that are incorporated in it.

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In order to not wrongly interpret the scope of this finding, however, it must be recalled that this is only the outcome of the role played by the entrepreneur’s income. The value of the constituent elements is therefore preserved “by definition,” rather than by the nature of things.

The enterprise system itself is only a social construction, which tends to bring about the entrepreneur’s free initiative. There could, however, conceivably be—indeed there are—systems of production that provide, to their participants, a compensation different from the one granted under the enterprise system. The enterprise system, which is certainly not dictated by nature, is the system of production pertaining to a community where all articles of wealth have been appropriated and the owner disposes freely of the contents of his rights.

c) The Production Cycle and the Working Capital Fund

The above analysis shows that the product is substituted for the articles of wealth by which it was constituted, in the rights that enclosed such wealth at the beginning of the process of production.

The production process is not instantaneous, however. It extends over a certain period of time, which depends upon its technological features and sets the duration of the production cycle.

Throughout the duration of this cycle, however, the articles of wealth that will constitute the product must necessarily remain at the disposal of the enterprise; they are not freely available and their value will not be restored until completion of the production process. They can therefore only fill the rights of claim that mature after completion of the production process.

But the articles of wealth included in the assets are the indistinct counterpart of the rights included in the liabilities. In order for none of these rights to be false, it suffices that the ability to dispose that is attached to some of them be deferred until the product becomes available.

The rights thus transformed into [delayed or conditional] rights maturing at a future date will be the entrepreneur’s own rights or third parties’ rights, depending on whether the constituent elements of the product that do not belong to the entrepreneur have been acquired for cash or on credit.

If the constituent elements contributed by third parties have been acquired for cash, it is the entrepreneur’s own rights that will be filled with the articles of wealth used to manufacture the product and will take on the character of delayed [or conditional] rights of claim.

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Their contents will become available again, and they themselves will recover their previous status as rights exercisable on demand, only upon completion of the product. The sale of the product will then make it possible to replenish the working capital fund, so that a new production cycle can be financed again. For this reason, the duration of the production cycle is often taken as the working capital cycle.2

When the articles of wealth that make up the product have been bought on credit, it is the rights assigned to the transferor that will be rights of claim maturing at a future date, until completion of the production cycle. These rights will not have to be filled prior to their due date, at which time the product reaches its sale value in the entrepreneur’s assets. They can therefore be filled without the entrepreneur having, at any time, to use the contents of his own rights. The credit consented to by the providers of the capital and services used during the production process will be substituted for the entrepreneur’s working capital fund.

Thus, a working capital fund and a credit are, to the entrepreneur, an inescapable option. This is due to the fact that the values invested in the production cycle are tied up for the entire duration of the cycle. This “tying up” can only affect certain holders of the rights included on the liabilities side of the enterprise’s ledger: it will affect the entrepreneur, if he owns a working capital fund and uses it in order to purchase the articles of wealth required for the development and production of the product, and it will affect those who provide these articles of wealth, if they sell these on credit.

The two procedures prevent the emergence of false rights: the first, by advancing the articles of wealth that will fill the rights assigned to the transferors of “raw materials”; the second, by putting off the time at which these rights can be filled.

For the emergence of false rights to be avoided, however, the holders of the rights enclosing the articles of wealth used in the production process must defer enjoyment for the entire duration of the production cycle.

The reason why, in the ordinary course of commercial transactions, this deferment is very often three months is that in most instances, this period is longer than, or equal to, the time interval between the purchase [of inventory] and the resale of the product by the merchant, an interval that is known as the length of the operating cycle. In industrial or agricultural cycles, however, the 119 credit period often has to be longer than this. This is the case, for instance, for fattening credit granted to a person buying store cattle for fattening purposes, where the credit is tied up for no less than nine months due to the time required by the fattening process; or for credit for production runs, which must be suited to the duration of the particular run; or again for long-term credit required for production activities whose output will become available much later, or will be sold only in the form of services, at the pace at which these are yielded by the capital derived from production.

In the case where credit of more than three months is required, however, this will be provided, not by the producers of the services or by the capital used in the production process, but rather by persons who can, without inconvenience—because of the wealth that they have “saved”—defer using up the contents of some of their rights. Such persons place their surplus resources at the disposal of the entrepreneur by means of a loan.

Thus, the only difference between the financing of production through credit and its financing through loans lies in the status or capacity of the person who accepts the deferment of enjoyment that production requires.

The analysis of the production process makes it possible to specify the working capital fund or the amount of credit that is necessary for an enterprise to yield a given production output at an even pace, by operating at a steady state.

Let V be the value of the daily purchases by the entrepreneur of capital and services; n the number of days measuring the duration of the production cycle. When operating in steady conditions, the entrepreneur invests daily in the production process resources representing an amount V. He can obtain these resources only by drawing on his working capital fund or by receiving a credit, so long as he has not started selling.

The product will only be available for sale starting on the n + 1st day, however.

The amount of working capital fund invested or the credit used will therefore increase during the first n days of the functioning of the enterprise. From the n + 1st day onward, the amount will stabilize at a level n × V.

Thus, working capital funds or the credit used by an enterprise operating at a steady state is equal to the value of its daily purchases of capital and services multiplied by the duration of the production cycle.

The above statement shows that, whereas the amount of working capital funds or the credits required by an enterprise are stable when the enterprise operates 120 at a continuing, regular, and steady state, it has to increase in periods of increasing production, otherwise serious disturbances would result.

In this respect, the two solutions—financing through working capital or through credit—are quite different.

The working capital fund is set up by the entrepreneur prior to the beginning of the production cycle. If financing is through working capital, production can expand, all else equal as regards prices, only to the extent that the entrepreneur manages to find in his own rights, or in the rights that are assigned to him, the additional resources that an increase in his daily investments involves. Yet this supplement can only be obtained from preexisting savings; the expansion of production will be dictated by saving.

In contrast, where financing is through credit, production can be expanded, all things equal as regards prices, without any further consequence, as far as producers are concerned, other than a deferment—for a period of the same duration as the production cycle—of the enjoyment of the supplemental wealth yielded by additional production. This shift is easily explained, because producers—through credit—are, in fact, paid with the assignment of rights to the product, and the value of production is, of course, in a direct ratio to the value of the capital and services incorporated into the product.

Thus, the methods of financing through working capital and by means of credit, while equivalent in terms of their economic effects, differ on account of the varying degrees of flexibility that they provide to production. The second procedure alone can meet the requirements of increasing production immediately and without any limitation.

d) Production Chains

In the state of economic specialization, which is dictated by the complexity of productive operations, a product is rarely the output of one single enterprise. Generally, the many processing operations, the various amalgamations of capital with services of which the product is the outcome, are effected by a series of enterprises, each of which receives the product to be processed in the state in which it was left by the previous one, and processes it until it is delivered for consumption.

We will call “production chain” the set of related and successive operations that culminate in the finished product.

The first enterprises in the sequence are those that process the raw materials properly speaking. The entrepreneur responsible for them owns capital, such as 121 mines, open quarries, tools and equipment, etc. A working capital fund and credit are available to him, so that he can hire the services of workers, foremen, and engineers. These services, combined with the services he draws from his own capital, and those he provides in managing his enterprise, make it possible to extract raw materials, coal, ores, etc., and put them in the [processed] state where they can be used for the purpose of amalgamating them into the product, or for the purpose of providing services that will be incorporated into it.

The raw materials are then sold by the enterprise that produced them to the second enterprise in the sequence; this company, in turn, purchases various services (of workers, engineers, etc.) and, possibly, services or capital produced by other enterprises, as necessary. The services and capital thus purchased, together with those that are provided by the entrepreneur through both the capital he possesses and those he controls by managing production, are amalgamated into a semifinished product [an intermediate product], which will then be delivered to another enterprise.

The finished product—whether capital or service—that can be delivered for consumption will emerge only upon completion of a number of processes. Its distribution, at the point in time and space where it is desired, and, possibly, its presentation in the form and quantity wanted are generally effected by the last entrepreneurs in the sequence, whether direct traders, wholesalers, or retailers, the last of these being responsible for actual delivery to the consumer.

§3. The Income Theorems When Production Does Not Show a Deficit

The preceding analysis brings out a number of relations between production, consumption and income. Generally, common sense gives an inkling of these relations. Their importance is such, however, that thorough specification and demonstration are necessary. We shall analyze these relations, assuming that the value of production is not less than the sum of the values at the instant of time considered—replacement values—of the articles of wealth that are incorporated into the product obtained.

THEOREM I: Value of the income generated by the production of a given article.

To take a concrete example, consider a production chain, leading for instance to the sale of a garment to the consumer. There are three successive stages of 122 production: that of the producer of wool, that of the entrepreneur who sells cloth, and that of the tailor who, with the cloth, produces the garment. For simplicity, we shall disregard the production cycles that yield related requisites, such as buttons, thread, needles, etc.

We shall trace, through the film-reel motion picture balance sheets of the three entrepreneurs concerned and those of other producers taking part in the production chain, the effects of the various operations into which these can be broken down. The film-reel motion picture aspect of this description is different from the usual accounting description, in that, rather than recording only the discontinuities that affect the various patrimonies, it traces in a continuous manner the evolution of the constituent assets and liabilities. We shall assume that the values relate to an article of wealth of some kind, for instance one gram of gold, and, for the sake of simplicity, that we are in an economic universe where prices, relative to this measuring-standard article of wealth, are unchanging.

The first stage in the sequence is a raw material production operation to obtain wool. The entrepreneur owns various kinds of capital, primarily a flock of sheep and pasture land on which the animals graze. These capital items yield various services at a pace that is set by the natural order of things: sheep-feeding services yielded by the land, wool-producing services yielded by the flock of sheep. The producer himself yields services: maintenance and shearing services, in his capacity as a worker, and management and production services in his capacity as an entrepreneur.

The amalgamation of all these services produces wool.

If we follow the process of production through the film-reel motion picture balance sheet of the wool producer, we note, on the assets side, the gradual emergence of the value of the wool growing on the backs of the sheep, while at the same time the rights that were filled with the wool-yielding services appear on the liabilities side, at the same rate and for an equal amount.

These rights are entered in the accounts that reflect their origin; those that enclosed the services provided by capital owned by the producer are entered into “income from owner’s capital” accounts; those that enclosed the services provided by the producer himself, as worker or entrepreneur, are entered into “income deriving from personal labor” accounts.

Regardless of the itemization chosen by the accountant, the value of the wool entered on the assets side is, at each instant of time, strictly equal to the aggregate volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side.

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As, however, the value entered on the assets side is not available prior to shearing, the corresponding rights can only be delayed rights 3 whose maturity is reached at a future date, upon completion of the production cycle.

When shearing has been completed, the producer can “dispose of” the wool. The rights that make up his income become rights exercisable on demand. If the producer then sells the wool to the cloth manufacturer, the articles of wealth that he receives in exchange—consisting of wealth properly speaking (if the sale is for cash) and of claims (if it is on credit)—will replace, on the assets side of the balance sheet, wool as contents of the rights on the liabilities side, but with exactly the same value, hence without altering in any way the volume of these rights.

The second stage in the sequence is the one for which the cloth manufacturer is responsible. The cloth manufacturer buys his raw material from the wool producer and derives from his own capital, factories, tools and equipment, etc. certain services required for the production. He obtains, through exchange, the services of workers, foremen, and engineers and, as necessary, patent services. He himself provides management services.

The incorporation of these various services into the purchased wool produces cloth.

On the assumption that production does not show a loss, the aggregate value of the articles of wealth, capital, and services that make up the cloth increases gradually throughout the production cycle. Its excess over the replacement value of these articles of wealth sets, at each instant of time, the entrepreneur’s own income, which is entered on the liabilities side of his balance sheet.

The third stage in the sequence is the tailor’s responsibility. The tailor buys cloth from the cloth manufacturer. By incorporating into it the services of workers and those that he himself provides as organizer of production, he produces the garment, whose value will fill the rights entered on the liabilities side of his ledger, including his own income derived from his activities as an entrepreneur.

If we consider the whole production chain, we find that the value of the garment can be itemized as follows:

  • — Value of the garment = value of the cloth + value of the workers’ services purchased by the tailor + value of the services provided by the tailor in his capacity as an entrepreneur;124
  • — Value of the cloth = value of the wool + value of the services of workers, engineers, patents, etc., purchased by the cloth manufacturer + value of the services provided by the cloth manufacturer in his capacity as an entrepreneur;
  • — Value of the wool = value of the services provided by the flock, by the pasture land that feeds the flock, and by the owner who possesses the flock and the land.

Thus the value of the garment is only the sum of the values of the various services provided by participants in the production process, be they services yielded by their own persons, or services generated by capitals that belong to them.

Now, each of these services constitutes the income of one of these participants, as a worker, as owner of capital, or as entrepreneur.

If, in the second of the above equations, we substitute for the value of the wool its itemization in the third equation, and if, in the first equation, we substitute for the value of the cloth its itemization in the second equation thus modified, we reach the fundamental conclusion that, under a system where prices are unchanging, any product has generated, throughout the course of its production process, incomes whose total value is identically equal to its own value at the instant of time considered.

If prices fluctuate during the production period, the above identities remain true, but only in terms of the prices existing at the instant of time when they are established; these prices may be different from the purchase prices of the raw materials and services used in the production process.

The value of the garment, for instance, is always identically equal, at any instant of time, to the sum of the values, at the same instant, of the cloth plus workers’ and tailor’s services that are incorporated into the product, but not to the sum of the previous values of these articles of wealth, at the time when the tailor purchased them for incorporation into the product. In other words, the above identity, during periods when prices fluctuate, will remain true only if one uses replacement values rather than purchase values.

Now, the value of the cloth, at any instant of time, is equal to its purchase value, adjusted for the increase or decrease in the value of the working capital fund or the credit invested, between purchase and the instant of time considered.

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The same is true of all the articles of wealth incorporated into the product.

We can therefore write:

  • — Value of the garment = purchase value of the cloth + purchase value of the workers’ services purchased by the tailor + value of the services provided by the tailor in his capacity as an entrepreneur at the time of their incorporation into the garment + increase or decrease in the value of the tailor’s working capital fund (or the credit extended to him) between investment and the instant of time considered;
  • — Purchase value of the cloth = purchase value of the wool + purchase value of the services of workers, engineers, patents, etc. acquired by the cloth manufacturer + value of the services provided by the cloth manufacturer in his capacity as an entrepreneur, at the time when they were provided + increase or decrease in the value of the tailor’s working capital fund (or of the credit extended to him), between their investment and the moment of time when the cloth in which they were invested was sold to the tailor;
  • — Value of the wool = value of the services yielded by the flock, by the pasture land that fed the sheep, and by the owner of the flock, at the time when they were provided + increase or decrease in the value of these services between the time when they were provided and the sale of the wool to the cloth manufacturer.

Therefore, in a period of variable prices, any product has generated, over the course of its production process, incomes and increases or decreases in the values of working capital funds (or of credits), whose total value is identically equal to the value of the product, at the instant of time considered.

The increases or decreases in the values of working capital (or of credit) maintain the purchasing power of the working capital (or of credit) invested in the production considered.

As a result of the above considerations, one can specify the aggregate amount of the working capital or credit required by a production chain that is assumed to operate at a steady state. If production is to expand smoothly, the working capital or credit available to the various enterprises in the sequence must dovetail into one another, in such a way that the daily output of the first enterprise can, upon completion of its production cycle, be purchased by the second, the production of the second by the third, and so forth. Each sale will replenish 126 the working capital fund of the enterprise concerned or make it possible to repay the credit used in the production process, and the amounts repaid are then available again for investment in a new production cycle.

For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that the services used during each production cycle are acquired simultaneously on the first day of the cycle, and that prices remain unchanged throughout the cycle.

If the first enterprise in the sequence buys, every day, services whose value is m1, and if its production cycle is n1 days, it will need a working capital fund F1 (or a credit for a period of n1 days), whose total value will be F1 = n1m1.

If m′1 is the value of the services provided every day by the entrepreneur in his capacity as production organizer, he himself will grant his own enterprise a daily credit equal to this amount, until the product is sold to the second enterprise in the sequence.

The second enterprise will need to have available, every day, the resources necessary in order to purchase the production of the first one—i.e., m1 + m′1—and to acquire the services m2 that it uses. If the duration of its production cycle is n2 days, then it will need a working capital fund F2 (or a credit arrangement for a period of n2 days) amounting to:

F2 = n2 (m1 + m′1 + m2)

This will also be the case for each enterprise operating in the sequence, until the product is sold for consumption, at which time the proceeds of the sale to the consumer will replenish the working capital fund of the last enterprise, or enable it to repay the credit extended to it, as well as the credit that the entrepreneur grants it every day in the form of entrepreneurial services.

The value of the working capital fund or the credit arrangement that all the enterprises in the production chain require is therefore:

F = n1m1 + n2 [(m1 + m′1) + m2]

+ n3 [(m1 + m′1 + m2) + m′2 + m3]

+ . . .

This analysis also shows that, in a production chain, the working capital funds or the credit arrangements used by the successive enterprises must “carry” the incomes generated to the various producers through to the end of the sequence, at which time the value of the product will restore the working capital funds or the credits to their normal levels. Thus, there is a mutual relay between the various working capital funds or the credits, as each sale by one enterprise 127 to the next or to the consumer releases the necessary working capital fund or credit to start a further production cycle, thereby ensuring the operation of the production apparatus at a continuing, regular, and steady state.

Furthermore, if we take into consideration the credit that the entrepreneur grants to the enterprise within the limits of his own income, it is clear that the amount of credit required by a given production chain is independent of the number of enterprises between which production is distributed. As regards the working capital fund, this is at a minimum level where all productive operations are concentrated in one single enterprise, because, in this case, the entrepreneur’s own income receives its full content only upon completion of the entire production cycle.

Lastly, it will be noted that the amount of credit granted or the working capital required for a given production depends on the length of the production cycles involved. Any increase in stocks,4 for instance as a result of poor sales, is the equivalent of an extension of the time necessary in order to sell the goods; the above formula therefore sets the influence that such an increase will have on the amount of credit or working capital invested in production. It also allows for a forecast to be made of the increase in the amount of credit or of working capital funds, which a given increase in the volume of production will require.

THEOREM II: Value of the incomes generated over a given period.

To the extent that a product generates, during the production process, an aggregate volume of incomes (and, where prices fluctuate, value increases or decreases in the working capital funds or credits involved) equal to its own value, the total value of the incomes produced over a given period (adjusted, when prices are variable, to take account of the increases or decreases in the value of working capital or credit concerned) is identically equal to the total value of the products generated over this period.

It is understood in this statement that the date when a product was generated is the date on which the services that constitute the product were provided.

The above relation shows that a country’s national income, regardless of its distribution and taxation, is equal to the value of the production achieved during the year considered by the natural persons or legal entities—including the state—that constitute the country.

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THEOREM III: Value of the incomes that are not used up at a specific instant of time.

Consumption can occur only where services have been released by capital, hence where income has been generated. One can therefore be certain that, in a closed universe, the value of total consumption over a given period is less than, or at most equal to, the value of the incomes generated during this period.

The services consumed are not necessarily produced by the consumer himself or by his capital, however; they may have been acquired through exchange, against capital belonging to the consumer. As a result, an individual can consume more services than are yielded by his own capital; but in order that this should be so, then, within the same community, another individual must accept to relinquish services in exchange for capital.

Thus, for instance, when a country is at war, national consumption possibilities are limited by the maximum rate of decapitalization of capital the state owns, or capital owned by nationals, unless the state can, by floating a loan abroad, exchange part of this capital for consumable services.

Consumption may either be for enjoyment or production purposes.5 Consumption for enjoyment purposes destroys the services involved, whereas consumption for production purposes spares them. But in a closed universe, the total sum of these services is, at any period of time, identically equal to the aggregate values of incomes. We can therefore state that, in a closed universe and under a system of stable prices, the difference between the total value of earned incomes and consumption for enjoyment purposes, over a given period, is identically equal to the increase in the value of existing capital between the beginning and the end of the period considered.

In other words, any excess of incomes over consumption expenditures has a counterpart in the form of an increase in the amount of acquired wealth.

In a period when prices are variable, the preceding statement must be supplemented, because, as incomes are generated, the values of working capital funds increase or decrease. The above statement then becomes:

The difference between, on the one hand, the total value of earned incomes and increases or decreases in the values of the working capital funds or credits realized over a certain period and, on the other hand, the value of total consumption 129 over the same period is identically equal to the change in value of existing capital between the beginning and the end of the period considered.

§4. The Income Theorems Where Production Shows a Deficit

Production is said to show a deficit when, upon completion of the production process, the value of the product is less than the aggregate value, at that same time, of the capital and services that have been incorporated into this product.

The entrepreneur’s income, which, in terms of the market, is the measure of the services that he has provided in his capacity as production initiator and organizer, must then be regarded as negative.6

But a negative income, while not meaningless in accounting terms, makes no sense in terms of economics.

It is only an algebraic expression, a representation of the value decrease for which the production process is responsible. A negative income means that the product, upon completion of the production process, no longer suffices to fill the rights that enclosed the articles of wealth of which the product is made.

In practice, however, in order to avoid an accounting description based on a purely algebraic concept, the entrepreneur’s income, where production shows a deficit, will simply be taken to be zero, and the values dissipated during the production process will be represented by a fictitious asset called a deficit.

With this artificial device, the assets on the balance sheet will fill the rights entered on the liabilities side, and the principle of value preservation will be safeguarded.

But it goes without saying that, on the assets side, the deficit will be a purely illusory value. The aggregate volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side can be maintained only to the extent that this illusory value is maintained on the assets side. But if this value has to be realized, or if the assets have to evaluated—on the occasion when the next detailed accounts are drawn up—for the value at which they could be sold, then the aggregate volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side must be scaled down by the amount of the deficit. Until then, these rights—being devoid of value to the extent of the deficit—will be, partly, false rights.

If the amount of the deficit is less than the entrepreneur’s own capital, then it is his own rights that will have to be devalued. If the entrepreneur owns no 130 capital, or if his capital is less than the deficit, then third parties’ rights will be devalued.

In each and every case, production showing a deficit will have generated false rights to the extent of the deficit.

Let us now take up the analysis of a specific production, such as that of a garment for example, where production yields a deficit. The equalities through which we described the various stages of production in the preceding sections will only be maintained if, upon completion of each stage, we increase the value of the product by the amount of the deficit generated at that stage. The rights included on the second side of our equalities will then keep their value, but they will be, to the extent of the deficit, false rights.

The three income theorems can then be stated as follows:

THEOREM I: During the production process any product generates incomes (and, where prices are variable, increases or decreases in the values of the working capital funds), whose total value is identically equal to the value of the product at the instant of time considered, plus the aggregate amount of the deficits occurring during the production chain. But, to the extent of this aggregate amount, the production process has turned into false rights some of the rights held by members of the producing community.

THEOREM II: The total value of the incomes generated over a given period (and, where prices are variable, of the increase or decrease in the values of the working capital funds) is identically equal to the aggregate volume of the products generated over that period, plus the amount of the deficits occurring during the production chains of which the products are the end result. But, during the same period, some of the rights held by members of the community considered have become false rights, to the extent of the aggregate amount of these deficits.

THEOREM III: The difference between the total value of earned incomes and increases or decreases in the values of the working capital funds recorded over a given period, on the one hand, and, on the other, the total value of all consumption occurring over the same period is identically equal to the increase in the value of existing stocks of capital occurring between the beginning and the end of the period considered, plus the deficits occurring in the production chains of which these value increases are the result. During this period, some of the rights held by members of the community considered have become false rights, to the extent of the aggregate amount of these deficits.

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The above theorems set the volume of the false rights for which, during each period, the deficits are responsible, through the value reduction that production has inflicted on the articles of wealth used in the process. Production, however, is not the only factor generating false rights. False rights may arise, as shown in Chapter VIII, when exchanges take place at prices different from the equilibrium price. Notably, false rights will be generated, independently of any deficit, when the articles of wealth incorporated in the product are purchased by the entrepreneur at prices higher than the price that ensures market equilibrium, or the product is sold at a price less than the price that ensures market equilibrium.

Similarly, any consumption or any loss of assets that is not accompanied by a concomitant reduction in the volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side will generate false rights.

The volume of false rights generated over a given period, within a specific community, will therefore not only be determined by the volume of production deficits occurring during this period; it will be the sum of all the false rights generated by the various factors mentioned above.

§5. Remarks concerning the Limited Scope of the Income Theorems

Some people will view the income theorems as meaningless truisms and will call into question the usefulness of the heavy device through which we have sought to demonstrate them. Others, in contrast, will seek to find in them lessons that they cannot provide. It is therefore crucial to specify their scope.

The income theorems show that any creation of wealth generates the rights that are intended to enclose this wealth. Thus, these theorems express with greater precision a concept that is invoked in theory just as often as it is negated in practice.

They lead to the statement that, where a product exists, there is no need to worry about the purchasing power that will enable it to be sold, or attempt to generate such purchasing power by means of a suitable policy.

In order that an article of wealth should fit into the right that can enclose it, however, it is not enough for the right to exist, but also that the holder should wish to fill it with the article of wealth that is supplied to him. The scope and significance of the income theorems would be dangerously exaggerated if they were viewed as providing evidence that the articles of wealth supplied will al132ways be demanded. The fourth and fifth parts of this book will show that this is not so; these parts will specify the economic and monetary consequences that the absolute freedom of choice of all rights holders entails.

The income theorems, therefore, do not in any way demonstrate the perennial nature of economic equilibria. These [economic equilibria] are of a lasting nature only under “steady state conditions”—that is to say, when the articles of wealth supplied are demanded by the holders of the rights that are suited to enclose them.

Thus, our income theorems provide only the framework in which a dynamic explanation will be inserted, but they do not provide the explanation itself; they have no causal virtue whatsoever.

This observation is especially important at a time when fashion has led to the hatching of numerous economic theories that seek to find, in the study of various types of purchasing power, the causal explanation for economic disturbances.

The following considerations will show that causal forces are never within the right, which is a passive envelope of articles of wealth that one fills it with, but in the will that chooses these articles of wealth and determines the use of the ability to enjoy and dispose, which the right confers.

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Chapter XI: The Special Status of Public Service Production

§1. The State as a Public Service Entrepreneur

a) Nature of the Producing Activities of the State

From the economic point of view, the state is an entrepreneur of public services: security services (through the army and the police), justice, education, welfare assistance, utilities, etc. In order to produce such services, the state acquires capital (iron, steel, cement, explosives, etc.), services of public servants (such as soldiers, policemen, judges, road menders, etc.), and services of workers (such as construction excavation workers, metallurgical or arsenal workers, etc.).1

The state amalgamates these services and generally transforms them so that they will constitute either the public services themselves or the capital, such as cannons, warships, roads, bridges, canals, etc., capable of producing such services.

The services and capital produced by the state are either consumed or capitalized in the form of articles of wealth that constitute public property.2

The public services that are consumed disappear. One can comment at length on the nature of such consumption. For instance, are the security services provided by the army and the police consumed by the independent entity that is the state, or by the individuals that constitute it?

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The question, which is that of the autonomous existence of legal entities, can be explored by the metaphysician; it is of little significance for our present purposes.

b) Public Expenditure and Taxes

The state pays for the services and the capitals that it uses in the course of its producing activities [either] in cash or at a due date. In the first case, it is wealth properly speaking, and in the second case, a claim that is substituted in the transferor’s rights for the articles of wealth acquired by the state.

The aggregate value of the articles of wealth, properly speaking, and of the claims that the state transfers to its suppliers of capital and services over a given period determines the amount of “government expenditure” over this period.

Government expenditure for purchases of services generates incomes for the beneficiaries. As regards government expenditure for purchases of capital, this generates income rights or capital rights, depending on whether the capital transferred has been produced during or prior to the beginning of the accounting period considered. If this period is fairly lengthy, then all the rights filled by the state, when it pays for public expenditures, constitute income. When the period is twelve months, income represents an overwhelming share.

Although the state acts like a private entrepreneur in regard to the production of public services and of the capital necessary to generate them, its role is different from that of an entrepreneur, insofar as it does not sell these services directly to those who can use them.

The state distributes, free of charge, public services to the community: protection services against external or internal threats, education services, welfare assistance, the use of roads, etc.

As regards the capital generating the services necessary for the production of public services, such as roads, bridges, canals, warships, etc., this the state keeps in its own patrimony, and merely draws from it the services that—when amalgamated with services provided by public servants or workers—will yield public services. Moreover, the state forbids itself from selling these, by making the inalienability of public property recognized by the law.

On the other hand, although the state distributes public services free of charge, it sees to it that its productive activities are remunerated by assigning to itself, through authoritative measures, claims on the assets of private persons, in the form of taxes.

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These claims are entered on the liabilities side of taxpayers’ balance sheets and reduce, by a corresponding amount, taxpayers’ own rights, while they increase, by the amount of their value, the assets of the state. These claims are substituted, in these state assets, for the articles of wealth distributed in the form of public services.

Thus, the acquisition of tax claims completes the production cycle in the course of which public services are generated, and enables the state—to the extent of the amount of these claims—to replenish the working capital fund or fill the credit committed in the production cycle.

One can of course attack this concept and contend that there is no direct link between the value of the services received and the amount of taxes paid. The objection is dismissed, however, if one observes that the tax rate, by setting their total proceeds, sets the unit price of public services.

Everything then happens as if tax revenues were, during each period of time, the payment for public services, their price being determined, through authoritative measures, at the level resulting indirectly from the existing tax rate and the quantity of services provided.

As far as the distribution of this [tax] payment among the members of the community is concerned, this is done on the basis of considerations that pertain to the art of taxation and are alien to the purpose of this present work.

c) The Production of Public Services, in Balance or in Deficit

The aggregate value of the tax claims acquired by the state over a given period of time sets the value of the services that it sells during this period.3

Depending on whether this value is in excess of, equal to, or less than the replacement value of the services and capital used in order to generate the public services sold, the “entrepreneur” that is the state, like any private entrepreneur, receives an income, which is positive, zero, or negative. Considering the definitions provided in the preceding chapter, the production of public services will show a surplus, break even, or show a deficit.

In fact, the tax rate rarely leaves the state an income of its own. In most cases, the production of public services either breaks even or shows a deficit.

Where it breaks even, the value of the articles of wealth whose amalgamation has produced the public services will be carried into these services. The 136 proceeds of their sale will therefore fill exactly the rights in which these articles of wealth were previously enclosed—i.e., the state’s own rights, if these articles of wealth were purchased in cash, and third parties’ rights, if they were purchased on credit.

When this is the case, the production of public services in no way affects the nature of the rights included in the liabilities of the state. If these rights were true rights at the beginning of the production cycle, they will still be so at the end.

By contrast, when production shows a deficit, then a part of the value of the articles of wealth that contributed to the generation of public services, a part that is equal to the amount of the deficit, is dissipated. The production process has truly vaporized this slice of value: it is irremediably lost.

In this case, the public services that have been generated, or the proceeds of their sale, do not replace the articles of wealth that have been incorporated into them. The aggregate value of the state’s assets has been reduced, as a result of the production of public services, by the amount of the deficit. To the extent of this amount, some rights included in the liabilities have thus become false rights. If the creditors of the state were to seek to exercise the ability to dispose that is provided by their rights, these rights would have to be devalued, in order to bring the aggregate volume of the state’s liabilities down to the level of the aggregate value of its assets.

Thus, any production of public services that shows a deficit due to the value that the tax rate assigns to it generates false rights to the extent of the deficit.

This conclusion does not in any way differentiate between the status of the state as “entrepreneur” and that of a private entrepreneur.

Although the consequences of a production that shows a deficit are the same for both, from the point of view of the volume of false rights generated, they are no longer comparable if one considers the assignment of false rights, hence their distribution, between the entrepreneur and the third parties appearing on the liabilities side of his ledger.

Under private law, third parties’ rights have precedence over those of the patrimony holder, which are generally referred to as “capital” [in reference to the patrimony holder’s equity] or “capital and reserves.” The former [third parties’ rights] cannot become false rights until the latter [holder’s rights, including the holder’s equity, if any] have been reduced to zero.

As a result, any production showing a deficit turns the entrepreneur’s rights into false rights before his creditors’ rights are affected. The entrepreneur’s as 137 sets will replace the values dissipated as a result of the deficit, in the rights of third parties.

The state, however, has exempted itself from the application of this rule of law, by making the assets that constitute public property unseizable 4 and inalienable. It is this dual feature that—in altering the rules for the assignment of false rights (if any)—establishes a distinction between public and private finance, and requires that public finance be studied separately.

§2. The Unseizability and Inalienability of Public Property, Two Distinctive Features of the Status of the “State as Entrepreneur”

a) The Consequences of the Unseizability and Inalienability of Public Property

In France and, we think, in most countries,5 the impossibility of obtaining measures of distraint against the debtor state prevents the creditor from laying hold of the necessary assets from the patrimony of the defaulting debtor in order to fill the rights of which he is the holder, when this defaulter is the state.

Even when sentenced to pay, the state pays only if and when it is willing to do so.

The assets of the state thus become unseizable, but they also have another attribute, at least when they are public property: inalienability.

In France, and we think (once again) in most other countries, the law provides that the state shall not sell property that, by its nature and its assignment, serves to meet collective needs. Such property includes public buildings and monuments, museums, roads, bridges, rivers, canals, most of the railways, forts, ramparts, warships, and the major part of military equipment—in fact nearly all the articles of wealth that constitute the assets of the state.

This exceptional status has no doubt been conferred upon this type of wealth by reason of its particular nature. As it can only satisfy collective needs, these types of property generally would not find any buyer other than the state. If supplied in the market, such wealth could only command a very limited price. Their sale or seizure would therefore inflict upon the state a severe loss.

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The dual nature of unseizability and inalienability of most of the articles of wealth capitalized by the state, however, profoundly alters the nature of the exchanges to which the state is a party.

If the exchange is on credit or on deferred terms—i.e., if it involves the transfer to the state of wealth properly speaking in exchange for a claim that is assigned to the transferor—then the holder of the claim cannot lay hold of the corresponding amount. His right may become false, even if the articles of wealth needed to fill it exist in the assets of the state.

But the state, even if it wanted to fill the rights on the liabilities side of its ledger that have reached maturity, could only do so by using articles of wealth that can be transferred. Now, that part of its capital which is public property is inalienable. The only items that can be transferred or sold are therefore those assets belonging to the state that are not part of public property, which are, in fact, public services and cash holdings in the state’s [financial] coffers.

Except in the exceptional case when the state’s bank account shows a significant cash balance, however, its cash holdings will not exceed the amounts required for its daily operations. Its cash holdings can therefore be regarded as incompressible, so that the only articles of wealth that it can dispose of in order to fill its creditors’ rights are public services, or the proceeds of their sale.

The state can, of course, float a loan. But issuing a loan simply means obtaining the present value of the annuities that will be, as the successive maturity dates are reached, transferred to the lender. Issuing a loan, therefore, simply means changing the date when the resources that these annuities represent are collected, but not the amount of these resources.

Thus, in each and every case, the state, in order to fill the rights for which it is a debtor, will only have available the value of the services that it produces. Any right of claim that will not find its contents in the value of these services will be a false right, regardless of the assets in the hands of the state.

The aggregate value of the public services provided by the state during each period of time depends, however, on the one hand, on their quantity and, on the other, on the price that the existing tax rate assigns to them. If the state wants to avoid the emergence of false rights on the liabilities side of its ledger, then it must bring action to bear on the tax rate and set it at a certain level, so that in any period aggregate tax proceeds are equal to the replacement value of the public services provided over the period considered.

The impossibility for the state to supply its various Treasury offices through the sale of those of its assets that are public property implies a special organization for its “finance department.” In addition, this impossibility affects the meaning 139 of the indications provided by its accounting, as to the nature of the rights on the liabilities side of its ledger; in particular, it alters the interpretation of the information yielded by the balance sheet as to the assignment of the false rights arising from a production deficit.

Let us now study these particular features in greater detail.

b) The Treasury: A Protected Cashier

The Treasury is, for the state, what the finance department is for a private enterprise: it pays for its purchases, collects claims, and settles debts.

When the state acquires capital or services, the Treasury enters—on the liabilities side of its balance sheet—the transferor’s claim.

If public accounts were kept in the same way as in private companies, the wealth transferred would be entered on the asset side of an account from which would be withdrawn, after all the required transformations or amalgamations, the public services sold to the taxpayer.

Under the same assumption, at the time of sale, the accountant would simply have to cancel the corresponding values in the account, by means of an entry on the liabilities side, and enter the tax claim resulting from the sale to the Treasury.

In actual fact, however, in most cases the two intermediate entries are simply omitted. Public accountancy does not include any [detailed] stock record. The Treasury alone intervenes and, during each period of time, simply records the debts resulting from purchases by the state, and the fiscal claims arising from tax assessment.

No difficulty arises when public services are sold at their production cost: as it receives the tax claims linked to the sale of services resulting from a given purchase, the Treasury has, in its portfolio, the values necessary to fill the rights that are included in its liabilities as a result of the purchase.

If, however, public services are sold at a price below their production cost, [with] the production of public services showing a deficit, then the Treasury will not find, in its assets, the resources that are necessary to match its liabilities. It is then that the considerable difference between the status of the Treasury and that of the finance department of a private enterprise becomes apparent.

In the case of a private enterprise, the finance department is simply a partitioning of the legal entity that its patrimony constitutes, and cash holdings, a mere component of total assets. If cash holdings are not sufficient, then the finance department will secure the necessary resources by selling some part of the assets. If it fails to do so, the creditor may compel it to do so, by directly 140 laying hold of the articles of wealth that are necessary to fill his matured claims. As long as the entrepreneur has a capital of his own, no third party’s right included in his liabilities can possibly be false.

Under public law, however, the inalienability of public property prevents the state from transferring to the Treasury any assets other than those it derives from the sale of public services. Where these are insufficient to meet the demandable claims, the creditor is in no position to force the debtor to carry out the necessary operations. Such a situation substantiates a complete separation between the holdings of the Treasury and those of the state. Under the rules of public law, the Treasury and the state are two distinct legal entities, with communicating but independent patrimonies.

Thus, the Treasury can be in deficit, while the state runs a surplus. The rights of the Treasury’s creditors will then become false rights, without the state’s own assets having been exhausted.

This situation fundamentally alters the consequences of exchange. Whereas under private law, an exchange will not generate false rights if transacted at the market equilibrium price, under public law the emergence of false rights will be avoided only if the services derived from the wealth purchased are effectively sold, and at a price such that the present value of the claims they generate is equal to their production cost.

This finding explains the shortcomings of public accounting. There is no need to trace the value of the state’s assets, because these assets have no influence on the nature of its creditors’ rights and on the state’s ability to fill them. The only thing that matters to the Treasury’s creditors is not the market value of the state’s assets but the value at which the services that they can yield will be sold.

Thus we find ex post facto confirmation of the views developed in the preceding section on the value of the articles of wealth that make up public property.

For the Treasury, as for the creditors of the state, this value will be the one resulting from the price at which the public services generated are sold—in other words, the rate of taxation. This value is therefore one that is determined by official measures.

Moreover, the inalienability of the articles of wealth that make up public property prevents the state, even if it wished to do so, from allocating the value that they could command in the market to the repayment of its matured debts, while their unseizability prevents the creditor from seeking, in the state’s assets, the value of these matured debts.

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Thus, the rate of taxation alone determines the value of public property within the state’s patrimony. Any other valuation would be theoretical and arbitrary.

c) Budgeting, a Misleading Method of Accounting

In order to assess the financial effects of the state’s productive activities, the budget that describes them is generally considered [as providing a true picture].

Under the French decree of May 31, 1862, relating to public accounting, “the budget is the instrument through which the state’s expenditures and income are forecast and authorized over a specific period of time.”

At first sight, the budget appears to bring side by side the production cost and the value of the sale of public services. The budget would thus be the equivalent of the working account in a private business enterprise, and would allow people to know whether the production of public services breaks even or shows a deficit.

In fact, however, this is only a misleading appearance; the budget, when considered in isolation, can in no way be regarded as a bookkeeping account of the public service production process.

On the expenditure side, it comprises the purchase value of the capital and the services that the state orders to be transferred to it over the budget period. Some of the capital and services will be capitalized; another part will be resold during the same period in the form of public services.

On the revenue side, the budget records the sale value of the public services provided during the budgetary period. Some of these services are the outcome of purchases made during this period; others are derived from the capital that was already part of public property at the beginning of the budgetary year.

Revenue and expenditure are not therefore related to the same articles of wealth. They have one thing in common, which is the value of the assets purchased and resold during the budgetary period; but in addition to this common element are added, on the expenditure side, the value of the capital and services capitalized during the budgetary year and, on the revenue side, the value of the capital and services derived from preexisting capital.

The budget is not a production account and can cast light on the question as to whether the state’s productive activities show a deficit or not, only if these two additional elements are of identical value; that is to say, if the value of public property—all else equal as regards prices—remains strictly unchanged. This will be the case, in particular, when the state operates under steady conditions, thus maintaining public property in an unchanged physical state—that is, com142pensating the wear and tear resulting from the provision of public services with the capitalization of newly acquired services.

In any other case, the budget is meaningful only when brought side by side with the state’s balance sheet—i.e., within the framework of a genuine accounting system. To such an accounting system, the budget provides only two specific accounts: income and expenditure.

Thus, a balanced budget can represent two very different systems of public service production:

  • 1. A balanced system if, all things equal as regards prices, the value of public property, taken as the present value—in light of the tax rate—of the public services that it can yield, does not change over the budget period. In this case, the value of the public services produced covers exactly public services’ cost of production. The budget is then said to be in actual equilibrium.
  • 2. A system showing a deficit if, all things equal as regards prices, the value of public property is reduced over the budget period. In this case, the value of the services sold has been increased to the level of their production cost only by adding to the services produced during the budgetary year services derived from preexisting capital—i.e., by decapitalizing some public property. The budget is said to be in apparent equilibrium.

Similarly, a budget that shows a deficit may represent:

  • 1. A balanced system of production if, all things equal as regards prices, the value of public property increases during the year by an amount equal to the budget deficit. In these circumstances, revenue is less than expenditure only because part of the acquired wealth has not been sold but capitalized. The budget deficit does not in any way reflect a decrease in the value of the wealth incorporated into the production process; the values missing in the budget will be found in the state’s assets and will be recovered by the Treasury, when the public services that the new assets can produce are sold. The budget deficit, which is purely apparent, is then said to be a cash deficit.
  • 2. A system of production showing a deficit if, all things equal as regards prices, the value of public property remains unchanged over the period considered, or only increases by an amount that is less than the deficit. In such a case, the value of the sale of public services is less than their production cost. The 143 missing values have been dissipated during the production process; nothing will allow these to be recovered. The budget deficit, which reflects the fact that production shows a deficit, is said to be a patrimony deficit.

The above analysis sheds light on the physical significance of the budget results.

The budget balance is the difference between two totals: the volume of the rights in which were enclosed the articles of wealth acquired by the state over the budget period, and the volume of the rights that had enclosed the public services sold by the state during the same period. Depending on whether the former is equal to or in excess of the latter, the budget will be in equilibrium or show a deficit.

The volume of the rights that enclosed the services sold by the state over the budgetary period depends on their quantity and on the price that the existing tax rate assigns to them.

The budget will be balanced, provided:

  • 1. If public services are sold at their production cost, that the quantity sold during the budget period is the exact amount that can be obtained by the capital and services acquired during the same period. Then, the state assets remain unchanged and the budget is in actual equilibrium.
  • 2. If public services are sold at a price lower than their production cost, that the public services sold constitute, in addition to those services that can be obtained with the capital and services acquired over the budget period, or their equivalent, those services that will raise the value of the public services sold to the level of the value of the purchased capital and services. This complement is provided by public property, whose value is reduced by reason of the services that it has yielded. The budget is then in apparent equilibrium.

The budget will be in deficit, provided:

  • 1. If public services are sold at their production cost, that the quantity of services sold is less than what can be obtained with the capital and services purchased during the budget period. The services purchased and not sold, or their equivalent, are capitalized and increase public property by an amount equal to their value. The deficit is only apparent.
  • 2. If public services are sold at a price that is less than their production cost, and if the deficit is equal to the decrease of value suffered by the capital and 144 services bought during the budget period, due to the tax rate, that the quantity of services sold is exactly that which can be obtained with the capital and services bought. The assets of the state then remain unchanged. The deficit is due entirely to a loss of value: it is a patrimony deficit.

One sees how misleading the conclusions derived from budgetary entries would be, unless compared with the variations in the various assets of the state. Only a balance sheet could bring out these variations with any degree of precision. In the absence of such a document, however, they can only be approximated through a qualitative interpretation of the budget.

§3. The Effect of the State’s Productive Activities on the Nature of Property Rights

The preceding analysis shows that the budget, if considered in isolation, does not make it possible to anticipate the nature of the claims that it assigns. And yet, it is a vital matter for a creditor of the Treasury to know whether his claim is true or false. This section will try to answer that question.

We have shown that, if one disregards the duration of the process of producing public services, everything happens as if the Treasury, after each purchase, entered in its portfolio the tax claims linked to the sale of the public services that the purchased article of wealth will make it possible to produce.

Assuredly, tax claims are fungible articles of wealth. There is no reason why, among all the claims that the state acquires and transfers to the Treasury over the budget period, a given claim should be related to a given asset. If, however, the production of public services is balanced, the aggregate present value of the claims acquired during any period is equal to the value of the articles of wealth purchased during this period, whereas it is lower—by the amount of the deficit—when the production of public services, taking account of the value assigned to them by the tax rate, shows a deficit.

This being so, if one wishes to forecast the nature of the claims arising from a given budget, hence the nature of the rights of third parties that enclose them, one has to seek, behind the appearance of budget results, the reality that it expresses.

a) Budget in Equilibrium

That which characterizes a budget in equilibrium is equality between the Treasury’s revenue and expenditure over the budget period, hence between the 145 rights entered on the liabilities side of the Treasury’s ledger as a result of the acquisition of articles of wealth by the state and tax claims that have reached maturity as a result of the sale of public services.

A balanced budget enables the Treasury to fill with true articles of wealth the rights that have been entered on its liabilities side as a result of the implementation of the budget.

When the budget is in equilibrium, the rights of third parties that are recipients in relation to the budget are therefore all true rights.

But the budget equilibrium may be actual or apparent.

If it is actual, it simply reflects equilibrium in the system for the production of public services, which are sold at their production cost. No false right emerges within the community considered.

By contrast, if the budget equilibrium is apparent, then the production of public services shows a deficit. The fact that the budget is in equilibrium just proves that the deficit resulting from production, such as it results from the sale price of public services set by the existing tax rate, has been covered through a transfer of state assets; in other words, by the uncompensated wear and tear of the capital that makes up public property.

In such a case, all things equal as regards prices, it is the value of the capital thus deteriorated that has diminished. It is therefore the rights that enclosed such capital that have become false rights.

Thus, when budget equilibrium is merely apparent, it is to the state, in its own rights account, that the false rights generated by the production deficit are assigned.

b) Budget Deficit

When the budget is in deficit, the value of the articles of wealth that the Treasury acquires during the budget period, by collecting tax claims, is less than the value of the articles of wealth required to fill the matured rights of which the Treasury becomes a debtor.

If the Treasury’s cash holdings are incompressible, which we here assume to be the case, the Treasury, after using its tax revenue, will only be able to fill the rights of which it remains a debtor with the tax claims representing the value, at the existing tax rate, of the public services that will be yielded later on by the articles of wealth capitalized over the budget period.

Depending on whether the present value of these claims is or is not sufficient to complete the filling of the rights included on the liabilities side of the Treasury’s ledger, these rights will either be true or false rights.

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If the deficit is only a cash deficit, public services being sold—in view of the existing tax rate—at their cost of production, then this condition is met: the implementation of the budget has not generated any false rights. The rights of claim that are not filled with real articles of wealth during the budget period find their counterpart in the present value of the services that the new investments made by the state over the same period will yield later on.

If the deficit is a patrimony deficit, with public services—in view of the existing tax rate—being sold at a price lower than their production cost, the rights of third parties included on the liabilities side of the Treasury’s ledger are devoid of content, to the extent of the values that the deficit has dissipated. These rights are definitively false rights; although they can be assigned differently, their nature cannot be changed.

Thus, any budget deficit in the nature of a patrimony deficit generates false rights among third parties that are Treasury creditors, to the extent of the deficit.

c) The Budget Deficit, a Measure of the False Rights Injected into the Social Structure through the Production of Public Services When the Assets of the State Remain Unchanged—That Is, When the State Operates Under Steady Conditions

The preceding analysis shows that the implementation of the budget can lead to the emergence of false rights among third parties that are Treasury creditors, only if the budget is in deficit. But this condition is not sufficient. False rights will actually develop only for that part of the deficit that is not offset by an increase in the state’s assets.

This shows that, during the many periods when the state operates under steady conditions, the budget deficit is the exact measure of the volume of the false rights assigned to third parties as a result of budget implementation.

This will be the case, in particular, when the state merely ensures the preservation of public property by providing a degree of maintenance that is exactly what is needed to compensate the wear and tear of the constituent assets, but without increasing their value.

When public property increases, the volume of false rights assigned to third parties will, during each period, be less than the budget deficit, by the present value—reckoned on the basis of existing tax rates—of the capital that has accrued to the assets of the state.

If the present value of the additional taxes that additional investments generate, at existing rates, is small relative to the amount of the budget deficit, the 147 budget deficit will measure, at a first approximation, the volume of third parties’ false rights generated by budget implementation.

In the absence of more accurate information, it is these conclusions that endow budget entries with practical significance, for the purposes of studying public finances and forecasting their economic and social impact.

§4. Treasury Problems

a) The Nature of Treasury Problems

The Treasury, as we have already said, is the state’s finance department. Its function is therefore to fill the rights of claim under its liabilities when they reach maturity.

To that end, the Treasury has available its own cash holdings, if any, and the tax claims that it collects on behalf of the state.

Generally, however, its cash balances, without which its “counters” cannot operate, can be regarded as incompressible. The Treasury’s resources will then be reduced to the amount of the tax claims that the state delegates to it.

The practical question consists in knowing whether and, possibly, in what cases the Treasury will be able to meet its commitments.

b) No Treasury Problem If the Budget Is in Equilibrium

There will be no Treasury problem if, at each instant of time, the Treasury’s revenue equals its expenditure.

This is the case when, the Treasury having no obligations other than those resulting from the implementation of the current budget, this budget is, during all periods of time, however short these may be, in strict equilibrium.

c) Treasury Problems Resolve Themselves on Their Own When the Deficit Is Only a Cash Deficit

When the budget is in deficit, the Treasury will not find in its fiscal revenue the wealth necessary to fill the rights that the budget implementation has included in its liabilities.

But the budget deficit may be a cash deficit or a patrimony deficit, depending on whether, during the budget period, public services are sold at a price equal to or less than their production cost.

If the deficit is a cash deficit, the Treasury receives, as a result of the implementation of the current budget, if not articles of wealth properly speaking, at 148 least tax claims, whose present value fills exactly the volume of the rights included in its liabilities.

It may be, however, that certain creditors of the Treasury will refuse to accept these tax claims as contents of their rights. The Treasury will then supply them on the market.

As tax claims are assumed to be true claims, however, they are certain to be disposed of at the market price. Their sale will yield articles of wealth properly speaking, to the extent of their present value, hence wealth capable of filling the creditors’ rights.

Thus, by supplying in the market the tax claims turned down by its creditors, the Treasury simply finds rights holders who are prepared, in exchange for the claims supplied, to part with the articles of wealth necessary in order to temporarily fill the rights that have been included in the Treasury’s liabilities, until the sale of the services capitalized by the state through its additional investments secures, in a definitive way, the resources that are necessary to fill these rights.

Where the deficit is a cash deficit, there cannot therefore be any Treasury problem.

Let us observe here that a cash deficit, which is a temporary deficit, resulting from a time lag between purchase and resale of the articles of wealth acquired by the state, may emerge, even during periods when the budget, which is calculated over a fairly long period, is in equilibrium.

If, for instance, the annual budget is in equilibrium, there is little likelihood that the monthly budgets, into which it can be subdivided, will also be in equilibrium. The fact is that the production of public services, like all production processes, involves certain time lags. The services produced can only be sold, and the proceeds collected in the form of taxes, some time after the necessary capital and services that make up the services have been purchased. The purchasing period will show a deficit, but the selling period will show a surplus.

If, however, public services are sold at their production cost, the temporary deficits will be cash deficits and, if the budget is in equilibrium, they will disappear as soon as the budget period is long enough to include both expenditure and revenue.

It is these temporary cash deficits that are usually covered, when the Treasury lacks the necessary working capital fund, by issuing Treasury bills, which are naturally redeemed with the proceeds of the sale of services in exchange for taxes.

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When the production cycle of public services is of such a time span that it extends beyond the budget period, then the temporary cash deficit appears as a budget deficit.

This is the case, for instance, with deficits stemming from major investment expenditures, such as the building of a dam, a railway, or a battleship.

Treasury problems arising from the deficit are then resolved, not by issuing Treasury bills, but by the floating of a loan. The loan’s redemption will be ensured by [the proceeds of] the sale of the public services yielded by the investment financed out of the proceeds of the loan.

Let us observe that, in accordance with the definition 6 submitted before, the loan will be said to be profitable if the present value of the resources derived from these successive sales is at least equal to the amount of expenditure by which the services sold have been obtained.

d) Treasury Problems Are Unsolvable Where There Is a Patrimony Deficit, Unless Some Rights Holders Are Prepared to Receive, in Exchange for Parting with True Articles of Wealth, the False Claims Assigned by the Treasury

If public services are sold against taxes at a price lower than their production cost, and if some decapitalization of public property does not make good the values thus dissipated, then the production deficit generates a budget deficit of equal amount, which is called a patrimony deficit.

In this case, the present value of the tax claims accruing to the Treasury, as a result of the acquisition of a given article of wealth, is less than the volume of the right that is included in the Treasury’s liabilities following this acquisition. To the extent of the difference, false rights emerge.

To the Treasury, however, tax claims are—as we have already observed—articles of wealth of an essentially fungible nature. A claim is not tied to the right that enclosed the capital or services that produced it. In order to fill a given right, the Treasury can therefore, at its discretion, use the present value of tax claims arising out of rights that will reach maturity only at a later date.

In so doing, however, the Treasury empties one right in order to fill another; the Treasury does not alter the volume of the false rights included in its liabilities.

As soon as false rights come into being, no exertion by the Treasury will allow to be brought forth the articles of wealth necessary to fill them. These ar150ticles of wealth will have been dissipated beyond recovery in the production process. There will therefore always be, on the liabilities side of the Treasury’s balance sheet, some rights empty of substance. When the holders of these rights wish to exercise them, they will be unable to obtain, from the debtor, values that he does not possess; the volume of their rights will have to be scaled down, through devaluation, to the level of the articles of wealth capable of filling them.

One should observe, however, that the devaluation of the false rights will not become absolutely necessary until they have to be filled with articles of wealth properly speaking. If, either of their own free will or under compulsion, the holders of these false rights, or any rights holders substituting for them, agree not to demand that their rights contain anything other than the false claims with which the Treasury can fill them, then no insufficiency of assets will be found to exist. False rights, to the extent that there is no desire to exercise them, will keep their nominal volume. Any Treasury problem will be avoided.

We aim to show, in Part III, that the eligibility of false claims for discount, under a monetary system, is simply a device allowing false rights to be filled with real articles of wealth that are withdrawn by state authority, not from debtor’s assets, but from the mass of articles of wealth supplied in the market as a whole. This transforms the false rights into true rights and resolves all Treasury problems, but at the price of serious economic consequences.

e) Budget Treasury and Treasury Budget

The Treasury, by selling in the market the tax claims it holds in its possession, obtains articles of wealth properly speaking, with which it can fill the rights included in its liabilities.

In so doing, however, the Treasury substitutes the obligations resulting from the loan contracted for those arising from the implementation of the budget.

From then on, the nature of the rights included in its liabilities can no longer be determined by simply studying the budget; for this determination, aggregate commitments and resources must be brought together.

This implies the establishment of a genuine Treasury budget, of which, at each instant of time, the budget Treasury will only be a component.

In fact, all the effort of a Treasury that is a debtor of false rights consists of trying to put off, to the greatest extent possible, the date at which they become payable.7 This accounts for the various procedures, such as perpetual 151 bonds, long bonds, and other devices, through which the Treasury tries to postpone the moment at which its mistakes are recognized, or rather the mistakes of the state, of which the Treasury is merely the servant and, generally, the victim.

It would be desirable for the treasuries of modern states to be carefully studied in light of the preceding analysis. Such a study would dispel all the fantasies of financial technique, in order to bring to the fore only the economic realities that these fantasies conceal.

As far as Treasury matters are concerned, it is in the assets of the balance sheets that realities must be sought and assessed. Liabilities are the outcome of the whims and, generally, of the perversion of men. As soon, however, as men try to obtain the true articles of wealth that have been promised to them, the false promises crumble and the only promises that subsist are those that realities allow to be kept.

§5. The Philosophy of the Treasury

The above analysis brings out the underlying meaning of financing methods.

The purchase of an article of wealth by the state, unless it is paid in cash, substitutes, in the right that enclosed it, a claim on the Treasury.

Whereas, however, under private law a claim on the buyer is generally a true claim, under public law it will be a false claim, even if the exchange has been transacted at the equilibrium price and the article of wealth purchased has not been consumed, simply due to the inalienability of public property. The claim will become a true claim only following a specific act on the part of the state, an act of authority par excellence, creating, through the imposition of a tax or taxes, the resources necessary to fill it.

A tax, it has to be admitted, is simply the authoritative transfer of the contents of a right from the assets of a taxpayer to the assets of the Treasury. This transfer removes all substance from the right concerned. On the occasion of the next detailed accounts, this right, flattened like a wineskin that has been emptied of the liquid that had previously filled it, will be voided in its quality as own right, while a right of equal volume—filled with the amount of the tax—will emerge in favor of the Treasury.

Thus, everything takes place as if the taxpayer’s right, with its contents, was transferred to the Treasury.

If, during a given period, the tax—which is the present value of the tax claims held by the Treasury—is of the same amount as the aggregate value of the 152 articles of wealth acquired by the state, the rights out of which these articles of wealth have been emptied remain true rights.

Two cases, then, have to be distinguished, depending on whether or not the tax claims are payable immediately.

If they are payable immediately, the budget is in equilibrium: the right of the creditor can be filled immediately with articles of wealth properly speaking.

If they are not, then the budget is in deficit. But the Treasury, in supplying its fiscal claims in the market, is certain to obtain the articles of wealth properly speaking that are necessary in order to fill the rights of its creditors.

The loan will simply have substituted the lender for the Treasury’s creditor, with regard to the deferment of enjoyment that the Treasury’s creditor was not prepared to accept.

If the present value of the tax claims received by the Treasury is less than the aggregate value of the articles of wealth acquired by the state, the rights from which these articles of wealth have been emptied are false rights, to the extent that the value necessary in order to fill them is lacking in the Treasury’s general assets. When the holder wishes to obtain articles of wealth properly speaking, these rights will have to be devalued.

In order to avoid such a devaluation of rights and its attendant disturbances, however, the Treasury can resort to the following methods:

  • 1. The Treasury can bring persons holding rights whose volume is equal to the volume of the false rights generated to decide, of their own free will, that they will not fill these rights with articles of wealth properly speaking, hence that they will allow them to continue to be filled with the false claims generated by the deficit. This is the loan method.
  • 2. The Treasury can compel holders of rights whose volume is equal to that of the false rights generated to not demand the true articles of wealth that they cannot obtain, by limiting—through state authority—their ability to demand in the market. This is the rationing method.
  • 3. Lastly, the Treasury can ensure through an indirect method—that is, through the eligibility of false claims for discount (described later on)—that some rights holders should fill, but only to an extent less than their volume, the rights that they have emptied of articles of wealth properly speaking, thereby releasing the articles of wealth necessary in order to fill the false rights of the Treasury’s creditors.
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All Treasury methods stem from the same concern: to locate the values that will provide the rights included in the Treasury’s liabilities with the content that has been promised to these rights, and to scale down the volume of such rights, through devaluation, only when every possibility of filling them directly has been exhausted.

Thus, these methods, however varied their forms might be, are only the art of apportioning, among the rights to be filled, the value that may be available to the Treasury, directly or indirectly.

Where these methods fail, a Treasury crisis develops for the simple reason that it is impossible to transfer articles of wealth that do not exist.

§6. The Fiscal Capacity Lie

The preceding analysis shows that the creation of false rights will be avoided only if the state transfers to itself, through the use of state authority, tax claims having the same value as the articles of wealth that it has acquired.

Such a tax still has to be feasible, however. Now, political literature frequently explains the deficit by observing that taxes are so burdensome that they cannot be increased any further. It is the meaning and the true scope of this admission of powerlessness that we will seek to analyze here.

Any purchase by the state generates false rights, whose false nature will be eliminated only when these rights have been filled with articles of wealth properly speaking, as a result of taxation or borrowing.

The financing of public expenditures does not therefore eliminate the levy suffered by the supplier of the state; it simply shifts it to the taxpayer, who may, during a limited period of time, be substituted with a lender.

If one considers the community as a whole, it is therefore not when the tax is collected or when the loan is received that the levy associated with a given [state] purchase occurs. The levy will have taken place at the time of purchase, when the article of wealth purchased is transferred from the right that enclosed it to the assets of the state.

It is, therefore, a gross mistake to view the tax or the loan as the act that generates the levy associated with a given expenditure. The levy is definitively effected by the purchase itself.

If the state takes no action in order to supply its Treasury, the levy will be borne by the transferor, whose rights will have become false rights. If the state 154 collects a tax, the levy will be shifted onto the taxpayer, and if the state floats a loan, the levy will be shifted onto the lender.

The statement that a budget should remain in deficit because the state cannot impose additional levies on the community is therefore mendacious. Whenever the state makes a purchase, it imposes a levy; the only choice that remains open to the state is which person will bear the levy.

Similarly mendacious is the statement that borrowing makes it possible to shift the burden of the levy onto future generations; a present purchase can only be covered by a present levy—that is, the levy that sustains the transfer engaged in to the benefit of the state. Borrowing cannot defer the levy; it simply places the burden temporarily on a lender before shifting it onto a taxpayer.

Thus, the concepts of fiscal capacity and borrowing capacity are illusory, if one views them as involving a limitation on the possibilities of imposing levies on private patrimonies [privately held wealth].

The levying power of the state is identically equal to its purchasing power, because it is at the moment when the purchase is made that the levy occurs. Taxation or borrowing will simply shift the base of a levy that has already been imposed. If taxation and borrowing do not suffice, devaluation will definitively set the balance to be provided by drawing on the supplier’s wealth.

These various methods of imposing a levy—through devaluation, taxation, or borrowing—all result in a right being emptied of its contents, but they differ appreciably as far as their ancillary aspects are concerned.

Levies effected through devaluation or taxation are final and irreversible; a levy in the form of a loan is a temporary one, unless the loan is of the perpetual type. Levies through devaluation or taxation—setting aside the serious disturbances to which devaluation gives rise—are, therefore, the natural counterpart of expenditure enabling the state to benefit from services that will be consumed, such as those yielded by explosives, soldiers, the police, or welfare assistance. By contrast, the third type of levy—a levy in the form of a loan—is a mode of financing that is suited to investment expenditures, whenever the wealth capitalized yields services whose value the Treasury will collect only at a later date. In this case, however, if the loan is to be a true loan, the present value of the rights that it assigns to the lender should not exceed the investments made, taking into consideration the prices at which the services yielded will be sold to taxpayers. If this condition was not met, the rights of the lend155ers, or those of any person substituting for them, would be partly false and bear, to that extent, a levy of a definitive nature.

There is, however, a very relative and strictly limited meaning of the term “fiscal capacity,” which gives it an acceptable sense: it is the meaning that sees in fiscal capacity a limit to the yield of a given system of taxation, under specific political and social circumstances. Within this meaning, saying that the limit of fiscal capacity has been reached simply amounts to the state recognizing its powerlessness in apportioning knowingly and consciously the burden of levies that its purchases inflict on the community. In the absence of any conscious allocation, the burden is then apportioned either in accordance with individual wills guided by the mechanism of the rates—if the deficit is covered by means of a loan freely subscribed to—or among the holders of matured claims on the Treasury, proportionally to their respective amounts (that is to say, in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner), if the deficit is covered through devaluation.

In each and every case, the levy is ensured: the state only ever receives that which it levies.

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Chapter XII: Conclusion to Part II: The Birth, the Life, and the Death of Property Rights

The preceding chapters lead to an overall view of the mechanism by which property rights are born, live, and die.

This is what will be presented here.

§1. Property Rights, When They Are Own Rights, Are Born, Live, and Die with Their Content; They Have No Autonomous Existence of Their Own, Except When They Are Third Parties’ Rights

a) Recognition Value1

An accountant is not a performer on the economic stage, but only the passive observer of its development. He records the origin of the articles of wealth that are added to the patrimony, the destination of those articles of wealth that are removed from the patrimony, and internal transfers within the patrimony.

So that he is able to take into account any event affecting the life of the patrimony, he only needs to know, in addition to the above, the value of any article of wealth whose location or composition changes.

Now, value is the product of a price by a quantity. Even as the accountant is not a performer on the economic stage, he is still less a market practitioner. The 157 price at which he will record an article of wealth on the balance sheet is immaterial to him, as long as the price does in fact exist.

When an article of wealth is added to the patrimony as a result of purchase, or exits a patrimony through sale, this price is, generally, the price at which the transaction has been concluded—that is to say, the market price at the exact instant of time when the transaction took place. This [transaction] price [of an article of wealth] can differ from the [article’s] market equilibrium price, however, if the price of the article of wealth in question is a controlled price.

Even if, however, the price recorded by the accountant [in the books] happened to be the market price at the moment at which the transaction took place, this will no longer be the case at the next moment in time.

Besides, quite frequently, the article of wealth concerned has not been exposed to the market before being included in the patrimony. This is the case, in particular, when [an article of wealth] is produced within the patrimony itself. Then, its recognized value can only be estimated. One may consider basing its value on the market price at the instant of time when it is [first] entered in the books, but even then the value assigned to it will not be any less arbitrary.

Thus, the value assigned to an article of wealth that is recorded in the books of accounts [at initial recognition] will generally differ from that which would be assigned to it by the market equilibrium price at the instant of time considered.

b) The Birth of Property Rights

Most articles of wealth emerge through a production process—that is to say, from the amalgamation of services with preexisting capital.

The services used in the production process are either labor services or capital services. In the first case, they are yielded by the human body; in the second, by the capital—land, factories and equipment, etc.—that has produced them.

Now, where slavery is prohibited, a human body always belongs to the person whom it supports. Capital, for its part, has been appropriated in its quasi-entirety, at least in the old communities that surround us.

As a result, all the services generating new articles of wealth are the fruits of capital that has already been appropriated.

But, of course, ownership of an object implies ownership of its fruits, because these are the services that were held within that object, and the ability to enjoy and dispose of an object naturally involves the ability to enjoy and dispose of the services of which it is made up.

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The services used in the production process are therefore always the property of the person who owns the capital that has yielded them, the person of the worker in the case of labor services, and the person of the capitalist when services are generated by capital properly speaking.

That is the fact, which the accountant simply records. The accountant notes the existence, in the assets of the patrimony, of newly produced services, and adds to the assets the value of these services and, if the case arises, the value of the capital into which they have been condensed, or of the articles of wealth for which they have been exchanged. He notes that these new values belong to the owner of the patrimony, by including them in the owner’s rights, on the liabilities side (as income, if the bookkeeping method is a detailed one).

Thus, a person’s own rights entered on the liabilities side of his balance sheet are born at the very instant of time when the articles of wealth that they enclose are included in the assets. They have no separate existence of their own; they are only the expression, in legal language, of the appropriation status of the newly emerged articles of wealth. Rather than bringing this status about, they are only its immediate consequence.

Sometimes, though quite rarely, certain articles of wealth emerge that cannot be considered the fruit of preexisting capital.

Where this is the case, the law assigns these ownerless goods, by regulating the methods of acquiring property (through occupation, invention, accession) or by presuming the intentions of the owner (if he died without leaving a valid will and testament).

In all the above circumstances, the accountant, again, simply notes the effect of legal devolution. This legal transfer of property has added articles of wealth to the patrimony’s assets; the accountant adds their value to the rights included in the liabilities.

Thus, if the accountant is alert, the receptacle always matches the contents.

In the exceedingly great humility of his mission, the accountant has not created the property, but he has created the rights that enclose it.

The right is the shell that encloses the fruit. The shell may, however, be totally or partially empty. The volume of the rights entered on the balance sheet is, in fact, the value at which the accountant recognized the articles of wealth that entered into a patrimony. We have shown that this value did not necessarily reflect the market equilibrium price at the time of initial recognition and that, 159 in any case, assuming that it did reflect the market price at the time [at which it was first entered into the books], this was no longer the case at the next moment of time, when the market equilibrium price had changed.

Therefore, the value, at market equilibrium prices, of the articles of wealth entered on the assets side will not necessarily be sufficient in order to fill, at each instant of time, the rights included in the liabilities. If the volume of these rights [included in the liabilities] outweighs the value of the assets entered, then the rights included in the liabilities will partly be false rights.

False rights may result, for instance, from an overvaluation engaged in by a businessman who wishes to conceal his insolvency.

They may be the outcome of an authoritative price-control measure by the state that sets the price [of an article of wealth] at a level above the market equilibrium level. Thus, setting a controlled price for wheat generates false rights among certain producers—namely, those who do not manage to sell their wheat at the official price.

Lastly, false rights may result from the existence, in the assets, of fictitious values, for instance those that, in the course of the year, represent articles of wealth that have been used up or lost.

In each and every case, false rights will not be eliminated until the volume of the liabilities has been brought down, through devaluation, to the level of the actual value of the assets, which is the value at which the assets can actually be sold in the market.

In fact, this readjustment of liabilities to the actual value of the assets takes place only on inventory dates, when detailed accounts are drawn up. This is why, during the intervening period between two inventories, a part of the rights included in the liabilities are generally false rights.

They would be and remain true rights only if the assets were constantly valued at the market equilibrium price and if, at each instant of time, the liabilities were adjusted to the aggregate value thus calculated, through variations in own rights. This continuing process of adjustment is what characterizes the film-reel motion picture balance sheet, envisioned as the extreme limit of a system of an accounting system under which inventories would be constantly updated.

c) The Life of Property Rights

The characteristic privilege of the owner’s position is the ability to enjoy and dispose of the object owned.

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As soon as the object owned has been included in his assets, the owner can use it in whichever way he chooses, and this use will generally result in a change, or changes, in its composition and value.

Here again, the accountant is only an alert onlooker, monitoring the changes that affect the object owned. He will simply adjust—on a constant basis in the case of a film-reel motion picture balance sheet or, in the case of a discontinuous balance sheet, at the dates at which detailed accounts are drawn up, or whenever a change of state takes place—the own rights included in the liabilities to the value of the articles of wealth in the assets. This he will do unless he prefers to temporarily represent, through fictitious items, the values that have disappeared.

In fact, the events that may affect the articles of wealth whose owner has the ability to “enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided however they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations,” may result from his own will, from the laws or regulations, or from circumstances unrelated to these two factors, because they are brought about by third parties or by the intervention of natural forces.

Hence, the existence of three categories of bookkeeping occurrences:

  • — events that the owner wanted to happen;
  • — events that are imposed by laws and regulations;
  • — events that result from forces external to the patrimony, be they natural forces or interventions by third parties.

The events that the owner, in the exercise of his ability of enjoyment and disposal, wanted to happen are by far the most frequent type of occurrence.

They include changes in assignment (exchanges, loans, donations) and changes in state (production, consumption).

Exchange substitutes, for the content of a certain right, another content of equal value. Exchange does not alter the value of the assets and for that reason does not affect the volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side. The accountant will therefore simply note the change in the substance of the assets, by shifting values from one item to another.

A loan is an exchange in which the borrower receives articles of wealth, properly speaking, and gives a claim pertaining to the additional value entered into his assets, the claim having an identical value to that of the wealth acquired.

Although the borrower’s assets are therefore increased by the substance and value of the wealth borrowed, his liabilities are increased by the rights that con161tained such wealth when it was entered in his assets. These rights, however, are not own rights, but the lender’s rights. Their inclusion on the liabilities side of the balance sheet gives rise to a special category of rights, that of third parties’ rights.

For the lender, the loan does not affect the value of his assets, and therefore does not affect the volume of the rights included in his liabilities. The loan only substitutes, in the lender’s assets—for the wealth loaned out—a claim on the borrower, a claim that represents the additional value acquired by the borrower.

In a community where some loans are not repaid, the rights included in the liabilities of the patrimonies will therefore be own rights or third parties’ rights, and the wealth included in the assets will be articles of wealth properly speaking or claims.

Donation is an act of disposal through which the owner transfers one of the components in his assets to a third party.

As the aggregate value of his assets is reduced by a corresponding amount, at least as soon as the object donated ceases to be represented by a fictitious value, the film-reel motion picture balance sheet will record a reduction equal to the volume of own rights included in the liabilities.

With regard to changes in state that are not accompanied by changes in assignment—these types of changes being modifications that result in general from acts of production or consumption—they involve, because of the material transformation of the articles of wealth that constitute the assets, the emergence or the disappearance of a certain value. In either case, the volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side is maintained at the same level as the assets, through an increase or a reduction of the volume of own rights.

Events that affect the patrimony through the application of legal decisions, or of regulations, involve a change in the assets, or the inclusion in the liabilities of claims assigned to third parties. In either case, such events lead to the adjustment of the volume of own rights to the new situation that these events bring about.

The most frequent events of this type are those that result from the assessment and collection of taxes. The tax claim, which the state assigns for itself, is entered on the liabilities side of the taxpayer’s ledger, under third parties’ rights. This leads to a scaling down of [the taxpayer’s] own rights by a corresponding amount.

As regards events resulting from forces external to the patrimony, be they natural forces or third parties’ actions, they bring about modifications of substance 162 as a result of fortuitous losses or gains, or [these events bring about] value changes as a result of increases or decreases in the value of individual assets. In either case, they require that own rights be adjusted to the new value of the assets, on those dates when detailed accounts are drawn up, and at each instant of time under the film-reel motion picture accounting system.

d) The Death of Property Rights

The death of a property right is simply the last stage in the existence of a right whose content dwindles. Any decrease in the value of the assets implies, as we have seen, a reduction in the volume of the rights included in the liabilities. When an individual asset has finally lost all of its value—that is, usually, when all the services that it could yield have been consumed or used up—the volume of the rights that enclosed it will be reduced to nil.

e) The Difference between Own Rights [Equity] and Third Parties’ Rights

The balance sheet is a motion picture of the life of a patrimony; it is a motion picture that shows, simultaneously, the contents on the assets side and the container on the liabilities side, the volume of this container—under a film-reel motion picture system of accounting—being constantly adjusted to the [fair market] value of the content.

If one considers, however, not the aggregate value of the liabilities but their breakdown into own rights and third parties’ rights, one observes that it is through the variation in own rights—to the extent there are any—that the adjustment occurs.

If, after own rights [equity] have been reduced to zero, the value of the assets is not sufficient to fill third parties’ rights, then the patrimony in question is bankrupt. Its assets are divided among the creditors, but its economic life comes to an end.

There is therefore a profound difference between own rights and third parties’ rights, both in their nature and in their character. So long as the patrimony is not bankrupt, third parties’ rights have an existence of their own, an existence that is independent of the assets’ value; by contrast, own rights [equity] are, at each instant of time, determined solely by value of the assets that remain available after the articles of wealth necessary in order to fill third parties’ rights 2 have been withdrawn.

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§2. Equity, the Guarantee of the Veracity of Third Parties’ Rights and the Condition for the Owner’s Freedom

The rights of the patrimony holder, set solely by the value of the articles of wealth available to fill them, will never be false rights.3

By contrast, third parties’ rights, which are defined a priori, will become false rights when assets become insufficient in order to fill them, and will remain false rights until the time when asset reallocation, following bankruptcy, will have brought the rights down to the level of their contents.

Thus, equity, which is simultaneously the content of the patrimony holder’s own rights and the measure of these rights, is the fundamental guarantee of the veracity of third parties’ rights. As long as [holder’s] equity continues in existence, as long as [holder’s] equity remains in excess of the asset values that might disappear as a result of consumption, production deficit, fortuitous loss, or decrease in value, third parties’ rights cannot become false rights.

The priority of third parties’ rights over own rights, in the context of a possible reallocation of the assets, therefore ensures the veracity of third parties’ rights throughout the vicissitudes of economic life, so long as the equity [cushion] of the patrimony holder has not been fully absorbed. This priority becomes ineffectual, however, in protecting third parties’ rights from possible devaluation when the [patrimony] holder’s own equity has been fully exhausted.

But, because of the need to reduce to a minimum the volume of false rights that may emerge, the legislator terminates the economic existence of any patrimony that is no longer able, through a reduction of the holder’s own rights, to prevent the appearance of false rights in its liabilities.

Bankruptcy, which renders all claims payable and divides the remaining assets among third-party creditors, is nothing more than the dissolution of the patrimony. Bankruptcy withdraws—from the free disposal of the patrimony holder—the values that constituted the patrimony’s assets, in order to subject them anew to the wills of third-party lenders.

Occurring as soon as the patrimony has been unable to fill the right of a third party, bankruptcy puts an end to the process that could generate false rights, 164 the moment that a payment default reveals that false rights could indeed be generated.

The precedence of third parties’ rights over those of the patrimony holder, and bankruptcy, are the two critical tools that tend to ensure the veracity of rights and, in any case, to limit to a minimum the volume of [false rights] that may arise.

The difference between the status of own rights and the status of third parties’ rights, although derived from positive law, is due essentially to the profound difference that exists between the respective positions of the patrimony holder and third-party creditors with regard to the articles of wealth that constitute the assets.

The patrimony holder has the ability to “enjoy and dispose of” these articles of wealth freely. He may transform them, consume them, and even destroy them. He is the master, even the sole master, of the development of their value.

By contrast, third-party creditors have no influence on the value of the articles of wealth with which their claims can be filled. The moment the loan has been granted, they can only witness powerlessly the variations in their debtor’s assets.

The difference between the status of own rights and the status of third parties’ rights simply stems, therefore, from the application of the principle that requires that the consequences of a given act be borne—as much as it is possible—by the person who decides to perpetrate it, and puts an end to his freedom of decision when he is no longer able to meet the obligations involved.

This difference has far-reaching implications. It limits any patrimony holder’s abilities of consumption to the contents of his own rights; it forces the patrimony holder to use the articles of wealth borrowed in such a way as to preserve or increase their value; it puts an end to deficit-generating productions, thereby preventing the debasement, from the consumers’ perspective, of the articles of wealth supplied through unprofitable processing operations. In brief, this difference makes loans, hence economic specialization, possible.

This difference, because it tends to preserve the veracity of third parties’ rights, can be regarded as one of the essential features of any civilization based on the property right of ownership—in other words, on the full freedom of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the wealth in his possession, at his discretion.

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§3. The Conditions for the Emergence of False Rights—There Are Practically No False Rights in a Community Where Exchanges Are Unrestricted

The precedence of third parties’ rights over own rights, under private law (that is, under any system whereby the creditor can lay hold of the assets of a defaulting debtor), implies a fundamental consequence: third parties’ rights are true rights, so long as the debtor owns some capital.4

No false right can therefore emerge under a system where every debtor possesses own rights.

But in a community where transactions are unrestricted, any lender who wishes to preserve his patrimony will agree to grant loans only to borrowers who own sufficient capital, so as to offset the uncertainties inherent in their proposed utilization.

It is in order to address this particular concern that all borrowing institutions—in particular the banks—publicize the amount of their capital and ostensibly present the amount as a security for deposits. It is for the same purpose that lending institutions, in particular those engaged in discounting operations, inquire about the debtor’s solvency and usually see to it that it is strengthened by the solvency of additional “signatories.” In the same spirit, they analyze the borrower’s activities and the possibility of losses being suffered as a result. Where the loan is a long-term one, lending institutions seek to forecast the outcome, in accounting terms, of the borrower’s economic performance over the entirety of the loan period.

The most carefully established forecasts, however, can be foiled by events. Price declines, unexpected losses or production deficits, or undue consumption may absorb all the capital and, when the capital has been dissipated, may make the emergence of false rights possible.

As soon, however, as a payment default reveals the existence [of false rights], bankruptcy puts an end to the process that led to their emergence. Then, the distribution of assets among the creditors reduces third parties’ rights to the volume of their contents. Devaluation restores to false rights, at the cost of a reduction in their volume, their original veracity.

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Thus, the formation of false rights is practically ruled out under a system of private law and free transactions: all rights are, in actual fact, true rights. Then, the legal mechanism ensures the full effectiveness, from the economic and moral points of view, of the allocation system based on the full freedom and responsibility of the owner within his rights.

Thus, the conditions that avoid the emergence of false rights can be satisfied under private law. This is not, however, the case as far as public law is concerned. Then, indeed, the fact that the state has a capital of its own among its assets no longer secures its creditors’ rights. The unseizability and inalienability of public property make the emergence of false rights possible, if tax proceeds do not provide the resources required in view of the Treasury’s total commitments.

The lender, however, where he can act freely, will try to forecast the future fate of the loan that he is getting ready to consent to. If a devaluation of his rights appears likely to him, he will refuse to lend true articles of wealth in excess of what can be repaid. Regardless of what its nominal value may be, the claim of the Treasury will be sold at a price reflecting its probable repayment value. If the lender’s forecast is correct, then it will have prevented the emergence of false rights, but by depriving the borrower of a privilege that would have accrued to him as a result of a false loan: the privilege of the deficit.

Thus, a loan can only generate false rights if the borrower is in a position to force purchase of the relevant claim at a price in excess of its real value.

This condition can be met through various procedures.

It is met, for instance, when the state, through an act of sovereignty, forces a creditor to accept payment in bills or obligations reckoned not at their real value (that is, at their market price) but at their nominal value. The payment in Treasury obligations, after 1918, to some creditors for war damages is an example of this procedure.

In general, however, it is a specialized institution, its central bank, that the state forces to buy—at their nominal value—the false claims it issues. In this way, the state can fill all its creditors’ rights, which will all remain true rights, notwithstanding the insufficiency of the Treasury’s assets. Only the rights included in the liabilities of the central bank (in fact, those of currency holders) become false rights. We will study in detail, in Part III of this book, the consequences of such a transformation.

While the state is therefore able to bring about, for its own benefit, the formation of false rights, by selling claims at a price higher than the price at which 167 they could be resold, it can use a similar procedure for the benefit of certain property owners, by forcing purchase of their assets at a price higher than the market equilibrium price. This is what the state does when, for example, it sets the price of wheat at a level higher than that at which it would have spontaneously established itself.

False rights then emerge in the balance sheets of persons who, wishing to sell an article of wealth whose price is controlled, do not manage to sell at the [fixed] market price.

In any case, for false rights to emerge, a debtor who does not own any capital or is protected by a system outside the ambit of ordinary law must [somehow] manage to borrow and force purchase of his claims at a price in excess of their market value. In practice, these two conditions are met only by the state: the first, in view of the unseizability and inalienability of public property; the second, as a result of the act of sovereignty that imposes purchase of certain assets—generally claims—at a price set, through state authority, at a level higher than the market price.

In fact, the state alone enjoys the privilege of being able to inject, in a continuous manner and in significant quantities, false rights into the patrimony of its creditors.

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Part III: Money and the General Price Level

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Chapter XIII: Introducing Money

§1. The Necessity of Money

In Part II, we studied economic phenomena occurring in a universe that was assumed to be without money, where wealth was exchanged directly for wealth, through barter.

This analysis showed that a system of appropriation, established through the conduit of rights linking the object owned to the person owning it, was likely to ensure the continuing and orderly functioning of a policed society. The analysis brought to light the mechanism that, under such a system, would allocate existing wealth, and existing wealth alone, through the vicissitudes of economic life.

Barter, although quite conceivable in an economy with little diversification, would soon become impracticable, however, because of the complications and burdens that it would bring about, as soon as the quantity of articles of wealth supplied in the market increased.

Under a barter system, any person wishing to change the contents of one of his rights must, in order to obtain the article of wealth of his choice, find another person prepared not only to acquire the article of wealth with which he wishes to part but also to relinquish the article that he wishes to acquire.

Such a coincidence, in the least bit complex economy, is already so unlikely to occur that, in practice, this will never happen. In actual fact, if it did occur, the exchange could only take place if the goods supplied by either party were of equal value, or divisible so that a partial exchange could take place.

If these conditions are not met, then the person concerned will need to initiate a chain of successive exchanges, which will come to an end only when, after parting with articles of wealth owned, the desired articles of wealth have been obtained.

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One only needs to realize how difficult, time-consuming, and costly some transfers are in practice to be convinced that such a procedure would rule out any trade expansion.

In order that economic activity should develop, a simpler and speedier mechanism was necessary.

It is this need that the use of money meets.

§2. The Principle of Money

The difficulty of exchange, in a universe without money, stems from the fact that any coincidence between the counterpart desired by the person who supplies an article of wealth and the counterpart supplied by the person who demands it is improbable.

It is true that this difficulty would be eliminated if all exchangers in a market agreed to rely on the intermediary of a third article of wealth, in exchange for which all the articles of wealth supplied would be parted with and all the articles of wealth demanded would be obtained. As soon as the use of this third medium became generalized, any change in the content of a right could be brought about by two operations only: the exchange of the article of wealth owned for the intermediary article of wealth, and the exchange of this intermediary article of wealth for the article of wealth desired.

It is this unique medium of exchange, accepted by all the suppliers in the market, that constitutes money.

From the moment that money exists, the position of the two persons participating in an exchange is no longer symmetrical. The seller parts with a nonmonetary article of wealth in exchange for money, and the buyer parts with money in exchange for a nonmonetary article of wealth.

On the other hand, all suppliers and all demanders of a given article of wealth are in the same position. Therefore, under a money system, they meet in one place, known as the market, where all the supplies of and all the demands for a given article of wealth to be exchanged against money are concentrated. It is on the market that, through the mechanism described earlier, the money price of this article of wealth is formed: this money price measures the number of monetary units in exchange for which the quantity unit of the article can be obtained.

Knowledge of the money price of the two articles yields knowledge of the quantity of one that can be obtained in exchange for the quantity unit of the other. As soon as the money price of an article is known, knowledge of its price in terms of the other articles in the market—which is essential under a 173 barter system—becomes unnecessary. Hence money, because it is the sole intermediary of exchange, is the sole standard of value.

The quantity unit of money is termed the monetary unit. It defines, as a consequence, the right-unit that encloses one unit of value, hence the right of property relating to one monetary unit.

Although, under a money system, any right whose content changes is necessarily filled with money—even if only for an instant of time—the money vanishes the moment the seller “reuses” the proceeds of his sale. From this moment on, everything will happen, as far as the seller is concerned, as if he had exchanged directly, through barter, the articles of wealth that he had owned earlier for those that he has now acquired.

Thus, money becomes the contents of the seller’s right only during the unavoidable time lag before the proceeds of the sale are reused.

This observation underscores the mistake that one would make—and which, indeed, many people make—in viewing the handing over of money as the procedure that generates the right of the person who receives it. Money is only the occasional content, accepted for reasons of convenience, of a preexisting right. Money does not create the property right any more than wine creates the bottle that holds it.

Bearing this simple observation in mind, as we shall see later, will spare one from most of the errors of theories that attribute a causal influence to money, which it utterly lacks.

§3. The Definition and Attributes of Money1

Money, the sole medium of exchange, must, if it is to fulfill its role, be able to fill, during the time lag necessary for reuse, the rights emptied of their content 174 that await the content that their holders intend to give them. Therefore, money itself can only be an article of wealth endowed with value.

If the two-way exchange—the article of wealth supplied against money, and money against the article of wealth demanded—is to take place smoothly, the monetary unit must have, in terms of these two articles of wealth and, generally speaking, in terms of any of the articles of wealth in the market, if not an immutable then at least a definite value at each instant of time.

Lastly, and this is the specific feature of money, it is essential that monetary wealth be accepted by all suppliers in the market.

These three attributes can be condensed into the following definition: any article of wealth that has a definite value and is accepted by all sellers in a market in exchange for the articles of wealth that they supply is known as money.

Where acceptance of a certain type of money is made compulsory by law, the money is referred to as legal tender [monnaie légale]; where acceptance results from the spontaneous concurrence of the great majority of sellers, then it is referred to as de facto money [monnaie de fait]. In general, when the money considered is legal tender, the law has probably also endowed it with extinguishing power [pouvoir libératoire], which refers to its property of freeing the debtor from the obligations he has to his creditor.

Let us consider separately the three abovementioned attributes.

ATTRIBUTE I: Money is an article of wealth.

The hallmark of money is value, hence the power to procure, through exchange, other articles of wealth.

An article of wealth may be wealth properly speaking or a claim.

Any kind of money that consists of wealth, properly speaking, is commodity money; if it consists of a claim, it is fiduciary money.

a) Commodity Money

Physically, commodity money consists of an article of wealth properly speaking, which is substituted—on an equal value basis—for the nonmonetary articles of wealth that have been emptied out of their sellers’ rights, and for which are substituted, on an equal value basis, the nonmonetary articles of wealth with which buyers fill their rights.

For reasons of convenience, monetary wealth is generally selected from those articles of wealth in whose case possession is equivalent to title, and which can therefore simply be transmitted by hand.

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For obvious reasons, it is desirable that monetary wealth be clearly defined, difficult to adulterate or counterfeit, easily divisible, capable of lasting indefinitely without deteriorating, and, lastly, that it should represent a significant value involving little volume.

It is gold that, up to the present, appears to have best met these criteria.

In order to facilitate the substitution of gold for nonmonetary articles of wealth in sellers’ rights, and the substitution of nonmonetary articles of wealth for gold in buyers’ rights, gold is usually divided up into small round ingots, whose value in terms of money is specified by an inscription stamped on one side. This is how metal coins, which are the traditional type of contemporary money, have been arrived at.

Coined money, however, is in no way different from the money that might consist of bars of unspecified weight, such as those that served as currency in China long ago, provided that such bars command widespread acceptance among sellers in the market.

b) Fiduciary Money

Fiduciary money consists of claims. When such money is used in an exchange, the money claim is substituted, in the sellers’ rights, for the articles of wealth sold, and the articles of wealth purchased are substituted for money claims in the buyers’ rights.

Fiduciary money, being in the nature of a claim, is subject to all the uncertainties attaching to third parties’ obligations. As a result, fiduciary money will command unanimous acceptance only when it is legal tender—an attribute that the state confers upon money issued by some specialized institutions known as central banks [of issue]—or when it constitutes an unquestionable claim on a perfectly trustworthy and creditworthy debtor.

Fiduciary money is usually in the nature of a claim payable upon demand.2 There are examples, however, of Treasury bills, used for monetary purposes, being fiduciary money consisting of a claim with future maturity.

A claim in the form of fiduciary money may be authenticated either by an acknowledgment of debt printed on a rectangular piece of paper or by a credit balance in a current or deposit account. In the first case, such a claim has a ma176terial representation in the form of a banknote; in the second case, it has no printed representation and is known as scriptural money.3

In general, among the various kinds of fiduciary money, only banknotes issued by one or several privileged institutions, endowed by the law with the monopoly of issue, are made legal tender by the state.

This is not the case with current and deposit account balances, which are therefore accepted as payment only to the extent that the recipient is assured of the existence of sufficient cover and has full confidence in the solvency of the institution that holds them.

Among all types of money, only metal coins and banknotes can be transferred physically hand to hand. For this reason, these are often regarded as money properly speaking, in contrast to scriptural money, which is transferred by means of a [wire] transfer.

c) Coinage Metals Can Be Regarded as a Particular Type of Fiduciary Money

Ownership of a metallic coin can be considered to be ownership of a metal disc; but it can also be regarded as the ability to enjoy and dispose of the monetary sign stamped on the metal.

Now, this monetary sign differs from a banknote only on account of its physical support.

According to this concept, the metal coin would be a claim on the issuing institution—generally the state—for a weight of metal corresponding to the legal definition of the currency concerned. The only difference between the banknote issued against gold and a gold coin would be in the location of the pledge: the pledge would no longer be held in the vaults of the central bank but kept, for convenience, if one may say so, underneath the very sign that constitutes money. This would be the safest of all possible hiding places, because the person holding the coin can lay hold of the pledge only by melting the title of claim that gives him the means of obtaining it [the pledge].

Thus, in theory, the person holding the gold coin would have two alternative ways of obtaining gold: either melt the coin itself, or claim redemption at the issuing institution.

In actual fact, the second alternative is never resorted to. It is unclear whether courts of law would rule that holders of gold coins have a claim on the issuing 177 institution, if it were proved that the metal pledge has been, contrary to existing legal provisions, willfully and fraudulently sweated, clipped, or debased by the issuing institution. Even if, however, on the legal front understanding metal coinage as a certificate of indebtedness secured by a pledge might not be confirmed, it would still be valid from the economic point of view.

Such an understanding offers the considerable advantage of unifying the concept of money, in that it makes it possible to consider the different varieties—regardless of whether they are real or fiduciary—as the representation of rights of claim payable on demand, in the various forms selected for reasons of convenience.

d) True and False Money

Although all kinds of money not consisting of a nondenominated gold ingot—that is, all types of money bearing an inscription specifying a nominal value—can be regarded as claims, these claims may be either true or false claims.

They will be true claims when the articles of wealth that they enable the holder to lay hold of from among the debtor’s assets match their nominal value, and false claims, when the value of these articles of wealth is less.

The study of the circumstances that determine whether a given kind of money is true or false, and the distinction between the properties of the two varieties, is of considerable practical importance. The matter will be examined further in Chapter XV.

Briefly, the various types of money can be classified as follows, depending on the nature of the monetary wealth involved:

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ATTRIBUTE II: Money is an article of wealth with a definite value.

In any exchange, in order that the buyer should be able to transfer to the seller a quantity of money that matches the value of the nonmonetary article of wealth transferred by the seller to the buyer, the monetary unit must have a definite value.

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Now, in order to set a unit of size, one can either establish its measure relative to another size taken as a unit, or define it by its intrinsic characteristics and take it directly as the unit.

The two methods are used for defining monetary units, and lead to convertible or inconvertible currencies, respectively.

a) Convertible Currencies

In the first type of currency, the value of the monetary unit is defined in terms of a certain quantity of an article of wealth chosen once and for all: generally, gold.

In order that the monetary unity should actually have the value that its definition assigns to it, however, a mere proclamation is not sufficient. It is not by saying that a rubber band is 100 cm long that the rubber band will be given a size of 1 meter, but by solidly fastening its endpoints to a measuring ruler of such a length, which will stretch the rubber band if it tends to contract, and which will contract the rubber band if it tends to stretch out.

Similarly, the monetary unit will have, in actual fact, in the course of exchanges, the value set by its definition only if it is subjected to forces that can maintain its value at that level.

These forces result from the convertibility mechanism, through which the monetary unit can be exchanged at no cost and without any restriction against the quantity of wealth that defines it.

It is clear that, as long as convertibility is ensured, the value of the monetary unit in an exchange can be neither less than nor in excess of the value of the corresponding quantity of the article of wealth used as standard.

If it is less, then any person holding money will make a profit by converting, at the central bank, the amount of currency that he holds into the article of wealth used as standard, and by reselling the latter for money in the market. The operation will involve supplies of the standard article of wealth being exchanged against money, and this will reduce the money value of the article of wealth used as standard. The readjustment process will develop its effects until the cause that gave rise to it has disappeared, so that the value of the monetary unit will necessarily be brought back to the definition level.

The reverse would happen if the value of the monetary unit, in an exchange, exceeded the value of the corresponding quantity of the article of wealth used as standard.

Thus, convertibility alone will maintain the equivalence between the value of currency and the value of the quantity of the article of wealth used as stan179dard that defines it. Convertibility thereby ensures a fixed money price for the article of wealth used as standard and determines the “monetary parity,” which is the price of the quantity unit of this article of wealth.

In practice, one must bear in mind that the value of the money is maintained at the definition level not because monetary parity is established by law but merely as a result of the effective functioning of the convertibility mechanism.

This mechanism can only continue to function, however, if in actual fact the institution whose task it is to maintain it in operation has the necessary reserves of the article of wealth used as standard, or of money, so as to meet all requests for conversion.

When these reserves are exhausted, convertibility will have to be suspended, regardless of whether this is desired or not.

The mechanism that ensures convertibility of the currency varies, depending on the nature of the sign (stamped or printed) representing the monetary unit.

When the money is gold coinage, convertibility results from freedom of minting and melting.

When it is fiduciary money holding legal tender status [monnaie fiduciaire légale], as is generally the case with banknotes, convertibility is ensured by a specific provision of monetary legislation, which makes it mandatory upon the central bank to exchange, on demand and upon presentation, the monetary sign for the weight of gold set forth by its definition.

Lastly, when the money is fiduciary money not holding legal tender status [monnaie fiduciaire non légale], as is generally the case with current and deposit account credit balances [book money], convertibility is only of the indirect type. It results from the obligation imposed on the debtor bank, as on any debtor, to redeem in legal tender, upon simple demand, its matured obligations denominated in money, and from the ability—granted to any person holding legal tender—to exchange it for an equivalent weight of gold.

The convertibility of a currency that is defined in terms of gold may include several modalities.

Freedom to melt, when there are gold coins, is usually unrestricted. Since 1914, however, freedom to mint has frequently been suspended. When this happens, a person holding gold can obtain money only in the form of banknotes or balances with a bank. Inversely, a person holding monetary units can obtain gold only in bullion form. The money remains convertible gold-based money, but is purely fiduciary.

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For reasons of convenience, the convertibility privilege is then accessible only to persons holding a minimum quantity of gold or of money, corresponding to the weight of the standard bar.

Such a system of money, which is convertible not into metallic coins but only into gold bars, is generally known under the British name “gold bullion standard,” as distinct from the classical gold standard system.

Under certain systems, convertibility into gold is only of the indirect type, because the central bank reserves the right to deliver to persons holding monetary units who request conversion, not gold, but foreign currencies exchangeable for gold. This is known as the “gold exchange standard.”

We will study the attributes of these various systems in greater detail later on. At this stage, suffice it to note that the fundamental property of these various systems is to ensure, as long as convertibility is maintained, a fixed money price for gold.4

We have so far considered only systems that define the value of the monetary unit in terms of one single article of wealth, but there are other systems. There are multiple standard systems, of which monetary history provides many examples.

The oldest example is bimetallism, which defines the value of the monetary unit as being at the same time the value of a definite weight of gold and that of a definite weight of silver—at a predetermined ratio.

The only condition necessary for this dual definition to be met is that convertibility of the monetary unit be actually ensured in relation to the two articles of wealth taken as double standard.

In fact, it is not necessary for the standard articles of wealth to be metallic, as is evidenced by the system that existed in France in early 1937, when two money prices were stable: the price of gold and the price of wheat. The stability of the former derived from the convertibility of the French franc into gold, which was ensured by the Bank of France; the stability of the latter derived from the convertibility of the French franc into wheat, which was ensured by the Wheat Office.

This “bimatterism” itself is only one step toward “plurimatterism,” a system under which many money prices would be fixed and maintained stable as a re181sult of convertibilities that purchasing and selling agencies, of the Wheat Office type, would be required to maintain.

We shall see further on under what conditions such systems can endure and what difficulties their application involves in any case.

Lastly, let us observe that, although multiple convertibility is a sufficient condition for the stability of money in relation to several articles of wealth used as standard, it is not a necessary condition, since such stability will be ensured if the public authorities manage—for instance by threat of penalty—to prevent any transactions on articles of wealth whose prices are fixed authoritatively at levels other than those that have been assigned to them.

Whereas, however, convertibility causes all individual wills to converge toward maintenance of monetary parity—by putting at a disadvantage any person who takes money in an exchange at a value different from that which was assigned to it by its legal definition—the stability of an inconvertible currency can only be forced upon individuals by an authority that is external to them. Such stability is thereby subjected to all the uncertainties of coercive solutions.

b) Inconvertible Currencies

Under an inconvertible currency system, the value of the monetary unit is no longer defined as the value of a given quantity of a given article of wealth, but [instead] as the value with which the quantity unit of money is endowed, at the instant of time considered.

This definition is analogous to the definition that would define the unit of volume as the volume a given receptacle can contain, at each instant of time.

Under an inconvertible currency system, there is no longer any privileged article of wealth possessing, in money, an immutable price. The price of each article, however, sets—at any time—the quantity of the corresponding article that can be exchanged against the money unit. Thereby, it determines the value of the monetary unit in relation to the said article and, as a result, the volume of the right enclosing the monetary unit in relation to the volume of the right containing the quantity unit of the article under consideration.

Although the right enclosing the monetary unit is therefore always the right-unit, this right nevertheless has—when the price of a certain article varies—a volume that is variable in relation to the right enclosing the quantity unit of this article.

When all prices in money change as a result of a general movement, one comes to consider that the value of the currency, or the volume of the right 182 containing the monetary unit—which is the same thing—has changed in relation to all the articles in the market.

Thus, the value, in terms of articles of nonmonetary wealth, of an inconvertible kind of money is, at each instant of time, what market prices make it.

Despite these possible variations, this value, in terms of articles of nonmonetary wealth, still determines—as under a convertible currency system—the consistency of all the obligations denominated in money, because Article 1895 of the French Civil Code provides that “an obligation resulting from a money loan always relates to the nominal amount set forth in the contract” and that “if the amount of specie has increased or been reduced prior to the time of payment, the debtor’s sole obligation is to repay the nominal amount loaned, and only that nominal amount, in the specie in circulation at the time of payment.”

Briefly, the various types of money can be classified as follows in relation to the convertibility criterion:

Commodity money: precious metal coins, which are always convertible

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ATTRIBUTE III: Money is accepted by all sellers in the market in exchange for the articles of wealth supplied by them.

Acceptance of money may either be imposed by law or be freely agreed to.

a) Money with Legal Tender Status

Money with legal tender status is money that suppliers of articles of wealth may not turn down, on pain of penalties.

Generally, one or two types of money have, in each country, the attribute of legal tender.

In France, for instance, Article 475§11 of the Civil code provides that “those who refuse to receive national specie and national currency that are neither false 183 nor altered, at the value for which they are in circulation” shall be sentenced to a fine of 6 to 10 French francs.5

This provision was aimed at metallic coinage.

Article 1 of the law of August 12, 1870, which abolished convertibility of the Bank of France notes, naturally conferred upon these the character of legal tender: “As from the promulgation of this law, the national Treasury and private individuals shall be under the obligation to receive Bank of France notes as legal tender.”

Article 14 of the law of December 17, 1897, restoring convertibility into gold, did not rescind the status of Bank of France notes as legal tender. Thus, before 1914, there were two kinds of money with legal tender status that were freely interchangeable: gold specie and Bank of France notes.

As indicated above, in general, legal tender was endowed with unlimited discharging, or extinguishing, power.6 In France, some types of money that did not hold legal tender status, such as silver, or fractional copper and nickel coins, also held discharging power up to certain limited amounts.

b) De Facto Money

De facto money is money whose acceptance is not a legal obligation but is freely agreed to by nearly all sellers in the market.

Money will be freely accepted only, however, if those who are asked to receive it have no doubt as to its value as an asset.

A gold coin whose weight and fineness are not questioned is the type of money that has an undoubted value. It would have been de facto money even if it had not been legal tender. Indeed, before 1914, the French “Louis,” which was legal tender only in France, was commonly accepted in all countries.

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At that time, the Bank of France note would probably have commanded universal acceptance in France, even if the legal obligation to accept it had not bolstered the unanimous confidence that it inspired.

On the other hand, scriptural money, which is not legal tender in France, is accepted only by those who believe in the existence of sufficient cover and in the solvency of the bank holding such cover. It is therefore de facto money to various degrees. When the solvency of a bank is questioned, the balances for which it is a debtor are no longer accepted in payment and lose their monetary character completely.

With reference to the unanimous acceptance criterion, the various types of money can be classified as follows:

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§4. The Structure of Stocks of Money in Circulation

Stocks of money in modern societies always comprise various types of money—scriptural money, banknotes, sometimes metallic coinage—between which individual cash balances are distributed.

Scriptural money, being claims payable on demand, is redeemable on demand in legal tender—i.e., usually in banknotes.

As far as money holding legal tender status is concerned, if it is convertible, it is exchangeable—on demand and upon presentation at the central bank—for its equivalent in the conversion article of wealth, in actual fact always gold. This metal will be delivered in the form of coins or ingots of a specified minimum weight, depending on whether the striking of coins is unrestricted or prohibited in the community considered.

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When in circulation, metallic coins often share with the notes issued by the central bank the character of legal tender. The obligation to redeem in metallic coinage debts denominated in money is mandatory only for the central bank, however, because of its convertibility obligations, whereas any other debtor can discharge a debt [through the use of] banknotes—convertible into gold, it is true, at the central bank.

Thus, under convertible currency systems, the various types of money are convertible into gold, at the holders’ discretion. Gold provides the base of the whole monetary structure.

By contrast, under inconvertible currency systems, the central bank does not have an obligation to redeem in gold the notes it has issued. It is these notes that, being legal tender, are then substituted for gold as the monetary base.

Under all monetary systems, all forms of scriptural money are freely convertible into legal tender, and under convertible currency systems the legal tender is freely convertible into gold; conversely, under all monetary systems, the legal tender can be freely converted into scriptural money by simple deposit into a bank account, and under a convertible currency system gold can be freely converted into legal tender, by payment to the central bank or—possibly—by striking coins.

Thus, in each and every case, the various compartments of monetary circulation are interconnected, and each individual can, at his discretion, transfer the money units that he owns from one compartment to another. It is the wills of all money holders, and these wills alone, that establish the form of existing money within the framework of the possibilities afforded by the monetary systems in force, hence the distribution of existing money among the various types.

§5. The Monetary Sign: A Rigorously Respected Uniform for the Values That One Wishes to Use as Money

The preceding analysis shows that monetary stocks, in advanced societies, are made up of various articles of wealth, whether metal or claims, underneath a sign that allows for immediate identification of their value. The monetary sign is what gives a known and undoubted value to the article of wealth, thereby making it immediately acceptable to all sellers on the market. Thus, the monetary sign is simply the uniform in which it is convenient to dress the values that one intends to use as money.

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§6. . . . But the Monetary Sign Is Not Money Any More Than a Uniform Is a Soldier

The monetary sign thus confers the attributes of money upon an article of wealth.

This sign will not become money, however, until it covers an article of wealth of equal value. This is the case, for instance, with the banknotes stored in the coffers of the central bank. They do not become money until they have been entered on the liabilities side of its balance sheet through exchange against a weight of gold or a volume of claims of equal value. Any banknote that has not been issued, or that has been retired by the central bank after being issued, is, in spite of appearances, merely a cast-off article of clothing that does not enclose any wealth.

And what is true of a banknote is equally true of scriptural money, whose sign does not exist prior to the emergence of the claim that it authenticates, or of metallic money, whose imprint has no greater value than that of its constituent metal.

In each and every case, the reality of money is not the monetary sign but the value of which it is the ostensible representation. The monetary sign is only the outward covering, thanks to which the value can be easily recognized and identified. Although this monetary sign is indispensable when it comes to creating money, it is like a uniform in relation to a soldier. And the monetary sign is not money any more than a uniform is a soldier.

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Chapter XIV: Necessary Cash Balances and Desired Cash Balances

§1. The Absolute Control of the Rights Holder over the Amount of His Cash Balance

The essential and dominant feature of all monetary phenomena is the absolute control that all rights holders have over the amount of their cash balances. If rights holders find that their cash balance is too large, they simply buy more; if they find that it is too small, they sell more, and there is no force that can prevent them from maintaining, at any time, the quantity of money at the level considered by them to be desirable.

A rights holder determines at his discretion not only the total amount but also the form and structure of his cash balance. If he wishes to have less money, properly speaking, and more bank credit, all he has to do is make a deposit into his account; if his desire is to have more money and less credit, he simply needs to cash a check on his bank balance.

Each individual is master, and sole master, of the amount of his cash balance and its composition.

Although he decides freely, he does not generally make a decision without reason. Let us therefore investigate the influences that combine to determine the amount of the desired cash balance.

§2. The Dual Function of a Cash Balance

If one observes the level of a given cash balance in relation to the economic activity of the person who holds it, one finds that it can always be broken down into two distinct parts.

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Let us consider, for instance, the case of a retailer who buys vegetables at a food market in the morning and resells them to customers in the afternoon. If he buys and sells on a cash basis, he can carry on in business only insofar as, every morning, he holds a cash balance equal to the value of the goods that he wishes to purchase. And he will naturally replenish his cash balance during the day and keep it in the cash register until the next morning.

The level of this indispensable cash balance is determined by the price and quantity of the goods to be bought. So long as our tradesman’s habits in matters of payments—i.e., his monetary mores—do not change, the amount necessary will be strictly proportional to the value of his daily purchases.

It is the amount of this cash balance, which is essential for the carrying out of a given economic activity, in the actual conditions in which it is carried out, that constitutes the necessary cash balance of the person considered.

Holding this cash balance does not protect the owner against the vagaries of economic life, however. If our tradesman has no other money reserves, then any price increase, any delay in sales or payment, will force him to reduce his purchases, hence, his level of economic activity.

In addition, he may wish to keep a money reserve in order to take advantage of an unforeseen opportunity, or forestall any unpredictable possible stoppage of his business, etc.

For all these reasons, he may wish to keep a cash balance in excess of what he considers to be necessary.

That part of the cash held by an individual in excess of his necessary cash balance will be termed hoarded cash.

The sum of the necessary cash balance and the hoarded cash sets the amount of the cash balance that an individual will wish to, and will in fact, hold. “It determines the level of his desired cash balance,” whose volume will be, at each instant of time, that of the rights to which the individual concerned will wish to give money as their contents.

§3. The Level of the Necessary Cash Balance

In order to be conveniently transferred for settlement purposes, value must be loaded onto money like goods onto a freight car [boxcar]; money is the vehicle for the transfer of values, just as a freight car is a vehicle for the transfer of goods.

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All freight operators know, however, that a minimum number of freight cars is needed to ensure a certain level of traffic. This is the minimum level below which rolling stock must not be allowed to fall.

Similarly, in order to finance a certain flow of transactions, a minimum stock of money is needed. This constitutes the “necessary cash balance” under the economic circumstances of the moment.

A freight car has a specific capacity in terms of volume; similarly, a monetary unit has a specific capacity in terms of value.

In order to cast light on the problem, let us investigate the number of freight cars necessary to transport a given volume of cargo every day, when operating under steady economic conditions; we will assume that each of the recipients, at all times, sends off articles of the same volume as the volume they receive.

The number of freight cars required will depend on the unit volume of the articles to be transported and on the number of units. But a freight car, once loaded, will not be available again until transportation has been completed and the freight car has been unloaded. The duration of the specific sequence of loading, moving, and unloading operations sets the “turnaround time” for the car considered. If turnaround time is n days, then it is only on the n + 1st day that a loaded car is available again.

In the intervening time, all the wagons used will need to have been taken from the rolling stock.

The necessary “rolling stock” [of freight cars] will therefore be w × n.

If actual numbers are reduced to the level of the necessary numbers, then each car will rotate every n days. The velocity of circulation, which measures the number of rotations per unit of time, is 1/n.

We must observe in passing that velocity of circulation is measured in the number of rotations per unit of time, rather than in the number of miles traveled, and that it would be proportional to velocity measured in miles only if all trips were of equal distance.

In the field of money, if the value of the settlements effected every day is v and the length of time required for each settlement is n days—that is, if a money unit used for a settlement only becomes available for a new settlement from the n + 1st day that follows its use-day, then the “necessary cash balance” within the community considered will be v × n money units.

If the aggregate actual cash balance does not exceed the level of the necessary cash balance, then each money unit will effect, on the average, one settle190ment every n days. This interval of n days will set the average duration of the rotation of the cash balances. The average velocity of circulation of money, which is the average number of transfers that each money unit will have accomplished during the time unit, will be 1/n.

The amount of the necessary cash balance of a given community operating under steady economic conditions is, therefore, equal to v × n, which is the product of the value of the nonmonetary articles of wealth exchanged every day by the average duration of the rotation of cash balances.

The value of the nonmonetary articles of wealth transferred daily is proportional to the general price level index and the total sales index.

We must, however, identify the influences that determine the average turnaround time of the cash balances.

The average turnaround time of a cash balance is the average time interval between the moment a money unit ceases to be available, because it is withdrawn from the cash balance of the payer, and the moment when it becomes available again because it is entered in the payee’s cash balance. It is the period during which the amount can no longer be used by the buyer but is not yet available for use by the seller.

This time interval depends both on the type of money used and on the physical circumstances of payment.

As regards money properly speaking—i.e., metallic coinage or banknotes—transfer is [simply] effected hand to hand. The duration of the transfer, if transferor and transferee are in each other’s presence, is extremely short. If, however, payment is between individuals who are far apart from one another, substantial time lags will be involved—for instance, in the sending of banknotes from one place to another by registered mail [or by money order], or of gold coins, from one country to another, by air or by boat.

If the value is transferred by check, it becomes included in the transferee’s patrimony only after the check has been received and cashed in at the transferor’s bank. All accountants are familiar with the existence of “in-transit” items. These set the amount below which cash balances in scriptural money cannot fall, and thereby determine the necessary cash balance in money of this type.

The level of the necessary cash balance therefore depends, all things equal as regards the value of the articles of wealth to be settled, on payment lags. Banking techniques tend to reduce these time periods, for instance by relying on air transport to carry cash, by resorting to electronic funds [wire] trans191fers, and by adjusting bank opening hours and makeup sessions to settlement needs.

Regardless of the state of the banking technology, however, such time lags cannot be less than a certain minimum, which hinges solely on the nature of the settlements to be effected.

When this minimum has been reached, the necessary cash balance is only a function of the amount of such settlements—that is, of the general price level and the index of trading activity.1

§4. The Level of Hoarded Cash

No individual maintains his actual cash balance at the minimum level represented by the necessary cash balance. The actual cash balance always exceeds the necessary cash balance by the amount of hoarded cash.

This amount is determined by a number of widely differing considerations. Hoarding involves self-denial, a sacrifice accepted for the purpose of meeting possible future needs. Depending on whether the rights holder inclines more or less toward security, and on whether circumstances lead him to view an increase in his cash requirements as more or less probable, or the money increments necessary to meet them more, or less, simple to secure, he will increase his hoarded cash to a more, or less, substantial level.

Thus, when he anticipates the possibility of disrupting circumstances, such as warfare, strikes, poor harvests, and, generally speaking, any occurrences likely to delay his income, or accelerate or increase his expenditure, he will wish to protect himself against the risk by increasing the volume of his hoarded cash.

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§5. The Desired Cash Balance

The desired cash balance, which is the value of the cash that each individual wishes to hold—hence the volume of those of his rights that he wishes, at each instant of time, to fill with money—is the sum of the necessary cash balance and the hoarded cash.

The two components are quite different in nature and in character, however.

The necessary cash balance is dictated indirectly by the value of the nonmonetary articles of wealth acquired during each period of time and by technical payment methods. The buyer, in fixing this value and in selecting these methods, determines ne varietur the amount of cash he will need to settle his purchases. This determination is not a conscious process, however. The amount of the necessary cash balance is usually not known, because its constituent elements, being “in transit,” no longer appear in the buyer’s patrimony and have not yet appeared in the seller’s.

If, for instance, the average turnaround time of the cash balances is two days, then each seller will have “in-transit” money resources amounting to two days’ selling. These money resources will fill part of his own rights. But, being visible only in terms of accounting, they will not yet show in any detailed accounts.

By contrast, the hoarded cash balance is the subject of a determination that, if not conscious, is at least fully apparent.

The necessary cash balance is forced upon individuals, whereas the amount of hoarded cash is the amount individuals want to have. The two amounts added together, however, make up the desired cash balance, which individuals will inevitably demand if they wish to maintain their economic activities and satisfy their desire for [financial] security.

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Chapter XV: The Creation and Destruction of Money

§1. The Various Producers of Money

Issuing money amounts to dressing up value in one of several special uniforms—metallic coin, banknote, bank credit—so that it can be acceptable to all sellers in a market.

It is therefore not only the central bank that has received the privilege of lawfully creating money but any institution whose “uniform” provides creditworthiness to the articles of wealth it adorns, thereby ensuring their generalized acceptance, which is one of the characteristic attributes of money.

In fact, these institutions are: the state, for the production of metallic coinage, and the banks, for the production of fiduciary money.

As far as coinage is concerned, the state assumes the striking monopoly for historical reasons, which led to the privilege of minting being regarded as one of the attributes of sovereignty. Another reason, probably, has been the desire to reap shameful profits from the manipulation of specie and, in any case, to prevent any private person from appropriating such profits.

With regard to a particular type of fiduciary money, scriptural money, its issuance is generally unrestricted, and is the responsibility of specialized institutions, banks. The banks have no obligations other than those of any debtor vis-à-vis his creditor: to repay matured debts, upon simple demand, in legal tender.

As far as issuing legal tender is concerned, the law nearly always provides that this is the privilege of central banks.1 In return for their privilege, the state 194 requires them to assume obligations that we shall discuss further on. In particular, under a convertible currency system, the state requires the central bank to exchange, at any time, on simple demand or upon presentation, the banknotes they have issued, for an equivalent quantity of the conversion article of wealth.

§2. The Raw Materials for the Making of Money

If one admits, for the reasons stated above,2 that metallic coinage can be regarded as a particular form of fiduciary money, then all types of money are claims on the institution that issued them.

As a result, the issuing of money can always be regarded as the acquisition of an asset by the issuing institution, an asset that, as a counterpart, enters on the liabilities side of its ledger a money claim for the benefit of the third party transferring the asset.

So long as the total assets of the issuing institution have the same value as the total claims included in its liabilities, these claims will be true claims. When, however, total assets are less than total claims, some of the rights included in the liabilities of the issuing institution will inevitably be false rights and, regardless of the desire of the issuing institution, they will not be able to be filled.

If the issuing institution wants to avoid the emergence of false rights, it will only need to issue money against assets whose value, at the moment when they must be realized, is not less than that of the money representing them.

The question is whether there are assets that meet this requirement.

It is clear that, under a convertible currency system, the conversion article of wealth presents the characteristic required, because its value—such as the value of gold under a metallic system—is set at an unchanging level through the legal definition of the currency.

There is no article of wealth, other than the conversion article of wealth, whose price cannot fluctuate widely. For this reason, they are all unsuitable for monetization.

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By contrast, under all monetary systems—whether it be a convertible or inconvertible currency system—true claims of the short-term type denominated in money can be monetized without danger, provided however that the volume of bills reaching maturity during any period of time is in excess of the monetary balances to be repaid.

Indeed, a discounted claim, if it is a true claim, will recover its nominal value at maturity, regardless of the change in the discount rate that may have occurred after it was discounted. As it is a true claim, it is possible to complete, without a loss, the discount operation.

By contrast, if the bank had to sell unmatured bills in order to meet requests for repayment, it would only collect a value that was less than the discount amount, if the market rate had risen above its level at the time of discounting.

Thus, in order that the discounting of true claims expressed in money should not lead to the emergence of false rights, it is sufficient that the bank, in order to meet requests for repayment, should be able to draw upon matured claims and, therefore, that during each period of time the total amount of the bills reaching maturity should be in excess of, or equal to, the total amount of the credit balances that may have to be repaid on demand.

Now, for a given volume of discount, the amount of claims reaching maturity on a daily basis, if evenly distributed, will depend on the maturity 3 of the claims discounted. The amount [of such claims reaching maturity on a daily basis] will be zero if the claims are perpetual, and equal to the amount of the portfolio, if the claims are one day away from reaching maturity. The issuing bank can therefore bring the volume of daily maturities in its portfolio to the level that it considers to be safe, by limiting the [maximum] maturity of the bills accepted for discount.

If, for instance, their maximum maturity is ninety days, one-ninetieth of the portfolio will reach maturity each day. In fact, experience shows that, except under exceptional circumstances, such a volume of reaching maturity per day provides adequate security.

The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the only articles of wealth that can be monetized without danger, or with such little danger that they are acceptable, hence the only raw materials for money, are, under a convertible currency system, gold and true short-dated claims denominated in money, and, under an inconvertible currency system, true short-dated claims denominated in money.

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It should be noted that if, during any period of time, demands for repayment of money balances—in other words, the amount of the undesired cash balances—were to be in excess of the sum of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the bank, in order to meet its commitments, would have to sell unexpired bills in the market. If, at the time of sale, the market rate had risen above the rate at which the bills had been discounted, the bank would receive less in assets than the liabilities resulting from discounting operations: false rights would emerge.

Under a convertible currency system, which is appreciably the general rule for the central bank, these false rights would be the issuing institution’s own rights, at least so long as its capital had not been exhausted; but under an inconvertible currency system, in contrast, they would be third parties’ rights, because only matured claims could be removed from the bank’s assets, and only on the occasion of their repayment.

Thus, inconvertibility does not prevent the emergence of false rights. Its sole effect is to transfer the false rights that may emerge from the central bank to those currency holders who, the moment matured claims have been repaid, can no longer use up their undesired cash balances.

Inconvertibility is therefore nothing but a system for protecting the central bank, quite similar, as far as the principle is concerned, to the principles of unseizability and the inalienability of public property, which protect the state.

We will show later on that inconvertibility is instituted precisely when the state, by forcing the central bank to accept false claims for discount, systematically generates the false rights that—in the absence of special provisions—would reduce its capital to zero. Thus, the two systems depart from the rules of ordinary law with the same aim in view: to make possible a prolonged deficit, by shifting its burden from the financing institution onto its third-party creditors.

It is true that, normally, matured claims without any counterpart in the debtor’s assets would, unless someone desired to have them, be valueless on the market. The rights that enclose them would have to be reduced to zero: they would be false rights in their entirety. When, however, the state imposes inconvertibility, it simultaneously makes money “forced currency” 4 and sellers are 197 under the obligation to accept it in payment at its nominal value. The ramifications of such a course of action will be discussed later on.

§3. Regulating the Issuance of Money

The preceding analysis shows that there is a considerable difference between the status of private banks and that of central banks, from the point of view of the implications of the risks that they take on.

In both types of institutions, false rights will appear on the liabilities side of the balance sheets, when requests for repayment require the sale of bills at a value that is less than purchase value.

In the case of a private bank, however, such false rights will be owned by the business, and third parties’ rights will remain unaffected as long as the capital [referring to the equity cushion] of the firm has not been exhausted. By contrast, in the case of a central bank, these false rights will remain the issuing institution’s own rights only to the extent that the currency has not been made inconvertible. Now, the assignment of false rights, by exhausting the assets that are meant to fill them, will soon make the suspension of convertibility a necessity. From then on, all newly emerged false rights will be assigned in their entirety to currency holders.

This contrast as regards the consequences involves a fundamental difference in the attitude of the state with regard to the two types of banks.

Private banks incur liability for their management. If they take undue risks, their capital will be reduced by an amount equal to their losses. If their capital is reduced to zero, bankruptcy will put an end to their activities, and injury to third parties will be as scant as possible if bankruptcy is promptly declared.

The state can therefore allow private banks full freedom as regards the risks that they assume, at least as long as the courts of law fulfill their functions firmly and expeditiously. Banking activity does not need to be regulated, except perhaps from the accounting point of view.

By contrast, the management of the central bank is a primary concern of the state. If it generates false rights, it may lead to the unavoidable suspension of convertibility and, by affecting the rights of currency holders once inconvertibility has become established, cause serious social disturbances.

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Under an inconvertible currency system, the harmful consequences of the risks assumed by the central bank are borne by the community, while the bank keeps the ensuing profits to itself. The state cannot therefore give it full management freedom. The state will regulate the bank’s issuing activity and require that it not assume risks beyond those that practically rule out—at least under normal circumstances—the emergence of any false rights.

The regulations will cover three main points:

  • — prohibit the central bank from monetizing any assets other than claims denominated in money and—under a convertible currency system—gold;
  • — require the central bank to turn down any claim that is not a true claim;
  • — force it to accept for discount only sufficiently short maturing claims so that, during any period of time, the probable amount of demands for repayments should be, on average, less than the amount of claims reaching maturity.

The statutes of all central banks are intended to secure compliance with these three principles.

The articles describing restrictively the nature of assets that can be monetized are based on the first principle.

In general, in addition to gold under a convertible currency system, the following are regarded as such: bills of exchange, promissory notes, checks, warrants, and Treasury bills.

The second principle is written into the texts requiring that any claim without consideration should be turned down, and that securities, signatures, or pledges should guarantee the proper completion of the commitments discounted.

The materiality of the consideration is, for any claim, prima facie evidence of its veracity, provided however that the counterpart against which the claim has been recognized should continue to exist in the debtor’s own rights, until the maturity of his debt. This the discounting bank endeavors to ascertain by studying the “transferor’s” activity.

In any case, the existence of creditworthy signatures or of pledges in the form of securities or hypothecated goods is a guarantee that the claim will remain true until it reaches maturity.

Lastly, the third principle is reflected in the laying down of a maximum maturity, which must meet two conflicting requirements: it must allow producers the borrowing possibilities that their usual production cycles demand, and provide the discounting bank with bills reaching maturity each day that are—on the whole—in excess of the volume of foreseeable demands for repayment. In 199 fact, the limitation [of this time period] to ninety days appears to be acceptable middle ground.

By conforming to its own statutes, the central bank usually limits to a very small amount the volume of false rights that it creates. These, then, are to be deducted from its operating profit. It may happen, however, that the state—in its quest for resources that it is unable to obtain from taxes or borrowing—forces the central bank to violate its own statutes, by requiring it to accept for discount the false claims that it [the state] creates. The grave consequences that such a requirement entails will be analyzed in detail in Chapter XVIII.

§4. The Distribution of Clients among the Various Producers of Money

The central bank and the private banks are therefore producers of the same article of wealth: money, thereby meeting the requirements of those who wish to monetize claims “eligible for discount.” At least in principle, however, their clienteles are bound to be different.

Indeed, claims are not fungible articles of wealth. The risk factor inherent in discounting depends on the creditworthiness of the signatories or the guarantees attached to the bill being discounted. Any discounting operation, therefore, implies thorough knowledge of the signatories’ status. This is why a transferor can normally secure discount only from a bank that knows him and where he has been “accredited.”

The primary clientele, in other words direct credit users, are thus distributed among the banks of discount, in general for reasons of location, or because of personal relationships. In the fulfillment of these functions, the banks are retailers of credit.

But any increase in their discounting operations creates cash requirements for the banks of discount, on two counts.

In the first place, such an increase generally implies a rise in the actual cash balance, which, all else equal, the banks regulate roughly in proportion to the amount of their liabilities payable on demand.5 In periods of normality, the ratio is about 10 percent.6

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In the second place, experience shows that—all else equal—private individuals maintain fairly constant proportions between their various types of cash balances. Any increase in circulation will therefore affect in roughly the same way—all else equal—the amount of money in circulation and the volume of bank credit.7

Thus, an increase by 100 million francs in the volume of discounting will have a dual effect: if the circulation is equally distributed between money properly speaking and bank credit, the increase will involve a deduction of 50 million francs from the cash balances of the discounting banks, which will increase the amount of money properly speaking in circulation; if the banks maintain their actual cash balances at one-tenth of their liabilities payable on demand, the increase will lead them to increase their actual cash balances by 5 million francs.

All told, the discounting banks will thus need to secure an additional 55 million francs of money properly speaking.

To achieve this, they will supply against money this same amount in bills that they themselves have discounted: they will “rediscount” these bills. In order to do this, however, they must affix their signatures. Now, unlike a private person’s signature, the signature of a bank usually has considerable creditworthiness attached to it, backed by substantial capital and reserves. Bills bearing the signatures of banks will therefore be regarded as substantially equivalent in terms of the guarantees involved. They can therefore be acquired without specific precautions and, as a result, be traded.

But whereas the banks whose volume of discount increases have to increase their cash balances, those banks whose volume of discount declines can reduce them. If the reduction of their cash requirements exceeds the sum of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the banks will supply their available cash balances in exchange for claims.

Thus, the confrontation of demands for, and supplies of, money against short maturing claims whose value is certain (due to the creditworthiness of the signatories) creates a veritable wholesale market for short-dated bills, known as the money market.

In principle, only bills countersigned by banks are accepted in this market. Only in exceptional circumstances will this market receive bills guaranteed by the signatures of major corporations and enjoying the same status as bank paper as a result of their credit rating.

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§5. The Money Market

In the money market, the price of the article of wealth exchanged, in other words the interest rate, is established in the same way as in other sectors of the market—i.e., by bringing together supply and demand. At each session of the market, the price becomes established at the level that brings the value of the claims supplied to the level of demand in money.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between the money market and other market sectors, due to the presence in the former of a specialized buyer, the central bank, which “takes” unrestrictedly—at or above a rate freely determined by its managers—the bills “eligible for discount.” Below such a rate, the supply of money against claims comes from private persons; but at this rate, the supply suddenly becomes unlimited. The curve of the total supply of money against claims will therefore be represented, at each session of the market, when the discount rate has been fixed at the level r, by a jagged line of the ss′s″ type (fig. 6).

lf1981_figure_006.jpg

Fig. 6. [Q: Quantity; D: Demand; S: Supply; R: Rate]

It is true that the central bank is not only a supplier of money against claims; it is also a demander, to the extent that the bills that it has previously discounted reach maturity. One can say, however, that the claims that the central bank supplies are matured claims and will therefore disappear when they have been collected. If, however, conditions remain equal and—in particular—if the 202 amount of the desired cash balance remains unchanged, debtors of matured bills, or any persons substituting for them, will supply the market with renewal bills having the same value as those they will have repaid. Thus, the event of previously discounted bills reaching maturity will increase, by the amount of such bills, the demand for money against claims in the money market. If the demand for money against claims by private individuals, during a given market session, is represented by the curve D, then the curve of the total demand for money against claims will be a curve D′ derived from D by raising all ordinates by the sum of matured bills previously discounted.

The market rate will become established at the level corresponding to the intersection of the curves of total supply of and total demand for money against short-dated claims.

It is immediately clear that the market rate can never exceed the discount rate.

If the total demand curve intersects the total supply curve in the vicinity of SS′—as is the case with curve D′—then the market rate is less than the discount rate. No bill is discounted with the central bank; the central bank is said to have “no contact” with the market.

On the other hand, if the point of intersection is in the s′s″ area—as is the case with D′1—then the market rate is at the level of the discount rate. At each session of the market, the demands for money against bills are served, by the market for the amount rS′, and by the central bank for the balance SS′1.

The above features of the curves of supply and demand in the money market will be used, in the course of the following chapters, for the study of the effects of any change in desired cash balances.

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Chapter XVI: The Principle of Variations in the General Price Level in Money

§1. Variations in the General Price Level in Light of the Theory of Rights

Chapter VIII provided an analysis of the mechanism of exchange in light of the theory of rights. We found that any exchange could be regarded as a simple change in the contents of the rights of each exchanger, a change that did not affect the rights themselves. We showed that this concept provides an insight into the price formation mechanism. At each session of the market, the volume of the rights that their holders wish to empty of and fill with a certain article of wealth measures the supply of and demand for this article of wealth. If these two volumes are not equal, the price changes, and the price change will only be the measure of the degree of pressure necessary so that the goods emptied onto the market can be carried into the rights that are intended to enclose them.

This concept, which is valid for a given sector of the market, applies equally, under a monetary system, to the market as a whole. During each session of the market, the aggregate volume, in money, of the rights that their holders wish to empty of any nonmonetary content measures aggregate supply; and the aggregate money volume of the rights that their holders wish to fill with any nonmonetary content measures aggregate demand.

We know, however, that under a system where prices [are allowed to] vary freely, the product of the general price index by the total sale index is equal, but for one constant factor, to total demand.1

Everything takes place, therefore, as though at each instant of time, the general price index established itself at a level such that the value of the articles of 204 wealth supplied in the market filled exactly and exclusively the rights that their holders wished to be filled. The general price index, just like a specific price, therefore only measures the average degree of pressure necessary so that, at each session of the market, all the articles of wealth supplied can be carried into the rights that are intended to enclose them, regardless of the distribution of demand and supply among the various articles in the market.

§2. The Divergence between the Desired Cash Balance and the Actual Cash Balance Is the Only Possible Cause of the Variation in the General Price Level

The preceding conclusion shows that the general price level can change only if, during a session of the market, the total volume of the rights emptied of their contents differs from the volume of the rights that are to be filled.

Let us investigate the factors that may cause such a difference.

Under a monetary system, any right that is emptied of a nonmonetary article of wealth is immediately filled with money. If, however, the seller does not wish to increase his cash balance, he will promptly empty the right that enclosed the article of wealth of the money acquired as a result of the sale, and he will fill it with the article of wealth desired. Thus, the right that is to be filled with nonmonetary wealth will be the very same one that has been emptied of such nonmonetary wealth; money will have been the content [of the right] only for an instant, between the emptying and the filling [of the right] on the market.

What is true of the individual is, however, also true of the community considered as a whole.

If, during a session of the market, the total amount of desired cash balances remains unchanged and the existing quantity of money is assumed to be constant,2 the total volume of the rights to be filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth will be equal to the total volume of the rights emptied of the same articles of wealth, regardless of the distribution pattern of the rights emptied and filled among the various market sectors. Where this is the case, the general price level will remain unchanged, in spite of individual price variations.

The total volume of the rights to be filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth cannot exceed the total volume of the rights emptied of those same articles of 205 wealth—assuming that the existing quantity of money remains unchanged—unless certain rights holders wish to fill with nonmonetary articles of wealth rights that have contained money before; in other words, unless the total amount of desired cash balances in the community considered decreases. Where this is the case, the volume of the rights to be filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth will exceed the volume of the rights emptied of such articles of wealth by the amount of the rights that enclosed the cash balances that had become undesired. The general price level will rise up to the point at which the value of the articles of wealth supplied is sufficient to fill the volume of the rights that are intended to enclose them.

At the same time, however, the volume of the rights that their holders intend to provide with a monetary content will have decreased, by the amount of the cash balances that have become undesired. In the market sector where money is exchanged, the volume of the rights to be filled will therefore be less than that of the rights that have been emptied, the difference being equal to the amount in question.

Now, by definition, the price of money is equal to unity. Adjustment, in this sector of the market, cannot therefore be effected through changes in prices.

But the rise in the general price level—by increasing the value of the articles of wealth that change hands—increases by the same amount the volume of the cash balances “called up” in order to ensure settlement [of these transactions], hence, all else equal, [also increases] the volume of the “necessary cash balances” within the community considered.

To take a concrete case, suppose that the average turnaround time of the cash balances is one day—in other words that the balances mobilized reach the recipients the next day—and all individuals suddenly reduce their hoarded cash by 50 percent.

The general price level will rise during the session of the market at which the reduction of hoarded cash occurs.

The rise will provide to the articles of wealth bought during the session the incremental value necessary in order to fill exactly the rights that contained the cash balances that have become undesired.

The rise, however, will increase—by a corresponding amount—the volume of the cash balances mobilized,3 hence the volume of sellers’ rights that the sellers will have to leave with a monetary content until they receive the settlement money.

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Thus, the cash balance elements that have become undesired will have been received into the sellers’ rights, as a result of the increase in the necessary cash balances that followed from the price rise.

Through this increase, the volume of the rights to be filled with money will rise to the level of the rights that have been emptied of money by the buyers of nonmonetary articles of wealth as well as by those persons who reduced the amount of their hoarded cash balance.

The next day, the undesired money having been included in the cash balances that have become necessary at the newly established price level, the amount of money collected will be equal to the amount of cash balances mobilized.

Thus, in the sector of the market where money is exchanged, equilibrium will be achieved at the same time as in all the markets for nonmonetary articles of wealth taken together, because of the rise in the general price level and the resulting increase in the necessary cash balances. Everything takes place as if the rise in the general price level continued until it absorbed, by an increase in the necessary cash balances, the cash items that have become undesired.

Everything would occur in the same way if the reduction in the desired cash balances had been the result of a decrease not in hoarded cash but in the necessary cash balances, again assuming that total circulation remained unchanged. The decrease in the necessary cash balances could result, for instance, from a reduction in settlement lag times. The price rise, through the increase in the necessary cash balances that it would bring on, would offset the decrease that had brought it about.

Any increase in the desired cash balances without an increase in the amount of money in circulation, by making the volume of the rights to be filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth lower than the volume of the rights emptied of these same articles of wealth, would mutatis mutandis lead to similar effects.

Inversely, any variation in the total amount of money in circulation, in other words in the level of actual cash balances, has no influence on the general price level if it is due to a variation of equal size in the desired cash balances. In the opposite case, however, a change in the general price level would indeed be generated.

Let us investigate, for example, the effect of the monetization of gold or of claims during a period when the amount of desired cash balances increased in the same proportion as the quantity of money in circulation.

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Everything would take place as if the rights that had been emptied of gold or of claims were filled not with nonmonetary articles of wealth from the market but only with the money obtained from monetizing their previous content. The volume of the rights to be filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth would therefore remain equal to the volume of the rights that had been emptied of these same articles of wealth, disregarding those that had enclosed the gold or the claims monetized. As regards these latter rights, everything would take place as if they had kept their initial content, after going through the simple formality of dressing this initial content up in the form of money.

By contrast, if the newly issued money is not desired, the rights that have been emptied of the gold or of the claims monetized are filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth in the market. The general price index rises up to the level where all the newly issued cash items that are undesired are taken up by the resulting increase in the necessary cash balance.

Thus, as long as the total amount of desired cash balances is equal to the total amount of actual cash balances, the general price level remains steady, regardless of variations in total supply and demand, or of variations in actual and desired cash balances. By contrast, if total desired cash balances and total actual cash balances differ, the general price level will change: the change, all else equal, will depend only on the margin of difference between the two. The general price level is therefore indifferent to the supply of and demand for articles of wealth, and to the quantity of money in circulation when this quantity is desired; it responds only to any differences that may develop between the aggregate amount of desired cash balances and the aggregate amount of actual cash balances.

This conclusion is of great importance. It shows how fallacious the thesis is that sees in the increase in the amount of money in circulation, or in an insufficient level of supply, the causes of a rise in prices. It shows how utterly unfounded the popular concept of inflation is, when it refers to changes in the quantity of money in circulation, without taking account of concomitant changes in desired cash balances.

As long as the actual cash balance is at the level of the desired cash balance, the volume of the rights to be filled is never and can never be different from the volume of the rights emptied during the same period of time. If more articles of wealth are supplied [on the market], then there are more rights to be filled; inversely, if fewer articles of wealth are supplied [on the market], then there are fewer rights to be filled. If the quantity of money in circulation increases, not all 208 the articles of wealth “emptied” [from the rights that contained them] are supplied in the market, because some are monetized; but not all the rights emptied are filled in the market, since some find their contents in the money obtained through monetization.

Thus, in all cases where simplistic theories, like the quantity theory of money, would have seen a reason for why the general price level should change, the general price level will have remained strictly unchanged because the actual cash balance will have remained equal to the level of the desired cash balance.

Some observers, purporting to be of the positive type of mind, will no doubt be astonished that we should base the key theory of variations in the general price level on a concept that is as distinctly psychological as the concept of the desired cash balance. This first contact with the realities of dynamic explanation ought not to surprise them, however.

Economic phenomena have deep roots in the hearts of men, there where the wills that generate actions develop in the light of consciousness and, quite often, unconsciously.

Being surprised that the economist finds the causes that he is looking for in the desires of men is like being surprised that the astronomer should find in gravitational attraction an explanation for the motion of planets.

Desire is, in economics, the equivalent of force in astronomy or mechanics: the explanatory instrument that will turn into logical necessities the appearances that observation will have revealed.

§3. Monetary Regulation

Any divergence between the levels of the desired and the actual cash balances causes the general price level to change; therefore, any monetary system where these two quantities are not constantly adjusted one to the other will be subject to continuing variations in the general price level, attributable to the continuing fluctuation in these two quantities—in particular as a result of changes in the amount of desired cash balances, due to psychological, economic, seasonal, or monthly factors.

Changes in the general price level will be due to the disparity between the volume of the articles of wealth supplied and the volume of the rights that their holders wish to fill with these.

Sometimes people will want more money and fewer articles of wealth than are supplied, and the general price level will fall; sometimes people will want 209 less money and more articles of wealth, in which case the general price level will rise.

If the intention is to avoid changes in the general price level, the only solution is to convert, in the first case, undesired nonmonetary articles of wealth into money, and, in the second, undesired monies into nonmonetary articles of wealth. Now, the first such conversion can be effected by dressing up in money nonmonetary articles of wealth that can be monetized; the second, by removing the “money clothes” from those articles of wealth that had been previously monetized.

If clothing and unclothing are done at the right time, these will bring, in both the market for articles of wealth and the money market, the goods supplied to the level of the rights that their holders wish to fill with these. This will therefore preclude any change in the general price level.

It is by no means certain, however, that, where the desired cash balance is in excess of actual cash balances, monetization will withdraw from the market just those nonmonetary articles of wealth that are undesired there. The reason is that monetization can only withdraw from the market articles of wealth that can be monetized: claims (if under an inconvertible currency system) and claims or gold (if under a convertible currency system). If, however, the articles of wealth withdrawn are of identical value to the undesired articles of wealth, then monetization—in reducing the aggregate value of the nonmonetary articles of wealth supplied in the market—will have prevented a fall in the general price level, but not a change in the price hierarchy.

Inversely, demonetization can only release those articles of wealth that had been previously monetized. It may therefore be that, when the desired cash balance is less than the actual cash balance, demonetization will not release the articles of wealth that holders of undesired cash balances want to substitute [for their undesired cash] in the rights that enclose them. In which case, demonetization will have prevented a rise in the general price level, but by replacing it with a mere distortion in the price scale.

Therefore, clothing in money undesired articles of wealth (or their equivalent) and unclothing articles of wealth that make up undesired monies provide a safe means of avoiding any movement in the general price level.

The purpose of all monetary systems is to ensure, through various procedures of differing degrees of effectiveness, the constant adjustment of actual cash balances to desired cash balances, thereby reducing to a minimum changes in the general price level.

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Monetary systems thus perform an essential function, monetary regulation, on which the stability of the community using the money considered depends.

Nonetheless, although an undesired article of wealth—or rather, its equivalent among the articles of wealth eligible for monetization—can always be clothed in money, inversely, an undesired amount of money can only ever release, through unclothing, the object that it contains. If this object has a purely illusory value, being a false article of wealth or a false claim, then no monetary gimmick can somehow extract from the money that which it does not contain, or through demonetization conjure up the values that could be substituted for the undesired cash balances in the rights that enclosed them.

As a result, whereas a fall in the general price level can always be avoided through the monetization of undesired articles of wealth or their equivalent, a rise can be avoided only if the money consists of true articles of wealth, whose value in the market is identical with that indicated in the monetary signs that enclose them.

In order to explore the various systems of monetary regulation, we therefore have to distinguish between two separate situations, depending on whether, in the community considered, false claims may or may not be monetized or, to use standard phraseology, are or are not eligible for discount.

In the first case, monetary regulation can be ensured and will be so, if it is properly conducted; in the second, regardless of the policy pursued by the responsible authorities, it can prevent a fall, but not a rise, in the general price level, when divergences between the desired and the actual cash balances tend to bring these about.

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Chapter XVII: Monetary Regulation in Systems Where Only True Claims Are Eligible for Discount*

We intend to show in this chapter that ineligibility of false claims for discount provides the monetary authorities with the certainty that they can maintain convertibility of money indefinitely, if they so desire. Now, convertibility entails considerable advantages—which will be described further on in this 212 chapter—for the stability of the social structure. As a result, any political system that does not force its central bank to accept false claims for discount reaps the benefits that such a situation implies, by maintaining the convertibility of its currency.

He who can do more can, however, also do less. A political system under which convertibility is possible does not in any way preclude an inconvertible currency system.

Now, convertible currency systems, while retaining the whole machinery of inconvertible currency systems, simply add one more device: the one that ensures monetary convertibility. Inconvertible currency systems are therefore substantially simpler than convertible currency systems.

In the interest of clarity, we shall study the inconvertible currency system first. The findings reached can be easily adapted to convertible currency systems.

I. The Case of Inconvertible Currencies or Currencies Implying Managed Regulation of the General Price Level

§1. The Main Features of Inconvertibility: A Reminder

Inconvertibility is a system where the value of the monetary unit is not the subject of an a priori definition under which it is defined by a fixed quantity of a certain article of wealth.

We have already shown that, under such a system, only true, short-maturing claims denominated in money could be monetized without any undue risk to the issuing institutions. We have also indicated that monetization was the responsibility of the banks, whether private institutions or central banks, whose supplies of and demands for “bankable” bills—i.e., bills eligible for discount by the central bank—converged in one market, known as the money market.

The study of this market demonstrated that it differed from usual markets only on one point: interventions by the central bank. This institution “takes” unrestrictedly, at a certain rate, known as the discount rate, all the bills that are supplied to it, while it “gives,” to the extent it holds them, any matured bills whose renewal is not requested of the bank.

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The existence of the central bank alters the shape of the curve of supplies of money against claims and, possibly, the level of the demand curve, as indicated above.1

§2. Providing the Desired Cash Balances

The man on the street generally takes no notice of the existence of the central bank and, quite often, at least in his daily activities, not even of the existence of private banks. And yet, at each instant of time, he freely determines the amount of cash that he holds, on the basis of the needs that he foresees or anticipates, and in the light of psychological dispositions of which he is barely consciously aware.

The desired cash balances can only be obtained, however, if the total quantity of money in circulation is adjusted to their aggregate level at each instant of time.

Thus, although there is no apparent direct link between the individual decisions that determine the amount of desired cash balances and the behavior of the banks that produce money, such a link is bound to exist. It is this link that we will investigate in this chapter.

Analysis will show that this link involves an irresistible but subtle mechanism. In order to uncover this mechanism, a scrupulously careful study will be required. But it also with a magnifying glass that a watch has to be examined, and in refusing the magnifying glass, it is not the subtlety of the mechanism that we diminish but only the knowledge we have of it.

For this purpose, we shall consider the case of a community operating under steady economic conditions, assuming that the amount of desired cash balances remains unchanged and that all sectors are in equilibrium, at each session of the market.

We shall further assume that the discount rate has been set at a level higher than the market rate.

Suppose now that a number of individuals suddenly want to increase the amount of their hoarded cash. In order to satisfy this desire, they have no alternative other than to sell without buying—in other words, to increase their supplies or to decrease their demands.

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Now, an increase in supplies or a scaling down of demands may affect either claims or articles of wealth properly speaking.

If they affect claims, they will bring about a rise in the interest rate.

As a result of the rise in the interest rate, it will be profitable to sell for cash in order to buy back forward, and to invest in the money market the proceeds of the first transaction, until the second is settled. Arbitrageurs, who are always on the lookout for a difference to be reaped, will undertake an operation that can yield such a benefit. The operation will cause a fall in spot prices, hence a decline in the general price level.2

If the increase in supply or the decrease in demand pertains to articles of wealth properly speaking, they will be the direct cause of a fall in the respective prices, hence in the general price level.

The price decline makes it profitable, however, to buy for cash and sell forward, while obtaining, through discount of the claims received as a result of the second transaction, the funds necessary for the settlement of the first. This operation, being profitable, will be effected by arbitrageurs. It will cause a rise of the interest rate in the market.

Thus, in all cases, regardless of whether the articles of wealth supplied are claims or articles of wealth properly speaking, the excess of supplies has the same effect, which is a fall in the general price level and a rise in the interest rate.3

The fall in the general price level reduces the amount of necessary cash balances, however, thereby releasing—without any change in actual circulation—the quantities of money that can provide the additional desired cash balances.

At the same time, the fall in the general price level brings the aggregate value of the articles of wealth supplied down to the level of the rights that are intended by their holders to enclose them, which are the rights from which the articles of wealth have been emptied, less those rights that receive for their contents, not articles of wealth properly speaking, but the additional desired cash balances.

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Thus, the price decline, while maintaining equilibrium in all market sectors, will satisfy the wishes of the persons who use money.

The price decline is accompanied by a rise in the interest rate, however. Now, it may happen that in its rise, the rising money market rate rejoins, and tends to exceed, the discount rate.

As soon as the money market rate reaches the level of the discount rate, however, it will cease to rise. From then on, the central bank will buy, in order to monetize them, all the claims that are supplied but not demanded—i.e., claims, supply of which, in the absence of the bank’s intervention, would have pushed the market rate beyond the discount rate.

Suppose, for instance, that the supply of and demand for money against claims are represented—depending on the rate and prior to the increase in desired cash balances—by curves S (supply) and D (demand) (fig. 7), and that the discount rate is at the level r.

lf1981_figure_007.jpg

Fig. 7. [S: Supply; D: Demand; R: Rate; Q: Quantity]

The market rate will be at the level r0, which is less than the discount rate.

If the desire to hoard cash increases, the general price level will fall and the market rate will rise. The additional desired cash balances will be provided as a result of the decline in the general price level and of the reduction in the necessary cash balances, so long as the market rate does not come up against the discount rate—i.e., so long as the curve of total demand in the money market—216 as it becomes established, in view of the additional demands resulting from the new needs for cash balances—remains at a level below, or at most equal to, that of curve D′.

As soon, however, as aggregate demand for money against claims exceeds this level, the market rate will remain at the level of the discount rate; from then on, the bank will “take” part of the bills supplied in the market. If, for example, the demand for money against claims rises to D″, the bank, at each session of the market, will take a quantity d′d″ of bills, so as to monetize them. In so doing, it will withdraw from the market the values supplied that could not have been inserted in the rights that were intended to enclose them. By monetizing such bills, the bank will dress them in money clothes and, in this way, restore them to the form in which they are desired. By transferring the undesired articles of wealth, or their equivalent, from the articles-of-wealth side to the money side the moment the market rate has reached the level of the discount rate, monetization eliminates both the excess in the supply of nonmonetary articles of wealth and the excess in the demand for money, which had weighed down the general price level. Monetization will therefore have eliminated the cause that had tended to depress the general price level.

Thus, any increase in the desired cash balance will bring about a price decline so long as the market rate remains below the discount rate, but the price decline ceases as soon as the market rate comes to bump against the discount rate. From then on, any additional cash balance still desired will be provided through the monetization of articles of wealth that are still undesired, or their equivalent. As the discount rate is nearly always close to the market rate, the decline in the general price level resulting from an increase in the desired cash balance will always be small in scope; the decline in the general price level will be zero, regardless of the increase in the desired cash balance, if the discount rate is at the same level as the market rate, at the time of the increase.

This analysis explains, in particular, why the circulation of money can be constantly maintained at the level of desired cash balances, even as discounted bills reaching maturity—bills that are unevenly distributed over time—constantly tend to reduce it regardless of the needs that it satisfies.

Indeed, for this to be the case without any change occurring in the general price level, it is sufficient that the discount rate be set at the level of the market equilibrium rate that supplies of and demands for money against claims expressed for nonmonetary purposes would imply; this rate would, all things considered, be the one that results from the confrontation of supplies of money that 217 did not arise from reductions in cash balances and demands that did not derive from additional cash requirements. This we shall term the economic market rate. The economic market rate will naturally vary at each instant of time, but the changes will be dictated by purely economic factors of a nonmonetary nature.

Let S and D be the supply (S) and demand (D) curves of money against claims for economic purposes (fig. 8).

lf1981_figure_008.jpg

Fig. 8. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply; E: Equilibrium]

If previously discounted bills, for an amount of EE′, reach maturity at a market session where the total amount of desired cash balances does not change, the curve of demand for money against claims will be shifted upward from E to E′. If the discount rate is at the level r, which is the economic market rate, the central bank will “take” bills for an amount EE′ and, by monetizing them, will provide the necessary cash balances to replace those that will have been reabsorbed by previously discounted bills reaching maturity.*

Thus, when the discount rate is constantly maintained at the level of the economic market rate, any additional desired cash balances, and any cash balances required to replace those that will be reabsorbed by the previously 218 discounted bills reaching maturity, will be provided through monetization, and not through a decline in the general price level; the general price level will remain strictly unchanged.

§3. Reabsorbing the Undesired Cash Balances

Consider the case of a community functioning under steady economic conditions, where the general price level is stable and the discount rate is set at the level r of the economic rate of the market (fig. 8). Suppose further that the maturities of previously discounted bills are evenly distributed over time and their amount at each session of the market is EE′.

So long as the aggregate amount of desired cash balances remains unchanged, the curve of total demand for money against claims is at the level D1, aggregating the demands for economic purposes and those for the repayment of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

At each session of the market, the central bank “takes” the bills supplied but not demanded, whose value is EE′. In so doing, it replaces, through the discounting of renewal bills, those cash balances that are reabsorbed by repayment of previously discounted bills.

Suppose now that, suddenly, some money holders decide to reduce the amount of their cash balances.

They can only do this by buying more or selling less.

But the increase in their demands or the reduction in their supplies may concern either claims or articles of wealth properly speaking.

If claims are concerned, then the money market will be affected. Now, a demand for claims against money is a supply of money against claims, whose variations have already been represented in figure 8 by curve S [supply]. In like manner, a supply of claims against money is a demand for money against claims, which is represented by curve D [demand] in figure 8.

An increase in the demand for, or a decrease in the supply of, claims against money will therefore cause an upward shift in curve S or a downward shift in curve D, hence, in either case, a reduction in the EE′ portion of the renewal bills “taken” by the central bank in order to be monetized there.

If, however, there is an increase in the supply of money against claims, the renewal bills that are not taken by the bank are supplied in the market. There, they will fill the rights that enclosed the undesired cash balances, in accordance with the desires of the rights holders. The proceeds of their sale will be paid into the central bank in settlement of the matured discounted bills, therefore reabsorbed.

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If there is a decrease in the demand for money against claims, articles of wealth that had previously been sold in the forward market will be sold in the spot market, since the community is functioning in a steady economic state. It is these articles of wealth that will come to fill the rights that had enclosed the undesired cash balances, whereas, as in the preceding case, the proceeds of their sale will be reabsorbed, as a result of repayment to the central bank of matured bills previously discounted.

Thus, the increase in demands or the reduction in supplies, when they concern claims, eliminate undesired cash balances without any shift in prices or in the rates, by displacing values from the money side to the articles-of-wealth side.

If the increase in demands or the reduction in supplies concerns not claims but articles of wealth properly speaking, then the situation will be more complex. An increase in demands or a decrease in supplies will tend to bring about a price rise in the spot markets affected.

But any rise in a spot market at a period when the interest rate remains unchanged will prompt persons who secured resources by selling forward and discounting the claims thus obtained to shift their supply from a forward market to a spot market.

For instance, a producer who sold sugar at three months to a retail grocer will find it more profitable to sell for cash. If he was in debit to the bank and secured the funds necessary for the settlement of his previous discounts by discounting the bills drawn from his sales, he will henceforth obtain the necessary funds by selling for cash. And the grocer who provides him with this cash will himself have drawn this cash from his cash balances that have become undesired, or from those that third parties will have provided him with.

This mechanism, which consists of shifting sales away from a forward basis to a spot basis, is so important that we intend to provide a less concrete but more precise description of it.

The tendency toward a rise in prices occurring without a fall in the interest rate pushes spot prices above their respective points of production, without affecting forward prices.

The result is a distortion in the price scale, a distortion that shifts production resources to areas where profitability has increased. In this way, production of claims is discouraged—therefore forward sales—in favor of spot sales.

Thus, everything takes place, when the community functions in a steady economic state, as if the tendency toward rising spot prices had made “pop” the claims intended for discount, thereby releasing in the spot market the articles of wealth of which they were the representation.

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The surplus of articles of wealth thus thrown onto the spot market is, however, exactly the one that is needed to fill, in accordance with the desires of their holders, the rights that had enclosed the undesired cash balances. As the value of the articles of wealth supplied for cash is brought up to the level of the rights that are intended to enclose them, any rise in the general price level is avoided.

At the same time, the popping of the claims that had been previously discounted reduces the demand for money against claims, hence the volume of the claims “taken” by the central bank and therefore the quantity of new money produced by the central bank to replace the money used for repayment of previously discounted bills.

Thus, it is by unclothing previously monetized articles of wealth that the popping of claims shifts—from the money side to the articles-of-wealth side—those values that were undesired in the form of money but desired in the form of wealth, thereby inhibiting any emerging tendencies toward a rise in the general price level.

The popping of the claims will not take place immediately, however, unless the economy is free of any resistances or frictions. In a real economy, the process will involve some time lags, during which a price rise may develop. The rise will be corrected, however, as soon as the result that it tended to bring about has been reached. As the force that it sets in motion increases with the distortion of the price scale, it will inevitably be effective. It will therefore inevitably bring the price index back to its previous level; the more limited in scope the resistances brought about by the disturbance, the more limited and short-lived the disturbance.

The two processes just analyzed imply that values of the central bank are diverted to the market in order to be sold there, in the first case in the form of claims and, in the second, in the form of articles of wealth properly speaking, after the popping of the claims that enclosed them.

Such diversion, however, can only take place upon previously discounted bills reaching maturity, because the inconvertible currency system, combined with the legal tender nature of money, limits the rights to repayment of the creditors of the central bank to the amount of matured bills. At each market session, only the discounted bills reaching maturity can come out of the bank.

If, at one session of the market, the amount of cash balances that have become undesired exceeds the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the amount of undesirable money can be reabsorbed only up to the total of these discounted bills.

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The rights that fill the nonreabsorbable cash balances, unable to obtain outside the market—in the assets of the central bank—the desired content or its equivalent, will have to find this in the market. These rights will therefore appear in the market, in order to be filled, in competition with the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied.

If it is claims that the rights holders demand, the price of claims will rise, and the interest rate will fall. If they demand articles of wealth properly speaking, then it is the price of articles of wealth demanded that will rise. In either case, the general price index will rise to the extent necessary in order to bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied up to the level of the rights that are intended to enclose them, rights that are those from which these articles of wealth have been emptied plus the rights that enclosed the undesired cash balances. At the same time, the rise in the index will increase the necessary cash balances to the exact extent necessary in order to absorb the undesired cash balances.

Thus, the moment that, at a session of the market, the amount of cash balances that become undesired exceeds the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, it is through a rise in the general price level that this excess is absorbed.

The reabsorption of undesired cash balances is therefore effected through a twofold process: so long as their amount is less than that of the previously discounted bills reaching maturity, and there is no change in the general price level or the interest rate, the reabsorption will be effected through the simple unclothing of previously monetized bills; the moment the amount of undesired cash balances exceeds the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the reabsorption is effected through a rise in the general price level, to the extent necessary so that the remaining undesired cash balances can be absorbed through increases in the necessary cash balances, and bring the value of the products supplied to the level of the rights that are intended to enclose them.

§4. The Influence of the Discount Rate

In the previous section, we studied the effect of changes in the desired cash balance, the interest rate remaining unchanged.

In this section, we shall investigate the consequences of shifts in the discount rate in relation to the market rate, on the assumption that total desired cash balances remain unchanged in an economy functioning at a steady economic state.

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a) The Consequences Due Specifically to the Level of the Discount Rate

Claims, regardless of whether they are eligible for discount, are only a particular content of property rights. For this reason, their purchase or sale carries the same consequences as that of any other article of wealth. In particular, in a system where the total amount of desired cash balances remains unchanged, an additional supply of claims in the money market will bring about—all else equal—a fall in the prices of claims, hence a rise in the interest rate, and a rise in the price of the article of wealth that the seller of a claim intends to substitute for it. The rise and fall will be such that they will leave unchanged the general price level, because the total volume of the rights to be filled has not been altered by the change in the content of the rights that have been emptied of claims in order to be filled with articles of wealth properly speaking.

The sale of claims can, however, have particular consequences of its own in the following two cases: first, when the desired cash balances remain unchanged and the claims seller is debtor of a matured bill previously discounted by the central bank; second, when the emptied claim is supplied not in the market but to the central bank in order to be monetized there.

In the first case, the right emptied of claims is filled with money in the market. The money is, however, paid to the central bank, which, in exchange, returns the matured claim—that is to say, the value that it had previously clothed in money. Thus, the right that has been emptied in the market is filled outside the market, through capture of one of the assets of the central bank. There is supply without demand, hence a fall in the general price level to the extent necessary in order to reduce the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market to the volume of the rights that are intended to enclose them. This volume is that of the rights from which they have been emptied, less the volume of the rights that had enclosed the demonetized cash balances. At the same time, the decline in the index brings down, through a reduction in the level of the necessary cash balances, the amount of the desired cash balances to the level of actual circulation.

In the second case, the desired cash balance is still unchanged, and the emptied claim is supplied not in the market but to the central bank, in order to be monetized there. The right that had enclosed the claim is filled with money without supply on the market. As, however, the assumption is that the desired cash balance remains unchanged, the rights holder does not keep the money obtained but demands in the market the articles of wealth that he intends to 223 substitute for it. There is demand without supply, hence a rise in the general price index. The rise in the general price index will be such that it brings the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market to the volume of the level of the rights from which they have been emptied, plus that of the rights that enclosed the claims monetized by the bank. At the same time, [the rise of the general price index] will cause the quantities of undesired money generated by monetization to be absorbed through an increase in the level of necessary cash balances.

A change in the general price level will therefore be avoided only if, at each instant of time, the fall and the rise in prices due to the abovementioned causes balance each other out. In order that this be so, it is necessary and sufficient that, at each instant of time, the value of the bills discounted be equal to the value of the bills previously discounted reaching maturity.

When this condition is satisfied, the volume of the rights filled outside the market will be equal to the volume of the rights emptied outside the market.

Now, at each session of the market, the bank “takes” all the bills eligible for discount that are supplied but not demanded at the market rate, and takes only those.

In figure 9, curves S and D represent the supply of and demand for money against bills eligible for discount; the volume of the bills discounted will be, for a discount rate r, the excess of demands over supplies of money at that rate, that is sd.

lf1981_figure_009.jpg

Fig. 9. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

Thus, the volume of the bills sold to the central bank, in other words outside the market, depends only—all else equal—on the level of the discount rate.

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For this volume to be equal to the volume of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the discount rate must be set at an appropriate level.

We are hence led to study the consequences of the various levels at which this rate can be set.

b) The Discount Rate Is at the Level of the “Economic Rate” of the Market

Let us suppose, in the first instance, that the discount rate has been set at the level of the “economic rate” of the market, a rate that ensures equality between supplies of and demands for money against claims expressed for economic purposes, and not as a result of changes in cash balances. If curves S and D represent these economic supplies (S) and demands (D) in the money market, then the “economic rate” is at the level r (fig. 10).

lf1981_figure_010.jpg

Fig. 10. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply; E: Equilibrium]

As, however, the assumption is that the community is one in which the total amount of desired cash balances remains unchanged, the demand for money against claims in the money market is different from the demand for economic purposes. At each session of the market, previously discounted bills reach maturity. If their amount is dd′, total demand for money against claims in the money market is at the level D′, and the market equilibrium rate at the level r′.

If the central bank did not intervene in the market, the market rate would become established at the level r′. As, however, the bank takes all the bills sup225plied but not demanded at the discount rate r, which is less than r′, the market rate is at the level of the discount rate r.

At each session of the market, the bank monetizes bills for an amount dd′, which is exactly equal to the total amount of bills repaid.

The volume of the rights emptied outside the market, through discounting at the bank, is therefore equal to the volume of the rights that are not filled in the market, as a result of repayments made to the bank. The general price level remains unchanged.

c) The Discount Rate Is Less Than the Economic Market Rate

Let us suppose that, in a community where the aggregate level of desired cash balances remains unchanged, the discount rate is suddenly reduced from the level of the economic market rate r to a lower level r1 (fig. 11).

lf1981_figure_011.jpg

Fig. 11. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

The market rate becomes established at the level r1.

At this rate, the bank “takes,” in order to monetize them, claims for an amount s1d1 at each session of the market.

The rights that enclose these claims are emptied outside the market in order to be filled in the market, the assumption being that the desired cash balances remain unchanged.

The uncompensated demand of the holders of these rights tends to bring about a proportional rise in the general price level.

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At the same time, however, the debtors of previously discounted bills abstain from filling, to the extent of the amount

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_001.jpg
the rights that they have emptied on the market. Their abstention, which brings about an uncompensated supply, alleviates correspondingly the uncompensated demand arising from discounting.

As a result, at each session of the market, it is only to the extent of the amount s1d1 that the rights emptied outside the market come seeking a content in the market. These rights cause a rise in the general price level that is proportional to the rights’ volume. The rise in the general price level will be such that it brings the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights from which they have been emptied plus the volume of the rights that had enclosed the undesired cash balances generated by discounting. When this level has been reached, then the rise will ensure, through an increase in the necessary cash balances, the absorption of undesired cash balances.4

The rise will not continue indefinitely, however.

Indeed, from the moment that the discount rate is lowered from r to r1, the amount of bills discounted daily will rise from dd′ to

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_002.jpg
At the end of a period of time equal to the maturity of the discounted bills—which, for the sake of simplicity, we assume to be uniform—the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity will no longer be dd′ but
lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_003.jpg
From then on, the unmatched supply of matured bills by debtors will be equal to the unmatched demand by discounters served by the bank. The former will fill the latter and, as deferred reuses will offset anticipatory uses, the general price level will cease to change.

Thus, the setting of the discount rate at a level below the economic market rate will bring about a daily rise in the general price level, and the greater the spread between the discount rate and the economic market rate, the higher the rise. The rise will, however, develop only during a limited period of time, which will be equal to the average maturity 5 of bills discounted. At the end of this period of time, the 227 general price level will establish itself at a new plateau, higher than the preceding one, and will remain unchanged, all else equal, so long as the discount rate remains unchanged.

d) The Discount Rate Is between the Economic Rate and the Market Equilibrium Rate

Let us suppose that, during a period of time when total desired cash balances remain unchanged, the discount rate is raised from the economic rate to a rate r2, between r and r′, which are the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate (fig. 12).

lf1981_figure_012.jpg

Fig. 12. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

As the discount rate is less than the equilibrium rate, the market rate is at the level r2.

At each session of the market, the demand by debtors of matured bills is satisfied up to

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_004.jpg
through the renewal of discounted bills, hence without any drawing on actual circulation, and is satisfied up to d2s2 by the market, hence through a decrease in actual circulation. Every day, actual cash balances will therefore fall below desired cash balances, and the difference will be equal to the latter amount. The situation is similar to the one depicted in the 228 preceding section: there is an insufficiency in cash balances when the market rate is at the level of the discount rate.

The persons who find that their cash balances are insufficient will supply without demanding, and these excesses of supplies will bring about an increase in demand in the money market, until the additional desired cash balances have been obtained.

Demand for money therefore rises to the level D″. At this level, the quantities of money required for repayment of previously discounted bills are provided through discounting: the general price level remains unchanged.

Thus, so long as the discount rate remains between the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate—that is, so long as the market rate abuts against the discount rate—the general price level remains unchanged.

e) The Discount Rate Is Higher Than the Market Equilibrium Rate

Let us suppose, again during a period of time when the desired cash balance remains unchanged, that the discount rate is suddenly increased from the level of the economic rate, r, to a level above the market equilibrium rate r′.

Let us first imagine that it is set at the level r3, which is close to r′ (fig. 13).

lf1981_figure_013.jpg

Fig. 13. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

The market rate will then be at the level r′, which is less than the discount rate. The bank has no “contact” with the market.

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At each market session, demands for money by debtors of bills that have reached maturity, dd′, are fully served by the market. Up to the extent of this amount, these debtors supply without demanding and, through the mechanism described in section 2 above, bring about a downward trend in the general price level and an upward trend in the market rate.

In contrast to the situation considered in the preceding case, however, the market rate no longer abuts against the discount rate. The downward trend in prices can therefore develop its effects until the moment that the market rate rejoins the discount rate. From then on, any additional cash balance that is still desired, and has not been obtained through a decrease in the necessary cash balances, will be provided through discounting at the bank, whence the change in the general price level.

Thus, at each session of the market, there is a fall in the general price level, and the further away the discount rate is from the market equilibrium rate, the greater the fall.

The decline in the general price level cannot continue indefinitely, however. When the discount rate has reached the level r3, the daily amount of bills discounted is no longer dd′ but a lesser amount,

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_005.jpg

At the end of a period equal to the maturity [lifespan] of the bills discounted, which, for the sake of simplicity, we shall assume to be uniform, the daily amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity is therefore no longer dd′ but

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_006.jpg
From then on, the unmatched supply by debtors of matured bills is reduced to the level of the unmatched demand by discounters at the bank. The general price level will no longer decline.

If the discount rate is increased to a level r4, which is above the rate rr′ at which all the cash balances required for the repayment of previously discounted bills are provided by the market, the market rate becomes established at a level

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_007.jpg
which is less than the discount rate. The bank still has no contact with the market. Every day, the general price level declines to the extent necessary in order to provide, through a reduction in necessary cash balances, the quantity of money dd′ required for the repayment of matured bills.

As in the case described previously, the decline comes to a stop at the end of a period equal to the maturity—which we have assumed to be uniform—of the discounted bills.

Thus, when the discount rate is brought to a level higher than the market equilibrium rate, the general price level is subject to a daily decline, which will be all the more pronounced the further removed the discount rate is from the market rate. This daily decline cannot, however, exceed a maximum corresponding to the 230 daily volume of previously discounted bills reaching maturity—a maximum that is reached only when the market rate remains below the discount rate. The daily decline does not extend beyond a limited period of time, which is equal to the average maturity of the bills discounted; this decline brings the general price level down to a lower plateau, where it will remain as long as, all else equal, the discount rate is not brought down to a level below the market equilibrium rate.

The above analysis shows that any shift that brings the discount rate to a level below the economic rate, or above the market equilibrium rate, will, all else equal, cause a shift in the general price level. The daily changes are cumulative, and develop over a period of time equal to the average maturity of the bills discounted. They are, therefore, always limited, and simply substitute one level of equilibrium for another.

Any unlimited rise or fall in the general price level is impossible.

As we shall see in the next chapter, the limited scope of possible shifts in the general price level is what distinguishes systems where only true claims are eligible for discount from systems that monetize false claims.

The above findings are, however, only the outcome of theoretical analysis.

I believe that experience will confirm them and legitimize the simplifying hypotheses thanks to which they could be established. These findings will only be able to be considered final, however, after they have been subjected to rigorous experimental verification.

This verification, I have not been able to attempt. I draw researchers’ attention to the need for this effort, however. In addition, I am convinced that the experimental study of discount and the analysis of the composition and behavior of portfolios will teach us useful lessons not only for the illustration—and perhaps the correction—of the above findings but also for the development of monetary theory in all its aspects.

§5. The Monthly Variation in Desired Cash Balances

In the preceding section, we assumed that the total amount of desired cash balances remained unchanged. In actual fact, this is never the case. Desired cash balances vary, mainly due to the uneven distribution of maturities over time. All else equal, as maturity dates draw near, the quantities of money that payers wish to hoard because of their actual or potential needs increase, whereas, 231 when the maturity date has come, necessary cash balances increase during the period of payment. Generally, maturities are concentrated at the month’s end. As a result, desired cash balances, which are at a minimum toward the middle of the month, increase as the month ends then fall back to their previous level.

The study of actual circulations reveals that these monthly swings show astounding regularity, so much so that variations in issuance can, all else equal, be forecast with a high degree of accuracy.

This pattern is rendered more complicated, however, by the existence of special maturity dates, when rents or dividends have to be paid, or when temporary needs, due to holiday periods, have to be met. We shall disregard these exceptional maturities, however, and concentrate attention on the effect of regular variations due to the monthly pattern.

Beginning in the middle of the month, one can note daily increases accelerate, then decelerate, then come to a stop when the desired cash balance is at its maximum, followed by a decline, which accelerates, then decelerates, eventually coming to a halt when the desired cash balance is at its minimum.

It should be noted that the factor observed here is not the amount of desired circulation but rather that of its daily variations.

In order to study the effect of these variations, let us consider the case of a community functioning in a stationary state—in other words, a community where all factors, except the amount of the desired cash balance, are stable. More specifically, let us suppose that the discount rate has been set at the level of the economic market rate, R, which is immutable, for the reason that it does not depend on the level of desired cash balances (fig. 14).

lf1981_figure_014.jpg

Fig. 14. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

Any increase in the level of desired cash balances increases by a corresponding amount the cash requirements for monetary purposes, which, when the community was functioning at a steady economic state, only comprised those implied by the repayment of previously discounted bills.

Starting from mid-month, when the level of desired cash balance is steady, we can observe that, as the month’s end draws nearer, the demand curve for money against claims gradually rises. Starting from curve D′ representing the economic needs with the sole addition of demands for the repayment of previously discounted bills, the curve will occupy day after day positions D1, D2, and D3, parallel with curve D′ but raised by an amount representing the additional cash balances desired every day. The preceding analysis shows that these additional cash balances will be provided through monetization of additional amounts, without any change in the general price level or any shift in the market rate.

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When the additional cash balances desired every day begin to decrease, the total demand curve will move in the opposite direction, occupying positions D3, D2, and D1; the amounts monetized every day will decline but, again, there will be no change in the general price level and no shift in the market rate.

When no further cash balances are desired—that is to say, when the desired cash balance has reached its maximum level—then the total demand curve will have returned to the level D′ and will not fall below it because D′ comprises elements that are assumed to be immutable.

When, however, the desired cash balance begins to decrease, there will be an increase in the supply of money against claims. The supply curve will occupy the positions S1, S2, and S3.

As long as the supply curve remains below S2, the cash balances that have become undesirable will be reabsorbed through a reduction in the amount of bills discounted at the bank for the repayment of previously discounted bills, hence, again, without any change in the rate.

At the level S2, all previously discounted bills that reach maturity are repaid without any new bills being discounted, through the use of undesired cash balances. But the market rate is still unchanged.

If the amount of daily undesired cash balances exceeds the amount SS2, then the supply curve exceeds the level S2. From then on, the market rate will begin to fall. When the supply curve is at S3, the market rate will be at the level r, while 233 the general price level will rise each day by the amount required to absorb, through increases in necessary cash balances, the quantities of money undesired each day. At the same time, the price rise will push the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights from which they had been emptied plus those rights that had enclosed these quantities of money.

When the daily rate of decrease in desired cash balances levels off, the supply curve moves in the opposite direction through positions S3, S2, and S1. As it falls from S3 to S2, the market rate moves gradually closer to the discount rate. When the supply curve is at S2, the market rate bumps against the discount rate. From then on, the market rate and the general price level remain unchanged, as all variations in desired cash balances are, again, absorbed or served by discount variations at the central bank.

One can recognize, here, the typical features of monthly market variations: the market rate falls below the discount rate as we move away from the month-end due date, while the quantity of money in circulation declines. Then the rate stops falling and begins to rise when, with the approach of maturity dates, the amount of desired cash balances begins to rise. The market rate stabilizes as soon as it rejoins the discount rate, as all additional needs for money are met through discounting.

Thus, when the discount rate is at the level of the economic market rate, the general price index and the interest rate remain unchanged in all periods during which the desired cash balances increase—regardless of the additional desired cash balances—as well as in periods when desired cash balances decrease, so long as daily undesired cash balances are less than the amount of previously discounted bills that reach maturity daily.

It is only when daily undesired cash balances exceed the amount of bills reaching maturity daily that the market rate will fall, while the general price level will rise.6

Thus, monthly variations in the desired cash balance will be provided for without any movement in prices or in the rate, except when daily decreases in cash balances outweigh the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

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One can see, again, that the shorter the maturity of discounted bills 7 is, the greater the adjustment capacity of circulation will be, without any variation in prices or in the rate.

The analysis presented in section 4 above shows that, so long as the discount rate remains between the economic rate and the equilibrium rate corresponding to a steady cash level (rate r′ in fig. 14), the situation is the same: the market rate cannot go up; it can only go down. The flexibility, in both directions, of circulation without any change in prices or the rate is still as has just been described.

This is no longer so when the discount rate is set at a level R1, above the rate of equilibrium r′ corresponding to a steady cash level (fig. 15).

lf1981_figure_015.jpg

Fig. 15. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

In this case, toward the middle of the month, during the period when the desired cash balances do not vary, the market rate is at the level r′, which is below the discount rate. The bank has no “contact” with the market.

Any increase in desired cash balances, as month’s-end maturities draw near, brings about an increase in the demand for money against claims. If the total demand curve occupies the position D1, then the market rate rises to the level r1.

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At each session of the market, the general price level will fall to the extent necessary in order to provide, through a variation in necessary cash balances, the additional desired cash balances, and to enable the articles of wealth supplied to insert themselves into the rights from which they have been emptied, less the volume of the rights that are intended to enclose the additional desired cash balances.

The rise in the rate and the daily fall in the general price level will accelerate, as long as the daily additional desired cash balances grow.

When, however, the curve of aggregate demand for money against claims reaches the level D2—that is to say, when the market rate abuts against the discount rate—the rise in the rate will cease, as will the acceleration of the decline in prices.

From then on, the daily decline in prices will be stabilized at the level necessary in order to provide, on a daily basis, through a reduction in necessary cash balances, the additional amounts of money corresponding to the gap between the curves D′D2.

If the daily increase in desired cash balances exceeds this amount, the demand curve will rise above the level D2. Now, when it is at D3, the portion D2D3 of the additional cash balances desired daily will be provided through increases in discounting at the bank, hence, without any shift in prices or in the market rate.

Thus, as soon as the market rate has rejoined the discount rate, but only then, the amount of the daily decline in the general price level will become steady.

The reduction in cash requirements will bring about, mutatis mutandis, movements in the opposite direction.

In brief, when the discount rate has been set at a level above the equilibrium rate for the period of steady cash balances, the monthly variations in desired cash balances will be served through movements in the rate and in prices, but the daily variations cannot exceed—during those periods when desired cash balances increase—the rate of variation that is reached when the market rate bumps against the discount rate. Therefore, the closer the discount rate is to this equilibrium rate, the more limited the instability will be.

If we call “circulation flexibility” the ability of circulation to respond, without a variation in the general price level—that is to say, without disturbance—to variations in desired cash balances, then circulation will show its maximum flexibility only insofar as the discount rate is set between the economic rate and the equilibrium rate that matches steady cash balances.

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§6. The Discount Rate as the Sluice Gate of Monetary Reserves

The preceding analysis leads to a concrete representation of the discount mechanism.

Any increase in the desired cash balance brings about an excess in the value of the articles of wealth supplied over the volume of the rights that are intended to enclose them. It is this excess that tends to cause a fall in the general price level and a rise in the interest rate.

But when, at the time the excess appears, the discount rate is at the market level, the articles of wealth emptied from the rights that their holders do not desire to fill in the market, because they want to increase their cash balances, or their equivalent, flow into the assets of the central bank, which represents them by money.

As a result of this outflow, the articles of wealth left in the market can be accommodated within the rights that are intended to enclose them without any shift in prices, whereas the additional desired cash balances are provided through the monetization of the articles of wealth withdrawn from the markets: any disturbance is avoided.

If, on the contrary, the discount rate is above the market rate, the regulating outflow cannot take place; the interest rate rises, and the general price level falls. The moment the rising interest rate rejoins the discount rate, however, the values supplied—which, at the price level reached at that instant of time, cannot be accommodated within the rights intended to enclose them—flow into the monetary reserves. The money needs still to be satisfied are met through the monetization of these articles of wealth; the rise in the market rate and the price decline come to a stop.

The discount rate therefore functions as a veritable sluice gate of monetary reserves. Its position sets the level that the market rate cannot exceed. As soon as this level is reached, the supplies still to be satisfied flow into the assets of the central bank and cease to lift up the interest rate.

Inversely, when the aggregate amount of desired cash balances declines, the volume of the rights that their holders wish to fill with articles of wealth in the market exceeds that of the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied, since the rights that had enclosed undesired cash balances are added to these. The general price level tends to rise and the market rate to fall.

This tendency cannot develop its full effects, however; the values that had been previously monetized flow out of the assets of the central bank. They 237 provide the nonmonetary articles of wealth desired by holders of undesired cash balances, or the equivalent of such articles of wealth, while they reabsorb—through their demonetization—an equal quantity of money. Thus, a decline in the interest rate and a rise in the general price level are both avoided.

The discount rate therefore plays, here too, the role of a sluice gate regulating the outflow of the accumulated reserves that it controls, as soon as the external water level tends to fall below the level at which the sluice gate has been set.

There is a fundamental difference between the two phenomena, however. Whereas any value weighing down on the market can be monetized—therefore flow out of the market into the assets of the central bank—only matured claims can be demonetized, hence flow out of the assets of the central bank onto the market.

Everything happens as if the only “liquid” component in the reservoir that the assets of the central bank constitute were the upper layer, consisting of matured claims.

If, during any period of time, the decline in desired cash balances tends to cause in the water level of the market an upward shift in excess of what can be offset by the outflow of matured claims, a rise is avoided only to the extent of this latter amount. Beyond that, the decline develops its effects: the interest rate falls to a level below the discount rate, while the general price level rises.

With regard to a decrease in desired cash balances, the regulation of the market is therefore effective only to the extent that, during each period of time, the quantity of money to be reabsorbed remains less than the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

§7. The Administered Regulation of the General Price Level

Under an inconvertible currency system, when the desired cash balance varies, the stability of the general price level is ensured only if the discount rate is in between the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate. Even when this condition is satisfied, however, the flexibility of circulation cannot exceed, during each period of time, the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, and any decrease in the desired cash balance in excess of this amount will cause a drop in the rate and a rise in the general price level. Such variations, however, will always be limited and are generally small in scope.

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Any policy aiming at maximum stability in the general price level will therefore attempt to maintain the discount rate between the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate.

But, in point of fact, these two rates move constantly: the former, under the influence of seasonal and structural variations in the degree of economic activity, and the latter, in conjunction with the former.

Maintaining the discount rate at an unchanging level therefore risks bringing the discount rate above the equilibrium rate during periods of decreasing discounting needs (for instance because of a slowdown in economic activity) or below the economic rate during periods of increasing needs (for instance due to an acceleration in economic activity).

In the first case, the general price level will fall during a period equal to the average maturity of the bills discounted, and it will become established at a lower plateau; in the second case, it will rise during the same period of time and will become established at a higher plateau. The two movements will bring about an economic disturbance, which could only have been prevented by an appropriate shift in the discount rate.

Thus, monetary regulation will be ensured only at the cost of a policy that constantly maintains the discount rate between the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate, where the discount rate will, in fact, be the market rate.

As the discount rate is set by the decision of monetary authorities, generally the leadership of the central bank, the regulation of the general price level, under an inconvertible currency system, will necessarily be a regulation of the administered type.

In order to determine the difficulties involved in a discount policy, it should be noted that the economic rate is not the outcome of the confrontation of supplies and demands actually expressed in the market but rather the outcome of this confrontation less supplies or demands of monetary origin. The economic rate, therefore, does not appear on the market. Similarly, the equilibrium rate, whenever it is higher than the discount rate, is not the market rate, even when cash balances are steady.

The central bank cannot therefore have direct knowledge of the exact range within which the discount rate must be maintained if monetary disturbances are to be avoided, but can only deduce this range on the basis of the movements it observes in the market.

When the general price level rises and the market rate is at the level of the discount rate, then the discount rate is below the economic rate; the discount rate must be raised.

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When the general price level falls during a period of time when the declining market rate moves away from the discount rate, then the discount rate has come to be higher than the equilibrium rate; the discount rate must be lowered.

The leadership of a central bank is therefore in the same position as an automobile driver; leadership has at its disposal a brake and an accelerator, of which it must make use when it observes a dangerous acceleration or a dangerous slowdown. The art of monetary management does not go beyond that. Complicating it with rational considerations would be to seek monetary accidents, just as one would be seeking car accidents by trying to determine on the basis of a road map the precise moment when a driver ought to accelerate or slow down his vehicle.

The discount policy cannot be subject to a priori decisions; it can only be determined “in the field.”

II. The Case of Convertible Currencies; i.e., Currencies with Automatic Regulation of the General Price Level but with Administered Regulation of Monetary Reserves

§1. The Characteristics of Convertibility: A Reminder

Convertibility is a system where the value of the monetary unit is defined as the value of a given quantity of a certain article of wealth.

We have shown 8 that under such a system, the central bank could monetize without undue risk, just as under an inconvertible currency system, short-dated true claims denominated in money, but also, and without any risk, the article of wealth in reference to which the monetary unit is defined, known as the conversion article of wealth.

Thus, under a convertible currency system, the central bank will have a dual activity. As under an inconvertible currency system, it will “take” unrestrictedly, at the discount rate, all short-dated true claims denominated in money that are supplied; and it will “give”—within the limits of previously discounted bills reaching maturity—all those that are demanded. In addition, however, it will “take” and “give,” at the legal rate, all the quantities of the conversion article of wealth that are supplied to it or demanded from it.

The most common convertibility system is the one that defines the value of the monetary unit in terms of a given weight of gold. It is known as gold mono240metallism. In the following sections, we shall study the functioning of this system. Our findings will, however, be valid, mutatis mutandis, for any convertibility system, irrespective of the conversion article of wealth.

§2. The Pegging of the Price Scale to the Conversion Rate in a System Where the Currency Is Convertible into Gold

Under a gold-convertible currency system, the central bank buys and sells at a fixed price any quantity of the yellow metal that is supplied or demanded. The market price of gold is therefore immutably set at a level in line with the definition of the currency in terms of its gold content.

We have shown in Chapter IV, however, that in a market in equilibrium and all else equal, price relationships remained unchanged, regardless of the absolute level of prices.

If this is so, the freezing of any one price will, of course, result in the whole price scale being frozen.

Thus, under a convertible currency system, at least as soon as equilibrium is reached, prices will be established, all else equal, at an unchanging level, which will depend only on the metallic definition of the currency.

§3. Providing the Desired Cash Balances

At each instant of time, the monetary system is characterized by the metallic definition of the monetary unit, generally set by law, and by the discount rate, itself set by the management of the central bank.

The metallic definition of the currency determines the immutable price at which the central bank buys and sells gold against money, the discount rate, and the price at which it buys short-dated claims denominated in money—the price at which they are sold back at maturity always being the one that results from their nominal value.

Let us suppose that, under such a system functioning in steady economic conditions, all markets being in equilibrium, total desired cash balances happen to increase.

Those who want to increase their cash balances will have to supply without demanding.

Through the previously analyzed mechanism, their supplies will generate an upward tendency in the interest rate in the money market and a downward tendency in prices in the market for articles of wealth properly speaking.

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If the discount rate is at the level of the market rate, this dual tendency will be thwarted immediately. The additional desired cash balances will be provided through monetization of claims, while the articles of wealth supplied but not demanded, or their equivalent, will be withdrawn from the market. Any change in the general price level will be avoided.

But if the discount rate is above the market rate, the rise in the market rate and the drop in the prices of the articles of wealth supplied but not demanded can develop.

There are two possibilities, depending on whether the persons who wish to increase their cash balances supply gold or other articles of wealth.

In the first case, the price of gold will tend to fall.

The central bank,9 however, takes all the quantities of gold supplied but not demanded.

It will therefore buy all the gold that weighed down on the market, in order to monetize it.

In so doing, the central bank will bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied down to the volume of the rights that are intended to enclose them, and at the same time will provide the individuals transferring the articles of wealth monetized with the money with which they intend to fill their rights. The additional desired cash balances can therefore be provided without either any change in the general price level or any disturbance whatsoever.

In the case where the articles of wealth supplied are not gold, it is their respective prices that will tend to fall.

But price declines will render less profitable—all else equal—the production of the articles of wealth they affect, and hence will redirect factors of production from such articles of wealth toward other articles of wealth on the market.

The fall will thereby spread to all market prices, except to the price of gold, which purchases by the central bank maintain at its previous level. Therefore, all the production resources released in all sectors of economic activity will converge on gold. The gold supply in the market will increase and, as the central bank takes all the quantities of gold supplied but not demanded, will increase by a corresponding amount the quantities of metal monetized.10

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Thus, whatever the articles of wealth supplied by those desiring to increase their cash balances may be, the convertibility mechanism will have served their demands by withdrawing from the market undesired articles of wealth, or their equivalent, and will thereby have prevented any drop in the general price level.

The supply of articles of wealth other than gold, however, will increase the supply of gold only when the effects of the shifts in production resources have been felt.

Such shifts, though, would take place immediately only in an economy without any resistances or frictions, of the type studied in theoretical economics. In such an economy, the convertibility mechanism would generate strict stability in the general price level.

In any real economy, however, there are resistances and frictions; shifts in production resources will take place only after significant time lags. Now, so long as these shifts have not occurred, the general price level can fall and the interest rate in the market can rise, at least until the interest rate abuts against the discount rate. Only from that time on will the additional cash balances still desired be provided through monetization of claims, as under an inconvertible currency system.

Thus, the convertibility mechanism has no immediate effect. It does not operate at the precise instant of time when the demands for additional cash balances are exercised, but later, only when the price drop—through its economic effects—has increased the production of yellow metal to the extent necessary in order to bring the price scale back to the level assigned to it by the legal definition of the currency.

We should like, in passing, to call the reader’s attention to these adjustment lags occurring in a real economy, which we mention here for the first time. In Chapter XXVIII, they will provide the principle of a theory of cyclical movements of economic activity and prices.

Even at this stage, these lags show why a credit-based currency is better than an exclusively metallic currency. Indeed, as far as metallic currency is concerned, the regulating process follows the change in the desired cash balance only when the shift in demand has brought about, through a shift of production resources, a change in the production—hence in the supply—of gold, whereas, in the case of a currency that can be generated not only through the monetization of gold but also through the monetization of claims, regulation occurs as soon as a change in demand, regardless of the article of wealth this change in 243 demand affects, has brought about a change in the supply of, or the demand for, claims in the money market.

§4. The Reabsorption of Undesired Cash Balances

If, under the system considered above, total desired cash balances, all else equal, happen to decrease, those wishing to substitute nonmonetary articles of wealth for money in some of their rights will demand without supplying. In so doing, they will generate an upward tendency in the price of the articles of wealth demanded, and a downward tendency in the interest rate in the money market.

The downward tendency in the interest rate will reabsorb, through demonetization of claims, undesired cash balances, as long as the amount of undesired cash balances is less than that of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

Thus, the downward tendency in the interest rate will prevent the dual tendency—toward a drop in the rate and a rise in prices—from developing its effects.

If, however, during a session of the market, the amount of undesired cash balances exceeds the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the prices of the articles of wealth demanded by holders of undesired cash balances will rise.

If it is gold that these holders wish to obtain, then, all else equal, the demand for the yellow metal in the market will increase. Now, the central bank gives any quantity of metal that is demanded but not supplied at the legal price; in this way, it will provide the articles of wealth necessary to fill the rights that had enclosed the undesired cash balances, while at the same time—through demonetization—it will reabsorb these cash balances.

Thus, the price rise will have been halted and undesired cash balances will be reabsorbed, in accordance with their holders’ desires.

If, however, it is other nonmonetary articles of wealth that the holders of undesired cash balances demand, they will cause a rise in the prices of these articles and, thereby, a rise in the entire interlocking price scale. Only the price of gold will be maintained at its prior level, through the intervention of the central bank. Thus, production of gold will be at a disadvantage, relative to other articles on the market. There will be a transfer of production resources away from gold toward these other articles, hence a decrease in the supply of gold 244 on the market where metal consumers, in particular industrial users, obtain their supplies. As their demands are assumed to be unchanged and the bank, through demonetization, serves any excess of supplies over demands, its intervention will reabsorb a quantity of metallic money equal to the amount of the cash balances that are still undesired. At the same time, a production increase will generate the supply of the additional nonmonetary articles of wealth desired by the holders of these cash balances.

Thus, in this case once again, the convertibility mechanism will have thwarted the upward tendency in prices and will have reabsorbed, without any change in the general price level, undesired cash balances.

In a real economy, however, shifts in factors of production are not immediate. The demand for nonmonetary articles of wealth will bring about a decrease in gold production 11 only after a significant time lag. And only when the effects of this decrease are felt in the market will undesired cash balances be fully reabsorbed. In the meantime, a rise in prices and a fall in the rate can occur. Both will be limited in scope, however, because the influence that tends to correct them increases steadily as they develop.

Thus, in each and every case, the convertibility mechanism will prevent—immediately in an economy without resistances and frictions, or after a certain time lag (depending only on economic viscosity) in a real economy—the price movement that the appearance of undesired cash balances in excess of the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity tended to generate.

§5. The Influence of the Discount Rate

In the preceding section, we discussed the effect of variations in desired cash balances, under a convertible currency system. In this section, we shall suppose that, under such a system, desired cash balances remain unchanged within an economy functioning at a steady state, and we shall investigate the effects of shifts in the discount rate.

Let us consider, for the sake of simplicity, the scenario of an economy without any resistances or frictions, where the supply of and demand for money against short-dated claims are represented, in relation to the discount rate, by curves S [supply] and D [demand] in figure 16.

lf1981_figure_016.jpg

Fig. 16. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply; E: Equilibrium]

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If the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity daily is EE′, then total demand in the money market is represented by the D′ curve. The economic market rate is r, and the equilibrium rate, r′.

If the discount rate is set at a level between the economic rate and the equilibrium rate, for instance at the level r of the economic rate, then the money required for repayment of previously discounted bills will be provided through new discounting at the bank: actual circulation will remain unchanged, at the level of desired circulation; the general price level will not change.

Under such circumstances, gold production will not be affected by repayments to the bank. The gold market, which is assumed to be in equilibrium, will remain so; the demand for gold for industrial uses will be covered by production, and will absorb production fully.

The metallic reserves, as well as the portfolio of the central bank, remain unchanged.

If the discount rate is brought to a level R1, which is less than the economic rate, then the amount of daily monetizations exceeds, by an amount s1d1, the quantities of money required for repayment of previously discounted bills. To the extent of this excess, they cannot be reabsorbed by the bank, which no longer has any matured bills available. They therefore tend to provoke, daily, the rise in the general price level that is necessary to absorb—through an increase in necessary cash balances—undesired monetizations and, at the same time, 246 to bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights that are intended to enclose them.

This upward tendency, however, triggers the convertibility mechanism analyzed in the preceding section. Through the convertibility mechanism, the upward tendency brings about the reabsorption, through exchange against gold, of undesired cash balances, hence, at each session of the market, a reduction—not exceeding the amount s1d1—in the metallic reserves of the central bank.

Any rise in the general price level is thus avoided, but at the cost of a depletion of the gold reserves, a depletion that provides the nonmonetary articles of wealth desired by holders of undesired cash balances (or their equivalent), while at the same time reabsorbing such undesired cash balances.

The process will continue until the maturing of the bills discounted at the new discount rate restores a steady economic state. The reduction in the rate, therefore, will have decreased the metallic reserves of the central bank by an amount that is equal to daily drawings on gold multiplied by the average maturity of the bills discounted.

If, on the contrary, the discount rate is raised to the level R2, which is substantially above the equilibrium rate r′, the market rate will be at the level r′. Every day, actual circulation will tend to fall below desired circulation, by a margin representing the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity. The discount rate tends to rise; the general price level, to fall.

The downward tendency of the price scale, however, triggers the convertibility mechanism analyzed in section 3 above. It brings about monetization of gold at the central bank, and thereby the withdrawal from the market of undesired articles of wealth, or their equivalent, and the provision of desired monies. Convertibility prevents any decline in the general price level but brings about—on a daily basis—an increase of the amount FF′ in the metallic reserves of the central bank.

The process goes on until repayment of all previously discounted bills brings the curve of demand for money against claims back to the level D, the supply curve to the level S, hence the economic rate to the level r. At this time, the currency has become fully metallic, or rather has a 100 percent gold backing. Metallic reserves have therefore increased by the amount of bills reaching maturity daily multiplied by the average maturity of the bills discounted.

Thus, the amount of the metallic reserves of the central bank, hence their proportion in relation to total circulation, only depends, all else equal, on the posi247tion of the discount rate in relation to other rates that characterize the market considered.

§6. Metallic Parity, the Sluice Gate of a Compensation Basin with Regard to the General Price Level

We have shown that, under an inconvertible currency system, the discount rate operates like a sluice gate with regard to the monetary reserves making up the assets of the central bank.

Under a convertible currency system, the discount rate still performs this function, but it is coupled with another regulating device, one that controls access to metallic reserves. As far as metallic reserves are concerned, metallic parity is the one factor that sets the threshold from which values flow from the market into the bank or from the bank onto the market. Metallic reserves, therefore, constitute a kind of additional compensation basin, which steadies the general price level when the sluice gate of discount is set at a level that would allow it to vary.

The difference between the consequences of the two regulating systems can be accounted for immediately if one considers that the first one is controlled by a rate, and the second by a price.

As explained previously,12 freezing the interest rate at a certain level sets the prices of claims eligible for discount not at an immutable absolute level but at an immutable position within the price hierarchy. It does not therefore determine the position of the price scale. On the contrary, setting the gold price immutably sets the entire price scale, at least under a system without resistances or frictions, thereby providing the convertible currency system with its most important characteristic.

§7. The Automatic Regulation of the General Price Level and the Administered Regulation of Metallic Reserves

The preceding analysis shows that, in an economy free of any resistances and frictions, convertibility maintains—without any intervention of any kind whatsoever—absolute steadiness of the general price level. In this sense, one 248 may say that a convertible currency can be regarded as ensuring the automatic regulation of the general price level and deserves to be described as self-regulating.

A convertible currency, however, does not eliminate the causes that, under an inconvertible currency system, tend to bring about shifts in the price scale. Where such causes operate, a convertible currency system simply fills with gold—drawn from the reserves of the central bank—those rights that their holders want to empty of undesired cash balances, or rights of equivalent volume, and transfers into such reserves the gold that is emptied from the rights that their holders wish to fill with additional cash balances, or rights of equivalent volume.

Thus, convertibility shifts onto the metallic reserves of the central bank the effect of the influences that tend to generate changes in the general price level.

We have shown, however, that these influences were controlled, to some extent, by the handling of the discount rate.

Discount rate management, therefore, provides the monetary authorities with absolute control over the level of their metallic reserves or, rather, over the ratio of such reserves to total circulation. If the level of metallic reserves is sufficiently increased, the result is a fully metallic currency—i.e., a currency with a 100 percent gold backing—and, if sufficiently decreased, a currency with no gold backing at all, in other words a currency with a 100 percent paper backing.

There is therefore no force that can prevent the monetary authorities from setting as they see fit the ratio of gold reserves to total circulation. In particular, no international loan is necessary: it is enough to bring the discount rate to an adequate level for this purpose.

A convertible currency, although it is a self-regulating device with regard to the general price level, is therefore a controlled 13 regulating device with regard to the level of metallic reserves.

This conclusion, however, holds only for the conditions under which it has been established. These are characterized, in the first instance, by the ineligibility of false claims for discount. We will show in the following chapter that, when this condition is not met, the monetary authorities lose all control over their metallic reserves.

In addition, the effects of the convertibility mechanism are felt immediately only in an economy that is free of any resistances and frictions. In a real econ249omy, its functioning involves time lags, during which the variations in desired cash balances are taken care of by variations in the portfolio of the central bank, not in metallic reserves. The level of these reserves, therefore, only responds with a certain time lag to changes in the discount rate.

In particular, monthly variations in desired cash balances will, in general, be of a time period that is too short to influence gold production. They will [instead] generate changes in the market rate and in the general price level.

Convertibility will therefore not prevent—even when the discount rate is maintained between the economic rate and the equilibrium rate—the setting in of a monthly pattern of variation in the interest rate and in the price index. These periodic oscillations will always be small in scope, however, and will not preclude a steady state. They will in no way impair monetary authorities’ control over the ratio of their metallic reserves.

§8. Multiple Standard Systems

Multiple standard systems are those that define the value of the monetary unit as the value of a determined quantity not of one specific article of wealth but of several articles of wealth, which are not necessarily of a metallic nature. Strictly speaking, the proper designation for such systems should be “plurimatterism” as opposed to monometallism, which we have been discussing.

Under multiple standard systems, for the monetary unit to preserve the same value as the quantities of matter in terms of which it is defined, it is sufficient that it [the monetary unit] should be freely exchangeable for these quantities.

The simplest and oldest of these systems is bimetallism. Under the bimetallic system, the monetary unit is defined as having the same value as a weight of gold kg and a weight of silver ks, both of which are fixed once and for all by [a] currency law.

As convertibility implies the possibility of exchanging the monetary unit for kg grams of gold or ks grams of silver, it naturally entails the possibility of obtaining kg grams of gold against ks grams of silver. Anyone wishing to acquire silver metal, for instance for industrial uses, can either produce it directly or produce gold and exchange the gold produced for silver.

Supposing that Cg and Cs are the marginal production costs in terms of money of one gram of gold and one gram of silver, respectively, the cost with the first method will be Cs francs, and, with the second,

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_008.jpg
francs.

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If

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_009.jpg
is less than Cs, in other words if the ratio of the metallic parities
lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_010.jpg
is less than the inverse ratio of the corresponding marginal costs
lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_011.jpg
, then the second method will be preferred to the first. Silver requirements will then be covered through gold production, the gold produced being exchanged against silver at the central bank.

This deflection of production, which will continue as long as the ratio of the metallic parities

lf1981_Ch17_IEQ_012.jpg
remains less than the inverse ratio of the marginal production costs, will necessarily have as effect exhausting the silver reserve by replacing it with a gold reserve in the vaults of the central bank.

If the ratio of metallic parities is higher than the inverse ratio of marginal production costs, then the inverse movement will occur.

Thus, the substitution of one of the conversion articles of wealth for the other in the reserves of the central bank will be avoided only insofar as the ratio of metallic parities is equal to the inverse ratio of marginal production costs.

Marginal production costs change constantly, however, in particular with the discovery of new fields or the development of improved methods of extraction.

A bimetallic system will therefore be constantly threatened with the depletion of one of the two reserves, unless the ratio of metallic parities is constantly adjusted to the ratio of marginal production costs.

The whole history of bimetallism bears this out. And it is because of the disturbances resulting from the continuing depletion of one of the two reserves and the complications that too frequent changes of the parities would have brought on that bimetallism has been abandoned in most modern states.

It is misleading, by the way, to present a monetary system that involves a twofold definition of money in metallic terms, as a currency of double convertibility.

In fact, this is a triple standard system, because gold monometallism is already a double convertibility system, considering that two articles of wealth are exchangeable for monetary units at a fixed rate: gold, at the price set by the metallic definition of the currency, and claims denominated in money, at the price resulting from the discount rate.

Viewed from this angle, it appears that, under a monometallic system, variations in the discount rate are merely changes in parity, which are intended to prevent the substitution—in the reserves of the central bank—of one of the two 251 articles of wealth for the other. These variations are essential for the system to endure, as would be—for a lasting bimetallic system—variations in one of the two metallic parities on which the system is based.

Bimetallism is just one example of a multiple standard system, but it is not the only one.

Before the Second World War, France had a double standard system because, since the creation of the Wheat Office, the French franc had been exchangeable at a fixed rate for a weight of gold determined by the currency law, or for a weight of wheat determined every year by the decision setting the legal price of wheat.

Double convertibility was ensured by the Bank of France with regard to gold–money exchanges, and by the Wheat Office as far as wheat–money exchanges were concerned.

As the wheat price was generally set at a level higher than the parity of marginal production costs, the phenomenon characteristic of the double standard came into play: the share of wheat in the monetary reserves increased year after year.

We do not claim in any way that the system could not have been viable; but it could have been so, like any multiple standard system, only insofar as monetary definitions had been maintained roughly at the parity of the inverse of marginal production costs. Wheat price stability would have been achieved, as in any convertible currency system, at the cost of instability in the reserves, which may be corrected by frequent adjustment of the conversion rate to the circumstances of production. The system was therefore economically feasible, but it has not yet been proved that it was also feasible politically.

The above considerations regarding double standard systems are also valid for all multiple standard systems, regardless of the number of articles of wealth in terms of which money is defined, hence for which it can be exchanged at a fixed rate.

The fixing of any price, if it is to be enforced by means other than police measures, entails convertibility of the currency in relation to the article whose price is controlled.

Theoretically, under a system where only true rights are eligible for discount, multiple convertibility can be maintained indefinitely, on the sole condition that conversion rates constantly remain in the same ratio as the inverse of marginal production costs. As many prices as one may wish can therefore be stabilized, provided, however, that the stabilization level is adjusted when marginal pro252duction costs change. In this way, a system of stabilized prices with discontinuous variations would be substituted for the system of prices varying constantly with the circumstances of the market. Price stability would be ensured through the instability of reserves.

This possibility is purely theoretical, however. Production costs change too often, and interests involved in price variations are so pressing, that one cannot imagine that prices fixed authoritatively 14 could be constantly maintained at their economic level.

In fact, only a single double convertibility system has been maintained over prolonged periods: the system of the gold standard, under which, as we have already seen, the price at which the bank buys one of the conversion articles of wealth—those that short-dated bills denominated in money constitute—is adjusted through changes in the discount rate.

Many precautions are needed, however, in order to ensure that those who set the discount rate do so in full independence, although their decisions are generally dictated—and even forced, when a rise is necessary—by variations in metallic reserves.

In general, fixing more than one price promptly results in the currency becoming inconvertible in relation to some of the articles whose prices are controlled. If one generalizes the convertibility concept, by relating it to the system under which an article of wealth can be freely exchanged for its money equivalent, one finds that convertibility is permanently ensured only in relation to those articles whose prices are subjected to market forces.15 Then, despite the wills of men, and generally against their wills, the price becomes established at the level that corresponds to the parity of the inverse of marginal production costs.

Multiple convertibility systems, although economically conceivable, are politically impossible, not because of the natural order of things, but because of the nature of the human beings who would be called upon to handle them, should such systems be introduced.

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Chapter XVIII: Monetary Regulation in Systems Where False Claims Are Eligible for Discount

§1. Not Everyone May Run a Deficit

A deficit is the situation facing a business that spends more than it earns.

We have shown that a deficit could be [either] a cash deficit or a patrimony deficit. In the first case, it results from purchases without resales; in the second, from sales at a value that is less than the value of the product sold.

Any production showing a deficit within this latter meaning generates false rights, for an amount equal to the deficit.

As long as the business owner has capital,1 it is his own rights that the deficit empties of their contents. As soon as this capital has been exhausted, however, or at any time if it is protected by the inalienability and unseizability that generally characterize state property, then it is the rights of third-party creditors that become false and will have to be devalued when their holders seek to exercise them.

These holders, nevertheless, will defend themselves against the loss that threatens them: they will accept claims on the business running a deficit only at a price that takes into account the probable repayment value.

In both cases, therefore, regardless of whether it possesses capital of its own, a business that runs a deficit will have received only the equivalent of what it will restitute.

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If this business is to receive more than it gives on a continuing basis, and reap the enjoyable consequences of a deficit, then the two following conditions must be met simultaneously:

  • — it must have no capital of its own, or, if it does, this must be protected by inalienability and unseizability features similar to those that protect public property;
  • — it must be in a position to force suppliers of those articles of wealth it wishes to buy to take its claims, not at their probable repayment value, but at the value that it pleases it to assign to them, known as the nominal value.

In principle, only the state is in a position to meet these two conditions at the same time: the first, because no lender will agree to make a loan to a borrower who has no capital of his own and, as a result, the inalienability and unseizability privileges that only state property enjoys are indispensable; the second, because it implies a constraint that only public sovereignty can impose.

One example of systematic overvaluation of claims is to be found in the procedure followed by the French Treasury, on several occasions, when it forced persons eligible for war damage compensation to receive payment in the form of loan securities counted at a value in excess of their current market price.

Such a procedure cannot, however, be common practice because, whenever the seller can act freely, he will refuse to part with true articles of wealth in exchange for false claims.2

This is why the state will secure the privilege of a deficit, in all certainty and on a continuing basis, only if it succeeds in exchanging, at their nominal value and in unlimited quantities, the false claims that it assigns in exchange for the articles of wealth it chooses to acquire.

To this end, using its sovereignty, the state forces the central bank to accept for discount these false claims as though they were true. Thus, when these false claims are not demanded in the market, they will always find a taker at their nominal value. Their price, disregarding discounting charges, cannot fall below this value and their sale at this price will be ensured, regardless of the quantities supplied.

The discounting of false claims, however, is—for the discounting bank—an exchange of unequal values, since it implies the assignment, to the transferor, of articles of wealth whose value exceeds that of the wealth transferred. If dis255count were effected on a cash basis—in other words, against the transfer of articles of wealth properly speaking—the discounting bank’s own assets would soon be exhausted. This would also be the case if, exchange being effected against claims payable on demand,3 the holders of these claims were in a position to exact the articles of wealth necessary to fill them.

For the bank that has discounted false claims to avoid the exhaustion of its capital and, subsequently, its insolvency, it is necessary that discount beneficiaries not be able to draw from the bank’s assets the true values to which discount entitles them.

In order to meet this condition, the state, when it imposes on the central bank acceptance of false claims, provides it with a privilege roughly equivalent to the privilege with which it protects public property: in this case, inconvertibility.4 Under such a system, the bank is released from the obligation to surrender true articles of wealth to those of its creditors seeking repayment. The bank can therefore meet its obligations, as far as these creditors are concerned, by supplying to them only the false claims it has received, and by doing so only within the limits of the matured claims in its portfolio. The assets of the bank, like those of the state, have become unseizable.

Under an inconvertible currency system, however, the claim payable on demand that the monetary sign constitutes will become a false claim as soon as the amount of requests for repayment—that is, undesired cash balances—exceeds that of previously discounted bills reaching maturity. Sellers will be tempted to protect themselves against the loss that could be inflicted upon them, by refusing to sell against money. The state then counters this latter parry, by forcing any supplier in the market to accept payment in money; it imposes penalties for refusal to accept specie, thereby imposing forced currency 5 on the currency, which has become inconvertible.

Through eligibility of false claims for discount, inconvertibility of the currency, and forced currency, the state is ensured of being able to exchange false claims in256definitely—at the nominal value it assigns to them at its discretion—against the true articles of wealth it wishes to acquire. Thus, the state is the only entity within the community that has the privilege of running a permanent deficit.

§2. The Eligibility of False Claims for Discount, without Which False Claims Would Only Be What They Really Are

A false claim, regardless of what its nominal value may be, has an equilibrium price in the market: the price at which the supply of and the demand for money against claims of the type to which it belongs will be of equal value. If, for instance, the repayment value of the false claim is zero, and if the market rate for true claims of equal maturity is 3 percent, its equilibrium rate will be 103 percent, a rate at which interest will ensure both repayment of capital and payment of income required by lenders.

The present value of a false claim of this type, which is ineligible for discount, will be equal to its true value—that is, zero.

By contrast, as soon as the claim has been made eligible for discount, its present value will rise to the level of its nominal value, less the agio dictated by the market rate.

Thus, through eligibility for discount, a false claim ceases to be that which it is and becomes that which its debtor wants it to be.

From then on, the right that enclosed this false claim can always be filled with the quantity of money corresponding to its nominal value and then, emptied of the money obtained, be filled with true articles of wealth in the market. It will have become a true right.

Eligibility for discount, as though by the touch of a magic wand, thus transforms a false right into a true right.

At the same time, eligibility for discount sets a false right free from the law of the market, by opening up for it an unlimited outlet at the discount rate.

Despite all its virtues, however, eligibility for discount does not eliminate the defect that so tainted the initial content of the right. Unable to bring into existence articles of wealth that do not exist, eligibility for discount maintains the illusory nature of the right it affects; it merely transfers the assignment thereof.

Indeed, to the extent that a false claim is not desired by private buyers, it will be acquired by the central bank. But, being included in the bank’s assets, it cannot—all else equal—be sold back in the market. Any attempt at resale would simply increase, by a corresponding amount, purchases of claims by the bank during the corresponding market session.

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The purchase of false claims by the bank is therefore an irreversible purchase. If the money against which such a purchase is brought about is undesired, such a purchase generates false rights by a corresponding amount. Under a convertible currency system, these rights will be the central bank’s own rights. In the general case where the currency has been made inconvertible, however, they will be the rights of third-party creditors—in other words, of currency holders. To the extent of the unsalable amount of wealth introduced into its assets, the bank will no longer be able to fill these rights with true articles of wealth. It is the consequences of this change that we will now consider.

§3. The Effect of Eligibility of False Claims for Discount under an Inconvertible Currency System

Let us investigate the effect of a deficit occurring suddenly in public finances that we assume had been in equilibrium. The deficit will result, for example, from a sudden increase in expenditure that is not matched by a corresponding increase in revenue. We assume, however, that the deficit is a patrimony deficit—in other words, that it is the outcome of the dissipation of values, not of their accumulation with a view to their eventual resale.

The community affected by the deficit is assumed to be functioning under steady economic conditions; in particular, desired cash balances remain unchanged.

Under our assumption, the deficit implies an excess of public expenditure over tax revenue. It generates opposite consequences for the Treasury and the members of the community.

As far as the Treasury is concerned, the deficit reduces cash availabilities. If the Treasury wants to maintain its cash resources at an unchanging level, being unable to dispose of public property items, it will have to borrow in the market. As, however, the deficit is a patrimony deficit, the claims supplied will be false claims. We assume that they have been made eligible for discount.

There are two methods for borrowing:

  • — The French method of offering Treasury bonds at a fixed rate and collecting, passively, subscriptions in the market, at this rate. In the general case where the total amount of these subscriptions is less than the deficit, the Treasury takes directly to the bank the bills that will provide the indispens258able additional resources for paying [the Treasury’s] expenditures. The bank takes them, nearly always, at a contractual rate that is significantly less than the market rate.
  • — The English method, through which the Treasury supplies each week, through a process of auction, the amount of bills that will provide the resources necessary in order to meet expenditures and of selecting the bills carrying the lowest rates. The average award rate is then the rate that brings supply to the level of demand, regardless of the level of demand; this rate, however, cannot exceed the discount rate because, at the discount rate, the supply of money against claims would be unlimited.

The two methods differ only in appearance. Both lead to an increase in the demand for money against claims, which equals—during each period of time—the amount of the deficit. In each case, the bank will absorb, once the claims have been made eligible for discount, all the claims supplied but not demanded at the market rate, regardless of whether these are taken to the bank by the Treasury in a systematic way, as under the French system, or by brokers, as under the English system.

As far as the members of the community are concerned, the deficit brings about consequences that are exactly opposite. Implying for the state expenditures that are not matched by revenue, the deficit increases private cash balances by its specific amount. If desired cash balances remain unchanged, which is our assumption here, the deficit brings about an additional demand for articles of wealth against money, corresponding to the undesired part of the cash balances generated by the deficit.

The articles of wealth demanded, however, may be either articles of wealth properly speaking or claims. Generally, the additional demand will be distributed between the two types of wealth, and—all else equal—the higher the market rate, the greater the proportion of claims.

It is these consequences that we have to investigate further, in order to bring into view the effect of the deficit. We shall assume that, before the deficit occurred, the supply of and the demand for money against claims in the market were represented by curves S [supply] and D [demand] (fig. 17), and the discount rate was set at the level r of the economic market rate.

The deficit increases by its specific amount the demand for money against claims. If its daily amount is dd″, it brings the curve of total demand for money 259 in the money market up to the level D″; but the portion dd″ of the bills supplied consists of false claims.

lf1981_figure_017.jpg

Fig. 17. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

At the same time, the deficit increases the supply of money against claims by the entire portion of the deficit that causes a demand for claims. This portion, which generally increases with the rate, raises the curve of the supply of money in the money market to the level S″.

At each session of the market, the bank “takes” the claims supplied but not demanded, in order to monetize them. Their daily amount is s″d″.

In so doing, the bank substitutes money for the undesired claims. But the amount of desired cash balances is assumed to be unchanged. The additional cash balances are therefore undesired and their holders will attempt to exchange them for nonmonetary articles of wealth. These articles of wealth, it is true, will be articles of wealth properly speaking, and not claims, because if they were claims, the demand for claims would have been higher and the amount of the bills taken by the bank would have been reduced by a corresponding amount.

We are therefore confronted with the problem studied previously,6 that of the reabsorption of undesired cash balances of an amount s″d″, in the case where holders of these balances demand not claims but articles of wealth properly speaking. Here, however, the problem takes on a special characteristic 260 because a portion of the claims that are the counterpart of money—a portion that increases with the duration of the deficit—consists of false claims.

To take a concrete example, let us assume that the amount of the daily deficit is less than the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity daily. This latter amount is a stable characteristic of the community considered, because, when the maturity 7 of the bills discounted is the same and their maturity dates are evenly distributed over time, it depends solely on the aggregate amount of desired cash balances, an amount that is assumed to be unchanging.

The demand for articles of wealth, properly speaking, by holders of undesired cash balances tends to bring about a rise in prices.

Operating through the mechanism previously analyzed, this tendency causes to pop—to the extent of the daily deficit—claims that, in the previously existing situation, would have been supplied to the bank for the renewal of discounted bills reaching maturity.

These claims are commercial bills [in the sense of commercial paper],8 hence true claims, because—before the deficit occurred—only true claims came into the central bank’s portfolio. The popping of these claims throws onto the spot market the true articles of wealth that these commercial bills represented. There, these articles of wealth fill—without any rise in prices—the rights that had enclosed the undesired cash balances. But the amount of the bills discounted by the bank is, during each session, reduced by the same amount.

Thus, the false claims generated by the deficit simply replace, within the limits of the unchanging amount of daily discounting, the previously discounted commercial bills. The former provide the cash balances that repayment of the latter reabsorbs.

An example will probably allow for a better understanding of the way in which this mechanism operates. The tendency toward higher prices generated by the deficit will encourage a sugar manufacturer who sells his production for settlement to supply it for a spot sale. Thus, as his cash sales will provide the money required for the repayment of his previously discounted bills, he will reduce his daily discounting. The retailer, for his part, will find, in the additional undesired cash balances generated by the deficit, the availabilities that 261 will enable him to settle for cash those of his purchases that he had previously taken care of on a settlement basis. Thus, the tendency toward higher prices will be thwarted from the outset—at least in a universe that is free of any resistances and frictions—and the false claims stemming from the deficit will gradually replace the true claims represented by commercial bills in the portfolio of the central bank.

Experience unquestionably bears out this first inference from the theory, hence the theory itself: all deficit cases reveal the gradual whittling down of the commercial bill portfolio, which is soon reduced to an incompressible level, a level that results not from financial considerations but from mere reasons of convenience for collection purposes.

This whittling down, in the case under consideration, provides an illustration and an explanation for Gresham’s law: bad money drives out good. “Unpoppable” false claims, by replacing popped true claims, have driven out good money to the benefit of bad money.

The preceding analysis shows that no undesired cash balance can endure, even when a daily deficit forces the monetization of the undesired false claims it generates, as long as the amount of monetized false claims remains less than the amount of previously monetized true claims reaching maturity. Instead of being renewed, the matured true claims, or rather the corresponding renewal bills, are emptied onto the market of the articles of wealth, properly speaking, that they enclosed and thereby reabsorb, through a process of substitution, the undesired cash balances resulting from the deficit.

This mechanism can only function, however, insofar as there are previously discounted true claims reaching maturity. Indeed, it is only to debtors of true claims that the option exists to either discount renewal bills or sell for cash the values that these bills enclose. These debtors alone are in a position to opt for the most advantageous solution, depending on the discount rate and prices.

Thus, in the preceding example, the sugar manufacturer who was a debtor of matured bills could have secured the resources necessary for payment by discounting the bills obtained from a new sale at three months or by cashing in the proceeds of a spot sale.

If, however, his sugar had only held an illusory value, the forward sale would only have produced a false claim. No price movement, however wide, could have drawn from the sugar values it did not contain: being an empty grenade, nothing could have caused it to explode. Its holder would therefore have had no other 262 solution but to offer it for sale in the market, where, once private demand had been satisfied, it would inevitably have been “taken” by the central bank.

Certainly, the aggregate total volume of previously discounted bills does not change; it depends solely on the amount of desired cash balances, which is assumed to be unchanging. A false claim that enters into the portfolio of the central bank only replaces a commercial bill representing an equal amount. If the deficit, whose amount is assumed to be unchanging, lasts for any prolonged period of time, this will gradually reduce the amount of commercial bills reaching maturity, hence the amount of previously discounted true claims.

It is only within the limits of the true claims reaching maturity, however, that the undesired cash balances generated by the deficit can be reabsorbed, hence that rights filled with money can be filled with articles of wealth properly speaking, without any price movement.

As soon as the undesired portion of the false claims generated by the deficit exceeds the previously discounted commercial bills reaching maturity, the excess cannot be reabsorbed by the popping of renewal bills. The money representing the false claims, instead of replacing the money resulting from the discounting of commercial bills, will be added to it. Although undesired, it will not be able to disappear. The persons holding it will nevertheless seek to fill their rights with articles of wealth, properly speaking, by demanding these in the market. Yet no additional article of wealth will be emptied onto the market. Their demand will therefore cause a price rise that will absorb—through an increase in necessary cash balances—the undesired cash balances that the deficit will have brought about.

Everything will take place as if the rights that enclosed the undesired false claims, having been emptied into the assets of the central bank—because it was impossible to pour onto the market articles of wealth that they did not contain—were being filled in this market, in competition with the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied in the market have been emptied. The volume of the rights to be filled will exceed—by a margin equal to the amount of the rights that enclosed undesired false claims—the volume of the rights emptied: the general price level will rise.

The amount of the daily rise will increase to the extent that the commercial paper portfolio [le portefeuille commercial] decreases. When this has been reduced to zero, or, more exactly, to the smallest incompressible amount dictated solely by reasons of convenience for collection purposes, the amount of the daily [price] rise will then depend only on the amount of the deficit. This amount 263 will be exactly the amount that, each day, will bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights from which they have been emptied, plus those rights enclosing the false claims transferred to the central bank. At the same time, this price rise will absorb—through an increase in the necessary cash balances—the additional undesired quantities of money through which these false claims will have been represented.

Thus, as soon as the commercial paper portfolio has reached its minimum level, the deficit will bring about a constant increase, which will persist, all else equal, as long as the cause that generated it has not disappeared.

In truth, this rise will stem from the need to find a content for the rights that had enclosed the undesired false claims generated by the deficit. Because these are undesired, they hold no value in the market. As soon as those who hold them intend to part with them, they can only empty their rights outside the market, at the central bank, even as they can fill them only in the market in competition with holders of the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied. The volume of the rights to be filled will therefore exceed that of the rights emptied onto the market by a margin representing the volume of the rights that enclosed the undesired false claims. The price rise will only have been the spontaneous response of the market to this disequilibrium, and the natural punishment of a policy that has created rights devoid of any wealth.

The price rise that the deficit generates is the defense of economic realities against financial illusionism, and proof of the fact that, although one can indeed create additional rights out of thin air, one can only find articles of wealth to fill these rights by taking them from those articles of wealth that already exist.

Thus, eligibility of false claims for discount enables the state to remain in deficit indefinitely, but it brings about a gradual price rise, which will develop—all else equal—as long as the deficit endures, and whose daily amount will depend only on the undesired volume of the false claims that the deficit generates; that is to say, of the portion of these claims for which their holders intend to substitute true articles of wealth.

The assignment of false claims eligible for discount therefore precludes, from the moment the false claims assigned become undesired, any steady state [in the economic structure].

It may be that the monetary authorities, when confronted with a continuous price rise, being guided by the rules derived from experience under a true claims system, will raise the discount rate.

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It is the effect of such a raising of the discount rate that we will investigate. Let us assume that it occurs under the circumstances described in figure 18: the amount of the daily deficit is dd″, but only gives rise to additional demand for claims to the extent of amount ds″. For the whole of the excess s″d′, the holders of false rights generated by the deficit demand true articles of wealth.

lf1981_figure_018.jpg

Fig. 18. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

Let us suppose that, the portfolio of commercial paper being reduced to zero, the discount rate is suddenly raised from r to r1. The supply of money against claims will increase and the demand decrease. The portion of undesired false claims will decline, and so will the amount of false claims monetized by the central bank.

The amount of undesired cash balances to be reabsorbed—in the first place through the popping of the true claims that make up the portfolio of commercial paper, and in the second place through a price rise—will therefore be reduced daily from the level s″d″ to the level

lf1981_Ch18_IEQ_001.jpg
The moment at which the price rise begins will therefore be delayed and, when it gets under way, its daily amount will be correspondingly reduced.

The reduction will be of limited duration, however. The reduction in the demand for money against claims for economic purposes will reduce, at the end 265 of a time period equal to the average maturity of the bills discounted,9 the supply of money against claims of economic origin.

The supply curve will be lowered from the level S to the level S1 and the price rise will resume at a rate barely lower than would have been the case initially if the discount rate had not been raised.

By increasing the supply of money against claims by an amount s′ s″′, the rise in the rate will have released on the market the true articles of wealth that are substituted—in the rights that enclosed them—by the additional false claims that have become desired.

In like manner, by reducing the demand for money against claims by d″′ d″, the rise in the discount rate will have released the articles of wealth that the true claims that are no longer monetized had enclosed—in other words, those that were the components of working capital funds that the rate rise rendered unnecessary.

Thus, the rise in the discount rate will have increased the volume of the true articles of wealth supplied in the market, but this increase results from a levy that is definitive. Once effected, it will not occur again; the price rise resumes at the rate that results from the amount of the deficit. The increase in the discount rate will only have delayed the process of the price rise insofar as the deferment of consumption accepted by a new segment of lenders and the dwindling of working capital funds (due to the economic slowdown) will have filled the false rights generated by the deficit.

Thus, in a system in deficit where false rights are eligible for discount, a rise in the discount rate is powerless to prevent a price rise. It can only mitigate or delay the rise for a period of time, which is equal to the average maturity of the bills discounted. The discount rate, therefore, ceases to be the effective instrument of monetary regulation; monetary regulation can only be effected through a price rise, which is the only method capable of providing in a lasting manner the desired content for the rights that enclosed the undesired claims generated by the deficit.

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§4. The Effect of the Eligibility of False Claims for Discount under a Convertible Currency System

The analysis presented in the preceding chapter shows that the convertibility mechanism does not eliminate the influences that tend to cause variations in the general price level but merely substitutes variations in metallic reserves for such variations.

Such substitution is observed, again, when the state assigns on a daily basis, under a convertible currency system, a certain amount of false claims eligible for discount.

As under an inconvertible currency system, undesired claims find an outlet only at the central bank. The rights that enclosed them, once they have been emptied outside the market into the portfolio of the central bank, are filled in the market.

As soon as the amount of undesired cash balances exceeds the amount of previously discounted true claims reaching maturity, the corresponding demand is exercised in the absence of any additional supply in the market. This demand tends to bring about a price rise. It is then that the convertibility mechanism comes into play.

If holders of false rights generated by the deficit demand gold, then the gold price tends to rise in the market. But the central bank serves unrestrictedly any demand expressed at the legal price. The excess of rights to be filled will therefore be deflected from the market and will draw from the metallic reserves of the bank the content necessary in order to replace the undesired false claims emptied into the bank’s assets.

Any price rise will be avoided, but will be replaced, at each session of the market, by a decrease in metallic reserves equal to the volume of undesired false claims generated by the deficit.

If holders of false rights intend to substitute articles of wealth other than gold for the false claims transferred to the bank, then their additional demand tends to cause a rise in the prices of those articles to which their demand relates. But this price rise, by increasing the profitability of corresponding productions, is “spread out” over the whole of the market, where it tends to provoke a rise in the price scale.

The price of gold, however, which the central bank “gives” unrestrictedly at the legal price, cannot increase. Therefore, it remains stable within a price scale that tends to rise.

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The resulting distortion transfers production resources from the production of gold to that of other articles of wealth. The supply of gold in the market decreases while that of other articles of wealth increases.

As this dual change goes on as long as its cause has not disappeared—in other words, as long as the price scale tends to move upward relative to an immobile gold price—it will inevitably prevent the tendency toward higher prices from developing its effects: the price scale remains unchanged at the level resulting from metallic parity.

As regards the rights that enclosed the claims transferred to the bank, they are filled with the products that are the outcome of the transfer of production resources from gold toward other articles of wealth. As a result of this transfer, however, gold production will decline. As the bank serves unrestrictedly any demand not satisfied at the legal price, the quantities of gold that are no longer supplied by domestic production are obtained by drawing on the gold reserves of the central bank, which are reduced by a corresponding amount.10

Thus, the general price level remains stable and everything takes place as if the false rights generated by the deficit were filled entirely with gold provided by the central bank.

Convertibility therefore substitutes a decrease in metallic reserves for the rise in the general price level, a rise that—under an inconvertible currency system—would have resulted from the assignment of false claims eligible for discount.

In our previous analysis, however, we assumed that transfers of production resources responded immediately to the causes that tended to bring them about. This will, however, be the case only in a theoretical economy without any resistances or frictions.

In a real economy, there will be time lags. As long as the transfer of production resources has not actually taken place, tendencies toward a higher general price level can develop their effects freely, and distortions within the price scale may therefore appear, in particular between the unchanging price of gold and the rising prices of other articles of wealth.

As, however, the influence that brings about transfers of production resources grows as long as the outcome it tends to bring about has not been obtained, then this influence will inevitably bring about this outcome, therefore 268 bringing the price scale back to the level corresponding to the immutable price of the yellow metal.

Thus, under a convertible currency system, the assignment of false claims eligible for discount enables the state to remain in deficit indefinitely. It does not affect the general price level but brings about a gradual decline in the metallic reserves of the central bank. This decrease will go on, all else equal, as long as the deficit persists; and its daily amount will be equal to that of undesired false claims generated by the deficit—that is to say, to the portion of these claims for which holders intend to substitute true articles of wealth.

The assignment of undesired false claims eligible for discount will therefore preclude—as under an inconvertible currency system—any permanent [economic] system.

One could demonstrate, as in the case of an inconvertible currency system, that any increase in the discount rate, by temporarily reducing the amount of undesired false claims, can temporarily mitigate the drawings on metallic reserves. If the deficit is of a continuing nature, a rise in the discount rate simply defers the effects a little bit; it is powerless to prevent them.

The gradual depletion of metallic reserves is therefore the unavoidable consequence of any deficit that exceeds the market’s willingness to lend.

This finding, which has always been borne out by experience, is of considerable practical significance. It shows that, under a convertible currency system, even in the absence of any capital exports, any significant deficit leads to gold withdrawals, insofar as holders of false rights generated by the deficit demand true articles of wealth.

Governments that are guilty of deficits nearly always blame their nationals for the gold outflows that threaten the convertibility of the currency. They nearly always try to ward off these outflows by resorting to coercive measures.

But rights holders who demand true articles of wealth are only making use of a demand ability that has been unconditionally granted to them. The policies of governments that take exception to the exercise of this ability would be simply ludicrous, were it not for the fact that such policies have often caused severe damage.

When the deficit is large and protracted, it will necessarily lead to the exhaustion of metallic reserves, hence to the suspension of convertibility. Generally, it is true, the currency will be made inconvertible before the reserves have been exhausted.

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From the moment that convertibility has been suspended, we find ourselves confronted with the same situation as in the preceding section. Metallic reserves will remain stable, but the general price level will be subject to a continuous rise.

§5. The Monetary Circuit, a Mere Truism Dressed Up in the Garb of Theory

The preceding analysis shows that, in a community where desired cash balances remain unchanged and all public expenditures are settled in money, a deficit generates—for the entirety of its amount—an additional demand for articles of wealth properly speaking or for claims.

The additional demand for claims, however, reduces by a corresponding amount the volume of the claims discounted at the central bank. Therefore, it is only when the deficit increases the demand for articles of wealth, properly speaking, that discounting can generate undesired cash balances, hence a price rise of the extent necessary to absorb these undesired cash balances through an increase in necessary cash balances.

An increase in necessary cash balances, however, increases only by a fraction of its amount legal tender needs. As far as the remainder is concerned, the increase bears on scriptural money 11 issued by private banks. Now, any creation of scriptural money implies the purchase by the issuing bank of claims eligible for discount for the portion that does not involve an increase in the liquid cash balances of this bank.

To take a concrete example, let us consider the case of a community where all government expenditures are paid in [money with] legal tender [status] and the deficit generates an additional demand for articles of wealth, properly speaking, representing only 50 percent of its amount.

Half of the claims supplied by the state running the deficit will be demanded in the market by persons holding, as a result of the deficit, undesired cash balances. The portion of these cash balances still in circulation will thus be reduced to 50 percent of the deficit. If, however, within the community considered, cash balances are evenly distributed between legal tender and scriptural money, holders of undesired cash balances will deposit half of these balances to their bank accounts. The bank where an account has been opened will, for its part, demand Treasury bills for an amount equal to these additional deposits, except270ing the limited extent—generally 10 percent—to which it increases its own cash holdings. The 50 percent portion of the deficit linked to demands for articles of wealth, properly speaking, will therefore bring about an additional demand for claims representing 25 percent less one-tenth of 25 percent, or 22.5 percent, of the deficit.

Thus, during each period of time, the deficit will generate an additional demand for claims representing 72.5 percent of the deficit’s amount. The deficit will have generated a price rise and an increase in the circulation of legal tender only to the extent of 27.5 percent of its amount.

Everything will have taken place as if the deficit had generated subscription resources to ensure its financing.

It is this mechanism, whose rigor comes as a surprise to the layman, that has been given the name monetary circuit. In fact, this term is a mere truism, since it simply states that the only claims discounted by the central bank are the supplied claims that are not desired by private individuals.

The preceding analysis nevertheless shows that in the portion of the deficit that feeds the circuit, two separate fractions must be distinguished: one, whose use is really postponed and which, as a result, actually delays the consequences of the deficit; the other, which generates demands for claims only because the money it causes to be issued is kept in the form of scriptural money, but does not prevent the price rise following the additional demands for articles of wealth, properly speaking, that it generates.

The circuit, to the extent it results from a deferment of demand, spares the community the economic and social disturbances that the price rise brings about.

By contrast, to the extent it results from the use of scriptural money issued by private banks rather than by the central bank, the circuit has no other merit than to reveal the existence and consequences of the deficit in the balance sheets of private banks, rather than on the balance sheet of the central bank. The reason why, however, all states that run a deficit seek to develop the demand for claims that the use of scriptural money brings about is that the balance sheets of private banks are less read and less commented upon than the balance sheet of the central bank. Subscriptions stemming from this source, however, do not in any way mitigate the effects of the deficit. Their only virtue is to attenuate its impact, not in reality, but in a document on which public opinion usually bases its assessment of public finance management.

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Seeking to foster the use of scriptural money is, for a government running a deficit, wanting to cure a symptom without dealing with the underlying ailment causing the symptom; it is seeking in an untruth excuses for one’s mistakes, and the means of perpetuating them.

On the other hand, a state that has been unable to avoid a deficit has the duty to mitigate the disturbances this deficit brings about. To this end, it will have to ensure that the beneficiaries of the rights arising out of the deficit defer the moment at which they will demand the articles of wealth, properly speaking, that are necessary to fill these rights. The deferment in use may be purely temporary, in the case of a cash deficit; but it will necessarily be definitive when the deficit is a patrimony deficit, because the rights assigned will then be false ones, which can be filled only by a rise in the general price level.

We will examine, in one of the following chapters,12 the means available, to a state running a deficit, for improving the functioning of the circuit by increasing demands for claims in the market.

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Chapter XIX: Money in Light of the Theory of Rights: True and False Money

§1. The Drawing Power and the Purchasing Power of Money

The theory of rights brings to light the true nature of money: money is only a particular and occasional content of property rights, a content that holders of property rights desire—for reasons of convenience—when they contemplate an exchange.

We have shown 1 that this content could always be regarded as a claim on the central bank, even when the money was metallic coinage. This claim is nearly always a claim payable on demand.

Being a claim, money provides its holder with a power to draw on the assets of the bank that issued the money.

Being invested with this power, a holder of undesired money can fill the right that encloses his cash balances—to the extent of the volume of this right—with values included in the assets of the central bank.

Under a convertible currency system, this ability is governed by the rules of ordinary law; by contrast, under an inconvertible currency system, it is in fact limited, at each instant of time, to the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

In view of this limitation, the possible excess of undesired cash balances over the total of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, an excess that cannot be satisfied by drawing on the debtor’s assets, constitutes, in the hands of its holders, a false claim. The rights that enclose it are false rights.

Among the holders of such rights, only the first demanders will be served. Those coming next, notwithstanding their desire and the fact that the kind of 273 money in their possession is a claim payable on demand, will not be able to obtain from the debtor bank values to match the level of their undesired cash balances. If these undesired cash balances had no merits other than being a claim on an insolvent debtor, the rights enclosing them would have to be devalued.2

It is here, however, that the particular nature of money intervenes: money is, de facto or de jure, universally acceptable to all suppliers in the market. As a result, money can always be exchanged, at its nominal value, for any of the articles supplied in the market. If those who hold money cannot fill their rights by drawing [on the bank’s assets],3 they hold the ability to fill their rights—to the extent of their nominal volume—by purchasing articles of wealth of their choice.

Their rights will therefore never have to be devalued because, as soon as the values that could fill them are lacking in the debtor’s assets, holders of undesired cash balances cease exercising their drawing power and use their purchasing power.

Purchasing, however, is to fill in the market for nonmonetary articles of wealth a right that has not been emptied there; it is demanding without supplying. As soon as a money holder exercises his purchasing power, the rights to be filled will no longer be just those that enclosed the articles of wealth supplied in the market, but these same rights plus those [rights] that contained the undesired cash balances.

Thus, the rights filled with undesired cash balances will find their contents in the market, in competition with those from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied. As the volume of the rights to be filled exceeds that of the rights emptied, the general price level will rise, and its rise will absorb—through an increase in necessary cash balances—the quantities of money that have become undesired.

Through this process, false rights filled with money will have found their new contents in the form of true articles of wealth corresponding to their nominal value. They will not have to be devalued, but the rise in the general price level will reduce the capacity of all the rights to be filled in the market, to the exact extent that they should be in order for the articles of wealth supplied to be sufficient to fill them.

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The universal acceptance of money, which is at the source of its purchasing power, thus determines the distinctive features of claims stated in money terms. It provides them with the fundamental merit that they never have to be devalued, even when they are false claims, but shifts from the debtor to the entire community of sellers in the market the onus of providing the articles of wealth necessary in order to fill them.

In point of fact, however, a money holder who wishes to reduce his cash balance is not aware of the option between apprehending power and purchasing power. He knows only of one procedure: buying without selling.

It is the rates mechanism, however, that tasks itself, at the same instant, with orienting his demand—or any demand of equal value that, through arbitrage, substitutes itself therefor—toward the market or toward the bank.

Under an inconvertible currency system, if the amount of undesired cash balances is less than that of the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the market rate is at the level of the discount rate, and the general price level cannot rise. Any excess of demand tending to push it up only brings about an increase in supplies in the money market, hence a decrease in the volume of the bills taken by the central bank for the renewal of previously discounted bills. Undesired money is reabsorbed through demonetization, in other words by drawing on the bank’s assets.

In contrast, when the amount of undesired cash balances exceeds that of the sum of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, the increase in supplies in the money market causes a fall in the rate and a rise in the general price level. It is through the market, therefore through the exercise of purchasing power, that the rights emptied of undesired cash balances are filled.

The convertibility system modifies the above mechanism only through the intervention of an additional regulating device. The demands of holders of undesired cash balances who seek in the market the true articles of wealth they desire are thus served by drawing on metallic reserves. Convertibility therefore only has the effect of substituting a decrease in metallic reserves for a general price rise, but lets subsist the option that is characteristic of the monetary form.

§2. The Meaning of Monetary Regulation

The use of money as a standard of value does not eliminate the influences that tend to generate variations in its price in relation to prices of other articles of wealth in the market. But the use of money translates into a rise in the general 275 price level or into a decrease in metallic reserves—depending on whether the currency is inconvertible or convertible—those influences that tend to cause the price of money to fall; and it translates into a drop in the general price level or into an increase in metallic reserves, those influences that tend to cause the price of money to rise.

These influences can, however, only be—in the case of money as with all articles of wealth in the market—divergences between total desired cash balances and total actual cash balances.

The only way to mitigate or eliminate such divergences is to adjust the amount of the latter directly to the former; it is the goal of monetary regulation. When the desired cash balance increases, monetary regulation withdraws from the market—in order to monetize them—the nonmonetary articles of wealth for which their holders intend to substitute money, or articles of wealth of equivalent value; when the desired cash balance decreases, monetary regulation withdraws from the market undesired cash balances and obtains from these, through demonetization, the nonmonetary articles of wealth that the holders of these balances intend to substitute therefor, or articles of wealth of equivalent value.

Let us now investigate in a more detailed manner the workings of the adjustment mechanism.

For the sake of simplicity, our analysis will be conducted within a context of an inconvertible currency, it being understood that the conclusions arrived at will also be applicable to convertible currency systems, if the terms “fall” and “rise in metallic reserves” are substituted for the terms “rise” and “fall in the general price level,” respectively.

Under an inconvertible currency system, only short maturing claims denominated in money can be monetized.

Any increase in the desired cash balance, generating a supply of articles of wealth unmatched by demands, tends to cause a fall in the general price level and a rise in the market rate.

But in the performance of its regulating function, the bank “takes” claims in the market, in order to monetize them, as soon as the market rate bumps against the discount rate; it thereby maintains the market rate at a level lower than the level that would ensure equilibrium between supply of and demand for claims. In so doing, however, the bank buys claims at a rate that is less than the market equilibrium rate, therefore at a price higher than the market equilibrium price. If the bank wanted to resell the monetized claims, it would not 276 find any buyer at the purchase price. Its portfolio therefore has a resale value that is less than the value for which it was purchased; the rights of its creditors—that is to say, of money holders—are partly false rights. If all its creditors requested repayment of their claims simultaneously, their rights would have to be devalued.

The overvaluation of the discounted claims, on the balance sheet of the central bank, is however only due to an insufficient agio for the determination of their present value.

As maturity dates of discounted claims draw near, the margin of inadequacy is being gradually reduced. At maturity, the realization value of the claims catches up to their nominal value. Thus, during each period of time, values appear in the assets of the central bank that can be sold at the price at which they were purchased: these are the bills reaching maturity. As a result, the central bank is in a position to repay its creditors without a loss, insofar as their requests for repayment do not exceed the sum of previously discounted bills concomitantly reaching maturity.

It is in order that the bank should not suffer any loss that an inconvertible currency system limits, during each period of time, repayment possibilities to the sum of these bills reaching maturity.

Owing to this limitation, however, any request for repayment exceeding this amount cannot be met by drawing on the assets of the central bank. It will therefore lead to a certain purchasing power being exercised in the market.

By being filled in the market, however, the rights that enclosed undesired cash balances increase by their own amount the volume of the rights to be filled.

Thus, the emergence of undesired cash balances will lead to a rise in the general price level only from the moment that holders of these cash balances use their purchasing power, because of the impossibility of exercising their drawing power.

The above observation sheds light on the mechanism through which the discount rate influences the market.

The bank absorbs, in order to monetize them, all the claims supplied but not demanded at the market rate. The quantity of money that it creates during each period of time depends therefore—all else equal—solely on the position of the market rate in relation to the market equilibrium rate.

Let us assume, for example, that supply of and demand for money against claims, for economic purposes, are represented by curves S [supply] and D [demand] (fig. 19). If the aggregate amount of desired cash balances does not 277 change and the daily amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity is dd′, then the aggregate demand for money against claims is represented by curve D′.

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Fig. 19. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

Let us imagine that the discount rate is brought down from the level r to r1; the market rate will become established at the same level. At each session of the market, the bank will produce a quantity of money s1d1. All that will be desired, however, is the quantity of money necessary to replace the amount that is reabsorbed by repayment of previously discounted bills,

lf1981_Ch19_IEQ_001.jpg
.

Thus, to the extent of the amount s1d1, the money created daily will remain undesired. It will not be able to be reabsorbed through demonetization, since previously discounted bills reaching maturity will already be covered by the

lf1981_Ch19_IEQ_002.jpg
portion of new discounted bills. It will therefore bring about an exercise of purchasing power in the market, and thereby a rise in the general price level.

The rise will be of limited duration, however. At the end of a period equal to the average maturity of the bills discounted, previously discounted bills reaching maturity will no longer be

lf1981_Ch19_IEQ_003.jpg
but
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From then on, debtors of the bills discounted will supply in the market—in order to obtain the resources necessary for settlement—the true articles of wealth that are, in their assets, the counterparts of their debts. These supplies will increase, by a corresponding amount, the aggregate supply of true articles of wealth without increasing 278 demand, since the resources obtained from the corresponding sales will be paid into the bank, for the repayment of previously discounted bills.

The true articles of wealth supplied will therefore fill the rights that contained the undesired additional cash balances. The rise in the general price level will come to an end, and a new steady economic state will become established, at a price plateau higher than the initial one.

§3. True and False Money

In order for a previously discounted bill reaching maturity to lead to an additional supply of articles of wealth, however, the discounted claim has to be a true claim. If, however, false claims have been made eligible for discount, the claim discounted may be a false one. In that case, its reaching maturity cannot lead to articles of wealth that do not exist being supplied in the market. The debtor will simply supply a renewal bill, and this—without increasing the supply of articles of wealth properly speaking—will only increase the demand for money against claims in the money market.

Thus, where false claims are eligible for discount, it may indeed happen that the rights enclosing undesired cash balances do not find in the market the additional articles of wealth, properly speaking, that are necessary in order to fill them. Then, no steady economic state will be established; the rise in the general price level will continue as long as undesired cash balances continue to appear.

The preceding analysis shows the reason why this is so: when the discounted claims are false, their overvaluation on the balance sheet of the central bank is no longer temporary but definitive. Even upon reaching maturity, they cannot possibly release articles of wealth that they have never contained. The money that represents them is, irretrievably and definitively, false money.

§4. The Socialization of the Deficit through Eligibility for Discount of False Claims

The eligibility for discount of false claims profoundly alters the consequences of a patrimony deficit.

A patrimony deficit is the situation facing a producer who sells his products at a price below replacement cost.

Such a deficit generates false rights to the extent of its volume. As long as the false claims that fill them remain ineligible for discount, however, these false 279 rights are the producer’s own rights—when he possesses sufficient capital to fill them—and his creditors’ rights when he does not possess any capital, or if his capital is protected by a system of inalienability and unseizability, similar to the system protecting state property.

In either case, the deficit concerns only the parties involved in the exchange in deficit: it is an occurrence relevant to private law.

By contrast, as soon as false claims become eligible for discount, the holder of such claims is certain that he will be able to sell them at their nominal value—in other words, able to fill his right, within the limits of its nominal volume, with articles of wealth of his own choice. His right becomes a true one.

The false claim has not disappeared, however. To the extent that it is undesired, it is transferred to the central bank, where it has become a counterpart of the money in circulation.

In the assets of the central bank, however, it remains a false claim: its resale value in the market is zero.

If the money of which it is a counterpart is undesired, it will not allow for its reabsorption.

Any cash element generated by the discounting of false claims will therefore lead, from the moment it becomes undesired, to a rise of prices in the market, to the extent necessary to bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights from which they have been emptied plus the rights that contained undesired cash balances.

Thus, the right that enclosed the undesired false claim will have been filled with true articles of wealth by drawing on the mass of articles of wealth supplied in the market, hence on the share that each of the demanders would have been able to obtain.

As a result of the eligibility of false claims for discount, the deficit no longer weighs down only on the persons participating in the exchange in which the deficit originates.

The deficit is no longer an occurrence relevant to private law, but a social fact that affects the whole community of demanders in the market.

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Chapter XX: Conclusion to Part III: The Subservience of Money

§1. The Silence of Money

Individuals set the level of their cash balances as they please.

At each instant of time, however, the total quantity of money in circulation is only the sum of individual cash balances. If individuals control their cash balance, it is because they control, through its intermediary, money issuance.

Now, holders of cash balances generally have no link to central banks. Most of the time, they take no notice of their existence, nor even of the nature of the procedures that they must follow if they wish to obtain money from them.

The only contact of holders of cash balances is with the market, where, by buying and selling, they determine the amount of their money availabilities.

Their monetary sovereignty can therefore only govern the issuance of money through the intermediary of the market.

The preceding chapters have described the nature of the mechanism that adjusts, at each instant of time, the quantity of money in circulation to the level of desired cash balances.

From the practical point of view, that which characterizes this mechanism is that nothing whatsoever reveals its existence to the layman, or even to the technician who operates it. It is, in fact, differences in rates or in prices that trigger the mechanism. These differences attract brokers seeking a profit. But even as they reap profit margins, brokers have no idea that they are the indispensable laborers performing the noble task of satisfying monetary needs. The same is true of bankers, who supply or demand money.

The mechanism operates silently, but with remarkable rigor. At each instant of time, it brings the quantity of money in its various forms—banknotes, bank 281 credit, sometimes even coins of precious metals—to the level of desired cash balances.

As a result, monetary circulation is always what those who use it want it to be.

§2. The Phenomena of Monetary Expansion and Contraction

Monetary expansion and contraction are only the overall manifestations of an increase or decrease in desired cash balances.

Expansion occurs when rights holders want to substitute money for the nonmonetary articles of wealth with which their rights are filled. If the articles of wealth can be monetized—claims under an inconvertible currency system, gold or claims under a convertible currency system—then the supply of these articles of wealth in the market brings their prices closer to the level at which the central bank buys them in order to monetize them. As soon as the market price reaches this buying threshold, monetization withdraws undesired articles of wealth in order to provide—without further price variation—the desired cash balances.

If the articles of wealth supplied are not monetizable, their supply in the market generates, through price or rate movements, the articles of wealth that can be monetized: gold, through the transfer of production resources, and claims, as a result of increased forward sales.

Thus, in the case considered, the monetary mechanism obeys the desires of men seeking to increase their cash balances and provides, with a minimum of disturbances, the additional quantities of money they wish to obtain.

Inversely, monetary contraction occurs when holders of rights filled with money want to substitute other articles of wealth for it. The supply, in the market, of the money that they no longer desire causes the price or rate variations that lead to undesired cash balances being demonetized.

The process of demonetization can, however, only release the nonmonetary articles of wealth (gold or claims) that form the counterpart of money. If these articles of wealth are precisely those that holders of undesired cash balances intend to obtain, these are filled with their rights, and nothing else occurs. If it is other nonmonetary articles of wealth that holders of undesired cash balances wish to obtain, then price or rate movements make these appear: through transfer of production resources when demonetization releases undesired gold, or 282 through substitution of spot sales for forward sales when it releases undesired claims. In this latter case, everything takes place as if the rate variations caused these claims to pop and led to the supply on the market of the articles of wealth, properly speaking, that were the counterpart of these claims in the debtor’s assets.

This process of demonetization will only operate, however, as long as the central bank accepts to demonetize undesired cash balances.

Yet we have already seen that it could do so without any danger of suffering losses only within the limits of the amount of previously discounted claims reaching maturity. If the amount of undesired cash balances exceeds these limits, then demand for nonmonetary articles of wealth cannot be served through demonetization. It will cause a rise in prices or a decrease in metallic reserves, to the extent necessary to give to the articles of wealth supplied in the market the additional value that will enable them to fill not merely the rights from which they have been emptied but also those that contained the undesired cash balances.

The price rise or the decrease in metallic reserves will—all else equal—only be temporary, however, since upon reaching maturity the previously discounted bills will release the nonmonetary values that holders of undesired cash balances wish to obtain.

In order for monetary contraction to release the values that holders of undesired cash balances want to substitute for these, however, the money that constitutes such values has to actually enclose them. This will be so only, however, if the money considered is true money. In any other case, and in particular when it has been created through the discounting of false claims, its demonetization will be unable to provide articles of wealth that do not exist. The movement in the rate will take place in vain. Only a rise in the general price level, or a reduction in metallic reserves, can provide holders of undesired cash balances with the articles of wealth that they wish to obtain. This time, however, the disturbance will be permanent in nature, because undesired claims reaching maturity will not release, through popping, articles of wealth properly speaking, but will only lead to the supply of renewal bills of an equal amount.

Now, a deficit, if it is a patrimony deficit,1 leads to the continuous assignment of false claims. If the deficit is both significant and prolonged, these false 283 claims, after a certain period of time, will gradually become undesired. Where they will have been made eligible for discount, they will be able to flow only into the assets of the central bank, the only taker in the market. Their monetization will generate additional cash balances. If the deficit is both significant and prolonged, these, in turn, will necessarily become undesired after a certain amount of time. Being false claims, however, they cannot be reabsorbed through demonetization. It is therefore through a price rise or through a depletion of the metallic reserves that their holders will obtain the articles of wealth they seek.

If they are served through a rise in the general price level—that is to say, under an inconvertible currency system—the rise in the index will absorb, through an increase in necessary cash balances, the quantities of money that are undesired. Their holders will then obtain the desired articles of wealth not through demonetization but by drawing the articles of their choice from the mass of articles of wealth supplied in the market, monetary expansion being a mere reflection of the increases in necessary cash balances resulting from the price rise that will have served them.

§3. Monetary Policy

In terms of the preceding analysis, any increase in the desired cash balance will be served through monetization—that is to say, without movement in prices or in metallic reserves—as soon as the market rate has rejoined the discount rate.

Inversely, when the money is true money, any decrease in the desired cash balance will be satisfied through demonetization—in other words, without any movement in prices or in metallic reserves—as long as the reduction is less than the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, at any period of time.

The continuing purpose of any monetary policy is to reduce to a minimum disturbances resulting from variations in desired cash balances—that is to say, the movements in prices or in metallic reserves that they can generate—by serving them, to the greatest extent possible, through variations in the quantity of money in circulation.

In order for any and all increases in the desired cash balance to be served through monetization, it is necessary and sufficient that the position of the discount rate be somewhere between the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate. Where this is the case, the market rate is at the same level as the 284 discount rate. No rise in the rate, and no fall in prices or in metallic reserves, can occur.

Thus, any monetary policy that tends to avoid disturbances linked to possible increases in desired cash balances will seek to maintain the discount rate within the range specified above.

Inversely, in order for any decrease in the desired cash balance to be served through demonetization, it is necessary and sufficient that it be less than the amount of previously discounted bills concomitantly reaching maturity.

Thus, any monetary policy that is aimed at avoiding disturbances resulting from possible decreases in desired cash balances will seek to maintain at the highest possible level the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity each day.

All else equal, however, the amount of bills reaching maturity daily only depends on the maturity of the bills discounted. At the limit, if the bank were to discount only matured bills, this amount would be equal, at each instant of time, to the total amount of the circulation. At each instant of time, total circulation could be repaid; regardless of their amount, reductions in desired cash balances could not cause any disturbance.2

In practice, however, it is not possible to constantly shift the discount rate so as to constantly maintain it between the fluctuating levels of the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate; similarly, it is not possible to limit the discounting capability of the central bank to matured claims.

The art of conducting monetary policy will essentially consist of compromise solutions providing, within the framework of practical needs, the maximum possible degree of economic stability.

As far as the discount rate is concerned, account will be taken of monthly variations in the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate, revealed more by their observable consequences than by theoretical research findings. The discount rate will be set at a level ensuring the average stability desired, without attempting to avoid—through constant shifts—any variations that might con285ceivably occur. The discount rate will be modified only when there is reason to believe that a shift in either the economic rate or the equilibrium rate is likely to be of prolonged duration.

As regards the maturity [lifespan] of the bills discounted, the statutes of the central bank will generally set a maximum limit, which—while taking account of market requirements and convenience—will allow a level of bills reaching maturity daily in excess of the reductions in desired cash balances likely to occur, under normal circumstances, from day to day. This determination will not rule out the possibility that the upper limit might be exceeded, during certain periods of the month or in exceptional circumstances, but it will keep the resulting temporary disturbance within tolerable limits.*

For monetary policy to be able to prevent any major disturbances, however, it is indispensable that one condition be satisfied: the veracity of money. This condition will be met only when true claims alone are eligible for discount. In fact, when the claims discounted are false ones, everything will take place as if they were perpetual. As soon as the portfolio of commercial bills has been repaid, there are no longer any reaching maturity, therefore no longer any possibilities of reabsorbing undesired cash balances. The monetary authorities are then denied any effective influence over money. From then on, influence is wielded by the state, which has exclusive control over the evolution of money through the undesired amount of false claims that it assigns.

§4. The Falsehood of Causal Money

The preceding analysis shows that in no case does money exert a causal influence on economic or monetary developments. Its amount is strictly determined by the wills of men, who are free to give the rights of which they are the holders the contents of their own choosing.3

In particular, when, during a period of budget deficits, false claims have been made eligible for discount, it is not the issuance of money that causes the price 286 rise. This only results from the determination of those persons to whom false rights have been assigned to fill them with true articles of wealth. And it is the price rise, once it has occurred, that leads, through an increase in necessary cash balances, to the increase in the quantity of money in circulation. Contrary to common opinion, we do not “make inflation”—rather, we undergo it, as soon as the actions have been taken that create the deficit.

One sees how puerile and misleading statements are that the monetary system will be reformed so as to “make money serve the economy,” or so as to “enable the full expansion of production to take place with stable prices and salaries,” or again so as to “tailor internal circulation to the needs of production.”

These are the very same conditions that the monetary systems that people seek to reform tend to satisfy. And where it so happens that monetary systems do not succeed in this, the reason is simply that governments have vitiated their functioning, by creating, out of thin air, rights that are devoid of any substance—rights that can only be filled by drawing on that which is being supplied in the market.

Blaming money for monetary disorders is like attempting to find an excuse in the form of an accusation.

There is not, and there cannot be, any monetary servitude, because money is only ever that which people want it to be: money is subservient.

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Part IV: Economic Life under a Monetary System

The institution of money does not alter the nature of the mechanism through which wealth is appropriated; this mechanism remains based on the existence of rights, which are the conspicuous signs of the privilege to use and dispose, granted to certain persons over certain things.

Neither does it affect the procedures through which the contents of rights of ownership can be altered.

The institution of money does, however, create a specific article of wealth, money, which is accepted in exchanges by all suppliers in the market.

Now, from the moment money exists, any person desiring to alter the content of one of his rights will realize that he will avoid all the inconveniences of barter, by filling his right with money through a sale of the article of wealth that it contained, and by exchanging, through purchase, the money thus obtained against the desired article of wealth.

Under a monetary system, an exchange will therefore always involve a money transfer and will constitute a sale for one of the exchangers and a purchase for the other.

As a result, any demand for a nonmonetary article of wealth will be a demand against money, regardless of the counterpart for which the purchased article of wealth will be substituted in the buyer’s patrimony. Similarly, any supply of nonmonetary wealth will be against money, regardless of the counterpart that will eventually have to be substituted for the article of wealth supplied in the seller’s patrimony.

Thus, under a monetary system, the various market sectors among which, under a barter system, the supplies of and the demands for a given article of wealth would have been distributed no longer exist. For each nonmonetary article of wealth, there will only be one market sector in which sellers’ rights will 288 be emptied and buyers’ rights filled. All of these rights will be evaluated in terms of money, in such a way that it will be possible to speak of the specific demand for and supply of each article of wealth in the market, during each period of time, without any further specification.

It is true that any demand for nonmonetary wealth, regardless of the article of wealth demanded, implies supply of the money for which this article of wealth will be substituted in the right that enclosed it. Similarly, any supply of nonmonetary wealth, regardless of the article supplied, implies demand for the money that will be substituted for it in the right that enclosed it. Supplies of, and demands for, money arising in the various sectors where nonmonetary articles of wealth are exchanged can therefore be considered in the aggregate. The aggregate supply of money will match the aggregate volume of the rights filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth in the various sectors of the market taken as a whole, and the aggregate demand for money will match the aggregate volume of the rights emptied of these same articles of wealth.

We have already shown,1 however, that as soon as the rights emptied of and the rights filled with the same nonmonetary article of wealth were of equal volume, at the market price, the quantities of money supplied and demanded were necessarily equal, as a result of exchanges relating to this article of wealth. Thus, when there is equilibrium in the market sectors where nonmonetary articles of wealth are exchanged, the total quantity of money supplied will be accommodated exactly within the aggregate volume of the rights that are to intended to enclose it.

The institution of money enables us to consider, as characteristic elements of each market sector, only the volume of the rights that appear in a market sector in order to be emptied, and filled, during the unit of time. Similarly, the institution of money limits the characteristic elements of the market as a whole to the aggregate volume of the rights emptied, and filled, during the unit of time, in all the nonmonetary sectors of the market as a whole, such volumes being, in each and every case, related to one and the same unit-right, which is the right enclosing the money unit.

In the following chapters, we will study the impact of these changes on the form of exchanges.

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Chapter XXI: Purchasing Power and the Articles of Wealth to Be Bought

§1. The Definition and Measure of Purchasing Power

The purchasing power of a person, over a certain period of time, is the volume of the rights that this person can fill in the market, by purchasing nonmonetary articles of wealth during this period.

The purchasing power of a community, over a certain period of time, is the sum total of the purchasing powers of the persons who constitute this community during this period.

Purchasing power as defined above is profoundly different, in its nature, from the right in which any appropriated article of wealth is dormant. A right, being a value receptacle, is of an essentially static size. It only becomes purchasing power when it has been emptied of its content in order to be filled with a nonmonetary article of wealth in the market.

Purchasing power is expressed in terms of units of volume over the time unit. Mathematicians would say that it is a “flow.” As such, purchasing power is analogous to total demand and merely constitutes, by the way, a specific form of it.

To be more specific about the nature of this size as defined above, one can say that purchasing power consists of any rights filled with money whose holder does not want to maintain their contents in the form of money.

The volume of these rights, during any period of time, is equal to the volume of the rights filled with money through the sale of a nonmonetary content in the market, or as a result of monetization of this content outside the market (that is, at a central bank), less variations in desired cash balances and also less the volume of the rights emptied of money outside the market—i.e., through repayment of previously discounted bills at a central bank.

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At any period of time, we therefore have:

Purchasing power = volume of the rights emptied in the market + volume of monetizations − volume of variations in desired cash balances − volume of demonetizations.

But the difference between monetizations and demonetizations represents the variation in actual monetary circulation between the beginning and the end of the period considered.

We can therefore write:

Purchasing power = volume of the rights emptied in the market + variations in monetary circulation − variations in desired cash balances.

At any period of time, the purchasing power of a community is equal to the volume of the rights emptied of nonmonetary articles of wealth in the market, plus the excess of overall variations in monetary circulation over overall variations in desired cash balances.

§2. Balance of Accounts and Price Movements

The statement above shows that, in a given market, the purchasing power exerted—in other words, the volume of the rights filled with nonmonetary articles of wealth—is equal to the volume of those rights that are emptied of the same articles of wealth only if, during the period considered, the variations in actual circulation are exactly equal to overall variations in desired cash balances.

Generally, this will not be the case.

Now, the general price level will rise or fall depending on whether the first volume is greater or less than the second. The difference can therefore be regarded as a characteristic feature of the market, essential for the study of variations in the general price level.

We shall call balance of accounts of a given market over a certain period of time the difference between the volumes, expressed in money terms, of the rights filled with and emptied of nonmonetary articles of wealth in this market, over the period considered.

The balance of accounts will be in surplus, in equilibrium, or in deficit, depending on whether this difference is positive, zero, or negative.

If the balance of accounts is in surplus, then the general price level will rise to the extent necessary in order to raise the volume of the rights emptied to the level of the rights to be filled; if it is in deficit, the general price level will 291 fall by a corresponding amount. The price level will remain unchanged only if the balance of accounts is in equilibrium.

The balance of accounts concept used here is not in accordance with the usual meaning under which it is commonly used in the theory of international trade, but we propose to show, in the chapter devoted to a discussion of international trade,1 that the usual meaning is only one particular illustration of the above definition, which can be generalized in a beneficial way so as to cover in one same theory both internal and international exchanges.

One can consider that there is, in each market sector, a partial balance of accounts, which is the difference between the volumes of the rights filled with and emptied of the article of wealth that is exchanged, over the period of time under consideration.

The aggregate balance of accounts, at each period of time, will only be the sum total of the balances of accounts of the various market sectors during the period under consideration.

It is clear that any aggregate value of the balance of accounts of a given market, and in particular for any balance that is in equilibrium, can correspond to an infinite number of different breakdowns between the various market sectors, because each exchanger may select as he pleases the sectors where he will empty and fill the rights whose contents he wishes to change.*

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This balance of accounts concept is extremely flexible. The aggregate balance can be broken down into specific balances for each of the various market sectors, and these specific balances can be merged into partial balances for any groups of sectors that we may find it useful to constitute. If the price level indices for these groups are defined as the average of operating prices in each of the constituent sectors, weighted for the quantities exchanged as would be the case with the general index, it is clear that each of these partial indices will remain stable, rise, or fall, depending on whether the corresponding balance of accounts is in equilibrium, in surplus, or in deficit.

Thus, depending on the method of grouping considered, one can distinguish various partial balances of accounts given the kind of articles involved (raw materials, semifinished or finished products) or regional balances of accounts, for instance for the Paris or the Bordeaux markets. Consideration of these partial balances will, as a result of the analysis of the influences that govern them, provide an explanation for variations in the corresponding price indices.

The next two chapters will show that this concept is the essential instrument of the theory of domestic and international trade.

§3. The Aggregate Balance of Monetary Accounts and Monetary Regulation

The concept of the aggregate balance of accounts leads to a concrete representation of the mechanism of monetary regulation.

The purchasing power equation shows that the difference between the aggregate volume of the rights that are filled and those that are emptied in a given market over any period of time—in other words, the aggregate balance of accounts of the market considered—is equal to the difference between the variation in monetary circulation and the variation in the desired cash balance over the same period.

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Now, monetary regulation tends to ensure equality between these two variations. If monetary regulation is rigorous, it adjusts—at each instant of time—the aggregate volume of the rights filled in the market to be equal to the aggregate volume of the rights that are emptied.

If this equality is arrived at during a period when the desired cash balance increases, everything takes place as if it operated so as to put outside the market, into the assets of the central bank, the articles of wealth enclosed in the excess of the rights emptied over the rights to be filled, or the equivalent of such wealth, hence those articles of wealth that could have been accommodated within the rights to be filled only at the cost of a more pronounced pressure—in other words, through a fall in the general price level.

The articles of wealth that have been put outside the market have not been eliminated, however; they can be returned to the market—at least if the article of wealth being discounted is a claim—within the limits of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

Now, if monetary regulation is effective, it will cause previously monetized articles of wealth to be returned to the market when the desired cash balance decreases.

Thus, monetary regulation tends to ensure exact synchronization between demands and supplies and, thereby, to cause the value of the articles of wealth to be bought to always exactly fulfill the purchasing power exercised in the market.

Any effective regulating policy will maintain continuing equality between the aggregate volume of the rights filled and that of those emptied in the market, hence equilibrium in the aggregate balance of accounts of the market.

For the reabsorption of undesired cash balances to be able to be realized, however, it is indispensable that articles of wealth previously put away at the central bank be returned to the market, when the money that represents them is no longer desired. For this, it is necessary that they have a value at least equal to the value of this money—in other words, that they have been acquired at a value not exceeding the one that they had actually commanded in the market at the time of purchase. If this condition is not satisfied, then the right of the money holder will be a false right. When the holder of this false right seeks to fill it with true articles of wealth, [the] monetary regulation [mechanism], regardless of its intended purpose, will be utterly incapable of placing in the market articles of wealth that do not exist. The monetization of false claims will therefore have created purchasing power without articles of wealth to purchase. 294 As soon as the recipient of this unjustified purchasing power intends to exercise it, his rights will be competing with those from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied. They can only find contents through a lesser pressuring of the articles of wealth supplied into the rights that enclose them, hence through a rise in the general price level.

This representation of the mechanism of the monetization of false claims will serve as a starting point for the journey that we will undertake, in Chapter XXIV, to the land of false rights.

§4. An Interpretation of the Movements of the General Price Level

The balance of accounts concept merely tends to uncover the link connecting the variations in the general price level to the difference between the aggregate volume of the rights emptied and that of those filled in the various sectors of the market.

If the two volumes are equal, the balance of accounts is in equilibrium. Then, the articles of wealth to be purchased exactly match the purchasing power exercised: the general price level remains unchanged.

If, however, to the contrary, the volume of the rights to be filled differs from the volume of the rights that have been emptied, the balance of accounts is in disequilibrium; the general price level moves to the extent strictly necessary in order to bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights to be filled, hence, to bring about a situation such that the articles of wealth offered for purchase fulfill entirely the purchasing power exercised in the market, but fulfill only that.

Thus, the price mechanism provides holders of nonmonetary wealth with the certainty that they will find a buyer for those articles that they desire to sell, and holders of money with the certainty that they will find a supplier for those nonmonetary articles of wealth that they desire to buy. Thus, the price mechanism offers both sides a guarantee of the reality and effectiveness of the ability to dispose freely, which the rights they hold promise them. It ensures, in the realms of their respective domains, their full sovereignty.

Monetary regulation does not add anything to this sovereignty, which is fully ensured by the price mechanism; it only makes the exercise of this sovereignty possible without any variation in the general price level or in the level of metallic reserves, by systematically ensuring the equality between the aggregate 295 volume of the rights emptied and that of those filled in the market, hence by ensuring equilibrium in the market’s aggregate balance of accounts.

Although the aggregate balance of accounts theory shows that the aggregate purchasing power that is exercised in the market will always find the necessary articles of wealth to fill it, it does not, however, demonstrate that these articles of wealth will be of the kind that holders of purchasing power desire to buy.

Specialization of demands forces us to consider not only the aggregate equilibrium of the market as a whole but aggregate equilibrium in those sectors where specific articles of wealth are exchanged. The study of the conditions and mechanism of their equilibrium will be the subject of the next two chapters, which deal with internal and international exchanges.

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Chapter XXII: Internal Exchanges

I. General

§1. Individual Prices: The Only Market Reality

Contrary to the assumption made in the preceding chapter, demand is not concerned with “articles of wealth” but rather with individual and specific articles of wealth. What interests a person holding purchasing power is not, therefore, the possibility of filling his rights with articles of wealth supplied in the market but that of finding those he desires to acquire.

For this reason, the general price level is a secondary factor to him; only the prices of those articles of wealth that he desires to acquire affect him directly.

Furthermore, whereas an individual price is a reality that derives from concrete transactions, the general price level is merely an abstract expression, a “mathematical entity,” which does not exist anywhere except in the mind of the statistician who calculates it.

Studying the market in its elemental realities means, therefore, going from the general price level back to its constituent factors—in other words, attempting to identify in the various sectors of the market the influences that determine individual prices, as revealed by daily transactions.

§2. Partial Balances of Accounts and Individual Market Prices

In the preceding chapter, we analyzed the link that connects variations in the general price level to the aggregate balance of accounts of the market, the difference between the aggregate volume of the rights filled and the aggregate volume of those emptied in the market.

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The aggregate volume of the rights filled in the market is, however, only the sum total of the rights filled in the various sectors. Similarly, the aggregate volume of the rights emptied is only the sum total of the rights emptied in the various sectors of the market.

Each market sector, therefore, has its own partial balance of accounts, which is the difference between the volume of the rights filled and the volume of those emptied in this sector.

One can see immediately that the price, in each market sector, will remain unchanged so long as the balance of accounts remains in equilibrium.

When the balance of accounts is in surplus or in deficit, the price will rise or fall to the level that brings the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights that are intended to enclose them, hence the volume of the rights emptied to the level of the rights filled in the market.

Thus, the variations in individual prices will ensure, in each sector of the market, equilibrium in the relevant balance of accounts.

One can see on this occasion that when the aggregate balance of accounts is in surplus, then at least one partial balance will be in surplus. The rise in the general price level will then result from the rise in the price of the specific article that has been the subject of the demand surplus responsible for the aggregate balance of accounts surplus.

§3. Demand Shifts within a Closed Economic Universe

We have often used the term “economic universe” without specifying its meaning. We are now in a position to indicate that a closed economic universe, or, more concisely, an economic universe, is a whole comprising all the market sectors in which a right can be emptied or filled.

A country that has no relations with the outside world is, within this meaning, an economic universe, whereas an exporting or an importing country is not.

In this chapter, we shall study the case of a country constituting a closed economic universe, reserving for the following chapter that of a country engaged in exchange with the outside world.

Let us imagine an economic universe functioning under steady economic conditions. Individual desired cash balances, hence aggregate desired cash balances, remain unchanged. The aggregate balance of accounts is in equilibrium, 298 as are the partial balances of accounts for the various market sectors. All prices are stable and the market as a whole is and remains in equilibrium.

In such a situation, disturbances can occur, all things remaining equal with regard to supply:

  • — as a result of a change in the kind of articles of wealth desired by some sellers in the market, hence due to a shift in their demands from one article of wealth to another;
  • — or, with or without a change in the article of wealth desired, as a result of a change in the selection of the market in which these sellers will fill their rights, hence due to a spatial shift in their demands;
  • — or as a result of a lag between the time when these sellers empty their rights and the time when they wish to fill them again with articles of wealth properly speaking, hence due to a shift in their demands over time;
  • — or, lastly, as a result of a change in the desired cash balance, although such a change may disrupt the regular and steady economic state, if monetary regulation is not perfectly ensured.

Changes in supply would—all things remaining equal with regard to demand—have similar repercussions.

We shall successively consider these leading disturbances.

II. Demand Shifts from One Article of Wealth to Another

§1. A Brief Reminder concerning the Point of Production

We have already shown1 that all communities are characterized by a certain hierarchy of “points of production,” which depends solely on the nature of things and the nature of the human beings that constitute this community.

Each point of production is the price level at which, at any period of time, the production considered desirable by all producers in the market is equal to the acquisition considered desirable by all persons who are in a position to buy in the market.

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No steady economic state can be established or maintained unless each individual price is at the level of the corresponding point of production. It is immediately clear, for instance, that any price that is above its point of production will bring about a situation where producers will desire to produce more, and buyers to buy less. As soon as their desires have been satisfied, the value of supplies will exceed demand, and the price will fall.

§2. The Price Mechanism, the Instrument of the Owner’s Sovereignty in the Selection of the Contents of His Rights

Suppose that a community is, at the outset, functioning under steady economic conditions: during any period of time, the volume of the rights emptied in each market sector is equal to the volume of those that appear there in order to be filled. The balances of accounts pertaining to the various sectors of the market are therefore in equilibrium. Furthermore, each individual price is at the level of the point of production that corresponds to it.

Suppose that, at this particular juncture, a transfer of demand occurs from one sector of the market to another, and that, for instance, a change in personal tastes or an advertisement campaign prompts certain people to drink more wine and, to do so, reduce their bread consumption. The volume of the rights to be filled in the wine market will exceed the volume of the rights that are emptied there, while the reverse will occur in the wheat market. The balance of accounts of the wine market will be in surplus, that of the wheat market in deficit, and the margin will be the same in the two cases.

A surplus and a deficit are simply algebraic expressions, however. It is their economic meaning that we should bring to light.

To say that the volume of the rights to be filled in the wine market exceeds the volume of those that are emptied in the same market means that, at market prices, a portion of the former—equal to the balance of accounts surplus—will not be able to find the content desired by the persons who are its holders.2

Similarly, to say that the volume of the rights to be filled in the wheat market is less than the volume of those to be emptied in the same market means that, at market prices, part of the latter, representing the balance of accounts 300 deficit, will not be able to be effectively emptied of their contents as desired by the persons who are its holders.

In both cases, the ability to dispose attached to some of the rights that holders desire to provide with a different content will be illusory: the corresponding rights will be false rights.

The price of wine and the price of wheat will not remain unchanged, however. Under the influence of the balance of accounts surplus in the wine market, the former will tend to rise; under the influence of the deficit in the wheat market, the latter will tend to fall. But the rise in the price of wine, all things remaining equal as regards the quantities supplied, will increase the volume, in money, of the rights emptied of wine; and the fall in the price of wheat, all things remaining equal as regards the quantities supplied, will decrease the volume, in money, of the rights emptied of wheat. If, therefore, we assume that the quantities supplied remain unchanged—as is the case at least at the moment that the demand shift occurs—the two-way price movement will continue until the volume of the rights emptied in each of these two market sectors is again equal to the volume of the rights that appear there in order to be filled. The combined price variations will be such that the general price level remains unchanged.

Thus, the price movement will have reestablished the equilibrium of the two partial balances of accounts affected by the demand shift. The price movement—without any variation in the general price level and regardless of the scope of the demand shift that has taken place—will thereby have reestablished a state in which demands for wine can be fully served and wheat supplies fully absorbed.

It is possible the price movement influences supplies and demands in the sectors of the market that it affects. If it does, however, the price movement will continue until the rights to be filled and those to be emptied are of equal volume, regardless of their respective variations. It will therefore inevitably restore the equilibrium of the two balances of accounts.

Thus, in any case, the price mechanism provides the “owner” with the certainty that he will be able to empty and fill his rights as he desires. In this way, the price mechanism ensures the reality of the right to dispose freely, which is one of the fundamental attributes of the property right of ownership; it therefore excludes any possible emergence of false rights in the community in which it operates.

Conferring effectiveness upon the ability to dispose freely, which is attached to the holding of a right, means, however, conferring upon the rights holder 301 full control over its content; the price mechanism therefore establishes the full sovereignty of an owner over his holdings.

§3. The Price Mechanism, the Instrument of the Specialization of the Production Apparatus with a View to Maximum Efficiency

The two-way price movement, following a demand shift, will have reestablished—without any variation in the general price level—the equilibrium of the two partial balances of accounts affected by the transfer. At the same time, however, it will have pushed the prices of wine and wheat away from their respective points of production.

Let us assume, in the first instance, that production costs for wine and wheat are independent of the quantities produced, an assumption that is not far removed from actual production circumstances. The points of production for wine and wheat then take on an immutable position in the price scale.

The fall in the price of wheat resulting from the shift in demand carries the price of wheat to a level below its point of production. The value of the wheat sold falls below the marginal production cost of all existing farms. The last portion of their respective productions is no longer profitable; farmers are prompted to reduce production.

But the decrease in the quantities of wheat produced releases the production resources in terms of labor and capital that had been utilized in the now-discontinued production.

At the same time, however, the rise in the price of wine brings it up to a level above its point of production. As a result of the price rise, marginal costs in all businesses fall below the remuneration that production procures. The price rise therefore induces all producers to expand production and, to this end, absorb the production resources released by wheat farms.

Thus, the fall in the price of wheat and the rise in the price of wine bring about a transfer of production resources from businesses producing wheat to businesses producing wine and thereby a decrease in the wheat supply and an increase in the wine supply.

As this two-way movement continues as long as the prices of wheat and wine have not returned to the levels of their respective points of production, the result is that they are necessarily brought back there, hence that a new distribution of production resources is established, corresponding to the new distribution of demand between the various articles on the market.

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As far as wheat production is concerned, however, the last resources that were used before the transfer occurred brought to their owners—as a result of the price movement that occurred—only a remuneration whose desirability was viewed as being outweighed by the undesirability of the sacrifice or effort involved in their use.

By contrast, in the case of wine production, such resources will provide a remuneration whose desirability is felt to outweigh the undesirability of the corresponding production cost.

Thus, the transfer shifts production resources from those uses that are felt to be least desirable to those that are most desired. As the transfer continues so long as equilibrium has not been restored, its effect is necessarily to direct production resources toward the use providing the most desired product in return for the least undesired effort.

Thus, the price mechanism, by bringing market prices back to the levels of the corresponding points of production, creates the one situation that yields the maximum degree of satisfaction for the least effort. The price mechanism is therefore, essentially, an economic specialization instrument that tends to secure maximum efficiency from the production apparatus.3

One should, however, observe that, although the allocation brought about by the price mechanism secures maximum efficiency, this is not because of a more or less arbitrary appreciation on the part of some abstract-minded theoretician or central planner ruling on the basis of personal ethical or social views; it is in the eyes of producers and consumers, taking into consideration the hierarchy of their tastes—an incontestable hierarchy, because it is the one that, explicitly or implicitly, drives their actions rather than their judgments.

When production costs, instead of being uniform, increase with the quantity produced—in other words, when the context is one of diminishing returns—points of production rise as demand increases. Where this is the case, the balance of accounts mechanism will always bring prices back to the level of the corresponding points of production, but these levels shift with demand itself. 303 Notwithstanding such variability, however, for any distribution of demand there is always one specific and well-determined hierarchy of points of production. Market prices are always spontaneously brought back to this hierarchy. As in the preceding case, the mechanism that brings prices back to the hierarchy ensures optimal specialization of production resources.

Thus, in each and every case, the price mechanism allocates production resources and provides them, from among all their possible uses, the pattern of allocation that provides the maximum efficiency to the production apparatus.

The significance of such a mechanism can be fully appreciated if one considers the situation that would occur in a community where it would be inoperative.

This would be the case if the use of production resources were determined by the authorities. The distribution of resources would then be immutable or such as the controlling authority would wish it to be, at each instant of time. In either case, producers and consumers alike would not wield influence over it.

In such a system, prices, if they can vary freely, will always ensure balance of accounts equilibrium in the various sectors of the market. Order will remain ensured, because any rights holder can only demand that which he is likely to obtain.

But transfers of means of production will no longer ensure the alignment of marginal desirabilities. Production resources may be tied up in uses where they will no longer provide the most desired product in return for the least undesired sacrifice or effort; the production apparatus will have the output sought by the authority that determines its use, but not the output that would have endowed the production apparatus—from the vantage point of both producers and consumers, within the limits of their respective rights—with maximum utility.

§4. The Effect of Resistances or Frictions and the Distortions of the Price Scale

One could observe that, in reality, the production, labor, and capital factors are in no degree interchangeable and that therefore the preceding analysis is purely theoretical and cannot provide any information on the meaning of actual facts.

There is no doubt that reality sets serious obstacles against the transfer of production resources, and that labor and capital are nearly always subject to a certain specialization that narrowly limits the scope of their possible uses. In 304 addition, changes of employment often entail painful adjustments for workers and their families, and transfers of capital from one industry to another are always costly and sometimes impossible.

Although these various influences delay the necessary adjustments—just as frictions delay movements—they cannot, however, prevent them from taking place. In all periods of time, new cohorts of workers reaching adulthood become specialized. They are naturally attracted to those trades that, all else equal, offer the highest remuneration.

Similarly, saving brings to the market—at each instant of time—capital seeking a return, which will be easily directed by slight interest rate differentials.

Thus, at each instant of time, the economy shows a minimum degree of flexibility, which enables it—in the great majority of cases—to adjust easily to changes required by a shift in economic circumstances.

It is only in exceptional cases—where the scope and speed of the shifts would exceed this minimum flexibility—that the price hierarchy could deviate for any prolonged period of time from the points of production hierarchy.

It should be noted, however, that even in this case the distortion could only be temporary and would inevitably disappear due to the influence of forces that tend to restore economic equilibria.

The time lag necessary for a return to equilibrium will depend on the scope of the disturbance that took place and on the resistance that the economic and social structure will set against the shift in means of production that is necessary to correct the disturbance. All else equal, the less organized a community is, the more quickly the forces that tend to restore equilibrium will act. Everything will take place as if economic matter showed a degree of “viscosity” that varied depending upon its degree of organization. The lower the degree of viscosity, the swifter the adjustments.

One should bear in mind, however, that regardless of the obstacles that men’s habits and passivity and, above all, economic organization set against the path of the adjustments required for any change in demanders’ tastes, these factors do not eliminate the forces that bring about such adjustments; these forces will cease exerting influence only when the outcome that they tend to bring about has been achieved. The sole effect of the resistances will therefore be to push the price away from its point of production to the extent necessary to overcome the resistances and to prolong the intermediate period during which the initial change will develop its effects.

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Thus, economic “viscosity,” although it does not prevent shifts in equilibrium, is undoubtedly a factor that amplifies price instability as well as the duration of the disturbances that perturb the market.

The terms used in this section will shock some people. Of good faith, they will feel sincerely indignant that one can relate to the “viscosity of economic matter” resistances to shifts that are—justifiably—of great concern to them. We are fully aware of the hardships and sufferings that certain changes in economic circumstances may cause. There is nothing that we desire more than a policy aimed at reducing them to a minimum and mitigating their painful effects.

In order to act in a way that is effective, however, it is necessary to be aware of the consequences of one’s actions. And this can only be achieved by embarking on an objective study of shifts in equilibrium, by assessing them within the framework of a rational economy, where producers temporarily become objective data and are regarded as mere production factors.

Rational economics does not deny the human aspect of economic problems any more than rational mechanics ignores the resistances and frictions that tend to contradict abstract reasoning. On the contrary, rational economics aims to provide the sociologist with an opportunity for effective action and thereby to offer him the means of proposing something other than a mere semblance of goodwill for the sufferings that he wishes to alleviate.

§5. The Particular Case Where the Demand Transfer Affects the Market for the Conversion Article of Wealth under a Convertible Currency System

A demand shift may, under a convertible currency system, affect the sector of the market where the conversion article of wealth is exchanged.

Consider, in a community functioning under steady economic conditions, and where the currency is convertible to gold, the effect of an increase in demand for gold jewelry. Certain rights that had enclosed, as content, various articles of wealth will be filled with yellow metal.

The balance of accounts of the abandoned markets will be in deficit, and the balance of accounts of the gold market will be in surplus.

As a result of convertibility, however, the central bank delivers every quantity of gold that is demanded but not supplied at the legal price.

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Additional demands for gold are therefore diverted from the market to the central bank.

Thus, whereas the deficit in the balances of accounts related to the markets of abandoned articles will be corrected by a fall in the corresponding prices, a fall that for reasons of interdependence will extend to the whole price scale, the excess of demands in the gold market will be served—without any variation in the gold price—by drawing on the metallic reserves.

As in the general case, equilibrium in partial account balances will therefore be restored and the sovereignty of the rights holders will be ensured.

By contrast, the immobility of the gold price appears to impede the mechanism that ensures, through a transfer of production means, maximum efficiency.

The price scale, however, carries with it in its downward moment all the points of production, including notably that of gold. As a result, the price of gold, despite its immobility, finds itself above its point of production. The production resources released in the abandoned markets are called to the gold market until the moment at which their transfer brings—through an upward movement of the price scale—the point of production for the yellow metal to the level of its legal price.

Thus, as in the general case, maximum efficiency has been established by the points of production mechanism. But the shift in the price of gold in relation to its point of production has been the result not of a rise of its own price but of a fall in the points of production scale.

The price mechanism is therefore of general scope. As soon as it can operate freely, it will ensure equilibrium in all balances of accounts, hence the effective sovereignty of rights holders, while at the same time providing the production apparatus with its maximum efficiency.

III. Demand Shifts over Space

Up until now, we have always held that the rights that were emptied in one sector of the market were necessarily filled in other sectors of the same market. Thus, during any period of time, the aggregate volume of the rights to be filled remained equal—assuming that the desired cash balances remained unchanged—to the aggregate volume of the rights emptied in the market. The aggregate balance of accounts remained in equilibrium and the general price level unchanged.

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This is not necessarily the case, however. Money has purchasing power in a wide area, where multiple distinct markets can be identified, each market being defined as the grouping of all the sectors whose prices enter into the calculation of the same general price level index.

For instance, a right emptied in the market in the city of Lille may be filled in the market in the city of Bordeaux. The aggregate balance of accounts of the Lille market will be in deficit and that of the Bordeaux market, in surplus. The general price level index will fall in Lille and rise in Bordeaux, and this two-way movement will continue until the previous equilibrium has been restored.

As the rights holders freely select the markets in which they operate, one is led to ask whether the gap between the two indices can grow indefinitely in accordance with the distribution of individual supplies and demands.

§1. The Import and Export Points

a) The Concept of Import and Export Points

Consider an article of a well-defined type, one that may be found in identical form and nature in both Lille and Bordeaux.

Any article bought in one market can be sold in the other, provided it is transported there.

As soon as the operation becomes profitable, it will be effected. But the cost, in the Lille market, of an article purchased in Bordeaux is equal to the price of this article in Bordeaux, plus the cost of transferring it to Lille.

These expenses include transportation costs, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges for moving the quantity unit of the article considered from Bordeaux to Lille.

If the going price in the Lille market is higher than the Bordeaux market price plus the total of these associated costs, arbitrageurs will purchase the article in Bordeaux and sell it in Lille.

Their intervention, however, will increase the volume of the rights to be filled in the Bordeaux market and that of the rights emptied in the Lille market, and this will tend to bring about a rise in prices in Bordeaux and a fall in prices in Lille.

As arbitrage will proceed as long as the price in Lille exceeds, even by a narrow margin, the Bordeaux price plus total costs incurred for transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges, the outcome will necessarily be that the gap between the two prices will be reduced to this total.

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Similarly, if the Lille price was less than the Bordeaux price plus transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges, the article would be purchased in Lille for resale in Bordeaux and arbitrage would reduce the gap between these two prices to the sum of these costs.

Thus, the Lille price cannot be higher than the Bordeaux price plus transport, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges for the quantity unit of the article considered between Bordeaux and Lille, or lower than the same price less the same charges. Relative to the Bordeaux price, therefore, the price in Lille remains within an upper and a lower limit: as soon as the upper limit is reached, the article considered begins “overspilling” from the Bordeaux market onto the Lille market; inversely, as soon as the lower limit is reached, the article overspills from the Lille market onto the Bordeaux market.

As far as the Bordeaux market is concerned, these two limits constitute, in its relations with the Lille market, the export and import points of the article concerned.

If we consider not one price in isolation but the general price indices of the two markets, we see that for each of the prices that are incorporated into the respective indices, the spread is limited by the relevant export and import points. The difference between the two averages represented by the indices is therefore itself limited to a certain average between these spreads.4

This average makes it possible to define, on either side of the Bordeaux general price level index, aggregate export and import points between which the Lille general price level index will necessarily remain contained.

b) Graphic Representation of the Points of Production Scales

When studying exchanges between different markets, it is convenient to have a graphic representation 5 of the various positions of the relevant prices and factors.

We have already shown that each market was characterized by a points of production scale dictated by the material circumstances of production and the preferences of persons who are in a position to take part in exchanges.

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This is the price scale that would become established under steady economic conditions, if demand could be served only by local production.

Let us suppose that the community considered comprises only two markets, Bordeaux and Lille, and let us draw, side by side, the points of production scale of each (fig. 20).

lf1981_figure_020.jpg

Fig. 20.

In addition, let us plot on the Bordeaux market scale, for each article, the import and export points for relations with the Lille market.

In figure 20, we have assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that only three items (coal, wheat, and wine) are exchanged in Bordeaux and Lille.

In the Bordeaux area, underground mines are located at such deep levels that operating them, if attempted, would be extremely costly. The price that would bring the quantity extracted to the level of demand—hence the point of production—would be very high.

By contrast, in the Lille area, mines are easily accessible. The point of production for coal there—at any value of the demand—is appreciably below that of the Bordeaux area, hence appreciably above the import point in Bordeaux for Lille coal.

As a result, no coal mine is exploited in the Bordeaux area. All the coal purchased in Bordeaux is imported from Lille. The Bordeaux price is not at the level of the corresponding point of production, but at the level of the Lille price plus transportation, insurance, and relevant customs charges for shipment of coal from Lille to Bordeaux.

In order to avoid any error of interpretation, it should be noted that the definition of the point of production does not rule out a change in the cost of production as a function of the quantity produced, and, as a rule, such a change occurs most frequently in the case of production with diminishing returns.6 As a result, it is possible that the crossing of an export or import point may cause a discontinuity in the market price’s variation. Generally, however, such discontinuity will be avoided because similar products originating in different places nearly always have some distinctive features; a locally produced item will not be turned down, all of a sudden, by all the buyers in the market, when the price corresponding to the point of production exceeds the price of the imported product, but increasingly large groups of buyers will neglect it when 310311 purchasing in the external market becomes less disadvantageous, or more advantageous.

If we consider the wine market, we observe the opposite situation. In the Lille area, the point of production for wine is notably above the price of Bordeaux wine, plus transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges between Bordeaux and Lille. In other words, the Lille point of production is above the Bordeaux export point.

All the wine sold in Lille is thus purchased in Bordeaux. Its selling price in Lille is equal to the Bordeaux price plus transportation, insurance, and customs charges between Bordeaux and Lille, hence above the price that would correspond to the Lille point of production.

No quantity of wine is produced in Lille.

Lastly, consider the wheat market in Bordeaux and Lille. The point of production of wheat in Lille is above the import point in Bordeaux, so that the Bordeaux area does not import wheat from Lille, and below the export point in Bordeaux, so that the Bordeaux area does not export wheat to Lille.

Local consumption is served only by local production; wheat prices in the Bordeaux and Lille markets are at the level of their respective points of production.

c) The Three Kinds of Prices: Below, Above, and at the Level of the Corresponding Point of Production

It is now clear that three kinds of prices in a given market can be distinguished, depending on whether the point of production for the external market—again, assuming that there are only two markets—is below the import point, between the import and export points, or above the export point.

In the first case, involving coal in Bordeaux, the article considered is not produced in the local market area; the price there is the external market price plus import charges. The point of production is merely the price of a theoretical (or potential) production, which would become real (or actual) production only if the Bordeaux area was totally cut off from the external market.

In the second case, that of wheat, in both Bordeaux and Lille, each of the two areas produces the goods that it consumes. The price in each market is at the level of the point of production corresponding only to local consumption. Everything takes place as if transportation costs protected the two markets against each other’s production.

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Lastly, in the third case, that of wine in Bordeaux, local production serves not only local needs but also those of the external market. All the wine sold in Lille is imported, and the Lille market price is at the level of the production price plus transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges. In Bordeaux, the point of production, and therefore the price, is at the level that will bring local production to the level of the quantities desired by buyers in the two markets.

§2. The Price Mechanism, the Instrument of the Sovereignty of Rights Holders in the Geographical Distribution of Their Purchasing Power and of the Maximum Efficiency of Production Apparatuses

Consider the economic universe that the Bordeaux and Lille markets would constitute if they were not connected to any other French or foreign market. We assume that they function initially under steady economic conditions, and that their price scales occupy the positions represented in figure 20. The respective balances of accounts are in equilibrium, and prices are stable in all sectors of the two markets.

Imagine that, following a severe winter, coal consumption increases in Bordeaux. People in Bordeaux will wish to fill with coal certain rights that, for example, they had previously filled with wine.

In the Bordeaux market, the price of coal will tend to rise and the price of wine will tend to fall.

But all the coal purchased in the Bordeaux market is imported from Lille. The increase in demand for coal in Bordeaux therefore increases by a corresponding amount the volume of the rights that are emptied in Bordeaux in order to be filled in Lille.

The balance of accounts, which is the difference between the volume of the rights filled and that of those emptied in each market, now shows a deficit in Bordeaux and a surplus in Lille.

As the volume of the rights emptied in the Bordeaux market exceeds the volume of those that are filled there, the general price level, and therefore all individual prices, tends to fall in Bordeaux. Inversely, the general price level, and therefore all individual prices, will tend to rise in Lille.7

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The effect of these tendencies will vary, depending on whether the currency of the community considered is inconvertible or convertible.

a) Under an Inconvertible Currency System

The tendencies stemming from the shift in demand can develop their effects. The two-way price movement that they bring about—in reducing the volume of the rights emptied in Bordeaux, while increasing the volume of those emptied in Lille—thereby tends to restore equilibrium in the two balances of accounts. As this two-way movement will continue until the cause that has given rise to it disappears, it will inevitably eliminate it, hence restoring equality between the rights emptied and those filled in the two markets. Thus, the two-way movement enables all those wanting to fill their rights in Lille to obtain the desired content there, exactly insofar as they are in a position to demand it, and all those who want to empty their rights in Bordeaux, to find there the necessary counterpart, commensurate to the volume of their supplies.

As a result, the rights holders can be left free to choose the markets where they will empty and fill their rights; whatever their decisions may be, they will be able to implement them without disorder. Their sovereignty will be fully ensured, not only with regard to the selection of the contents of their rights but also with regard to the choice of the markets in which they will engage in the activities necessary to obtain these contents.

If the shift in demand had no other consequence, the resulting movements in the general price level would depend only on its extent. Their scope of movement would not be limited.

The transfer, however, not only alters—through a change in prices—the volume of the rights emptied in the two markets, it also affects the nature of the articles of wealth that the rights enclose.

Indeed, the two-way movement in the general price level is reflected graphically by a relative shift of the two points of production scales. This shift tends to bring the Lille points of production for articles imported to Bordeaux from 314 Lille to a level above the Bordeaux import points; hence, the corresponding imports tend to come to a stop. The shift also tends to bring Lille points of production for articles not previously exported from Bordeaux to Lille to a level above the Bordeaux export points; hence, the shift tends to generate corresponding exports.

If, for example, the points of production scales for the two markets are as indicated in figure 20, their relative movements will bring the Lille wheat and coal points of production closer to the corresponding Bordeaux export points. As, however, the hierarchy of points of production in the two markets is not the same, the level of the export point for Bordeaux wheat will be reached before that for coal. From then on, wheat, in Bordeaux, will be subject to an additional demand from the Lille buyers. Of all prices in Bordeaux, that of wheat will be the only one that will stop falling.

As a result, farmers in the Bordeaux area will be induced to allocate to wheat the productive resources released from wine production.

The market with a deficit will therefore be spontaneously brought to specialize in the article of wealth whose external point of production is the first to exceed the corresponding export point.

All things remaining equal as far as transportation, insurance, and customs charges are concerned, however, the first export point reached will be that of the article whose point of production occupies the lowest position on the domestic price scale, relative to its ranking on the scale in foreign markets. This article will be the one that is produced under the most economical conditions in the market considered, relative to conditions prevailing in other markets.

Thus, as a result of the shift in demand, the production resources released by stopping production of the article that has become undesired will spontaneously concentrate on the good whose export makes it possible to obtain the desired import in the most economical way.

In this way, the shift in demand will have established the kind of geographical specialization that enables production resources to attain maximum efficiency, not in the absolute sense but in relation to the tastes and desires that are actually expressed by the persons who are in a position to participate in the two markets.

At the same time, variations in the general price level will have been limited to the amount strictly necessary in order to ensure the transfer of production resources that will restore equilibrium in the two balances of accounts. In view of the fact that, in most cases, total transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges represent only a small portion of the value of the corresponding 315 article, the shift in the general price level related to a geographical shift in demand will be limited and always less than what it would have been without any change in production.

The demand shift not only entails a relative shift in the price scales for the two markets, but it also causes a shift of money, one that maintains the actual cash balance in each market at the level of the desired cash balance.

Indeed, so long as balance of accounts equilibrium has not been restored, there is still a balance of rights emptied in the Bordeaux market, in order to be filled in Lille.

These rights take on a monetary content in Bordeaux, where they absorb the portions of the necessary cash balance that have been released by the fall in prices in the Bordeaux market. This monetary content is released in Lille, where the money that these rights enclosed is absorbed by the increase in the necessary cash balance following the rise in prices.

The balance of accounts movements therefore allocate among the various regional markets—in accordance with their respective needs—the aggregate amount of money in circulation.

Thus, under an inconvertible currency system, the price mechanism ensures—through a simple shift in the points of production scale—equilibrium of regional balance of accounts, geographical specialization with a view to maximum efficiency, and a distribution of cash balances that is in accordance with the needs of the various markets.

b) Under a Convertible Currency System

Consider now the case of a currency convertible to gold. In one of the markets, a specialized institution, the central bank, superimposes on the obligation to buy claims at the price resulting from the discount rate the obligation to buy and sell gold at the price set by the legal definition of the currency.

Convertibility maintains the gold price at an immutable level in the market where the central bank operates.

Indeed, the price cannot deviate from official parity because, if the price were lower or higher, the operation consisting of purchasing or selling gold in the market in order to sell it back to or buy it back from the bank would be profitable, and would therefore be effected, thereby bringing the market price back to official parity.

In order to study the effect of a geographical shift in demand, consider again the preceding example of an economic universe consisting of only two 316 markets: Bordeaux and Lille. Assume that the central bank is located in Bordeaux. It is therefore in Bordeaux that the market price of gold will stick to official parity.

Official parity determines two prices for each external market, from which it will be profitable, respectively, to import gold from the external market or export it to said market. These prices, which will deviate from the legal price by a margin representing transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges applicable, between the two markets, to the weight of gold contained in one unit of money, are the exit and entry points of gold for the Bordeaux market in relation to the external market considered.

As transportation and insurance charges between the two markets are extremely limited compared with the value of the metal transported, the spread between the gold points will be very small also, generally the smallest of all spreads between the import and export points for the various articles in the market.

If the cost of producing gold is high in the area that supplies one of the markets, the corresponding point of production will itself also be high. In that case, the gold fields will not be exploited; all the gold will be imported from external markets with a lower cost price.

To take a concrete example, suppose that the points of production scales for the Bordeaux and Lille markets, as well as their relative positions, are as indicated in figure 21. The point of production for gold in Lille being below the import point in Bordeaux, all the gold purchased in Bordeaux is imported; only the gold fields in the Lille area are exploited. The gold price in Bordeaux is the Lille price plus transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges from Lille to Bordeaux.

lf1981_figure_021.jpg

Fig. 21.

Let us now study the situation resulting, under such a system, from a shift in demand from the Bordeaux market to the Lille market.

The assumption is that, at the outset, the two markets are functioning under steady economic conditions, that all partial balances of accounts—hence the aggregate balances of accounts—are in equilibrium, and that prices are stable in the various sectors of the market.

Due to the severe winter conditions referred to above, people in the Bordeaux area come to increase their demand for coal by reducing their demand for wine. There will be a shift in demand from the Bordeaux to the Lille market.

The Bordeaux balance of accounts will be in deficit; the Lille balance, in surplus. The general price level will fall in Bordeaux and rise in Lille.

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Just as under an inconvertible currency system, this two-way movement, by increasing the volume of the rights emptied in Bordeaux while reducing the volume of the rights emptied in Lille, will tend to restore equilibrium in the two balances of accounts. If the two-way movement succeeds in so doing, the initial disturbance is corrected.

But the rise in the Lille price scale raises the price of gold in the Lille market above the gold entry point in Bordeaux and brings it closer to the exit point. From the moment the exit point has been reached, those persons who empty rights in Bordeaux in order to fill them in Lille will gain if they exchange for gold, at the central bank, the proceeds of their sales and ship the gold thus obtained to Lille in order to exchange it against the articles of wealth they wish to acquire, rather than use directly in Lille the money obtained in Bordeaux.

By engaging in this operation, they will not affect the Bordeaux market, because the exchange of money for gold takes place outside the market, at the central bank. The balance of accounts of the Bordeaux market remains in deficit.

By contrast, these persons bring to the Lille market an additional supply—that of the gold transported from Bordeaux to Lille—but not any additional demand, since a right emptied of its gold content is one that has already come to Lille to be filled with coal. The Lille balance of accounts equilibrium has been restored.

Thus, as soon as the gold price in Lille bumps against the Bordeaux gold exit point, the general price level in the Lille market stops rising.

From then on, the phenomenon is limited to a downward slide of the Bordeaux price scale relative to the Lille price scale (which remains unchanged).

The downward slide of the Bordeaux scale could—by itself—restore the local balance of accounts equilibrium. The slide would only need to persist until the volume of the rights emptied in the Bordeaux market had been reduced to the decreased volume of the rights appearing in Bordeaux in order to be filled. The downward slide would thus provide all the rights holders with the certainty that they can effectively empty and fill their rights in the market of their choice, thereby ensuring their geographical sovereignty.

The extent of the price movement, however, would depend only on the shift in demand that had occurred, and would therefore not be limited. Now, in this case as under an inconvertible currency system, this shift tends to push the Lille prices of Bordeaux imported articles above their import point, thereby stopping their importation, and to push the Lille prices of articles not exported from 319 Bordeaux above their export point, thereby bringing about their export. Because of this dual effect, it tends to reduce the volume of the rights that are emptied in Bordeaux in order to be filled in Lille, and to increase the volume of those that are emptied in Lille so that they can be filled in Bordeaux, hence hastening the restoration of equilibrium by reducing the extent of the price movement necessary in order to bring it about.

As in the preceding instance, the relative shift in the two price scales does not merely generate mutually offsetting supplies and demands in the two markets. The demands that the shift generates in Lille pertain to Bordeaux products whose export point is the first to be exceeded—i.e., those whose cost is lowest when produced in the Bordeaux market area. Similarly, the imports that the shift eliminates in Bordeaux are those whose import point is the first to be exceeded; these are the goods that, among Lille exports, had only the smallest cost price advantage.

Thus, the price mechanism brings about—in the two markets—the kinds of shifts in production resources that provide the production apparatus, taking into consideration the new distribution of demands, with its maximum efficiency. At the same time, the price mechanism reduces to a minimum the price disturbance that will reestablish equilibrium.

The above analysis also shows how, under a gold-convertible currency system, the general price level becomes established in the various markets.

Gold production becomes spontaneously localized in the market where its point of production is the least high. In this market, the price scale is such that it will assign to gold, at the counter of the central bank, a price between the entry and exit points of gold resulting from the legal definition of the currency. The position of the price scale in the gold-producing market, in turn, sets the position of the price scale in other markets, at the level that ensures equilibrium in their respective balances of accounts, and thereby in their mutual payments.

Thus, the definition of the monetary unit in terms of gold determines the price scale in all markets within the monetary area considered.

§3. The Two Principles of Regional Exchanges

One can see how balance of accounts equilibrium is permanently ensured in the various regional markets within the same monetary area.

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The mechanism that brings this equilibrium about can be summed up in two principles, which we shall now discuss.

We have already noted that the price differential of one article for sale in two different markets is always less than total transportation, insurance, and customs charges incurred to move it from one market to the other.

The reason is that, as soon as the difference between the relative circumstances of local production tends to establish a price differential in excess of the above total, then one of the two prices is no longer determined by the circumstances of local production and adjusts to the other.

Such a limitation, however, which is a feature common to all market prices, implies a similar limitation as regards price indices, which are, in fact, price averages. This similar limitation defines, in each market and in relation to any external market, aggregate import and export points, between which the index of the external market will always be contained.

So long as the total sum of transportation, insurance, and customs charges is low in relation to the value of the article concerned, this difference itself is also quite limited. If one disregards this difference, one can conclude, as a first approximation, that the two indices have the same value—in other words, that money has the same aggregate purchasing power on the whole of all the markets under consideration. This is the purchasing power parity principle.

In order to arrive at a clear statement of the principle, we shall simply assume that, in all the markets considered, the distribution of consumption is roughly the same, so that the weighting coefficients used in calculating the general price level indices are the same. In practice, this assumption is quite permissible because of the low degree of sensitivity of the indices to these coefficients. The purchasing power parity principle can therefore be stated as follows:

PRINCIPLE I: The purchasing power parity principle: the difference between the general price level indices of two markets where prices are free and between which articles of wealth move freely is always less than the average—calculated in the form of indices—of aggregate transportation, insurance, and, possibly, customs charges involved in the shipping, from one market to the other, of all the articles whose prices enter in the calculation of the indices.

The external market index shifts, between the limits set by the aggregate import and export points in each market, until the two balances of accounts are in equilibrium. Once this equilibrium has been reached, any shift in demand 321 from one market to the other will produce the relative shift between the two price scales that is necessary to correct the initial disturbance.

If we call disparity the difference between the general price level indices for each of the markets under consideration, the following principle can be stated:

PRINCIPLE II: The disparity principle: the general price level disparity between two markets where prices are free and between which articles of wealth move freely tends, at each instant of time, to ensure equilibrium in their respective balances of accounts, through its variations in the aggregate import and export points range.

Principle II shows that, on the market of a community whose members have substantial external incomes, the price scale will be relatively high, compared with those of external markets, so that the external price of a sufficient number of articles remains below the corresponding import points; conversely, Principle II shows that the price scale of a community that has an external debt will be relatively low, so that many external prices exceed the corresponding export points in the market considered.

For a given article, however, the price differential between the two markets will generally be small, since it cannot exceed total transportation, insurance, and customs charges involved in moving the article from one market to the other.

The two balance of accounts principles provide a general view of the mechanism that ensures, at each instant of time, the regional equilibrium of economic systems. In order to appreciate its significance, one should bear in mind that this mechanism will inevitably function effectively, since the forces it sets in motion will develop until the result that they tend to bring about has been achieved.

In fact, if the mechanism were not effective, money would accumulate in surplus markets and flow out of deficit markets, and no economic system would be certain to last. The mere permanence of exchanges is evidence that such a mechanism exists and does govern reality. But the above considerations were only intended to specify its nature.

§4. The Impact of Internal Tariffs on the Domestic Market

A by-product of the preceding analysis is to shed light on the mechanism through which a tariff will influence economic specialization.

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Protecting a market by means of a tariff is to bring about—by increasing one of the components of import costs—the lowering of the corresponding import point on the points of production scale.

The raising of a tariff, therefore, carries the same consequences as an increase in transportation costs. It is an act similar to the blocking of a tunnel or the destruction of a port.8

If the import point thus lowered remains above the foreign price, it will not prohibit imports; the tariff is simply of a fiscal nature.

If, however, raising the tariff brings the import point to a level below the domestic price, then the tariff really is a protective one. The tariff creates an industry that would not otherwise exist.

In this case, however, the tariff, by eliminating an import, generates a balance of accounts surplus in the protected country. It therefore brings about a rise in the price scale there, a rise that will not be eliminated until and unless balance of accounts equilibrium has been restored.

But equilibrium will only be restored when the price scale has been raised, in relation to that of the external market, sufficiently to bring about the rise in imports and the drop in exports conducive to offsetting the surplus resulting from the tariff increase.

Thus, one can assert with all certainty that the tariff has been powerless to generate a surplus in the balance of accounts, which will inevitably be brought into equilibrium.

The only effect of the tariff will have been to substitute, for productions for which the protected country was best suited, productions that other countries achieve at lower costs. This consequence, it is true, is essential, because it allows the tariff authorities of a country to shape the domestic economy as they wish.9

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Knowledge of the balance of accounts mechanism enables one to counter the frequent fallacy of considering tariff protection essential, on the grounds that, in a given market, all domestic productions are allegedly at a disadvantage compared with productions in foreign markets.

Our analysis shows that this argument is absurd. Any balance of accounts deficit, from the outset, brings about a movement in the price scale that will inevitably restore equilibrium. This movement operates so as to concentrate production on the article that is produced in the least unfavorable conditions in the market under consideration.

Now, however much at a disadvantage a country’s production may be, there will always be one article that is at a lesser disadvantage than others. It is the production of this article that the price mechanism develops, and it is through this path that it restores balance of accounts equilibrium.

Protecting a market is therefore not ensuring balance of accounts equilibrium, because such equilibrium is bound to exist; protecting a market simply means cordoning it off from the specialization that, taking into account the natural order of things, would secure maximum efficiency.

§5. Specialization and the Standard of Living

Protection can move an import or export point away from the corresponding point of production, but it cannot cause the points of production hierarchy to differ from what the natural order of things dictates. Now, there are economically underprivileged regions. These are the regions where much labor input is required to obtain limited product output. In those regions, the points of production of the articles of wealth sought by men occupy a relatively high position in relation to that of human labor.

The inhabitants of these areas will be led to buy in external markets those articles that they can find there on cheaper terms. The regional balance of accounts deficit will cause the price scale to fall until the prices of certain articles, those that are produced in the least unfavorable conditions compared with those prevailing in external markets, come to bump against the corresponding export point.

Thus, the region concerned, however much at a disadvantage it may be, will specialize in the production of those articles for which it is the least ill-suited. Its balance of accounts will be in equilibrium, in spite of the unfavorable circumstances of production. But the remuneration of human labor can only cor324respond to the location that its point of production assigns to it in the price scale; any tariff protection can only bring about a deterioration of its position.

§6. Tariffs and the Price Mechanism

The preceding analysis also allows one to counter another widespread sophism, which claims that the price mechanism never governs reality, because it is nullified, at all times and in all countries, by the imposition of tariffs.

Knowledge of the customs protection process reveals that tariffs do not in any way impair the price mechanism. Tariffs do not in any way prevent the price mechanism from ensuring or—as the case may be—reestablishing balance of accounts equilibrium.

Tariffs operate solely by affecting the spread that exists between the import or export points and the related point of production. As stated above, a tariff operates in every respect like an increase in transportation costs.

Because of this specific feature, a tariff influences not the price directly but rather factors contributing to price determination. A tariff will not prevent a price from becoming established at the level required to achieve balance of accounts equilibrium.

A tariff does not therefore impede the functioning of the price mechanism. It reduces man’s standard of living but does not impair balance of accounts equilibrium, hence the permanence of economic communities.

§7. A Preliminary General View of the Price Mechanism

We can now undertake an initial overview of the mechanism through which rights holders are certain that they can fill their rights with the articles of wealth of their choosing, to the extent compatible with the technical circumstances of production.

When, in a given market, demand for an article exceeds supply, the price of the article will rise up to the level of the point of production dictated by the new demand.

If the production cost of the article considered is high, however, or rises rapidly in the market concerned, its price will come up against the nearest import point before reaching its point of production. From then on, any quantities still desired will be imported: the balance of accounts will be in deficit. The deficit, however, will cause a drop in the price scale until equilibrium is restored, and 325 this will be achieved by exporting those articles that are produced in the best or the least bad conditions, compared with those prevailing in external markets.

Thus, the production apparatus will have specialized in the production of the article of wealth that makes it possible to obtain the desired product at the cost of the least effort or, rather, of the least undesired effort. The general price level in the market will fluctuate—depending on individual demands—between the two aggregate import and export points (reaching these points, by the way, on very few occasions), and its swings will permanently ensure the balance of accounts equilibrium, hence the lasting economic quality of the community considered.

IV. Demand Shifts over Time

Up until now, we have always assumed that a right that was emptied of nonmonetary articles of wealth was immediately filled with other nonmonetary articles of wealth. As a result, so long as the assumption was that the desired cash balances remained unchanged, the volume of the rights to be filled was—at all periods of time—identically equal to the volume of the rights emptied. The balance of accounts of the markets observed taken as a whole—that is, of the economic universe that the markets constituted—remained in equilibrium.

This is not necessarily the case, however. Any individual who empties a right of nonmonetary articles of wealth today may wish to fill it with other nonmonetary articles of wealth only at a future date. In which case, he is confronted with the following option:

  • — either allow his right to retain a content in the form of the monetary proceeds of the sale; but this solution would—all else equal—increase the aggregate volume of desired cash balances; it is ruled out on the basis of our initial hypothesis;
  • — or simply receive, from the person to whom the content of the right has been transferred, the assurance that he will receive from this person, at a future date called the due date, the nonmonetary articles of wealth capable of filling the right. Such an assurance is known as a claim.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us recall here that, although the exchange of a nonmonetary article of wealth for a claim leaves the transferor’s right empty of articles of wealth properly speaking, it fills it with a value, which 326 is that of the claim obtained. Everything takes place as if the right that enclosed the article of wealth transferred were filled with money in the sector of the market where this article of wealth is bought and sold, and the money obtained were immediately exchanged for a claim in the sector of the market where claims of the type desired are exchanged for money.

For the sake of simplicity, we shall consider only claims denominated in money.

§1. The Concepts of Rent, Interest Rate, and Point of Production for the Various Categories of Loans: A Reminder

We have already discussed, in Chapter IV, section 6, the concepts of rent and interest rate. We have shown that rent is the price paid for the deferment of enjoyment that the lender agrees to in filling his right with a claim. This price reduces, by a corresponding amount, the value of the purchased claim.

When applied to the value of the claim, this reduction represents the interest rate. Thus, the interest rate is only the relative measure of the impairment in value suffered by an article of wealth whose enjoyment is deferred.

We have also found that, for each category of loan, there is a corresponding point of production at which the volume of loans considered to be desirable by the lenders (because the undesirability of the deferment of enjoyment that the loans entail is outweighed, in their view, by the desirability of the remuneration that they provide) is equal to the volume of borrowing considered to be desirable by the borrowers (because the desirability of the advanced enjoyment that borrowing provides outweighs, in their view, the undesirability of the interest payments required).

§2. The Price Mechanism, the Instrument of the Rights Holder’s Sovereignty in Choosing the Time When He Will Fill His Rights with Articles of Wealth Properly Speaking

We are still assuming that, at the outset, the community considered is functioning under steady economic conditions: all partial balances of accounts are in equilibrium, all prices are stable at their respective points of production, and all desired cash balances are unchanging.

Imagine that, under these circumstances, a person who filled his rights with wine after he emptied them of wheat decides to defer his demand for wine, for 327 instance in order to cash in the interest on the capital—reinvestment of which is thus postponed.

The volume of the rights to be filled in the wine market will be correspondingly reduced. The wine market balance of accounts will show a deficit; the price of wine will decline to the extent necessary in order to bring the volume of the rights emptied of wine down to the level of the rights to be filled with it.

At the same time, the volume of the rights to be filled in the market for claims in money will increase. As a result, the balance of accounts of this market will show a surplus: the price of claims in money will rise to the extent necessary in order to bring the volume of the rights that enclosed the claims supplied, up to the level of the rights to be filled with claims.

But a rise in the price of claims in money means they undergo a smaller abatement in value, hence a drop in the interest rate.

The drop in the price of wine and the rise in the price of claims will be such that they will leave the index of the general price level unchanged.

Thus, without any variation in this index, the price mechanism will have brought the volume of the rights to be filled in the two sectors of the market back to the level of the rights that come to the market to be emptied. Thereby, the price mechanism will have enabled all the rights holders wishing to alter their rights’ contents to satisfy their desires; the price mechanism will have ensured their full and entire sovereignty.

§3. The Price Mechanism, the Instrument of the Specialization of the Production Apparatus over Time, with a View to Maximum Efficiency

The price movement following the shift in demand over time carries the price of wine and the price of claims away from their respective points of production.

In the wine market, as a result of the price fall, each wine grower finds that the undesirability of the work involved to obtain the last production portions outweighs the desirability of the additional returns that they provide. Renouncing such undesired productions will release the resources that were tied up there. It is the new allocation of these resources that we should explore.

We must observe that, in many cases, income from invested capital may not be forthcoming until a long time after investment. Such is the case, for example, with hydroelectric power plants. The income derived from the sale of 328 electricity will not be obtained until the electricity has been produced and supplied.

The present value of the plant—the value for which it could be sold—is the total of the present value of all the annuities that it will yield. All things equal as regards the price of electricity, present value will increase as the interest rate declines.

A drop in the interest rate does not affect fixed investment costs, however. It will therefore increase the desirability of hydroelectric plants that can be installed, without increasing the undesirability of their installation. It thereby offers to the production resources released in the abandoned markets an outlet where they will find a greater return. Such resources will therefore be attracted toward this deferred-income-producing type of business undertaking.

The transfer of such resources will have diverted them from uses where returns had been declining—as a result of the shift in demand—toward those uses whose profitability the shift in demand had increased; the transfer will thus have reestablished, taking into account the change in consumer preferences that has taken place, maximum efficiency of the production apparatus.

At the same time, the transfer will have brought the market rate back to the level of its point of production.

An inverse shift would cause an inverse movement, substituting uses involving spot sales for those yielding only deferred income. In this case, the movement in the rate would have caused the “popping” of the claims, in order to release for cash the values that they enclosed.

Thus, rate and price movements will have shaped the economic structure, in such a way that the economic structure can constantly provide maximum efficiency, in relation to the changing preferences of the rights holders with regard to the staggering of their demands over time.

V. Demand Shifts between Nonmonetary Articles of Wealth and Money through Variations in the Desired Cash Balance

In order that this chapter should be of general applicability, we should now go back to the assumption on which it is based, which is that the desired cash balance remains steady.

This steadiness ensured equilibrium in the aggregate balance of accounts of the market and, therefore, the immobility of the general price level.

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When the desired cash balance varies, aggregate purchasing power varies in the opposite direction. The consequences that such a variation entails differ, depending on whether the existing system is an inconvertible or convertible currency system.

§1. Under an Inconvertible Currency System

Suppose that in a given market the desired cash balance increases, for instance because of a greater desire to hoard on the part of some of the persons constituting the community considered.

Those who wish to increase their cash balances will empty their rights onto the market, so that they can be filled with money. Supply will be increased, without an increase in demand.

This imbalance will cause a price fall in the market sector affected by the excess supply.

If the economic matter presents no “viscosity”—and we shall assume that this is the case, reserving for Chapter XXVIII an investigation into the effects of adjustment lags—the distortion of the price scale in relation to the points of production scale will cause shifts in production resources. These will turn the fall in one of the market prices into a drop in the general price level, thereby bringing about a temporary rise in the interest rate. But the fall in the general price level will lower the amount of necessary cash balances, thereby releasing the quantities of money likely to provide the desired additional cash balances.

The fall in prices will, however, in the case of each article, bring the external market price closer to the corresponding export point in the market under consideration; the rise in the rate will bring the rate closer to the discount rate.

The following stages of the phenomenon will vary, depending on whether it is the discount rate or an export point that is reached first.

If the discount rate is reached first, because it has been established at the level of or very close to the market rate, any possible rise in the rate—hence any possible fall in the general price level—will, from then on, be checked.

The excess of values supplied in the market will, in the form of claims, be diverted toward discounting, and their monetization will provide the excess cash balances still desired. Thus, the discount rate really operates like a “monetization point,” which is the equivalent of the import point for the article of wealth—in this case, money—that is the subject of increased demand.

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By contrast, if it is an export point that is reached first—because, for instance, the discount rate is at a level substantially above the market rate—excess supplies will be diverted from the market considered to the external market whose export point has been reached. In this external market, they will cause a fall in the general price level and a reduction in the necessary cash balances. The cash components that have become undesired in the external market will be channeled onto the market where an increase in the desired cash balance has occurred and will contribute to providing the stocks of money necessary in order to meet this increase.

The effect of the increase in the desired cash balance will therefore be limited to the market in which it has occurred only so long as no export point has been reached. The moment one or several export points have been reached, the fall in the general price level will spread to all the markets in the monetary universe considered, and it is through a reduction in all their necessary cash balances (as a whole) that the desired additional cash balances will be provided, so long as the market rate has not come up against the discount rate.

Thus, it is through the workings of import and export points that a genuine interdependence is established between all markets within a given monetary area.

§2. Under a Convertible Currency System

For the sake of simplicity, we shall consider only the case of a currency convertible to gold.

An increase in the desired cash balance tends, as in the preceding case, to bring about a fall in the general price level and a temporary rise in the interest rate.

If the discount rate is reached immediately, because it has been set at a level at, or close to, the market rate, the process is exactly the same: monetization of claims—for an amount equal to the amount of the articles of wealth supplied by persons wishing to increase their cash balances—will produce the desired additional cash balances.

If, however, the discount rate is at a level notably above the market rate, the downward trend in the general price level triggers the convertibility mechanism.

The form this mechanism takes will be different, however, depending on whether the increase in the desired cash balance occurs in the gold-producing market or in another market within the economic universe considered.

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In the first case, any person who owns production means and desires to increase his cash balance has a choice between two possibilities: either sell the articles of wealth that he produces without expressing a concomitant demand, or produce gold and monetize it at the central bank.

Because of the downward trend in the general price level, the second alternative will be preferred. It will provide the desired additional cash balances, but will stop the price movement abruptly.

If the increase in the desired cash balance occurs in a non-gold-producing market, then the downward trend can develop its effects.

As soon as a point of export toward the gold-producing market has been reached, the decline tends to spread to this market. There, this decline is immediately thwarted, by causing the monetizations of gold that will provide the additional desired cash balances.

Thus, regardless of whether the currency is inconvertible or convertible, regardless of whether monetary regulation is adequately ensured or not, the price mechanism will enable those wishing to increase their cash balances to obtain for their rights—with a minimum of disturbance—the desired contents.

VI. Domestic Exchanges in Light of the Theory of Rights

The previous three parts of this chapter show that under a system where prices are free, any rights holder can give to his rights the contents of his choosing, without any variation in the general price level index pertaining to the monetary area under consideration.

This possibility is unconditional when the desired change of contents concerns only nonmonetary articles of wealth. In cases where the desired change of contents concerns money itself, it hinges on effective monetary regulation.

This outcome will appear paradoxical to the layman, who is used to simplistic statements regarding the law of supply and demand.

The theory of rights, however, provides a very simple explanation.

§1. The Synchronization of Aggregate Supply and Demand under a True Rights System

Where the desired change of contents does not affect the total desired cash balance, any sale will be accompanied by a purchase of equal value. If the seller himself maintains his cash balance at an unchanged level, then purchase and 332 sale will compensate each other within his own patrimony. If, to the contrary, the seller does not immediately reuse the proceeds of his sale, then the sale will be offset by a purchase not matched by a sale, effected by a person desiring to reduce his cash balance exactly to the extent that the other person desired to increase his.

In both cases, supply and demand will be synchronized. It is not surprising, therefore, that the general price index should remain unchanged.

If the aggregate desired cash balance increases, the volume of the rights to be filled is less than the volume of those that are emptied. The general price level tends to fall, and the interest rate to rise. But under a convertible currency system, as soon as the disturbance occurs—or, under an inconvertible currency system, as soon as the market rate bumps against the discount rate—the contents of the rights that their holders wish to fill with additional cash balances (or the equivalent of such contents) are monetized, hence withdrawn from the market. At each market session, the volume of the rights emptied on the market of nonmonetary articles of wealth is thereby brought back to the level of the rights to be filled: synchronization is, again, ensured, and the general price level remains unchanged.

The inverse occurs when the aggregate desired cash balance decreases. Money is demonetized and releases the nonmonetary articles of wealth that were the counterpart of it.

For this release to be able to be accomplished, however, these articles must have—in the market—a value commensurate with that of the amount of money that represents them. This will be the case as long as the reduction in desired cash balances remains less, during each period of time, than the volume of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

If the money consists of false claims, however, demonetization cannot release true articles of wealth that do not exist. To the extent that false claims are undesired, the volume of the rights to be filled exceeds that of the rights emptied; there is no synchronization, and the general price level will rise in the market.

§2. Limiting the Distortions in the Price Scale

Thus, in a universe with true rights, the general price level can only register minor variations. Individual prices will vary, however, and they will do so whenever supplies or demands are shifted from one sector of the market to 333 another. The price will fall there where there is an excess of supplies, and the price will rise there where there is an excess of demands, the extent of the combined variations being such that the general price level will be left unchanged.

The scope of these particular variations will depend solely on the scope of the shift that occurred. It will therefore be without limit when one of the articles affected by the shift exists only in fixed quantities. This will be the case with all the articles that are not “produced” as such, for example great masters’ paintings, statues, performances by a particular actor, etc. Their prices will only be a matter of supply and demand.

In most cases, however, the articles of wealth exchanged can be produced. As a result of the two-way price variation following any shift in demand, production of the last portions of the abandoned article becomes less desirable and production of the additional portions of the article to which demands have shifted becomes more desirable. The two-way price variation therefore brings about a transfer of production resources. Now, this transfer reduces the volume of the rights emptied of the former article and increases that of the rights emptied of the latter article. The transfer of production resources thereby tends to correct the distortion in the price scale.

If the productions under consideration are on a constant returns basis, the transfer will bring the prices affected by the shift in demand back to their previous levels; if they are on a variable returns basis, the transfer will simply shift prices to an extent commensurate with the points of production shift. In each and every case, once equilibrium has been restored, the change in the price hierarchy in the various sectors of the market will be either nonexistent or very small.

It is the functioning of this mechanism that we have observed in the first five parts of this chapter.

In part II, we have shown that any shift in demand from one article of wealth to another, within the same market, brings on a shift in production resources in this market from the abandoned article to the sought-after article.

In part III, we have shown that any shift in demand from one regional market to another brings about, in both markets, the shift in production resources necessary for the equivalent of the articles of wealth that are no longer sought in the abandoned market to be demanded in this same market.

In part IV, we have shown that any variation in the time interval between when a right is emptied and when it is filled again with articles of wealth, properly speaking, leads to either the creation or the popping of claims, as a result of a shift in productive activities creating loans or borrowing.

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Lastly, in part V, we have shown that, under a system of effective regulation, any variation in the desired cash balance leads to a corresponding amount of monetization or demonetization, without any variation in the general price level.

In each and every case, the price variation will exceed the shift—if any—in the corresponding point of production only to the extent necessary to trigger the transfer of production resources matching the demand transfer.

If the demand shift is slow, or if production adjustment is quick—in other words, if consumption is extremely steady, or production highly mobile—individual prices will always be at the level of their respective points of production, hence unchanging or capable of only minor variations.

This will be the case, in particular, in the universe without any resistances or frictions, which is the subject of theoretical economics.

In a real economy, shifts in demand will bring about the variations in individual prices that are necessary to maintain equilibrium in those partial balances of accounts that are affected by shifts in demand. These variations, to the extent that they exceed the points of production shifts, will only be temporary, however. As soon as production has been adjusted to the desires that it tends to satisfy, prices will revert to their natural levels; the price scale will once again have become identical to the points of production scale.

Thus, in each and every possible case, the price mechanism provides rights holders with the certainty that they can—with a minimum of disturbance—empty and fill again their rights in accordance with their desires. Furthermore, the price mechanism enables rights holders to obtain from the production apparatus a maximum of satisfaction for a minimum of trouble, thereby ensuring, in the best possible circumstances, the absolute sovereignty that Article 544 of the Civil Code had promised rights holders without, however, taking the care to establish it.

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Chapter XXIII: International Exchanges

In the preceding chapter, our assumption was that any right whose content a rights holder desired to change could be filled only in the market in which it had been emptied, or in any other market within the same monetary area. In this chapter, we will reverse this assumption: any right that has been emptied in a given market can be filled in any market, at the holder’s discretion, regardless of whether the currency used in the two markets is the same.

I. General Considerations concerning Foreign Exchange

§1. Introducing Foreign Exchange

When a right emptied in a market is filled again in the same market, or in a market within the same monetary domain, the change in content involves only two operations: a sale, by which the right emptied of the article of wealth it enclosed is filled with money in the relevant market sector where this article of wealth is exchanged; and a purchase, by which the right is emptied of money and filled with the article of wealth that its holder wishes to acquire in the market sector pertaining to this article of wealth.

In the exercise of his sovereignty, however, the rights holder may decide to fill his right in a market within a different monetary domain. In that case, the above method cannot transfer purchasing power from one market to the other, since the money used in the first market is not generally accepted in the second.

In order for the holder of the right that is filled with domestic currency to be able to acquire the article of wealth of his choice in a foreign market, he must substitute, for the money with which his right is filled, the money that is accepted in the market where he wishes to purchase. The rights holder will therefore have to exchange domestic currency for a foreign currency.

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It is clear that, at the same time, other people will wish to sell in the foreign market and buy in the domestic market. A foreign exchange market will thus be established where suppliers and demanders of the two currencies will operate.

The difference between supplies of and demands for the currency of the first country against the currency of the second country, during any period of time, is the balance of payments of one country with the other, or the international balance of payments between the two countries concerned, for this period.

The British balance of payments with France, for instance, will be the difference between supplies of and demands for pounds sterling against French francs. It will show a surplus if aggregate supply of pounds sterling against French francs exceeds aggregate demand, and a deficit in the opposite case.

It is clear that the balance of payments is the difference between the volume—expressed in domestic currency—of the rights that are emptied and then filled with foreign currency against domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. In terms of the above definition, it is therefore equal, but with the opposite sign, to the balance of accounts of this particular market sector.

Let us now consider an economic universe comprising only two monetary areas, that of the French franc and the British pound sterling, and suppose that desired cash balances remain unchanged on both sides. In this case, any right that is emptied and not filled again in one monetary area will necessarily be filled in the other, thereby generating a demand for the money of the second area against the money of the first. The aggregate balance of accounts of one of these two monetary areas—which is the difference between the total volumes of the rights emptied and of the rights filled in its market—will therefore be equal to the balance of accounts of the foreign currency market in domestic currency, but with the opposite sign. Since this balance of accounts is equal, and of an opposite sign, to the foreign country’s balance of payments in the country considered, this balance of payments, at each instant of time, will therefore be equal to the aggregate balance of accounts of the country considered.

This relationship shows that the international balance of payments is only one particular instance of the aggregate balance of accounts of a market; it accounts for the fact that the international balance of payments is often referred to as the balance of accounts and justifies the general meaning given to these terms in our previous definition.1

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§2. The Various Types of Foreign Exchange Markets

In foreign exchange markets, as indeed in any market, prices can [either] be free or be set authoritatively.

If they are free, they will establish themselves, at each session of the market, at such a level that the volume—expressed in domestic currency—of the rights enclosing the quantities of foreign currency supplied against domestic currency comes to equal the volume of the rights enclosing the quantities of domestic currency supplied against foreign currency.

Two major cases should be considered, depending on whether the currencies exchanged are convertible—at a fixed rate—to the same article of wealth, which for the sake of simplicity we shall take to be gold.

If the currencies exchanged are convertible, then in each of the two monetary areas considered there is an institution that buys and sells any quantities of gold at a fixed price.

As a result, any person in either country who wishes to purchase the other country’s currency has the following choice: either buy such currency at its going rate in the foreign exchange market, or buy gold from the domestic institution tasked with converting the domestic currency, ship such gold to the institution tasked with converting the currency in the country whose currency he wishes to buy, and sell it against money to this institution.

The cost of one unit of foreign currency acquired through the latter procedure will be equal to the price, at the domestic central bank, of its gold contents as per its legal definition (this price being its gold parity), plus insurance and freight for shipment of such gold contents between the two central banks.

The less costly of the two procedures will naturally be preferred.

As a result, the rate of a foreign currency in the foreign exchange market cannot exceed the price level representing metallic parity plus charges for shipment of the metal, as indicated above. This is the level that determines the gold exit point.

One would demonstrate in the same way that the rate, in the foreign exchange market, cannot be lower than metallic parity less charges relating to shipment in the opposite direction. This rate determines the gold entry point.

Thus, the exchange rate of one currency with regard to another, when both are convertible to gold, necessarily remains contained within the range of the corresponding gold points.

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This general situation may take different forms, depending on whether central banks deliver gold in the form of gold pieces or only in bars of a certain minimum weight. In the first case, one has the gold standard; in the second, the gold bullion standard. In addition, there is an intermediate form, one that—as we shall show—debases the whole system without eliminating its intrinsic merits altogether. Under this variant, one of the institutions in charge of currency conversion operations agrees to issue money not only against delivery of metal but also against claims payable on demand denominated in gold. This variant is known as the gold exchange standard.

Unless the two currencies exchanged are both convertible, at a fixed rate, into the same article of wealth, the possibility for holders of one currency to acquire the other currency at a price representing conversion parity (adjusted only for freight and insurance charges) no longer exists. The rate is therefore no longer contained between the gold points in the foreign exchange market. The rate freely establishes itself at the level that ensures equality between the volumes of the rights that holders on either side wish to empty and fill with foreign currency against domestic currency. The system is then one of inconvertibility, itself capable of taking various forms, depending on whether both currencies concerned, or only one of them, are inconvertible.

If a foreign currency’s rate in the foreign exchange market is set by legal or regulatory provisions operating effectively, then one faces a market with frozen prices, a situation that we have previously discussed.2

We showed at the time that if the rate is notably different from the price that would have become established spontaneously in the market, there remains a substantial gap between the supply of and demand for the article whose price was controlled.

For instance, if the price of the foreign currency is maintained at a level below the market equilibrium price, then demand will exceed supply. Some people will therefore be unable to obtain the foreign currency they wish to acquire.

If their desire is strong and their civic sense poor, they will be tempted to offer more than the official rate, thereby possibly jeopardizing control measures. In order to avoid the disturbances that would otherwise ensue, the controlling 339 authorities freeze the domestic currency contents of the rights that could enter the exchange market, and allow domestic currency to be exchanged for foreign currency only within the limits of the foreign currency amounts supplied at the price set by the authorities. This is known as the clearing system.

§3. Foreign Prices in Domestic Currency

The existence of an exchange rate determines the price in domestic currency of the articles of wealth that any buyer in a given country can purchase abroad; this price is equal to the foreign price multiplied by the corresponding exchange rate.

When the foreign price has been expressed in the domestic currency, the conditions under which exchange takes place between markets in different monetary areas can be compared just as the conditions between different markets within the same monetary area can be.

Thus, for any article that may be acquired domestically or abroad, there is—above and below the domestic point of production—an import point and an export point; the import and export points differ from the domestic price by the amount (expressed in the domestic currency) of transportation, insurance, and customs charges relating to import or export of the quantity unit of the article considered from one country to the other.

If the foreign price and the exchange rate are such that the foreign price in domestic currency is below the import point, any quantity of the article considered that is purchased in the domestic market will be imported from abroad. The domestic price is then equal to the foreign price expressed in the domestic currency, plus transportation, insurance, and customs charges pertaining to import of one quantity unit of the article considered.

If the foreign price and the exchange rate are such that the foreign price expressed in the domestic currency is above the export point, then any quantity of the article considered that is purchased abroad will be exported by the domestic market. Its foreign price, valued in domestic currency, is at the level of the corresponding export point.

Therefore, it is only when the foreign price expressed in the domestic currency is located between the import and export points for the article considered that each market will be served only by its domestic production, and the price in each market will then become established at the level of the points of production corresponding to the volume of domestic demand.

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§4. A Graphic Comparison of the Domestic and Foreign Points of Production Scales Expressed in Domestic Currency

When comparing domestic and foreign points of production scales expressed in the domestic currency, it is useful to use a graphic representation, just as one does for comparisons within the same monetary area.

Supposing the price of an article in Britain is PB and the British exchange rate in France is R F B, then the British price in French francs will be R F B PB. The foreign points of production scale in francs can be derived from the points of production scale in the foreign country by multiplying each point of production level by the exchange rate at the instant considered.

If we visually depict, on the domestic points of production scale, the import and export points of each article with regard to the foreign market considered, we can see that all articles whose foreign points of production expressed in French francs are below the corresponding import points will be imported from abroad, whereas all articles whose foreign points of production expressed in French francs are above the corresponding export points will be exported. In the first case, the domestic price will be less than the price corresponding to the point of production and equal to the foreign price in French francs plus transportation, insurance, and customs charges. In the second case, the domestic price will be at the level of the domestic point of production for the quantity demanded in the domestic and foreign markets.

The only articles that will be produced in both countries simultaneously will be those articles whose foreign point of production in French francs is located between the corresponding import and export points. The price of those articles in each of the two markets will be at the level of the domestic point of production.

In figure 22, it has been assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that in the scale of British prices in France, the length R F B, representing the price of the British monetary unit in French francs, was measured by the unit of length. Due to this artificial device, the scale of British prices in French francs is the same as the scale of British prices in pounds sterling. Where this is not the case, the two price scales are similar, but not identical.

lf1981_figure_022.jpg

Fig. 22. [R F B: British exchange rate in France; PB: British prices in pounds sterling; PF: French prices in francs]

The chart shows—for wine, coal, and wheat—the three kinds of prices that have just been considered.

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§5. Foreign Exchange Parity

The preceding analysis shows that, in an economic universe consisting of two national monetary areas, the volume of international exchanges depends solely on the relative position, in either area, of the domestic price scale and that of the foreign price scale in domestic currency.

When, however, the positions of the price scales in the two countries considered are set by some authority, this relative position depends solely on the exchange rate of one country in relation to the other.

This being so, we shall term “foreign exchange parity” the foreign exchange rate at which the international balance of payments is in equilibrium, when the price of any article that is actually produced is at its point of production level.

It is therefore clear that no steady economic state can endure unless the foreign exchange rate is at the level of parity as defined above.

II. The Sovereignty of Rights Holders in the International Allocation of Their Purchasing Power and the Maximum Efficiency of Domestic Productive Apparatuses under an Inconvertible Currency System

§1. The Effect of an International Shift in Demand

Consider an economic universe comprising only two national monetary areas, for instance Britain and France. In each area, only true claims are eligible for discount, so that any right that is emptied onto the market does not have a volume other than that of the articles of wealth it encloses.

Suppose that, at the outset, the two economies function under steady state conditions: desired cash balances remain unchanged, hence balances of accounts in all market sectors—hence the aggregate balances of accounts of the two markets—are in equilibrium. The two balances of payments are therefore in mutual equilibrium.

Lastly, the price of any article actually produced in either country is at the corresponding point of production level. Productive activities are therefore allocated between the two countries as in the preceding analysis. The exchange rate of one country in the other is at parity level.

Suppose that, under these circumstances, the holder of a right that was emptied and then filled in the French market decides, without changing the market in which it has been emptied, to fill it in the British market.

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In the French market, this shift substitutes a foreign exchange demand for the demand pertaining to the abandoned article. All else equal, the British exchange rate in France will rise and the price of the abandoned article will fall. The combined variations will be such that the general price level index, which includes the price of the British currency in French francs, will remain unchanged in the absence of any change in the aggregate volume of the rights to be filled.

Thus, the demand transfer, in the first stage, simply causes a distortion in the French price scale, reflecting the demand transfer that took place.

But the foreign exchange movement, by bringing the volume of the rights emptied in the foreign exchange market to the level of the rights to be filled, will have provided foreign exchange demanders with the certainty that they will obtain the foreign currency needed to make purchases abroad. Thus, regardless of the scope and suddenness of the initial disturbance, the foreign exchange movement ensures the efficient exercise of foreign exchange demanders’ sovereignty in the international allocation of their purchasing power.

The rise in the British exchange rate in France, however, does not have as its sole effect restoration of foreign exchange market equilibrium.

The exchange rate rise makes the whole of the British price scale in French francs go up in relation to the French price scale. The rise therefore tends to push the French franc prices of British products imported into France above the import points for France, hence bringing closer the moment at which they will no longer be imported. Similarly, the rise in the British exchange rate in France tends to push the British prices (in French francs) of products that are not being exported from France above the export points, hence bringing closer the moment at which they will be exported.

When a British price in French francs rises above its import point in France, the import of the corresponding article ceases.

Similarly, when a British price in French francs rises above its export point, the quantities of the corresponding article purchased in Britain are exported from France.

In the first instance, a liability is eliminated from France’s balance of payments; in the second, an asset is introduced.

Thus the rise in the pound sterling tends to restore balance of payments equilibrium, not only by raising the value of the foreign currency actually supplied in the foreign exchange market but also by increasing its quantity. Thus, if equilibrium has not been restored as a result of the first procedure before an import or an export point is exceeded by the corresponding foreign price in French 344 francs, the extent of the foreign exchange movement necessary to restore balance of payments equilibrium will be reduced in proportion to the liabilities eliminated from, or the assets introduced into, the balance of payments concerned.

The scope of the foreign exchange movement brought on by a shift in demand will therefore never exceed that which is necessary to restore balance of payments equilibrium, through both a variation in the value of the foreign currency concerned and a shift in international trade flows. The extent of the movement will always be substantially less than it would have been in the absence of trade flow changes.

An international shift in demand does not only affect the international balance of payments, however. It also alters the allocation of demand in the two markets concerned.

In the previous example, demand—in France—for the abandoned article will decline; but as soon as an import or export point has been crossed, supply of the relevant article will be scaled down or demand stepped up.

This dual change tends to bring the price of the first article below its point of production, and to bring the price of the second article above its point of production.

The distortion in the price scale will tend to transfer toward the production of the second article resources that can no longer be profitably used for the production of the first.

Now, the article whose price will tend to rise is the one whose British price in francs meets the corresponding import or export point first—in other words, the article that, from the point of view of its production cost in France compared with its foreign production cost, is in the least unfavorable position among those articles that are already imported, or in the most favorable position among those articles that are not yet exported.

It can be similarly demonstrated that the price distortion that occurred in Great Britain will shift resources from the production of articles that will no longer be exported to France, or are beginning to be imported from France, to the production of the article for which there is a newfound demand by persons who have abandoned the French market.

Thus, the foreign exchange and price movements will have specialized the French and British economies in those productions that provide maximum efficiency to the Franco-British productive apparatus as a whole.

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Furthermore, in point of fact, the foreign exchange and price movement will be more gradual than the preceding outline would indicate, because any rise in British prices in francs, in relation to French prices, will bring buyers from the British to the French market in increasingly large numbers.

It should also be noted that in this mechanism, claims in money function just like any other articles in the market, with the ranking that their points of production in the two countries considered assign to them. If the interest rate in one country is relatively high, when compared with that in other countries, the export point of claims may be among the first to be crossed when the relative shift in the price scales, brought about by a deficit, develops its effects.

In this case, but only in this case, it is by exporting claims [denominated] in money—in other words, by borrowing abroad—that the deficit country will restore equilibrium to its balance of accounts.

The assumption, in the preceding analysis, was that shifts in trade flows or production immediately followed the cause that tended to bring them about. This hypothesis, however, holds only in the realm of theoretical economics. In every real universe, there are resistances and frictions, which delay the adjustments that are induced by any shift in demand.

Exchange and price movements persist, however, as long as the cause that has given rise to them has not disappeared, so beyond equilibrium levels, until the moment that the result that they tend to bring about has been achieved.

Thus, in a real universe, any shift in demand will generate an exchange movement greater than the one that would have been necessary in order to bring the foreign currency rate to its new parity level. Similarly, the shift will push the individual prices that it affects beyond their respective points of production. But such spreads, whose effects increase proportionally with their extent, will inevitably overcome opposing resistances and frictions, at least as long as the factors that characterize economic equilibrium have not been permanently immobilized.

In each and every case, therefore, but only after a certain time lag—which will be particularly long if the perturbing shift is rapid or the economy affected relatively less flexible—a steady state will be reestablished, implying a return to the exchange parity resulting from the new allocation of demand and a return of all individual prices to the points of production levels that this allocation entails.

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In this way, the price mechanism—of which the foreign exchange mechanism is only one specific case—will have ensured the full sovereignty of rights holders with regard to the selection of those markets in which they empty and fill the rights whose contents they wish to change. In addition, the price mechanism will have minimized the exchange and price disturbances that shifts in equilibrium involve, and will have maintained the efficiency of national productive apparatuses at its maximum level, taking into account people’s changing preferences and the shifting nature of things.

§2. The Influence of the Discount Rate

In the study of monetary regulation, we have shown 3 that any shift in the discount rate outside the range delimited by the economic rate and the market equilibrium rate causes shifts in the price scale in the opposite direction.

Thus, for instance, any rise in the French discount rate outside these limits will cause a fall in the price scale. This fall will bring about a relative shift in the scale of French prices and in the scale of British prices in French francs, of the same type as would have been brought on by a rise in the exchange rate for pounds sterling in France.

If the rise in the discount rate coincides with a shift in demand from the French toward the British market, then the exchange rate movement that would have restored balance of accounts equilibrium becomes unnecessary.

Thus, an appropriate handling of the discount rate may mitigate and, possibly, prevent temporary exchange rate variations resulting from international shifts in purchasing power under an inconvertible currency system.

III. The Sovereignty of Rights Holders in the International Allocation of Their Purchasing Power and the Maximum Efficiency of Domestic Productive Apparatuses under a Convertible Currency System

§1. The Mechanism for Pegging the Price Scale to the Conversion Rate of the Currency under a Gold Money System

The graphic representation of domestic and foreign price scales in domestic currency illuminates the mechanism for pegging the price scales to the legal 347 definitions of currencies, a mechanism whose existence we have already mentioned.4

Consider, in the first instance, a country that we assume has no relations with others, that operates under a convertible currency system, and where points of production under current circumstances are as indicated in figure 23.

lf1981_figure_023.jpg

Fig. 23.

If the economy is functioning under steady state conditions, then market prices are at the level of their corresponding points of production.

Now, suppose that the authorities suddenly decide to peg the domestic currency to gold, and that the parity adopted sets the price of the quantity unit of gold bullion at a level higher than its market price.

The central bank, or the mint, will take unrestrictedly the quantities of gold supplied at this price, to monetize them.

If desired cash balances remain unchanged, however, the rights that enclosed the monetized gold are emptied outside the market and filled in the market. Monetization therefore brings about a rise in the general price level. As the rise will continue as long as its cause has not disappeared, it will necessarily push the price scale to the level that brings the point of production for gold to the level of its legal price.

One would demonstrate in the same way that, if the legal price for gold were set at a level lower than its market price, this would generate an inverse shift.

Thus, in a country where gold is actually produced, the legal parity level selected sets ne varietur the level of the price scale.

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This level will remain unchanged as long as the position of the point of production for gold does not change in the points of production hierarchy. It will change, however, when this position shifts. This finding will be the basis of the theory of secular movements in the general price level, outlined in Chapter XXVIII.

We must also consider, however, the case of a country where gold production costs are too high for gold to be actually produced there.

To take a concrete example, let us take up the scenario explored in the previous section of this chapter.

Consider, as before, an economic universe comprising two monetary areas: Britain and France. The assumption will be that, at the outset, both areas are functioning under steady state conditions. Economic specialization between the two countries is such that the aggregate balance of accounts of each country, hence their mutual balance of payments, are in equilibrium.

When an article is produced in the domestic market, its price is at the level of the corresponding point of production; when the article is imported, its price is at the level of the foreign point of production plus transportation, insurance, and customs charges relating to import.

The assumption is that the point of production for gold occupies, in the price hierarchy, a position that is substantially lower in Britain than in France. As a result, it is only in Britain that gold deposits will actually be exploited.

The British currency is assumed to have been pegged to gold prior to the instant of time considered, whereas the French currency is still inconvertible. The British price scale occupies the position assigned to it by the legal definition of the currency. In France, the price scale and the pound sterling exchange rate are such that the Franco-British balance of payments is in equilibrium.

As France operates under an inconvertible currency system, gold is just one among all the articles of wealth in the market; its price follows the common rule. If gold is imported, for instance for industrial needs, the price will be at the level of the British price in French francs plus transportation, insurance, and customs charges relating to import.

The situation is represented in figure 24, where the quantity unit for gold is taken to be the gold content of one pound sterling. Under this conventional definition, the point of production for gold is, in each price scale, the regular and steady production price of this same quantity of gold.

lf1981_figure_024.jpg

Fig. 24. [R F B: British exchange rate in France; PB: British prices in pounds sterling; PF: French prices in francs]

The British exchange rate in France is the French franc price of this same quantity of gold deliverable in the British market.

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Suppose now that the French franc is pegged to gold at a level that gives to the weight of gold contained in one pound sterling a price lower than the point of production for gold in France, but significantly higher than the exchange rate, for instance at the level indicated by the arrow on the right-hand side of figure 24. This pegging level determines, in France, the import and export points of gold in relation to the British market.

At this level, buying gold in Britain and selling it to the French central bank in order to convert the French francs thus obtained into British pounds sterling will be a profitable operation. The operation will therefore be undertaken. Arbitrageurs who engage effectively in this operation will use pound sterling cash balances in order to buy gold in London, ship it to France, and sell it to the Bank of France. They will reconstitute their cash balances to initial levels by exchanging the French francs obtained against pounds sterling in the foreign exchange market.

This operation brings about demand for British pounds against French francs, and will push up the British exchange rate in France. The rise will continue until this rate bumps against the exit point of gold corresponding to the definition (in terms of gold) of the French franc.

From then on, arbitrageurs will complete their operations not by demanding foreign exchange but by sending shipments of gold: the French gold reserve will no longer increase.

The increase in the British exchange rate in France, however, raises the scale of British prices in French francs. All else equal, this will generate British purchases in France and eliminate French sales in Britain. As a result, a surplus develops in the aggregate balance of accounts of the French market. This raises the price scale in France until balance of accounts equilibrium is once more restored. Now, this will only be the case when the two price scales are, again, in the same relative position as before—in other words, when the French price scale has been lifted upward to the same extent as the exchange rate.

Thus, the setting of gold parity in France will have set the sterling exchange rate in France 5 and, through the intermediary of the price scale in countries where gold is actually produced, will have determined the level of the French domestic price scale.

Convertibility will therefore have pegged the price scale to the conversion rate: directly in gold-producing countries, by setting the price scale at such a 351 level that the point of production for gold and the legal gold price coincide, and indirectly in non-gold-producing countries, by setting the price scale at a level that ensures international balance of payments equilibrium.

§2. The Effect of a Shift in International Demand

Let us consider an economic universe comprising two monetary areas, Britain and France, each with a currency convertible to gold. The assumption is that, all else equal, the gold production cost is significantly higher in France than in Britain, so that gold is extracted only in Britain.

The assumption is also that, at the outset, the two economies are functioning under steady state conditions: desired cash balances remain unchanged, balances of accounts in all market sectors are in equilibrium, as are, therefore, the aggregate balances of accounts of both countries and their mutual balance of payments. Prices of articles that are actually produced in each country are at their corresponding points of production. The allocation of productive activities between the two countries is dictated by the mechanism analyzed in the previous section.

Lastly, the pound sterling exchange rate in France is located between the entry and exit points of gold.

The situation in the two markets is, for instance, as shown in figure 25.

lf1981_figure_025.jpg

Fig. 25. [R F B: British exchange rate in France; PB: British prices in pounds sterling; PF: French prices in francs]

In Britain, the price scale is at such a level that it brings the point of production of gold to the level of the price that the legal definition of the currency entails. In France, the price scale is at a level that ensures equilibrium in the Franco-British balance of payments.

Suppose that, in these circumstances, the holder of a right that was previously emptied and refilled in the French market decides that, without changing the market where it is emptied, he will refill his right in the British market.

The transfer will substitute, in the French market, a demand for foreign exchange for the demand previously expressed in the abandoned market sector. The pound sterling exchange rate in France will rise, the price of the abandoned article will fall, and the two combined variations will be such that the general price level including the exchange rate will remain unchanged.

This dual movement will—as under an inconvertible currency system—tend to correct the disturbance caused by the shift in demand. If this dual movement succeeds in correcting the disturbance before the exchange rate bumps against the exit point of gold, the result will be exactly the same as under an inconvertible currency system: the variation in the exchange rate and the distortion in 352353 the price scale will have ensured the sovereignty of rights holders in the international allocation of their demand and maintained the maximum efficiency of the domestic productive apparatuses.

Generally, however, this will not be so. Very quickly the exchange rate, in its upward movement, will come up against the exit point of gold. From then on, persons wishing to buy in Britain will find it advantageous, rather than buying pounds sterling in the foreign exchange market, to exchange their French francs against gold at the Bank of France, in order to ship the gold thus obtained to London and sell it there for pounds sterling.

The operation, being profitable, will be undertaken: as soon as it has been effected, the exchange rate will remain unchanged, the rights that have been emptied in the French market so as to be refilled abroad being filled with gold, not in the market, but outside the market by drawing on the reserves of the central bank. Thus, the demand transfer will generate in France a supply unmatched by demand, hence a fall in the price scale.

Inversely, the gold inflow generates a demand unmatched by supply on the British market, hence a tendency for the price scale to rise.

In an economy free of any resistances or frictions, however, if the country is gold producing, the price scale is immobilized—as a result of the convertibility mechanism—at a level that sets gold’s point of production at the level of its legal price. The tendency of the price scale to rise simply shifts production resources from gold production to the production of other articles of wealth: the price scale remains unchanged.

If there are resistances and frictions, the price scale will be raised temporarily above its equilibrium level.

The British price scale will therefore be stable or on a rising trend.

The fall in the French price scale, occurring at a time when the pound sterling exchange rate in French francs remains unchanged and the British price scale is stable or on a rising trend, will raise the British price scale in French francs in relation to the French price scale.

Thus, from the moment the pound sterling exchange rate in France has bumped against the exit point of gold, the exchange rate will remain unchanged, but the relative shift that the rise in the exchange rate would have brought about, under an inconvertible currency system, will result from a relative shift in the two price scales.

This relative shift will bring about, mutatis mutandis, all the consequences mentioned in the preceding section.

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The relative shift will therefore have for effect, in the first instance—all things remaining equal as far as the allocation of production resources is concerned—to bring the total value of the wealth supplied in the two markets to the level of the rights intended to enclose them. In other words, the relative shift provides rights holders with the certainty that they will be able to fill their rights in the markets of their choice. The relative shift will thereby ensure the sovereignty of the rights holders in the geographical allocation of their demands.

The relative shift, however, tends to bring the British price in French francs of products that were being imported from Britain into France above the level of the French import point, hence putting an end to their importation. It also tends to bring above the export point the British price in French francs of products that—although not imported—were not yet being exported, hence causing their exportation.

Now, as soon as an import or export point is crossed, a liability is eliminated from, or an asset introduced into, France’s balance of payments with regard to Britain. Thus, the relative shift in the two price scales tends to restore equilibrium in the aggregate balances of accounts of the two countries, not only as a result of fluctuations in the aggregate value of the products supplied in their respective markets but also by shifts in supplies and demands that are expressed in these markets. This is why the extent of the relative shift in the price scale is always less extensive than the shift that would have been necessary to restore equilibrium in the absence of any shifts in trade flows.

As soon as equilibrium is restored in the aggregate balances of accounts of the two countries, on account of this dual effect, their mutual balance of payments is once again in equilibrium; the gold movement ceases.

Due to the relative shift of the two price scales, however, the first article that ceases to be imported, or that begins to be exported, is the article whose import or export point is first crossed by the British price in French francs. It is therefore the article whose point of production occupies the lowest position in the French price hierarchy relative to the position it occupies in the British price hierarchy, therefore the article whose circumstances of production in France—compared with those that prevail in Britain—are the least unfavorable or the most favorable. Thus, the relative shift in the price scales forces specialization of the two economies in those activities that, again, in view of the shift in demand, ensure their maximum efficiency.

It should be noted that, in this process, gold performs simply like any other article of wealth that can be produced in the community considered. If gold’s 355 point of production is low, the gold export point may well be one of the first export points to be crossed: the debtor country will extract and export gold in order to obtain the purchasing power necessary to settle its imports bill. If, however, gold’s production cost is high, there will be no gold production and the debtor country will be led to specialize in the production of other articles of wealth.

Similarly, claims themselves will be used as means of settlement in international trade only with the ranking assigned to them by their point of production.

The shift in international demand that occurs after an import or an export point has been crossed tends to push the corresponding price away from its point of production. The resulting distortion in the price scale is only temporary, however. Its emergence will immediately induce transfers of production resources that bring market prices back to their respective points of production. A steady state is then restored and the economy has adjusted to the perturbing shift in demand.

Thus, in each and every case, the shift in demand causes the abandoned country to specialize in the production of the article that enables it to obtain at the least cost—while taking into account the natural order of things and human preferences—the article of wealth demanded abroad.

In this section, our assumption has also been that shifts in prices and production resources followed immediately after the causes that tended to bring them about. In reality, however, this assumption does not hold. The preceding analysis does, however, reveal that shifts in price scales and in specific prices will necessarily persist until the result that they tend to bring about has been achieved. Therefore, they inevitably reestablish initial equilibrium, regardless of the scope of the disturbance; but when the disruptive shift is considerable and swift, or when it occurs in an economic environment that is slow to respond, the extent of price shifts will exceed that which would have been necessary in order to restore equilibrium in an economy free of any resistances or frictions. Only when such shifts have actually brought about the necessary changes in trade flows and the necessary transfers of production resources will they cease and will price scales and individual prices be restored to their respective levels of equilibrium.

Thus, under a gold currency system, as under an inconvertible currency system, the price mechanism ensures the sovereignty of rights holders and maximum efficiency in the use of the domestic productive apparatuses. Whereas 356 under an inconvertible currency system equilibrium is restored by an exchange rate variation, under a gold currency system equilibrium is restored by a variation in the gold reserves.

In either case, the variations in the exchange rate or in the gold reserves persist only to the extent that the equilibrium that they tend to further has not been restored. These variations will therefore be limited in scope and can only temporarily exceed—when resistances and frictions impede the necessary adjustments—the scope that would have been necessary in order to correct the initial disturbance in an economic environment without any “viscosity.”

§3. The Influence of the Discount Rate

We have shown 6 that any rise in the discount rate beyond the market equilibrium rate causes debtors of matured bills to try to obtain in the market—rather than through the renewal of discounted bills—the money required for their settlement.

In a period when the desired cash balance remains unchanged, such a diversion generates in the market a supply unmatched by a corresponding demand, thus a tendency for the general price level to fall. But the convertibility mechanism absorbs in the form of gold, in order to monetize it, the equivalent of the articles of wealth supplied but not demanded. It thereby generates a demand unmatched by supply, which offsets the supply unmatched by demand resulting from the rise in the discount rate and ensures stability of the price scale, the result of convertibility.

If, however, the rise in the discount rate occurs when a shift in demand directed abroad generates a demand for gold in the market, the bank would not be faced with the obligation to buy that the rate movement would otherwise have required. As the bank does not buy, there is no demand unmatched by supply, and therefore the influence that prevented the price scale from falling as a result of the rise in the discount rate disappears; the fall can develop its effects.

Thus, raising the discount rate, when a shift in demand to a foreign country causes a balance of payments deficit, can—if the rate increase is sufficiently large in scope—restore equilibrium as a result of a shift in the price scale, without any variation in the gold reserves.

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Inversely, in the country to which demand has been transferred, the fall in the discount rate can prevent an increase in the gold reserves, without impairing the mechanism that tends to restore equilibrium.

Thus, in each and every case, the proper handling of the discount rate allows for mitigating or avoiding the repercussions of an international shift in demand on the metallic reserves of the countries concerned.

§4. Gold Production and the Price Hierarchy in Gold Currency Countries

The allocation of production resources is usually ensured by a shift in the market price relative to the corresponding point of production.

Now, when it comes to gold, under a convertible currency system, the situation is different: the gold price in the market remains immutably fixed at the level resulting from the legal definition of the currency.

In this case, regulation is ensured, as in the general case, by a shift in the price within the points of production scale. This shift results from a shift in the points of production scale relative to an unchanging gold price, however, rather than from a price shift in an unchanging points of production scale.

To take a concrete example, consider again the economic universe represented in figure 25.

As gold’s point of production is significantly higher within the price hierarchy in France than in Britain, gold production will become located in Britain. The gold price in France—if we disregard transportation, insurance, and customs charges—is the same as in Britain.

Suppose that, in these circumstances, demand for gold in France increases, for instance due to a noticeable rise in gold consumption by the pharmaceutical industry.

The gold price will tend to rise in the French market. Now, the central bank will sell at the legal price any quantity that is demanded but not supplied by the market, and demands will therefore be deflected from the market to the central bank.

Thus, supply shaped by gold demanders will not be matched by any demand in the market. The volume of the rights emptied in the market will exceed the volume of the rights to be filled. The French price scale will fall, the legal fixity of the gold price notwithstanding.

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The fall in the price scale in France, however, will generate a surplus in the Franco-British balance of payments. The exchange rate of the pound sterling in France will deteriorate, and will quickly bump against the gold entry point. From then on, anyone in Britain who has settlements to effect in France will find it advantageous to ship gold to France rather than buy French francs in the foreign exchange market. The gold thus shipped will be offered for sale in Paris, where it will supply—without drawing on monetary reserves—gold users.

In order to obtain gold on the British market, however, debtors in French francs will supply without demanding. The British price scale, in turn, will tend to fall. Thus, the fall in the general price level, stemming from an increase in gold demand in France, will tend to spread to all gold-producing countries and, through them, to all gold currency countries.

In a gold-producing country, however, the fall in the price scale leaves the legal price of the currency unchanged. This generates a widespread shift in production resources toward gold-producing enterprises. The shift will persist as long as the price distortion that brought it about has not disappeared. All else equal, the effect of the shift is therefore to raise gold production to such a level that the price scale in the gold-producing country will be brought back to its previous level,7 while enabling it to meet new gold demands from non-gold-producing countries.

Thus, any additional demand for gold spreads its effects to the community of countries under the gold system. Under a very slight margin of mutual adjustment, resulting from gold point differentials, everything takes place as if these countries formed one single monetary area, where the general price level moved globally.

Within this one area, gold production is directed by shifts in the price scale in gold-producing countries.

The hierarchy that becomes established, at each instant of time, between the price levels prevailing in the various gold currency countries directs the newly extracted gold toward the countries that desire it. This ensures an allocation of gold reserves that conforms to the wishes of rights holders.

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The interlocking solidarity between gold currency countries is one of the essential features of the situation created by convertibility. In particular we shall see in Chapter XXVIII that convertibility subjects such countries as a whole to a unified pace of economic evolution over time.

§5. The Particular Case of the Gold Exchange Standard

A convertible currency system may comprise one particular form, under which a central bank is empowered by its statutes to buy not only gold and claims denominated in domestic currency but also claims in foreign currencies, provided that the currencies in which these claims are denominated be themselves convertible to gold. This is known as the gold exchange standard.

Again, consider the situation of two countries, Britain and France, operating under the gold currency system, with this difference, however: that the French central bank, for instance, is authorized to hold claims denominated in pounds sterling, the assumption being that the pound sterling is freely convertible to gold.8

Suppose that, at a time when the two countries are functioning under steady economic conditions, a transfer of demand from Britain to France occurs.

Demand for French francs against pounds sterling will cause a rise in the French franc exchange rate against pounds sterling. But when this rate reaches, not the gold exit point, but the point of gold parity, it will become profitable to buy claims denominated in pounds sterling in London and sell them to the Bank of France against francs,9 rather than buying French francs in the exchange market.

The exchange rate of the French franc in pounds sterling will cease to rise as soon as it bumps against this bar.

If, at that time, equilibrium has not been restored between the two balances of accounts, any shift in demand still to be satisfied will bring about, in London, a supply of the undesired article of wealth and a demand for claims denominated in sterling, and, in Paris, a supply of claims denominated in pounds sterling and a demand for the desired article of wealth.

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In London, the demand for claims denominated in pounds sterling tends to lower the interest rate and, all else equal, deflects from discounting to the market demands for the renewal of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

As long as the shift in demand is less than the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity, there is a supply unmatched by demand in the market, and as a result the British general price level tends to fall. What happens is similar to what would have happened in the same circumstances under the gold standard system.

If, however, the shift in demand exceeds the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity—and this will always be the case when the shift is a sizable one—then this brings about, for the entire amount of this excess, a mere transfer of demand in the British market from undesired articles of wealth to claims having equivalent value. The shift therefore has no effect on the balance of accounts of the market and leaves the British general price level unchanged.

By contrast, in the French market, the supply of claims denominated in sterling—eligible for discount under the gold exchange standard system—quickly brings the market rate to the level of the discount rate. Once the discount rate has been reached, claims denominated in sterling are supplied, not to the market, but outside the market, to the central bank, whereas the rights from which the claims have been emptied are filled in the market, with desired articles of wealth. The balance of accounts of the French market develops a surplus, just as would have been the case under a straightforward gold currency system: there exists a demand that is unmatched by supply, hence a tendency for the general price level in the French market to rise.

It is therefore clear that the gold exchange standard does not eliminate the relative shift in the price scales that tends to restore equilibrium in the two balances of accounts. This relative shift is not, however, the result of a dual movement—a fall in the country that purchasing power leaves behind, and a rise in the country to which purchasing power flows—but simply the outcome of a rise in the surplus country with no fall in the deficit country. There is still a relative shift, but only as a result of a rise relative to a fixed floor rather than a falling floor.

Everything takes place as if the gold exchange standard system enabled one country to receive an inflow of purchasing power without another country suffering a corresponding outflow, to have a balance of accounts surplus not matched by a deficit in another country.

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If shifts in production resources were instantaneous, as would be the case in an economy where there are no resistances and no frictions, this change would have no consequences.

In a real economy, however, the gold exchange standard reduces by half the effectiveness of the mechanism that tends to restore balance of payments equilibrium and delays the moment that equilibrium is actually restored. The gold exchange standard therefore increases the scope of the disturbances that will occur before equilibrium is restored.

This can entail grave practical consequences during periods when major international transfers take place. In fact, the gold exchange standard bears a large measure of responsibility for the exceptional scope of the period of prosperity that ended in 1929 and for the gravity of the crisis that followed.

IV. Considerations Common to the Various International Settlement Systems

§1. Similarities and Dissimilarities between Inconvertible and Convertible Currency Systems

The preceding analysis brings to light the features common to inconvertible and convertible currency systems. Both ensure equilibrium in domestic balances of accounts and, therefore, international balance of payments equilibrium. Both operate so as to specialize national economies in the production of those articles of wealth that provide them with maximum efficiency and, in particular, will enable them to obtain at the least cost those articles of wealth that their nationals decide to purchase abroad.

Equilibrium and specialization are, however, brought about by different means under the two monetary systems.

Under an inconvertible currency system, equilibrium and specialization are the outcome of combined exchange rate and price movements, which cause the relative shifts in the scales of domestic prices and foreign prices in domestic currency necessary to bring them about.

Under a convertible currency system, the price scale is maintained at an unchanging level in the markets of gold-producing countries, by a shift in production resources between the production of gold and that of other articles of wealth.

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Exchange rate fluctuations themselves are kept within a narrow range by the functioning of the convertibility mechanism.

As a result, among the three factors that can ensure balance of payments equilibrium between two gold currency countries (the two domestic price scale levels and the exchange rate), two factors (the price scale in a gold-producing country and its exchange rate) are fixed.

And yet, as we have seen, balance of equilibrium is ensured even in this case. Equilibrium is then brought about, however, except for a very minor margin of variation corresponding to the band between the entry and exit points of gold, as a result of a shift in the price scale in the non-gold-producing country.

This shift is triggered, the moment the exchange rate comes to bump against one of the import or export points limiting its fluctuations, by gold movements, which thereby take the place of exchange rate variations.

Inconvertibility and convertibility are therefore only two different modalities of one and the same mechanism, which ensures—by means of relative price variations—balance of accounts equilibrium and the sovereignty of all holders of property rights.

§2. The Two Principles of International Exchanges

The international exchange mechanism boils down to two principles, which, mutatis mutandis, are similar to those governing exchanges between the various markets within a given monetary area.

The first principle reflects the fact that the gap between the domestic price and the foreign price in the domestic currency is always less than total transportation, insurance, and customs charges relating to import or export. This is not surprising: the limitation is due to the fact that the price in one of the two markets is no longer determined by the circumstances of local production, and adjusts to the price resulting from the circumstances of production in the other market, as soon as the gap between these two sets of circumstances tends to create a price differential higher than cumulative transportation, insurance, and customs charges between the two markets.

Such a limitation implies, of course, a similar limitation with regard to the differential between price indices representing averages of all market prices. This can be stated in a simple formula, if one accepts that price indices in the two markets are calculated according to the same formula, using the same 363 weighting coefficients. This assumption is quite acceptable in practice, because price indices are not particularly sensitive to weighting coefficients.

The limited scope of individual price differentials leads to the following principle:

PRINCIPLE I, or the purchasing power parity principle: If we consider two countries where prices are free, and between which goods can move freely, the difference between the general price index in the one country and the general price index in the other, expressed in the currency of the first country, is always less than the average (calculated with the index formula) of the cumulative total of transportation, insurance, and customs charges relating to shipment from one country to the other of all the articles whose prices enter into the calculation of the indices.

It has sometimes been argued that this principle determines the exchange rate of the currency of one country in the other. Our analysis shows that this is not so, since the relation arrived at includes three variables: two price levels and an exchange rate. Having knowledge of one relation between the three variables is clearly insufficient, in and of itself, to determine these variables. Such a relation is a mere truism, with no causal implications, a mere statement of the fact that one stops buying abroad that which is more affordable domestically.

On the other hand, the purchasing power parity principle makes it possible to define, on both sides of the general domestic price level, two aggregate import and export points, between which the general level of foreign prices in domestic currency will always be contained.

Within the interval that delimits, on either side of the domestic price level, the aggregate import and export points, the general index of foreign prices in the domestic currency will be, at each instant of time, at the level that ensures balance of payments equilibrium, regardless of the shifts in price levels within the two countries considered.

If we call disparity between the general levels of domestic and foreign prices in the domestic currency the difference between the general domestic price level index and the general index of foreign prices in the domestic currency, one can state the following principle:

PRINCIPLE II, or the disparity principle: If we consider two countries where prices are free and between which goods move freely, the disparity between the general level of domestic prices and foreign prices in the domestic currency tends 364 to ensure, at each instant of time, equilibrium in their respective balances of accounts, as a result of its variations within the interval between the aggregate import and export points.

These two principles, which could easily be extended to a universe comprising a large number of national monetary areas, provide an overview of the mechanism that ensures geographical equilibrium between economic systems at each instant of time.

In order to appreciate the full significance of these principles, one should bear in mind that they will inevitably be effective, because the forces they set in motion develop their effects until the result that they tend to bring about has been achieved.

The second principle accounts, in particular, for the fact that, under a free price system and free trade, a country is always able to settle its foreign debts.10

Moreover, in the absence of this principle, no metallic currency system would have been able to subsist. The mere fact that such systems last, in periods when prices and trade are free, provides, in and of itself, conclusive evidence of the existence, full effectiveness, and sensitivity of a mechanism whose nature and functioning we have only sought to define up until now.*

§3. The Effects of International Exchanges

International exchanges have all the characteristics of exchanges between regional markets within the same monetary area. These characteristics have been 365 analyzed at length in the preceding chapter. We will not reprise that presentation here; we will simply adapt the conclusions already arrived at to the specific situation considered in this chapter.

We could demonstrate, as we did in the case of regional exchanges, that as long as prices are not blocked or the quantities exchanged set by authoritative measures, international exchanges lead to production resources specializing in those uses that ensure their maximum efficiency. In this way, they raise the standards of living of the people affected to the maximum level compatible with the technical circumstances of production.

We could also demonstrate, as in the preceding chapter, that a customs duty in international trade is the exact equivalent of an increase in transportation charges, and its only effect is to move the import point of the article concerned away from the corresponding point of production. A customs duty is therefore an obstacle to optimal specialization, and only tends to deprive nationals in the “protected” country of more favorable circumstances of production, hence from possible higher standards of living, which they would enjoy if they were to purchase in the country against which they protect themselves.

It is true that a customs duty, if it succeeds in bringing the import point below the foreign price in domestic currency, maintains in the protected country a production that would not otherwise exist. This will simply have displaced another production providing a greater return, however. No economic activity is created, and the output obtained with the protected production resources has simply been debased.

The conclusions arrived at in the preceding chapter under the title “Specialization and the Standard of Living”11 could also be extended to international exchanges. We could show that the price mechanism provides human labor, under a free price system, free rates of exchange, and free trade, with its maximum productivity.

Lastly, we must, in the case of international exchanges as in the case of domestic exchanges, refute the fallacy that views a customs duty as an obstacle to the free operation of the price mechanism. Allegedly, the world of the liberal economy governed by the price mechanism would be a purely theoretical concept, as there is almost no economy that is not protected by tariffs.

Nothing could be further from the truth. A customs duty is not an obstacle to the free functioning of the price mechanism. A customs duty influences 366 certain price factors, but does not in any way prevent the price mechanism from bringing about and safeguarding balance of accounts equilibrium, taking account of the situation that it creates. Whatever degree of protection it affords, a customs duty does not shelter the exchanges it affects from market forces.

We do not purport to study here the complex political problem of tariff protection. We do not view well-being as the ultimate purpose of human societies, and we accept the fact that a given community may well prefer to maintain certain forms of economic activity to the detriment of its standard of living. For instance, we accept the idea that a country, even apart from any national security considerations, may wish to safeguard its agriculture, by renouncing the material benefits that industrialization would provide.

Our view, however, is that such a policy should be adopted knowingly, and that it should not be based on the sophisms and falsehoods usually adduced in justification, but rather on a clear-eyed awareness of the consequences it entails.

The preceding analysis allows us to further elaborate the consequences of tariff protection and to choose in full conscious awareness between the resulting benefits and the inherent costs.

§4. International Capital Movements and the Pseudoproblem of Transfers

The title of this section improperly describes the subject matter that will be explored here. The term “capital movements” commonly refers to transactions whereby a right that has been emptied in one market is filled in another. Within this meaning, the term “capital movements” refers to transfers by the incomes holder who spends them in a market other than the one in which the incomes were obtained, by the capitalist who invests abroad funds obtained in the domestic market or repatriates to his own country the cash proceeds of foreign sales. Transfers in settlement of foreign debts are also capital movements.

In all the above-mentioned instances, what is meaningful is not the geographical shift of a capital, in the economic sense previously defined—which is at issue—but the geographical shift of a right between the time at which it is emptied and the time at which it is filled with nonmonetary wealth. Although we shall use the conventional phrase, we propose to use it jointly with the term “shift in purchasing power,” which is more accurate.

The preceding analysis shows that any shift in purchasing power causes a shift in articles of wealth, which safeguards equilibrium in the balances of ac367counts concerned. The shift does not affect just any articles of wealth, however, but those that enable the debtor country to pay off its debt on the least costly terms—in other words, to secure the resources necessary in order to settle its purchase at the least expense.

These resources will be the proceeds of the sales of goods, services, or claims, depending on whether the country concerned is well- or ill-suited as a producer of these various articles of wealth, provided however that these are in demand abroad. Within each of the above categories, the article actually exported will be the one that the debtor produces the best, or, to invoke less clear but more rigorous terminology, involving the least sacrifice in terms of marginal undesirability.

Knowledge of the mechanism that regulates balances of payments shows, once again, that in a system where prices are not blocked and the quantities exchanged are not fixed authoritatively, international balances of payments will inevitably be in equilibrium since the influence that ensures their equilibrium persists as long as the result that it tends to produce has not been obtained.

This essential finding accounts for most of the features relating to international transfers.

a) Foreign Incomes and Trade Balances

If a country has a considerable foreign debt, it will have to transfer abroad the yearly amounts required for debt servicing. This country will therefore export, among the articles of wealth that its creditors consider to be most desirable, those that it can produce at the least cost. Generally these articles of wealth will be goods, and its trade balance will develop a surplus in excess of its external payments. The debtor country may just as well export services, however, which are invisible items in its trade balance, or even claims if its level of indebtedness increases further. In each and every case, the completed transfers will restore balance of payments equilibrium, as a result of the shifts in articles of wealth that they will have brought about. Statistical reports will simply describe the way in which this equilibrium has been restored.

Similarly, if a country’s nationals obtain substantial incomes abroad, these incomes will improve the assets side of the international balance of payments. This improvement will be offset, on the liabilities side of the ledger, by imports of articles of wealth of equivalent value. But the articles of wealth imported will be of the kind that the country concerned is least suited for producing, among those that its nationals desire to acquire. Depending on whether these articles of 368 wealth are goods, services, or claims, they either will or will not show in the trade balance but, regardless of the state of the trade balance, the country’s balance of payments will be in equilibrium.

In the majority of cases, it is goods, whose international transfers are recorded in trade statistics, that will be imported. Where this is the case, any country that obtains substantial incomes from abroad will have a trade balance deficit, and any country with a foreign debt will have a trade balance in surplus.

This accounts for the fact, which comes as a surprise to the layman, that wealthy countries nearly always have trade balance deficits, and poor countries a trade balance surplus.12 The widespread nature of this phenomenon and its paradoxical appearance should be sufficient evidence of the irresistible efficiency of the international balance of payments mechanism as described above—not in a theoretical universe, but in reality.

b) Psychological Capital Migrations

Periods of trouble have displayed many examples of massive shifts in purchasing power, mainly prompted by expectations of monetary upsets. In view of their suddenness, they are true experiments in the scientific sense of the term, and their study has yielded highly rewarding teachings.

We have analyzed some such typical shifts in our Theory of Monetary Phenomena.13 These shifts confirm, with striking accuracy, the consequences that theory had led us to expect.

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More recently, the case of Germany has provided a new illustration of the extraordinary effectiveness of the stabilizing mechanism: between 1930 and 1931, the German trade balance “improved” by about 1,500 million marks, or—at the time—close to 18 billion francs, as a result of mass capital exports prompted by monetary fears.

c) The Pseudoproblem of Transfers

Major shifts in purchasing power have often been required for the settlement of commitments arising out of political agreements—in other words, not attributable to economic factors.

Such transfers require that the debtor provide contributions in foreign currency.

It has often been argued that the debtor’s capacity to pay was limited by the amount of foreign currency that could be acquired against domestic currency and that, in order to avoid economic disturbances, the amount of transfers required had to be subordinated to the level of availabilities.

This contention was solemnly affirmed on the occasion of the Dawes Plan, in 1924, when reparations payments imposed on a vanquished Germany were arranged. The plan provided for the creation of a “committee on transfers,” whose task was to tailor Germany’s payments to her payment capacity in foreign currencies. In particular, the committee was to limit or suspend German payments if it felt the amount involved exceeded Germany’s “transfer capacities.”

Such a contention rests on the idea that the concept of transfer capacity is meaningful.

The preceding analysis, however, shows that where prices and the quantities exchanged are not fixed authoritatively, any rights holder is ensured that he can fill his right with any article of wealth he may choose to acquire, in any market he pleases, provided however that only true rights be eligible for discount.

Any demand, once expressed, will give rise to the trade flows that will come to satisfy it. If demand remains unexpressed, however, there will be no trade flows.

Therefore, the volume of resources that can be transferred is determined, not by so-called transfer capacities, set by the natural order of things, but rather by the volume of actual transfers, which, regardless of its size, sets the volumes of the resources supplied in the market so that these transfers can take place.

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Attempting to find in so-called transfer capacities the limit to possible transfers, is to make the mistake of André Gide’s character Nathaniel, who “followed, so as to guide himself, a lamp that he held in his own hand.”14

It is true that the automatic character of transfers is ensured only to the extent that true rights alone are eligible for discount. We propose to show in the following chapter that a budget deficit generates a balance of payments deficit and that, if a right that is to be transferred is a false right, its transfer may be impossible.

This is the reason for the deplorable confusion that is responsible for the fact that analysts have tried to demonstrate that so-called transfer capacities set limits to transfer possibilities, whereas such limits are only due to taxability limits in debtor states.

When it comes to international transfers, the problem is not one of foreign exchange (as a foreign exchange problem is always resolved automatically) but a problem of taxation or borrowing. It concerns levying the resources necessary in order to avoid a deficit that would generate false rights.

In general, the pseudoproblem of transfers is only a veil—with ostensibly technical considerations—used to conceal the powerlessness and the ill will of governments that do not wish to resolve the mundane problem of equilibrium in their Treasury, taking into account the quantity of the contributions to be transferred.*

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§5. The Futility of Any Distinction between Domestic and International Exchanges

The similarity that exists between the considerations set out in this chapter and those in the preceding chapter is quite enlightening. It shows the profound sameness of the mechanisms, in various forms, that ensure—in all monetary systems—the regulation of exchanges, whether these be between different markets within one single monetary area or between different monetary areas.

In each and every case, regulation [of exchanges] is ensured by a relative shift in the points of production and price scales. The only difference—purely technical—between domestic exchanges and international exchanges is that the domestic currency price of an article purchased abroad depends not only on its foreign price but [also] on the exchange rate. Under a convertible currency system, however, this exchange rate can only fluctuate within a narrow range.

All exchanges, whatever the geographical distribution may be of the market sectors in which they take place, have only one purpose: to meet the exchanger’s wish by providing his right with the desired content. Purchase abroad brings to the buyer the benefit of whatever favorable circumstances of production may exist in the foreign country, hence the possibility of obtaining at the least sacrifice the articles of wealth of his choice. Regardless of whether an exchange is domestic or international, however, in all cases the balance of payments of the market where it originates is in equilibrium, because it cannot not be in equilibrium.

One realizes how fallacious the contention is that gives preference to exports over domestic sales and views purchases abroad as reprehensible.

Any foreign sale implies the importation of an article of wealth of equal value. Any foreign purchase leads to the export of an article of wealth of equal value.

To believe that prohibiting the purchase of a foreign car promotes the domestic industry is lying to oneself and lying to the whole community. To abstain from buying a foreign car leads to the sale of a domestically manufactured car, but also prevents access of another domestic product to a foreign market. And if manufacturing a domestic car requires more effort than would have been required, on an equal value basis, in order to manufacture another product for which the domestic industry would have been better suited, production of the domestic car requires a certain amount of fruitless effort, hence a net loss of welfare, without any benefit accruing to the community.

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Moreover, how can one think that a simple monetary border line can change the economic significance of a transaction? Did the usefulness of the sale of one ton of Norwegian ore in Sweden increase overnight when Norway separated from Sweden?

Exchange increases welfare because it provides the exchangers with the benefit of circumstances of production that are better than would have been the case otherwise. The more favorable these circumstances, the more beneficial the exchange, whether it be a domestic or international one.

Paeans extolling exports are nonsense and falsehoods.

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Chapter XXIV: Journey to the Land of False Rights

§1. A General View of Procedures Likely to Generate False Rights

A right will be true or false depending on whether its volume is equal to or greater than the value of the wealth that it encloses.

If rights were determined only by their contents, they could only be rights in kind, as is the case with shareholders’ rights. Their volume would be determined, at each instant of time, by the amount of wealth enclosed. There could be no false rights.

False rights cannot exist unless certain rights—for instance, bond holders’ rights—are the subject of an a priori definition: depending on whether the content measures up to the measure of the right or not, a right will be true or false.

Let us recall here that a true right provides the rights holder with the ability to actually dispose, hence purchasing power, to the extent of its nominal value, since its content can be exchanged, on an equal value basis, against money, and money against any article of wealth that is supplied in the market.

By contrast, a false right provides purchasing power only to the extent of the wealth it encloses. When it comes to all the difference between a false right’s nominal value and the value of its content, the ability to dispose—which the right purportedly provides—is only illusory.

Therefore, it is by comparing the volume of a right with the value at which its content can actually be sold that one will know whether a right is true or false.

Rights are always rights of a [natural or legal] person, however. Yet in most cases, accounting procedures do not deal separately with the various rights of one and the same individual. These are viewed as a lump, so that they appear to be filled with all the wealth included on the assets side of his patrimony, or, more exactly, on the assets side of the patrimony holder’s claim to his own patrimony.

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Thus, the rights included on the liabilities side of a patrimony are true or false, depending on whether the total sales value of the goods that make up the assets is equal to or less than their nominal volume.1

The procedures that assign false rights are those that introduce, on the liabilities side, rights of a volume greater than the value of the articles of wealth they introduce on the assets side.

The simplest of such procedures is that used by a patrimony holder who inflates the value of his assets compared with their actual value at market prices. This is the procedure used by a tradesman who overvalues his inventories in order to mask his insolvency. This is also the procedure used by an entrepreneur who, in his records, enters at their purchase price goods whose market price has declined or which—by mistake or fraudulently—were purchased at a price higher than their true price. Lastly, this is also the procedure followed by anyone still including in his assets goods that have been used up, lost, or wasted.

Such procedures enable the person drawing up the balance sheet to manipulate the volume of the rights entered on the liabilities side. The illusion created, however, will carry no serious consequences. The volume of the patrimony holder’s rights will be increased only insofar as the enclosed wealth remains overvalued. But the moment the enclosed wealth faces the test of the market, the moment its value is no longer an arbitrary estimation and becomes the measure of an objective size, the illusion will be dispelled; the patrimony holder will have to agree to a “capital reduction” that scales the container down to the size of the contents.

Thus, false rights last only as long as they are filled with illusory values, which the rights holder was able to decide upon because he was alone in assessing these values.

Including false rights on the liabilities side of a patrimony, however, involves more serious consequences if the balance sheet includes third parties’ rights. In this case, false rights may emerge on the occasion of an exchange leading to the transferor being assigned rights in excess of the value of the wealth transferred or as a result of consumption, loss, or depreciation of such wealth.

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So long as the patrimony holder possesses capital [in the sense of equity], however, third parties will “receive their full rights”; only own rights may become false. It is only when [the patrimony holder’s] own capital [in the sense of equity] has been exhausted that third parties’ rights may be infringed upon.

Where third parties’ rights are false, they will remain so only insofar as the rights holder allows them to remain filled with an overvalued claim. The moment the rights holder resolves to provide them with a different content, false rights will have to be devalued.

Thus, in this case also, the accounting illusion will not have outlived the illusory value that created it. Furthermore, the illusion has strictly limited consequences, since it only affects the debtor or his creditor.

In the two previous cases, overvaluation of assets was the rights holder’s doing, in order to deceive himself or others. But overvaluation can be forced by a decision made by any public or private authorities prohibiting any transaction at a price below the price they set at their own discretion.

This is what happened in France, for instance, when the law of August 15, 1936, introduced a minimum price system for wheat, thereby raising wheat prices to a level substantially higher than the one that would have led to market equilibrium.

Effective law enforcement action might result in the successful enforcement of the legal price. This price will then actually be the market price. The equilibrium price will be a mere “shadow” price, at which the market price would become established again, only if the law setting forth the minimum price was rescinded. However theoretical this equilibrium price may be, though, it has its own specific and well-defined value at each instant of time. As long as market circumstances and, in particular, the desirability of the product and the undesirability of the productive effort involved remain unchanged, the supply and demand curves as price functions, hence the equilibrium price, remain unchanged.

The equilibrium price therefore has an objective existence, regardless of whether it is the market price or not. Wherever the legal price is set at a level higher than the equilibrium price, this leads to a change in the market price, not the equilibrium price. In the absence of any steps in order to increase supply or reduce demand, this also inevitably tends toward an excess of supplies over demands.

Thus, in a market where wheat supply and demand are represented by curves S (supply) and D (demand) (fig. 26), if the legal price is set at p1, above the equi376librium price, this leaves the d1s1 portion of market supplies without any matching counterpart.

lf1981_figure_026.jpg

Fig. 26. [Q: Quantity; P: Price; D: Demand; S: Supply]

In such a case, only a part of the rights that rights holders wish to empty of their wheat content can be so emptied at the legal price. The corresponding rights will be true rights.

At each session of the market, however, the quantity of wheat enclosed in the rights whose volume is d1s1 will not find a taker. Notwithstanding the desire of its holders, this wheat will be totally unsalable; therefore, its value will be zero in the market. The rights that contain it will provide their holders with no ability to dispose whatsoever; they will be false rights.

Thus, fixing the price at a level above the equilibrium price will have generated, at each session of the market, a volume of false rights that is equal to the excess of supply over demand at the price set.

The allocation of these false rights is, it is true, undetermined. They will accrue to those of the suppliers that have not been lucky enough to capture one of the very few demands expressed in the market. Whoever the assignees [of false rights] may be, however, they will appear and, indeed, cannot fail to appear at each session of the market.

The fact that this analysis is not just theoretical becomes obvious if one observes the results achieved in cases where the authorities imposed overvalued prices and failed to provide for the purchase of the wealth supplied but not demanded.

French farmers who offered their wheat for sale in vain in late 1934 perceived directly, in their purchasing power, the effective and inexorable nature of the 377 price mechanism. Theirs is not the only case. Any effective valorization,2 which influences prices without influencing the underlying causes of price determination, leads to the same conclusions. Experience in the fields of coffee and diamonds has fully brought these conclusions to light. And the failure of loans offered at a price above the market price, which leaves the borrower with a portion of the offered securities, shows that the equilibrium price concept is a valid one in respect of all market sectors.

Let us note here that, whereas setting prices above the equilibrium price level leads to some supplies remaining unabsorbed, on the other hand, where prices are set below the equilibrium price—for instance, as is often the case, for rent prices—some demands remain unsatisfied. In this case, certain rights filled with money cannot be emptied of their contents by exchange against the article of wealth whose price is controlled, and such rights become false.

The general public may be largely impervious to the teachings of economic experience, but it could not remain blind to the disorders brought about by price controls. In late 1934, French higher officials were told by economists that the setting of a minimum price for wheat would create a slump in the wheat market. Officials’ view was that this was pure theory. Soon, however, they were forced to pay attention to the sufferings and complaints of farmers who produced unsalable wheat. The only logical remedy that the French authorities were able to implement, without giving up the idea of upgrading wheat prices, was to buy all the stocks of wheat that were offered for sale but not demanded at the legal price.

Price-setting measures therefore became unnecessary; the market price could not be lower than the price at which the government “took” the excess supplies offered for sale in the market. Any right that was filled with wheat could always be emptied of its content and became a true right: regardless of market fluctuations, its volume remained that assigned to it by the legal price.

This is the principle underlying the solution applied by the French Wheat Office in relying on a public agency, acting on behalf of the government, to buy all the wheat quantities that did not find a buyer at the legal price.

This is a general solution. All attempts at “valorization,” leading to the same disappointments, have led to the same remedies.

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For instance, the upgrading of wages, generally obtained through collective bargaining agreements rather than as a result of minimum wage-setting measures, has always created unemployment when it raised the price of labor above its equilibrium level. Workers, offering their labor and time in vain, have experienced the sad frustration that the rights assigned to them—although their volume was considered to be fair—were only false rights. In order to redress this intolerable injustice, the government had to intervene directly, or rely on a special board, in order to buy the services offered but not demanded at the set price, and provide a compensation referred to as unemployment insurance (or “dole” in Britain).

We are aware that this comparison between the wheat market and the labor market will shock those who refuse to view human labor as a type of wealth that is subject to supply and demand. In spite of their undoubted goodwill, however, they are the victims of a dangerous illusion. The analogy is not, in fact, based on the existence of a common nature between these two types of wealth in which everybody—including the most theoretically minded of economists—recognizes distinct features. It is based on the commonality between the procedures used in an attempt to raise the price of the two articles of wealth, such procedures being based on the allocation of rights devoid of any wealth—that is to say, false rights.

Any authoritative price-setting measure creates false rights, but most of the false rights allocated originate in budget deficits—in the sense of patrimony deficits, rather than simple cash deficits. This procedure is therefore what must be analyzed fully. The case of wheat was discussed simply because it sheds light on how public services create false rights when their production shows a deficit.

We demonstrated earlier that the claim on the Treasury assigned to transferors of capital and services acquired by the state for the production of public services could only be filled by the proceeds of the sale of such services, hence by the taxes assessed as payment.3

If the sale price covers the cost price, then the production of public services is in equilibrium: the claims on the liabilities side of the Treasury’s ledger, completely filled, are true claims, and therefore the rights that enclose them are true rights.

By contrast, if the sale price of public services is less than their cost price, the values that their production introduces on the assets side of the Treasury’s 379 ledger do not fill the corresponding rights on the liabilities side. To the extent of the deficiency on the assets side, the rights that constitute the liabilities side of the ledger become false rights.

If the state were a debtor in terms of ordinary law, this would lead to an adjudication of bankruptcy and to the allocation of the state’s assets between its creditors, hence to a devaluation of creditors’ rights.

Such an outcome would, however, put an end to the existence of the Treasury and the operation of public services and administration. Such a solution is inconceivable.

Thus, the Treasury, which escapes the rules of ordinary law, fills claims presented for repayment up to the level of their nominal value, so long as it is not short of cash.

In so doing, the Treasury fully converts into false claims those that will still have to be repaid when the Treasury’s resources have been exhausted. Just like the unsalable wheat referred to in the preceding discussion, such claims will be valueless in the market. The rights containing them will be, for their whole and entire volume, false rights.

Thus, in a deficit situation, only claims holders who have had the privilege of laying hold of their due share from the insufficient assets of the Treasury will be able to modify the contents of their rights—in other words, to exercise the privilege to dispose that such rights provide. They will therefore find themselves in a position comparable to that of wheat holders in a set minimum price situation.

In order to appreciate the full meaning of this analogy, let us simply observe that in both cases the situation is the outcome of an upvaluing that is both artificial and deceitful, because it provides the seller with the privilege of obtaining a price that the buyer refuses to confirm.

In the case of claims, however, just as for wheat, governments cannot allow the supplies of persons wishing to sell unsalable assets to remain unmatched and unsatisfied. And as the price matching the nominal value attracts no prospective buyer in the market, governments resort to the only logical solution: have such assets be purchased by the Treasury.

Thus, just as the Wheat Office must buy at controlled prices all the wheat supplied but not demanded, so the Treasury is ordered to buy back any claim that is supplied but not demanded, regardless of whether tax revenues provide sufficient funds to fulfill this repurchase.

This mission raises a financial problem for the responsible agency, however. In procuring unsalable—hence valueless—assets, the agency soon exhausts its 380 own resources. If it wants to pursue its tasks, it has to be provided with additional resources. This hinges on special resource-yielding procedures, which we shall now discuss.

§2. Money, the Main Drain for Undesired False Claims

The financing problem is simple enough: means must be found to sell assets that nobody wants at the price at which they have been purchased.

These assets, however, have been “entered” in the balance sheet of the buying institution, where they have been substituted for the articles of wealth assigned to the transferor. These assets therefore give the transferor a false claim on the patrimony of the institution.

If the institution is to be spared the threat of insolvency, there is only one solution: the central bank must be forced to buy such false claims, in order to monetize them, regardless of whether these false claims represent the value of unsalable wheat or of claims that will never be paid.

Thus, the Wheat Office or the Treasury will receive the money that will replace in their cash holdings the money that they have remitted to transferors of wheat or purchased claims. The Wheat Office or the Treasury will therefore be able to carry on their duties indefinitely and, in so doing, convert into true rights the false rights that had enclosed unduly upvalued articles of wealth.

The wheat sellers or the Treasury’s creditors will therefore no longer have any grounds for complaints. They will have recovered an effective ability to dispose freely; they will be able to fill their right, up to the level of its nominal value, with any article of wealth of their own choice.

From the moment, however, that false claims on the Wheat Office or the Treasury are made eligible for discount, the central bank will buy in the market any claims that are supplied but not demanded. The central bank will therefore be gathering, in its assets, all the undesired false claims.

Transfer to the bank will not, however, alter the nature of the claim transferred. A false claim it was, and a false claim it will remain. On the other hand, as a result of it being included in the bank’s assets, it will have become the counterpart of the money in exchange for which it was acquired. Its purchase by the central bank has therefore included a false claim into the bank’s assets, hence a false right of equal volume on the liabilities side. As soon as the bank has obtained the inconvertibility privilege—and we have seen 4 that, after the bank has absorbed a 381 certain amount of false claims, the bank could not be denied the inconvertibility privilege—the false rights created will be those of currency holders.

Thus, as soon as false claims have been made eligible for discount, money will, inevitably, drain away those false claims that their holders do not wish to keep, regardless of their origin.

Through the eligibility of false claims for discount, money will have truly become the main drain for undesired false claims.

§3. False Claims and Balances of Accounts

In discussing the mechanism of monetary regulation, we contrasted—with regard to the central bank—the status of true claims with that of undesired false claims.

Whenever they are true, claims are monetized only if the money by which they can be represented is desired. In the contrary case, the claims “pop” upon reaching maturity, and release the enclosed values that fill the rights whose contents they constitute.

Whenever they are false, claims are necessarily monetized, for lack of another outlet at the price offered by the central bank, or because their popping cannot release values that they do not contain.

Thus, the assignment of false claims drives back to the central bank, on a daily basis, the portion among them that is undesired. The false claims are replaced in the rights that enclosed them, by the cash holdings arising out of their monetization.

If these cash holdings are themselves desired, then the assignment of false claims will not have other economic consequences. But if they are not desired, their holders will demand in the market the articles of wealth, properly speaking, that are necessary in order to fill the rights in which these cash holdings are enclosed.

We have shown 5 that if there are, at that time, true claims (in fact, commercial bills) 6 reaching maturity in the portfolio of the central bank, this additional demand will cause the true claims to pop. This will release the articles of wealth, properly speaking, that are necessary to fill, without any price increases, the rights that enclosed the undesired cash balances, while 382 reabsorbing, through the demonetization of the popped bills, these undesired cash balances.

The false claims generated by the deficit will thus be substituted for commercial paper in the central bank’s portfolio.

When, however, the amount of commercial paper has been reduced to zero, or more exactly to the bare minimum resulting from the convenience of collection purposes, this process will cease to operate. The previously discounted claims, reaching maturity, will now only be false claims. They will therefore no longer be able to release, through popping, true articles of wealth (for the reason that they do not enclose any) nor lead, through repayment, to the reabsorption of undesired cash balances (for the reason that they cannot be repaid, but only renewed).

Also, from then on, demand for articles of wealth, properly speaking, by holders of undesired cash balances will no longer attract an offsetting supply in the market. The volume of the rights to be filled will exceed the volume of the rights emptied: the balance of accounts of the market will show a surplus.

The surplus will be equal, at any period of time, to the volume of the rights that enclose undesired cash balances—that is to say, to the volume of those undesired claims whose counterpart in the form of money is itself undesired.

Thus, any deficit that will have reduced the amount of commercial paper in the portfolio of the central bank to its bare minimum will bring the market’s aggregate balance of accounts into surplus on a daily basis, to the extent of the excess of undesired false claims assigned every day over the additional cash balances desired every day.

It is through this fundamental consequence that the deficit develops its full economic and social repercussions.

We now propose to trace this development under the various monetary systems.

§4. The Effect of the Assignment of False Claims Eligible for Discount under an Inconvertible Currency System

On a daily basis, the deficit assigns rights filled with illusory values, but whose holders are in a position to demand in the market any articles of wealth of their choice.

This purchasing power, which is not matched by articles of wealth to buy, amounts, at each session of the market, to the volume of the rights whose contents 383 do not actually hold the value attributed to them—in other words, the volume of the undesired false claims whose counterpart in money is not itself desired.

Its immediate effect in the market will naturally depend on the articles of wealth that the holders of such false claims intend to substitute for them.

Since they desire neither claims nor money, however, they can only hesitate between articles of wealth, properly speaking, that are domestically produced and those that are produced abroad.

If they demand domestically produced articles of wealth, their demand will increase by a corresponding amount the volume of the rights to be filled in the market sectors that it affects. It will generate a price rise there.

The ensuing distortion in the price scale will, however, shift production resources to those articles of wealth whose prices have been pushed to a level above their points of production. This shift will transform the rise of the product on which demand has focused into an overall rise affecting the entire price scale. Thus, the effect of the increase in demand will be “spread” over the market as a whole, regardless of its initial orientation. The rise in the general price index will depend solely on its amount.

The rise in the domestic price scale, however, causes—all else equal—a shift in this scale relative to the scale of foreign prices in domestic currency. It tends to push below their export points foreign prices in francs for products that were exported, hence putting an end to corresponding exports, and to push below their import points foreign prices in francs for products that were not imported, hence bringing about their importation. This dual movement will put into deficit the balance of payments of the country where false claims have emerged. Demand for foreign currencies will exceed supply; the exchange rate will rise to the level that will bring the scale of foreign prices in French francs relative to the domestic price scale back to the position it held before the rise in the domestic price scale occurred.

Thus, at each market session, there will be a rise in the exchange rate that is proportional to the rise in the general price level.

If, on the other hand, holders of false rights generated by the deficit intend to fill them with articles of wealth produced abroad, their demand will increase by a corresponding amount the volume of the rights to be filled in the foreign exchange market. It will cause a rise in the price of the relevant foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency.

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The rise in the exchange rate will, however, push up the scale of foreign prices in French francs relative to the domestic price scale. Due to the mechanism referred to above, exports will be stimulated and imports discouraged. This will give rise to foreign demands in the domestic market and make domestic demands in the foreign market disappear. The rise in the exchange rate will therefore increase the volume of the rights to be filled in the domestic market, putting the aggregate balance of accounts in surplus, and lead to a rise in the general price level.

The rise will cease only when the influence that has brought it about has disappeared—in other words, not before the two price scales have been restored, taking into consideration the new exchange rate, to the relative position that ensures balance of payments equilibrium. This outcome will, however, be secured only when the additional demand in the domestic market comes to have the same volume as the additional rights filled abroad.

The outcome will thus be the same as in the preceding instance: the deficit will generate a daily rise in the general price level to the extent necessary in order to fill—through an increase in the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market—the false rights that have arisen as a result of the deficit, as well as a rise in exchange rates proportional to the rise in the general price level.

In the above discussion, however, our assumption had been that influences were followed immediately by the responses that they tended to bring about. This is the case only in the realm of theoretical economics, however, in which there are no resistances or frictions.

In a real economy, adjustment lags can indeed occur, from which price distortions can result. These will not, however, affect the general price level; they will disappear as soon as the shifts in production resources that they tend to bring about have occurred. Thus, a deficit will always have the same effect: a rise in prices and a rise in the exchange rate, which are inexorably related and are the inevitable consequence of the need to provide a content for the rights that holders wish to empty of the false claims linked to their emergence.

The specific feature of this mechanism is that, contrary to the mechanism that operates when no false claim is assigned or when the false claims assigned are not eligible for discount, it brings about, as long as the deficit lasts, a continuous rise in prices and exchange rates, hence a continuous decline in the purchasing power of the monetary unit. This mechanism, therefore, precludes any steady economic state.

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§5. The Effect of the Assignment of False Claims Eligible for Discount under a Convertible Currency System

In order to take a concrete example, let us assume that the convertibility considered is convertibility to gold and that the country running a deficit is not a gold producer. We have shown that in such a country, under regular and steady operating conditions, the price scale becomes established—relative to the price scale in the gold-producing country—at a level ensuring balance of payments equilibrium, the exchange rate being such that the price of foreign gold valued in domestic currency is located between the entry and exit points of gold resulting from the legal definition of the two currencies.

As under an inconvertible currency system, the deficit will bring the balance of accounts of the deficit country into surplus, by a margin equivalent to the amount of undesired false claims whose money counterpart is not desired. The immediate effect of the deficit will depend on the content that rights holders will wish to give to the rights that have been emptied of undesired false claims.

If the holders of these rights demand domestically produced articles of wealth, then their additional demand will increase by a corresponding amount the volume of the rights to be filled in the domestic market. It will tend to bring about a rise in the price scale.

But the rise in the price scale will bring the balance of payments into deficit, thereby causing a rise in the exchange rate. As soon as the exchange rate bumps against the gold exit point, the rights still to be filled in the foreign exchange market will be driven back to the central bank, where they will be filled with gold.

Their contents will be emptied onto the foreign market, where they will generate a demand unmatched by supply, thereby tending to push up the price scale. Here, however, we assume that the foreign country is a gold producer. The tendency for the price scale to rise, pushing gold’s point of production above its legal price—hence the gold production cost above the market price—will cause a shift in production resources away from gold production toward the production of articles of wealth demanded by the country running a deficit. This shift will prevent any movement of the price scale.

Thus, the domestic price scale will tend to rise relative to an immobile foreign price scale. The balance of payments deficit will lead to gold drawings from 386 the deficit country’s gold reserves. The gold drawings will prevent the tendency of the price scale to rise from developing its effects; they will continue as long as the cause that has given rise to them has not disappeared—in other words, as long as the false rights generated by the deficit have not been filled with gold from the central bank and find abroad the articles of wealth with which their holders wish to fill them.

If the holders of false rights demand articles of wealth that are produced abroad, their additional foreign exchange demand brings the exchange rate for the foreign currency concerned to the gold exit point. From then on, the rights emptied of undesired false claims are filled with gold by drawing on the metallic reserves of the deficit country. Any price rise is therefore avoided. In the foreign market, events take place in the manner outlined in the preceding discussion, and the general price level remains unchanged.

Thus, in each and every case, the price scales will remain stable, but the gold reserves of the deficit country will face daily drawings, for an amount representing the daily total of undesired false claims whose money counterpart is not desired.

Everything takes place as though the deficit country, instead of filling the deficit-created false rights through a price rise as would occur under a convertible currency system, tried to find contents [for these rights] abroad. To this end, the deficit country exchanges against gold at its central bank the false claims linked to the emergence of these false rights and empties in foreign markets the gold thus acquired in exchange for the articles of wealth that holders of false rights wish to acquire.

In the foreign market, which we here assume is a gold producer, the gold coming from the deficit country is substituted for an equal amount of domestic production. This releases production resources that allow for the filling of the false rights stemming from the deficit, without any rise in prices.

Thus, all told, the deficit results in gold being drawn from the metallic reserves of the deficit country; the gold thus removed reduces, by a corresponding amount, production of gold in gold-producing countries and the production resources thus released provide the articles of wealth demanded by the recipients of the deficit.

Naturally, this leads to a depletion of the deficit country’s gold reserves. If the deficit is of a continuing or prolonged nature, it inevitably leads to currency inconvertibility.

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The preceding analysis shows that, under a convertible currency system, as under an inconvertible currency system, the assignment of false claims eligible for discount precludes any steady economic state; it is certainly true that the general price level in the deficit country remains stable, but its metallic reserves face gradual depletion, with the result that, if the depletion is prolonged, a change in the status of the currency cannot be avoided.

The above analysis also shows that effects of the deficit are not limited to the monetary area in which it appears. Although price levels in gold-producing foreign countries remain unchanged, such countries experience shifts in production resources that substitute the production of various articles of wealth for the production of gold that is rendered unnecessary by shipments of gold from deficit countries.

In the preceding analysis, however, the assumption throughout has been that economic changes immediately followed on from the influences that tended to bring them about. This is the case only, however, in the kind of universe without any resistances or frictions, the subject of theoretical economics.

In every real universe, time lags will intervene, during which the tendencies toward shifts of characteristic factors of the economic state can develop their effects.

Thus, in non-gold-producing countries, the additional demand by assignees of false rights, if this demand is aimed at articles of wealth other than gold, will cause gold movements—and therefore inhibit the tendency for the general price level to rise—only after it has effectively created the shifts in international trade flows that it tends to bring about.

Similarly, in gold-producing countries, the tendency for price levels to rise as a result of additional demand coming from deficit countries will be inhibited only after the shifts in production resources that it tends to bring about have actually occurred.

In the meantime, the tendencies for the general price levels to rise can develop their effects: the general price index will rise, both in the deficit country and in the gold-producing country, and will revert to its equilibrium value—the value that corresponds in each country to the legal definition of the currency in terms of gold—only after the stabilizing factors have come into play.

Thus, in a real universe, one that contains resistances and frictions, any deficit—even under a convertible currency system—will bring about increases in the general price level, not only in the deficit country but in metallic currency countries as a whole.

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The general price rises will be of limited scope and duration, however, since they will be corrected by inverse movements as soon as the disturbances are of sufficient scope to trigger the reactions that they tend to bring about. This is how the principle of pendular movements arises. From this principle, we shall derive our theory of cyclical price movements in Chapter XXVIII.

This is also how a new aspect of the interdependence between metallic money countries becomes clearer. When their economies include resistances and frictions, then a deficit in any one of them tends to bring about a general price rise in all the others. This rise will develop its effects as long as gold production in gold-producing countries has not been reduced by an amount equal to gold shipments coming from deficit countries.

Thus, under a metallic currency system, a deficit is no longer a purely national event. Such a deficit affects the community of countries linked to the same conversion article of wealth. The members have the right and the duty to request every other member of the de facto association they constitute to account for its financial management.

Naturally, this finding carries political consequences of considerable scope. These will be elaborated in the conclusions of this work.

§6. The Deficit and Eligibility for Discount in Light of the Theory of Rights

The deficit, when not purely apparent—in other words, when it is a patrimony deficit—is the situation faced by a state that dissipates values by selling services below the cost price.

The reason why a deficit entails the assignment of false rights is simply that the values acquired by the Treasury, as soon as they are entered in the Treasury’s assets and taking into account the price at which it will sell them, no longer fill the claims by which the values are represented.

For the assignment of false claims to accrue the privilege of the deficit to the state, however, it is necessary for the false claims to be taken, not as the value of the wealth that they will enable their holders to lay hold of from among the Treasury’s assets, but as the nominal value mentioned, subject of course to the normal agio for the deferral of enjoyment that they involve. This can only be the case, however, if they give to their holders the certainty of being able, when they so desire, to exchange these claims against articles of wealth of their choice for the full nominal value.

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It is clear that, if these claims were of the usual type, they could not provide such certainty to the recipients. The state circumvents this difficulty, however, by conferring upon false claims, through an act of sovereignty, a particular privilege in the form of eligibility for discount.

Being eligible for discount, a claim can be exchanged—if its holder so desires—for a quantity of money equal to its nominal value. The right that encloses the claim can therefore be filled, at any time, through purchase in the market, and for an amount up to its nominal volume, with those articles of wealth that its holder wishes to obtain.

The articles of wealth thus acquired will not be drawn from the debtor’s assets, however (where they do not exist), but from the market, where the right that had contained the claim will—in order to be filled—come into competition with the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied will have been emptied. The aggregate volume of the rights to be filled will therefore be increased, at each session of the market, by the volume of the discounted claims.

Now, the discounted claims, being devoid of value, cannot through a process of popping release wealth that they do not contain. They remain passively stored away in the assets of the central bank, notwithstanding any influence that tends to make them pop. They do not therefore contribute anything to the mass of articles of wealth that has been emptied from the rights of buyers.

At each session of the market, the volume of the rights to be filled will exceed the volume of the rights that have been emptied of their contents, by the amount of the discounted claims. The rise in the general price level or the depletion of metallic reserves will only be a means of providing the rights to be filled with articles of wealth that the rights emptied do not supply.

Thus, the false rights created by the deficit, as soon as the claim associated with their emergence has been made eligible for discount, can be filled up to the level of their nominal value. They will have become true rights; but the articles of wealth that will fill them, instead of being provided by the debtors of discounted claims, will have been obtained either by drawing on the mass of the articles of wealth supplied—through a scaling down in the share that the holders of the rights from which these articles of wealth have been emptied can obtain—or by drawing on the metallic reserves of the central bank.

The reason why eligibility of false claims for discount enables a state running a deficit to receive more than it gives is that the community of market suppliers as a whole (if under an inconvertible currency system) or the central bank (if under a convertible currency system) is forced to give more than it receives.

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Eligibility for discount therefore does not create any value. It is merely an artifice, enabling the state to have third parties fill the rights that it empties to its own advantage. That is the way in which it constitutes the true secret of the deficit.

The rise in prices or the depletion of metallic reserves will, however, operate only to the extent that recipients of false claims exercise the privilege conferred upon them as a result of eligibility for discount: the ability to fill, in the market or by drawing on the assets of the central bank, the rights carrying the false claims received from the Treasury.

Now, being certain that they can, at any time, obtain the articles of wealth of their choice, they can defer the time at which they will demand them. In the meantime, their rights will remain filled with the false claims linked to their emergence. To these holders, these false claims will be the desired content.

Therefore, the visible consequences of the deficit will be deferred as long as the recipients of the false claims created by the deficit (or any persons who would accept to substitute for the recipients) can be made to desire such claims, after eligibility for discount has guaranteed their value.

As long as the false claims are desired, everything will take place as though they were true claims.

If false claims are desired indefinitely, the consequences of the deficit, or, more specifically, the disturbances that reveal the existence of such consequences, will be deferred indefinitely: the state will enjoy the privilege of obtaining, not only without demanding, but above all of obtaining without the consequences of the levying in which it is engaged appearing in any way.

§7. The Art of Handling False Rights

Causing false claims to be desired after having provided their holders, through eligibility for discount, with the certainty that they can, at any time, fill their rights with articles of wealth of their choice is therefore the secret to a deficit without tears.

Causing false claims to be desired, however, means arranging for the holders of the rights enclosing them, or any holders of rights of equal volume, to desire—either of their own free will or under duress—letting their rights remain filled with such claims. This amounts to persuading holders not to demand the true articles of wealth that might be substituted for the false claims.

All the recipes that make up the art of handling false rights are derived from this principle.

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In the present state of the financial pharmacopoeia there are four main prescriptions: taxation, borrowing, price and foreign exchange controls, and rationing plus clearing systems.

a) Taxation

A tax is simply the transfer of a right, under force of law, from the taxpayer to the state.7 The state, therefore, becomes master of the content of the right transferred. The state is entirely at liberty to desire, in order to fill this right, not new articles of wealth, but a false claim that is undesired by its recipient. The state, in acquiring such a [false] claim in the market, provides the transferor with the true articles of wealth that the latter desires. But the state, for its part, forever relinquishes the possibility of obtaining true articles of wealth, as its false claim is devoid of value. The state, therefore, undertakes to allow the right acquired through taxation to remain indefinitely filled with the false claim generated by the deficit, to the extent that it does not wish the disturbances caused by the deficit to become apparent, even belatedly. And as the claim is a claim on the Treasury, the simplest way out is to cancel it, together with the right that encloses it.

Thus, taxation is a remedy for the deficit only if the state relinquishes—within the limits of the amount of undesired claims—the possibility of obtaining the true articles of wealth that its fiscal proceeds could procure. And quite naturally so, since these true articles of wealth have already been obtained as a result of the assignment of false rights—the problem consisting precisely of filling these false rights.

b) Borrowing

A loan is an exchange in which one of the exchangers, called the lender, transfers to the other, known as the borrower, the ownership of an object and receives, in consideration thereof, ownership of a claim payable on demand, or maturing at a future date, on the object loaned.8

During the life of the loan, the borrower’s right is filled with the object loaned. On the other hand, the right from which the object loaned has been removed 392 is filled with a claim—that is, with the right to receive back the object loaned at maturity.

Everything takes place as if the lender relinquished, until the due date, the ability to fill his right with articles of wealth properly speaking, hence the right to request that they be delivered by the borrower. The borrower, being temporarily sole master of the object borrowed, can dispose of it at his discretion, and therefore substitute for this object a false claim generated by the deficit.

In acquiring such a false claim, the borrower will fill with true articles of wealth the false right that enclosed this claim.

As the lender, or any person substituting for him, cannot demand payment of his claim before the due date of the loan, the borrower is at liberty to keep the false claim until that date, so as to prevent its fallacious nature from becoming apparent.

Thus, a loan, on the sole condition that its proceeds not be spent except to buy back false claims, will—like a tax—prevent the disturbances associated with a deficit.

Nevertheless, a loan is only temporary. At its maturity, if the loan is not renewed, the borrower will have to fill the lender’s right with articles of wealth properly speaking. In order to obtain them, he can only rely on a false claim that is eligible for discount. In discounting his claim, the borrower can repay his debt, but not without causing the disturbances that the loan had allowed to be deferred.

Thus, in contrast to taxation, borrowing, when considered as an aspect of the art of handling false rights, is only a temporary solution. Borrowing wards off the visible consequences of the existence of false rights only to the extent that it defers the demand for true articles of wealth necessary in order to fill them—that is, for the length of time the loan was agreed upon or renewed.

A loan can be voluntarily agreed to by the lender or be forced upon him.

Free acceptance by the lender is generally obtained through the granting of special benefits, nearly always in the form of interest payments.

When the loan is forced upon the lender, for instance in the case of various forms of compulsory saving that were recently implemented, it only amounts to a temporary tax. A loan will ward off the disturbances linked to the deficit only if, at its due date, it can be replaced by a freely accepted loan or paid back out of tax proceeds properly speaking.

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c) Price and Exchange Controls

Taxation and borrowing transfer to the state articles of wealth that enable it to fill, either in a permanent or in a temporary way, but in accordance with the wishes of their holders, the false rights generated by the deficit. They therefore eliminate or defer its effects in a direct way.

But it is possible, without giving holders of undesired false claims the true articles of wealth that they seek, to prevent these holders from obtaining—or even claiming—for their rights any contents other than the false claims that are linked to their emergence, or the money with which false claims can be represented. This involves two indirect procedures, which remain to be considered here.

In order to obtain true articles of wealth, the holder of a false claim eligible for discount will have to demand these in the market, after having discounted his claim. His demand will increase the volume of the rights to be filled. During the market session considered, the volume of the rights to be filled will exceed the volume of the rights emptied onto the market.

Thus all the rights to be filled will not be able to find their desired content, except by drawing on metallic reserves (under a convertible currency system), or by expanding the value of the articles of wealth supplied, hence through a rise in prices or in the exchange rate (under an inconvertible currency system).

Ending currency convertibility closes off the first path; pegging prices and exchange rates closes off the second.

When the currency has been made inconvertible and all prices and exchange rates pegged, the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market will be immutably pegged to the volume of the rights from which they have been emptied. They can therefore only fill rights of equal volume. Any attempt to fill additional rights will fail.

Thus, at each session of the market, rights of a volume equal to the excess of the rights to be filled over the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied—hence equal to the volume of the rights enclosing the undesired false claims—cannot be filled with the true articles of wealth desired by the holders.

These unsatisfied holders will be in the position of passengers unable to get into a “full” streetcar. They do not give up their plans: they simply wait.

Similarly, those who have been unable to fill their rights with the desired articles of wealth in the market will not give up. They will wait until they can 394 satisfy their desires. As long as they have not succeeded in satisfying their desires, however—and regardless of whether they like it or not—their rights must remain filled either with false claims or with the money by which such claims can be represented.

Thus, currency inconvertibility combined with price and exchange controls ensures, at each instant of time, that the undesired false claims, or the money that represents them, are inserted into the rights of the persons who could not get themselves served in the market.

Everything takes place as though these undesired false claims were desired, not in and of themselves, but in an indirect way and for want of anything better.

For inconvertibility combined with price and exchange controls to constitute an effective solution, however, these must be given strict and general applicability.

Any oversight in price setting would enable holders of undesired false claims to obtain some of the true articles of wealth that they desire. There would be an inflow of rights to be filled in the relevant market sectors, with the result that prices would rise to the level necessary to ensure equilibrium. The rise in the prices that escaped control measures would be such that it brings the general price index to the level at which it would have become established, had prices remained free in the market as a whole. In other words, the smaller the number of prices affected in this way, the greater the price rise.

Whereas it is easy to suspend convertibility—because, when there is no metallic coinage circulation, conversion operations take place at a limited number of counters—price and exchange controls involve serious technical difficulties.

If price control measures are to erase the effects of a deficit, it is not enough for such measures to be generally applied: they must also be effective. Any omission or loophole attracts rights seeking to be provided with a content, thereby bringing the price to the level necessary for them to be filled with the desired contents. One can easily appreciate the extremely difficult law enforcement problems that are involved in the surveillance of all actual or potential transactions.

And yet, these are not the only problems that a price control policy has to resolve. In any real economy, which is affected by constant and unpredictable changes in the circumstances of production, and also—in many cases—by changes in consumers’ tastes and needs, authoritative price-setting measures will not make it possible to continuously maintain, between market prices, a 395 hierarchy conforming to the points of production hierarchy. Yet the allocation of production resources will be dictated by prices in the market—that is to say [in this instance] by prices set by force of law. The allocation will therefore deviate from the allocation that would provide production resources with maximum efficiency. If the state wishes to avoid distortions that are too shocking, and ensure that the needs it considers most important, rather than the needs expressed in various black markets, are served, the authorities will have to set the allocation and use of existing production resources by force of law—in other words, the allocation of human and capital resources. The state will thus be led, inevitably, to a system of total planning.

It should be pointed out that although the state is indeed aware of the most important needs when it is itself the one that is experiencing these needs (in other words, when it is, as in wartime, the main consumer on the market), when it involves the needs of the members of the community it leads, the state will have to determine the most important needs through arbitrary choices. The needs satisfied will no longer be those needs that people experiencing them feel are the most critical, but rather those needs that the central planning authority determines “must be” the most critical.

An entire book would be required to fully analyze the technical difficulties involved in price and exchange controls. Here, we only wish to make the sheer magnitude of the challenge clear.

In any case, one thing is certain: price and exchange controls, unless accompanied by a corrective measure in the form of rationing, have two main consequences, disorder and injustice.

As soon as a price, in a given sector of the market, is frozen below the level at which it would have become spontaneously established, the volume of the rights to be filled exceeds the volume of the rights to be emptied, and some demanders cannot be served. This, as we have just noted, is the very purpose of the whole system. Because some demanders are not served, however, a competition is bound to break out between those who fear that they may not be satisfied. They will seek to win suppliers’ preference, either by force or by offering suppliers hidden benefits.

Finally, the only rights that will remain unfilled with true wealth will be the rights of the weak and the scrupulous. The undesired false claims of unsatisfied demanders, or their overabundant cash balances, will be concentrated in these rights. In the final analysis, their holders will be the only victims of the system.

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Disorder and injustice will therefore be the inevitable outcome of price-setting measures.

d) Rationing and Clearing

Price controls create disorder because they prevent certain rights holders not from demanding but from obtaining. Price controls create injustice because they leave up to chance or corruption the task of determining who will be served.

There is only one way to correct the deficiencies of this system, while still wishing to use it in order to remedy the effects of a deficit that one is unable or unwilling to prevent, and that is to submit all individual demands to a system of prior authorization, so as to adjust, at each period of time, their aggregate volume to that of the rights emptied in the market, all while ensuring an allocation between individuals regarded as equitable. This is the rationing system. Rationing is in fact a sluice gate system, blocking access to each market sector for a portion of the demands that rights holders would express in the absence of controls. In order to demand under a rationing system, it will no longer be enough to have a right to fill—in other words, to be a currency holder. An additional requirement must be met: money must be matched with a purchase authorization.

If rationing is to reach its first objective, which is to avoid disorder, then during each period of time the aggregate volume of the rights to be filled, in each sector of the market, must be the same as the volume of the rights that appear there in order to be emptied. In practice, this condition will be met if, for all articles, purchase authorizations are limited, not in terms of value but in terms of quantity, to the amount of articles of wealth offered for sale.

If the second objective—avoiding injustice—is to be met, then purchase authorizations must be allocated among the various applicants in accordance with a rule that is considered to be equitable.

The rule will vary depending on the nature of the articles under rationing; it may ensure quantitative equality in allocations; it may adjust the quantities allowed to the effort made by the beneficiary in the performance of his tasks; or it may adjust the quantities allowed to the value these tasks represent for the community. Each set of ethics will entail an allocation system true to its philosophy.

If the system is duly applied—in other words, if it encompasses all the articles of wealth that may be supplied in the market—and if the total of rations 397 allocated does not exceed the total of rations supplied, then it obligates any supplier to fill with true articles of wealth the rights that he has previously emptied in the market, only within the limits allowed by his total allocated rations. The excess of his emptied rights over his allocated rations will inevitably and forever remain filled with false claims or with the money by which these claims can be represented. Thus, the insertion of the false claims arising from the deficit into the rights necessary to enclose them will be ensured, any disorder will be avoided, and the general allocation will be consistent with the concept of justice held by the allocating authority.

With regard to the prior-authorization mechanism, this can take various forms: retailers or wholesalers may receive coupons to be surrendered for restocking purposes, or they may be required to register in order to receive supplies for the rations that they have to serve. Alternatively, people may be registered on a first come, first served basis: a primitive form of this system consists of long lines of shoppers waiting outside stores on the sidewalk. Lastly, the allocating authority may simply rely on an authoritative system of rule-of-thumb allowances.

In order for rationing to offset the deficit, rationing has to be comprehensive in scope—in other words, rationing must apply to articles of wealth purchased abroad as well as to those produced domestically.

As far as import transactions are concerned, those that are considered to be nonessential are generally prohibited and subject to prior authorization of foreign exchange purchases that may occur on the market.

For the system to operate effectively, however, no foreign exchange demand may be served by free transactions between buyer and seller of the same currency. This requirement is satisfied in practice by granting a public or semipublic body, known as the Foreign Exchange Control Board, a monopoly for foreign exchange operations. The existence of the Foreign Exchange Control Board enables the government to submit the use of foreign exchange reserves to its will, hence to a previously established plan.

If there are no foreign exchange reserves, however, or if existing reserves are earmarked for other uses, the board will have to limit the volume of foreign exchange allocations to the volume of foreign exchange earnings over each period of time. If the government does not limit imports to the amount of exports, then it will have to record demands for foreign exchange allowances and 398 serve them in the order in which they are recorded. This is the principle on which the clearing system is based.

The preceding analysis shows that rationing and clearing systems, in each sector of the market, simply act as strainers limiting the volume of the rights to be filled to the volume of those that are actually emptied and, in the case of a clearing system, ensuring that rights to be filled are served in order of registration. Both devices convert into extended delivery delays the rise in prices and the foreign exchange rate, or the depletion of metallic reserves, that would result from the need to fill false rights. The length of the delay, which would be zero in a true rights system, will however only depend, in a deficit period, on the volume of false rights to be filled.

Rationing and clearing systems do not therefore strike at the root of the evil; they simply alter its manifestations.

The above observations are essential in order to appreciate any multilateral clearing systems currently being considered. These make the instituting of a grant of credit more palatable—partly consisting, incidentally, of false rights. A grant of credit will prevent any transfer delay, but at the cost of disturbances linked to the extent of undesired false claims that creditors’ rights may contain.

Nevertheless, until the credit granted has been exhausted, deficit countries can import. Their creditors will be paid cash. Everyone will be very pleased. The device will have masked the problem of the presence of huge masses of false claims, constantly sustained by the prolongation of budget deficits and simply determined by price and exchange controls, combined with rationing and clearing systems.

In providing this additional extension, then, the granting of credit may not have been unnecessary.

In any case, unless existing false rights have been canceled during this additional breather and the sources of new false rights have dried up, as soon as the credit granted has been exhausted the original option will reemerge, in its cruel simplicity: either provide false rights with a content, or make wait those persons wishing to fill them.

International settlement systems are simply “claims mills,” which transform the contents of the rights brought to them without changing their substance. If each producer can only receive the amount of flour extracted from the grain that he brought to the mill, then no disturbance is to be feared. If claims to flour 399 exceed the amount that can be productively extracted from grain, then disturbances cannot be avoided. The clearing system will simply convert into additional delivery delays the devaluation of rights that insufficiency of flour would otherwise entail. As to a possible credit that the Mill Customers Union may grant, this will make it possible, by advancing a certain amount of flour, to put off delivery delays. If the flour advanced is not real flour, however, the rights that it has filled will need to be devalued all the same, as soon as their holders insist on seeing “what is really inside” and refuse to be content with a misleading appearance.

Thus, the clearing system, even on a multilateral level, leaves the problem entirely unsolved. The problem arises only on account of the existence of false rights, and it can only be resolved by their elimination.

It is common knowledge, and experience has often confirmed, that the various modes of rationing create practical difficulties, and that clearing systems involve considerable inconveniences. It is also a known fact that such devices lead to reduced efficiency and have demoralizing effects. That is more suitable for a monograph study, not for the analysis of principles that we are attempting to engage in here.

What is more relevant to our present purposes, however, is bringing to light the mechanism through which these various systems correct the manifestations, while hiding the underlying causes, of the deficit that has led to their imposition.

The reason why rationing prevents the rise in prices and exchange rates that would result from a deficit under an inconvertible currency system is that rationing makes it impossible to fill, with true articles of wealth, rights equal in volume to the false rights generated by the deficit.

Rationing therefore creates on the market a situation similar to that which would have existed if false rights had not been assigned.

This shows how untruthful the assertion is that scarcity makes rationing necessary. Scarcity, under a true rights system, does not in any way imply rationing, since it limits the volume of the rights that can be filled to that of the articles of wealth supplied in the market to fill them.

Rationing does not correct the deficit; it simply allocates it. Contrary to what too many people commonly believe, rationing is not the essential tool for an egalitarian or equitable allocation, because the pattern of allocation that it generates could have been brought about by an appropriate system of taxation.

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The truth is that, in forcing certain rights holders to forgo the contents that they desired and to be content with false claims, rationing subjects them to a levy similar, in principle, to that resulting from taxation or public borrowing.

This levy is allocated among all the suppliers in the market. It strikes each of them, at each period of time, within the limits of the excess of the rights emptied by each supplier over the aggregate volume of the rations allocated to him. Rationing is therefore nothing more than a method of apportioning the levy to which a taxation policy, aimed at avoiding a deficit, would have subjected the community.

On balance, the art of handling false rights comprises only two kinds of recipes: those that cancel false rights and those that prevent them from being filled. All of these recipes ensure that the symptoms of the deficit will be avoided, by bringing the volume of the rights to be filled to the level of the articles of wealth capable of filling them. In their common principle, they are only a reminder of the economic realities that lie behind the veil of financial illusions. Man is full master of the rights that he allocates, but not of the articles of wealth that fill them. If the former exceed the value of the latter, no trick can possibly provide false rights with a content other than the false claims linked to their emergence.

If the holders of false rights are not content with such illusory wealth, then a price rise will be reality’s last line of defense. Through a price rise, the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market will be brought to the level of the rights to be filled, thereby effecting, on the community of suppliers as a whole in the market, the levy that will provide the false rights generated by the deficit with a content.

Thus, in each and every case, the illusion will be dispelled: the true articles of wealth necessary to offset the deficit will be drawn from existing articles of wealth. All the state will be left with is a choice in the methods—whether these be conscious or unconscious, deliberate or tacit, voluntary or spontaneous—by which the falsehood it has perpetrated, in letting rights subsist whose contents it has dissipated, will be rectified.

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Chapter XXV: Conclusion to Part IV: The Sovereignty of Rights Holders

The preceding chapters, which were devoted to a study of domestic and international exchanges, confirm that any holder of a true right enjoys the certainty of being able, at any time, to fill this right with the articles of wealth of his own choosing.

Our journey to the land of false rights has taught us that holders of false rights, as a result of the eligibility for discount of false claims, enjoy this same privilege.

Thus, any right provides its holder with full mastery over its content. If the holder wishes to retain this content, nothing can prevent him from doing so. If he wishes to change it, he can sell and buy in the markets of his choice, regardless of their geographical distribution, the distance and number of borders between these markets, and the time interval between the two transactions. Gluts or shortages will never be an obstacle, and he will never have to suffer any delay. The desired article of wealth will be supplied at the location, in the form and at the instant of time that he desires, in the quantities that the market price enables him to purchase.

A rights holder, however humble, therefore enjoys the immense privilege of a sovereignty, limited in its extent, but unlimited in the freedom of decision that it provides to the holder.

The effectiveness of this sovereignty is a highly unlikely feature. It ought to surprise any observer of economic life, but because of its permanent nature the feature has come to be a sort of daily miracle, overlooked by the layman. Everyone thinks it justified to take this for granted, much like a person counts 402 on the presence of oxygen in the air, or the heat of the sun, without marveling at the resulting benefits.

Consider, however, that holding a right will provide the holder with the ability to dispose freely that is promised in Article 544 of the French Civil Code, only if—everywhere and at all times, in each market sector—the volume of the rights to be filled is equal to the volume of the rights to be emptied. The fact that such an ability has never been lacking, in a world where men could freely choose the contents of their rights from among the countless possibilities provided throughout the world, between products of the past and contemporary products, between existing and potential production, is a miracle that should cause the blind to see and the deaf to hear, and bring to economic thought its most intransigent deniers.

The preceding analysis—this was its purpose—has brought to light the mechanism that ensures this freedom to dispose of an object owned. It shows that this freedom is the outcome of spontaneous price movements, leading to constant mutual adjustment between selling and purchasing decisions, in spite of each individual decision being very much unpredictable.

A price is not, however, merely the passive and purely arithmetical tool for equalizing demand and supply. A price exerts a profound effect on both. If, tomorrow, there is less demand for rye and more demand for wheat, the price mechanism will cause the abandonment of those productions of rye that are less desired than the productions of wheat that could replace them. Price is the all-powerful hand that ensures the allocation of production resources and shapes the economic structure of the community that it governs. Through its effects, the most unattractive and dangerous jobs will be performed, and risk capital will be found; through its effects, a demander will, at his discretion, seemingly draw from nowhere the desired productions and eliminate production of those products he no longer likes.

Thus, the sovereignty of the rights holder is no longer the free gift of an independent legislator; although the rights holder is generally unaware of it, his sovereignty is the consequence of a mechanism that is just as unnoticed but just as effective as the mechanism that ensures our heartbeat: the price mechanism.

These views are confirmed, a contrario, by simply observing the disturbances that occur when this mechanism is brought to a halt. The long lines of shoppers waiting outside stores, which are the immediate consequence of any price control policy, are unquestionable proof that whenever a price is set at a level 403 below its equilibrium level, this generates an excess of the volume of the rights to be filled over the volume of the rights emptied of the article of wealth whose price is controlled. Palliative measures, such as rationing or clearing systems, eliminate the visible consequence of the disequilibrium; they do not eliminate the disequilibrium itself.

When controlled prices differ from the prices that would have spontaneously established themselves, they inevitably leave some supplies, or some demands, unsatisfied. In other words, a number of suppliers or demanders are prevented from exercising the right to dispose that they had been granted.

Where the rights holder’s sovereignty is effective, then it is the use that is made of it that determines, at each instant of time, the price hierarchy within the community considered and, through this hierarchy, the allocation of production resources.

Thus, rights holders, being certain to obtain what they desire within the limits of their respective rights, determine the economic structure and the price levels within their community, by deciding what they actually wish to obtain. In so doing, they determine the economic and monetary state of their community and the evolution, over time, of the factors that define this economic and monetary state.

We propose to explore the principles underlying this evolution.

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Part V: Economic Evolution

Economic evolution is only one fragmentary aspect of the aggregate evolution of the universe, as it is concerned, among the elements that make for progress with the passing of time, only with those events that may affect human welfare. Much like economic science itself, the partitioning that singles out these events has meaning only in relation to man, his needs, and his desires. It depends as much on the observer as on the situations observed: it is an artificial and ill-defined process. Yet, however imperfect it may be, it makes it possible to prune out, amid the entanglements of perceptible appearances, all that which, in view of current technology, appears not to exert immediate action on the material life of human communities.

We describe economic evolution by recording its successive states: these are like instantaneous photographs of situations that have barely emerged when they already cease to exist, except as memories, in the splendors of history. These accounts are just as different from reality, however, as a cross section is from a stream of events. In order to piece together economic evolution, one has to project the film of their uninterrupted sequence and hence replace a succession of separate occurrences with the continuous stream of events from which they have been extracted.

This flow of successive occurrences is the economic history of the group considered, itself a portion of its universal history. Dynamic theory aims to provide a causal explanation of this history, by establishing a link between all the snapshots of which this history is, in its continuity, the indissoluble synthesis.

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Chapter XXVI: Demand, the Offspring of Desire and a Fettered Sovereign

§1. The Human Will, a Model for All Dynamic Explanations

Understanding a process of evolution is to show that it could not have been other than what it was.

Now, there is one situation only where man has direct cognizance of the causal mechanism through which evolution is generated: the one where he himself is the author, if not the protagonist, of the sequence of events concerned.

We propose to show that dynamic explanation, in the economic field as in other fields of knowledge, simply generalizes the process of explanation relevant to those evolutions of which we are directly aware, because we have directly brought them about.

The economic state of a community, at a given instant of time, is the state of its capital assets. During the interval between the instant of time considered and the next instant, such capital assets provide services and depreciate by a margin equal to the value of the services they have released. The services provided, however, are consumed [used up], lost, or saved.

In the first case, they enhance, by the amount of their value, the welfare of the person consuming them; in the second, they are dissipated in the surrounding atmosphere as, for example, the energy of a stream that has not been harnessed; in the third instance, they will be incorporated in the new capital assets to whose formation they have contributed. In the three cases, therefore, the use of the services released during the time interval dt by the capital assets existing at instant t determines the economic situation existing at instant t + dt.

The production of services and the utilization of the services produced are the two influences that determine the curve of economic evolution; these are 408 the influences that need to be traced and explained, if we are to understand how at each instant the future economic situation matures in the present, and how the present emerged from the past.

As a matter of fact, in modern communities, all capital assets that generate services whose quantity is limited in relation to the needs to be satisfied are appropriated.

Appropriation provides the owner with the ability to call on a coercive force, the police, to protect—against any rival claim—the privilege to enjoy and dispose that he has been invested with.

What needs to be further specified is the nature of this privilege, in relation to the control it provides over the object owned and over the services that this object can release.

In a given state of technology, the nature and aggregate amount of services that a capital asset is likely to produce 1 are contained between strictly defined limits. Generally, however, the owner of capital assets sets at his discretion the pace at which these services will be released, and always controls their use.

Capital is controlled by the owner just as a ship is controlled by the helmsman. A ship can only yield transportation services, whose modalities and speed result from technical features beyond the control of the helmsman; but through his actions, the helmsman steers the ship and determines, with the charted course, the nature of the service provided and the use that is made of this service.

The owner is therefore, with regard to the object owned, subjected to the hard constraint of physical possibilities. He can use the object owned only within a very narrow range of possibilities, a range that is dictated by the natural order of things; but within this range, he can have the object “at his disposal”—in other words, use it at his discretion. He is master of the object owned, just as the captain is master on board, after God. His action over the object owned cannot exceed the limits set by its creator, but as a result of this action, he has at his disposal the services that the object can release and he establishes his influence on the economic evolution of the universe to which the object belongs.

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Explaining economic evolution is therefore, at each instant of time, to relate to the causes of economic evolution (if any) the behavior of men with regard to the goods over which they exercise their property rights.

The study of the causes that determine men’s actions obviously does not lie within the purview of the economist. Let us only observe that an action cannot possibly have cause, except for the person who accomplishes it. For all those who do not perceive, in their conscious awareness, the unfolding of the process culminating in the act, an act is something immanent; it can be a cause, but not an effect.

The psychologist describes desire as the frame of mind that tends to bring about an act. Its content is just as complex as the human soul itself. When an act is conscious and deliberate, however, the perception of desire is accompanied by an awareness—which is more or less confused depending on the extent to which the act was voluntarily accomplished—of the satisfaction that the act should yield and of its ultimate purpose. It would therefore seem that desire is but the awareness of the being’s thrust toward the wished-for end and of the attraction of expected delights.

Around the act about to be accomplished, however, consciousness sheds light not only on the object desired but also on the margin of possible acts and on the desires that such possible actions could have fulfilled. Consciousness here presents the accomplished act as the outcome of a choice between several competing desires, and makes it possible to see in it the culmination of a logical process in which competing tendencies were confronted. Thus, an act would only be the outcrop, at the surface of reality, of the causal series generated in one’s innermost being by the conscious or unconscious motivations determining the act.

The economist, in leaving to the psychologist the task of analyzing the complex mechanisms whose existence is immediately revealed by consciousness, simply posits that, wherever an act has been accomplished, a tendency has prevailed, and the economist refers to the prevailing desire as the will of the person concerned.

The will is thus—for an economist—from among all the competing tendencies, the tendency that leads to the actually accomplished act. This provides the economist with the term from which he can infer the appearances he proposes to explain. To an observer who does not limit his ambitions to searching 410 for a purely verbal cause, however, the distinction between an act and the will that inspires it is an artificial one. The act and the will are not two distinct realities connected by a link of causality, but simply two interdependent aspects, two sides—one external, the other internal—of one same reality: the stream of life, of which the act is only its perceptible manifestation.

Evolution is the fact; in relation to it, the human will has an explanatory virtue only because consciousness provides us with an immediate knowledge of the process through which our own personal actions are gradually developed.

In his rationalist imperialism, however, man will not limit his ability to understand to those evolutions that he brings about; he also wants to explain those he observes around him and outside himself.

To this end, he will generalize the explanatory mechanism provided by his own consciousness and, there where he does not directly perceive the cause of an act—the tendency that leads to the act, which he calls the will—he will postulate it. Positing as a principle that any change is the consequence of a preexisting tendency toward change, he will call the tendency either force or will, depending on whether it comes from an object or from a person. And the two concepts will provide an explanation all the more easily as they have been invented only for the purpose of explaining the fact concerned.

Force and will are therefore just the verbal representations of influences that tend to produce the act to be explained. They are the devices that enable us to impose upon the external world internal causality, whose existence is revealed to us by our consciousness. With their arbitrary nature, however, when they have been given the names that express the essence of their substance, force and will constitute the all-powerful instruments of human explanations, because they enable us to substitute causation for succession, which is the only feature revealed by the observation of events.

Thus, the will, which is postulated when it is not directly perceived, and which is extended, under the name of force, over to the realm of inanimate objects, provides the model for all dynamic explanations, those by which man manages to dress in the garb of causality the various types of evolution revealed by the external world.

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§2. The Marginalist Theory, a Device to Substitute a Mechanistic Explanation for the Finalistic Explanation Provided by the Will

All dynamic explanations rely on the tendencies of the phenomena they seek to explain. They combine knowledge of the exact point on the curve with knowledge of the direction of its tangent. They invoke the direction that the will, or the force, determining the path observed seeks to impose, hence the end that the will, or the force concerned, assigns to the evolution whose unfolding is represented by the observed path.

As a matter of fact, the need to define a tendency existing at a given instant of time—the hallmark of the finalistic nature of all dynamic explanations—is what requires the use of differential language in any attempt to explain a given evolution.

A mathematical spirit, however, often abhors finalistic explanations. In its yearning for deductions, a mathematical spirit prefers to derive effect from cause rather than infer cause from effect because, in its simplicity, this type of mind does not realize that both of them are simply two concomitant aspects of one and the same evolution, observed from different angles.

Dynamic explanation is finalistic because it portrays an act as the effect of the tendency carrying the being toward the end pursued by the one desire that—having prevailed over all competing desires—has become a will. In the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, “In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end; and this is it that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will.”2

If an act is to cease being a mere aspiration toward its own end, and become the logical consequence of preexisting premises, one only needs to admit that, in the struggle among competing desires—there where the economist, in search of explanations, looks for the origin of the accomplished act—the intensity of each competing desire is a function of the “desirability” of the end toward which it tends. Let man, then, always decide in favor of the most desirable solution, and every one of his actions will become a logical necessity, unavoidably 412 imposed by his preference scale. Moreover, knowledge of individual scales of preference would make it possible to foresee man’s behavior, as far in advance as one could wish. The universe, as any mechanistic system of explanation requires, would be entirely determined; a sufficiently powerful mind could, at any time, perceive its whole evolution at a single glance.

The marginalist theory thus provides a powerful explanatory instrument, which is worth what all human explanations are worth: the means of tracing back, through a deductive approach, all the appearances they were created to explain.

Although the particular being on which the marginalist theory rests is a useful “homo economicus,” it would be a preposterous claim to see in such a being the characteristics of man.

§3. Whereas Desire Commands within the Domain Owned, It Demands in the Rest of the Universe

The marginalist theory provides a logical foundation to the selection that will draw, from a bundle of competing desires, the will from which the act will result.

The will of a man is, however, capable of direct action and is therefore the prime mover of economic evolution only within the domain that he may “enjoy and dispose of”—in other words, within the domain that the goods he owns constitute.

Any wealth external to this patrimony is in the possession and under the control of other people who, alone, can dispose of it.

But desire knows no law. Desire knows of no boundaries between the various patrimonies, and embraces all the goods that the earth can supply. This means that a person who experiences desire will, if left to himself, covet and demand his neighbor’s property; but if the police force is effective, this person can enjoy and dispose of other people’s property only if the rightful owner agrees. The rightful owner, relying on his own right, will however only agree to a transfer if he finds that a transfer yields the advantages he considers to be more desirable than those advantages he must part with in exchange.

This highlights the process underlying exchange, which is a particular tool of economic evolution, through which the will tends to bring about a change in assignment rather than a change in nature. This change moves articles of wealth from one patrimony to another, and thereby endows these articles of 413 wealth with the maximum utility 3 they are capable of providing within the community considered.

Demand is a solicitation to transfer, just as force is a solicitation to motion. In the same way, value is resistance to transfer, just as mass is resistance to motion.4

Under a system of pronounced specialization, demand will be the main factor of economic evolution, because demand is what enables the desire of men to encompass the whole field of the articles of wealth desired, immense, for each of them, compared with the narrow domain of the articles of wealth possessed.

We have seen in Chapters XXII and XXIII how demand, by setting the use of production resources, brings about the kind of specialization conforming to the wishes of demanders.

Each individual, allowing his demand to flow according to the stream of his desires, apportions it among countless little streams, directed toward the sectors of the market where the exchange of the articles to which he aspires takes place. As they enter each market sector, all these individual trickles of demand converge into a single demand, which is the true expression of a collective will. It is this aggregate demand, specialized by the kind of wealth dealt with, that will shape the use of productive forces at the demanders’ discretion, and will provide the economy of the group concerned with the structure—account being taken of all possible structures and those only—that will best serve the whole of all individual aspirations.

Thus, the causal influence emanating from particular wills subdivides itself into smaller parts and regroups to form real threads of causation, related to the various articles in the market, and these are the forces directing economic evolution.

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Demand, the offspring of desire, is therefore the all-powerful tool through which an individual’s will extends its sovereignty outside the domain he owns, until it reaches the outer limits of the universe. Demand is the irresistible influence, which turns the world into what it should be so as to provide man with the most satisfaction for the least effort, within the framework of surrounding realities.

Again, positive minds will once more be surprised 5 that is ascribed [here] to intangible demand the force forging the concrete world—the world to which they wish to circumscribe reality.

In the field of economics, however, ultimate reality—the reality that is the fountainhead of every other occurrence—is man’s desire. The decisive factor for the study of a market is not the amount of existing quantities but the gap between those and the quantities desired. The wheat crop, or the quantity of banknotes in circulation, does not teach us anything, whereas the gap between the volume of the wheat crop and the quantity of bread desired, or between the amount of money in circulation and the desired cash balance, determines developments in the relevant markets.

The gap between the existent and the desired is the motive force behind all shifts in equilibrium, the one factor in which should be sought, in the final analysis, the impetus behind any economic evolution.

Thus, one realizes how fallacious the statement is that reproaches “scientific” economics for neglecting moral factors and pits it against certain so-called psychological economic or monetary theories.

Far from overlooking moral factors, scientific economics assigns them to their rightful place: that of the primary cause of all causal sequences, whose unfolding it investigates, beginning with the first economic link.

§4. The Fettering of Demand under a True Rights System

Demand is the act of an individual who decides to fill a right in the market sector where the article of wealth he wishes to acquire is exchanged.

A right, however, is only ever a receptacle enclosing a certain value; a right can be filled only to the extent that it has previously been emptied of its content. Its volume, under a system where only true claims are eligible for discount, 415 is therefore determined ne varietur by the value of the articles of wealth that are enclosed in it.

Thus, any demand is predicated on a supply of equal value. No individual can possibly draw on the wealth supplied in the market, except within the limits of the wealth that he will empty onto the market; he will only be able to serve himself by serving others.

The maximum value of demand—hence the volume of the desires that burst out of the inner realm of an individual’s psyche and are expressed openly in the market, which cease being mere psychological occurrences and become economic facts and the starting points for causal series in what is known as the external world—is strictly limited to the value of the articles of wealth supplied in market. At each instant of time, from the stream of desires that floods the hearts of men, a selection is made: this selection makes, of some of these desires, a demand, endowed with all the positive and quantitative characteristics that allow demand to be taken as the starting point of an objective study, while it lets other desires remain as confused aspirations and dreams, which may have some merit in the eyes of a poet, but to which an economist will remain totally indifferent.

Desire is infinite, continuing and never assuaged; demand is strictly limited, always frustrated in its aspirations toward the desired possibilities by the heavy weight of sacrifices it entails. Desire is free; demand is fettered.

It is not sufficient, however, to note that demand is the outcome of a selection between competing desires; we have to specify how this selection takes place.

We have shown 6 that each individual adjusts his holdings, in every article of wealth, to market prices. He will engage in any purchase whose desirability, in his view, outweighs the undesirability of the money sacrifice involved, and he will engage in any sale whose undesirability is outweighed by the desirability of the amount of money obtained.

Thus, exchanges cease only when the last “slice” of the holdings of all the articles of wealth owned by all the individuals constituting the community considered is, in the eyes of each such individual, neither more nor less desirable than the quantity of money that this slice represents at the market price. When this stage has been reached, man may continue to desire, but homo economicus ceases to demand.

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Desire generates demand only if there is a divergence between the desirability of an additional acquisition and the undesirability of the parting with money it requires.

Thus, the maximum desirability mechanism is only a system for sifting out the desires that tend to turn into demands.

The above analysis gives an idea as to the nature of those forces that sustain men’s activities and generate steady state conditions of their daily work.

In the general case of market-oriented production, man obtains desired articles of wealth through exchange, only to the extent that he accepts the undesirable effort that yields the articles of wealth to be parted with in order to acquire the others. This is how the divine punishment is carried out: “Man shall earn his bread by the sweat of his brow.”7

Man will, however, produce the articles of wealth that can be exchanged against the desired bread only insofar as the desirability of bread outweighs, in his own judgment, the undesirability of the sweat at whose price the articles of wealth in question can be obtained. Now, at each instant of time, consumption, in reducing holdings of those articles of wealth that are consumed, increases the desirability of an additional unit of each article and, by raising this desirability above the level of the undesirability of work, again subjects man to the law of effort.

The constant pressure exerted by marginal utilities, due to the effect of consumption, links man to his daily work and brings about a steady state, which is the economic feature of the permanence of human societies.

§5. The Unfettering of Demand under a System of False Rights Eligible for Discount

Under a system where only true claims are eligible for discount, the only way for an individual to acquire the ability to demand, in any form whatsoever, is by emptying rights onto the market. The value of his demand, during any period of time, will be strictly limited to the value of the wealth that he has supplied.

Now, from the moment a natural person or a legal entity has secured eligibility for discount of the false claims that this person takes out, the volume of 417 the rights that this person may fill in the market is no longer the volume of the articles of wealth that this person supplies in the market, but [rather] the volume of the articles of wealth that the false claims issued by him—after discounting—allow him to lay hold of in the market. This volume is set by the nominal value that it pleases the person issuing the false claims to assign to these claims; this volume has no link to the value of the wealth (which is generally zero) that the claims enclose. The issuer of false claims can hence receive something, without parting with anything. This person no longer earns his bread by the sweat of his brow; he escapes the law of effort as well as divine punishment.

Freed from the heavy counterweight of a supply of equal value, his demand can leap, unfettered and joyously, into the infinite world of desires. All avenues are wide open, because of the false right. No herculean tasks, no spectacular undertakings, no weapons, no wars, and even no gifts are beyond reach or impossible. Welfare assistance and insurance, asylums, hospitals, social security expenditures, all forms of largesse to which generous souls aspire, become possible.

A false right eligible for discount is the magic wand that gives man the power to realize all his dreams: it is the magical charm that sets man free from the cursed circle of reality.

When man has received the marvelous gift of a false right, the only thing that remains to be done is to lean over the great lake of articles of wealth supplied and draw from this lake the articles of wealth that can satisfy him. What is more, his demand, relying on false rights, shall be served just like the humble demand of those who have toiled in order to obtain.

There is, however, a considerable difference between these two demands: the latter only lays hold of the equivalent of what it has supplied; the former takes, without surrendering anything.

If, then, all holders of rights, both true and false, intend to fill them, then nothing will prevent the volume of collection instruments from exceeding the volume of the wealth supplied in the market, by the amount of undesired false claims.

Now, although a false right may indeed enable one to draw water from the lake, it will not enable one to draw from the lake more water than it contains. The share of each right will have to be scaled down, unless a new reservoir of adequate volume allows the amount of water that is lacking to be found outside the lake.

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A rise in the general price level under an inconvertible currency system, depletion of metallic reserves under a convertible currency system, are the unavoidable consequences of this alternative. These two phenomena also convey the resistance of reality to the falsehood that men will have engaged in by creating, out of thin air, rights devoid of substance, in allocating purchasing power without articles of wealth to purchase.

Under an inconvertible currency system, the reduction in the capacity—in terms of true articles of wealth—of all the rights coming into competition in order to be filled in the market will impose on the holders of true rights, where the articles of wealth supplied come from, a levy equal in value to the value of the articles of wealth unduly obtained by the creator of the deficit. This levy will therefore be the same as the levy that the tax necessary to avoid the deficit would have inflicted. This levy, however, will have been implemented blindly through a rise in prices, therefore without any consideration being given to fiscal justice; by its very nature, it will only affect suppliers in the market, instead of being distributed in a purposefully deliberate manner among all members of the community. It will bring about grave social disturbances.

Under a convertible currency system, it is by drawing on the holdings of the central bank that the same levy will be effected. If the deficit is large in scope and lasts for an extended period of time, it will necessarily lead to the suspension of convertibility.

These disturbances are all the consequences of the unfettering of demand. If one wishes to avoid these disturbances without putting an end to the deficit that gave rise to them, there is no other solution except to obtain from the community of suppliers in the market that these suppliers accept to want that which the fetters of true rights would have forced them to want: in other words, to limit the volume of the rights to be filled with true articles of wealth to the volume of true articles of wealth supplied in the market—therefore to give up on the idea of filling with true articles of wealth rights equal in volume to the rights seeking to be filled without however having been emptied in the market.

In order to try to bring some rights holders to give up on this idea, they could be offered compensation: this is the solution of a voluntary loan. For the life of the loan, the borrowed rights remain filled with false claims; all happens on the market as though the false claims had not been created.

To the extent that the volume of rights voluntarily filled with false rights remains less than the amount of the deficit, however, the assignment of false 419 claims eligible for discount leads to disorders such as a rise in prices or the depletion of metallic reserves. If one is not prepared to put up with such disorders, it is through coercion that the result persuasion could not secure must be obtained: limiting to the volume of the true articles of wealth remaining available—after the person in deficit has served himself—the rights capable of being filled in the market; this is the solution of rationing.

Rationing is therefore simply an authoritarian tool to bring the level of aggregate demand expressed in the market down to the volume of the rights that have been emptied in the market.

Rationing is the effort by the sorcerer’s apprentice to try to put back in fetters the demand that he has foolishly unfettered. And since he never succeeds completely in this and brings about, through the restrictions he inflicts, immense reductions in economic productive performance, his victims, if they were aware, should be led to ask themselves whether their government would not have been less unreasonable, in seeking to obtain directly—in the broad daylight of budgetary equilibrium—the purchasing power it sought in the falsehood of the deficit, and in not unfettering, through the assignment of false rights, blind forces it then seeks to subdue.

§6. The Effect of the Fettering and the Unfettering of Demand on Economic Evolution

The fettering and the unfettering of demand do not in any way infringe upon the sovereignty of rights holders. These remain masters, without any kind of restriction, of giving the contents of their choice to their rights. By demanding it in the market, their will exerts upon the allocation of productive resources the influence that will provide the productive apparatus with its maximum efficiency. It shapes the economic structure of the community considered.

The sovereignty of the rights holder is all-powerful under both a true rights system and a false rights system, but the consequences of this sovereignty will be very much different in each of the two cases.

In the former case—a true rights system—the volume of the rights to be filled will be equal, at each instant of time, to the volume of the rights that are emptied onto the market. Subject to a few details noted previously, the general price level (under an inconvertible currency system) and the general price level and the amount of metallic reserves (under a convertible currency system) will re420main unchanged, regardless of the use that rights holders make of their sovereignty. Monetary appearances will remain unchanged, regardless of any changes in the economic structure.

By contrast, in the second case, involving a false rights system, when the demand of the person in deficit has been unfettered as a result of the eligibility of false claims for discount that this person assigns, the volume of rights to be filled will exceed—by the amount of undesired false claims—the volume of rights emptied onto the market. There will be a rise in the general price level, or a depletion in metallic reserves, to the extent necessary to provide a content to the rights that enclosed these false claims. Monetary appearances will change, regardless of the simultaneous evolution in the economic structure.

Thus the unfettering of demand leads to a profound change in the influence exerted by rights holders on the economic history of the community of which they are part. In each and every case, it is their will that determines the allocation of production resources, thereby setting the evolution of the economic structure. Under a system of fettered demand, however, this evolution, whatever it may be, places itself and remains within the framework of immutable monetary appearances, whereas under a system of unfettered demand, this evolution unfolds in the framework of monetary appearances that are themselves—and independently of the economic structure—in a path of constant evolution.

Such are the general features of types of economic evolution that characterize true rights systems and false rights systems. These are general features, which we shall elaborate on further in the chapters constituting Part V of this book.

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Chapter XXVII: The Evolution of Economic Realities, Independently of Monetary Appearances

A rights holder is the sovereign master of the contents of his rights. He freely chooses which of his rights he will empty and refill in the market. This makes for the kind of allocation of production resources that provides maximum efficiency to the economy. We propose to investigate the mechanism through which, at each instant of time, the will of rights holders shapes economic realities under the various systems where we can consider the mechanism’s workings.

I. The Determination of the Economic Structure as a Result of Individual Wills

§1. The Patrimonial Structure of Economic Matter

Living matter is made up of assembled cells. Each cell comprises a nucleus, a protoplasmic mass, and an envelope. Similarly, economic matter has a cellular structure. All goods that do not exist in unlimited quantities—compared with the needs to be satisfied—are appropriated and therefore allocated between individual patrimonies. Each patrimony comprises a head that governs its evolution, a mass of articles of wealth constituting the patrimony holder’s assets, and an envelope that—although purely ideal—is a rigid demarcation line between the appropriated domain and the rest of the world.

For each exchanger, exchange is simply a two-way transfer of wealth across the envelope of the patrimony.

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§2. The Tension of Desire, a Characteristic Feature of Each Patrimonial Cell

At each instant of time, the desires of an individual sweep through his universe. He will “take” or “give” any article of wealth that is to him more desirable or less desirable—taking into consideration those articles of wealth already in his possession—than its market value. An individual will therefore cease to exchange only when the marginal desirability of all equivalent articles—for instance, those articles that are worth one franc at the market price—is the same to him, regardless of whether the articles are part of his patrimony or belong to the rest of the world.

It is the equalization of these marginal desirabilities that constitutes the adjustment to market prices previously described.1 Equilibrium will be achieved only when—in the eyes of the patrimony holder—the desirability of the acquisition of further wealth whose price is unity is the same for all the articles of wealth in his possession, and equal to the undesirability of parting with an equal amount of wealth.

Everything takes place as though the desirability of acquiring and the undesirability of transferring operated on the envelope of the patrimony, like the forces of osmosis that command exchanges between living cells, two opposite pressures: one tending to push out the goods owned, the other tending to prevent them from escaping.

Exchange will cease only when the pressure that is exerted on the two sides of the envelope has the same value for all the goods owned or that could be acquired.

This even tension of the desire that has been satisfied or remains to be satisfied is—all else equal—the weaker, the greater the mass of goods owned is. It will be considerable when one is destitute and will tend toward zero when close to satiety. At each instant of time, this even tension is therefore a characteristic feature of the patrimony and varies with the mass of wealth included in the patrimony.

§3. The Establishment of a Steady Economic State

If the goods supplied in order to satisfy men’s desires remained unchanged, exchange would soon channel every article of wealth to the patrimony where it 423 would have maximum desirability. Freedom of exchange would thus lead to a state of equilibrium, where the desirability of any additional acquisition would be balanced by the undesirability that such an acquisition would entail. In such a world, desire could subsist, but demand would be extinguished as a result of exchange; economic evolution would come to an end, in the unchanging state of maximum satisfaction.

Generally, however, the articles of wealth that man desires can be both consumed and produced. Consumption is a process of destruction, whereas production is a creation of values. Both are characterized by the quantity and nature of the articles of wealth that are either created or used up during the unit of time.

Consumption is prompted by desire, just as the drinking of fluids is prompted by thirst. A consumer experiences the desired pleasure of his thirst being quenched; but there is also the undesired trouble of the flask that is emptied. During any period of time, each individual raises his consumption to the level at which the desirability of any increase in consumption would be outweighed by the undesirability of the loss of wealth involved.

Similarly, production brings to the producer the desired satisfaction of owning the product or receiving the proceeds of its sale, but also the undesired trouble of the sacrifice required in order to produce. When production relies on personal work contribution, the sacrifice takes the particular form of productive effort. At any period of time, each producer raises his production to the level at which—as far as he is concerned—the desirability of any increase in production would be outweighed by the undesirability of the transfers of wealth and the additional effort involved.

Thus, consumption and production will cease to grow only when, for any quantity of goods whose value is unity, the desirability of any additional consumption and the undesirability of any additional production are brought back to the level of the tension of desire that characterizes the patrimonial cell considered.

The forces prompting consumption and production are therefore governed, like all the desires of homo economicus, by the fundamental rule of the alignment of marginal desirabilities. Their motive power operates only to the extent that marginal desirabilities deviate from the level of equilibrium to which exchanges—and internal changes occurring within the patrimony—always tend to bring them back.

Imagine, now, a person owning considerable wealth and happening to be in a state of equilibrium for marginal desirability, in which some pedantic Epicu424rean would have found an explanation for this much-vaunted ataraxia.2 If this person is alive, this state of equilibrium will not last. Hunger will be experienced on an increasing scale in all the directions in which his desire exerts itself, and as a result the marginal desirability of the foods coveted—either for immediate consumption or for saving with a view to future consumption—will also increase.

The level of desirability within the patrimonial cell considered will tend to rise.

As soon as the desirability of the food under consideration outweighs the undesirability of the loss of wealth that consumption would imply at market prices, however, consumption will occur and the corresponding desire, being satisfied, will cease to grow.

Several possibilities must then be distinguished, depending on the impact of consumption on the patrimony.

If, notwithstanding all the changes that affect it, the value of a person’s patrimony does not decline, then a steady state will be established as a result of direct equilibrium between consumption and production. This is the condition experienced by any person who lives “off his interest,” without any risk to his principal.

Generally, however, the value of the patrimony will decline. The person concerned will “live off his principal.” The undesirability of any additional transfer of wealth will increase: within the patrimony considered, the level of desirability will rise. As a result, the level of desirability will be brought closer to the point at which the undesirability of any additional transfer of wealth will outweigh the undesirability of the productive effort that could forestall such an additional transfer of wealth. The moment this level is reached, it is the individual himself, and not the capital he holds, that will provide by his labor the wealth desired or, more specifically, the values with which such wealth can be acquired. This person’s production will increase to the point where the undesirability of the effort involved in producing one additional unit would outweigh the desirability of the additional consumption or saving that such production could yield.

In this way the values of all individual productions over time will be established, while a steady state will be established within each patrimonial cell 425 where, at any period of time, the value of the articles of wealth produced will remain equal to the value of the articles of wealth consumed or saved.

§4. Patrimonial Specialization, the Consequence of the Uneven Hierarchy of Individual Preferences

Consumption or savings on the one hand, and production on the other, do not however pertain only to a specific amount of just any kind of wealth, but to specific articles of wealth. For there to be equilibrium, it is not sufficient for the aggregate value of the wealth consumed or saved to be equal to the value of the wealth produced; the same equality must also exist, within the aggregate figures, with regard to each category of wealth. The mechanism that ensures equilibrium—in terms of values—between production and consumption, however, also governs their allocation in kind among all possibilities.

To demonstrate this in a simple way, we shall consider an economy where all production is sold in the market and all consumption served by the market.

As a result of the establishment of a steady state, patrimonies’ cash holdings remain unchanged and so does, therefore—all things remaining equal as far as individual scales of preference are concerned—the marginal desirability of money for each member of the community considered.

The members of the community find themselves faced with market prices, as though they were faced with a given piece of information that they do not appreciably affect with their choice.

Whereas any consumption provides a desirable satisfaction, which depends only on consumers’ tastes and hunger, consumption also involves an undesirable sacrifice: that of the quantity of money that has to be parted with.

Although the undesirability of this money transfer, which is the product of the marginal desirability of money by price, remains unchanged as long as the price itself remains unchanged, on the other hand the desirability of consumption increases, for any living person, with the degree of hunger experienced. When the desirability of consumption outweighs the undesirability of the money transfer, then the individual concerned will start to consume.

As time passes, however, his hunger does not increase at a uniform pace in all directions. The desirability of an acquisition will outweigh the undesirability of the expenditure involved soonest in those directions where hunger increases fastest. It is therefore the corresponding products that the consumer’s demand will affect.

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Thus, it is the scale of individual preference and the rate—specific to each individual—at which desirabilities increase over time that will specialize the demand of patrimony holders among all the articles of wealth supplied to satisfy it.

In tending to depress cash holdings, however, consumption also tends to increase their marginal desirability. Now, whereas any production involves an undesirable effort, production also provides for a desired satisfaction: the remuneration that is attached to it.

The former will depend, taking into consideration production circumstances, solely on the producer’s tastes and resources. The law that relates it to the quantities produced during the time unit remains unchanged, as long as such tastes and resources remain the same. By contrast, the desirability of the remuneration increases with the desirability of money.

When the desirability of the remuneration outweighs the undesirability of production, the producer will start to produce.

While the undesirability of production increases as a function of the quantities produced during the time unit, however, its rate of increase is not the same in all the directions in which the productive effort can be directed. It is in those directions where the rate of increase is slowest that the desirability of the remuneration will first outweigh the undesirability of the productive effort. The producer will therefore be led to specialize in this direction.

The scale of undesirabilities specific to each producer and their rate of increase, based on the quantities produced during the time unit, therefore determine the directions in which individual productive efforts will be oriented.

Thus emerges the mechanism through which individual desirability curves—as a function of the quantities consumed or produced, which are the specific and concrete expression of people’s tastes and resources—shape patrimonial cycles and thereby determine the economic structure of the community considered.

§5. The Shaping of Patrimonial Cycles through the Price Hierarchy

The preceding analysis shows how each patrimony holder adjusts his economic cycle to market circumstances, by weighing the desirability of any acquisition against the undesirability of the money transfer involved, and the undesirability of any production against the desirability of the resulting remuneration.

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In the preceding section, we considered price as a given of the market, so that, for each individual, the undesirability of the money transfer involved in any amount of additional consumption, and the desirability of a remuneration resulting from an additional amount of production, depended solely on the marginal desirability of money.

Although any given individual does not meaningfully affect market prices, this does not mean that market prices are immutable.

Quite the contrary, we know that prices will fluctuate until the level that brings the volume of the rights emptied onto each market sector to the level of the rights that appear there in order to be filled.

Naturally, the undesirability of a money transfer and the desirability of a money acquisition depend not only on the marginal desirability of money but also on the quantity of money transferred or acquired.

Any price increase will therefore increase, all else equal, the undesirability of the money transfer involved in the acquisition of the corresponding article. Because of this, the price increase will deflect from the market the demand of those patrimony holders for whom the desirability of the corresponding acquisition outweighed the undesirability of the money transfer linked to the former price, but is outweighed by the undesirability of the money transfer resulting from the new price.

Inversely, any price increase will increase, all else equal, the desirability of the money acquisition relating to the production of the corresponding article. Thus, the price increase will lead to the supply of articles of wealth, the undesirability of whose production had outweighed, in the eyes of producers, the desirability of the remuneration resulting from the former prices, but is [now] outweighed by the desirability of the remuneration that the new price establishes.

Thus, price variation shapes the economic cycles of consumers and producers, by providing maximum efficiency to the resources held by each of them.

Now, it is important to note that this influence is not due to the absolute value of the price, but [rather] to its location in the price scale. As a matter of fact, the desirability of a given remuneration in money and the undesirability of a given money transfer depend on the volume of desirable items whose acquisition the money unit allows. They will be high when the general price level is low, and low when the general price level is high, and will vary inversely to the general price index that measures them. Any individual price movement proportional to the simultaneous movement in the general price level therefore leaves unchanged the undesirability of the money transfer involved in the ac428quisition of the corresponding article, as well as the desirability of the remuneration linked to its production.

These two characteristics change only if the location of the price in the price scale changes.

What affects the structure of patrimonial cycles is not therefore the nominal level of a given price but its rank in the price hierarchy.

We defined the point of production as being the price level that—in the market—brings aggregate supply, which results from the behavior of all the patrimonies that are suppliers at this price, to the level of aggregate demand, which results from the behavior of all the patrimonies that are demanders at this same price.

The preceding analysis shows that no steady state will be established until the price reaches the level of its point of production, the point of production itself being set by the responses that the price will generate among all patrimony holders, taking into consideration their respective tastes and the circumstances of production available to them.

The preceding analysis also provides information as to the nature of the mechanism through which price changes affect patrimonial cycles. Such variations determine individual supplies and demands. The sum of individual supplies and demands will constitute aggregate supply and demand, whose confrontation will, in turn, set the market price.

Through its functioning, the price mechanism shapes the characteristics of all patrimonial cycles in such a way that—taking into account each individual’s particular tastes and the physical circumstances of his productive activities—equilibrium should be ensured in all sectors of the market, at each period of time. In other words, any demand, however insignificant, will be satisfied, and any supply, however large, will be taken up, taking into account the countless realities that make up the economic world.

Thus, the price mechanism creates the only collective order that will provide maximum satisfaction to individuals, in the factual circumstances in which they happen to find themselves, while ensuring the permanence of the social group to which they belong.

§6. The Point of Production, the Outcome of a Clash between Human Nature and the Natural Order of Things

At each instant of time, the market price is at the level for which the total volume of nondeflected demands is equal to the value of already-generated sup429plies, taking into account the responses that the market price elicits in all the individuals who constitute the community considered.

We must insist on the nature of such responses: they are not value judgments with varying degrees of subjectivity, but decisions turned into actions, which as such feature all the attributes of objective realities. Because of this specific feature, they can be empirically observed and apprehended by scientific analysis.

These responses, however, simply reflect individual tastes and express the scale of values to which exchangers relate desired or undesired occurrences when confronted with market prices.

Now, responses generated by a specific price depend on:

  • — the volume of potential demands that this price deflects from the market, hence the desirability, in the eyes of prospective demanders, of the corresponding article, compared with the undesirability of the money sacrifice involved in its acquisition;
  • — the volume of supplies that this same price generates, hence the desirability, in the eyes of prospective suppliers, of the quantity of money to be derived from the sale, compared with the undesirability of the transfer involved, which—as is generally the case, where the article is actually produced—is the undesirability of the productive effort necessary to obtain this article;
  • — the varying degree of the desirability of money, which depends on the purchasing power of money—in other words, on the quantities of all the articles that it allows a buyer to acquire.

The first factor reflects individual tastes and human nature. The second is due to the difficulty encountered in obtaining the articles of wealth transferred, hence—in the case of articles of wealth that are actually produced—to the technical circumstances of production; in other words, the natural order of things. The third factor is due to the general price level.

Of these three factors, the first two reflect the stable characteristic features of the community considered; the third, by contrast, is contingent. The point of production concept was introduced in order to bring to light the influence of the first two factors and to isolate it from the influence of the third.

At each instant of time and regardless of the general price level, the points of production hierarchy will shape all patrimonial cycles in such a way that, in each market sector, equilibrium between demands and supplies will be ensured, under conditions that will provide all market participants with maximum desirability.

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It is therefore through their impact on the points of production hierarchy that individual desires, which are confronted with the resistance of realities, will shape, taking into consideration all possibilities, the economic structure of the community concerned.

§7. Shifts in Economic Equilibrium

Men’s desires and the resistance of the natural order of things determine the economic structure at each instant of time, but the economic structure will remain stable only to the extent that men’s desires and the resistance of the natural order of things remain unchanged. On the other hand, if these change, their variation will alter the economic structure, thereby generating an economic evolution over time. Let us investigate the main sources of these causal influences of economic evolution.

a) The Influence of Human Nature

Human nature is the permanent cause to which we ascribe the motives that determine, under a given set of circumstances, individual wills. In the field of economics, it is always reflected in a scale of preference,3 which determines, for each article of wealth, the extent of the sacrifices the demander will agree to before giving up on his demand, and the extent of compensation the supplier will require in order to part with an article or to produce it.

Human nature thus determines the volume of the desires that—for each price level—will pierce the envelope of inner life and come to express themselves as demands in the light of day of the market.

If an article of wealth becomes more desired, for instance through the discovery of a new property, or because of a broader scope of possible use, or as a result of an advertising campaign, the volume of the demand that will remain for the same position of the price within the price hierarchy will be higher; it is therefore only through a relative increase that enough desires will be snuffed out, and enough supplies generated, so that the market remains in equilibrium.

It is important to make clear that human nature, as referred to here, is not that of a vague homo economicus, conjured up for explanatory purposes, but the nature of real human beings, filled with desires, that make up the community considered. It is their actual tastes, expressed directly by the acts they bring about, that make for the structure of the economy.

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The price mechanism is therefore not a representative system subject to majority rule but a genuine plebiscite, where any individual—no matter how lowly he may be—makes his voice heard in proportion to the rights he holds and exerts the determining influence that allows him to derive maximum satisfaction from his universe.

The price mechanism makes of man’s desire the all-powerful influence that governs economic evolution and adjusts productive activities, at each instant of time, to the tastes that they have the task of satisfying.

b) The Influence of the Natural Order of Things

The natural order of things offers resistance to men’s desires, since it allows men to satisfy their desires only at the cost of some sacrifices. These sacrifices consist either in parting with wealth or, in the general case where the article of wealth to be transferred has to be produced, in making the productive effort necessary to obtain it.

Although the hierarchy of the different desirabilities linked to the various productive efforts is indeed a matter of individual taste, this hierarchy depends—all things equal as regards human nature—on the effort required to produce various market articles, hence on the circumstances of their production.

Now, for each producer, these circumstances are those that involve, among the various possibilities allowed by the state of the art, the lowest costs.

As a matter of fact, at each instant of time, the state of the art puts at the disposal of producers various production processes, which require differing quantities of the various services necessary to produce the article concerned. The classic example of an industrialist who can rely either on human labor or on capital services in order to resolve a material-handling problem is well known. It is clear that his choice will depend on the relative prices of the various competing services. This is why abundance of capital, because of its impact on the interest rate, is one of the essential features of the changing nature of ordinary circumstances, and why its variations constitute one of the main determining factors in economic evolution.

Similarly, technological improvements, by providing more economical methods of production, constantly reduce the undesirability of the productive effort linked to a given production. Thereby, technological improvements alter the rank of the corresponding point of production in the points of production hierarchy and shift production resources that—under the new circumstances—have lost their maximum efficiency.

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A course of lectures on political economy ought to highlight those influences through which the countless aspects of “things” determine economic evolution. This cannot be done here, and we simply wish to mention the emphasis that ought to be given to this consideration in any dynamic theory.

From the practical point of view, a dynamic theory should highlight, in particular, those influences that set the location of wages within the points of production scale. Dynamic theory would show that any technical improvements or any increase in the volume of existing capital—by lowering the corresponding point of production—raises wages in the price hierarchy, thereby improving the standard of living of the workers. Fully bringing to light the process through which this is brought about should be one of the major concerns of a science that aims to lead to the art of governing men.

II. The Evolution of Economic Realities under a True Rights System

The preceding analysis highlights the mechanism through which the wills of men, in their confrontation with the resistance of natural circumstances, determine, at each instant of time, the economic structure and thereby determine its evolution over time.

In the eyes of an observer, this evolution is reflected in a continuous change in the allocation of production resources and in the products generated. Within the realm of measurable realities, the immediate cause of this continuous change will be found not in the nominal value of prices but in the price hierarchy.

Individual wills therefore determine economic evolution by setting the price hierarchy.

We propose to investigate the modalities of this influence, under a true rights system, within the various possible contexts.

§1. Economic Evolution in an Economy without Any Resistances or Frictions

In an economy without any resistances or frictions, any distortion in the price scale—relative to the points of production scale—immediately generates a shift in the allocation of production resources, which maintains the efficiency of the productive apparatus at its maximum level.

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As a result, any price that tends to deviate from its point of production is immediately brought back to it.

Now, any change in the will of a given individual alters the volume of the rights to be emptied or filled in the market sectors it affects. This change, therefore, tends to bring about a distortion in the price scale and, thereby, shifts in the allocation of production resources. The moment the price reaches the level of its new point of production, however, those shifts that are necessary in order to restore optimal efficiency to the productive apparatus—taking into account the new needs to be satisfied—have in fact taken place; from then on, the price hierarchy will remain unchanged, regardless of the concomitant shifts occurring in the price scale as a whole, hence in the general price level.

Thus, changes in economic realities, as prompted by changes in people’s desires, will be reflected in changes in the price hierarchy and in the allocation of production resources, these latter changes constantly maintaining the maximum efficiency of the productive apparatus in relation to the ever-changing needs that it tends to satisfy.

Most of the time, productions will take place on the basis of slightly diminishing returns. As a result, the rise in the point of production, under the influence of an increase in demand, is nearly always quite weak, and very often insignificant for common shifts.

At the limit, for productions on a constant returns basis, the points of production will be immutably set within the price scale, regardless of changes in demand for the corresponding articles.

In this case, any change in the level of desirability does indeed tend to bring about a relative shift in the price concerned, but this shift is immediately curtailed by the resulting shifts in production resources.

Thus, in an economy without any resistances or frictions, economic evolution always results in very small changes in the price hierarchy—often, the price hierarchy even remains unchanged—but economic evolution involves a constant adjustment of the economic structure to the needs that it tends to satisfy, hence to the human wills that determine such needs.

Human wills thus shape production resources and give these resources, at each instant of time, the allocation where they will attain their maximum efficiency.

In order to appreciate the practical meaning of this finding, one only needs to imagine the countless individual wills operating in the complex universes in which we live, under the influence of countless desires, these desires them434selves constantly modified by changes in tastes, fashion, or circumstances. One only needs to think of the steady impact of advertising campaigns, collective fads, and the changing needs brought about by exceptional events, such as particularly severe winters or blistering summers, threats of war, or war itself. All these influences, which combine into clusters of demand or supply, constantly shape the economic structure as a result of slight modifications in the price hierarchy and turn it into what it has to be in order to satisfy, to the greatest extent possible and at each instant of time, men’s wills and desires.

In the preceding analysis, we had assumed that a change in demand affected a nonmonetary article of wealth, but a change can also affect the amount of the desired cash balance, in any of its various possible forms. The considerations developed in the chapters on monetary regulation indicate that in this case, as indeed in the general case, a change in demand will affect production of the article of wealth to which it relates, but its influence tends to bring about a shift in the whole price scale in relation to the price of the article of wealth that can be monetized, the price of this article of wealth remaining at an unchanging level. A change in demand therefore tends to bring about a relative shift in the price of money in the price scale, thereby adjusting the production of money to the needs that it tends to satisfy. Monetary evolution is therefore simply one particular aspect of economic evolution.

§2. Economic Evolution in a Real Economy

A real economy differs from an economy without resistances or frictions no less than a real universe differs from the type of universe that theoretical mechanics considers.

In a real economy, the disruptive forces will act only when strong enough to overcome the frictions opposing any modification of the existing state. The effect will be felt only after a certain period of time, depending upon the structure of economic matter.

There is, however, a profound difference between price movements and shifts in production resources. Price movements respond rapidly to any imbalance between demand and supply, at least in structured markets. On the other hand, shifts in production resources—because they affect men’s lives directly and because they bring about changes in their habits, often shifts causing damage, 435 inconvenience, or even serious disturbances in family life—quite justifiably give rise to resistances that cause the effects of shifts in production resources to lag.

As long as the shift in production resources has not taken place, however, the price movement will continue.

Thus, in an economy where shifts in production resources do not respond immediately to distortions in the price scale, any change in demand causes a shift in the price, to the extent necessary in order to bring the value of supplies—within the production context of the moment—to the level of demand.

The price may therefore exceed the corresponding point of production. Only when the price movement has been sufficient to overcome resistances to a shift in production resources will the price movement in the price scale come to an end. Then, a price movement in the opposite direction—linked to the shifts in production resources—will occur, which will gradually bring the price back to the level of its point of production.

Thus, in a real economy, economic evolution will appear in the form of temporary changes in the price hierarchy. The extent of these temporary changes will vary directly with the speed of the initial disturbances, or with the viscosity of the medium in which they occur. A distortion of the price scale, relative to the points of production scale, will however only be a substitute for a shift in production resources, and will disappear to the extent that a shift in production resources occurs.

It is therefore clear that the difference between the evolution of an actually existing economy and the evolution of an economy without any resistances or frictions will only have been a temporary one. In either economy, individual wills remain the all-powerful influence that, at each instant of time, generates and shapes the economic structure and its modifications over time.

III. The Evolution of Economic Realities under a False Rights System

The assignment of false claims eligible for discount increases the rights to be filled—by a margin equal to the rights that contained the undesired claims—without increasing in any way the rights emptied onto the market. At each session of the market, however, the articles of wealth supplied are allocated among all the rights to be filled. The rise in the general price level or the depletion of metallic reserves then generates additional supplies, and this will 436 provide the rights that are filled with undesired false claims with the content desired by their respective holders.

Beyond this phenomenon, however, which shall be discussed further in Chapter XXX, the assignment of false rights does not in any way alter the mechanism that determines, at each instant of time, the allocation of production resources. A demander equipped with false rights is in no way distinguishable from other demanders in the market. His demand affects the price of the article concerned, just as does the demand of a true rights holder.

It is therefore clear that the assignment of false rights will alter the allocation of production resources, to the extent that it alters the allocation of rights to be filled in the various market sectors. But if the assignment of false claims occurs at a uniform pace over time, and if—at each session of the market—the content that the person in deficit intends to substitute for the false claims that have been emptied of their rights remains the same, the deficit will leave unchanged the allocation of production resources as soon as the allocation of production resources has adjusted to the allocation of demand resulting from the deficit.

Thus the deficit, in spite of the constant rise in the general price level or the steady depletion of metallic reserves it brings about, does not in any way rule out the existence of a steady economic state.

Economic realities can remain unchanged and unaffected by the gradual deterioration of monetary appearances.

This finding highlights the superficial nature of financial disturbances. It accounts for the fact that a country can carry on living almost normally, subject to certain disturbances that will be specified further on, even as its money deteriorates. This finding brings out the profound difference between the evolution of economic realities and the evolution of monetary appearances.

IV. The Evolution of Economic Realities, a Linear View of the Totality of “Past” Patrimonial Cycles

The evolution of economic realities is described by the statistics that represent, at each instant of time, the economic structure of the community considered. This evolution is therefore merely a motion picture of the progress of this structure over time.

The aggregate nature of the statistical values that this evolution presents, however, masks an essential aspect: patrimonial allocation, which combines 437 their consecutive components into production-consumption pairs derived from the cycles around which the economic life of individuals “revolves” at each period of time.

Aggregate production and consumption figures are only the outcome of the arbitrary “unfolding” of these individual economic cycles, in which one should always seek—under the misleading appearance of an evolution that has been presented in an artificially linear manner—the human realities of economic life.

The characteristics of individual cycles are what make up the aggregate evolution of the community considered. Where individual cycles function at a continuing, regular, and steady state, the economy will appear “motionless” to an observer watching only external and global appearances. By contrast, where changes occur, economic statistics will reveal the outline of an evolution.

We have demonstrated that each of these elementary cycles was truly shaped by men’s desires. Men shape their economic universe so as to give it the structure that will yield the greatest enjoyment for the least pain. At each instant of time, it is the all-powerful points of production mechanism, which—independently of the general price level—will draw, seemingly out of nowhere, the privileged set of circumstances that alone, among all possibilities, will feature this characteristic.

Thus, economic evolution is strictly determined, and it is determined independently of monetary contingencies. Economic evolution, which is a trade-off between men’s desires and the resistance of the natural order of things, sets the path along which each individual will pluck all the satisfactions that he can reap with the means at his disposal, in view of his individual nature and the nature of surrounding circumstances.

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Chapter XXVIII: The Evolution of Monetary Appearances under a True Rights System. A Theory of Secular Movements and an Outline of a Theory of Cyclical Movements in the General Price Level

By monetary appearances, we mean all visible aspects of the monetary situation: the general price level, the amount and nature of monetized assets.

Their evolution is, of course, determined by the phenomena that we discussed in the chapters dealing with the various types of monetary regulation and with domestic and international trade. We propose now to bring together the conclusions previously arrived at, and to adapt them to the specific problem of evolution over time.

In this chapter, we propose to deal with the situation of an economy where all rights are true rights. As we shall see, evolution will be quite different depending on whether one deals with an economy without any resistances or frictions (as considered in theoretical economics) or instead with a real economy. The two cases will be considered separately.

I. The Situation in an Economy without Any Resistances or Frictions

§1. Stating the Problem

The problem to be dealt with here is that of the impact of the use that rights holders make of their sovereignty, on the general price level and on monetary reserves.

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In order to determine the true nature of the problem, one must realize that an economic community is a collection of countless individuals acting independently, under the continuous push of their desires, in the pursuit of maximum desirability, which—under the influence of their needs and tastes of the circumstances of production—is constantly changing. At each instant of time, their actions tend to bring about what they consider to be the most desirable situation. The combination of individual behaviors, in their rudimentary disorder, converge, however, to lead to the emergence of certain collective appearances: the general price level, the amount and nature of monetary reserves, the size of the various types of output, which, in the eyes of an outside observer, constitute the characteristic features of the evolution of the economic community considered.

We have already shown 1 that the general price level could vary only if there was a divergence between the aggregate volume of the rights emptied and those filled in the market for nonmonetary articles of wealth. We have established further that, during any period of time, the difference between these two volumes was equal to the difference between the variations in the aggregate amount of desired cash balances and the variations in actual circulation during the same period of time.2

As long as both remain equal, the volume of the rights to be filled is, in each period of time, identically equal to the volume of the rights emptied. Regardless of the changes desired concerning the contents of the rights held, regardless of the distortions that such changes may cause in the general price scale, thus regardless of men’s unpredictable decisions, the general price level remains unchanged.

For there to be a variation in the general price level, it is necessary—although we do not say that it is sufficient—that there be a divergence between the variations in desired cash balances and actual cash balances.

Consider the situation brought about by an excess of total desired cash balances over total actual cash balances. This is the situation that will result at a time when money in circulation remains unchanged, for instance, from an increase in necessary cash balances due to an approaching holiday period or from an increase in hoarding due to a looming threat of war. This may also be the situation brought about at a time when the level of desired cash balances 440 remains unchanged, the decline in monetization resulting from a decrease—all else equal—of supplies of claims or of gold in the market.

The cash balances of some people will be less than what they would wish them to be.

In order to correct this deficiency, those who wish to increase their cash balances will supply and abstain from demanding, thereby causing a twofold imbalance: an imbalance in the market for nonmonetary articles of wealth, where the aggregate volume of rights to be filled will be less than the aggregate volume of the rights emptied of their contents, and an imbalance in the money market, where the inverse situation will exist.

The excess of the volume of rights emptied onto the market of nonmonetary wealth will tend to lower the general price level. This downward tendency will first affect the price of the article whose supply has come to exceed demand. In an economy without any resistances or frictions, however, this tendency will be “spread,” instantly, over the whole price scale. We should not forget, because this is essential for the purpose of our analysis, that this extension is the consequence of the mechanism that tends to preserve the price hierarchy: the decline of one particular price will redirect, toward the production of articles of wealth whose prices have not declined, the productive resources whose use has become undesirable in the abandoned market. The downward tendency develops its effects, all else equal, until the price hierarchy is once again in conformity with the hierarchy of marginal production costs.

At the same time, the price decline, while it lasts, tends to bring about a rise in the interest rate.

A downward tendency—by an overall movement—of the whole price scale, and an upward tendency in the interest rate: these are the two forces whose developments have to be closely monitored, if we wish to explain the evolution subsequent to an increase in the desired cash balance.

§2. Under an Inconvertible Currency System, the Limited Mobility of the General Price Level

Under an inconvertible currency system, the situation will develop differently depending on whether the discount rate is at a level equal to or above the market rate.

In the first case, the market rate cannot rise. The upward tendency of the market rate and the downward tendency of prices will be immediately inhibited by the monetization of claims for a value equal to the value of desired ad441ditional cash balances. This monetization—in reducing by a corresponding amount the value of the nonmonetary articles of wealth emptied onto the market, and in increasing by the same amount the volume of money supplied—will restore equilibrium in the two markets: the general price level will remain strictly unchanged, notwithstanding the increase in the desired cash balance.

If the discount rate is higher than the market rate, then the rise in the market rate and the downward movement in the price scale can develop. But as soon as the market rate comes to bump against the discount rate, this two-way movement will come to an end, regardless of the cash needs still to be satisfied. From then on, unsatisfied cash requirements will be served through monetization of claims and—as in the previous case—the general price level will remain unchanged.

The general price level remaining at an unchanged level will have made disappear the cause of the rise in interest rate, however, and the interest rate will—all else equal—fall back to its previous level.

Thus, when the discount rate is higher than the market rate, any increase in the desired cash balance brings about, in the first instance, a decline in the price scale. The decline in the price scale, because of the reductions in the necessary cash balance that it brings about, provides desired additional cash holdings. But the scope of the decline, which is irresponsive to the increase in monetary needs, depends solely on the spread between the market rate and the discount rate. The decline is therefore always limited, and generally small.

An excess of actual cash balances over desired cash balances would have the opposite consequences: an upward tendency in the price scale through a general upward movement, and a downward tendency of the interest rate.

The downward tendency of the interest rate would, however, lead to the demonetization of previously discounted bills and thereby inhibit the aforementioned two-way movement: the general price level would, as a result, remain unchanged.

Only if the amount of cash balances that have become undesired exceeded the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity would the upward tendency in prices and the downward tendency in the interest rate be able to develop their effects. The two-way movement would persist until it absorbed—through an increase in necessary cash balances—the additional cash balances that remain undesired. At that time, the price movement would come to an end, and the interest rate would revert to its previous level.

Thus, in this case as well, the variation in the general price level would be limited and generally small.

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The immobility or the limited mobility of the general price level, and the close or fairly close adjustment of the quantity of money in circulation to the aggregate amount of desired cash balances: such will be—notwithstanding the total freedom of individual wills and the total unpredictability of their fluctuations—the system of monetary evolution under an inconvertible currency system in an economy without any resistances or frictions.

§3. Under a Convertible Currency System, the Strict Immobility of the General Price Level in Gold-Producing Countries, and Its Quasi-immobility in Other Countries

Although an inconvertible currency system limits the margin of possible fluctuations of the general price level, it does not eliminate this margin altogether. A convertible currency system, by contrast—in an economy without any resistances or frictions—reduces this margin to practically nothing, by substituting variations in metallic reserves for the variations in the general price level that monetary regulation would have allowed to subsist.

The phenomena observed are different depending on whether, in the country considered, the production cost of gold is such that gold is actually produced or not.

Consider a country where, as is the case in most European countries, gold is not produced on an industrial scale, and suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that this country has relations with only one other “foreign” country, where gold is actually produced.

We have seen 3 that, in the gold-producing country, the price scale is set by the definition of the national currency in terms of gold and is established at a level such that the point of production for gold coincides with its legal price and remains pegged to that level, if the universe considered is without any resistances or frictions.

In the non-gold-producing country, the price scale becomes established at a level that ensures, at an exchange rate that remains between the gold entry and exit points, international balance of payments equilibrium.

If certain rights holders in the non-gold-producing country find that their cash balances are insufficient, they will supply and abstain from demanding. The volume of the rights to be filled will be less than the volume of the rights 443 emptied in the market of nonmonetary articles of wealth, and will exceed the volume of the rights emptied in the market where money is exchanged.

This dual imbalance will generate a downward tendency in the price scale and an upward tendency in the interest rate.

If the discount rate is at the level of the market rate, the downward tendency in prices will be immediately inhibited by the monetization of claims, as in the preceding case.

If, however, the discount rate is higher than the market rate, then the price scale can decline.

As, however, the decline in the price scale carries with it the import and export points, it tends to push foreign prices in domestic currency above their respective import or export points.

Now, as soon as a point has been crossed, the corresponding article either is no longer imported or begins to be exported. In either case, rights that had previously been filled abroad now appear in the domestic market in order to be filled. The foreign purchasing power inflow thus generated will persist until its cause has disappeared—in other words, until the balance of accounts deficit generated in the domestic market by the increase in the desired cash balance is corrected, as a result of an inflow of foreign demand of the same amount.

Yet such a result will generally be obtained at the cost of a very small relative shift in the two price scales, a shift that, in any case, will be less than the spread between the aggregate import and export points,4 hence totally unrelated to the shift that would have resulted, in the absence of foreign demands, from a decline in demand in the domestic market.

The foreign demand inflow in the domestic market will generate an international balance of payments surplus for the country considered. Foreign buyers, in order to settle their purchases, will fill with gold (at the central bank) the right emptied in the foreign market, and empty onto the domestic market the gold they will thus have obtained. This gold will be “taken” by the domestic central bank, which will monetize it.

The small relative shift in the two price scales therefore has two consequences: it increases, by the amount of foreign purchases, the volume of the rights to be filled in the domestic market, and thereby brings this volume—despite the increase in the desired cash balance—back to the volume of the rights that appear in the market in order to be emptied; and it increases, by the 444 same amount, the quantity of money available in the market, thereby providing the desired additional cash balances.

This dual outcome will restore the equilibrium that had been disrupted by the demand for additional cash balances: the general price level will cease to vary. Thus, in an economy without any resistances or frictions, the downward tendency in prices will almost immediately be inhibited by the convertibility mechanism.

Although the shift in demand leaves the volume of the rights to be filled in the domestic market practically unchanged, it nevertheless alters their distribution among the various market sectors. Demand is reduced in those market sectors abandoned by the rights holders who wish to increase their cash balances; demand increases in those market sectors affected by foreign demands generated by the decline in the price scale.

These latter market sectors, however, are those whose import or export points were first exceeded by the foreign price in domestic currency; in other words, those whose production cost—although higher than the foreign production cost in domestic currency—was closest to it in the price hierarchy.

The shift in demand will therefore have the effect—in the country where it occurs—of transferring production resources from articles abandoned by people who desire to increase their cash holdings to those articles that have come to be demanded by foreign demanders.

In the gold-producing foreign country, the transfer of domestic demands to the country that increases its cash holdings tends to generate a decline in the price scale—not including, however, the gold price, which remains immutably pegged to the level resulting from the legal definition of the currency. Therefore, the sole effect of the downward tendency in the price scale is to transfer to gold-producing enterprises the production resources that have been deflected from the production of articles whose demand has been transferred abroad. The tendency toward a shift in the price scale is immediately inhibited by these transfers, in the type of economy without any resistances or frictions considered here. If, as we assume is the case here, gold production in the gold-producing country is on a constant returns basis, then the general price level remains strictly unchanged, despite the increase in the demand for gold.

The country that desired to increase its cash holdings will therefore specialize in the production of those articles of wealth that enable it to obtain on the best possible terms, from the gold-producing country, the quantity of gold nec445essary for the production—through monetization and without any appreciable variation in the general price level—of the desired additional cash balances.

Let us note, in passing, that the change in the desired cash balance has influences that are not limited to the country where it occurs. It influences the allocation of production resources as much in the gold-producing foreign country—and, through this country, in all convertible currency countries—as in the country whose general price level it tends to modify directly. Thus, the change in the desired cash balance is essentially an international event relevant to the economic history of the community of metallic currency countries as a whole. Any disturbance in one of them affects them all. Their fate is linked and their evolution is interdependent, as if they constituted one common area sharing one and the same currency, despite differences in parity and exchange fluctuations between the gold points.

It goes without saying that any decline in the desired cash balance would, mutatis mutandis, have inverse consequences.

Thus, in an economy without any resistances or frictions, the general price level will remain strictly unchanged in the gold-producing countries, and will show only very small variations in the non-gold-producing countries, notwithstanding any modifications in the economic structure due to changes in demand or in the circumstances of production.

The economy will “run,” and will be shaped, at each instant of time, by men’s desires. Each individual will choose the content of his rights, without any central authority being concerned with harmonizing his decisions. And yet, the economic evolution that will emerge from this chaos of individual paths will leave the general price level unchanged. Convertibility of the currency will thus superimpose, upon the elementary disorder generating constant changes in the economic structure, a collective order, which will present all the characteristics of immobility to the observer external to the community observed and mindful only of variations in the general price level.

Such immobility, within a context of motion, is highly paradoxical. It is the essential feature of monetary convertibility as applied to economies without any resistances or frictions.

It shows that convertible money, within such an economy, involves not only exchange rate stability but, above all, stability in the purchasing power of the monetary unit, despite the storms that may stir up the hearts of men and the revolutions that may upset the structures of their economies.

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It leads to the notion of a world whose structural evolution would be subject, at each instant of time, to the free will of men, but this structural evolution would in no way affect the general price level and the purchasing power of money.

§4. The Fallacy of the Quantity Theory [of Money]

The above conclusions again highlight the fallacy of the quantity theory [of money], which views variations in the quantity of money in circulation as the major, if not the only, cause of variations in the general price level.

In a universe without any resistances or frictions, the general price level will show only limited variations under an inconvertible currency system, and will remain practically unchanged under a convertible currency system. As for the quantity of money in circulation, it will vary only in accordance with the aggregate amount of desired cash balances. It will never be the cause of the general price level, or of any monetary phenomenon.

“Generating inflation” is therefore a concept that is not only inaccurate but utterly devoid of meaning.

II. Theory of Secular Movements in the General Price Level

§1. The General Price Level in Gold-Producing Countries Will Remain Unchanged Only to the Extent That the Location of the Point of Production for Gold Remains Unchanged in the Price Scale

The preceding analysis shows that, under a convertible currency system and in an economy without any resistances or frictions, the immobility of the price scale is strictly ensured (in countries that actually produce gold) by the mechanism that maintains the point of production for gold at the level of the legal price, and is substantially ensured (in non-gold-producing countries) by the mechanism that ensures equilibrium in their international balance of payments.

Thus, price levels will remain practically unchanged in the gold money countries taken as a whole. It is through the immobilization of the price scale in gold-producing countries, however, that this immutability will have been obtained.

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It is therefore this immobilization that dictates the stability of the general price level in convertible currency countries taken as a whole; consideration of the functioning of the mechanism leading to this immobilization gives an insight as to its full consequences.

The intervention of the central bank has only one consequence under a convertible currency system: it pegs the price of gold at the level of its legal price, by “taking” all the quantities supplied but not demanded, and by “giving” all the quantities demanded but not supplied, at this price.

In an economy without any resistances or frictions, however, prices are constantly maintained at the level of their points of production by the shifts in production resources that would occur, should a price deviate from such a level.

As for the points of production hierarchy, it remains unchanged as long as psychological and technical circumstances remain the same—in other words, as long as people’s attitudes and the natural order of things remain unchanged.

As a result, the fixity of the gold price in the market will have immobilized the point of production for gold, which will itself have immobilized the whole price scale.

This immobilization will be possible only insofar as the location of the point of production for gold in the price hierarchy remains unchanged, however.

As a matter of fact, if this location moves upward, the immobilization of the gold price will be accompanied by a downward shift in the price scale. If, to the contrary, the position of the point of production for gold moves downward, then an upward movement in the price scale will result.

Now, the position of the point of production for gold will remain unchanged in the price scale only insofar as the circumstances that determine it remain unchanged.

Indeed, the point of production for gold is the price level at which the quantities whose desirability in terms of acquisition outweighs the undesirability of the money sacrifice involved are equal to the quantities whose undesirability in terms of production is outweighed by the desirability of the resulting money remuneration.

Any change in the desirability of acquiring gold (for instance, because of considerations related to fashion, or because new uses have been developed) or any change in the undesirability of gold production (for instance, because of the discovery of new deposits or new methods of extraction, or again because of improvements to existing methods) will therefore—all else equal—bring about a shift in the location of the point of production for gold in the price 448 scale, and thereby, under a convertible currency system, a change in the general price level.

In a real economy, the movement in the general price level may be somewhat deferred as a result of resistances and frictions, but it cannot be avoided; the preceding conclusions will therefore apply.

In actual fact, shifts in the point of production for gold within the price hierarchy will be caused mainly by variations in the undesirability of gold production—in other words, by the cost price of gold.

Such changes may be sudden or gradual.

Sudden variations will result from a discovery of new deposits, more easily accessible or easier to develop than existing deposits. In the past, such discoveries have always brought about upward movements in the price scale: these simply tended to bring a point of production that had moved down back to the level of the legal price (the legal price having remained unchanged).

Price rises following the discovery of new fields constitute genuine “experiments” in the sense of physical sciences, and bring unquestionable factual confirmation to the theory.

Apart from such abrupt changes, however, the production cost of gold is subject—relative to other production costs—to constant variations, which are due to the relative evolution of various techniques. These variations, generally gradual, will bring about inverse variations in the general price level: a slow rise when the cost of producing gold declines faster than the average of other production costs, and a slow decline in the opposite case.

Such uneven changes in production costs will inevitably generate overall movements in the general price level as a whole; because of their slowness and continuity, such movements are known as “secular” movements, so as to distinguish them from cyclical movements, which will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

It may have been useful at this particular stage to show through a direct analysis of gold extraction costs that periods when the secular movement trends upward are periods when the location of the point of production for gold moves down in the price scale.

I was unable to attempt this research project.

I hope that a monographic study will soon come to fill in this gap, but one can consider it a certainty that its findings will provide this theory with experimental confirmation, which will confirm the qualitative knowledge that we have already provided of the circumstances of gold production.

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§2. Variations in Gold Production Costs in Gold-Producing Countries Will Generate a Secular Price Movement in All Gold Money Countries

The analysis presented in the first part of this chapter highlights the interdependence of general price levels in metallic money countries taken as a whole.

The shifts in the general price level that are generated, in gold-producing countries, by variations in the cost of producing gold will therefore spread automatically to all convertible currency countries. As a result, these will be subjected to a uniform rate of secular evolution.

III. Outline of a Theory of Cyclical Movements in the General Price Level

In the first part of this chapter, we studied the effect of the forces generating monetary evolution in a universe without any resistances or frictions. Such a universe, however, is purely theoretical. Like the universe studied by theoretical mechanics, it provides information on the tendencies of concrete phenomena, but not on their actual form. In real universes, there are resistances and frictions that oppose shifts in economic equilibrium and delay the action of forces that tend to bring such shifts about. In addition, these resistances vary considerably, depending on the structure of the universe concerned and, in particular, on its level of organization. Such resistances—regardless of whether they are strong or small—never are nonexistent, however. We propose to investigate their effects on patterns of economic evolution.

Let us recall that, here, we are only considering a true rights system. Changes occurring in communities with false rights will be discussed in Chapter XXX.

As a matter of fact, a universe with true rights is always a convertible currency universe. The link between convertibility and the veracity of rights does not, however, hinge on the natural order of things. This link is only the outcome of governmental preference, for the reason that no government would accept to relinquish advantages that are well within reach. Nothing therefore prevents us from imagining a universe with true rights featuring an inconvertible currency.

The analysis of monetary evolution under an inconvertible currency system is a meaningful step toward the study of monetary evolution under a convertible currency system, and a prerequisite to its analysis within a universe with 450 false rights. We shall therefore consider monetary evolution under an inconvertible currency system first.

§1. The Impact of Resistances and Frictions on Monetary Evolution, under an Inconvertible Currency System: The Unforeseeable and Purely “Historical” Evolution of the General Price Level; the Lack of Any “Natural” Price Level

Under an inconvertible currency system, any inadequate cash holdings lead to a decline in the general price level only insofar as the market rate does not come to bump against the discount rate, and any cash surplus leads to an increase in the general price level only insofar as the market rate can fall below the discount rate.5

In short, variations in the general price level are limited because, not being able to take place unless the market rate varies in the opposite direction, variations in the market rate are limited by the discount mechanism. The regulation of the general price level, accomplished through the intermediary of the market rate, is therefore only indirect. If it is to operate in a strict manner, then it is necessary for the link between the general price level and the market rate to be strict itself. In actual fact, however, this will be the case only in an economy without any resistances or frictions.

Let us consider, for instance, an increase in desired cash balances. People wishing to increase their cash holdings will supply and abstain from demanding. If they abstain from demanding claims eligible for discount, it will directly cause a rise of the rate in the money market, and this will tend to bring about a decline in the general price level, through the workings of the mechanism described above. The rise in the market rate, however, will bring it closer to the discount rate. Once the market rate comes to bump against the discount rate, the desired additional cash balances will be provided by monetization of undesired claims: any rate movement and any movement in the level of prices will come to an end.

In the great majority of cases, however, demanders of additional cash balances will abstain from demanding, not claims eligible for discount, but other articles of wealth: articles of wealth, properly speaking, or claims of a different 451 type. Their abstention will bring about a direct price decline only in the market for such articles of wealth.

The price decline will decrease the amount of cash holdings necessary for the functioning of the market sectors it affects. This will provide the desired additional cash holdings.

The decrease, however, will tend to spread from market sectors directly affected by excess supplies to other sectors of the market and, at the same time, to cause a rise in the money market rate.

It is at this juncture that resistances and frictions will come into play.

The mechanism that tends to spread, over the market as a whole, the disequilibrium affecting one given compartment is what ensures the permanence of the price hierarchy. We have shown 6 that this mechanism relied on a transfer of production resources from the article of wealth whose price was being depressed to those articles of wealth whose prices remained at their previous levels. Now, in a real economy, such a transfer takes place only where the resulting benefit is sufficient to overcome the resistances it awakens. This transfer will therefore involve time lags; the fiercer these resistances are, the greater the time lags will be.

The initial price decline will, in particular, cause a rise in the interest rate only after it has spread to markets under surveillance by arbitrage, and when it has been on a sufficient scale in order to induce arbitrageurs to intervene. Arbitrageurs will then buy for cash in order to sell forward. It is by supplying on the money market, with a view to the settlement of their cash transactions, the claims resulting from their forward sales that they will generate an upward tendency in the rate, and it is only when the market rate comes to bump against the discount rate that the fall in the general price level will come to an end.

Until that time, the fall can develop, providing—through a decrease in necessary cash balances—the additional desired cash balances. The fall will develop even if, at the moment that the insufficiency of cash balances became apparent, the discount rate was already at the level of the market rate.

In a real universe, no system of monetary regulation, however perfect, can therefore ensure strict stability in the general price level. In the majority of cases, the general price level will only stabilize when the movement in prices has been of sufficient scope to generate an upward tendency in the interest rate in the 452 money market, and when this tendency itself has brought the interest rate to the level of the discount rate (if the latter two rates had differed initially).

Thus, adjustment lags will have altered monetary evolution, in making possible movements in the general price level, movements that would have been avoided in an economy without any resistances or frictions.

Such alterations of monetary evolution, which are due to the time interval that separates cause and effect in a real universe, are not simply lags in monetization, however. These alterations are final. The price decline, although due only to an adjustment lag, is irreversible. Any subsequent change in the desired cash balance will generate its own consequences starting from the resulting new level of prices established by the decline. The price decline, therefore, becomes a definitive component of economic history, and even the memory of the price level that would have been maintained in a universe without any resistances or frictions is lost forever.

One could demonstrate, in like manner, that any excess in the desired cash balance, which generates demands unmatched by supplies, will cause a downward tendency in the money market rate only if the additional demands pertain to claims eligible for discount. Where this is not the case, the only prices directly affected will be those of the articles of wealth that are the subject of additional demands. The upward tendency in prices will spread to other market sectors—and bring about a downward tendency in the interest rate—only when it is sufficient to overcome the resistances and frictions resulting from any transfer of production resources and to induce arbitrage operations between spot and forward transactions.

Now, as long as there is no downward tendency in the market rate, the rights that enclosed undesired cash balances will not be provided with a nonmonetary content as a result of the demonetization of such balances: the general price level will rise, even if the amount of cash balances that have become undesired is less than the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity. As in the previous case, the rise in the general price level will absorb, through an increase in necessary cash balances, the cash elements that have become undesired. As in the previous case also, although resulting from a mere adjustment lag of an essentially temporary nature, the rise in the general price level will be an irreversible fact.

Hence, in a real universe, an inconvertible currency system will not ensure a strict and fixed limitation of variations in the general price level. The monetary evolution brought on by a given change in the level of the desired cash bal453ance will depend not only on the scope of this change and on the position of the discount rate relative to the market rate but primarily on the way in which the desired additional cash balances will be sought.7 Depending on whether the article that is no longer demanded is a claim or an article of wealth properly speaking, and—if it is an article of wealth properly speaking—depending on the speed with which the disparity between the spot price and the forward price will induce arbitrage operations, the increase in the desired cash balance will be served by a movement in the general price level or through monetization, and the whole of the subsequent history of the community considered will be affected.

In a real economy, monetary evolution under an inconvertible currency system can therefore be explained, but it cannot be foreseen. Furthermore, monetary evolution, in such a case, depends on unforeseeable choices. Monetary evolution is really “history,” whose successive stages are chronologically coordinated but in no way determined by the natural order of things or by the decisions of the authorities that set the discount rate. Each phase is generated by the previous one, through the free choices of countless individuals whose behavior sets the trajectory, over time, of the social group that they constitute.

In a real economy under an inconvertibility system, there cannot therefore be any question of a “natural” level of prices. There is no such thing as a natural level of prices, but only, at each instant of time, a de facto level, which is the result of individual wills and the outcome of the whole history that preceded it.

Although the location of the discount rate relative to the market rate does not determine the general price level, it does however contribute to its formation by setting the time from which a restrictive monetary policy will occur. Setting the discount rate therefore puts at the disposal of the central bank a tool for intervention that is not all-powerful or automatic but that does constitute an essential element in the set of influences that will determine the monetary evolution of the community considered.

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§2. The Impact of Resistances and Frictions on Monetary Evolution, under a Convertible Currency System: The Cyclical Evolution of the General Price Level around the Average Level Set by the Definition of the Currency in Terms of Gold

a) The Mechanism Limiting the Deviations

We have shown8 that in a monetary system, convertibility is only an additional device, which tends to convert possible variations in the general price level into variations in metallic reserves. Because of this particular feature, convertibility tends to ensure strict stability in the general price level.

In a real universe, however, the effect of this additional regulatory force is not felt immediately, not any more so than the basic influence of the discount mechanism is felt under an inconvertible currency system.

We propose to demonstrate that it is these intervention lags that generate the cyclical pattern of monetary evolution.

The starting point is the same as in an inconvertible currency system: an increase in the desired cash balance, for instance, will prompt people wishing to increase their cash balances to supply without demanding.

If the rights that are emptied of nonmonetary articles of wealth in order to be filled with money do not have as content claims eligible for discount, the downward tendency of prices will not be inhibited immediately, even if the discount rate is at the level of the market rate, and the general price level will tend to decline.

The situation will differ, however, depending on whether these rights, which are not filled with discountable claims, enclosed gold metal or other articles of wealth.

In the first case, demand will be less than supply in the market sector where gold is exchanged. Under a convertible currency system, however, the central bank will take, in order to monetize them, all the quantities of gold supplied but not demanded at the legal price. The central bank will therefore absorb the undesired gold and provide the desired cash balances. The central bank will thereby prevent the downward tendency in prices from developing its effects and will ensure, through an increase in metallic reserves, strict stabilization of the general price level.

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In the general case, however, demanders’ abstention will pertain to other articles of wealth. The abandoned market sectors are the only sectors that will be directly affected. The price decline occurring in these market sectors will, however, generate shifts in production resources, and these will “spread” the initial disturbance over the whole of the market, by generating an overall decline in the price scale.

The effects of this overall decline will be different, depending on whether the country affected is, or is not, an actual gold producer.

In the first case, all market prices will decline, except for one: the gold price, which will be maintained at an unchanging level by the obligation of the central bank to take all the quantities of gold supplied but not demanded at the legal price.

The distortion thus created in the price scale will shift production resources away from those articles of wealth whose prices have declined, and toward gold. These shifts in production resources will tend to raise the prices of all the abandoned articles of wealth, and to cause the desired additional cash balances to be provided not by a reduction in necessary cash balances but by additional gold-extracting operations.

As these shifts will continue as long as the gold price in the market remains above its point of production, they will inevitably bring the price scale back to its previous level.9

Nevertheless, the shifts in production resources generated by a distortion in the price scale will not occur immediately. Yet the influence that tends to bring the price scale back to its previous level will arise only when such shifts occur. Until then, the price scale may decline and its distortion, due to the fact that the price of gold is fixed, may become even more pronounced.

Thus, the downward tendency in prices will develop its effects. This tendency will rouse an antagonistic force, however. The more pronounced the price scale decline, the more intense this antagonistic force will be. This antagonistic force will act like a spring and will inevitably bring the price scale back to its equilibrium level.

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Thus, because of adjustment lags, the general price level will not be immutable, as would have been the case in an economy without any resistances or frictions. The general price level may deviate from its equilibrium level, all the more so as resistances and frictions will be able to delay compensatory adjustments for a longer period of time. Thereafter, however, the general price level will be automatically brought back to its equilibrium level.

In a country where the production cost is too high for gold to be extracted, circumstances would be rather more complex.

The decline in the price scale, relative to an immobilized price scale in a gold-producing country, will tend to push foreign prices in domestic currency above their respective import or export points.

As soon as an export point has been crossed, foreign demand, which was previously served in its own market, will be transferred to the domestic market. As soon as an import point has been crossed, domestic demand, which was previously served through imports, will be brought back to the domestic market. In either case, the volume of the rights to be filled will diminish in the foreign market and increase in the domestic market.

The transfer of purchasing power will generate an international balance of payments surplus for the country considered. It will lead to gold being imported, hence monetization of gold, and thereby to the desired additional cash balances being obtained.

As soon as the desired additional cash balances have been provided, the relative shift in the two price scales will come to an end.

It is in this way that, in an economy without any resistances or frictions, the decline in the domestic price scale would have been strictly limited to the very small amount necessary to correct, through a shift in trade flows, the initial disturbance.

In a real economy, this will not be so.

In the first instance, the transfer of demand from the foreign market to the domestic market, in reducing the volume of the rights to be filled in the foreign market, tends to generate, in the foreign market, a decline of the whole price scale, with the exception of the gold price, which remains unchanged due to the convertibility mechanism.

This decline, in thwarting the effect of a decline in domestic prices, tends to defer the moment at which the relative shift in the two price scales will be sufficient in order to correct the initial disturbance.

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In the second place, the transfer of demand from the foreign to the domestic market will—all else equal—tend to raise above their respective points of production the prices of the articles it affects. There again, the transfer of demand will defer the time when the relative shift in the two price scales is sufficient to correct the initial disturbance.

Because of these two factors, the scope of the decline in the domestic price scale due to a given increase in the desired cash balance will significantly exceed what the scope would have been in a universe without any resistances or frictions where—because of immediate transfers of production resources—the price scale in the gold-producing country would have remained strictly unchanged, while in the two countries all prices would have been maintained at the level of their respective points of production levels.

Distortions in the price scales bring about forces that tend to correct them, however. These forces continue to gain in strength as long as their cause persists. They will therefore inevitably be effective.

In the gold-producing country, the decline in the price scale brings about a decline in all production costs, therefore that of gold. Among all market prices, however, the gold price alone remains unchanged. The decline in production costs will therefore render more and more profitable transfers of production resources, away from the production of various articles of wealth and toward gold production. Whatever the resistances and frictions may be that reality sets in the way of such transfers, there will come a moment where the resulting increase in profit will be sufficient to overcome these obstacles. Now, as soon as these transfers of production resources occur, they will reduce the production of all other articles of wealth and thereby tend to bring about a rise in the price scale. As these transfers of production resources will persist until the point of production for gold has reverted to the level of its legal price, they will bring the price scale—in the gold-producing country—back to its initial level.

But this return, by amplifying—all else equal—the relative lowering of the price scale in the non-gold-producing country, will put the international balance of payments as well as the balance of accounts of this country in surplus. This will tend to correct part of the decline of its price scale, the part that was unavoidable because of the temporary decline in the price scale in the gold-producing country.

Similarly, in the non-gold-producing country, the distortion in the price scale, due to the inflow of demands for articles whose import or export points have first been crossed, will bring about transfers of production resources, away 458 from the production of the articles of wealth abandoned by demanders of additional cash balances, and toward the production of articles that benefit from new demands. These transfers will tend to bring the prices of the latter articles back to the levels of their respective points of production.

This decline, like the previous one, will, however, tend to put into surplus both the international balance of payments and the balance of accounts of the country where it occurs, and, thereby, to correct that part of the decline in its price scale which was inevitable because of the temporary distortion of this price scale.

Thus, transfers of production resources, when they occur, will gradually bring the price scale of the gold-producing country back to its initial level, and the price scale of the non-gold-producing country back to the level at which it would have found itself immobilized in an economy without any resistances or frictions.

In a real economy, monetary evolution will therefore deviate only temporarily from the path that it would have followed in an economy without any resistances or frictions. The deviation will have generated forces that tend to correct it, and their intensity will increase directly with the scope of the deviation. These forces, no matter what the various resistances and frictions may be, will inevitably overcome them, and will therefore inevitably bring back all the elements characterizing the evolution observed back to their equilibrium level—in other words, to the level that would have been reached immediately in the type of universe modeled by theoretical economics.

Thus, in a real economy, a convertible currency system will not be a system of quasi-fixity of the general price level, but it will be a system under which, in each country, the general price level can deviate from the level corresponding to the definition of the national currency in terms of gold, to be gradually and inevitably brought back to this level by the stabilizing forces generated by the disturbance itself.

b) The Unavoidability of Cyclical Evolution

The preceding analysis shows that, in a real economy, any increase in the aggregate amount of desired cash balances will bring about a decline in the general price level, not only within the monetary area where it occurs but also, via the intermediary of gold-producing countries, in all countries with gold convertible currencies taken as a whole.

Now, in the ordinary course of economic life, the aggregate amount of desired cash balances may change from time to time.

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Indeed, each patrimonial cycle revolves around the actions of the person heading the patrimony. As long as circumstances do not change, mutually offsetting individual deviations ensure quasi-fixity in the aggregate amount of cash holdings. Various events, however, are bound to affect in the same direction the desires for cash holdings of all or many patrimony holders.

A good harvest, for instance, will increase the value of the transactions to be settled; all else equal, this will increase necessary cash balances, hence total desired cash balances. Similarly, any fear of political or social disturbances, any threats of war, would increase desire for hoarding, hence, in this case also, total desired cash balances.

Such increases will trigger the phenomena analyzed in the preceding section, and they will generate both a downward tendency in the general price level and the forces that will tend to correct it.

The downward tendency in the general price level, which results from the insufficiency of the volume of the rights to be filled, has near-immediate effects, however; on the contrary, the forces that tend to correct the downward tendency in the general price level will develop their effects only after the shifts in production resources that they tend to bring about have occurred. These latter forces, in a real economy, will therefore have a lagged effectiveness.

Because of this time lag, the downward tendency in the general price level will be able to develop its effects.

As soon as a price movement is perceived, however, it is the object of spontaneous amplification. If the movement is a downward one, all the sellers who have noted the existence of a downward tendency will try to escape its consequences and will therefore attempt to sell before the decline develops any further; on the other hand, all buyers will defer their purchases as long as they possibly can.

These two additional factors, by increasing the excess of the rights emptied over the rights to be filled, will reinforce the disturbance that gave rise to them.

The downward tendency will intensify further; the general decline in the price level will persist at an accelerating pace.

The wisdom of mankind has known about this phenomenon for a long time and summarized it in the expression, “The decline beckons the decline.”

The decline will render increasingly profitable, however, transfers of production resources likely to correct it.

Whatever resistances and frictions any tendency toward the modification of the existing state may trigger, this tendency toward modification persists on an increasing scale (like the tension of a spring that is being stretched) as 460 long as the transfers that it tends to bring about have not been effected, and the tendency will therefore inevitably bring these transfers about.

From the moment these transfers begin, however, they will reduce the volume of the rights emptied onto the market. In the non-gold-producing countries, this reduction will be to the benefit of rights emptied onto foreign markets. In the gold-producing countries, this reduction will be to the benefit of rights emptied of gold in the assets of the central bank, where their contents will replace the drawings that have provided the desired additional cash balances.

In both cases, the transfer of production resources will reduce the excess of the rights to be emptied over the rights to be filled, hence the force that had brought about the decline in the price level. The more the transfer of production resources intensifies, the more this antagonistic influence will increase. And because the transfer will inevitably persist as long as its cause has not disappeared, the transfer will inevitably bring to zero the excess of supplies, whatever the resistances and frictions may be, and is hence bound—after having gradually reduced the rate of the decline—to put an end to it.

The influence that tended to intensify the price decline diminishes with the rate of decline, however. When the general price level no longer changes, there is no longer any reason for engaging in precautionary sales or deferred purchases. By contrast, the influence that tends to bring about shifts in production resources, which is an influence that is a function not of the price movement’s pace but of the price movement’s absolute value, retains all its intensity. It will therefore continue—by itself—to develop its effects. In other words, it will continue to increase that part of domestic production which, in non-gold-producing countries, is emptied onto the foreign market and not in the domestic market, and, in gold-producing countries, not in the domestic market but outside the market, into the assets of the central bank. In both cases, this influence will therefore reduce the supply of articles of wealth without affecting demand and, as it is no longer offset by an opposite excess of unmatched demand, it generates an upward tendency in the general price level—in other words, a tendency for the general price level to return to its initial position.

This upward tendency, in turn, will be the object of a spontaneous amplification: “The rise attracts the rise.” The upward tendency will develop its effects.

In developing its effects, however, it will gradually attenuate the price distortions that have brought it about. When the level assigned by the definition of the currency in terms of gold has been exceeded, the upward tendency will cause opposite distortions that, in turn, will generate influences in the oppo461site direction, and the process just described will be reproduced, in an inverse direction.

This does not mean that secondary influences cannot graft themselves onto this broad framework: a good or bad harvest, or hoarding movements prompted by psychological motivations. Such ancillary factors will superimpose their influence upon the influence resulting from adjustment lags. In the great majority of cases, however, and unless there are disturbances of an exceptional scope, the influence of adjustment lags will be the predominant factor. It will therefore give a cyclical appearance to monetary evolution, comprising alternations of phases of increase and decline in the general price level.

Periods of rising prices, which are periods when demands exceed supplies, and therefore periods of high levels of economic activity, are commonly known as “boom” periods. Periods of declining prices, which are periods when supplies exceed demands, and therefore periods of declining levels of economic activity, are known as periods of depression.

The passage from upturn to downturn will generally be accompanied by dramatic accidents, which constitute economic crises.

The cyclical evolution maintains the general price level around a central or average position, resulting from the definition of the currency in terms of gold. Hence, under a convertible currency system, this average position constitutes a “natural” price level, corresponding to a stable equilibrium to which the actual price level always tends to revert. It is above all by the establishment of this natural price level that a convertibility system offers a contrast with the system of indetermination, which is characteristic of inconvertible currencies.

It is not possible to study here, in detail, the morphological and social characteristics of the various stages of the economic cycle. We simply wanted to show that in a living economy, with resistances and frictions—in other words, in the framework of a real universe—monetary appearances will necessarily be characterized by a pendular pattern, generating periodic crises.

This cyclical evolution of monetary appearances will be superimposed, however, upon their secular evolution—without significantly affecting it, at least not over extended periods—as well as on the structural evolution of economic realities.

Thus, these various movements are only a convenient disaggregation of the aggregate results produced by the simultaneous evolution of the countless patrimonial cycles that make up the community considered.

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Patrimonial cycles will always be shaped directly by the wills of patrimony holders. It is through its intermediary—by shaping the choice motives that determine these wills—that changes in gold production costs on the one hand, and resistances and frictions on the other, superimpose upon structural modifications, due to changes in tastes and needs, the secular and cyclical movements of monetary appearances.

c) Duration and Scope of Economic Cycles

Economic cycles will be characterized by their duration and by their scope.

The duration of an economic cycle is the time interval between two successive returns of the same phase: it will be, for instance, the period of time that will have elapsed between two successive crises.

The duration of the cycle is made up of the duration of each of its various components. We have demonstrated, however, that each component would last as long as the antagonistic forces roused by any change in the general price level had not produced their effects.

Consider, for instance, the period of declining prices brought about by a fortuitous increase in the desired cash balance, occurring at a time when the price level is at its equilibrium position.

The influence that tends to depress the general price level, resulting from an excess of supplies, has a nearly immediate impact. The influence—consisting of transfers of production resources—that tends to bring the general price level back to its equilibrium level is of lagged effect.

The period of declining prices will last until the second influence is strong enough to cancel out the first.

Now, the time lags involved in the transfer of production resources are partly psychological and partly technical in nature.

Technical time lags are primarily those required by adjustments in tooling and, more generally still, those required by the development of new tools. Conceivably, for a given community and a given state of the art, technical time lags can, all else equal, be of a more or less permanent nature.

As a result, economic cycles, all else equal, will be of practically equal duration.

This finding, nevertheless, is subject to the “all else equal” reservation, which has its full meaning here. The duration of economic cycles will remain constant only to the extent that the process of evolution described above remains free of any outside influence.

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At any time, however, fortuitous (chance) changes in the levels of desired cash balances may occur. These will superimpose their specific influence upon the influence of cyclical forces properly speaking, and will thereby modify the duration of the economic cycle.

The regularity of the economic cycle over time will therefore be only approximative and may, at any time, be affected by external influences of a psychological or physical nature.

The scope of the cycle results from the spread between the general price level’s average position—such as it is set by the currency’s definition in terms of gold—and its extreme positions, at the end of periods of rising and declining levels of economic activity.

The preceding analysis shows that the general price movement will change direction when the forces that tend to bring about shifts in production resources are strong enough to overcome the resistances that tend to immobilize them.

These forces, however, increase directly with the spread between the actual level of the general price index and its average level.

Therefore, the more powerful resistances and frictions are, the greater the scope of the economic cycle will be.

The more the economic structure resists the forces that tend to alter it, the greater the modifications that will affect it.

Although resistances and frictions do depend on the psychological dispositions of men and on the characteristic features of their economies, they are also a function of the degree of economic organization. Associations in different forms, such as labor unions, trusts, and cartels, may indeed facilitate the adjustment process; but most of the time they constitute a powerful means of resistance against the shifts that prices tend to impose.

Thus, depending on the way in which they are handled, they will contribute to decreasing or increasing the scope of economic cycles, and therefore to intensifying, or diminishing, economic and social stability.

In any case, any unreasoned resistance to a shift in equilibrium will tend to amplify economic cycles. While purporting to directly provide men with the kind of stability that they long for, it will have increased the instability they dread.

As long as resistances and frictions remain unchanged, the scope of economic cycles will, all else equal, be practically constant. For the scope perhaps more than for the duration, however, this regularity may be disrupted 464 by all kinds of fortuitous (chance) events, which may superimpose their own influence on the impact of cyclical forces.

For instance, an increase in hoarding, during a downturn, will amplify the depression, whereas during an upturn it will reduce the expansion.

The constancy of the economic cycle is therefore—in terms of both duration and scope—essentially contingent in nature. The cycle provides the underlying tendency, onto which various other influences—the outcome of a generally unforeseeable historical evolution—come to graft themselves.

d) The Interdependence of Gold Currency Countries

The preceding analysis shows that the pendular swings of monetary evolution will affect all gold currency countries, taken as a whole, simultaneously.

In actual fact, any divergence between the volume of the rights emptied and the volume of those filled in the market of a gold currency country will, as a result of its influence on the international balance of payments of this country, be “spread” over all the markets of convertible currency countries as a whole.

Thus, a decline in the desired cash balance occurring in a non-gold-producing country will increase the volume of the rights to be filled, thereby generating additional demands not only in the market where the decline first occurs but in all other markets to which it is linked through the convertibility mechanism. The decline will therefore generate shifts in production resources in all these markets as a whole, and these shifts will eventually lead to a decline in gold-extracting operations in gold-producing countries. In these countries, the gold production decline will be compensated by an increase in the production of “other articles of wealth” that these countries were previously importing from abroad in exchange for the gold they sent out.

The pendular pattern of monetary evolution is, however, merely the effect of a disequilibrium between rights emptied and rights filled. Via gold-producing countries, the mechanism just described will propagate these pendular swings to the countries with metallic currencies as a whole. It is in gold-producing countries that the dampening effect that will limit the scope of cyclical oscillations will develop, as a result of transfers of production resources between enterprises producing gold and other articles of wealth.

Similarly, any fortuitous (chance) disturbance will affect the pendular swings not only in the countries where it occurs but also in all gold countries as a whole.

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Close monetary interdependence is therefore created between all convertible currency countries. These countries, then, become a true political family, whose members are subjected jointly to events occurring in any one particular member, and they are collectively linked to the same cyclical pattern of economic evolution.

This close interdependence may even spread to inconvertible currency countries, to the extent that their rates of exchange are not fully free.

Thus, the evolution of the economic cycle,10 being strictly common to all gold countries and affecting other countries to varying degrees, will be a worldwide phenomenon, which will develop a recurring succession of prosperity and depression, with all attendant propitious or adverse consequences in the countries most remote from the causes that will have given rise to it and from the influences that will have affected it.

e) Experimental Verifications

The preceding analysis shows that the resistances and frictions that impede shifts in production resources in any real economy account for the cyclical pattern of monetary evolution. Adjustment lags account for every aspect of pendular evolution and thereby provide the “theory” that explains the alternation between periods of prosperity and depression.

In order for our theory to be definitively admitted as valid, however, it should not only be investigated in a thorough manner but, above all, systematically subjected to the test of events. This confrontation with the facts should first address the main perceptible consequence of our theory, which is the shift in production resources as a function of the pace of economic activity.

There is one area in which the test is particularly easy, that of gold production, because statistics in this field, which appear to be reliable, allow for variations to be monitored. These statistics show variations of considerable scope between periods of rising prices and periods of declining prices. Thus the annual rise in gold reserves went from 1.5 percent, during a period of rising prices, to 7 percent (in 1930) and even 7.75 percent (in 1931), during a period of declining prices.

If this information is confirmed, it would show that shifts predicted by theory do actually occur, and with a scope that will come as a surprise to the layman.

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In order to complete the verification, however, it will also be necessary to investigate those shifts in production resources that the theory implies in non-gold-producing countries, between productions intended for the domestic market and productions for export.

A detailed study of the mechanism of these shifts will no doubt allow for the discovery of a link between their specific features, on the one hand, and the scope and duration of economic cycles, on the other.

It is not possible to attempt such experimental verifications here, because of the time-consuming and difficult research involved, which is possible only in the framework of a monographic study.

I do hope that this type of research will attract researchers and provide the theory of adjustment lags with a wide experimental base, without which it cannot be considered to be definitively established.

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Chapter XXIX: Aggregate Evolution under a True Rights System

§1. The Components of the Driving Force of Monetary Evolutions

It became clear, at the end of the preceding chapter, that the gap between aggregate demand and aggregate supply is the driving force and therefore the immediate cause of monetary evolutions.

Nevertheless, an immediate cause only explains to the extent that it itself can be explained. If we wish to gain a deeper insight into the mechanism of monetary evolutions, it is this explanatory gap that has to be related to its determining causes.

We have already shown,1 however, that, during any period of time, the difference between the volume of the rights filled and the volume of the rights emptied in the market—hence the difference between aggregate demand and aggregate supply—is equal to the difference between variations in aggregate actual cash balances and variations in aggregate desired cash balances occurring during the same period of time.

Where the amount of money in circulation varies just like the aggregate amount of desired cash balances, then the volume of the rights to be filled is identically equal to the volume of the rights emptied onto the market, and no force will tend to bring about a shift in monetary equilibrium.

By contrast, if there is a divergence between these two amounts, then the volume of the rights to be filled diverges from the volume of the rights emptied, and the difference between these two volumes tends to bring about changes in monetary appearances.

Thus, the quantity of money in circulation and the aggregate amount of desired cash balances are the components of the driving force of monetary evo468lutions. To explain these evolutions is to relate changes in the quantity of money in circulation and in the aggregate amount of desired cash balances to the causes that bring them about.

The quantity of money in circulation and the aggregate amount of desired cash balances are themselves resultants, however. In order to explain the variations, it is necessary to isolate the elements that constitute them and show how these are determined. This we shall now attempt to do.

Desired cash balances are the sum of hoarded cash and necessary cash balances.2

Each individual determines in full freedom, at each instant of time, the portion of his assets that he will keep in the form of money, taking into account existing and foreseeable circumstances, the regularity of his income and expenditure, and the means available to him as well as his personal tastes.

The aggregate amount of hoarded cash balances is only the sum total of these individual hoarded amounts. At each instant of time, this aggregate amount is the outcome of the psychological response of countless individuals to the ever-shifting realities that surround them.

As for necessary cash balances, these result, at each instant of time, from the value of exchanges to be settled and the technical modalities of actual settlements. If such modalities are determined by usage, necessary cash balances depend only on the first of the above factors. This factor itself is, however, dictated by the substance of exchanges and the price at which they are transacted.

The substance of exchanges is itself the outcome of individual free wills. Once it has been determined, the amount of necessary cash balances depends solely on the general price level.

Thus, the aggregate amount of desired cash balances is, at each instant of time, the outcome of two distinct sets of influences: countless psychological influences, which reflect the infinite diversity and unpredictability of individual states of consciousness, and mechanical influences, which attach through a very strict link the amount of necessary cash balances to the general price level.

Variations in the quantity of money in circulation, at each period of time, result from the difference between the amounts of monetizations and demonetizations that have taken place.

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The influences that determine monetizations and demonetizations vary, depending on whether the existing system is an inconvertible currency system or a convertible currency system.

Under an inconvertible currency system, only short-term claims denominated in money can be monetized. At each instant of time, the central bank “takes” passively, in order to monetize them, any claims of this type that are supplied but not demanded at the discount rate. It is the total amount of such claims that determines the amount of monetizations.

This amount is therefore strictly determined by the supply of and demand for—at the discount rate—claims eligible for discount. The graph representing the money market, with which we are quite familiar, tells us that this amount is determined by the positions of the curves of the supply of and demand for discountable claims as a function of the interest rate and by the level of the discount rate.

The curves of the supply of and demand for discountable claims, however, reflect, at each instant of time, the variations—as a function of the interest rate—in the aggregate demand for loans and the aggregate supply of loans against claims of this type. Each of their ordinates is the sum of a considerable number of individual supplies and demands, which reflect decisions freely arrived at by all individuals, nationals or foreigners, who are in a position to participate in the market.

For the most part, these decisions themselves reflect the psychological responses of individuals in light of the choices available to them. These decisions also express preferences resulting from preference scales, which are characteristic of their personal tastes, taking into account the extent to which their needs have already been satisfied, the existing purchase or sale circumstances in the various market sectors, forecasts concerning the future evolution of such circumstances, and, generally speaking, all circumstances under which countless desires may be satisfied.3 As long as these circumstances remain unchanged, corresponding supplies and demands will depend only on individual tastes and will change only if these tastes change.

In addition to these factors of psychological origin, however, in the demand for and supply of claims against money there may be other, purely occasional 470 influences: those emanating from arbitrage operations, when the general price level changes.

We have, indeed, shown that any decline in the general price level leads to purchases for cash combined with forward resales, with discounting of the claims obtained from the second transaction for purposes of settling the first transaction. The decline in the general price level will increase—by the amount of the claims thus discounted—the supply of claims against money and will correspondingly raise the curve representing its variations.

Inversely, any rise in the general price level, leading to spot sales, forward purchases, and investment (while waiting for the settlement of the purchases) of the resources derived from the sales, will increase—by the amount invested—the demand for claims against money and therefore correspondingly raise the curve that represents its variations.

These shifts in the curves of supply of and demand for claims are only temporary, however. As soon as the movement of the general price level comes to an end, the additional supplies or demands disappear, and the corresponding curves revert—all else equal—to the positions that they occupied prior to the price movement.4

Thus, under an inconvertible currency system, the amount of monetizations that have occurred depends on two sets of influences: influences of a psychological or physical kind, which are related to human nature and the natural order of things; and purely mechanical influences, which derive not from the absolute level of prices but from shifts in the price level, and will be stronger the greater and the faster the shift itself is.5

As long as the first set of influences remains unchanged, the amount of monetizations will depend only, as a result of a purely mechanical link, on variations in the general price level.

As to the amount of demonetizations, during each period of time, it is equal to the amount of previously discounted bills reaching maturity. It is therefore beyond the reach of any current influence.

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As a result, under an inconvertible currency system, the difference between monetizations and demonetizations is entirely determined, at any period of time, by the two sets of influences referred to above.

Under a convertible currency system, money can be obtained by monetizing claims—as under an inconvertible currency system—but also by monetizing gold. The quantity of money in circulation will therefore depend on all the above-mentioned influences, but also on those that affect the monetization and demonetization of gold.

At each instant of time, however, the central bank “takes” any quantity of gold that is supplied but not demanded at the legal price and “gives” any quantity that is demanded but not supplied.

The volume and the direction of its interventions, which set the volume of monetizations or demonetizations of gold, will therefore depend only on the aggregate amount of supplies of and demands for gold in the market, at the price at which the central bank intervenes in the market.

This price has a particular feature, however, which is that convertibility itself operates so as to maintain this price at a strictly immutable level. We have already shown 6 that this fixity did not prevent shifts in the gold price within the price scale, when the location of its point of production changed. Thus, rather than being the outcome of changes in the gold price within an unchanged price scale, these shifts result from movements of the price scale as a whole relative to an unchanging gold price.

Under a convertible currency system, it is therefore not shifts in the gold price but shifts in the general price level that bring about changes in the supply of and demand for gold. These variations have to be traced as a function of the general price level.

Now, aggregate supply and demand in the gold market combine supplies and demands from various sources.

The most important of these are generally those resulting from international settlements: supplies when the international balance of payments is in surplus, and demands in the opposite case.

We have already observed 7 that the amount depends, all else equal, solely on the difference between the general domestic price level and the general level of foreign prices in domestic currency. If we assume that the foreign 472 price level is unchanging—and it will be and remain so, practically as long as the volume of domestic disturbances is fairly minor relative to the volume of exchanges in foreign markets taken together—the difference between the general domestic price level and the general level of foreign prices in domestic currency will depend solely on the general domestic price level. The supply of gold resulting from international settlements will decline in line with the general price level, will be zero at the price level ensuring international balance of payments equilibrium, and will, at any higher value, be substituted by demand.

Curves S1 and D1 will therefore represent supplies of and demands for gold due to international settlement, depending on the general price level (fig. 27).

lf1981_figure_027.jpg

Fig. 27. [Q: Quantity; S: Supply; D: Demand; P: Price]

The level of these curves will depend on the desirability of all articles, domestic or foreign, for all buyers, domestic or foreign. Suppose that, somewhere in France or abroad, somebody who used to consume Port wine suddenly, without any change occurring in prices, prefers Burgundy wine: the gold supply curve will be raised and the demand curve will be brought down. Similarly, any change in the scale of preference—as a result of which, anywhere in the world and without any change in the relative levels of domestic and foreign prices, English cloth will be preferred to French cloth, or a Citroën car to a Buick car, or again bonds or shares issued in France to British consols 8 or shares issued in London—will affect the position of the two curves.

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Thus, it is the wills of countless individuals acting everywhere in the world, independently of one another, and under the sole impulse of their respective desires, that will determine, in the French market, the curves of the supply of and demand for gold resulting from international settlements.

As long as the tastes of these individuals remain unchanged, or, if they do change, as long as the changes are mutually offsetting, the two curves will remain unchanged. The moment a disturbance occurs, however, the dominant influence will shift them to the extent that—for each value of the general price level—the aggregate supply of or demand for gold has been modified.

Supplies and demands relating to international settlements are not, however, the only supplies and demands to be expressed in the market. Generally insignificant supplies may well originate from gold holders who, on account of the general price level, consider gold to be less desirable than other articles of wealth that could be acquired by selling gold. Similarly, demands for metal may originate from persons who—under the same circumstances—consider gold to be more desirable, because of its particular attributes for adornment or saving purposes, or because of its industrial or pharmaceutical properties, and for whom this desirability outweighs the undesirability of the money sacrifice that is required to purchase gold.

For a given value of the general price level, such supplies and demands depend, of course, on individual tastes. Let fashion focus on platinum jewels rather than gold jewels, and one may observe that the supply of gold will increase in the market without any change occurring in relative prices. Similarly, imagine that an advertising campaign enhances confidence in a pharmaceutical product with a colloidal gold base, and it will be found that the demand for gold will rise. The corresponding supplies and demands therefore respond to influences of an essentially psychological kind. All things equal as regards individual tastes, however, supplies will rise and demands will fall with the general price level. They add themselves to those resulting from international settlements and raise the aggregate supply and demand curves for gold in the market to the levels S2 and D2.

Lastly, in countries where the gold production cost is sufficiently low for gold to be effectively extracted, there exists a third source of supplies: those emanating from domestic production.

Their volume, during any period of time, will equal the amount of newly mined gold whose production requires an effort, the undesirability of which is outweighed by the desirability of the resulting returns. As these proceeds are 474 unchanging, the volume of gold supplies due to this factor depends essentially on the undesirability of gold-extracting operations—in other words, on production costs. For an unchanging general price level, gold production costs will generally be a decreasing function of the quantity produced. Production will stop at the level at which the cost of producing one additional unit would exceed the sale value.

But the production cost rises with the general price level. The quantities produced therefore decline with it. As they add up to supplies resulting from other factors, they raise the aggregate market supply curve to the level S3.

It is therefore clear that any discovery of new gold fields, which are more easily accessible than known reserves, or any improvement in extraction techniques, will raise the curve S3.

Thus, the aggregate market supply and demand curves for gold are the resultants of countless factors. These may be of a psychological nature and are related to the staggering of individual desires and its modification over time. They may also be of a technical nature and relate to possible uses of gold, to the way in which consumers appreciate these, to production circumstances, or to what prospective producers believe about the production effort that is required. Briefly, such influences are the outcome of all the responses that the countless factors mentioned above bring about in the hearts of men.

When the positions of the curves of aggregate supply of and demand for gold as a function of the general price level are fixed, and as long as psychological and technical circumstances remain unchanged, changes in the quantity of money in circulation due to monetizations and demonetizations of gold will depend only on the general price level. If the general price level is lower than P1, monetization will occur; if it is higher, there will be demonetization of gold.

The previous analysis sheds light on the various kinds of influences that determine, at each market session, the difference between the variations in the quantity of money in circulation and the variations in the quantity of desired cash balances, therefore between the volumes of the rights that are filled and emptied in the market. These influences are, mostly, psychological and technical in nature. It is in the hearts of countless men who are in a position to participate in the market, or who are in a position to affect the supplies and demands that constitute the market, that psychological influences develop, in light of all the circumstances that determine individual decisions. As for technical influences, these convey, at each instant, a factual state of affairs, unresponsive to economic factors.

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When psychological and technical conditions are settled and as long as they remain unchanged, however, the difference between the volume of the filled rights and the volume of the emptied rights is determined:

  • — under an inconvertible currency system, on the one hand, by the general price level, to the extent that it affects, through the intermediary of necessary cash balances, the amount of desired cash balances; and on the other hand, by the variations in the general price level, to the extent that these affect, through the intermediary of the amount of monetizations, the quantity of money in circulation;
  • — under a convertible currency system, by the same influences, to which is added the influence that the general price level exerts by affecting—through the intermediary of monetizations or demonetizations of gold—the quantity of money in circulation.

At each moment of time, it is the resultant of all these influences that will bring about the force generating monetary evolution and determine its direction. It is therefore this resultant’s variations that should be closely monitored, if one wishes to forecast and explain the forms of this evolution.

§2. The Two Types of Monetary Regulation

To take a concrete example, let us suppose that at the instant considered, the aggregate volume of rights to be filled in the market is less than the volume of rights that appear in the market to be emptied.

This will be the case, for instance, when political concerns increase the desire of a large number of people to hoard.

The general price level will tend to decline; the interest rate in the money market will tend to rise.

If under an inconvertible currency system, and if the discount rate is higher than the market rate, then the tendency toward a decline in prices will be able to develop its effects. By reducing, all else equal, the amount of necessary cash balances, it will immediately provide the additional desired cash balances and will thereby tend to reestablish equality between the volume of the rights emptied and the volume of the rights filled.

As soon as the market rate bumps against the discount rate, however, the equivalent of articles of wealth having become undesired will be withdrawn 476 from the market, in order to be monetized and reconstituted in the desired form of additional cash balances.

From that moment on, any increases in cash balances that remain desired will be immediately obtained. The decline in prices will come to an end and the interest rate will fall back, all else equal, to its previous level.

Monetary regulation will have made the cause of the price movement disappear, but without correcting the variation that occurred before monetary regulation came into play.

If we find ourselves not in a world without any resistances or frictions but in a real universe, this aspect is even more pronounced. The initial disturbance—an increase in the desired cash balance in the example considered—will have caused a rise in the interest rate only after time lags, which vary in accordance with the type of articles of wealth in exchange for which increases in cash balances are demanded, with the mobility of production resources, and with the vigilance of arbitrageurs.

Monetary regulation will come into play only when the market rate has bumped against the discount rate, therefore all the later the further away the discount rate is from the market rate.

As long as monetary regulation has not come into play, however, it is through a decline in prices that the desired additional cash balances will be obtained, because the decline in prices immediately causes the corresponding decrease in necessary cash balances.

But when at last the market rate bumps against the discount rate, if it reaches this rate before all of the additional desired cash balances have been provided by the decline in prices, then monetization will provide only the surplus cash balances remaining desired at that moment of time. And right away the interest rate will fall back to its previous level.

Monetary regulation will therefore purely and simply have ratified the price level that existed at the time when it began to come into play, indifferent to the level that would have established itself if delays owing to resistances and frictions had not delayed its intervention.

This is because, under an inconvertible currency system, the regulatory system is sensitive not to the absolute price level but to its shifts. The regulatory system does not tend to preserve a certain price level but only to preclude, from the moment it comes into play, the rate variations without which variations in the general price level cannot occur. It is therefore only an indirect system of 477 the immobilization of the general price index, without memory of the past and entirely indifferent as to the level it stabilizes.

Under a convertible currency system, the same mechanism operates; but if the general price level it establishes is not the one that brings the point of production of gold to the level of its legal price, the supply of gold is not equal to demand, at the price at which the central bank buys and sells it on the market; there are monetizations or demonetizations of gold.

These tend to bring the general price index to the level corresponding to metallic parity, and since these come to an end only when this index has returned to it, they will inevitably bring the general price index back to this level.

If we find ourselves in an environment without any resistances or frictions, this mechanism will ensure the immobilization of the general price level at the level corresponding to the metallic definition of the currency, strictly so in a gold-producing country, and nearly strictly so in a non-gold-producing country.

In a real universe, however, this mechanism comes into play only when the initial disturbance has shifted the demand or supply curve of gold in the market—that is to say, after considerable delays, greater, in any case, than the delays pertaining to regulation by the interest rate. Also, the tendency toward movement in the general price level can develop its effects, just as under an inconvertible currency system. But the more the price level deviates from the level corresponding to metallic parity, the more the force grows that will tend to bring the price level back to this parity level. The force will therefore inevitably be able to attain sufficient intensity to first compensate, then reverse, the tendency that gave rise to it, unleashing in this way the reciprocating motion, which is characteristic of the cyclical evolution of prices.

This is therefore only due to the intervention—under a convertible currency system—of a subsidiary regulatory mechanism, directed not by variations in the price index but by the absolute level of this index, a mechanism that retains the memory of the equilibrium level and that, when the index deviates from it, much like a spring that is extended, tends to bring the index back to this equilibrium level.

These two systems—the inconvertible currency system and the convertible currency system—are primarily distinguished by the regulatory influence they exert. The inconvertible currency system, sensitive only to variations in the general price index, stabilizes the level that economic history hands over to it at the moment when it begins to come into play; the convertible currency sys478tem, to the contrary, sensitive to the gap between the existing level and the level corresponding to the metallic definition of the currency, tends to bring the existing level back to the level corresponding to the metallic definition of the currency, when economic history has let the existing level deviate from it.

§3. Aggregate Evolution

a) Statistical Stability in Universes Governed by the Law of Large Numbers

The previous analysis enables us to perceive, in its immense complexity, the whole of generative forces of monetary evolution and the way in which these forces combine to bring this evolution about.

These forces are those that contribute to shape, at each instant of time, the difference between the volume of rights emptied and the volume of rights filled in the market, thus determining the variations in the quantity of money in circulation and in the aggregate amount of desired cash balances. They emanate from all the rights holders who, wherever it may be in the world, affect by their decisions one or the other of these quantities.

It is within the conscious awareness of individuals who are in a position to participate in the market that the actions are devised that—indirectly—will determine these two quantities. Any change in the amount of cash balances that it pleases individuals to hoard, any change in the nature or the value of the articles of wealth they acquire or in the procedures through which they settle their purchases, any change in the amount of short-term claims denominated in domestic currency that (wherever in the world it may be) an individual decides to supply or to demand, and lastly—under a convertible currency system—any additional shift in gold for industrial or adornment purposes, any variations in supplies of gold stemming from existing supplies or new extractions, will generate changes in the difference between the volume of rights to be filled and the volume of rights to be emptied in the market. It is therefore an infinite amount of elementary influences, emanating from countless individuals, that converge to form, at each instant, the generative force behind monetary evolution.

Nevertheless—and this is the crucial aspect—these influences will not act independently of one another, but only through the difference between the total amounts that tend to affect the quantity of money in circulation on the one hand, and the value of desired cash balances on the other. It is therefore only 479 when they have combined their effects into two aggregate factors, into two resultants, that this dual mass of elementary influences will bring about and direct monetary evolution. If these results have the same value, immobility will occur. If the values diverge one from the other, a movement will occur.

Yet elementary actions, which are the direct product of individual behaviors, present all the unpredictable spontaneity of these.

Experience shows, however, that as long as individual behaviors are not themselves subject to an influence that tends to render them parallel to one another, therefore as long as individual behaviors remain independent of one another, their average or aggregate characteristics, which are governed by the law of large numbers, present an extraordinary stability.

The examples of phenomena that are erratic at the individual level and stable when they are observed in groups comprising a large number of independent elements are numerous, not only in the social sciences but in all natural sciences, where they constitute the great family of statistical phenomena.*

The oldest and perhaps the best-known of such examples is the one revealed by demographic phenomena. The lifespan of any given child cannot be predicted. And yet, the staggered deaths, over time, within a group comprising a great many children can be predicted with a degree of likelihood that is unquestionably advantageous to life insurance companies.

Similarly, I have often thought that the modest trade of a newspaper kiosk would be very much unpredictable, unless the habits of the customers the kiosk serves were governed by the law of large numbers as regards their daily commute and routes, and as regards the magazines and papers in which customers read the news.

Individual influences, whose summation determines the aggregate amount of desired cash balances or the quantity of money in circulation, are also subject to this law of large numbers, as long as individual behaviors remain independent of one another.

No one can predict, for instance, the amount of cash that a given individual will decide to hoard, or the kind of settlements he will have to effect as a result of purchases it will have pleased him to make, or the method of settlement he 480 will choose. And nevertheless, statistics reveal the extraordinary stability of the characteristic features of monetary circulation, hence of the average habits of money users—as long as the characteristic factors that determine individual behaviors do not change.

Similarly, no one can predict the amount of short-dated bills that such-and-such a French or foreign firm will offer for sale at tomorrow’s session of the Paris market, or the amount of bills that another firm may demand in order to shift its surplus cash balances. Their behavior, determined by countless psychological and technical influences, will have all the unpredictability of individual decisions. And nevertheless, statistics reveal the extraordinary stability that supply and demand—all else equal—display in the money market.

Similarly, again, no one can predict whether a given individual will purchase tomorrow a gold bracelet for his wife, or sell tomorrow an antique golden quill in the market; no one can predict the amount of gold demands that he will, indirectly, express in the market, by drinking a glass of Port wine or by purchasing a jacket made of English cloth; lastly, no one can predict whether a given worker seeking employment, or given quantities of capital seeking being put to work, will direct themselves toward enterprises producing gold or instead toward enterprises that produce iron and nickel.

And nevertheless, supplies of and demands for gold are, on the markets where this metal is traded, extraordinarily stable, as long as no influence intervenes that affects all individual wills in the same direction.

Hence, in any social group comprising a large number of distinct individuals, acting independently of one another, the aggregate amount of desired cash balances, the supply and demand curves of claims or of gold, will display—as long as the circumstances that govern individual behaviors remain more or less unchanged or contain only minor, multiple differences, and are themselves independent of one another—the characteristic stability of statistical phenomena, notwithstanding the total unpredictability of the elements that constitute it.

b) The Establishment of a Steady Economic State and Its Shifts over Time

If we assume that the supply and demand curves of short-term claims, or gold, against money are stable, the amount of monetizations will depend only, at any given session of the market, on the discount rate (under an inconvertible currency system), and on the discount rate and the legal definition of the currency (under a convertible currency system).

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If the amount of desired cash balances is itself stable, then the difference between the volume of the rights emptied and the volume of the rights filled on the market will be nil, and thus the market in equilibrium, only if the discount rate—or the discount rate and the metallic definition of the currency—are such that at each market session the amount of monetizations is equal to the amount of demonetized cash balances.

First, we will consider a country endowed with an inconvertible currency. Let us assume that the discount rate is at a level higher than the market rate. Renewals of previously discounted bills reaching maturity will be directed toward the market: the general price level will decline and the interest rate will rise. As soon as the interest rate has bumped against the discount rate, however, the amount of the shortfall in cash balances resulting from the excess demonetization will no longer be covered by a decline in prices, but by new monetizations.

In a universe without any resistances or frictions, the amount of the daily decline in the general price level will depend only, therefore, at each instant of time, on the spread between the market rate and the discount rate: the closer the discount rate is to the market rate, the smaller the decline in prices will be.

Nonetheless, in keeping with the previously described mechanism,9 this daily decline will continue only for a limited period of time, a period equal to the average maturity of discounted bills. Indeed, at the end of the period defined by this time span, the amount of daily demonetizations will be brought back to the amount of monetizations resulting from the position of the discount rate in relation to the market rate’s initial position. The quantity of money in circulation will cease to vary; the general price level will stabilize.

If we consider the period during which this phenomenon unfolds as a whole, everything happens as if the daily shortfall in monetizations created a shortfall of actual cash balances that was equal to the product of the daily shortfall and the average maturity of bills discounted; but the effect of this shortfall unfolds gradually, during the entirety of the period considered.

At the end of this period of time, a steady economic state will establish itself at a plateau lower than the one from which we started, the extent of the decline depending only on the initial spread between the discount rate and the market rate, subject to a maximum, reached when the market rate, lifted higher by the decline in prices, comes to bump against the discount rate.

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In a real economy, the market rate will be lifted higher only when the decline in prices has been sufficient to trigger the intervention of arbitrageurs. Until then, the extent of the daily decline may surpass the previous amount.

The daily decline in the general price level corresponding to the initially existing spread between the market rate and the discount rate can therefore exceed the scope that this decline would have had in an economy without any resistances or frictions.

We can see, here, that—all else equal—under an inconvertible currency system, the more active the forward market is, and the more vigilant arbitrageurs are, the more stable the general price level will be. The shutting down of the forward market, so often implemented in order to prevent “speculation” from harming the market, is therefore, without question, a factor that amplifies the very instability this measure is intended to combat.

In any case, except for this intensification of the scope of the price shift, the phenomenon, in a real economy, will be the same as in a universe without any resistances or frictions: a steady economic state will establish itself, at a new price plateau, at the end of a period equal to the average maturity of bills discounted.

An excess of monetizations over daily demonetizations would lead, mutatis mutandis, to movements in an inverse direction.

Hence, no matter what the scope of the disturbance may be, the disturbance will be limited in extent and duration.

We will nevertheless show, in the next chapter, that the mechanism restoring a steady economic state on a new price plateau operates in both directions only under a true rights system.

When the currency is convertible, the same basic phenomenon remains. But if the general price level that it tends to establish deviates from the level corresponding to the metallic definition of the currency, the convertibility mechanism tends to bring it back to this latter level.

In an economy without any resistances or frictions, the response would be immediate and would ensure, at the cost of a variation in metallic reserves, the strict stability of the general price level.

In a real economy, however, the shift of the supply and demand curves of gold in the wake of a variation in the general price level will occur only after considerable time lags.

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Through the mechanism analyzed in the previous chapter, this lag will bring about the pendular evolution of the general price level around the average position corresponding to the metallic definition of the currency.

Hence, in this case also, a steady economic state will establish itself, but rather than being a state of immobility, it will be a state of periodic oscillation around an equilibrium level, this equilibrium level itself being unchanging.

c) Shifts in Statistical Stability, the Product of the Convergence of Individual Wills

The previous section shows that any economy left to itself, under unchanging conditions, will be led toward a steady economic state in which it will stabilize itself.

The steady economic state, however, will itself remain stable only to the extent that the statistical variables themselves—the aggregate level of desired cash balances and actual cash balances, on the adjustment of which the steady economic state is based—are not themselves altered.

Statistical variables, however, remain stable only if the elementary factors of which they are the summation, although not unchanging, display, in terms of their average value, only small deviations that are independent of one another. If these deviations all come to vary in the same direction under the effect of one and the same influence, then statistical stability will vanish.

It is thus that the staggered deaths, over time, of a group consisting of a large number of children of a certain age are stable and predictable only if the influences shaping their life expectancy are independent. If an epidemic were to affect all of them in one direction, then the permanent phenomenon will have disappeared.

Similarly, the statistical stability on which the trade of a newspaper kiosk is based exists only to the extent that the individual wills of the customers who constitute its client base are independent of one another. If, one day, these wills are all rendered similar as a result of some sensational event, which increases, for instance, the number of newspapers purchased or makes one newspaper preferable over another, then demand will lose its customary stability.

Now, in the same way, in the field that is of concern to us, the aggregate amount of desired cash balances and the aggregate amount of money in circulation will be stable only to the extent that the countless influences that determine them remain independent of one another.

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If fears pertaining to the global political situation, or to political or social unrest, render individual wills similar by raising simultaneously, among all individuals, the level of cash balances they wish to hoard, then the aggregate amount of desired cash balances will increase.

A good harvest, by increasing—for a large number of individuals within the community—the value of settlements to effect, and therefore the amount of necessary cash balances, will clearly entail a similar consequence.

Similarly, the prediction of a price decline or of a decline in the value of the currency, by raising simultaneously among all the individuals who are in a position to participate in the market the desirability of borrowing or the undesirability of lending, will alter—all else equal—the positions of the supply and demand curves of claims against money, thus the volume of monetizations or demonetizations of claims and, thereby, the volume of the quantity of money in circulation.

Lastly, in a similar way, under a convertible currency system, any poor harvest, which renders the purchase of foreign wheat more desirable; any trend in collective psychology or in monetary concerns, which increases or decreases—prices remaining equal—the desirability of foreign investments; any discovery of more easily accessible deposits or of extraction methods reducing the cost of production of gold will shift the supply and demand curves of gold in accordance with the price, and thereby the quantities of gold that are monetized or demonetized, thus the amount of monetary circulation.

Hence, for the amount of desired cash balances or the amount of actual cash balances—and thus the difference between the volume of the rights filled in the market and the volume of the rights emptied in the market—to be changed, it will be sufficient, other circumstances remaining unchanged, that individual wills be rendered parallel to one another through the intervention of an influence that affects all of them in a similar direction.

d) Aggregate Evolution under an Inconvertible Currency System

Any modification in actual cash balances that is not compensated by a modification—in the same direction—of desired cash balances results in a difference between the volumes of the rights filled and emptied in the market, therefore a variation in the general price level.

The variation that results from a given variation in the actual or desired cash balance is not immediate, however. We have shown, in section (c) above, that when it resulted from a shift in the supply or demand curve of claims against 485 money, the new steady economic state did not establish itself until the end of a period of time equal to the average maturity of bills discounted.

Similarly, when it results from a variation in desired cash balances, it generally affects the price level during a period of time equal to the average length of the cash turnover cycle. If, in fact, a person considers his cash balance to be too high, he will express demands in the market without providing supplies, up to the amount of his undesired cash balances. The next day, however, he will cash in proceeds on the basis of the level of earlier prices. To bring his cash balance to the desired level, he will once more have to demand more than he supplies. It is only at the end of the cash rotation period that his inflows will establish themselves at the level resulting from the new conditions and that a steady economic state can establish itself.

Thus, the shift in equilibrium pertaining to a given disturbance will generally be gradual and will find itself completed only after a period involving considerable time lags.

If, during this adjustment period, conditions do not change—in other words, if the generative influences of monetary evolution (the aggregate amount of desired cash balances, and the position of supply and demand curves of short-term claims against money) remain unchanged—the initial disturbance will develop its effects on its own. The difference between the volume of the rights filled and the volume of the rights emptied that it brings about will cause a gradual shift in the general price level until the establishment of the new steady state.

But if, at the end of this period, a new disturbance occurs, which affects one or the other of the specified causal influences, it will alter the difference between the volumes of the rights emptied and filled, as though it had occurred in isolation. From then on, it will no longer be the initial disturbance but instead—during their entire common period—the two coexisting tendencies that will affect the general price level, and contribute to determining, each through its respective effects, the aggregate difference between the volume of the rights filled and the volume of the rights emptied in the market.

If the two simultaneous influences are in the same direction, they will reinforce each other during the entirety of their period of coexistence, thereby amplifying the shift in economic equilibrium. This will be the case, for example, of an increase in hoarding, occurring during a period of a decline in prices caused by a surge in demands for claims in the market.

If the two tendencies are of opposite directions, they will clash and may even cancel each other out. In this way, an increase in hoarding could neutralize the 486 effect—on the general price level—of a fall in the demand for claims caused by political or monetary concerns.

Economic equilibrium will thus be the resultant of multiple influences. They will not act in isolation, but will combine their effects into a single force, which will, at each instant of time, be the generative force of monetary evolution.

It is in this sense that monetary evolution will be an aggregate evolution, the product, at each instant, of the totality of the influences that generate it.

e) Aggregate Evolution under a Convertible Currency System

Under a convertible currency system and in a real universe—that is to say, a universe with resistances and frictions—any disturbance will cause, due to a lag between price variations and the responses that tend to correct them, an oscillatory difference between the aggregate volumes of the rights filled and emptied in the market, a difference that will bring about the cyclical evolution of the general price level.

If, once the disturbance has occurred, circumstances do not change—that is to say, if statistical stability finds itself restored—this pattern of cyclical evolution will maintain itself indefinitely.

If, however, another disturbance occurs, this disturbance will in turn generate an excess or a shortfall in the volume of the rights to be filled in the market.

Excess or shortfall will add itself algebraically to the difference between the volumes of the rights emptied and filled resulting from the cyclical pattern. The two influences, by their combination, will shape the aggregate balance of accounts of the market, which will determine the variation in the general price level at the instant of time considered.

It is therefore this balance of accounts, and no longer the balance that resulted from the preexisting cyclical evolution, that will bring about the lagged responses of the convertibility mechanism and will, thereby, generate a new oscillatory pattern of the general price level.

We will leave to mathematicians the task of studying the “composition” of the two influences and the consequences this composition entails for the curve of monetary evolution.

For us, here, it is sufficient to know that it will alter the form of the original cycle.

The disturbing influence can, subsequent to the moment when it occurs, reinforce or counteract the cyclical evolution under way.

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If the difference between the rights filled and emptied due to the new disturbance is in the same direction as the difference due to the cyclical pattern at the moment considered, it increases the absolute value of the latter. In so doing, it reinforces the latter’s effects, and increases the scope and—generally—the duration of the phase under way. Such will be, for example, the consequence of a reduction in hoarding occurring, for psychological reasons, during an upswing in the economic cycle.

If the difference between the rights filled and emptied due to the disturbing influence counteracts the influence resulting from cyclical evolution, then the disturbing influence will reduce the value of the latter, thereby reducing the scope and—generally—the duration of the phase under way.

Such will be, for example, the effect of an increase in hoarding, for psychological reasons, during the downswing of an economic cycle.

A good illustration of the preceding analysis would be to discuss its application to a particular case, both because of its historical importance and in order to fulfill a previously made promise 10 that we would specify the impact of the “gold exchange standard” on monetary evolution.

During the years 1925–1928, the world economy was in an upswing. Some of the countries where the gold standard had been reestablished, however, were operating under the gold exchange standard. In point of fact, the gold exchange standard had been recommended by a resolution of the international conference held in Genoa in 1922.* Under the gold exchange standard, countries’ central banks were allowed to hold in their assets not only gold and short-term claims denominated in domestic currency but also claims payable on demand, or short-dated claims, denominated in foreign currencies.

Now, as various European countries were gradually returning to normalcy, capital, which had moved massively to the United States during the war and 488 the period of financial disorders that followed, had begun to flow back to Europe.

Under the gold standard system, this inverse flow would have reduced the volume of the rights to be filled in the United States by increasing—by the same amount—the volume of the rights to be filled in countries receiving the transfer. Occurring during an economic upswing, this backflow would have tended to reduce, in the United States, the balance of payments surplus and to increase European balance of payments surpluses.

The growing gap between US and European prices that such a divergence would have resulted in would have tended to dampen the rise in European prices and, compensating the amplifying effect in Europe through the contracting effect in the United States, would have let the cycle take its normal form.

The system of the gold exchange standard, however, although abiding by—as has been shown previously—the increase in the rights to be filled in the countries receiving capital inflows, prevents the reduction in rights to be filled in the countries that lose capital.

As a consequence, the return of capital to Europe, while it tended to amplify the trend toward economic expansion of European countries, did not counteract the trend toward economic expansion in the United States. The sensitivity and the effectiveness of the stabilizing mechanism found themselves markedly reduced and, thus, the scope and the duration of the upswing were greatly increased.

This is how a “boom” could develop without precedent in history, responsible also—because of its scope—for the turmoil without precedent that marked the downswing period, which the boom was bound to bring about.

The severity of the crisis of 1929 is hence the direct result of the impairment of the convertibility mechanism by the generalization of the gold exchange standard system.

Evolution under a convertible currency system, just as under an inconvertible currency system, is thus an aggregate evolution, the product of the composition of all the influences that, at each instant of time, tend to bring it about. In a real universe, however, the disturbing influences, rather than affecting a steady difference (if not nil) between the rights emptied and filled, merge with the cyclical difference stemming from the convertibility mechanism and thereby alter the scope and duration of the economic cycle. The cyclical phenomenon is therefore essentially contingent.

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In the large majority of cases, however, occasional disturbances, although they alter the size of the generative force of monetary evolution, are insufficient to alter its direction: the cyclical phenomenon remains dominant. Only major disturbances, such as wars and political or social crises, are capable, by inverting this force, of breaking the cyclical pattern of global evolution, and thus of profoundly altering the shape of the economic cycle.

f) Monetary Policy, a Simple Factor in Aggregate Evolution

Among the influences that contribute to shaping the aggregate, generative force of monetary evolution, there are two influences that are not of a statistical nature, because they depend on the conscious will of a small number of men: they are the influence exercised, in all systems, by the discount rate and, in a convertible currency system, by the legal definition of the currency.

As has been shown many times, variations in the discount rate, all things equal as regards the position of the supply and demand curves of discountable claims, and during a period equal to the average maturity of bills discounted, cause the amount of daily monetizations to vary. They therefore introduce a component in the aggregate force that governs the market, a component that adds its influence to all the influences that exert themselves at the same moment.

This component, however, has no privileged action whatsoever. It is simply one cause among other causes. It will reinforce or counteract the resultant influence, depending on the direction in which it exerts itself. If it counteracts the resultant influence, its effect will only ever be a dampening one. It will be capable of inverting a motion under way only if it is of sufficient scope to invert the whole of the influences it counteracts.

Similarly, the legal definition of the currency sets, all things equal as regards the supply and demand curves of gold, the direction and the amount of the difference between monetizations and demonetizations of this metal occurring at each market session. It is in this manner that a devaluation of the currency can forestall the decline that would be necessary to restore convertibility after a prolonged period of a rise in the general price level.

Changes in the discount rate and monetary devaluations are hence only temporary components of the determining force behind monetary evolution.

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Chapter XXX: Aggregate Evolution under a False Rights System

§1. The Deficit, an Additional Factor in Aggregate Evolution

The title of this chapter could lead to confusion. A false rights system is not a system where all rights are false, but only some of them: those rights that contain articles of wealth whose price has been upvalued, these articles of wealth generally being false claims stemming from a deficit.

We have shown 1 that, in fact, only the state is able to inject continuously an appreciable amount of false claims into the rights of its creditors. For the state to be able to do so, it is sufficient that the state make false claims eligible for discount. The amount of false claims created is then, during each period of time, equal to the patrimony deficit.

As for false rights, they are not empty rights, but [rather rights] filled with false claims. It is the false claims that, in turn, have no counterpart in the debtor’s assets. As a result, when the claims holder wishes to fill the rights enclosing his claims with true articles of wealth, he will be unable to obtain these articles of wealth from his debtor, as the debtor does not possess them. The claims holder can only obtain them on the market, competing in the market with holders of rights from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied.2

As long, however, as the holder of a false claim is satisfied, as long as he is not interested in “looking at what is inside,” the false nature of the assets he holds does not become apparent. Everything takes place as if his claims were true claims, and the rights enclosing these claims, true rights.

By contrast, when the holder of a false claim wishes to obtain true articles of wealth, he will supply the contents of his rights in the market and demand 491 the articles of wealth he wants. His demand will cause the popping of an equivalent amount of true claims, previously discounted, reaching maturity.3 This popping will release the true articles of wealth necessary to fill, without disturbance, the rights that enclosed the undesired false claims, while these claims will be substituted, in the assets of the central bank, for matured commercial bills that are not renewed.

As soon as the central bank’s portfolio of commercial paper has been either depleted or reduced to the incompressible minimum required for collection purposes, this process will cease to operate, however.

From then on, the demand by discounters of undesired false claims will no longer lead to any offsetting supply in the market. This demand will increase—by the amount of the rights that enclosed the false claims—the aggregate volume of the rights to be filled in the market, without altering in any way the volume of the rights that are emptied in the market. In this way, this demand will increase, by a corresponding amount, the difference between the aggregate volume of the rights filled and that of those emptied in the market, thus the generative force behind monetary evolution.

Thus, the deficit affects the aggregate evolution of the community considered by generating, from the moment when the amount of previously discounted true claims reaching maturity has been brought to zero, a demand that is unmatched by supply, which is equal to the undesired portion of false claims resulting, during each period of time, from the deficit.

This demand unmatched by supply is, however, merely one of the many components of aggregate demand. Its influence is simply commingled with the influence of all other components that exert influence on the market. It will be a determining cause of aggregate evolution only if, as a result of its amount, it is a dominant element in the resultant force to whose formation it contributes.

§2. The Degree of Circuit [Closure],4 a Measure of the Impact of the Deficit on Aggregate Evolution

Following the preceding analysis, the deficit will generate a demand unmatched by supply—thereby affecting the force that governs aggregate evolution—only 492 to the extent that the assigned false claims resulting from the deficit are undesired.

The essential question in forecasting the effect of a deficit therefore consists in knowing to what extent the false claims that the deficit creates will be undesired.

This is a problem that hinges on economic psychology and is similar to the problem presented by the study of demand and supply pertaining to any given article of wealth in the market.

Methods of analysis proper to marginalist theory may not resolve the problem, but they may at least help to clarify it.

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Let us consider, in the first place, a community with true rights, functioning under steady state conditions, with a discount rate being set at the level of the economic market rate.

For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that any short-dated claim appearing in the patrimony of one member of the community is immediately supplied in the market. This assumption simply forces us to hold that any assignee of a claim who does not sell this claim has demanded it in the market, and has therefore increased demand by the volume of the rights that he has not emptied in reality. This description obviously does not alter the difference between the aggregate supply of and demand for short-dated claims on the market.

The supply of claims against money will consist, at each market session, of two components: claims arising from forward sales during the session considered, irrespective of the article sold, and claims issued for the renewal of previously discounted bills reaching maturity.

The first component consists of the claims that have arisen from all the production cycles of the community considered. Their amount equals that of the productions whose cost is less than the resulting remuneration. All things remaining equal with regard to other factors of the cost of production, this amount decreases when the interest rate rises.

It will be represented, as a function of the interest rate, by curve S in figure 28.

lf1981_figure_028.jpg

Fig. 28. [S: Supply; R: Rate; D: Demand]

The second component consists of the claims supplied to renew previously discounted bills reaching maturity. This component brings supply in the money market to the level S′.

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As regards the demand for claims against money, it measures, for each interest rate, the amount of claims whose desirability for market participants—taking into consideration the interest income that claims provide—outweighs the undesirability of the deferral of enjoyment that their acquisition entails. This amount increases with the interest rate, as is represented by curve D.

Now suppose that, in the public Treasury, a daily deficit exists in the amount S′S″, which is covered by the assignment of false claims eligible for discount. A false claim eligible for discount is, despite its false nature, an article of wealth endowed with value, because its holder only has to discount it in order to be able to exchange it for any article of wealth of equal value, less any discounting charges. The only difference, compared with a true claim, is that the articles of wealth necessary to fill a false claim cannot be drawn from the debtor’s patrimony, but must be obtained in the market, in competition with the holders of rights from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied. To the claim holder, this difference is immaterial, however: regardless of whether his claim is true or false, within the limits of the volume of his right the claim holder can obtain—whenever he wants—any article of wealth of his choice.

Thus, the supply of and the demand for false claims are affected by the same influences that affect true claims. The market will not even distinguish between true and false claims of equal maturity: Treasury bills and commercial bills [commercial paper] of certain value will be traded at practically the same rate.

If, for the sake of simplicity, we assume, as with true claims, that any false claim acquired is immediately supplied in the market, the supply of claims will be uniformly increased—regardless of the interest rate—by the amount of the daily deficit.

In the figure representing the money market (Fig. 28), the curve representing the supply of claims will be raised to S″.

But the supply of false claims increases by a corresponding amount the volume of the rights to be filled. Part of this increment will be filled with articles of wealth properly speaking, and part with claims.

The rights that will come to be filled in the money market will, at each interest rate, be those rights whose undesirability, in terms of the deferred enjoyment that the acquisition of one additional claim provides, is outweighed—in the holders’ eyes—by the desirability of the additional interest income that such an acquisition entails.

During each market session, the portion of the rights emptied of false claims that generates demand in the money market will therefore increase as 495 the interest rate rises. This portion will increase, by a corresponding amount, the prior demand and will raise the curve representing the demand for claims against money to D′. The gap between curves D and D′ could, in theory, reach the gap that exists between curves S′ and S″, but only at very high interest rate levels.

If the discount rate has been set at or above r0, the deficit will, during each period of time, generate a demand for all the false claims it has generated: the circuit will be complete.

Generally, however, the equilibrium rate r1 will be extremely high. The discount rate will therefore always be at r1, below r0. At this rate, the deficit will create an additional demand for claims in the money market not exceeding d′d′1. The circuit will be incomplete, and the shortfall will represent the portion

lf1981_Ch30_IEQ_001.jpg
of the deficit.

The central bank, however, “takes” all the claims supplied but not demanded at the discount rate; it will therefore absorb, at each market session and in order to monetize them, claims in the amount of d′1s″1.

Within the limits of this amount, the rights that enclosed the false claims created by the deficit will have been emptied outside the market. To the extent that the additional cash balances resulting from the monetization of undesired false claims are themselves undesired—either for hoarding purposes or because they are required for an increase in necessary cash balances—the aggregate volume of the rights to be filled in the market will exceed the volume of the rights to be emptied in the market.

Thus, at each market session, the deficit will have generated an excess of rights to be filled, amounting to d′1s″1, and equal to the portion of the deficit for which there is no circuit.

An essential question remains: What will be, at each instant of time, the degree of circuit [closure]?

The preceding analysis shows that this depends, in the first instance, on the discount rate, at least as long as the discount rate is not less than the equilibrium rate r0, which will always be the case in periods where the deficit is considerable in scope and of a prolonged duration.

For a given level of discount rate, however, the degree of circuit will depend on the distance between curves D and D′, hence on the shape of curve D′ and, more specifically, on the speed with which it travels above curve D as a function of the interest rate.

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The ordinates of this curve, however, represent—at each interest rate—the quantity of claims whose undesirability, in terms of the deferred consumption they inflict, is deemed to be outweighed by the desirability of the interest income they provide.

The higher the desirability of claims, all else equal, the higher curve D′ will be.

Thus, the degree of circuit [closure] depends primarily on the preference scales of the claims as a function of the quantities owned—in other words, on the psychological dispositions of individuals.

If the desire to save money is great, the degree of circuit will be considerable; if, on the other hand, the desire to hold “real values,” or articles of wealth properly speaking, is great, then the degree of circuit will be small.

In any case, the degree of circuit will be stable only to the extent that the resultant of individual tendencies remains stable—in other words, as long as these are governed by the law of large numbers. If circumstances change, shifting many or all individual scales of preference in the same direction, then the degree of circuit will change. Now, among the most powerful factors that shape the attitude of individuals toward the deferral of enjoyment that the acquisition of a claim entails are those that derive from the forecasting of future price movements. If many people expect a price decline or a fall in the interest rate, they will defer purchases of articles of wealth properly speaking and maximize their purchases of claims denominated in money: the degree of circuit will increase. By contrast, if many people expect a price rise or a rise in the interest rate, they will maximize purchases of real values and will defer purchases of claims.

It is in this way that “speculation” with regard to price movements, and therefore (if under an inconvertible currency system) with regard to exchange rate variations, is the source of significant changes in the degree of circuit [closure].

Capital export crises lower this degree to a minimum level, whereas capital compartmentalization tends to bring it close to unity.

In French monetary history, on multiple occasions we have witnessed flows of this kind, which constitute genuine experimental verifications of circuit theory. A thorough study of the first half of 1939 would be particularly fruitful in this respect.5

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Beyond these purely psychological factors, however, the degree of circuit [closure] is affected—as long as a steady state has not been established—by various technical factors, which pertain to the very structure of economic systems.

In the large majority of cases, a recipient of additional cash balances does not increase his demand for nonmonetary wealth (articles of wealth properly speaking or claims) until he has actually experienced, through the increase in his cash holdings, the repercussions of the deficit. Any period of deficit will therefore, in its first phase, bring about an increase in hoarding, which will reduce the excess of the rights to be filled in the market, hence the perturbing influence resulting from the deficit.

Similarly, many rights arising out of the production process are definitively allocated only after considerable time lags. This is the case in particular for rights allocated in the form of dividends to shareholders of corporations. As long as they have not been allocated in a definitive manner, they are filled with claims in the money market. An increase in their volume, during a period of deficit, therefore increases the size of demand in this market until the difference between the volume of the rights acquired and the volume of the rights distributed by a company stabilizes.

Lastly, let us recall the observation made in Chapter XVIII, section 5, to distinguish between the true circuit, which results from deferral of consumption, and the purely apparent circuit, which has no economic consequences and results from the holding of certain cash balances in the form of money issued by private banks—that is, separate from the central bank.

In a community where the state pays for all its expenditure with money and obtains the resources to cover its deficit by discounting Treasury bills at the central bank, all the false rights arising out of the deficit are initially filled with money issued by this bank: banknotes or credit balances in the bank’s books.

Let us suppose that there is no circuit to any degree whatsoever—in other words, that recipients of false rights want to fully fill their rights with articles of wealth properly speaking. The volume of rights to be filled will each day be increased by the amount of the deficit. If under an inconvertible currency system, the general price level will rise, each day, to the extent necessary to bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market to the level of the rights that these articles of wealth must fill: necessary cash balances will rise, each day, by the amount of the deficit.

But part of the additional cash balance that has become necessary because of the rise in prices will be required, not in the form of banknotes or credit bal498ances at the central bank, but in the form of credit balances on the books of private banks. Some recipients of money issued by the central bank will deposit this money in their accounts with those banks, where—except to the limited extent that the banks increase, as a function of their deposits, their cash holdings or their balances at the central bank—these amounts will generate demands for claims in the money market.

If money circulation consists of equal parts money issued by the central bank and money issued by private banks, then “private” demand for Treasury bills will reach, on a daily basis, about 50 percent of the deficit.

The finance minister will be proud and will issue press releases to boast of the confidence his management inspires. In fact, this circuit rate is the result of a purely mechanical influence and, in the circumstances considered, will constitute the minimum level below which this circuit can never fall.

In many countries, the circulation proportion of “bank credits” within the total quantity of money in circulation, hence the minimum circuit rate, will be higher. Nonetheless, the corresponding circuit will never exclude possible price rises; to the contrary, the circuit will be generated by price rises.

The only effect of such a circuit will be to shift the allocation of new issuances from the balance sheet of the central bank to the balance sheets of private banks. Beyond this, such a circuit will have no economic impact. Nevertheless, the reason that states running a deficit seek this effect is that the balance sheets of private banks are less widely read and commented upon than the balance sheet of the central bank. This circuit, purely apparent, helps states running a deficit to conceal the disequilibrium of their management, but without mitigating in any way the disturbances that their management brings about. The circuit is an instrument not of improvement but of falsehood.

In Chapter XXIV we saw that the sole purpose of rationing methods is to increase, through the use of constraint, the circuit rate.

In order to measure their impact, one would need to compare the circuit rate that rationing methods bring about with the minimum level just described above. To take a concrete example: for the years 1940–1943, Mr. Sauvy, director of France’s Institut de Conjoncture,6 calculates that the degree of circuit closure, in France, was 76 percent, 80 percent, 67 percent, and 72 percent, despite 499 all the control measures that were implemented in order to maximize the degree of circuit closure.7

In any case, under a set of given circumstances, the circuit rate will remain unchanged as long as individual tendencies remain the same. The circuit rate is the overall reflection of these individual tendencies and, as such, is a “statistical” quantity, which the economist may regard as a datum.

§3. The Effect of False Rights on Aggregate Evolution under a Convertible Currency System

The previous analysis shows that any deficit creates a generative force of monetary evolution, a force whose size depends solely on the undesired portion of the amount of false claims created each day.

In order to forecast the effects of the deficit in advance, however, it is essential to bear in mind that this force is only one component of the aggregate force that will affect the overall evolution of the community considered.

As such, it combines its influence with the influence of forces having another origin. When operating in the same direction, this force amplifies the other forces’ effects; when operating in the opposite direction, it impedes them.

Nevertheless, we have shown that to the extent—in a community without false rights and where the currency is convertible—individual tendencies display the statistical stability that characterizes communities comprising a large number of individuals acting independently of one another, a steady economic state will inevitably establish itself.

In an economy without any resistances or frictions, this regular and steady pace implies stability in the general price level, hence equality between the volume of the rights filled and the volume of the rights emptied in the market.

In a real economy, this steady state is a state where the general price level fluctuates cyclically, and therefore the difference between the aggregate volume of the rights filled and the aggregate volume of the rights emptied oscillates around a value of zero.

It is onto this difference that is grafted the effect of any deficit that comes to disturb the preexisting steady state.

In an economy without any resistances or frictions, this effect will increase, by the amount of those false claims that are undesired each day, the volume of 500 the rights to be filled. This effect will therefore bring about, correspondingly, a daily decrease in the central bank’s level of metallic reserves.

In a real economy, this effect will increase by an equal volume the excess of the rights to be filled, during the upswing of the cycle, and decrease by the same amount the excess of the rights to be emptied, during the downswing of the cycle. This effect will therefore increase the pace and scope of periods of economic upswing and decrease the pace and scope of periods of economic downswing. It may even, when the amount of undesired false claims each day is considerable, fully offset and even reverse the cyclical pattern during a significant downswing. In that case, the cycle will only translate into a change in the pace of upward movement that will constantly characterize the general price level.

Generally, however, as long as the daily amount of false claims undesired each day is not exceptionally high—either because the deficit itself is very high or because the degree of circuit [completion] is weak—the cyclical tendency will remain predominant. The deficit will alter the shape of the cycle, but without eliminating it altogether.

The composition of the two influences—the cyclical influence and the influence of the deficit—accounts for the periods of price decline observed in 1920–1921, even in states running serious deficits. It also accounts for the close interdependence that links the situation of the Treasury to the pace of economic evolution. For states running deficits, periods of upswing are periods of Treasury crises and therefore generally periods of political turmoil, whereas periods of downturn, which mitigate payment difficulties of states running a deficit, wrongly lead people to believe that financial problems have been resolved.

The composition of the tendencies stemming from the cycle and the deficit does not exclude the simultaneous action of any other influence resulting from changes—in the aggregate—in individual tendencies. Any increase in hoarding, for instance, will reduce the pace and scope of the upswing phase and increase the pace and scope of the downswing phase. In this way, much to general surprise, political fears and in particular risks of war have largely mitigated the Treasury difficulties of states running a deficit.

In any case, the combination of the oscillating force, which generates the cyclical movement, with the force generated by the deficit can only temporarily alter the deficit’s repercussions on economic evolution. The deficit generates an excess of rights to be filled, an excess that will be increased during the upswing and reduced during the downswing, but which—if one considers the economic cycle as a whole—will remain determined by the daily amount of 501 Treasury shortfalls. This excess will be able to obtain its content—unless this is provided by some exceptional disturbance, such as a change in hoarding—only from the metallic reserves of the central bank. The deficit will therefore reduce these reserves, as it would have done in an economy without any resistances or frictions. When the deficit is large in scope and long-lasting in duration, it will necessarily lead to the suspension of convertibility.

§4. The Effect of False Rights on Aggregate Evolution under an Inconvertible Currency System

Under an inconvertible currency system as under a metallic currency system, the deficit increases—by the amount of false claims undesired each day—the volume of the rights to be filled in the market. If the deficit occurs during a period of statistical stability, this tendency will be the only one to exert an influence. It will then bring about a rise in prices and in the exchange rate, to the extent necessary to bring, each day, the value of the articles of wealth supplied to the level of the rights that they must fill.

We have shown, in a booklet published in 1925,8 that if the deficit is of an unchanging amount in terms of purchasing power, the price curve will be an exponential one. In addition, we verified that, in a great number of countries with a budget deficit, the rise in prices indeed follows that law over extended periods of time.

Such a finding, due to its rigor and general applicability, provides our theory with experimental confirmation. In addition, this finding provides us with an effective tool for analyzing aggregate evolution.

The facts show, indeed, that the law of prices remains rigorously exponential only if all else remains equal.

As soon as disruptive influences upset statistical stability, they combine with the influence generated by the deficit to form a new resultant that affects aggregate evolution.

Such influences may, in the first instance, be amplifying influences, resulting from anticipatory purchases by individuals expecting a rise in prices.

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They may also have specific causes, however, such as those linked to hoarding movements due to fears of internal or international disturbances. These influences thus provide an opportunity for verifying that under an inconvertible currency system, any increase in hoarding mitigates, and can even—if it is significant enough—eliminate, the effects of a deficit.

Similarly, variations in the desirability of claims denominated in domestic currency—in other words, essentially, changes in the degree of confidence, or lack thereof, in the currency—temporarily add their component to the driving force that affects aggregate evolution, by shifting the curves of supply and demand in the money market.

Lastly, the economic cycle in gold standard countries will affect inconvertible currency countries, by generating, through supply of and demand for foreign claims, shifts in the characteristic curves of the money market.

Thus, aggregate evolution will result from many constituent components, themselves the outcome of the ever-shifting influences that affect the market. During periods of considerable budget deficits, only one influence will be permanent with regard to its direction and size, however, and that is the influence stemming from the budget deficit. This influence will generally be predominant and, in this way, will determine the general direction of economic evolution. The rise in prices and exchange rates will then be the unavoidable penalty resulting from the deficit.

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Chapter XXXI: Conclusion to Part V: The Sovereign Wills within the Rights They Govern; Causes of the Aggregate Evolution of Economic Universes

§1. Man “Elevated to the Dignity of Causality”

In the preceding analysis, economic evolution constitutes the outcome of forces that are parallel, but which move in different directions, and whose partial or total resultants determine the progress of the economic structure and of monetary appearances over time.

In each market sector, it is, at each instant, the difference between the aggregate volume of the rights that holders decide to fill and empty that causes the present state to emerge from the one that preceded it, even as the difference between these volumes already nurtures, in the present, the emergence of the state that will succeed it. This difference is the determining influence, which sets the economic trajectories whose cluster will make for the aggregate evolution of the community observed.

Thus, after long detours, we find here once again the general views set out in Chapter I of this work, concerning the nature of the dynamic explanation of phenomena. Perhaps our presentation would have been simpler if we had started, a priori, from the concept of economic force, and followed its developments in the various domains that we have explored. We think, however, that we should be careful in the use of analogies, which can only be metaphors, and we preferred to let the concept of economic force impose itself on us, rather than seek to impose it upon the subject matter.

Moreover, such a concept, in spite of its apparent simplicity, is exceedingly complex. Its clarification will require serious research and in-depth reflection, 504 particularly when time is introduced into the description of economic phenomena. Only experience will tell how fruitful this effort will be.

Such as it appears to us, however, the concept is already sufficient to provide the immediate cause of economic evolution. It is therefore the explanatory factor that we sought, the one that the economist can apprehend, at the edge of his discipline, as soon as the various causal series that affect it cross the discipline’s boundary.

Like all dynamic explanations, however, this concept is not a prime cause, but only the effect of preexisting wills. It is these wills, sovereign in the rights that they govern, that determine, through the aggregation of the supplies and demands where they express themselves, at each instant, the causal forces and economic evolution and, in this way, the ends toward which this evolution tends.

The choice of ends, however, is only the notion of “ordering things toward an end.”1 Although imposing the ends is the privilege of the Divinity, man participates in this by exercising the ability to dispose that his rights provide him with. This ability therefore elevates him, within the area of sovereignty set by his rights, “to the dignity of causality.”2

It is true that the use man will make of this causal power remains to be explained. The economist leaves it to the psychologist or the theologian, however, to explain the ways in which man’s decisions are determined. The economist takes man as he is, with his ever-changing scale of preference that explains his actions. And when the economist has shown, on the basis of the hierarchy of individual preferences, the way in which the influence of each individual on 505 the aggregate evolution of his own universe is determined, the economist will have accomplished his task, as he will have pushed the starting point of the causal series—the series whose development he studies—back out of the field of study that has been allotted him.

For the economist, therefore, aggregate evolution is the product of individual wills, enclosed in the domain of their respective rights. Each of these individual wills shapes its field of sovereignty as it pleases and thereby exerts the causal influence it holds.

Some will consider this analysis to be purely theoretical. In order to appreciate its realism, let them look at the crops ripening in the fields on an evening in May. They will see oats, wheat, clover, rapeseed, hay, and vines, all bearing evidence that the diversity of economic ends is not a theorist’s dream, and that each individual contributes to writing the economic history of the human community by mastering strictly compartmentalized areas of purpose.

§2. The Contingency of Economic History

Thus, economic history is only the description of the aggregate evolution of a community, over time. This evolution will be shaped by sovereign wills within their respective rights.

Certainly, the services that only a capital can provide and the use that will be made of it are not just any services or any use. These can only exist within a narrow margin, which, for a given state of the art of technology, depends only on the nature of things. Within this margin, however, the owner can choose freely. Being master of his field, he determines, within the wide range of production possibilities allowed for by the climate and the kind of soil, the production that, in ripening, will become tomorrow’s reality.

Similarly, the industrialist, who is master of his factory, and who decides to produce automobiles intended for leisure driving, or weaponry necessary for national defense or for territorial expansion, will contribute to shaping—within his domain—the history of the community to which he belongs.

Similarly, a person owning coal, who burns it to heat his home or who converts it to synthetic oil through liquefaction, will also have made his own contribution to this process.

Finally, a young man from a good family, in choosing between being prodigal and saving his wealth, by either spending his assets or preserving them, will contribute to determining not only the subsequent state of the economy but also the subsequent social structure.

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Thus, human wills, from among countless possibilities, steer the trajectories of the objects they govern. They determine their history, within the limits of a zone of freedom that is set, at each moment, by the state of the art of technology. Through the choices they make, they make the present emerge from the past and, notwithstanding the enchainment of effects to causes, they bring about the future, the outcome of their creative freedom.

Such observations are formidable, because of the far-reaching conclusions to which they lead. They intimidate the economist and call for the philosopher’s and the scientist’s critique. I was pleased to find that Mr. Jean Perrin, the author of Les Atomes [Atoms], who is obviously both a philosopher and a scientist, had reached a similar conclusion: “The most admirable,” he wrote at the end of a study focused on “evolution,”3 “is that each conscience is able to compare two possible courses of action, in wanting to pursue one of them, and to then carry it out freely by means of extremely delicate orientations, thus deliberately guiding, to a certain extent and within the limits dictated by laws that are indifferent to man’s thinking, the evolution of matter or of energy.”

It is under the grip of this guiding power that objects emerge from the domain where they undergo, passively, the evolution that physical forces imprint upon them. Through appropriation, they are subjected to the will of man, who has the ability to enjoy and dispose of them: these things become a subject matter for economics and, as such, fall within the purview of a new science, the science of the transformations that the desires to which they are subjected tend to impose on them.

§3. Despite the Unpredictability of Individual Behaviors, Political Economy Is Not a Minor Science*

Political economy, as it appears to us now upon concluding the preceding analysis, will not allow for the type of infallible predictions in which people saw, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the hallmark of a true science.

Laplace, for instance, held that

we ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one 507 instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.4

Now, any reasonable person will be convinced that in analyzing the economic process, one datum will always escape this superior intelligence, however vast it may be: the demand that this person will express shortly at the restaurant, when choosing what it is he will order from the menu for lunch. This datum is currently inaccessible, because the choice has not yet been made and will remain undetermined until the moment at which the choice is made.

For a long time, this fundamental unpredictability of economic decisions has placed political economy in the humble position of a minor science, which, as we said in the introduction, was more relevant to fine talk than to conscious thought.

For a decade now, however, the situation has changed considerably, not in the area of political economy, but in those sciences that no one refuses to consider scientific. According to Sir Arthur Eddington, a leading scholar in that field and professor at Cambridge University, “determinism has faded out of theoretical physics. . . . The rejection of determinism is in no sense an abdication of scientific method; indeed it has increased the power and precision of the mathematical analysis of observed phenomena.”5 In an interesting study on the “decline of determinism,”6 he called on scholars of the social sciences to “be awakened to the new situation which has arisen on the physical side.” It is his advice that I would here like to follow.

For Sir Arthur Eddington, the indeterminacy in contemporary physics essentially proceeds from the fact that “in the present theory there occur symbols whose values are not assignable by observation. Hence if we use the equations to predict say the future velocity of an electron the result will be an expression containing besides known symbols a number of undeterminable symbols. The latter make the prediction indeterminate.”7

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It cannot be determined, however, not because of ignorance or powerlessness on the observer’s part, but simply “because it is not yet decided.”8

For example, “in saying that there is no contemporaneous characteristic of the radioactive atom determining the date at which it is going to break up, we mean that in the picture of the atom as drawn in present-day physics no such characteristic appears; the atom which will break up in 1960 and the atom which will break up in the year 150,000 are drawn precisely alike.”9

But “indeterministic or secondary law accounts for regularities of experience, so that it can be used for predicting the future as satisfactorily as primary law. The predictions and regularities refer to average behavior of the vast number of particles concerned in most of our observations. When we deal with fewer particles the indeterminacy begins to be appreciable, and prediction becomes more of a gamble; till finally the behavior of a single atom or electron has a very large measure of indeterminacy. . . . That is the secret of all our successful prophecies: the unknowns are eliminated not by determinate equations but by averaging.”10

Per this view, scientific forecasting in both physics and political economy is of a similar nature. In these two disciplines, scientific forecasting is possible only under a system of statistical stability—in other words, as long as separate elements are not subject to some upsetting influence affecting individual tendencies in the same way.

The only difference between the two fields is that such influences are more frequent and perhaps easier to develop in the social sciences than in the physical sciences, and that the factors whose influence contributes to the emergence of the aggregate phenomenon are fewer in number in the former than in the latter, so that in the former, statistical regularities are of a more uncertain and less permanent nature.

Although at a disadvantage from this particular point of view, political economy enjoys an immense advantage when compared with theoretical physics: that of perceiving directly the process through which is filled the gap of indeterminacy that theoretical analysis leaves wide open.

We know, when we make a decision, how a decision is arrived at. We know that it is at the exact moment at which the decision is made that the future be509comes the past. At the same time, we perceive the nature and the limit of the determinism that statistical regularity establishes.

Thus, political economy, having long been a minor science during the time when determinism was king, has much to teach the natural sciences, now that these, too, know only indeterministic laws. Far from being the humble sister of the proud disciplines of theoretical physics, political economy can be considered their predecessor and their guide in the modest domain of “statistical” forecasting where all human knowledge meets.

“Naïve realism, materialism, the mechanistic hypothesis were simple,” Sir Arthur Eddington continues, “but I think that it was only by closing our eyes to the essential nature of experience, relating as it does to the reactions of a conscious being, that they could be made to seem credible. These revolutions of scientific thought are clearing up the deeper contradictions between life and theoretical knowledge, and the latest phase with its release from determinism marks a great step onwards. I will even venture to say,” he concludes, “that in the present theory of the physical universe we have at last reached something which a reasonable man might almost believe.”11

Let us hope that we have achieved the same result in the difficult field of economic theory.

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Part VI: The Social Order

Economic evolution is determined by the wills of the persons who, in fact, “dispose”1 of the constitutive objects of the community considered.

Now, the state of this community, the social state, is at each instant of time only one of the moments of its evolution, a cross section of the stream that carries it toward the ends chosen by the directing wills.

Anyone, whether it be man or God, who finds this state imperfect and wishes to alter it has to act on the influences that have brought it about—namely, on the wills that are its efficient causes.

Such action tends to turn societies into something other than what they would be under the sole influence of the wills of those persons who, in these communities, have been “elevated to the dignity of causality” by exercising the ability to determine the fate of objects.

It is this modifying action that constitutes the government of human societies.

In the following chapters, we shall study the means and purposes of such action and specify the results it provides, which depend on the circumstances in which such action is undertaken.

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Chapter XXXII: The Government of Human Societies*

I. The Constraining of Individual Wills, an Instrument of the Government of Men

In the present section of this chapter, we explore whether governmental action is possible and, if so, what its modalities are.

The problem consists in determining whether, and possibly how, men can be made to act differently from the way they would if they were led solely by the desires that “objects” engender in them.

In order to attempt this investigation, we must have a clear insight into the mechanism of causal action through which men direct the evolution of objects subjected to their wills.

Up until now, however, we have analyzed the police protection procedure, which protects against any rival claims the ability to dispose that is granted to the holder of a property right of ownership, but we have not attempted to determine how the holder of a property right of ownership actually exercises this ability—in other words, how he manages to impose his will upon the objects of which he is the owner.

We propose to clarify, in the first instance, the mechanism of this action of persons over objects. Thereafter, we propose to investigate the ways in which such action can be modified.

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§1. People’s Mastery over Objects

We will not go on and on about the essence of persons and objects. All we need to know for our present purpose is that objects “are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice.”1

Thus, people lead, and objects are led.

Nonetheless, the modalities of the guiding action that objects passively undergo will vary, depending on whether they are the bodies of living beings or inanimate objects.

The body of a living being is directly moved by the will it supports. An action is developed at the same time as the will it expresses.

The action and the will are closely and indissolubly linked and are only two distinct facets of the same reality: life, whose accomplished act is the external form, just as the state of consciousness from which it derives is its internal form, for the living person.

The essential feature of a person’s action upon his own body is its immediate character. The physiologist may find that the process involves intermediaries, but not the psychologist, for whom, “I will and therefore I act.”

In contrast, a human being directs the evolution of inanimate objects through the intermediary of a movement. The field will grow wheat or oats as a result of the sower’s actions; an automobile will leave its load motionless, or transport it over a certain distance, depending on the driver’s actions; coal will heat a family home, or provide the motive power to propel the train forward or the chemical energy that synthetic oil will store, depending on whether the worker shovels the coal into a fireplace, into the furnace of a locomotive, or into a reactor where it can be liquefied.

Human beings therefore exert an action on inanimate objects by steering them, through the actions they carry out, between all the possibilities allowed for by the existing state of the art of technology.

Thus, the master of an object directs its evolution with appropriate actions and physical movements. His action is mediate, since it can only be accom515plished through the intervention of the body that provides a person with his physical support.

Each person, therefore, manages a dual domain: his own body and, in the rest of the world, all the objects taken together with regard to which he can actually accomplish the necessary actions to determine their evolution.

In the rest of the world, however, this sovereignty is only an extension of the sovereignty that a person exercises over his own body, so that, in the final analysis, it is the mastery of man over his own body that ensures any causal influence he may exercise and determines the evolution of the objects that are subject to his will.

§2. Adding Compelling Desirabilities or Constraining Undesirabilities, the Only Means of Changing Individual Wills

If we wish to alter the evolution of objects, it is the guiding actions directing them, hence the wills behind them, that have to be altered.

Thus the problem of government is always a matter of acting on individual wills. The methods capable of resolving this problem are those that will allow a will to be different from that which it would have been under the sole influence of the person in whom the will is developed to translate into an act.

Any action, for the person who undertakes it, is worth the desirability of the benefits it results in and the undesirability of the effort the action requires. Generally, the desirability of the benefits decreases with the quantity obtained during the time unit, whereas the undesirability of the effort increases in proportion to the quantity supplied.

We have shown that everything takes place as though each individual always sought to increase the desirability of his holdings. Let us recall, once again, that homo economicus, subject to this principle, is as different from real man as a material point in classical mechanics is from a falling stone; but both explain, within their respective fields, observable phenomena, precisely because they were created in order to explain them.

If we accept the premise of viewing any living person as pursuing maximum desirability—of which homo economicus fits the description—the actions that each individual performs are, at each instant of time and as long as his scale of preference does not change, strictly determined, since these actions will be all those whose desirability outweighs the undesirability of the sacrifice required. 516 All else equal, these will remain unchanged, as long as nature and the hierarchy of this individual’s tastes do not change.

To change individual behavior in a universe where human nature and nature itself remain unchanged, there is only one solution: alter the unit desirability or undesirability, which—without changes in individuals’ given tastes—the acts that individuals may perform hold for them.

Now, for each individual, unit desirability and undesirability depend only on the characteristics of the act performed. These can only be altered by adding, to the results that are specific to the act itself, secondary results: rewards or punishments, whose desirability or undesirability will add itself to the desirability or undesirability of the former.

If the secondary and the principal results are indissolubly linked, then each individual will set his course of action depending on the aggregate result of his action in the actual circumstances in which it is performed. Individual behaviors will no longer be determined by the intrinsic consequences of a specific act alone, but by its consequences as modified beforehand by any compelling rewards or constraining penalties that will have been attached to the act.

Therefore, the only way to compel an individual who remains similar to alter his behavior is to alter systematically the affective consequences of a given act for the person who performs the act, by adding positive or negative sanctions, rewards or penalties.

If the constraining sanction has been suitably calculated and is consistently applied, the authority that imposes it will be certain that it can set individual behavior to its liking, under all circumstances. A few examples can illustrate and clarify the effect of constraining sanctions.

A dog watching another dog gnawing on a bone is eager to have control over this bone. This desirable result, however, would expose the dog to the undesirable response of the other animal, which it will have to rob. The first dog will attack, as long as the desirability of the bone outweighs the undesirability of the danger the attack will expose him to. As soon as this undesirability is sufficiently large, however, it will constrain the dog to give up on the attack, however desirable might be—in his eyes—the result that he could obtain from the attack.

Man’s position in society is very much similar. A hungry man will covet his neighbors’ bread. If he is neither able nor willing to acquire it through work, he will contemplate stealing it from his neighbors through the use of guile or force.

The desirability of an additional slice of bread, however, hence of the robbery necessary to obtain it, will decrease with the quantity possessed. The mar517ginal desirability of theft can be represented by curve M (fig. 29). Any theft, however, will expose the thief to the defensive reactions of those who have been robbed. Generally, the scale of these reactions will increase directly with the quantity of wealth stolen, either because the number of persons affected increases with the quantity stolen, or because the greater the loss incurred is, the stronger the reactions of each of the persons affected will be. In any case, as far as the thief is concerned, the undesirability of the reactions can be represented by the curve U.

lf1981_figure_029.jpg

Fig. 29. [S: Supply; M: Marginal Desirability of Theft; U: Marginal Undesirability of Theft; T: Theft]

In such circumstances, a thief will commit all the thefts whose desirability appears to outweigh the undesirability of the dangers inherent in the reactions to which he will be exposed, during each period of time. And therefore the thief will steal a quantity of bread equal to St each day.

The aggregate quantity of daily thefts occurring within the community will be the sum of individual thefts determined in this way.

The only way to reduce the number of thefts will be to make them more undesirable to thieves, for instance by giving weapons to potential victims to defend themselves; or by imposing fines or jail sentences on the thief. These measures will raise, all else equal, curve U, for instance to the level U′, and will reduce—all else equal as regards individual morality—the number of thefts. If the punishment is sufficient, it will eliminate all thefts except those committed by abnormal people, for whom the desirability of theft is exceptionally high, or for whom the undesirability of sanctions is exceptionally weak.

This same analysis sheds light, in all areas, on the process by which individual behaviors are determined.

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For the person carrying out charitable work, charity brings about the desired feeling of alleviating hardship. The desirability of charity generally decreases with the daily amount of alms distributed. Inversely, charity inflicts on the donor the undesirability of the sacrifice involved. As in the preceding case, the desirability and undesirability of alms are a function of their daily amount and, for each individual, can be represented by curves M and U (fig. 29), respectively. Their intersection will determine the daily amount St of charitable acts performed by the individual to whom these curves apply.

To develop charity within a community, it is sufficient to attach a compelling reward to each charitable donation: a feeling of satisfaction for doing one’s duty, the hope of a heavenly reward, or even a simple promise of recognition or of future honor.

Such rewards, all else equal, will increase the desirability of charitable donations; they will raise curve M and increase the volume of daily charitable acts.

Some will take this analysis to be childish. These considerations are presented here not for their psychological merits but because they cast light on the mechanism through which men can be made to act differently from how they would under the sole impulse of their own nature and the desires and passions that drive them.

We agree, the description has no value beyond that of marginalist theories; it provides an explanation not for the psychologist but for the economist, who is simply eager to forecast the collective phenomena that form the substance of his observations.

This description takes on its full value as an analytical tool when the act is not an individual or unilateral act but rather the bilateral act that constitutes exchange. We have shown how, in such a case, the individual curves of marginal desirability and undesirability determine, in the production system of the market, aggregate supplies and aggregate demands in each market sector.

Let us consider, for instance, the wheat market, where supply and demand are assumed to be represented, as a function of price, by curves S [supply] and D [demand] (fig. 30).

lf1981_figure_030.jpg

Fig. 30. [Q: Quantity; D: Demand; S: Supply; P: Price]

Imagine that, during a period of shortages, it is decided to impose on any demand for wheat a fine in the amount dd′. The unit price of wheat, for each buyer, will no longer be the market price, but the market price plus the fine whose payment is associated with the purchase. At each market price

lf1981_Ch32_IEQ_001.jpg
, the demand expressed in the market—individual tastes remaining equal—will be what it would have been in the absence of a constraining amount at the price 519 considered plus the amount of the fine, or p1. The demand curve as a function of the price will shift to D′. If the fine is sufficiently large, it will become prohibitive; in that case, no demand will be expressed within the price range where supply still exists in the market.

During a period of glut supply, any supply may in a similar way have been slapped with a fine. In such a case, supply would be, at each market price, that which it would have been in a free market, but at the price considered less the fine; the supply curve would have taken the position S′. As in the preceding case, a heavy enough fine would have prevented any exchange, by eliminating any supply within the price range where a demand still exists in the market.

Mutatis mutandis, compelling bonuses would have yielded similar results.

In the preceding examples, the constraining sanction applied to a specific act. A constraining sanction may be applied indiscriminately to all of an individual’s potential acts, except those ordered by his master. If the punishment is so heavy that all prohibited acts become undesirable, regardless of the desirability of the specific reward these acts may yield, the individual to whom the sanctions apply will eventually be led to want only that which his master wants. This will create, for him, a state of slavery, where everything—despite the control the slave retains over his own body—will take place as though his body were directed by the master’s will.

At the cost of various adjustments, a similar technique will make it possible to command men in all domains.

A soldier, for instance, retains control over his own body. The existence of a number of constraining sanctions or compelling rewards, however, induces him 520 to want—hence to order his body—to perform the acts that his superiors want him to perform, in all cases where a sense of duty to and love for one’s country would not have induced him to take such action of his own free will.

Similarly, within an organized economic system, any business executive will retain control over his own acts. The sanctions available to the board, however, lead any entrepreneur to want, in cases where company loyalty would not have induced him to do so of his own free will, to undertake the acts that will shape his business according to the outline set forth in the business plan.

Thus, in all circumstances, it is by adding compelling desirabilities or constraining undesirabilities that the government of men is exercised. Governing is not forcing a man to act against his own will, but altering the consequences of his actions so that he pursues freely that which his government imposes upon him to want.

A man who is governed therefore always remains “in the hand of his own counsel.”2

He remains a free man.

His freedom, moreover, is not a social fact. It is the consequence of his physical nature, which subjects the acts performed by his body to his will, and to his will alone. No state of subordination can impair such freedom.

But the intervention of a constraining authority, in altering, by means of additional desirabilities or undesirabilities, the affective consequences of any acts that may be performed, brings the person who is under constraint to want freely the acts that the constraining authority chooses for him. This intervention thereby indirectly substitutes, in whole or in part, the will of the constraining authority for the will of the person under constraint, across the whole range in which this person exercises control over objects, but without impairing his freedom of decision.

Thus, constraint would be the only way to govern men, if their scale of preference—that is to say, their innermost nature—were strictly immutable.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to forget that certain states of mind may profoundly alter the scale of values in light of which each individual weighs the consequences of his potential acts and chooses the ones he will perform.

Love in all its forms, love for God, love of country, filial love, may induce man to substitute, for his own scale of values, the scale of values that the authority he reveres orders him to adopt.

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It is then without constraint, with the ardent desire to obey or to serve, that he will perform acts that were to him not the most desirable ones. “He who is led by the Spirit, is no longer under the law.”3 The person who is led by the Spirit acts as though love or faith had truly altered human nature, to the point of making him want that which his love or his God wants for him.

These observations confirm the general applicability of our analysis: man will always perform the acts that he considers to be the most desirable. The only way to prevent him from performing such acts, or to force him to perform other acts that he would not perform of his own free will, is through constraint.

And to the extent that governing is altering men’s behavior, constraint will indeed remain the sole instrument for the government of human societies.

§3. The Various Sources of Constraining Influences

Any constraining sanction4 consists of a desired or undesired influence, indissolubly linked to the performance of an act, and which thereby alters the total desirability of the consequences of this act for any individual who will perform it.

There will therefore be as many forms of constraint as there are sources of desirable and undesirable influences for the individuals they affect. We propose to review these various forms of constraint here.

a) Violence of the Strong

The simplest of all constraining actions is that exerted by the strong over the weak.

Through the action of his force, the strong can effectively inflict painful sensations—essentially undesirable—on any person less strong than himself. Conversely, the strong can spare the weak from any undesirable sensations that third parties would wish to inflict upon them that they could not prevent on their own.

For such an action be effective, it is sufficient that it cannot be offset by a competing force. Any individual will therefore have constraining authority over weaker persons, among those subjected to his action, to the extent that the strength he exercises is not itself dominated by more powerful forces.

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It is in this way, by constraint, that the strong [individual] can alter the desirability of all the acts that those weaker than him carry out, and hence determine their behavior at his discretion, provided that he not be prevented from doing so by a greater constraining force against which he could not defend himself.

b) Divine Authority

Religious faith is a source of constraint, as much by the love as by the fear it inspires.

A loving child will respect his father’s wishes. Similarly, a God-loving man will observe God’s commandments, however desirable the acts that God enjoins him to renounce may be, and however undesirable the acts that he orders him to perform may be.

If a believer’s love for God were not enough to offset his desires or passions, it would be strengthened by the desirability of the rewards promised to those who observe God’s commandments and by the undesirability of the punishments inflicted upon those who break them.

The compelling desirability may be that of the joys granted to them in this life or in the hereafter, and the constraining undesirability, that of the sufferings they will endure before or after their death.

In all cases, for a man who believes in God, the desirability of a certain act no longer consists only of the consequences, when considered in isolation, that the act itself entails, but rather the desirability that all these consequences—including the rewards or punishments provided by the divine will—constitute as a whole.

In this way, the Divinity exercises a constraining influence, tending to impose upon men respect for its will, as revealed by religious commandments and by related teachings that complement these commandments.

c) The Conscience

Constraining action is particularly evident in theocratic societies, but it is no less apparent in societies that call upon the moral sense of individuals in order to impose upon them adherence to certain rules of behavior. In fact, healthy individuals experience the desirable feeling of having fulfilled their duty when they obey the principles dictated by their conscience, and experience the undesirable feeling of remorse when they violate these principles. The moral sense thus induces them to want to perform those acts that the moral sense 523 has made into a “duty,” regardless of the affective nature of their intrinsic consequences.

There is no doubt, however, that the canons of the moral sense do not have the same rigor as God’s commandments or divine teachings. Their features are almost always similar in essence, however, so much so that one may wonder whether they have an independent existence or are, rather, the imprint left upon the wax of the human conscience by the religious mold where this conscience was formed.

d) The Police

Although the constraining influence of the moral sense generally coincides with that exerted by religious faith, it is far from having—at least for the great majority of men—the same degree of effectiveness.

This is why social authorities are led to rely on other forms of constraining action, directly applied by themselves, in societies where religious faith is no longer universal and all-powerful, or when social authorities wish to influence acts that were not covered by the divine will.

This social constraint is exerted either by the allocation of additional desirabilities, typically including honors, decorations, and promotions, or—and above all—by the application of constraining undesirabilities, imposed by a coercive force, the police, which is organized and controlled by public authorities.

Police constraint brings into play undesirabilities that affect the individual in his reputation, his assets, his freedom, sometimes even his life, and that are applied as soon as the authorities become aware that an act they sought to ban has been engaged in.

The police will be effective and society effectively policed if, in all cases, the undesirability that is attached by police action to any act the authorities wish to prohibit outweighs the desirability of the potential benefits this act may bring.

Thus, regardless of whether constraining intervention is divine or human, regardless of whether it is based on present or future punishment, and regardless of whether it inflicts physical or moral suffering, it is exercised through the same procedure: by altering the consequences of the act it seeks to alter.

This is because, in all cases, man remains “in the hand of his own counsel” and because, so long as his tastes remain unchanged, his behavior can be altered only by changing the results in view of which he determines his behavior.

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§4. The Law, the Instrument for the Enforcement of Any System of Constraint of Individual Wills

In order to describe systems of constraint, it is necessary to know not so much the legal sanctions put in place, but the acts to which they will be applied. In fact, the distortion imposed upon the behavior of individuals by the constraining action—and therefore the influence on the aggregate evolution of the community it governs—results from the conditions of these penalties’ enforcement, and not from their nature.

This section focuses on the conditions of these sanctions’ enforcement, and on the procedure through which these are made effective.

For the sake of simplicity, consider the case where the constraining authority seeks to prohibit an act that the constrained person would perform if he were left to himself. The sanction then represents an undesirability, which reduces by a corresponding amount the desirability of the consequences of the act that is to be thwarted.

Our conclusions shall remain valid, mutatis mutandis, when the constraining authority seeks to bring a person under constraint so that he will perform an act that the person would not have performed if he had been left to himself. In this case, the disciplinary measure will be a reward, which will either add its own desirability to the desirability of the act’s consequences or reduce the undesirability of these consequences.

The imposition of a constraining sanction can be effective only if three conditions are met, however.

In the first instance, a person who is tempted to carry out a prohibited act must be certain that the constraining sanction will be administered without fail.

Under systems that rely on theocratic constraint, this condition is met through one of the essential attributes of the Divinity: the ability to know, by supernatural means, all of men’s acts, regardless of whether these are apparent or hidden.

Under systems that rely on the moral conscience in the exercise of constraining authority, this condition is met through man’s inability to hide his acts from the judgment of his conscience. Cain tried in vain to escape the eye that had witnessed his crime; no wall, no tower, no roof could shield him. And when, 525 eventually, Cain sought relief in death from the remorse that pursued him, “the eye was in the tomb and kept looking at Cain.”5

In policed societies, it is the injured party who triggers, by means of his complaint, a constraining action. Such constraining action will be private or public, depending on whether the harm is done to a private person or the community itself.

The police can fulfill their mission to the extent that they can identify the culprit and apply the sanction associated with the act to the culprit.

For the constraining action to be effective, a second condition must be met: the undesirability of the sanction must be sufficient to render the forbidden act undesirable, however desirable the result may be that would have been obtained from the act in isolation. This requires that the undesirability of the sanction applied substantially outweigh the desirability of the act in the eyes of all those who might be tempted to engage in it.

In theocratic societies, this will be the case for any man who fears God, dreads his punishments, and seeks his rewards.

In societies based on a moral sense, the penalties stemming from remorse or the rewards stemming from the satisfaction of having done one’s duty will be effective for all those who heed the voice of conscience.

Lastly, in policed societies, sanctions enacted by the civilian authorities, such as fines or corporal punishment, or deprivation of freedom or of life, will catch all acts except those performed by abnormal individuals hoping to evade the constraining action through cleverness or cunning, or for whom the undesirability of the potential sanction is considerably mitigated because it only represents a future possibility.

In all cases, however, for the constraining undesirability to have the intended effect, it must play a decisive role in the struggle between contending desires whose outcome will be an act of will. For this to occur, it is necessary—and this is the third condition that any system of constraint seeking to govern economic evolution must meet—that any person who may be subject to this constraining undesirability know, clearly and in advance, which acts will result in the application of constraining sanctions and which acts will not.

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The sanction will therefore be an inducement to act only if the conditions in which it is to be enforced are clearly and unambiguously defined and known to all those whom they may affect.

Under theocratic systems, this condition is met through a revelation, which shows man the rules to which his behavior must conform, if he is to escape divine wrath or obtain the rewards promised to the just. These rules are contained in commandments and in teachings, which are God’s own word and disclose his will.

In societies based on a moral sense, the rules governing constraining action are revealed to men directly by the voice of conscience, which, in each case, makes them aware of what their “duty” is. As has already been observed, however, in most cases the dictates of one’s conscience are far from having the clarity and rigor that divine commandments possess.

In policed societies, the statutes of police intervention are defined by laws and regulations that everyone is supposed to know: “Ignorance of the law excuses no one.”6 These laws and regulations set out in each and every case which acts are licit and not subject to any compelling sanction, and which acts are illicit and make the persons responsible for them subject to the strict enforcement of the law.

Thus, all systems of constraint, regardless of whether they are theocratically based, morally based, or police based, have one common feature: they define those acts that, if carried out, will lead to a constraining undesirability being applied. In this way, all systems of constraint indirectly determine the area in which an act, for the person who carries it out, has only necessary and direct consequences as a result of the natural order of things. Within this area, each individual chooses freely in view of these results alone, and taking into consideration the desirability of these results for him. Within this area, his action is thus subjected to no constraining force; at each instant of time, among all existing possibilities, this action will be what the person engaged in it wants it to be, in the full freedom of his conscious or unconscious will.

Hence, any commandment, any law or regulation, divides the realm of the possible into two distinct domains: one of permissible action, where man can 527 make his own choices freely, taking into consideration his acts’ consequences alone; and an area of prohibited action, where any intervention will result in the constraining undesirability being applied.

It is said that within the area where action is allowed, man has the “right” to act, whereas within the prohibited area this right is withdrawn from him.

Commandments, laws, and regulations thus define the rights of the men to whom they are applied, each individual right being only a freedom of action delimited by the constraining authority.

The right to own, the right to think, the right to write, the right to believe, do not imply possession, thought, writing, or belief, but simply the allocation of areas where man is free to own, think, write, or believe as he pleases.

Rights thus delimit the areas within which man will determine his own acts by taking into consideration only the intrinsic consequences they entail, without the intervention of sanctions that will tend to alter his decisions.

A man without a right is not a man who cannot act, but one whose acts are determined, not by his own will, but by the will of the constraining authority. Like any living being, the slave remains “in the hand of his own counsel,” but the factual circumstances, within which he can act, lead him to want only that which his master wants for him.

Rights allocate an area where one can act freely by setting the limits of the area where action is constrained. In defining an area where action is unconstrained, rights define the task of the constraining authority. Regardless of whether the constraining authority is religious, moral, or social, it will punish any act performed outside the area it delimits. Simple knowledge of the individual rights is therefore sufficient, in all circumstances, to determine the mission of the constraining authority.

The right is therefore not only the freedom of action as outlined by the constraining authority but also the criterion for the authority’s intervention.

Because of this dual nature, rights are the main instrument for the government of human societies.

II. The State of Nature

The state of nature is the state of a society where man is alone with his fellow men and where the only influences are those emanating from him and them: the sky is empty [there is no divine commandment], the conscience is silent, 528 and there is no government; men and things exist in their natural state, without any “supernatural” or “governmental” constraint to alter their character.

We shall investigate the characteristics of such a community.

§1. The Delimitation by Force of Individual Fields of Sovereignty

Any man faced with pleasant things, which we call “articles of wealth,” will wish to enjoy and dispose of 7 them. Enjoyment and disposal imply exclusive action, however. They will be possible only when the desired object has been removed—like a bone that a dog carries to his kennel—from the influence of rival wills. The only way to remove it, however, is to attach, to their desired enjoyment, the undesirability of a constraining sanction. This sanction can be enforced only by force, however, and on the condition that no force more powerful come to neutralize the force that will impose this sanction.

Among hungry dogs, the strongest one, or the one that has succeeded in making itself out to be the strongest, will get the coveted bone.

Thus, spontaneously, a social order will establish itself, where each individual will delimit the domain in which he has the ability to enjoy and dispose. At each instant of time, this domain will be the area that he has successfully protected, by his force, against all rival claims seeking to infringe upon it.

As force delimits areas of free choice, one could say that force creates the right. This right, however, is only temporary and contingent: it will last only as long as the equilibrium from which it is derived endures. Furthermore, there is no way for the holder of the right to retain it except by remaining the strongest. Any change in the balance of force will shift the areas of individual sovereignty: the social order that is produced by force is an uncivilized order, one that force alone can maintain.

In an uncivilized society, the distribution of wealth, although the outcome of force, is not arbitrary. An economist seeking to explain it would no doubt be very pleased to find that it, too, is subject to the law of marginal desirability.8

Each individual will extend his own domain until the moment at which the undesirability of the effort necessary to acquire or safeguard further acquisition exceeds the desirability of this acquisition. The greedier and stronger the 529 uncivilized man is—all else equal—the richer he will be, but he will only ever have rights to the extent of his strength.

§2. Slavery, the Unavoidable Consequence of a State of Nature

In a state of nature, force is exerted on all forms of wealth. The bodies of living beings, whether these be animals or men, do not escape from this any more than do inanimate objects.

Certainly, force cannot preclude the control that a person has over his own body. This control derives from the natural order of things; no state of social subordination can destroy it. Force can, however, render all the acts that a person may perform—except those ordered by another person—so undesirable that the person will always decide not to perform them.

In that case, everything takes place as though the will of the second person had been substituted for the will of the first; the first person will have been turned into a slave.

In order that a master should truly have free and full control over his slave, however, not only does the master have to dispossess the slave of the control over his own body, the master also has to prevent rival wills from governing his slave’s body. The master therefore has to protect the conquest of this body, like the conquest of any other article of wealth, by forcefully excluding all rival claims from it. The only difference, when it concerns a living being, is that force will have to exclude not only third parties’ wills but also the will of the person whose body remains physiologically bound to him.

Thus, in a state of nature, the weak will inevitably be captured. The only ones who can manage to escape slavery will be those who will find, in their force or in the protection they can secure, the means of overcoming the influences that seek to subjugate them. We can see just how wrong Rousseau is when he indignantly declares that “man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”9 Rather, like Joseph de Maistre,10 we do think that in a state of nature, slavery is the only “natural” state for the great majority of men and that a considerable amount of religious, moral, or social constraint is required to get man out of this state.

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§3. The Spontaneity of the Feudal Order

The preceding analysis shows that, in any community that is left to itself, an order will be spontaneously established in which a strong man submits to his own will any object that a man [even] stronger than him has not succeeded in removing from his control.

The evolution of objects thus subjugated, regardless of whether these are bodies of living beings or inanimate objects, will be entirely determined by the master’s will. Within the fiefdoms that force has delimited, the lord alone will be a cause, insofar as his own action is not “caused” by his overlord’s will.

Thus, any natural society will necessarily tend toward a feudal structure, whose characteristics, in the pure state, will be entirely determined by the will of the strong, each of these ruling the domain from which he will have successfully excluded rival wills.

I trust that historians will allow me to call upon their science, with all the precautions required of a layman.

I am not very familiar with the history of the Middle Ages. It seems to me, however, that insofar as reality can confirm theory, the history of the Middle Ages confirms the preceding analysis, by showing how the feudal state spontaneously established itself in France when imperial power disintegrated. It also shows how, at the time, the coalescence of persons and things around dominant wills created the hierarchy of sovereignties, which was characteristic of the new order.

Certainly, the new order that established itself was not an absolutely pure state of nature. The dominant wills, in some of their acts, remained subjected to religious constraint and to political tradition. The “natural” influences, however, appear to have been the determining factors in the development of the political situation.

I hesitate to deliver such superficial views here. If I do so, it is only in the hope of provoking useful analyses and, perhaps, to induce someone to undertake—if this has not already been done—any remaining study necessary to provide greater clarity with regard to these conclusions.

§4. Armed Peace, an Example of a State of Nature

It is difficult to find in human societies an example of a genuine state of nature. There is no human being whose acts are not, to some extent, constrained by religious, moral, or police influences.

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It is, it appears, in the realm of international relations, among the legal entities that states constitute, that such constraining influences are least felt.

Until now, in fact, in the absence of an international police force, states have been almost completely free of any social constraint. Furthermore, in their relations with other states, it seems that governments have often failed to heed the voice of human conscience and have acted as if their actions were not to be punished by divine wrath. We certainly do not claim that there has never been a government guided by highly moral reasons, but simply that, over long periods of history, international relations have been dominated by the principle of reason of state [raison d’État],11 under which “the safety of the people is the supreme law.”12

Now, the people’s safety is that which governments consider to be such—in other words, that which governments want given their appetites and passions.

The principle of reason of state is, in the eyes of government, the law of maximum desirability, in a world having no constraint other than force.

And so “might is most often right in matters of state.”13

Each individual has no rights other than those that he can defend or have defended by other people. The moment at which force ceases to hold back covetousness—always on the lookout for an opportunity—then the law will vanish and, with it, the existence of the faltering person.

In such a situation, peace can be maintained only during the very infrequent periods when competing forces balance one another out. It will always be an armed peace, an interval between two wars.

This state of armed peace, however, conveys only a very faint idea of the horror of a true state of nature, because here relations are “natural” only among states and not among men. To assess it, just imagine what human communities would be like under a system where relations among individuals were just 532 as free of constraints as relations among states are. Quasi-universal subjugation and permanent warfare between masters would be the essential features of human communities subjected to the sole influence of nature.

III. The Imposition of Social Peace

The main purpose of all reformers who have tried to improve the fate of human communities has been to eliminate the inevitability of war among men.

§1. The Principle of a Peaceful Society

War is the result of competing claims over the enjoyment and disposal of a given object. A community will therefore be peaceful when the enjoyment and disposal of a given object will only ever be desired—under the circumstances and conditions where these can be obtained—by one person.

For such a community to exist, it is necessary and sufficient that enjoyment and disposal, which in and of themselves arouse the covetousness of men, be rendered undesirable to any person other than the person who has been chosen to enjoy these.

The challenge of establishing a peaceful society is therefore simply that of applying a particular system of social constraint, similar in its basic principle to that of the systems outlined in the first part of this chapter, but which presents the specific feature of granting only to one person the right to enjoy a given object and dispose of it.

The constraining authorities, which attempt to impose social peace upon men against their nature and against their inclination, implement just such a system.

§2. The Various Forms of Pacifying Constraint

We have shown that societies can have a religious, a moral, or a police basis. In all three types, the constraining authority will succeed in pacifying relations among men if it manages to establish strict compartmentalization 14 of the sovereignty that men exercise over objects.

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a) Theocratic Societies

In theocratic societies, it is the divine will that forbids man to seize or even covet the property of others.

On Mount Sinai, Moses received the following two commandments:

“Thou shalt not steal.”

“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor’s.”15

In the Gospel, it is God’s seventh and tenth commandments that impose social peace, by forbidding to men any act or stray impulse that could affect the property of others:

  • Thou shalt not take the goods of others,
  • nor knowingly keep them.
  • Thou shalt not covet the goods of others,
  • To have them unjustly.16

Faced with these formal provisions, a God-loving or a God-fearing man cannot desire any articles of wealth that do not belong to him, however desirable, in and of themselves, these articles of wealth may be in his eyes. Not desiring them, he will therefore not attempt to obtain them. Any rival influence—and therefore any threat of war—among men will thus have been eliminated.

The sacred texts thus place at the foundation of social relationships a strict distribution of individuals’ respective spheres of sovereignty. So long as men accept this division, no conflicting influences can emerge: peace on earth will have been given to men of goodwill.

b) Societies with a Moral Basis

In societies with a moral basis, the conscience rejects the taking or coveting of other people’s goods. Thus, the human conscience adjusts the desirability of any act tending to obtain goods in this way, through the undesirability of the remorse that results from sinning.

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Wherever human conscience is heeded and obeyed, no one object can be desired by multiple persons at the same time. Here again, peace will have been imposed on men.

c) Societies with a Police Basis

In policed societies, it is judges who order, and the police who implement, the enforcement of sanctions that the law imposes upon those who intend to enjoy and dispose of their neighbor’s property. If the penalties are adequate and if law enforcement is effective, the enjoyment and disposal of any object will be rendered undesirable to all those other than the owner of the object.

The compartmentalization of areas of sovereignty will be ensured and—the possibility of any rival claims being excluded—peace will be established among men.

The analysis of the processes through which social peace is imposed upon men, in spite of themselves, is confirmed a contrario by observing the circumstances that bring them back to the uncivilized state. A weakening or the disappearance of religious faith, the absence of any moral sense, a lack of courts to order effective constraining sanctions, or a lack of police to enforce constraining sanctions allows the “natural” tendencies of men to run their course. Men are then free to unleash war, which is for them the state of nature, and which these civilizing constraints had averted all the more effectively, the stricter these constraints were and the more strictly they had been enforced.

§3. The Property Right of Ownership, a Particular Category of Right, Providing a Person with the Freedom to Enjoy and Dispose of an Object

All systems that seek to establish peace among men are based on the same principle: subjecting each object to the will of one person. This exclusive right of enjoyment and disposal 17 of an object by one person is known as the property right of ownership.

The owner enjoys full freedom of action with regard to the object; all other members of the community have the obligation to not interfere.

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The establishment of the property right of ownership hence subjects any object to one master and one master only. As far as the individual is concerned, the universe is then divided into two different parts: one comprising the domain he owns, where he is sovereign, and the rest of the world, where—except with the agreement of another owner—he is without action.

Only within the domain he owns may an individual act freely—that is to say, determine his acts on the basis of the desirability that the intrinsic consequences of these acts, and these consequences only, entail for him. Outside his own domain, his action is constrained, because, regardless of the desirability of a given act, he will be led, by the constraining sanctions that are attached to it, to want to not carry out this act.

Ownership thus creates a zone of freedom of action: it is therefore indeed a right, in the sense of the first part of this chapter.18 That which characterizes this right, among all possible rights, however, is that the delimitation it establishes is of a purely geographical nature. The property right of ownership separates this fragment of the universe that the owned object constitutes, and hands it over to the sole will of the owner. It hands it over to the owner in full, however, with all its attributes, such as nature has established them.

Other rights differ from the property right of ownership, since they result from a partitioning of this right. Like the property right of ownership, other rights provide an individual with full freedom to do whatever he pleases with an object, but this freedom is limited to certain uses from among all possible uses.

Thus, fishing rights, hunting rights, planting rights, construction rights isolate out some of the influences that the object may undergo and allow the person endowed with these rights to use the object in these ways. But only the holder of a property right of ownership may at the same time fish, hunt, plant, and build on the object owned, thus choosing the influences he will make the object undergo from among all possible influences.

The property right of ownership is geographically limited, because it applies only to the object owned, but, alone among all conceivable rights, the property right of ownership covers the object in its entirety, such as nature has made it, without correctives of any kind, thereby subjecting it in its entirety to the free will of the owner.

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§4. A Property Right of Ownership Can Apply to Living Beings Just as Well as to Inanimate Objects

Although the property right of ownership is the ability to dispose of an object, this right is indifferent as to the nature of the object owned; this can be the body of a living being just as well as an inanimate object.

The body of a living being presents a specific problem for the constraining authority, however, if this authority intends to assign it to a person other than the person who has received from nature the privilege of controlling its movements.

In that case, in order to eliminate any conflicting influence, the pacifying constraint will have to keep the object owned not only from those persons who do not own it and yet seek to gain control over it but also from the control of the person whose disputed object constitutes his bodily support.

To do this, the constraining authority must, as has been shown previously,19 render undesirable to this person all those acts that are different from the acts his master wants him to perform. When this result has been obtained, the constrained person, although retaining physical control over his own body, will have lost the legal ownership of his body; he will have become a slave.

Thus, under systems where slavery is not prohibited, the human body can be appropriated, like the bodies of animals or any inanimate object. The human body then becomes an object among other objects, the subject of a property right of ownership whose holder need not be the person who received, from nature, the privilege of having control over that body.

This kind of dissociation between physical and legal control may appear, perhaps, needlessly subtle. It was necessary to present it, however, so that we may refer to it in the following analysis of the processes for governing men.

§5. The Consequences of Appropriation

a) The Appropriation of Existing Articles of Wealth, during Their Entire Existence, Is Ensured by the Sole Will of Their Successive Owners, without Any Intervention by the Constraining Authority

The property right of ownership does not imply, as a superficial examination might suggest, the assignment of an object to a person, but only the assignment to a person of the exclusive ability to use and dispose of an object.

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For instance, ownership of a loaf of bread does not necessarily result in the loaf being consumed by the owner, but only entails the right for this owner to choose, in full freedom, the action (consumption, destruction, sale, donation, etc.) he will administer to this object as well as the moment he will perform this action.

This characteristic feature of the property right of ownership, freedom of action, which entails in particular the ability to dispose, has a major consequence: freedom for the owner, if he does not intend to keep to himself the privilege with which he has been endowed, to choose the person to whom it will be transferred.

Thus the constraining authority has no role to play in the assignment of property rights of ownership. This is the work of owners themselves. At each instant of time, property owners determine, in the full freedom provided by the constraining authority, how the rights they exercise will be assigned at the next instant. It is their will, and their will alone, that determines the evolution of their fields of sovereignty over time and, thereby, the social structure of the community considered.

When the owner dies without having been able, or without having wanted, to create a will, this will is presumed under a set of legal rules governing the devolution of intestate successions. Thus, all acts of postmortem disposal of property still fall under the general rule: they are always determined by the will, explicit or presumed, of the owner.

b) The Appropriation of New Articles of Wealth Results, without Any Intervention by the Constraining Authority, from the Appropriation of Production Resources

Existing articles of wealth are appropriated without any intervention by the constraining authority, and the same is true of new articles of wealth, which are the outcome of productive activities.

Production, in fact, combines capital and services. Capital is something that is already owned; services are the product of capital that has already been appropriated.

As the ownership of an object implies the right to enjoy and dispose of it, this also implies, clearly, that the owner has the right to dispose of the services an object produces. Any owner of capital will therefore own the resulting services.

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Production uses only articles of wealth that have already been appropriated. We have shown,20 however, that the production process does not affect the rights that enclose the wealth used by the production process. The volume of the rights remains the same; only the nature of their contents is modified.

The appropriation of the product therefore spontaneously results from the appropriation of production resources.

Thus, by the definition of the property right of ownership, the fruits of human labor belong to the owner of the body that has produced them. Under any system where slavery is prohibited, this owner is, and can only be, the worker himself.

Society does not, therefore, need to intervene to assign new articles of wealth each time they derive—through production—from wealth that has already been appropriated.

In contrast, when new articles of wealth emerge that cannot be regarded as the result of existing property, the authorities have to determine how these will be assigned, so as to prevent the reemergence of competing wills inconsistent with social peace. Thus, the law determines the fate of “ownerless property” by specifying the method of acquisition through occupancy, intervention, accession, etc.

In a long-established society, where all goods known to exist have been appropriated, instances where wealth is assigned authoritatively are exceedingly rare. They relate solely to goods that have appeared seemingly out of nowhere, or whose ownership is questionable.

By contrast, in primitive societies, there may be many instances of vacant goods. Landholdings, in particular, enter into the realm of appropriated objects only after an initial assignment, which will necessarily be arbitrary.

It is only after such an assignment has been made that they will be subjected to a sequence of appropriations, which engender one another, by the sole will of their successive owners.

Thus, existing articles of wealth or new articles of wealth, save for exceptional cases involving ownerless goods, are always appropriated without the constraining authority having to intervene.

This finding explains why the sacred texts do not define the lawful owner, and do not even appear to be concerned with identifying him. It is enough for the texts to have this sole commandment be enforced: “Thou shalt not steal,” so 539 that every article of wealth is in the hands of the person entitled to have it at his full disposal, since his predecessor in title will have assigned this right to him.

The same finding explains the seemingly paradoxical absence, in pacified societies, of any authority responsible for the assignment of property rights of ownership. The moment an object has been appropriated, it is the will of the master, and this will alone, that will determine its assignment. Society may be called upon to “state the law,” when the law is challenged, and thereby to force recognition of the lawful owner, by identifying the chain of exchange that has vested the property right of ownership in him, but society cannot substitute itself for the owner when it comes to the right to dispose, which is one of the essential attributes of ownership.

Thus, the vast legal apparatus, which fits all existing goods in a network of rights without a loophole, has a life of its own, free of any external intervention, with each of its successive states emerging from the one preceding it by the will of owners alone.

§6. The Social Structure: The Outcome at Each Instant of Time of a Historical Evolution Entirely Determined, from an Arbitrary Initial State, by the Sole Will of Property Rights Holders

The social structure is characterized, at each instant of time, not by the nature of the goods that constitute individual patrimonies—since, at each instant of time, the patrimony holder may modify this through exchange—but by their aggregate value. It is this value, and this value alone, that determines the distribution of articles of wealth within the community.

Now, if we consider a universe starting from an initial moment of time when all existing goods have been appropriated, its social structure, at any given moment of time, will be the outcome of the economic evolution, between the beginning of the period and the instant considered, of all the patrimonies that constitute it.

In a pacified society, however, where each individual article of wealth is subject to the will of one master only, this evolution depends solely on the will of patrimony holders. It is this will, and this will alone, that at each instant of time makes the state of a given patrimony emerge from the state immediately preceding it.

In order to understand the workings of the mechanism through which, at each instant of time, the social structure is generated, one should bear in mind 540 that although the evolution of a given person’s patrimony over a certain period is determined by the action applied, at the initial state of the person’s patrimony, by the will that governs it, the current state of a person’s patrimony is the outcome of all its intermediate states, and hence of the will that has determined its fate at each of the constituent instants of the time interval considered.

Only a mathematician can grasp the full import of this observation. He will appreciate that the evolution of a patrimony can only be determined step-by-step, and that it is the outcome of an integration between the beginning of the period considered and the instant of time considered.

Even in the intuitive form in which we have presented it, however, this observation gives an insight into the cumulative nature of the influences that affect the evolution of patrimonies.

At each instant of time, the composition of a patrimony will be the cumulative product of its previous evolution: this is the legacy of the entire history imposed on the patrimony by the continuous chain of individual wills to which the patrimony has been subjected since its creation.

Economic evolution will, however, be the one factor generating social structures only in a community where, from the outset, all goods have been appropriated. If, however, there were any ownerless goods at the outset, or if ownerless goods subsequently emerged, their assignment (either directed by the law or settled by violence) will constitute a noneconomic factor that influences the distribution of articles of wealth. Thus, at the beginning of societies, the distribution of landholdings injects an element of arbitrariness, whose impact can be mitigated over time but which will never cease to influence the social structure.

The social structure is therefore, at each instant of time, the outcome of a process of historical evolution, which, starting from an arbitrary initial state, is determined by the sole will of the holders of property rights of ownership.

IV. The Necessity of Government

§1. A Pacified Society Is Not a Governed Society

In a pacified society, a gun will not be needed, because the articles of wealth it would allow one to acquire are burdened by a constraining undesirability that is strong enough to make the articles of wealth undesirable to nearly all those who might wish to obtain them.

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Most assuredly, men will still experience desire. The goods of their neighbors will, however, remain desirable only if these are obtained with the consent of the rightful owner. Thus, exchange will be spontaneously substituted for abduction, and purchasing power will be substituted for the power of violence. In the peaceful sovereignty of an unchallenged property, the owner will freely choose the crop for his field and the use he will make of his harvest. If he assigns it to the market, the demand that will constitute its counterpart, combined with that of his fellow men, will induce free decisions among producers, which will yield for the community the maximum satisfaction for a minimum of effort.

Thus, any owner will enjoy the certainty that he can always fill his rights as he chooses. No desire will be so low or so perverse as to remain unsatisfied, provided, however, that the desire is strong enough to eliminate competing desires in the heart of the individual experiencing them, and that this individual has been endowed, through an evolution for which he is responsible for only a very short period of time, with the rights that can enclose the desired object.

The control of the owner over the object owned will be absolute. Nothing can prevent him from enjoying and disposing of it as he pleases, regardless of the consequences for the object, for himself, and for the rest of the world.

If he is a free man, and thus owns his body, he will carry out all the acts whose desirability—in his eyes—outweighs the difficulty of the effort or the trouble involved, and will refrain from engaging in the acts that do not meet this condition. He will therefore behave in light of his own tastes and of the consequences alone that nature has attached to his actions.

If there is not enough filial love in his heart so that the desirability of his parents’ happiness outweighs the undesirability of the effort or sacrifices involved in making them happy, rather than honor them, he will abandon them to their fate, however forlorn old age may make them.

If he does not naturally abhor murder, he will kill whenever the desirability of the consequences of murder outweighs the undesirability of the effort required to kill or the risk of violent reactions that he may be exposed to as a result.

If he does not naturally hate vice, he will be lustful whenever lust brings him more pleasure than sufferings or troubles.

Lastly, if he does not naturally loathe lying, he will lie as long as he feels that the benefits of falsehood outweigh the inconvenience of being known as a liar, or the fear of reprisals on the part of his victims.

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It should be noted, however, that when we consider filial love and abhorrence of homicide, lechery, or falsehood as factors of decision in a society that is merely pacified, we refer only to those feelings that arise spontaneously in the hearts of men, and not to those that could have been introduced into their hearts by centuries of religious or moral teaching.

Socially, man will similarly help his fellow man only to the extent that the desirability—in his eyes—of alleviating suffering, in and of itself, outweighs the undesirability of the sacrifice involved.

In a society that has merely been pacified, however, only the joy of giving, and not the desire to obey God’s commandments or the appeal of heavenly or earthly rewards, will have to offset the undesirability of the gift and the sacrifices it entails.

Similarly, too, each man will save, or consume, as long as—in his eyes—the desirability of saving outweighs, or is outweighed by, the undesirability of deferring consumption that saving entails. Thus, depending on how individuals save or consume, extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth will emerge and the right of inheritance will increase these inequalities without limit. The volume of patrimonial rights will be determined, for each individual, by the free will exercised by all his forebears.

It is, however, not only external objects that a free man can have ownership of but also his own body. If, when he is drunk, quenching his thirst appears more desirable than the preservation of his own freedom, nothing can prevent him from selling away his body for the desired wine. Similarly, if he does not have sufficient wealth to repay the debts he has incurred, he will have to relinquish to his creditor the available assets represented by his own body.

Thus, even if slavery has not been brought about by violence prior to the establishment of pacifying constraint, it will emerge from the sole will of certain rights holders as a necessary consequence of their free will.

In a universe that has merely been pacified, the dignity of being a “person” does not result from being a human being. Rather, this dignity results from the coincidence, essentially contingent in nature, between the physical control that man exercises over his body and the legal control that confers ownership of his body upon him.

Lastly, in such a universe, collective needs will be satisfied only to the extent that some individuals consider that the desirability of satisfying these needs outweighs the undesirability of the effort required to satisfy them. A road, for instance, will be built only if enough people attach greater importance to the 543 services that they may derive from the road than to increasing crop production, the latter of which they could achieve by not working on building the road. The fatherland will be defended only if there are enough people who feel that the direct or indirect benefits to be derived from military service offset the resulting inconvenience.

Thus, a pacified world will be shaped solely by individual wills. It should be noted, however, that the individuals who impose their own ends on the world will not be all the individuals who constitute mankind, but only those persons whom fate has provided with property rights, and each of these will exercise his own control over a portion of the universe that corresponds to the volume of his rights.

All the characteristics of human societies will depend on these wills alone, although these wills have little to do with the process by which they were selected.

Under such a system, however, the men who shape the world will be “natural” men, free of any religious or moral constraint, about whom it is said, “God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.”21

People who are familiar with natural men, if only because of the knowledge they have of their own nature and because they have listened to the uninterrupted voice of their secret conscience, have no doubt as to the fact that the undesirability of the consequences alone of murder, vice, or lies will let a substantial number of these [harmful acts] subsist; that the love of one’s neighbor will rarely outweigh the undesirability that works of charity require; that differences among men will spontaneously lead to immense social inequalities; that the shortsightedness of men or the heat of their passions will inevitably reduce to slavery those men, as well as their offspring, who could not control their passions; and finally, that the limited scope of the sentiment of the common good in the hearts of most men—when compared with the intensity of individual desires—will leave nearly all collective needs unsatisfied.

A world that has merely been pacified will be a world of murder, lust, and falsehood, a world of selfishness and hatred, of extreme inequality and slavery, lastly a world where only the desires of a few individuals will be served, without anything ever being done to make one’s country prosperous, happy, and powerful.

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Such a world will be abhorred by all those who believe that a society of human beings not only has to bring to some of its members those satisfactions they consider to be the most desirable ones but should tend toward the achievement of ultimate purposes, through the action of all those who aspire to some ideal and to progress, charity, justice, prosperity, or greatness. Those people will feel that the ends they prefer for social evolution have to be imposed upon society, even though these may displace some individual ends. They will be particularly anxious for human society to be steered toward the goals that they assign to it, like a ship is steered by a helmsman, and therefore subjected to the intervention of “government,” without which the goals could not be reached.

§2. The Purposes of Government: The Pursuit of Moral, Social, and Collective Objectives

We have shown in the first part of this chapter that individual behavior can only be changed through the exercise of some power of constraint. The only authorities that can wield such power will therefore be governmental authorities.

In actual fact, however, a constraining power can only take a religious, a moral, or a police form.

To investigate the purposes of governmental action is to investigate the objectives that these three types of power impose upon the societies they govern.

a) Theocratic Governments

Men living in primitive societies appear to have been subjected to only two authorities: force and their gods. “It was the universal opinion among the ancients,” according to Fustel de Coulanges, “that a man owed no obligations except to his own gods.”22

Thus the only way for man to escape from the state of nature was by submitting to the will of his gods: government was purely theocratic. Men governed on earth only as the representatives and interpreters of the divine will, whose enforcement they had to strictly ensure.

This view governed the political organization of ancient civilizations, but believers accept it at all times. Again, St. Thomas Aquinas explains it most lucidly: “Two things belong to providence—namely, the type of the order of things 545 foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything. . . . As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things inferior by superior.”23

The most obvious type of theocratic government appears to have been the government whose structure and history is described in the Old Testament. Moses received God’s word directly on Mount Sinai amid storm clouds and thunder. Moses governed the people because he was directly chosen by God, who ordered him to say to the children of Israel, “I am hath sent me unto you.”24 Moses’s government was a centralized government, which he set up by choosing “able men out of all Israel, and made them heads over the people, rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens. And they judged the people at all seasons: the hard causes they brought unto Moses, but every small matter they judged themselves.”25

As regards the task of the government, it is defined by God’s commandments in great detail. Among all possible acts, God’s commandments lay down those that are prohibited and those that are ordained. Performance of the former and nonperformance of the latter entail divine punishment.

The commandments therefore tend to alter, through the influence of constraining sanctions, the use that men would make of the sovereignties they have been granted if they acted on the basis of their acts’ consequences alone.

The substance of these commandments—excepting those that are intended to enforce social peace by prohibiting infringement of other people’s property—can seemingly be divided into three main categories.

The first category includes commandments that tend to alter the use of man’s natural sovereignty over his own body. As they affect morals, these commandments are essentially moral in nature. They prohibit murder, lying, bearing false witness, adultery. They ordain love for one’s parents and the sanctification of the Lord’s day.

In this area, the Law of Moses stands out on account of its extremely detailed requirements. The Law of Moses not only provides for supernatural sanctions, which “visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third 546 and fourth generation of them that hate Me, and show mercy unto thousands of them that keep My commandments”; the Law of Moses also lays down the purely human sanctions that God’s representatives will have to enforce whenever there is a breach of the law.

The second category of commandments tend to alter the use men make of the sovereignty derived from their rights of ownership over objects external to their own bodies.

The corresponding requirements are of a social order. With the same detail throughout, they lay down how slaves, widows, and orphans, as well as objects that are loaned or borrowed, shall be treated; they allocate the disposal of a portion of individual wealth by ordaining charity and requiring the payment of tithes and the offering of first fruits. In all cases, they alter the will of the object’s master by modifying the final result that any action he may undertake is likely to yield him.

The third category of commandments, by far the largest, govern men’s action in order to produce the collective evolution that divine authority seeks to impose on men at each instant of time.

These commandments therefore no longer lay down permanent rules; they apply to the specific situations in which history places, in each of its successive moments, the governed people. These commandments govern the movements of this people, delimit the territories it must acquire, order war or peace, and determine its form.

In sum, these commandments provide for the government of the community not from the viewpoint of permanent moral or social necessities but in everyday life, in the narrow sense of the term “govern” as commonly understood.

The Gospel retains, in its commandments, the principle of the moral obligations that constitute the Decalogue. Alongside these, however, the Gospel emphasizes the law of love and charity, which is no longer just one of the many expressions of the divine will, but contains, along with the obligation to love God, “all the Law and the prophets.” The law of love and charity leads men to desire to use the goods they own in a different way from what would have seemed—in their eyes—to be the most desirable way if they had considered the natural consequences alone.

The law of love and charity is supplemented by all of divine teaching, which requires men, against their natural inclinations, to respect the poor, to despise riches and honors, to submit to the divine will, and to base social relations on 547 a respect for human dignity, independently of any consideration of rank, class, or nationality.

It behooves us to reflect for a moment on the chasm that separates the social state that the divine will tends to bring about from the “natural” state that human nature, if left to itself, is bound to establish. To enforce love between men who naturally hate one another, to impose charity on men who are naturally motivated by selfishness, to command that they should resist their natural inclinations instead of sliding downward into all the natural disorders of falsehood, lust, and murder, and thereby turn the hellish world that the natural desires of men would create into a habitable world: these are the fruits of the constraint to which divine law subjects human wills.26

Nevertheless, although Christianity tends to alter men’s morals and their social relations, it does not affect the collective evolution of societies directly. It lets Caesar impose the acts that will determine its course. It is true that Christianity does influence the course of this evolution, because the acts performed by the civil authorities are not exempt from its laws or from its sanctions, but this influence is indirect, and differs from the influence exercised by the God of Israel through his constant communications with men. Therefore, civil governments, even where anointed by the Lord, maintain a large degree of autonomy, which makes of them—in the area of responsibility that is granted 548 them—genuine “secondary causes,” whose action, together with the ends they impose, has to be studied separately.

b) Governments with a Moral Base

Governing men by the moral sense tends to subject them to the imperatives of conscience, to require them to perform those acts that conscience regards as moral, those that will provide the joy of having performed one’s duty, and to forbid men from performing those acts that appear to be immoral and generate remorse. It therefore tends, in all cases, to make it so that the act chosen by men as being the most desirable one is not in fact the act that they would have considered to be such on the basis of the act’s consequences alone.

The ends pursued by governments with a moral base will be those that the dictates of conscience tend to impose. Broadly speaking, these ends will coincide with those of revealed religions. Hence, the main difference between societies with a moral base and theocratic societies lies in the a priori nature of the laws that govern the former, compared with the supernatural origin of those imposed upon the latter.

It is also in their generality, however, that moral principles are similar to the commandments of the religions whose god does not make his will known to men on a daily basis. Moral principles may govern men’s morals and social relations, but not the historical evolution of communities. Their ends will therefore be primarily moral or social; as a consequence, moral principles, too, will leave to Caesar the task of imposing collective goals on human groups, while limiting themselves to governing their consciences.

c) Civil Governments

As has just been indicated, over long periods of history, civil governments have exercised only a very limited share of governmental action. Morals and social relations were governed directly by the divine will, which relinquished to the temporal power only administrative tasks and the responsibility for strictly collective interests. And even in this area, heads of government, pontifices maximi or monarchs by divine right, were considered to derive their authority from a delegation on the part of the Divinity, which had entrusted them with the mission of interpreting, formulating, and carrying out its dictates.

It is only from the [French] Revolution on that civil governments ceased to be, at least in theory, an emanation of divine authority, and came to be the representatives of a new entity, the nation, whose wills they were supposed to express.

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From then on, although they still looked after collective interests, their activities increasingly encroached upon the domain of morals and social relations, either to support God’s commandments with police coercion, thereby enforcing adherence to these commandments upon all those whose wavering faith was insufficient to maintain such adherence, or to extend governmental action to fields that divine authority had left to the free will of men.

Thus, the action of civil governments in modern states, just as was typically the case with theocratic governments in past times, covers three areas: collective, social, and moral.

We shall specify the nature of the ends that civil governments seek to impose in each of these areas.

Any government responsible for a community experiences, in the first instance, the need to ensure its existence and its permanence. To that end, the government must protect it against two kinds of dangers: external dangers, which emanate from rival powers that want to acquire sovereignty over the temporal domain that supports the life of the community; and internal dangers, which tend to destroy public order and social peace.

Protection against external dangers imposes on governments the burden of providing for national defense, whereas protection against internal dangers imposes on governments the burden of providing justice and the police.

Moreover, the economic evolution of societies has led the state to be tasked with responsibilities that likely would not be carried out, or would be carried out inadequately, by private individuals: the building of roads, bridges or canals, ports, or railroads; the administration of postal, telegraph, and telephone services; and the setting up or management of certain industries hence gradually entered the public domain.

Lastly, the desire to shape men’s minds and decide their “scales of preferences” has led those governments that are free of religious faith to become increasingly interested in national education. At the extreme, this tendency takes the authority to teach away from religious institutions, so as to provide the state with a monopoly in the field of education.

All these governmental interventions have the common feature of requiring the use of services in order to be effectively carried out: services of soldiers, judges, or policemen; services of engineers and workers; services of teachers; and services provided by artillery, aircraft, war ships, by railroad or by rolling stock, by roadways, bridges, canals, or schoolhouses.

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Tasks that are in the collective interest will be carried out only if the community can have the services that these tasks require at its disposal—in other words, if the community can impose its own ends on the capital that is capable of producing these services.

In a universe where all capital is appropriated, however, it is only the holder of the property right of ownership, and he alone, who can impose his ends upon the object owned. In all cases where collective ends are not those that present maximum desirability in the eyes of property rights holders, these ends can be reached only by procedures prohibiting the “owners” from making the use of their capital, and of the services produced by their capital, that corresponds to their personal tastes.

Thus, concern for the general interest essentially entails the substitution of collective for individual ends, as far as the case of capital that can produce the services required by governmental action is concerned.

But the choice of ends is the essential prerogative of property rights holders. Any governmental action therefore requires the dispossession of individuals who would have been in a position, by virtue of the rights they held, to impose their own ends on the wealth that is required for the fulfillment of collective needs.

In the following section, we shall investigate the methods by which such a dispossession of property rights can be obtained.

Under purely theocratic regimes, commandments ordering charity and love tend to correct the inhumane aspect of a distribution of wealth that is set only by owners’ control over their property. The Christian social order, in particular, was to find in these commandments its essential feature.

To the extent that faith ceased to be universal and its impact on men’s behavior came to be less pronounced, however, and to the extent that greater awareness made the community more demanding in the social realm, governments were increasingly of the view that they had to endow with their constraining action the religious teachings that sought to render the distribution of wealth more humane, and direct of their own accord—through new commandments called social legislation—certain areas that sacred texts had relinquished to individual free wills.

Thus the system of public assistance requires taxpayers to devote part of their resources to charitable ends. Similarly, social insurance programs, when in financial disequilibrium—which is nearly always the case—make the community at large responsible for the obligation of supporting the elderly and for 551 mitigating the sufferings caused by disease, accidents, and, frequently also, unemployment.

Each of these interventions forces individuals to use their wealth in a way other than the one that, to them, would have been the most “desirable.”

Similarly, in order to counter inequities that they consider to be unjustifiable, modern governments often intervene in the setting of financial compensation by imposing, for instance, a minimum wage.

Governments also tend to correct undue accumulation of capital through progressive taxes on income or on great wealth. Inheritance taxes, in particular, considerably alter the distribution of wealth that the owner’s will would have established had he been left free to transfer his patrimony, after his death, in the way he felt was the most desirable one.

Interventions altering the social structure are not limited to quantitative interventions. Some authoritarian regimes forbid private individuals from owning all or part of production resources; in this way, such regimes seek to prevent individuals from wielding the sources of influence and profit that these production resources constitute. Quite often, too, governments endeavor to sustain certain activities, notably agriculture, which would otherwise be largely limited in the face of foreign competition, if individuals had been left to direct their economic activities in the ways that appeared to them to be the most “desirable,” or the least “undesirable,” given the remunerations these activities could provide.

In all cases, social ends can be attained only if they are substituted for the ends that private rights holders would have imposed on the objects owned by them, hence by infringing upon the sovereignty that their rights had afforded them.

Man’s morals, consisting of the actions he imposes on his body, derive principally from religious or moral imperatives. Yet civil governments have often reinforced these imperatives with their own constraining sanctions. As civil governments do not, however, have supernatural knowledge of men’s acts and motivations, which is one of the essential features of the Divinity; and as they are not ever-present, in the way that conscience is, at the site where competing desires clash, civil governments witness only acts that have been carried out, and not the intentions behind these acts in the moral sphere. Thus, civil governments’ constraining action, being devoid of nuance and limited to transgressions of the law, is both imperfect and crude.

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Thus, where God’s commandments and the human conscience prohibit falsehood, civil laws prohibit only perjury. Where the former prescribe honoring one’s father and mother, the latter only require a maintenance allowance. Where the former prohibit desiring carnal knowledge outside marriage, the latter only punish adultery and unnatural practices.

It is perhaps with regard to murder that the constraining action of civil governments comes closest to that of theocratic or moral governments. Even so, civil action is only initiated when the authority has been informed that an act of murder has been committed, whereas the eye that followed Cain did not cease seeing his crime, in spite of all the walls intended to conceal it.

Although with regard to mores, civil governments are less effective than theocratic or moral governments, they have, as public sentiment has developed, nevertheless gradually extended their control to areas that were not governed—at least not explicitly—by theocratic or moral governments.

In the first instance, moral action by civil governments aimed at prohibiting slavery.

In fact, in the absence of any explicit commandment making the ownership of one man by another undesirable through the addition of constraining sanctions, slavery is still possible.

There where slavery exists, it will tend to endure indefinitely: a slave’s child will belong to the master, just as the yearly calf crop belongs to the owner of the herd. To put an end to slavery, the constraining authority will have to render undesirable, to the owner, the preservation of his right over the body of the slave, so that the master will wish to free his slave.

Under a property system, however, any free man can become a slave if he decides voluntarily to alienate his body to a third party, for life or for an extended period of time. Thus, a free man may give up his freedom through exchange: in this way, a defaulting debtor may become his creditor’s property, as was in fact the case in all primitive systems.

Abolishing slavery under a system of widespread appropriation is to prevent a free man from alienating his body to a third party, even though he may want to do so, or to prevent him from performing the acts that may force him to do so. Abolishing slavery is therefore to force, through the use of constraint, a free man to not want to change the contents of the property right of ownership he exercises over his own body and, thereby, this involves restricting the ability to dispose that is provided by his property right.

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Therefore the problem of slavery is similar to the problem that legislators had to resolve when they wanted certain objects to remain the property of certain persons. As such, the legislature declared certain objects that are indispensable to life, as well as certain working tools, to be unseizable. Similarly, the French law of July 12, 1909, provides that certain family goods may not be seized, and, similarly, the system of entailed estates meant that certain families were obligated to retain ownership of certain landholdings.

In all cases, just as is the case where the law seeks to prohibit slavery, the law always eliminates or restricts the right to dispose that which is attached to the property right of ownership, and forces the holder of a right to accept a specific content, even if a different content appears—in and of itself—to be more desirable in his view.

The problem of slavery is of considerable theoretical importance, because it confronts any civil government seeking to safeguard human dignity.

Any work contract, in fact, deprives a worker from the full control over his own body, to the extent provided for under the contract. Any contract for an unlimited or prolonged period could produce a situation verging on slavery. Thus the law deems such contracts to be void.

The sentiment has grown increasingly widespread, however, that human dignity and physical health could be compromised by excessive daily labor that excludes essential rest and the leisure necessary for intellectual and moral development. Thus, civil governments, in most modern states, have set a maximum ceiling on the daily labor supply—currently eight hours—that is allowed.

A similar limitation forces men to use their bodies—over which they have enjoyment and disposal, in their capacity as free men—in ways that may be different from the ones they would choose, under the impetus of their desires alone, if they had been left to act freely.

Similarly, various laws and statutes pertaining to paid holidays, weekly rest, and labor of women and children are simply ways of forcing free human beings, on the basis of moral considerations, to use their bodies in a way that is different from the way they would if they satisfied their own tastes under their actual circumstances.

Thus, in all cases, government—whether it be a theocratic, moral, or civil government—is simply the art of altering, by the use of constraint, the use of certain articles of wealth by substituting collective, moral, or social goals for the 554 individual goals that their owners would have pursued in the exercise of their sovereignty as owners.

Governing is therefore removing articles of wealth from the control of their respective owners, so that these articles of wealth can be used the way government authorities want; governing is therefore ensuring that the world will not only be the way owners want it to be but—for the entire share of the goods that are withdrawn from their command—the way governments want it to be.

V. The Methods of Government

§1. Two Methods of Government: The Liberal and the Authoritarian (or Socialist)

The preceding analysis shows that the problem of government, in its various forms, is always the same: ensure that a use is made of the sovereignty that certain rights of ownership imply—sovereignty of the owner over his goods or of the free man over his body—that is different from the use that the holder of the right would have chosen on the basis of just the consequences of all possible uses.

The problem thus presented, two methods—and two methods only—can resolve it: strip the owner of the portion of sovereignty whose use one wishes to change, and transfer it to the governing authority; or ensure, by the use of constraint, that the holder of the property right himself chooses, with regard to the articles of wealth he governs and in his full sovereignty, the ends that the government seeks to impose on these articles of wealth.

The first method is that of taxation. It is, for example, the one pursued by a government that, in order to fulfill its national defense obligation, has transferred to it rights filled with money; the volume of these rights will equal the value of the capital and services required for national defense.

Endowed with these rights, the government demands—on the market, just like a private individual—the necessary articles of wealth and, when it has obtained these, makes the use of them that will properly ensure the desired security.

Similarly, in order to provide public assistance, a government will impose a levy upon private individuals’ rights and reassign these to people whose lot is to be improved.

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In all cases, taxes transfer to the government the areas of sovereignty that the successful accomplishment of its governmental task requires. Taxation turns the government into a property rights holder, similar to all persons possessing such rights, a holder that decides, in its simple sovereignty of being an owner of property, on the contents these rights will receive and the use that will be made of them.

It is thus in choosing the ends imposed upon the area of sovereignty of which it is a rights holder that the state exercises its governmental action. Within this domain, the state’s will is all-powerful; outside it, like any private person outside the property he owns, it is without action.

Therefore, the government does not affect the sovereignty of rights holders in the area that has not been taken away from them. Their field of sovereignty is reduced by the contents of the rights that are transferred to the government, but, after taxes have been levied, the residual area remains subject to the sole will of the owner. Therefore the owner’s will remains fully free within the domain owned. For this reason, this kind of government system is called liberal.

The second method does not alter the delimitation of the fields of individual sovereignty, but it imposes upon the property rights holder the obligation of wanting, for some of his rights, the content and the use necessary to the accomplishment of governmental tasks.

For instance, to limit wheat or wine production, a government will not deprive land owners of control over their own fields. It will rely on constraining sanctions to render undesirable, to farm owners, the production that the government wishes to prevent.

A theocratic government seeking to improve the lot of the poor would also use this method: such a government will not dispossess the rich of their goods but will inspire them, through an appropriate constraining action, to provide the charitable use of these goods that will ensure the fulfillment of governmental intent.

This method implies a modification, by the use of constraint, not of rights holders’ tastes—rights holders always being “in the hand of their own counsel”—but of the wills that generate their actions. A land owner remains master of his whole field and continues to use it for the purposes he considers to be the most desirable ones; but the desirability that determines his decisions is no longer based on his actions’ consequences alone; it is altered by the undesirability of the constraining measures that the government may wish to impose.

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Thus, the area in which the rights holder chooses freely—that is to say, the area that is free of any constraint—is reduced by the area that is affected by constraining sanctions. His freedom of enjoyment and disposal is applicable, within the object owned, only to certain courses of action: those courses of action that governmental intervention has not forbidden the rights holder from pursuing.

Such systems, which are based on a restriction of property rights, enable governments to make the world, not such as it would be if the rights holders had been left to decide freely, but such as these rights holders would decide after their will has been constrained by governmental action. Such systems allow governments, without levying taxes—therefore without apparently affecting the distribution of wealth—to bring an all-powerful tutelage action to bear upon individual wills, and to direct these wills the way a commander directs his troops. For this reason, such systems are referred to as authoritarian.

Quite frequently, taking into account the generally social purpose of restrictions on property rights, such systems are referred to as socialist.

Many authors, however, apply this epithet only to authoritarian systems that are meant to improve the lot of the underprivileged classes, in particular the working classes, by restricting the right to property. Under this terminology, socialist regimes can be said to be authoritarian systems with generous leanings.

It is in order to avoid any polemics as to the sentimental orientation of economic systems that it appears preferable to simply describe as authoritarian those systems that restrict, through the use of constraint, the freedom of choice of the property owner within the domain owned, regardless of whether the objectives aimed at are of a collective, moral, or social nature.*

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§2. The Theoretical Equivalence between the Two Methods of Government with Regard to Any Collective, Social, or Moral Ends

The distinction between the two methods of government—liberal and authoritarian—takes on its true significance only if one observes that, at least in theory, any collective, social, or moral objective can be achieved at the discretion of the authority that enforces it, by either method.

Let us consider, for example, the collective objectives pursued by governments within the framework of their national defense tasks. In order to carry out this mission, they can transfer, through taxation, the rights necessary for the procurement of weaponry, aircraft, and soldiers’ services required by national defense and demand such capital equipment and services in the market sectors where they are exchanged; and, with the articles of wealth acquired in this way, they can produce the service that will ensure the security of the community for which they are responsible.

This is the liberal method, and the one pursued in peacetime by the British government in creating an all-volunteer army.

Under such a system, soldiers’ services are obtained by offering high enough remuneration to induce enough individuals to voluntarily want to provide their physical services under the command of superiors assigned to them by the military hierarchy.

This method of government implies no act of authority other than the one that ensures the collection of taxes. Outside the fiscal realm, all transfers are effected through voluntary exchange. This method of government therefore does not impair owners’ sovereignty, not even soldiers’ sovereignty over their own bodies.

But the government authority may, through constraint, compel some citizens to want, for some of their rights, the content—and for this content, the use—that is necessary to establish a national defense force.

Thus, governments may compel a person possessing a certain amount of wealth to provide, for a given period of time, the services of draft or saddle animals, vehicle services, and all sorts of contributions in kind.

A government can also compel all able-bodied men, without depriving them in any way of the control over their own bodies, to obey those responsible for national defense. This obligation will be enforced by instituting constraining 558 sanctions, which will make undesirable any insubordinate acts during the period of “service” that is imposed on the person.

This is the authoritarian method, exemplified by the French system of compulsory military service.

With the authoritarian method, the provider of services is not dispossessed; he is only forced to want, for the capital whose ownership he retains, the ends that the governing authority wants him to pursue.

As far as all collective objectives are concerned, there is general equivalence between the two methods of government. For instance, any road-building project can be achieved by the liberal method of taxation, to purchase the necessary materials and workers’ services, or through the authoritarian method: contributions in kind and forced labor, which do not divest owners of their rights, but constrain them to want for these rights the contents and the manner of disposal that will lead to the results sought by the government.

Similarly, any social objective may be achieved equally by the liberal method or by the authoritarian method, the latter of which then appears, more specifically, as a socialist method.

In the area of public assistance, the government authority can levy through taxation the resources it will distribute, either in money or in kind, to persons whose suffering it wishes to alleviate—this is the liberal method—or it can compel the owners of resources to provide the charity the government wants, without stripping the owners of these resources; this is the authoritarian method.

Generally, theocratic governments resort to authoritarian methods. They allow the wealthy man to remain master of his riches, but teach him that he will violate God’s commandments and face the punishment threatened to sinners if he solely uses his property in selfish ways, the way his personal desires could lead him to do. Theocratic governments may, however, also pursue charitable works through the liberal method; they need only to compel the wealth holders to tithe, the proceeds of which the government itself would distribute among the poor.

Similarly, if a government thinks the wages of a particular group of workers are too low, it can levy through taxation the resources it wants the workers to have and distribute these proceeds as wage increases—this is the liberal method. The government could equally well require employers to pay a salary higher than that resulting from the free play of market forces, by forcing employers to respect—under threat of compelling sanctions—collective labor agreements and minimum wage laws. The employer then finds himself constrained to 559 “want,” for the additional resources distributed to his workers, the use that the state considers most desirable. This is an authoritarian system, which everyone would—this time around—agree to call socialist.

A government based on moral principles can also, in theory, be exercised either through a liberal or through an authoritarian method.

Governing mores means ensuring that man behaves differently—in the use of his faculties, and in the various acts he can order his body to perform—from how he would have chosen to behave under the sole impulse of his own desires.

If the legislator wants to limit the working day to eight hours, he may, through the imposition of constraining sanctions, make any work in excess of official working hours undesirable. Man remains master over his body and its actions, but he is led, by constraint, to want to not perform those actions that the government authority does not want him to perform.

This is the authoritarian or socialist method.

If the government authority wishes to obtain the same results without constraint, there is only one solution: acquire property rights over all the days of labor supplied in the market, regardless of length, and use or sell back only the services provided by each worker during the legally authorized working time.

If it intends to use this method, the state would have to finance the purchase of services that are offered but not used, by taxing away resources equal in value to the value of dissipated services—that is to say, the rights necessary to enclose those articles of wealth on which it intends to impose ends that are different from the ones that the rights holders would choose for these rights.

Of course, this is a purely theoretical solution. In practice, the government will regulate hours of work only through the authoritarian method. An analysis of the liberal alternative shows, however, that the difficulty in the governing of mores stems from the difficulty of transferring ownership rights involving the human body.

In point of fact, any authority that wants to prohibit, for instance, falsehood, lechery, or murder faces the same problem.

When using the authoritarian method, it will be sufficient for an authority to attach a sufficiently strong undesirability to the act it seeks to prohibit, so that the person capable of performing the act prefers to not do so.

When using the liberal method, the government authority will have to acquire control over the body that may perform this act, in such a way that this body only 560 performs those actions ordered by the government authority. Thus, a slave will neither lie nor kill if he is prevented from performing any acts other than those ordered by his master, and if his master orders him to neither lie nor kill.

Thus, governing mores by using the liberal method requires full control over the governed body by governmental authority—that is to say, slavery.

It is for this reason that governing morals and mores, in countries where slavery does not exist, is always done through the authoritarian method and why theocratic governments, in particular, never imposing slavery for their benefit, rely only on the authoritarian method.

No matter how theoretical it may be, it was nevertheless necessary to show that the liberal option exists, and that the authorities may choose to impose moral ends, just as collective or social ends, through either liberal or authoritarian methods.

Thus, in all fields, any governmental task may be accomplished through one of two methods: the liberal method, which allows any rider to remain full master of his horse, but which—when the liberal method wants to direct the horse—chooses for the horse a rider who will prefer the path government wants; or the authoritarian method, which, without changing the rider, creates in the rider the will to guide his horse toward the ends the government seeks to impose on the horse.

Certainly, we do not claim that the two methods are interchangeable. To the contrary, we aim to show, in the sections that follow, that each has its own advantages and disadvantages and is thereby more or less suited to its purpose. In order to clarify the nature of governmental action, however, it was necessary to demonstrate that in theory any collective, social, or moral objective could be achieved with either method.

In particular, it was essential to fully clarify that liberalism and authoritarianism (or socialism) are not programs of government but methods of government, which are indifferent to the use that is made of them.

In practice, governmental systems always encompass interventions of both kinds. Some, such as those seeking to govern mores, are solely achieved through authoritarian methods; others, such as those associated with the use of civil servants’ services, essentially through fiscal methods.

Real and existing systems are therefore always partly liberal and partly authoritarian. They nevertheless are labeled as being one or the other, depending 561 on the proportion between the two methods of government, and on whether the governmental authorities favor one or the other when both methods are equally applicable.

§3. The Repercussion on the Property Right of Ownership: The Need for Taxation under a Liberal System, and the Need for Legal or Regulatory Restrictions on the Sovereignty of the Owner under an Authoritarian System

Government is the art of imposing on certain objects the evolution that government authorities want for these objects.

Where the governed object is not the property of government authorities, this can be done only by removing the object from the control of its owner in order to subject it to the control of the government.

Now, the property right of ownership and the constraining action that makes this right real provide the owner with the certainty that he alone will determine the fate of his goods. The government will therefore engage, in any case, in some impairment of the property owner’s privilege.

The liberal method resolves the problem of government by transferring the property right over the object to be governed to the governing authority; the authoritarian method, by transferring the governmental will onto the owner of the object to be governed.

For the transfer of ownership that is required for the exercise of liberal government to be actually effected, it has to be forced upon the owner. To that end, the constraining authority—which may be different from the governing authority—will, all while continuing to protect the object that constitutes the tax from third parties’ claims, have to attach an undesirability, for its owner, to any act of enjoyment or disposal other than the transfer to the government, such that the owner, of his own free will, decides to pay the tax.

Under a liberal system, the government will therefore have to attach to pacifying action—through which it ensures the compartmentalization of individual sovereignties—an additional constraining action: fiscal constraint, whose area of application will be defined by tax laws, and through which it will ensure the transfer to the government of the “things” that are indispensable to fulfilling the government’s objectives.

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Generally, the things whose transfer is enforced in this way are monetary units. It may happen, however, as was the case with tithes or first fruits, or even as with compulsory deliveries of metal under the German occupation of France, that forced transfers are in kind.

In contrast, the authoritarian method does not affect the geographical scope of individual property rights, but forces the rights holders to want to make the use of some of their rights in the way the governing authority wants.

Now, a property right of ownership grants the owner the ability to choose the way in which the object owned is used, free of any constraining action, from among all possible uses. The owner’s choice will not always coincide with that of the governing authority, unless any other choice is rendered undesirable to the owner through the addition of constraining sanctions, which will change the desirability of any specific choice.

Such sanctions will prohibit certain courses of action from among the whole range of possible actions. They will therefore restrict the property right of ownership, not in terms of its object but in terms of its consistency.

Thus, in order to impose the practice of charity on men, an authoritarian system will not withdraw ownership of their goods from them, but will force them to want to use some of it for charitable purposes.

Similarly, in order to limit the working day to eight hours, the authoritarian method does not remove man’s sovereignty over his own body, but renders undesirable, through the intervention of constraining sanctions, any work in excess of the legally permitted number of working hours. The authoritarian method therefore restricts the area of free determination—in other words, of the determination that is free of any constraining sanction—which is provided by man’s ownership of his own body, so as to remove from this area of free determination those areas whose removal is required for the fulfillment of the government’s will.

The restriction imposed may vary in scope, depending on whether the government simply intends to forbid certain courses of action or require a certain action.

In this latter case, that of complete servitude, the range of acts forbidden through constraining sanctions must cover all possible acts, other than those the government wishes to see performed.

The authoritarian method of government therefore requires that the constraining authority add, to the action by which it ensures the compartmental563ization of individual sovereignties, an additional action, through which it will prohibit—within each property right and among all possible courses of action—those courses of action of which governmental action requires that they not be performed.

Generally, this statute of a constraining intervention in the framework of individual property rights of ownership will involve commandments, laws, or regulations.

Under a system of authoritarian government, the property right of ownership will therefore no longer be a zone of freedom of action within the full range of possible acts, but will only be freedom of action within the area that has not been proscribed by government regulations. Thus the definition of the property right of ownership has to be changed. The property right of ownership will no longer be the ability to enjoy and dispose of an object in the most absolute manner, and will instead become the right “to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations.”27

This definition, which is that of Article 544 of the French Civil Code, is relevant to the two methods of government action.

Under the liberal system, the laws and regulations—once taxes have been paid—do not prohibit any of the uses allowed by the natural order of things. A strictly liberal society is therefore a society without any laws or regulations other than those that forbid the enjoyment and disposal of other people’s property or that establish tax obligations.

By contrast, under the authoritarian system of government, the laws and regulations subject individual wills to the restrictions that are willed by government authority. They force property rights holders to determine the fate of the objects owned only in the area within which freedom of action is allowed.

But the two methods of government—the liberal as well as the authoritarian method—both enable the government authority, through the taxes it levies or through the legal restrictions or regulations it issues, to direct social evolution at its discretion, and to impose the collective, social, or moral ends it wants, by moving the path of social evolution away from the paths where social evolution would have been taken as a result of the wills of property rights holders alone.

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VI. The Degree of Government

§1. The Scope of Governmental Ends, the Determining Cause of the Amount of Taxes under a Liberal System, and of the Extent of Legal or Regulatory Restrictions on Property Rights of Ownership under an Authoritarian System

The two methods of government, liberal and authoritarian, have this common feature of removing from the sovereignty of the owner greater or lesser portions of his patrimonial domain. The systems therefore rest on the same foundation: the appropriation of wealth by individuals, which is the firm soil into which all political systems, including those that claim to restrain it, thrust their roots. The government of human societies, regardless of whether it is liberal or authoritarian, is simply the imposition, upon certain portions of patrimonial domains, of ends that are different from the ends that the patrimony’s holder wanted to impose upon them.

The government of a given society will therefore be characterized, independently of the nature of the objectives it imposes and of the method it uses to impose these objectives, by one essential feature: the portion of individual patrimonies that it removes from the control of their respective holders so as to make this portion subject to the will of government authorities.

The size of this portion depends on the volume of the collective, social, or moral objectives that the government intends to impose upon the human group it governs.

It is this volume that will determine the amount of taxes (under a liberal system), and the volume of legal or regulatory restrictions imposed on rights of ownership (under an authoritarian system)—therefore, in either case, by difference, the articles of wealth that will remain subject to the wills of their respective owners.

§2. Two Extreme Ends of the Spectrum: Individualism and Communism, between Which All Existing Societies Are Located

The preceding analysis shows that one can imagine, independently of the method they put into place, two extreme types of government: one, which removes nothing from the influence of individual wills; the other, which removes everything from them.

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The first type leaves to individuals full sovereignty over their own patrimonies. Social evolution [there] entails no collective, social, or moral objectives, only individual ones. At each instant of time, the world is such as property rights holders, within their respective domains, wish it to be.

Such a system involves neither taxes nor legal or regulatory restrictions on property rights of ownership. It ensures the full sovereignty of individuals over all existing wealth. It is therefore known as individualism.

At the other extreme, all existing wealth is removed from individual sovereignty. This is the limit of a liberal system that levies away all individual resources through taxation, or of an authoritarian system that restricts, through legal or regulatory provisions, an owner’s freedom of enjoyment and disposal, to the point of leaving, at each instant of time, only a single course of possible action: the course of action that the social authorities intend to impose upon the owner.

Under such a system, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, everything takes place as if all existing goods were the property of the social authorities, which alone could enjoy and use it. All goods are in common. For this reason, the corresponding system is known as communist.28

In point of fact, there is no real system that corresponds to these extreme forms.

No policed society can be entirely individualistic, because levies will always be necessary for the organization and maintenance of the police force.

Similarly, any society subjected to religious commandments or ethical rules is not fully individualistic, as individuals are prevented from using certain rights—rights over their own bodies or rights over their own property—in the way that they might have wished if they had been free of any religious or moral constraint.

No real society can be fully communist, were it only for the impossibility of removing from individuals any freedom of control over their own bodies. Each individual will therefore always keep a certain area of sovereignty, however limited it may be.

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In fact, individualism and communism characterize tendencies rather than absolute forms of government.

An individualistic system is one that tends to leave the widest possible portion of sovereignty to property rights holders; a communist system is one that tends to limit such sovereignty to the greatest extent possible, by substituting collective, social, or moral ends for the ends that property rights holders would have imposed on their own goods if they had retained full control over these.

In any case, it is essential to remember that, whereas liberalism and authoritarianism (or socialism) are only methods of government, in sharp contrast, individualism and communism are programs of government, which are characterized by different degrees of governmental intervention.

In theory, a highly individualistic government may be of the authoritarian type, if the limited levies imposed upon individual sovereignties are made effective through legal or regulatory restrictions on property rights; similarly, a quasi-communist government may be liberal, if it is through taxation that it effects the levies required for government action.29

Such a paradox can exist only within certain limits, however, because any fully communist regime will have to be authoritarian, because it cannot rely on the quest for maximum desirability to be the driving force that directs individual wills.

VII. The Foundations of Governmental Action

§1. One Only Governs Objects That Have Already Been Appropriated

The preceding analysis shows that governing is merely changing the ends that are imposed upon certain objects by the wills that control them. Governing tends to substitute the objectives sought by the governing authority for the objectives that the owners of these objects would want for them.

Thus, the problem of government is only a problem of displacing certain objects in relation to certain wills. Like any problem of relative motion, this problem can be resolved either by displacing objects (this is the liberal method) or by displacing wills (this is the authoritarian method). In any case, the problem is meaningful only in relation to a given state of the social structure.

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The analysis of the governmental process is heavily obscured by the dual meaning of the word “governing.” In the broad sense, government is the art of imposing specific ends on certain objects. In this sense, any owner governs his patrimony. In the narrow sense, which is the usual meaning in political vocabulary, governing is the art of imposing ends on objects that are different from those that their respective owners would like for them: in fact, ends chosen by the government authorities. In this sense, only objects that have already been appropriated can be governed. Indeed, if they had not been appropriated, the authority that would like to control their evolution, rather than the government, would appropriate them. This authority would act like an owner managing his own patrimony, as would a government whose budget was fully financed by the resources of public property,30 or a king who owned all the slaves and all the wealth necessary to fulfill his social mission, and not like a government that controls other people’s property.

Thus, the problem of government arises only in communities where objects have already been subjected to controlling wills through appropriation. The problem of government is the problem of modifying the evolutions that these wills tend to impose on the domain under their control.

§2. The Structure of the Governmental Apparatus

Although the problem of government arises only in societies that have already been pacified as a consequence of the appropriation of articles of wealth, the appropriation of articles of wealth is in no way a spontaneous process. This process of appropriation can take place only if it is ensured by some constraining authority, one that can shield the appropriated domain from any influence other than that of the owner.

In order for the owner to actually enjoy full ownership of his possession, it will have to please the constraining authority to transfer the benefit of its protective intervention to any party that is legitimately invested by the legitimate owner. Appropriation therefore implies, on the part of the constraining authority, the will to subject its interventions passively to owners’ acts of disposal.

Now, for a governmental action to be able to be exercised, it is necessary that this ability of the owner, to be the only party determining the evolution of the object owned, be eliminated. The constraining authority therefore has to make 568 an exception to the charter of its intervention, in order to transfer to the “government” the portions of sovereignty that it will have withdrawn from property rights holders.

Such a transfer can be effected through fiscal constraint, or through the enforcement of laws or regulations. In either case, the transfer can be effected only if the constraining authority decides, by an act of free will, to make the governmental will effective by validating it in its interventions, and therefore remove its power of constraint from the command of owners, so as to place it at the disposal of the government.

Thus the only will elevated to the dignity of government, in a pacified society, is the will in favor of which the constraining authority has agreed to suspend the automatic nature of its interventions, so as to submit them to laws and regulations that this will has promulgated. Only investiture by the constraining authority is capable of conferring governmental power. No government can therefore exist unless “anointed” by a constraining power.

The constraining power and the will that is invested by it are the two main organs of the governmental apparatus, those organs outside of which no government could exist.

§3. Faith, the Source of All Constraining Power

For an authority to have the power to constrain, it is necessary and sufficient that it succeed in rendering undesirable any act performed in violation of the commands it enforces through its interventions.

This will only be the case, however, if any individual who has not renounced, out of a sentiment of duty or love, a prohibited act knows that performing this act will entail punitive measures that will render this act undesirable, however desirable the results of this act, in and of themselves, may appear to be in his eyes.

For a power to be truly constraining, it is not sufficient that this power punish any breach of the law once it is carried out; it is also necessary that the constraining power inspire, before a breach of the law occurs, the certainty that the offense will bring about a sufficient penalty so as to render the act undesirable to anyone who may be tempted to engage in it.

Thus, in fact, the only constraining authorities will be those authorities that can inspire faith in their existence and the certainty that they will inexorably apply the sanctions attached by them to the commandments, laws, and regulations of which they are the guardians.

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In any society governed by a sincere and widespread religious faith, the constraining power will be that of the Divinity. A person who believes in God cannot desire to perform an act punished by supernatural chastisements, even if this person has not, through filial submission, stopped considering this act to be desirable in and of itself. Similarly, he cannot consider undesirable an act that will entail heavenly rewards, even if he has not been led, out of love, to want to perform this act. All sacred texts, therefore, make of faith the first of duties.

A god that does not inspire faith may chastise, but he cannot constrain. And so the authorities that have sought to govern communities in which religious faith was no longer universal and all-powerful have created a purely human power, the police power, capable of attaching constraining sanctions to any breach of the laws and regulations enacted by the authorities.

But the police power, too, will be a constraining authority only if the undesirability of the sanctions it inflicts intervenes as a motive in all the [inner] debates of conscience where wills are developed. This will be the case only if all members of the community are convinced that performing a prohibited act will inevitably result in the constraining sanction being duly enforced, thus if the police have succeeded in inspiring, through their actions, a universal belief in the constraining sanctions’ existence and effectiveness.

Only a society that has developed a power that can generate belief in its existence and faith in its effectiveness can be pacified and governed. In the absence of such a power, the society remains in a state of nature.

These reflections explain the fact that the League of Nations has been, up to the present day, neither pacified nor governed. The League of Nations remains in a state of nature, precisely because no supernatural or natural power has been able to inspire, in the authorities that lead nations, faith in its ability to constrain their wills. If such a power were to emerge tomorrow, if it were to succeed through its actions in creating a sentiment recognizing its effectiveness, then peace, like government, could be imposed upon nations, just as peace and government have been imposed, in the national framework, upon the men who constitute nations.

§4. The Constraining Power, Source of All Sovereignty

As soon as an authority is in a position to constrain, it can establish sovereignty if it so wishes.

The sovereignties it establishes can be of two distinct kinds, however. In the term “sovereignty,” we once again find the ambiguity we already observed in 570 the term “government.” The constraining power establishes property owners’ sovereignty by subjecting its interventions to their will and by sanctioning their acts of disposal; it establishes governments’ sovereignty by waiving—in governments’ favor—the rules that govern its interventions protecting property, thereby allowing for obstruction to the will of property owners.

Rights holders’ sovereignty covers the domain that they own; governments’ sovereignty covers the domain that is not in the possession of rights holders.

The moment, however, a given will has been endowed with the privilege of governing—as soon as it has been “consecrated” by the constraining power—it will determine at its sole discretion the evolution of the domain it governs. In this domain, the only objects that will remain subjected to the wills of their owners are those objects it pleases the government not to rule over.

Thus, within a governed community, the sovereignties of property owners will always be precarious and will only ever be delegated sovereignties. These sovereignties will exist and subsist only to the extent that it pleases the government to not withdraw them.

In turn, however, whenever the constraining power has not been created by governments, the sovereignty of governments will exist and subsist only by the will of the constraining power. In any society under the influence of religious faith, the government will only ever be an emanation of the divine will; it will only be, and can only ever be, a government by divine right.

A genuine hierarchy of sovereignties therefore emerges, since all sovereignties other than that of the constraining power are merely delegated sovereignties. The delegation of sovereignty is immediate in favor of governments, and mediate in favor of property rights holders, but, in all cases, it derives from one single source, which is supernatural in theocratic societies, and human in civil societies: the power that exercises the privilege of constraining human wills.

§5. In Any Area of Sovereignty, the Will of the Sovereign Is the Imperative of Governmental Action

Every area of sovereignty, whether primary or delegated, is subjected to the sole will of the person who, through the constraining power, holds the ability to enjoy and dispose of it. For the appropriated domain, governmental authority is this will, and therefore the governing authority chooses the ends that will determine the evolution of the appropriated domain. This will is the prime cause 571 and the immanent force, which, at each instant, makes the present emerge from the past, and which explains without having to be explained.

This is how the divine will, as expressed by the texts in which it revealed itself, rules over souls within the area of sovereignty that the Divinity has set aside for itself. This is how the will of civil governments imposes collective and social objectives upon the domains that it governs. And lastly, this is how the will of property owners governs the domain in which these owners hold, as a result of their rights, the ability to enjoy and dispose.

Within the hierarchy of sovereignties established by the constraining authority, each domain is subjected to the will of the sovereign that has been assigned to it, and to the will of the sovereign alone. The world, at each of its instants, is merely the aggregation of the independent forms freely chosen by each sovereign will for the domain it governs.

§6. The State, a Legal Entity Motivated by the Will of Collective and Social Ends

The sovereign governs his kingdom by imposing, either through his own acts or through the acts of his delegates, the ends he considers to be the most desirable.

If the sovereign is a natural person, his governmental activity is merely one of the expressions of the life that animates him. To live is to will and to act; it is therefore to choose and impose ends on the objects that are under one’s control. The government of an absolute monarch is therefore only one specific example of the process by which man imposes his will upon things. Explaining this particular process is merely discovering the influences that have brought about the monarch’s decisions and produced his actions.

Where the sovereign is a legal entity, however, it is not endowed, directly, with either will or power of action. Its establishment therefore has to include organs capable of uncovering, and translating into actions, the wills it expresses. The legislative and executive powers, respectively, perform these two functions in the societies that prefer to remain subjected to the sovereignty of the nation.

The parliament expresses national wills, and its functioning can be understood only if it is viewed as a veritable collective conscience where, as in the hearts of men, competing desires clash and wills are born, which the executive power then turns into acts.

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Budget debates illustrate the close similarity between the mechanisms through which collective and individual wills are developed.

Like a natural person, the parliament orders every expenditure whose result outweighs—in terms of its desirability—the undesirability of the sacrifice involved.

Whereas, however, for natural persons the desirability of the last need that is satisfied is equal to the undesirability of the last sacrifice that is consented to, in the state’s case, the desirability of the last need that is satisfied matches the undesirability of any additional taxation.

The greater the desirability of public intervention, the higher the levy on privately owned wealth or assets 31 will be. Thus, the extreme intensity of the needs to be met in wartime leads to extremely high levels of taxation. The more reluctant the collective conscience is to pay taxes, however, the less the needs that only state intervention can satisfy will be satisfied.

Thus, in addition to those rights that constitute public property, the volume of the rights at the disposal of the state for the fulfillment of the government’s mission during each period of time is determined as a function of the desirability to the sovereign (that is to say, parliament) of collective and social ends, and of the undesirability of taxes.

It is the content of these rights that the sovereign manages, taking into account the desirability that each of the possible uses presents. If the public conscience wants expansion and power, the state will fill the rights that it manages with services and capital capable of providing expansion and power. If the public conscience prefers prosperity and economic expansion, the state will build roads, ports, railroads, and canals, or order these to be built. If the public conscience favors alleviating unjustified sufferings or mitigating social inequalities, the state will allocate the contents of the rights its controls, either in kind or in money, to those people whose plight the state seeks to ameliorate.

Therefore everything takes place as if the sovereign imposed its own ends—regardless of whether these are collective, social, or moral—upon the domain it controls, in such a way that this domain has maximum desirability to the sov573ereign. The sovereign’s policy, at each instant of time, is simply a reflection of the hierarchy of its desires.

This hierarchy, regardless of whether it is conscious or unaware, is therefore the supreme principle of governmental action. As it is the choice of the sovereign that determines this hierarchy, the choice of the sovereign is the fundamental problem of the art of politics, as soon as this choice is no longer considered to be settled, at a supernatural level, by divine election.

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Chapter XXXIII: Two Kinds of Civilizations: Civilizations with True Rights or Free Prices; Civilizations with False Rights or Controlled Prices

§1. The Civilizing Power

The preceding chapter shows that a society does not spontaneously abandon the state of nature. A society can only be civilized by a powerful will, which exercises an effective constraining power over all of its members, and which is driven by the sense of a pressing civilizing mandate.

The civilizing will can be either divine or human.

In both cases, it will be effective and have a civilizing effect to the extent it succeeds in constraining and compelling people to behave differently from the way they would behave if they only took into consideration their acts’ direct consequences.

§2. The Strength of the Legal Instrument

To civilize is therefore to substitute the intended social state willed by the civilizing power for the social state that unrestricted individual wills would establish if these wills were simply left to themselves.

Although the civilizing power has to alter men’s behavior in order to carry out its mission, it can do so only by taking into account the mechanism by which men’s behavior is determined.

The matter of human societies is man, such as he is, physically, morally, man “always in the hand of his own counsel.” Whoever—whether it be man or God—wants to change men’s behavior will have to use human nature rather than try to change it. Thus, without altering the mechanism through which man 575 makes up his mind, the civilizing power will be driven to give him reasons for acting in the desired way, by attaching appropriate sanctions to the consequences of his acts. The main purpose of the legal system is to divide the area of all possible acts into areas where man can act freely and areas where his behavior is constrained.

Thus, the legal system is the basic instrument of any civilizing endeavor. It is through the legal system, and the legal system alone, that the governing authority defines and makes known the social state it intends to substitute for the one that individual wills would have brought about if left to themselves; it is through the legal system that the governing authority forces men, notwithstanding their opposite desires, to achieve this social state.

The legal structure, however, will be constantly battered by human passions. For the legal structure to endure against these passions, it is not enough for this structure be a set of more or less coherent abstract principles; it is necessary that the legal structure have the rugged toughness of the simplest realities.

It is this feature that usually escapes the attention of analysts.

In order fully to understand the role played by the legal system in the construction of human civilizations, one should always bear in mind that a right is an ability to act independently of any constraining intervention, and that it thereby defines a contrario the acts that are liable to punishment. Action outside the law is action that is subject to the police. And it is the reality of the sanctions that are applied by the police that provides the abstract edifice sketched by the jurist with all its realism.

§3. The Perversion of Legal Systems by Price Controls

For a right to truly provide, within the domain it defines, freedom of action to its holder, it is necessary that the holder be able to actually perform, within this domain, all the acts allowed by the natural order of things.

These may be acts of enjoyment or acts of disposal.

Freedom to enjoy a good is effectively ensured by excluding any unauthorized intervention, but the freedom to dispose will exist only if the owner has the certainty of finding a buyer when he wants to exchange the object he owns.

Under a free price system, this certainty exists. We have shown, in fact, that under such a system, the price establishes itself, at each instant, at the level that ensures market equilibrium—that is, equality between the volumes of the rights 576 that their holders wanted to empty of and fill with the article of wealth considered.

In this case, a right effectively confers upon its holder the ability to enjoy and dispose of the object owned, and is therefore a true right. Not only does the legal system exclude influences hostile to the privileges the right promises; the legal system renders these privileges effective with all their attributes.

As the constraining authority is all-powerful, however, it may prohibit transactions at a price below or above a given level. It can do so simply by attaching sanctions to these transactions, which will render these transactions undesirable to any person who would be tempted to engage in them.

If the fixed price is a minimum price—notably above the price that the market would have spontaneously established in the absence of any intervention—for example in figure 31 at the level p1, the volume of the rights to be emptied will exceed, at each market session, the volume of the rights to be filled, by the amount d1s1.

lf1981_figure_031.jpg

Fig. 31. [Q: Quantity; D: Demand; S: Supply; P: Price]

To the extent of this amount, certain rights holders will be unable to exchange the articles of wealth they own. The ability to dispose, which had been promised to them, will be purely illusory: their right is a false right.

Some may think that this is pure theory. We would like to convince them, however, that this finding is very much real and valid.

Indeed, for the right to not be a false right, it would be sufficient for the market price to be different from that which it would be if it were left to itself (in the absence of state intervention)—in other words, if the tendencies of the vari577ous individuals were different from what they actually are. But had these individual tendencies in fact been different, the market equilibrium price would not have tended to be a price that authorities wished to prevent; price setting would not have been necessary.

The market equilibrium price is an objective reality, even when it differs from the actual market price. Those who doubt it only need to recall the many occasions when minimum price systems were established.

In France, in the latter part of 1934, any wheat transactions below a minimum price were prohibited. No device had yet been contrived, however, to purchase the wheat that was supplied but not demanded. Wheat producers, who desperately offered their wheat for sale without finding any buyers, experienced themselves and should have taught the most resistant observers that the falsity of a right was not a figment of the economist’s imagination.

Similarly, workers who offer, in vain, their services under a minimum wage system will tragically experience that the right gifted to them by collective bargaining agreements, in setting the price of their services without taking any measure for this price to be an equilibrium price, is not a true right.

Setting maximum prices has opposite effects. Rent control, for instance, turns rights filled with money into a false right, whose holders seek housing without being able to obtain it.

Thus, price controls lead to a real perversion of legal systems. Price controls comply with the outward appearance of legal systems, but profoundly vitiate their substance, because they impair the effectiveness of the privilege to dispose, which is attached to an ownership right.

§4. Social Orders and Disorders

In a civilization with true rights, the aggregate volume of the rights that their holders wish to fill with any article of wealth always equals the aggregate value of the wealth supplied to fill them.

Thus, every article of wealth has a designated place to which it is automatically carried. “A place for everything and everything in its place,” this is the model for societies with true rights, just as it is for orderly households.

In such a society, any rivalry between sellers or buyers who fear that they may not be satisfied is ruled out: civilizations with true rights are social orders.

The wording of this conclusion, however, does not fully convey its significance. The social order, in a society consisting of a large number of individuals 578 and comprising a complex economy, is a state characterized by its extraordinary improbability.

For such an order to exist, it is necessary that, in each market sector, the aggregate volume of the rights that their holders intend to fill be equal to the aggregate volume—at the market price—of the rights that their holders wish to empty.

These aggregate volumes, however, are simply the sum of individual supplies and demands.

Yet each of these individual supplies and demands is the expression of a will, settled upon in light of market prices, by a patrimony holder conscious of his desires and mindful of providing these desires with maximum satisfaction. Such decisions, therefore, are arrived at in full freedom of conscience. They are therefore strictly independent of one another.

For order to exist, in a given sector of the market, even for an instant of time, it is necessary that all autonomous decisions, which come to converge in this market sector so as to form at this instant of time aggregate supply and aggregate demand, present relationships between themselves such that their totals have equal value.

Such an equality of values represents a unique state among an infinite number of equally possible states.

To measure its improbability, it is enough to consider any market, the wheat market for example, and to explore the conditions that have to be met, in a given country, for this market to be in equilibrium.

In France, for instance, the total area of land suitable for growing wheat is considerable. Each particular field, however, can be used to grow many other crops as well. Each land owner chooses, more or less consciously, which crops to plant, taking into account not only the price of wheat but also the prices of all other crops that could be planted in its stead. The yield of each plot, subject to weather conditions, depends on cropping systems, the quantity and quality of fertilizer used, the quality of seeds, etc. The portion of the harvest that will be supplied on the market depends on the needs of the farmer for his own nourishment and that of his family, and on the requirements of his farm.

Yet domestic supplies are not the only ones that may reach the market. If the domestic price exceeds the price of certain foreign countries plus transport, insurance, and customs charges, then imports will occur. If no quota system hinders imports, these imports will increase market supplies by a corresponding amount.

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Moreover, aggregate demand results from the amount of money each patrimony holder decides to devote, at the market price, to the purchase of wheat. Aggregate demand depends on the total amount of individual resources, on each demander’s tastes, which vary from person to person, and—for any one individual—from one period to another, on the prices of all the goods and articles of wealth he could buy if he reduced his demand for wheat, as well as on the quantities that may be exported to foreign markets.

Hence aggregate supply of and aggregate demand for wheat in France are the outcome of the behavior of countless individuals, acting in a totally unrelated manner, in the full autonomy of their conscious awareness. Aggregate supply and demand are determined not only by market participants but also by those who refrain from participating in the market—in other words, in actual fact, by all patrimony holders who, everywhere in the world, produce or could produce, consume or could consume, wheat.

Under these circumstances, the approximate equality between the aggregate supply of and the aggregate demand for wheat, during a given market session, can only be the result of a combination of countless circumstances, of which we cannot imagine that the result is obtained by chance.

Now, for equilibrium to be effected not only during one market session but over an extended period of time, it is not sufficient that such a combination exists, however unlikely it may be, under given circumstances; it is also necessary that its characteristic factors be constantly adapted to changing circumstances, such as state-of-the-art technology, consumer tastes, and changes in modes of transportation.

The wheat market, however, is only one specific market among all the markets where goods sought by men are exchanged. In order that all these countless markets permanently be near equilibrium, the conditions required for equilibrium—already so highly improbable for each individual market—have to be met simultaneously.

The search for such equilibrium raises a problem of inconceivable complexity, and it is difficult to imagine how improbable the solution is that can ensure such equilibrium. Just to get some idea, it is not possible to do better than invoke the metaphor used by Mr. Émile Borel, in his book Le Hasard [Random chance],1 to convey how improbable it is that a brick, when laid on a surface, should rise in the air that surrounds it. Such an event could only result from 580 the formation of a stream of molecules of parallel velocities, coming to strike the side of the brick that faces the ground and lifting the brick upward. The formation of such a stream out of molecular chaos is at least as improbable, says Mr. Borel, as the recreation of all the books in the French National Library by monkeys let loose in a typewriter shop and typing on the keys at random.

If, nonetheless, men, let loose in full freedom in a society with true rights, achieve, each day, the miracle of typewriting monkeys, it is because the independence of their actions is merely an outward appearance. These acts are, in fact, coordinated by an all-powerful, but invisible, influence: the price mechanism.

If the volume of the rights to be filled in a market sector exceeds the volume of the rights to be emptied in that market sector, then demanders who face the risk of not being served will seek to obtain the preference of suppliers. To this end, if the price is not controlled, demanders will propose a price higher than the going price: the market price will rise. As this movement will continue as long as the cause that brought it about has not disappeared, this movement will inevitably bring the value of supplies up to the level of demand; in other words, this movement will inevitably ensure equality between the volume of the rights that their holders wish to fill and the volume of those rights their holders wish to empty in the market sector considered.

Now, such an equality ensures that the articles of wealth supplied are exactly accommodated within the rights in which buyers intend to enclose these articles of wealth, and that the quantity of money supplied is exactly accommodated within the rights that sellers wish to fill with money. In this way, this equality creates and maintains the ordered state in which each article of wealth finds the place desired by those who possess the ability to move it.

Articles of wealth will therefore be shifted to where they are wanted, at the time and in the quantity desired; professions, even the most difficult ones, even the most off-putting ones, will be filled to the precise extent necessary to meet the demand of consumers; production will provide consumer goods and capital equipment in proportion to the needs that must be met; foreign exchange markets will equilibrate, taking into account the countless demand and supply flows that converge there. In short, at each instant of time, in each of the countless sectors into which the market can be divided, supply and demand will have and will maintain equal value, regardless of the unpredictable factors that converge to form them.

Under such circumstances, any demand expressed in the market will be satisfied. No lines of shoppers outside the door of a store, no accumulation of 581 unsalable inventory, will generate the disorders that always result when demands and supplies are not and cannot be satisfied.

The price mechanism, the regulating force of civilizations with true rights, will thus have made a collective order emerge out of the chaos of individual wills, regardless of whether these wills are free or constrained. In this collective order, each individual has his mission to fulfill, which is essential to aggregate equilibrium. The price mechanism will have transformed an agglomeration of independent patrimonial cells into an “organism,” endowed with a collective life, itself directed toward the ends imposed by the wills governing individual patrimonies.

In order for such an organism to endure, it is necessary that the patrimonial cycles mesh with one another, and that their respective activities be coordinated, in type and in quantity, in space and time, in view of the harmony of the whole.

The price mechanism establishes this social order, which is more improbable than the miracle of the typewriting monkeys, infallibly, but without ever becoming visible, through the sole play of individual preferences. In allowing each individual to follow his own inclinations and desires and seek, independently of all other individuals, maximum satisfaction, the price mechanism leads the individual to play his part in the immense orchestra that will produce the harmony of a balanced social life. The price mechanism thus turns the isolated individual, without his being aware of it, into the member of an organized community and into the unaware but indispensable builder of the permanence of the group to which he belongs.

The disturbances that characterize societies with false rights confirm the preceding views a contrario. In the market of any upvalued article of wealth, the volume of demand, at each market session, is less than the value of supplies. As a result, the articles of wealth supplied cannot all be accommodated within the rights intended to enclose them. A portion of these articles of wealth will remain unsalable, notwithstanding their owners’ wishes, and as a result will not find the place sought for them by the persons who nevertheless hold, legally, the ability to dispose of these articles of wealth.

Because the owners, notwithstanding the economic impossibility, will continue trying to exercise their legal privilege, some competition will unavoidably arise among sellers who fear they may not be satisfied. Some will try to gain preference by making their supplies available before their competitors, others by granting hidden advantages. Their attempts will not eliminate dis582equilibrium, however: they will simply shift its impact, without providing a place for the articles of wealth that cannot possibly be accommodated. The accumulation of unsold inventory stocks, the existence of permanent unemployment, and demoralization in the markets will be the inevitable consequence of the establishment of minimum prices, however: civilizations with false rights are social disorders.

§5. Regardless of Whether It Is Based on True or False Rights, Any Civilization Can Be Liberal or Authoritarian

For a society to be civilized, in the first instance it is necessary that the society have been taken out of the state of nature through the imposition of social peace. We have shown that such an outcome can be obtained only through the compartmentalization of individual sovereignties. All civilized societies will therefore rest on the same base: the appropriation of articles of wealth.

Social peace, however, is only one stage in the civilizing process. This process always implies a modification, the extent of which varies with the degree of government, of the state that holders of property rights would freely choose to impose upon their respective domains. It is this modification that constitutes the government of human societies. It can be obtained by the liberal method or by the authoritarian method, but both methods are equally applicable under a true rights system and a false rights system.

Regardless of whether a right is true or false, a right always defines an area of individual sovereignty. This area will always be effective if the right is true, but it cannot be effective if the right is false. In both cases, however, the sovereignty, which is provided with the attributes that give it the veracity or the falsity of the right that defines it, can be transferred, by the fiscal method, or—limited in its consistency—by the authoritarian method.

We will therefore need to examine for both types of civilizations—those with true rights and those with false rights—the two methods of government: liberal and authoritarian.

This will be the subject of the next two chapters.

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Chapter XXXIV: Civilizations with True Rights, or Social Orders

In this chapter, we shall study the particular group of civilizations comprising systems where the constraining power refrains from any intervention tending to peg prices or limit their margin of variation, whether directly or indirectly. In these civilizations, all rights provide the holder with the full freedom of enjoyment and disposal that they imply. The legal system is fully effective and therefore brings about a civilization with true rights.

Even though the compartmentalization of individual sovereignties guaranteed by the legal system generates social peace, it does not, however, resolve the problem of government. Quite the contrary, this compartmentalization of sovereignties subjects all articles of wealth to the sole will of their respective owners.

A society will be governed only when collective, social, or moral ends are substituted for some of the ends that property rights holders would have imposed upon their domains had they been left to act freely. This substitution can be brought about by the transfer of sovereignty, as with the fiscal method, or by a transfer of sovereign wills, as with the authoritarian method.

In fact, in all real societies, the two methods are used concurrently.

For the sake of simplicity, however, we shall investigate the characteristics specific to the two methods of government within the (purely theoretical) framework of systems that use only one method or the other, and that are therefore either purely liberal or purely authoritarian systems.

We shall attempt to provide only a general view of these extremes, because, given the complexity of reality, each of these systems raises complex problems whose study would require a detailed analysis, which only monographic studies could attempt to provide.

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I. The Liberal Order

§1. The Principle of the Social Order

The liberal order is a social order characterized by the owner’s complete freedom to act as he pleases within the domain owned.

Given that a property right of ownership confers upon its holder the ability “to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations,” any system in which articles of wealth are appropriated will be a liberal one, when laws and regulations do not prohibit any of its possibly uses. The owner can then choose from among the entire field of possible human action. This choice will be a free one because, free of any constraining intervention, it will be limited only by the natural order of things.

A liberal system is therefore based on a particular delimitation of the constraining action that generates the social order. This constraining action prohibits any individual from exercising influence over articles of wealth he does not own, but refrains from affecting his freedom of action with regard to the articles of wealth he owns.

Total freedom of the owner within his own domain, total abstention of the owner outside his domain, such is the charter of the liberal system.

Under such a system, any owner will shape the content of his rights as he pleases.

In particular, each producer will make use of his capital, including his own body, in the way that will provide him with maximum desirability, in light of market prices. He will therefore adjust, at each instant, his supplies and demands to existing prices. In doing this, however, as we have explained at length in the preceding chapters, he will contribute to the formation of aggregate supply and demand in each market sector, and hence to the formation of the price that ensures equilibrium in each sector.

Yet market prices, in turn, determine the allocation of production resources among various possible uses, and thereby the structure of the whole community.

Thus, in the final analysis, the liberal world is genuinely shaped by the will of owners, each of whom gives to his patrimony—in light of his tastes and taking into account all possibilities—the one state that presents maximum desirability for him.

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Note here that the system of command, which any productive process implies, is in no way incompatible with the liberal order. A worker does not obey an entrepreneur’s orders by coercion, but because, of his own free will, he prefers his salary over the direct consumption of the labor services that his body can provide. Similarly, a voluntarily enlisted soldier does not obey his superiors on the basis of coercion, but because the benefits resulting from his contract outweigh, in terms of desirability—in his eyes—the undesirability of the resulting subjection.

Wage labor is simply one specific aspect of the price mechanism; the wage system ensures the equilibrium of the labor market, given the free or constrained wills of all its participants. As a result, it is in no way exclusive of interventions that tend to alter individual remunerations. In order that these interventions not generate false rights, however, these interventions must be applied—as will be specified later—to individual wills, which are the causes of prices, and not directly on prices themselves.

§2. Government in a Liberal System

The social structure resulting from the system just described would be purely selfish in its nature, since it would solely reflect, for each patrimonial domain, the desires of the owner.

A society can only endure, however, if certain collective, social, or moral needs are satisfied.

Indeed, the satisfaction of these needs is not immaterial to individuals. The great majority regard them as desirable; but the acts of disposal that the satisfaction of these collective needs entails are not more desirable to individuals than those acts of disposal that they can perform themselves.

Human nature is such, in fact, that each individual, left to his own devices, is concerned first and foremost with his own needs and those of his family. To an individual, the use of resources to satisfy these needs appears essential in his eyes.

Collective, social, or moral needs will therefore be satisfied only if the resources necessary to satisfy these needs have been removed from the exclusive control of their owners in order to be subjected to the governmental will.

In a liberal society, however, the owner’s will faces no constraint within the domain owned. The government can therefore not affect the use of the contents of certain rights unless it itself becomes the owner.

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The essential characteristic of the liberal system is that government action is limited to those articles of wealth over which the government exercises rights of ownership. The government has no more privileges than a mere owner as far as these articles of wealth are concerned, but it does enjoy all of these privileges.

Thus, the government, equipped with its rights, will supply and demand on the market. In this way, it will contribute, within the limits of the aforementioned rights, to the formation of prices and the determination of production cycles. The government will thus be one of the determinants of the social structure, but in the same way as any rights holder participating in the market, and without any privilege resulting from the public nature of its participation.

§3. The Amount of Fiscal Levies, the Sole Limit of Liberal Intervention

Because the government, under a liberal system, can only subject to its will the articles of wealth over which it exercises property rights, the extent of its intervention will, in any case, be limited to the volume of this wealth.

The wealth over which a government exercises property rights can, however, only come from three sources: public property, borrowing, or taxation.

As a matter of fact, however, the ability to dispose of public property is strictly limited owing to the very special nature of the capital assets that make up public property, with the result that these assets are generally not very desirable for uses other than those in which the state engages. Their capital value, in the market, will nearly always be very weak. This is why the state abstains, save in exceptional circumstances, from alienating public property. In France, this de facto rule is even confirmed by a legal prohibition.

The state therefore simply limits itself to using or selling the services that its own capital assets are capable of providing. This is why, always de facto and often de jure, the ability of intervention that the ownership of public property confers upon the state is limited, during each period of time, to the income yielded by public property.

When, during a certain period of time, the value of the services produced by public property is less than the value of the services that government action uses up, the government will not be able to operate unless it can secure additional resources. Such additional resources, however, can be obtained only through borrowing or taxation.

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Borrowing, however—except in the case of a perpetual loan—only provides resources to the borrower to the extent that the borrower commits to handing over control of an equal amount of resources at a later stage. Borrowing is therefore a means of accelerating the consumption of resources it covers, but—if we consider the full term of the loan—provides the borrower with no additional consumption ability.

In contrast, taxation gives the government the ability to enjoy and dispose of the resources it levies on individual patrimonies. Regardless of the contents of the rights that taxation transfers to the state, these rights can be filled with the articles of wealth necessary for the accomplishment of governmental tasks.

Under a liberal system, the maximum possible extent of state intervention is therefore determined by the amount of taxation plus income from public property. Within these limits, the government’s will is all-powerful; beyond these limits, it is utterly powerless.

A government that intervenes little in economic life is often referred to as liberal; 1 in other words, a government that only reduces the sovereignty of property rights holders by small amounts is often referred to as a liberal government.

The preceding analysis reveals the inanity of this notion. Liberalism is not a degree of government but a method of government.

The scope of governmental intervention under a liberal system, at each instant of time, solely depends on the volume of the rights upon which the state imposes its own ends. These include, other than the income from public property and the proceeds of borrowing, the proceeds of taxation.

Liberal intervention is therefore limited only by the total amount of fiscal levies.

A liberal government can therefore be as social as the governing authorities want it to be. No undertaking, no amount of generosity, however considerable, is off-limits to a liberal government, on the sole condition that the necessary fiscal levies be effected so as to provide the resources necessary to finance the expenditures in question.

The limits of liberal intervention are to be found solely in the value of these levies, not in some transcendent prohibition.

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§4. The Shortcomings of Liberal Government

We have already asserted 2 that although in theory the liberal and the authoritarian methods of government are equivalent, the former implies, with regard to the government of mores, [a state of] slavery for the governed person. This assertion must be elaborated upon further, however, in view of its practical implications.

The characteristic feature of the liberal system is the freedom of the owner in relation to the object owned—in other words, the ability of the owner alone to choose, in view of the direct consequences and therefore without constraining sanctions, the actions that he performs within the domain that he owns.

In such a system, government—in the sense of imposing extraindividual ends upon certain objects—is possible, but it implies attributing to governmental authority a property right with regard to the governed object.

When the object governed is an inanimate object, there are no difficulties: the governing authority is simply substituted for the property owner when it comes to the right to use and dispose, which are implied in any property right of ownership.

When, however, it is mores that the governing authority intends to determine, the problem, without being different, is more complex. The object to be governed is no longer inanimate: it is the body of a living being. This body is, however, directly commanded by the will of the person whom it supports. It can only be subjected to a different will by this person. The transfer of property can therefore no longer be brought about by simply substituting one will for another, but only by the establishment—for the person whose mores one wishes to govern—of a veritable state of slavery.

Thus, a government that wanted to use the liberal method to outlaw lying would have to abolish freedom of speech—that is, to choose the words a person utters in order to impose the statement the government wants. Similarly, in order to limit normal working hours to eight hours by using the liberal method, the government would have to remove workers’ control over their own bodies and force them to work only in ways directed by governmental authority.

This kind of subjection is theoretically possible. It is the kind Ignatius of Loyola sought to establish as a rule for his religious order. “In a word, I ought 589 not to be my own, but His who created me, and his too who holds the place of God, yielding myself to be molded in his hands like so much wax; and whether as to writing or receiving letters, conversing with persons, or keeping silence, being with this person or that, and the like, I should place all my devotion and promptitude in doing whatever is required of me. I ought to be like a corpse, which has neither will nor understanding.”3

Similarly, any person following a “director” can be regarded as having, to a certain extent, transferred ownership of his own body to the will that directs it.

Outside of these highly specific “directive” situations, however, governing mores through the liberal method implies slavery.

Any government that rejects slavery but that seeks, nevertheless, to impose ethical rules upon men and regulate the use of the faculties that nature has granted them—that is, men’s natural rights, such as the right to speak, the right to write, to believe or think, the right to work or rest—cannot be liberal, but will have to resort to the authoritarian method.

Thus, any theocratic government that seeks to govern mores, or any civil government that regulates working conditions, is necessarily authoritarian.

The liberal method of government is practical and effective only for the imposition of collective or social ends, but not for the imposition of moral ends. In fact, the government of mores is necessarily an authoritarian government.

There is one further vantage point from which the method of liberal government appears less flexible and less suitable to some of its ends than the authoritarian method. Government intervention, in order to modify the use an owner makes of his sovereignty, may prohibit certain possible acts or force him to perform a given act. The government may for instance want to forbid the owner of an agricultural field to grow wheat, or force him to grow rapeseed. In the first case, one is confronted with a negative governmental action, in the second with a positive governmental action.

In either case, the liberal method requires transfer of the field’s ownership to the government. If the government intends only to prohibit wheat cultivation, and not grow crops on its own lands, it will have to sell the property right pertaining to the field it transfers to itself, but without the right to grow wheat. On the other hand, by using the authoritarian method, all the government would have to do—without dispossessing the owner—is to make growing wheat undesirable by attaching a constraining sanction to it.

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The liberal method would therefore be substantially more cumbersome to apply than the authoritarian method.

Thus the liberal method is expedient only for positive acts of governmental action, but not for acts only seeking to prohibit owners from certain uses of the object owned among the various possible uses.

§5. The Forms and Techniques of Liberal Constraint

Liberal constraint will have a dual purpose: to impose social peace through the compartmentalization of individual sovereignties, and to ensure that the rights necessary for carrying out government wishes are transferred to the state. Liberal constraint will therefore be pacifying and fiscal, but nothing more.

In its pacifying form, liberal constraint will have to render undesirable any act of enjoyment or disposal performed by any person other than the legitimate owner, with the exception of those acts authorized by the legitimate owner. To fulfill this part of its task, the constraining authority will have to subject its interventions to the will of property rights holders; the constraining authority will truly be in their service.

In its fiscal form, liberal constraint will have to render undesirable, to the legitimate owner, any act of enjoyment and use of the wealth that the government has decided to transfer to itself. In the area of fiscal constraint, the constraining authority will be in the government’s service.

In both areas, however, the task of the constraining power will be accomplished only if the constraining power succeeds in effectively rendering undesirable any breach of an ownership right or fiscal commandment. Let us pause for a moment to consider the degree of constraint, whether it be divine or human, that is necessary to impose upon men such as they are—full of covetousness, eager to increase their holdings, and who are, in any case, unwilling to allow themselves to be constrained—respect for other people’s property and the payment of taxes, which are levied on them.

Severe and strictly applied sanctions, and effectiveness in investigating violations of property rights and fiscal obligations: these are the conditions without which a liberal order could not exist.

This shows how absurd the notion is that a liberal society is a system of laxity, disorder, and confusion. Although liberalism indeed limits the intervention of the constraining power to the safeguarding of property rights, possibly modified through fiscal transfers, for this power liberalism involves the use of ap591propriate sanctions so as to give an absolute undesirability to the acts these sanctions seek to prohibit.

It is true also that limiting the tasks of the constraining authority is a condition favorable to their accomplishment. Under a liberal system, the mission of the constraining power will always be clearly defined. Offenses will be all the more rare as those tempted to engage in these acts are convinced that they will be punished without fail. Surveillance by property rights holders or revenue agents personally responsible for tax collection—who are always vigilant—will easily unleash constraining intervention whenever an offense is committed.

Thus, under a liberal system, the constraining mission of authorities, even in communities that are not suffused with profound and widespread religious faith or with a universally held moral sense, is humanly possible: a few courts of law, aided by a few law enforcement officials, will suffice to fulfill this mission.

§6. Characteristics That Are Specific to the Liberal Order

a) The Liberal Order Requires an Authoritarian Ethos

We have already shown 4 that under a system where slavery is excluded, the liberal method does not allow for the governance of mores.

In letting men reach their decisions, within the domain owned, by taking into account only the consequences of their actions, the liberal method effectively refrains from affecting the use that a free man makes of his body and of the faculties that nature has attached to his body.

The critics of the liberal system are therefore justified in reproaching it for its moral indifference.

Liberalism will escape the state of nature and the “law of the jungle” only if it is supplemented by the authoritarian constraints that are necessary to impose a moral code upon men. Rather than fending off such authoritarian constraints, however, liberalism calls for them, as a necessary complement to its constitution.5

The liberal order requires the support of a moral code, whether divine or human. In the absence of a moral code, it would still be a social order, but an uncivilized one.

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b) The Liberal Order Is, at Each Instant, the Order That Enables Property Rights Holders to Derive Maximum Desirability from Their Respective Domains

The liberal order is, at each instant of time, strictly determined because it can be inferred from the immediately preceding state, by the sole knowledge of the wills of property rights holders and the areas in which these wills are respectively applied. The trajectory of a liberal society, much like the trajectory of a mass in classical mechanics, is determined by the forces operating on it.

At each of the points on this trajectory, the liberal order is the one that enables owners to derive maximum desirability from their respective domains in light of their current tastes.

Nevertheless, although this order is one of countless possibilities, these possibilities simply result from the nature of things, and without any human intervention. No compelling rewards or constraining sanctions, which are intended to alter intrinsic desirability, are attached to the states from among which the owner chooses tomorrow’s reality. The owner chooses, in light of his tastes, from among all the solutions provided by nature. A characteristic feature of the liberal system is to not close off any of the paths opened by the existing state of technology.

Although the structure of a liberal society is dictated by individual wills, it is not, however, the product of all the wills that constitute the community considered. Among these wills, the only causal influences will be those wills that possess property rights, each within the domain that his rights define.

Now, the volume of property rights, although strictly determined at each instant of time, is only to a weak extent determined by the will of property holders; it is, indeed, the outcome of a historical evolution, which depends on this will only for the last part of its trajectory.

This feature of the liberal order has been highlighted by historical materialism and constitutes its contribution to truth, among the many doctrines of the day: the social structure resulting from a liberal system is, at each instant of time, the culmination of a process of evolution of which all past moments are necessary in order to account for the present moment in time. Had any one of the past states been different—in particular, as a result of government interventions that contributed to shaping the past—then the present state would be very much different from what it is now.

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c) The Liberal System Is Not a System of Selfishness but of Specialization of the Directing Responsibilities

That which characterizes the liberal order is the purely individual nature of the ends that govern its evolution. Each patrimony holder directs his wealth into the pathways that will provide him, and him alone, with maximum desirability.

Those who focus on this characteristic feature see in it familial selfishness, and the enshrinement of the rule “Every man for himself.” In their view, the liberal system is a petit bourgeois system; 6 only selfish, personal ends are taken into account in creating a world from which any greatness and any generosity are ruthlessly excluded.

Such an analysis, which proceeds from a superficial view of the liberal system, is profoundly unjust. Certainly, under a liberal system, individual wills alone—in the harshness of their natural selfishness—determine the evolution of their patrimonies, but only after the government has received, by means of fiscal transfers, the rights that are necessary to the accomplishment of collective and social tasks.

Assuredly, the property rights holder may think only of the interests that he views as fundamentally important in light of his tastes, his selfishness, and even the baseness of his human nature. He knows, however, that a legal entity has been created, with the responsibility and the means necessary to carry out all the noble tasks that the collective conscience demands.

He may ignore such tasks all the more justifiably as they are carried out, with no more concern on his part other than to contribute his share of the necessary sacrifices.

Thus, the liberal system is not, as is too often said, a petit bourgeois systemor a system of familial selfishness, but only a system of specialization of responsibilities: upon the individual is incumbent the responsibility for immediate interests, those of his own person and those of the people for whom he feels direct responsibility; upon the state, the legal entity tasked with collective and social ends, is incumbent the responsibility for those interests it is tasked with serving and that it knows directly, by reason of its very constitution.

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d) A Liberal Government Is Limited Neither in Its Collective Undertakings Nor in Its Social Programs, but It Can Only Give What It Receives

Although the liberal order is entirely determined by the wills of property rights holders, it can nonetheless be governed, on the condition that the government intervene solely as an owner of property and within the limits of its rights. The scope of government activities will therefore be limited, at each instant, only by the volume of rights whose lawful holder is the government.

Within the limits of these rights, a liberal government may, at the sole discretion of its ruling authorities, wage war or construct buildings, provide assistance or insurance, or even squander public funds. A liberal government enjoys the ability to use its rights freely, like any property holder within the domain he owns.

In particular, and contrary to what too many people believe and to what can sometimes be observed, a liberal government can be as generous as government authorities want it to be. Its social programs are in no way limited by its liberal nature, but only by the resources at its disposal, hence by the resources it chooses to obtain via taxation. It is an error and a fallacy to deny that a liberal government can achieve as much, socially, as other types of government. Within the limits of its resources, a liberal government can achieve what it wants, but its wishes can prevail only within these limits.

Such a government can, in particular, change individual remunerations at its discretion. As it refrains from any constraining actions other than those that delimit property rights and ensure tax collection, however, it will not do this by setting wage controls. A liberal government wishing to increase the pay rate in a productive activity will have to grant an additional remuneration, hence a subsidy, to the worker whose plight it wishes to ameliorate. In this way, a government can achieve as much as its resources allow. It is therefore false to claim that a liberal government cannot favor certain categories of producers.

Similarly, a liberal government can alter, at its discretion, the use an entrepreneur makes of his business, but only by rendering desirable to the entrepreneur those uses the government seeks to make into a reality, and by rendering undesirable those uses the government seeks to prohibit. The entrepreneur’s choices, however, are guided by the quest for maximum return.7 In order to 595 change the use that is made of the business venture in question, a liberal government—because it refrains from setting prices—will have to increase the productivity of those activities it seeks to promote and decrease the productivity of those activities it seeks to counter. A liberal government can do this at its discretion by subsidizing the former and penalizing the latter through the use of fines. Here again, it is wrong to claim that a liberal government is unable to alter production.

Thus, a liberal government can shape economic matter as it wishes. It will have full control over individual remunerations and the structure of production cycles. It will be able to influence them, however, only by levying on some the additional resources that it allocates to others. Its ability to govern, in this field just as in others, will be limited by the extent of its fiscal capabilities.

e) Liberal Government Is Conscious Government

Thus, a liberal government can govern, but only if it secures through taxation the resources required for governmental action that are not provided by public property or borrowing.

For each government intervention, the question will then arise, in full light of day, as to whether the contemplated expenditure is opportune. The usefulness of this expenditure will have to be explicitly decided upon; it consists in knowing whether, in the eyes of the government, the desirability of the resulting outcome outweighs the undesirability of the additional taxes required.

Thus a liberal state is not a state of limited possibilities. It can govern just as easily and as extensively as any other political system. A liberal state is one whose government can only govern explicitly and consciously, however. Each government act involves an option that has to be weighed. The price of government intervention cannot be concealed, and only interventions whose desirability, in the eyes of the sovereign, outweighs the undesirability of the sacrifices taxpayers must make are undertaken.

In the past, so-called liberal systems have often appeared to be devoid of a social spirit, not because of some inherent defect but because of the sincerity liberal systems impose upon government authorities. Those authorities that had achieved little in the social realm were those that had intended to achieve little in this area. And the reason they wanted little is that their sovereign institutions, hence the human beings they actually represented, determined that the undesirability of the additional sacrifices involved outweighed the desirability of any increase in social expenditure.

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The social achievements of a liberal government are not the result of its specific nature, but rather of the desires of the sovereign that runs it.

f) In a Liberal Equilibrium, Desire Subsists but All Wills Are Quenched by Satiety

Under a liberal system, any person is free to act as he pleases within the domain that his rights assign to him. A person will therefore cease acting only when no additional act appears desirable to him, taking into consideration all the consequences the act would entail. The equilibrium that is established at each instant of time is therefore such that none of the persons who could actually shift the equilibrium have any desire to change it.

It is worth noting, in order to specify the nature of liberal equilibrium, that the maximum satisfaction of the property rights holders is not the one that some government esthetes or cabinet moralizers choose for them, but rather the one that they themselves consider to be the maximum satisfaction in their innermost consciousness, taking into consideration all the possibilities provided by nature.

Certainly, liberal equilibrium does not preclude desire. The desire that liberal equilibrium allows to subsist, however, is a platonic desire, which does not tend to be translated into an act under the circumstances in which such an act could be performed. When equilibrium is reached, although certain objects remain desirable, none of the acts necessary to obtain these objects is desirable any longer. Therefore, any solicitation to motion has vanished.

The essential feature of the liberal order is to be wanted, from among all possibilities, by the persons who are in a position to alter it. Being wanted by them, the liberal order does not have to be imposed upon them. The establishment of the liberal order therefore does not entail constraints other than those that delimit individual sovereignties and enforce payment of taxes. Within these constraints, the liberal equilibrium is both spontaneous and stable, since no will tends to displace it.

II. Authoritarian (or Socialist) Orders

§1. The Attack against Liberalism

The liberal system allows each individual to retain complete control over his own goods, except for the contributions required by the government; he retains complete control over his own body as well, except for the restrictions imposed by God, or by his own conscience.

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Within this private domain, each owner imposes his own ends, those he considers most desirable given his tastes, taking into consideration their only consequences to him.

Under such a system, only the domain in which the government exercises its property right—either as an element of public property or as the product of borrowing or taxation—will be directed toward extraindividual, collective, social, or moral ends.

The state of the world, at each instant of time, will be the aggregation of all the partial states that each owner, including the government, has imposed upon the domain he controls.

Although, under such a system, the state of each domain is the one that holds maximum desirability in the eyes of its owner, there is no reason why this should also be so in the eyes of the other members of the community.

To the contrary, nearly all other members of the community feel that the world would be better if their fellow men used the goods they own toward different ends. Some will think that the holders of property rights of ownership have misjudged their own true interests, others that the general interest requires the sacrifice of private interests. In either case, they will reject the liberal order as both selfish and pernicious, and will instead favor a policy that is able to substitute the order they desire for the liberal order.

The liberal order will be opposed by all those who feel that man is not the best judge of the use he makes of his natural abilities in the areas that his religion and morals leave to his freedom of action, and by all those who do not wish him to be able to think, to believe, to speak, or to write as he likes; the liberal order will be opposed by all those who feel that the worker should not be sole master of the nature and duration of his labor, the entrepreneur the sole master of his business enterprise, the producer the sole master of his products, and the consumer the sole master of the kind of wealth he consumes.

The liberal order will be opposed by all those—be they employers or workers—who are unhappy with market prices, which determine individual rewards and the distribution of the fruits of production.

The liberal order will be opposed by all those who are indignant at the social structure stemming from the system wherein men can freely use the articles of wealth to which they hold right of ownership.

Lastly, the liberal order will be opposed by all governments that would like to govern more extensively but which find themselves limited—in their governing zeal and in their desire to wage war, to construct buildings, to provide public assistance and insurance—by the limitation of their resources; and by all 598 governments that seek election to achieve great tasks but are thwarted in their creative enthusiasm by the impossibility of levying more taxes on the community they wish to enrich.

From all political quarters, forces will rise against the order that holders of property rights of ownership want. These forces will be moral or mystical, generous or selfish, conservative or revolutionary. Wherever they succeed in making themselves heard, they will demand interventions to alter the social state that offends them, and will thereby impair the sovereignties of owners, who alone shoulder responsibility for this state.

It is true that these owners could raise their voice. Although aware of the benefits to be derived by them from seizing control of their neighbor’s sovereignty, they are not, however, aware of the losses that would result from an infringement on their own sovereignty.

Furthermore, far from being aware of the benefits they derive from their sovereignty, in the great majority of cases they are barely aware of its existence. Only the so-called privileged classes demand that their sovereignty be safeguarded, but this is only because their sovereignty, rising substantially above average sovereignties, is bound to appear more beneficial to them than a share of adverse sovereignties.

Thus, attacked from all sides, barely defended, the liberal order appears doomed under all systems where the greatest number constitutes the law.

§2. Authoritarian (or Socialist) Solutions

The liberal method of government would provide, it is true, the means of removing articles of wealth whose use is criticized on the basis of the ends that its owners impose on it. Control of articles of wealth has, however, been left to their respective owners precisely because the liberal mode of government did not appear applicable, either because it would have involved, for persons, a state of slavery judged unacceptable, or because it would have required additional taxation whose undesirability in the eyes of the governing authority outweighed the desirability of the additional degree of government that this additional taxation would have made possible.

In either case, reformers—as they cannot directly govern the articles of wealth that remain as individuals’ property—have only one solution: ensure that the owners themselves want, for the goods that have been left in their control, to use them in the ways in which the reforming will wants to see them used.

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In order to achieve this, reformers have to be in a position to exert a constraining influence on individual wills. We have already shown that, in order to do this, they need only inextricably attach sufficient sanctions to the acts they want to prohibit, in order to render these acts undesirable to those who would be tempted to engage in them.

Thus, reformers will be able to restrict, as they please, the freedom of action that each property owner derives from his own rights and hence reduce the property owner’s range of possible acts; in rendering undesirable all acts other than those they wish to see performed, reformers can substitute themselves for the owner in the choice of ends that he will impose on the domain of which the owner, although indeed constrained, remains the sovereign master.

As soon as a reformer has been able to seize a constraining power, he will be at liberty to determine himself the evolution of goods owned by those whom he is able to constrain. With regard to these goods, he will truly become, by the authoritarian method, a governing power.

We will now investigate the application of this method in the increasingly numerous fields where it substitutes, in whole or in part, government wills for the wills of men who only in appearance keep the ability of enjoyment and disposal that is attached to the property rights of which they remain the holders.

In the field of mores, the divine commandments, like the dictates of conscience, have always restricted the area of free control that free men derive from the possession of their own bodies.

The grip of divine commandments, such as those that constitute the Decalogue, is however strictly limited. To the believer, they render lying, for example, undesirable, but they allow him to speak as he wishes in the vast area of truth.

Man, whether he is governed by his religion or by his conscience, remains free to behave as he wishes within the area that has not been closed off to him by the commandments he obeys.

This freedom has been attacked by many governments that have been antagonized or hindered by freely spoken or written criticism.

In order to restrict this freedom, they only had to use the very method by which, in a similar area, religious or moral constraint was exercised: attach constraining sanctions to the acts they sought to prohibit, thereby rendering them undesirable to those who were tempted to perform them.

Authoritarian governments have always attempted to extend the scope of this method, often seeking to govern not only the expression of thought but thought itself, banning all opinions, all creeds, or even strictly scientific assertions that 600 appeared—in their eyes—to be inaccurate or dangerous, forcing people to love or hate those whom the government wanted to be loved or hated; in short, substituting the government’s will for the free will of men in those areas that religion and ethics had not regulated.

From our strictly economic vantage point, men in exchange economies adjust their behavior to market prices. We have shown at great length that their decisions lead to a state that enables them to draw from their capital assets—including their own bodies, the source of the labor services they provide—maximum efficient performance and return, but which at the same time provides third-party buyers with the certainty of obtaining, at the lowest possible price, the articles of wealth they seek. This state is therefore not only a selfish state but the one that the community as a whole considers to be the most desirable one, given the tastes to be satisfied and the means available for satisfying them. This desired state, however, is not the one that Colbert 8 considered to be the best, given the responsibilities he felt were incumbent upon him. Colbert felt that it was his duty to change certain features.

If it was a light and delicate material that the price mechanism caused to be produced, because it was considered to be the most desirable to acquire and the least undesirable to produce, no matter: if he, minister and secretary of state, held that a closely woven and solid type of cloth “was better”—whether it be for buyers, for sellers, or for the whole community—he would enforce production of this kind of fabric.

Similarly, if the manufacturing process chosen by producers, seeking maximum profit, did not appear to be the most beneficial in his eyes, he would substitute the one he considered to be the best on the basis of his personal views.

To do this, it would not be necessary for him to acquire ownership of factories, or grant them subsidies; he only needed to constrain the wills of manufacturers. Constraining sanctions or compelling rewards would alter, for manufacturers, the desirability pertaining to the various possible alternatives and lead them to want those that the minister considered to be the most desirable.

In economics, Colbertism is a common and widespread practice. It allows the constraining authority to substitute uses of its choice for the uses that income 601 holders would like to make of their sovereign power. If the constraining authority maintains that a desired expenditure is not very desirable, or that a necessity is better than a luxury, that a particular purchase is not wholesome for the individual or dangerous to the community, that certain types of housing (which would satisfy occupants’ tastes) do not meet its aesthetic standards, or if the constraining authority believes that a specific technical process is not the most desirable, or that a particular invention would lead to social disturbances, nothing could be simpler: a constraining sanction, by altering the desirability of alternative uses, will lead the rights holder to want, in his own sovereignty, the use that the constraining authority wants for him.

It is mainly in the field of human labor, however, that the need to correct the results of the free operation of the price mechanism has become apparent. The limitation of working hours, allocation of days off and periodic leave, labor laws for women and children, respect for the dignity of the worker, and insurance against occupational hazards had to be imposed even where neither suppliers nor demanders would have proposed or demanded them.

Such results can only be obtained by constraining market participants to not consider as the most desirable state the one that they would have chosen strictly on the basis of the resulting personal benefits that would have accrued to them. Social action, in its various aspects, is thus only a distortion, by the use of constraint, of the system that the free choice of “property owners” would have led to, had owners been able to reap—free of any constraining sanction—the fruits of the acts that they could have performed.

Among the determining factors of worker conditions, the wage is the one factor that affects the lives of workers and their families most directly. As a result, wages specifically have led to the intervention of governments concerned with social welfare.

The problem of wages is simply one specific instance of a more general government problem: modifying the levels of remuneration that result from the free operation of the price mechanism.

In fact, one of the abiding concerns of modern governments is to set the volume of certain rights at the level they consider equitable, and to thereby shield them from the vagaries of economic fluctuations.

In practice, this concern emerged mainly with regard to remunerations affecting a large number of individuals: primarily the level of wages and, in major grain-producing countries, the price of wheat.

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Under a free price system, the remuneration of producers is determined by the equilibrium price that is established spontaneously in each market. This price, however, is the price at which the volume of the rights emptied of their contents equals the volume of the rights to be filled. It therefore depends only on the wills of the individuals who control these rights.

Thus, remunerations are only the indirect consequence of producers’ and consumers’ tastes, of the opinions they hold about the undesirability of production and the desirability of consumption. They take no account of governments’ views regarding the merit or beauty of a given productive activity, or the benefits or inconvenience of one type of consumption or another.

If the government wishes to alter a level of remuneration without resorting to authoritarian price-setting measures, it has only two solutions available: it can either grant a subsidy to the producer it wants to favor, or it can exert a constraining influence on the causal factors that determine the price whose result is the targeted remuneration.

If the first solution, which is the liberal one, is not available—either because of the inadequacy of government resources or because the expenditure involved cannot be agreed to—then only the second solution remains available.

If the government wishes to raise the remuneration of workers, it has to ensure that at each salary level, workers supply less labor, or entrepreneurs demand more. If the government wishes to raise the price of wheat, then it will have to ensure that, at each market price, producers supply less grain or consumers demand more.

In either case, the government will have to influence the causes of prices, therefore individual wills, and we know that it is only through the use of constraint that the government can successfully achieve this.

Moreover, producers who want to raise the prices of their products for their own benefit rely on this same method: trusts, cartels, or producers’ associations are simply means to modify the wills of businessmen without dispossessing them of their businesses.

Levels of remuneration contribute to the determination of the social structure, by adding their influence to the allocation of wealth resulting from prior evolution.

Now, correcting social inequalities has always been one of the major objectives of social reformers.

We have already shown that unlimited correction of social inequalities can be accomplished, under a liberal system, through the instrument of re603distribution by means of taxation. Any government wishing to correct social inequalities without increasing taxation, or without exceeding the limits permitted by taxation, will however have to use the authoritarian method to influence the determining causes of wealth accumulation. For this purpose, the government will only need to discourage saving: progressive taxes, inheritance taxes, and threats of devaluation are all influences suitable for reducing the desirability of additional saving.

Conversely, governments wishing to foster saving beyond the desired level have a range of measures available: forced saving, “iron savings,”9 are simply forms of saving under constraint. In principle, rationing itself is nothing but an immense system of constraint, as we have shown, intended to increase the quantity of wealth saved to the level of the deficit.

In the preceding examples, it is because governments are unable or unwilling to govern by the liberal method that they find themselves resorting to the authoritative method.

The same process infallibly leads them to resort to the authoritarian method, whenever they want to govern to a degree that exceeds what the quantity of levied taxation allows.

Thus, for instance, a government may lack the resources necessary to raise the strength of its armed forces to the desired level through voluntary enlistment. In this case, this government will rely on conscription to compel men, who remain full masters of their own bodies, to turn their bodies to the kind of military use the government wants. This is also the way in which a government, whose public works or road construction projects are limited by available funds, will force people who possess the rights necessary to carry out these projects to use them the way in which the government wants. Contributions in kind, mandatory labor involving men, horses, or carriages, are simply authoritarian construction methods, in contrast to the liberal procedure of the business enterprise.

Similarly, a government limited in its social welfare activities as a result of inadequate funds at its disposal, will have these activities carried out directly, either in kind or in cash, by people it does not tax so as to accomplish this task 604 itself. This authoritarian method is used, for instance, by governments that increase the desirability—to private businesses—of building workers’ housing or offering apprenticeships, by granting tax deductions for expenses allocated to financing these activities. This is also the method whereby all social charges, weekly rest, paid holidays, social security and social insurance expenses, and family benefits are imposed on private businesses. In this field, besides, civil governments simply follow the example of theocratic governments, imposing through constraint charity and love for one’s neighbor.

Thus, in nearly every case, the authoritarian alternative is only a means for governments to escape the liberal rule that limits their governmental action to the level of available resources at their disposal—that is to say, generally, the total amount of taxes they levy.

In letting governments compel property rights holders to use their property rights the way in which the government would have used these rights had it been the owner of these rights—but without requiring that these rights be transferred to the government—the authoritarian method allows the government to escape the budgetary constraint, and extends governmental power to the area affected by this method.

Thus, the authoritarian method is essentially a means of governing without levying—or at least without levying explicitly—through taxation the resources necessary for governmental action.

§3. The Cost of Authoritarian Solutions

Although authoritarian methods are, indeed, methods of governing without taxation, it would be a grave error to view them as methods of governing free of charge.

Any authoritarian intervention involves restricting a property right of ownership, hence limiting the area of use and control that is provided by this right.

Yet any right, any portion of a right, commands a price in the market. At this price, the value of the levy on sovereignty 10 associated with the authoritarian method equals, with a few negligible exceptions that we will not explore here, the total amount of taxes that would have allowed the same governmental intervention to be accomplished with a liberal method.

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Compulsory military service, for instance, enables the government to secure soldiers’ services without paying for them. Those in this military are deprived, however, of exercising control over their own labor services during their time of service. This labor, had soldiers supplied it in the market, would have commanded a certain value: the same value as that of the tax that would have enabled the state to acquire, through a liberal method, the soldiers’ services it needed.

Similarly, any road repairs achieved through the use of mandatory labor involve, for the individuals performing this work, a reduction of their sovereignty, a reduction equal in value to that of the taxes that would have allowed the same amount of work to be performed under a liberal system. Similarly, again, any task of assistance imposed through religious, moral, or police constraint implies drawing on the ability of using freely the resources whose use is involved in this task; this drawing has the same value as the taxes that would have been necessary to effect the same transfer of wealth by use of the liberal method.

When authoritarian intervention involves government authorities not having control over a property right of ownership in its entirety, but rather only a restriction of this right, the equivalence may be less apparent but it is nonetheless real.

For instance, a government that forbids the owner of a field from growing wheat does not deprive the owner of all sovereignty over the wealth he owns; the government only restricts the scope of his sovereignty. Everything takes place as if the government appropriated the full right of ownership and returned it to the owner, reduced only by the right to grow wheat.

Under a liberal system, however, the same result could have been obtained—in theory—through taxation. It would have been sufficient for the state to lease the fields whose crop cultivation it wanted to regulate, so as to then lease out the fields, on the condition that the fields not be sown with wheat.

The difference between the market value of an unconditional operating right and of the same right restricted in certain abilities of disposal represents the price of the corresponding intervention. This difference measures the value of the levy that the farmer faces as a result of authoritarian intervention. We see that this levy is equal in value to the amount of taxes that the state would have had to collect in order to obtain, by the use of the liberal method, the same result.

Thus, in all cases, any act by an authoritarian government involves a levy on the community, equal in value to the levy that would have been required had it been performed by the use of the liberal method.

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Most assuredly, the distribution of the levy’s impact is not the same in both cases, although the liberal method enables the government to determine the impact of the levy as it wishes. Regardless of the method, however, the levy is real and has the same value.

Thus, contrary to appearances, the authoritarian method does not provide governments with a secret way of making omelets without eggs. The number of eggs required is exactly the same as under the liberal method: it depends only on the size of the omelet.

§4. The Forms and Techniques of Authoritarian Constraint

Authoritarian systems of government are based on a restriction of property rights of ownership, not as far as their geographical extent is concerned, but with regard to their consistency. The constraints they apply are intended to modify the desirability pertaining to certain directions of action, within the zone of free action defined by the right. Such systems therefore restrict the owner’s freedom.

It is only possible to restrain that which exists, however. Authoritarian orders are therefore based on the property right of ownership, just as liberal orders are and contrary to what is commonly believed. As paradoxical as it may seem, authoritarian orders can even be considered to be more respectful of property rights than liberal orders, because, for a given governmental task, authoritarian orders simply direct the property rights holders to use their rights in a certain way, whereas the liberal orders withdraw the rights from their owners so as to transfer them to the government.

At a foundational level, therefore, any authoritarian system encompasses constraints that tend to ensure social peace through the compartmentalization of individual sovereignties. These are the liberal constraints, less those that tend only to ensure the collection of taxes.

Beyond these constraints, however, an authoritarian government imposes additional constraints that tend to modify, within the limits of the property right of ownership, the desirability of the consequences that are directly related to various possible acts. To this end, the government will attach to these consequences constraining undesirabilities or compelling desirabilities, which lead the holder of a right to either consider undesirable those courses of action the government wants to prohibit, or make him desire to perform those actions the government wants him to perform.

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The problem of authoritarian constraint lies in the modalities of implementing such constraining sanctions and compelling rewards.

There are countless solutions, because in each case they must be suited to the type of right they affect and to the nature of the restrictions they impose on such a right.

When restrictions are permanent, for instance when they involve imposing an ethical code or implementing social legislation, they are defined by commandments, laws, or regulations. Their formulation, in defining the area in which individuals can act freely, sets a contrario the task of the constraining power.

In certain cases, authoritarian solutions take the form of collective bargaining agreements, labor settlements, or industrial cartels.

Where they pertain to the organization of a profession, in particular to relations between workers and employers and the determination of their respective duties, they are often expressed in various forms of corporate statutes.

Authoritarian governmental action is more complex where it tends to deal with situations that are in a state of flux. This is the case, in particular, where the government imposes collective ends adapted to unpredictable circumstances. The technique of authoritarian government action will then be, in various forms, one of “command.”

This technique implies the subjection of individual wills to governmental decisions, through the imposition of constraining sanctions, which render undesirable any acts other than those that the government representatives order to be performed.

This form of government is that of a military command, which explains why men who are used to it—even when they hold civilian positions—generally cannot conceive of a form of government other than the authoritarian one.

In the economic realm, authoritarian government is exercised through the creation of organizing committees or trade unions, whose decisions are accompanied by sanctions that force members of the profession to comply.

Such institutions shift the location of the directing will and give governmental sovereignty to the bodies empowered to enforce their decisions.

Notwithstanding the appearances that they let subsist, such institutions create a situation that is similar in principle to the situation that would exist if the union body or the organizing committee were vested with a property right to the articles of wealth whose evolution they determine.

Thus the logical culmination of these solutions is the transfer of all means of production to the governing authority.

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The governing authority can then directly impose the ends it considers most desirable on the productive apparatus, and in particular can substitute egalitarian or social ends for the concerns over financial returns that drive private producers.

Such a transfer, which is the characteristic feature of most programs commonly known as socialist programs, highlights the common nature of the liberal and authoritarian methods of government.

The assignment to the state of a property right of ownership over all means of production, the extreme end of authoritarian evolution, brings us back to a situation where the owner—in this case the state—wields full control over the object owned and imposes upon the object those ends it considers to be the most desirable.

The resulting situation presents one of the essential characteristics of the liberal order; it differs from the liberal order only in that it forbids private individuals from using the rights they retain for the acquisition of production resources.

In its extreme form, the socialist order is simply a liberal order under which the state is sole owner of production resources.

In sum, the technique of authoritarian government consists in forcing men to want something other than that which they would have wanted had they been left to themselves. If this technique is to be effective, however, it has to successfully introduce into their conscience elements of a decision that are likely to alter their behavior.

The problem of authoritarian government is therefore similar to the problem that religious disciplines resolve in directing the conduct of men. Religious disciplines, however, have powers to this end that will always evade human governments. Through supernatural means, the Divinity knows not only the acts of men but the secret motivations that inspire them. The Divinity can even reinforce, through the obligation of confession, this transcendental view of behavior to be altered. Lastly, the Divinity puts into place, so as to alter the affective consequences of individual behaviors, not only earthly and human punishments but also punishments that can affect future life for eternity.

Authoritarian human governments have to rely on similar methods. When applied by them, however, the effectiveness of these methods is considerably diminished. Human governments can only punish acts that they are aware of, and they are only aware of acts that have not been concealed from them. Any 609 authoritarian undertaking necessarily implies an extreme development of the methods by which governments attempt to penetrate the conscience of men and be informed of their actions.

It should be noted that despite the supernatural means available to it, the divine will is often transgressed. What will happen, then, in the case of the will of civil governments, governments that are reduced to the sole effectiveness of human law enforcement?

The fundamental defect of all authoritarian regimes is that they are powerless to enforce their decisions.

In fact, the authoritarian method of government can be effectively enforced only in a small number of specific cases, with regard to acts that are easy to observe and clearly characterized. In all other cases, no matter what the penalties applied may be, whatever the powers granted to the police may be, whatever the rewards given for serving as an informer may be, the authoritarian method of government involves a degree of deception that is all the greater the more acts it affects, the more dispersed the acts are, and the more secret the acts are.

The first question concerning any authoritarian undertaking pertains to its feasibility in practice, for governments of men, which only have at their disposal inadequate means afforded to human action.

To want to generalize authoritarian action, to want to govern increasingly broad fields through authoritarian action, is to forget the limitations of human faculties; it is to attempt to give men powers that only the gods can hold; it is to commit an immense sin of pride, which inefficacy and disorder always end up punishing.

§5. Characteristics Specific to Authoritarian Orders

a) Methods of Authoritarian Government Prevent Property Rights Holders from Deriving Maximum Desirability from Their Respective Domains

Just as under a liberal system, the state of the communities governed under authoritarian systems is strictly determined by the wills of property rights holders at each instant of time. Under an authoritarian system, however, these wills no longer choose the solution that appears most desirable to them in light only of the personal consequences provided by various alternatives, but rather in light of these consequences corrected in advance by the constraining sanctions or compelling rewards that the government implemented at its discretion.

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Governmental intervention, in restricting the zone of free choice, closes off certain courses of action to the owner. If these courses of action are not those that the owner would have chosen in view of their intrinsic consequences, the returns on his holdings will be reduced as a result.

Thus, when government prohibits a businessman from engaging in certain lines of production or requires his business to close down during certain periods, he will see the productivity of his business decline. The authoritarian government will then have kept a businessman from deriving maximum return from his enterprise.

Through this particular feature, authoritarian systems stand in contrast to liberal systems. Nevertheless, this contrast is more apparent than real. Under a liberal system, the owner derives maximum return from his domain, but only after this domain has been reduced by the portion necessary to finance government activity. Under an authoritarian system, the owner retains the entirety of his domain, but governmental constraint reduces the total desirability of the services he can derive from his domain. We have shown that, in either case, the value of the levy is the same and depends solely on the intervention undertaken, and not on the method through which the intervention is effected.

b) The Methods of Authoritarian Governments Are Less Suited to an Equitable Apportionment of the Levies They Entail Than Liberal Methods Are

Although the two methods involve the same levy on sovereignty to sustain a government activity, the distribution of the overall levy is not necessarily the same under a liberal system as under an authoritarian system.

Under a liberal system, in fact, the distribution of the fiscal levy is consciously ensured and may be dictated by considerations of equity. Under an authoritarian system, in contrast, the distribution results from the very nature of governmental intervention, the levy being borne directly by the owner of the object that is subject to the levy.

Under an authoritarian system, an equitable distribution of required sacrifices can only be ensured through compensatory taxes—that is to say, by resorting to liberal methods of government.

Hence an authoritarian government is less suited than a liberal government to the equitable distribution of public burdens.

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c) Authoritarian Methods of Government Are Generally Less Consciously Aware Than Liberal Methods of Government

A liberal government is conscious of its own ends because any government intervention involves a fiscal levy, and no tax will be levied unless the desirability of the resulting benefits outweighs the undesirability of the necessary sacrifices. The budget is a mirror that reflects the government’s conscience, and by providing the government with an image of its actions, the budget forces the government to not perform those acts that public opinion would disapprove of.

Under an authoritarian system, there are no controls of this kind. Levies on sovereignty, which rarely affect monetary wealth under such a system, cannot be added up. Such levies are therefore outside the scope of any budgetary procedure.

Moreover, their undesirability, although it can be assessed qualitatively, cannot be measured with any degree of precision.

It is therefore extremely difficult to weigh their undesirability against the desirability of the intervention it makes possible.

Authoritarian systems generally lack awareness. Under the pretext of serving some ill-defined notion of the general interest, more felt than deliberately thought out, such systems allow all sorts of interventions, which are certainly not useless but whose utility 11 does not always offset the sacrifices they require.

Such sacrifices are all the more easily accepted as they do not appear in the resources of the governed, but only in their standard of living, which defies precise measurement.

Nonprofitable investments, or interventions based on aesthetic rather than economic considerations, are more easily undertaken in the favorable obscurity of an authoritarian government than in the full light of a liberal government.

d) Authoritarian Methods of Government Advance the Dissipation of Governmental Authority

Under a liberal system, governmental authority is entirely concentrated in the hands of the persons invested with the privilege of fiscal sovereignty.

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Under an authoritarian system, governmental authority is in the hands of any person who, de jure or de facto, has the power to constrain.

Although these powers may result from a delegation of the constraining power, they may also be the outcome of voluntary or forced acceptance of some collective discipline.

Under an authoritarian system, any natural person or legal entity that manages either to subject individual wills to its decisions or to prevent individual wills from turning to the constraining power to evade the consequences of these decisions becomes a governing authority.

Thus, trade unions, industrial combines, [economic] cartels, organizing committees, regardless of whether these are imposed or spontaneously accepted, exercise a governmental action the moment their decisions are effectively applied.

Such decisions are, however, inspired by the specific motivations of the authorities that exercise them. These motivations, regardless of appearances, are generally selfish and always self-interested.

If the government proper wishes to discipline the actions undertaken by these emerging de facto governments, it will immediately be faced with the problem of economic fiefdoms. The government proper will be able to resolve the problem only by subjecting these de facto governments, in turn, to its constraining power—in other words, by strengthening the law that they had to evade in order to emerge.

e) Authoritarian Methods Are More Suited Than Liberal Methods to High Degrees of Government; Any Communist Government Is Necessarily Authoritarian, and Any Individualistic Government Is Necessarily Liberal

The exercise of constraint, in restricting the area of control and use that a right provides to its holder, can reduce the desirability of productive effort, and thereby weaken the stimulus that causes and sustains this effort.

Any system that imposes considerable levies on individual sovereignties may have to impose through authoritarian methods the productive efforts it considers essential, if it does not want to see production reduced.

If the levy on individual sovereignty is total in scope, as would be the case, in theory, under a fully communist regime, there will be no production except that willed and imposed by the central power. In a communist system of organization, the government will necessarily be authoritarian.

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In sharp contrast, any individualistic system, under which government levies are reduced to nil, will inherently be a liberal system.

f) Authoritarian Methods of Government Are More Difficult in Their Application Than Liberal Methods of Government and Are, Generally, Vitiated by an Important Degree of Fraud That Remains

Authoritarian government involves constraining the will of the owner within the property he owns. It therefore tremendously increases the task of the constraining authority. It will require a constant police presence and extremely diverse methods of control. It therefore entails considerable overhead expenses.

Yet however perfect the constraining action may be, it will never succeed in discovering and penalizing all offenses. Authoritarian systems are always vitiated by instances of fraud, which will be all the greater as the restrictions imposed on property rights of ownership increase.

III. Order and Freedom, the Fruits of Civilizations with True Rights

§1. Governmental Action, Regardless of Whether It Is Liberal or Authoritarian, Never Leads to the Emergence of False Rights If It Is Conducted without Immobilizing Prices

Liberalism and authoritarianism, although they are different methods of government, both have this common feature of involving a restriction on property rights of ownership, in the form of transfers under a liberal system, and in the form of restrictions under an authoritarian system.

In both cases, governmental action therefore requires that the constraining power, which is the guardian of property rights of ownership, be subordinated to the government’s will.

In fact, this subordination is all the more easily secured as the constraining power is, for any civilian government, a police force that it established and controls.

Now, anyone having the power to transfer or restrict property rights can also increase, at his discretion, the volume of existing rights or create new ones out of thin air.

The volume of existing rights can be increased simply by authoritatively setting the prices of the articles of wealth that fill them at a level higher than the 614 market equilibrium price—in other words, rendering undesirable, by the use of a constraining sanction, any transaction at a price below the fixed price.

In order to create rights out of thin air, it is sufficient to assign a value, through price setting, to symbols that are devoid of value.

If, however, the constraining power deliberately restricts itself from intervening to set a price authoritatively, the volume of the rights will be determined solely by the prices that are spontaneously established in the market.

Under such a system, the governmental capacities of a liberal government will be limited to the rights it has transferred to itself; those of an authoritarian government will be limited to the restrictions it has brought to bear on the rights of private individuals.

Thus, under both systems, governmental interventions—regardless of their scope—will neither have increased the volume of existing rights nor will they have created any new rights. Governmental interventions will have taken place without the emergence of any false rights.

§2. Consequence 1: Regardless of Whether They Are Liberal or Authoritarian, Civilizations with True Rights Are Social Orders

Regardless of whether it is free or constrained, the will of the rights holder will determine his behavior. It is the sum of individual behaviors, however, that determines the aggregate supply and demand in each market sector.

As long as prices are free and not controlled, they are determined spontaneously at the level that brings the volume of the rights to be emptied to the level of the rights to be filled, at each market session and in each market sector. Any supplier is therefore certain, at any time, of being able to exercise the ability to dispose, which is provided by his ownership right.

Thus, under a free price system, regardless of whether the government is liberal or authoritarian, and regardless of the scope of governmental interventions, the legal system is always endowed with its full effectiveness.

Governmental intervention may, of course, influence prices in the various market sectors. It is by influencing the determinants of these prices—through subsidies under a liberal system, and through constraint exerted upon supply or demand under an authoritarian system—that governments will alter prices, however, and not by preventing causes from producing their effects.

To the contrary, the price movement—under all circumstances—will continue until it reaches the level that will ensure equilibrium in the correspond615ing market sector: as a result, suppliers and demanders in that market sector will be certain that they can make use of their rights in the way that they consider to be the most desirable, regardless of whether their rights have been restrained through authoritarian constraints.

The price mechanism will therefore retain, in spite of all governmental interventions, its all-powerful effectiveness. The price mechanism will ensure, at each instant of time, that every existing article of wealth is exactly accommodated within the right that is intended to enclose it. Even the possibility of any delay in a supply being absorbed or in a demand being satisfied will be ruled out. Shoppers will not line up outside stores, there will be no lines of unemployed people in front of employment agencies, no unsalable or unpurchasable articles of wealth, therefore no disorders resulting from a divergence between legal abilities and economic possibilities: civilizations with true rights, regardless of whether they are liberal or authoritarian, are social orders.

§3. Consequence 2: Regardless of Whether They Are Liberal or Authoritarian, Civilizations with True Rights Enjoy a Stable General Price Level and, under a Convertible Currency System, Full Control over Their Metallic Reserves

In a society with true rights, regardless of whether false claims are eligible for discount, only true claims will actually be discounted. Money will therefore always have, in the assets of the central bank, a counterpart of equal value, or of potentially equal value when the discounted claims reach maturity.

As we have shown in Chapter XVII, such a currency will ensure the quasi-stability of the general price level, regardless of the scope of governmental interventions, and regardless of the disturbances that may affect individual behaviors.

This quasi-stability will exist despite, or rather because of, the full freedom of individual prices.

Indeed, in each market sector, prices will vary based on fluctuations of supply and demand. Despite the apparent independence of individual prices, however, the whole of price changes occurring during a given period of time in all market sectors will be such that the general price level will remain practically unchanged.

This stability in the general price level will be achieved without the intervention of any kind of orchestra conductor, without controls of any kind, simply by virtue of the rights’ veracity.

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The preceding section [§2] recalled that the price mechanism, under a system of free and uncontrolled prices, ensures the effectiveness of the ability to dispose that is promised to any property rights holder.

In an economy with true rights, it is admirable indeed that this effectiveness is ensured without any meaningful variations in the general price level, regardless of the changes that may occur in the natural order of things and in human nature, regardless of political or social storms, and, lastly, irrespective of the nature and degree of government interventions.

Under such a system, the monetary unit will retain, under all circumstances, an appreciably constant purchasing power. Men will be able to contract in money terms, even on a long-term basis, without fear that the value of their contract will be upset by price changes. Forecasting will become feasible; men, masters of their own fate.

If the currency is metallic, the monetary authorities will be able to set the ratio of gold reserves at their discretion. Their decisions alone will determine whether convertibility is maintained. Any possible monetary crisis or disturbance will be ruled out: men will live as they did before 1914, in the blissful state of monetary innocence 12 that is characteristic of civilizations with true rights.

§4. Consequence 3: In Civilizations with True Rights, Men Can Be Left to Act Freely within Their Respective Rights

As long as prices are not set authoritatively, the behavior of men and governments cannot lead to social disorder, nor to any major movement in the general price level, nor to the depletion of metallic reserves.

This conclusion is hardly believable, but it is true.

It is impossible, however, to assess its full significance without realizing its deeper reality and its universality.

Whatever the harvest may be, producers will be able to sell it all; whatever the normal working hours may be, there will never be any permanent unemployment.

Regardless of whether men want to save or spend, regardless of whether they are frugal or spendthrift, businesses will always find the capital they seek and savers will always find the investments they want.

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Technology may change and inventions may drastically change production processes, but they will never create disturbances or disorders.

Lastly, whatever the evolution of men’s tastes and needs may be, their demands will always be satisfied and, however unpredictable these may be, they will never cause any notable change in the general price level and will never call the status of the currency into question.

Thus, men can be left to act freely within their respective rights. How they use the freedom deriving from their rights can never disrupt the social order or alter the currency’s purchasing power.

Similarly, governments can govern freely. The use governments make of their constraining power, whether it be through the liberal or through the authoritarian method, will never generate social disturbances or monetary upsets.

The true rights system will hence have resolved the political problem such as Rousseau put it: “Find a form of association . . . in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.”13

In precluding the disorders that appeared to be the unavoidable consequence of men’s freedom, the true rights system will have made freedom possible. Human liberty will be the precious fruit of civilizations with true rights.

This conclusion is certainly important, but it will take on its full value only when compared with the conclusion that the following chapter will bring out, showing that civilizations with false rights leave only a choice between social disorder and slavery.

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Chapter XXXV: Civilizations with False Rights, or Social Disorders

I. Social Disorder, the Product of False Rights

§1. Refusal of Civilizations with True Rights

Civilizations with true rights, regardless of whether they are liberal or authoritarian, have a common feature: they limit the scope of governmental intervention to the volume of the rights that the government controls.

The government may control these rights either directly, by taxation (as under the liberal method), or indirectly, by constraining rights holders’ wills (as under the authoritarian method).

In either case, however, there can be no governmental sovereignty unless individual sovereignties are infringed upon.1

As soon as the government has used the rights that are directly or indirectly available to it, its intervention comes to an end, notwithstanding all the desires of the governmental authorities and all the needs of the governed community.

Thus, under a true rights system, the government does not govern, outside the use of resources it draws from public property, except by how much it levies upon private individuals.

Yet there are many cases where a government cannot—or does not want to—either govern less or levy more. This is particularly the case when a government is engaged in a war on which the survival of the country depends; it is also the case of governments closely committed to a political program whose very nature does not allow them to obtain through borrowing, or to demand 619 through taxation, the financing of the tasks that they promised they would accomplish, not any more than it can directly force the members of the community to carry out its tasks. Finally, this can also be the case of governments that, in a period of declining prices, see their revenues diminish without a similar drop in their spending, particularly as a result of fixed expenses that [national] debt servicing entails.

In either case, any government wishing to continue governing when its resources have been exhausted cannot do so unless it obtains more than it gives, or forces third parties to contribute. Yet this is impossible in civilizations with true rights. Any government wishing to govern without levying will therefore have to cast off its governing principles and seek in other civilizations the means of obtaining the resources that it is either unable or unwilling to demand or obtain.

§2. Price Setting, a Means of Giving without Taking and Obtaining without Requesting

Civilizations with true rights limit the possibilities of government action because, at each instant of time, these possibilities cannot exceed the volume of the rights that the government has at its disposal, either directly or indirectly. At each instant of time, however, the volume of these rights is strictly determined by the value of the wealth they enclose, which in turn is set by their market equilibrium price.

For the limit of intervention thus established to be successfully breached, it is necessary and sufficient that the government be able to increase the volume of its rights—in other words, that the government succeed in getting the articles of wealth it directly or indirectly controls to be taken at a price that is higher than their equilibrium market price.

If the government succeeds in so doing, the scope of the tasks it can carry out will no longer be limited by the level of its resources or the amount of levies it imposes upon private individuals. The government will have broken away from the fundamental law of civilizations with true rights: it will be able to give without taking and obtain without requesting. Freeing the government from the subjections that restrict its possible courses of action to within the narrow limit of the resources it controls is therefore simply to put the government in a position to set, authoritatively, above the equilibrium price, the price of some of the articles of wealth it holds, and to compel certain buyers to purchase these articles at the value the government has assigned to it.

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Whoever resolves this problem will hold the secret to governing without levying.

§3. Any Authoritative Price Increase Augments the Purchasing Power of the Producer of the Article of Wealth Thus Upvalued, and Generally It Is through the Overvaluation of Treasury Bills That Governments Attempt to Govern Free of Charge

Upping the valuation of an article of wealth increases the purchasing power of the person who produces it.

Now, governments generally produce only tax claims, which provide the resources necessary for governmental action when they are collected or discounted.

The true value of such claims depends only on the amount of corresponding future collections. A government that has reached the limit of its tax collecting abilities cannot increase the value of these claims, because any increase in the value of these claims implies an increase in taxation, which was assumed to be impossible.

Although a government cannot increase the sales value of the claims it assigns—whose value is determined by their market price and thus by the opinion that potential buyers have of their true value—it can, however, increase their discount value. To do this, the government need only set the price at which the discounting institution is instructed to buy these claims above the market equilibrium price.

To the extent that a government can sell the claims whose value has been upvalued in this way, it will have increased its purchasing power and, by a corresponding amount, its governmental capabilities.

This same method, by assigning claims a value that they do not possess, creates out of thin air the rights that enclose the claims: this method thus provides the key to a government that is free of charge.

Examples of authoritative upvaluations of claims are common in the erring ways of governments running deficits. In France, during the interwar period for instance, the government paid out war damage compensation in the form of so-called national defense bonds allocated to the victims: the value of these bonds was calculated at a level higher than their market price.

The overvaluation of Treasury bills is the method that governments running a budget deficit usually use, however, to obtain the resources necessary for government action. To the extent that governments manage to sell these bills, they increase the government’s resources by the full difference between the true value 621 of the bills—that is, the price at which they could have been redeemed at maturity, possibly adjusted by an agio calculated at the market rate—and the value at which they are actually sold, which is generally their nominal value 2 reduced by an agio calculated on the basis of an arbitrarily set rate.

The sale of Treasury bills at an overvalued price provides financial resources that add to the general resources available to the state and can thereby be used to carry out any and all governmental tasks.

Among the tasks that require the attention of modern governments, however, increasing the remuneration of certain categories of producers is one of the costliest. Now, while this can be done indirectly through the use of subsidies—hence by drawing on the general resources of the Treasury—it can also be done directly, by setting the price of articles of wealth produced by producers whose position governments seek to improve at a level higher than the market equilibrium price.

Any producer that manages to sell the product thus upvalued will see the volume of his rights increase by the full amount of the surplus value resulting from the authoritative price-fixing measure.

Thus, to improve the remuneration of wheat producers, governments frequently resort to fixing a legal price. It is also in this way that, so as to increase the income of workers as a whole or of some of them, governments often set minimum wages, unless they delegate their governmental powers to trade unions or employers’ associations, so that collective bargaining agreements, whether they be binding de jure or de facto, get to set specific wage levels.

In all these cases, the authoritative fixing of a price above its equilibrium level assigns to the producer of the article whose price is controlled additional income, just as a state subsidy would provide.

This therefore makes it possible for the government to perform a true governmental act, but to do so without imposing any levies, and is therefore simply one specific form of the policy of government free of charge.

§4. . . . But Authoritatively Setting a Price above Its Equilibrium Level Entails the Inexorable Emergence of False Rights

Although the authoritative increase of a price raises the purchasing power of the producer of the article whose price is fixed, this is only to the extent that he manages to sell his product at the fixed price.

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We have seen,3 however, that any fixed price, even when it is adhered to by the public, does not alter the market equilibrium price and that, as a result, part of the resulting rights are false.

This question is so important here that we have to take it up again in detail. First, we shall consider the special case of price fixing to increase the remuneration of certain producers, and then we shall consider the general case of government in the absence of levies through the overvaluing, by fiat, of Treasury bills.

In 1932 and 1933, the price of wheat in France was woefully low. The government wanted to intervene. Through the law of July 10, 1933, the government set a minimum price and provided for serious penalties to anyone purchasing or selling wheat at a lower price. This is one of the rare examples of a direct action taken on a price, with no arrangements other than police measures to make it effective.

Let us suppose that supply and demand in the wheat market were represented, at the time, by curves S [supply] and D [demand] as in figure 32.

lf1981_figure_032.jpg

Fig. 32. [D: Demand; P: Price; S: Supply; Q: Quantity]

For a minimum price set at the level p1, the volume of supplies exceeds the volume of demands, at each market session, by an amount d1s1. In other words, at each market session, the portion d1s1 of rights that their holders wish to empty of the wheat they enclose will not be able to be so emptied. The ability to dispose, which had been promised by these rights, will therefore have been illusory. Price controls will have created, on a daily basis, an amount of false rights equal to this volume.

If the minimum price is set at level p3, above the satiety price p2 at which demand disappears altogether, no supplier will find a counterpart for the arti623cles of wealth that he intended to sell: the volume of false rights generated by price control measures, each day, is equal to the volume of the daily supply of wheat.

Although the volume of the false rights for which the price control measures are responsible is entirely determined by the level at which the price has been fixed, the allocation of these false rights is not determined. When the price is lower than the satiety price, the only true rights—among the rights that enclose the articles of wealth supplied—are those whose holders are skillful or fortunate enough to find a counterpart in the insufficient demand expressed in the market.

The distribution of false rights, when not determined on the basis of corruption or fraud, is therefore the outcome of random chance.

Wherever they may be located, however, the false rights generated on a daily basis will retain their essential feature: deny the holder the ability to dispose, although these rights had promised the holder this very ability.

Such consequences materialize in any market sector where the price has been increased authoritatively without arrangements having been made to absorb the articles of wealth that are supplied but not demanded.

The experience of coffee and diamonds confirms what the wheat market teaches us. The unemployment seen in all communities where wages are set considerably above their equilibrium level is a tragic demonstration of this mechanism’s generality. In all cases, increasing prices authoritatively creates, on a daily basis, its share of false rights. The further away the fixed price is from the equilibrium market price, the higher the amount of false rights that will be created.

It is true that direct price control measures resolve only very particular problems of governmental intervention: those designed to increase the remuneration of certain producers.

Most often, however, a Treasury is in deficit not for specific reasons but simply because the general level of government expenditure exceeds total government income. In this case, the problem of governing without imposing levies cannot be resolved, except through the authoritative overvaluation of the only articles of wealth a Treasury can supply: claims over the proceeds of its future revenues.

We shall demonstrate that this procedure, as in the cases discussed above, generates false rights, and that the volume of these rights depends only on the spread between the sale or assignment price and the equilibrium price of the overvalued claims.

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The simplest example is that of the payment of state creditors with bonds priced above the market price. The creditor who is not prepared to keep the bonds that he has been forced to accept will find, in selling them, that part of the rights that enclose these bonds are false rights.

This procedure, which is disadvantageous to the creditor, is however extremely inconvenient to the debtor. It can only be used, and has only been used, in very specific cases, such as after the 1914–1918 war, for payment of certain types of damage.

In the majority of cases, the Treasury has to pay in money. If the Treasury is in deficit, it will obtain the necessary funds from its cash holdings by forcing certain buyers—generally the central bank—to buy Treasury bills supplied but not demanded, at a price above that at which these could be sold in the market. Clearly, the sale of Treasury bills provides cash to the state’s coffers. If the buyer tries to resell all the bills he has acquired, however, he will not succeed in doing so. The rights that enclosed the cash balances exchanged for unsalable bills have become false rights.

In order to determine the volume of false rights generated in this way, we need to return to the diagram representing the market situation. Suppose that the supply of and demand for Treasury bills against money are represented, as a function of the interest rate, as in figure 33. Fixing the bill rate at the level r1, below the equilibrium rate, increases the volume of the Treasury’s rights by the full excess of value that this rate confers upon issued bills, but generates on a daily basis, in the assets of the institution that is forced to purchase these bills, 625 a volume of false rights equal to s1d1. If the bill rate is fixed at the level r2—lower than the rate at which the demand for bonds begins—the Treasury creates out of thin air the rights it derives from the issuance of these bonds, but the rights within which these bonds are enclosed, both before and after their placement, are entirely false rights.

lf1981_figure_033.jpg

Fig. 33. [Q: Quantity; R: Rate; D: Demand; S: Supply]

Now, a Treasury in deficit will rather spend its resources on payment of current expenditures than on the redemption of Treasury bills that have reached maturity. These bills, if they were not eligible for discount, could not be redeemed. There would therefore be a demand for bonds in the market only if their interest rate offset the capital loss that their purchase entails. At a market rate of 3 percent, for instance, the demand for bills that people know will not be repaid on their maturity date would begin only if a rate higher than 103 percent per year were attached to them. This means that in the case of false claims eligible for discount, the rate will in fact always be lower than the rate at which demand would begin, hence the position r2 in figure 33. The assignment of these claims will generate a volume of false rights that is identically equal to their arbitrarily assigned value.

§5. False Rights, the Source of a Levy That Covers a Deficit Responsible for Their Creation; This Deficit Would Have Been Covered through Taxation, Equal in Value to This Levy, under a Liberal System and through Constraint, Equal in Value to This Levy, under an Authoritarian System

A false right, being unable to be emptied of its contents, provides no purchasing power whatsoever to its holder. The holder realizes this when he supplies this content for sale on the market. The assignment of a false right therefore reduces, by its full amount, the value of the patrimony into which it has been included. We propose to quantify the size of the levy associated with a deficit financed through the creation of false rights.

Let us consider, once more, the governmental action of raising wheat producers’ remuneration by fixing the legal price of wheat at a level above the equilibrium price.

If the legal price is p1 as in figure 32, the fixing of the wheat price will, on a daily basis, have filled with unsalable wheat a volume of rights equal to d1s1. In these rights, however, wheat has displaced the true articles of wealth in exchange 626 for which it was acquired. The allocation of these rights has therefore resulted in a levy equal to the value of the unsalable wheat, or s1d1 × p1.

In a civilization with true rights, however, under a liberal as well as under an authoritarian system of government, an increase in the remuneration of wheat producers could have been obtained by any procedure raising aggregate demand in the market from the level D to the level D′.

Under a liberal system, such a solution would have required the state to draw on its resources in order to demand the unsalable wheat on a daily basis. The state would therefore have had to increase taxes—or possibly borrowings—by the amount of the additional resources allocated to wheat producers.

Under an authoritarian system, the desired result could have been obtained through any system of constraint that increased total individual demands by the same amount.

The result of such an increase, however, would have been to fill private individuals’ rights with an undesired and unsalable article of wealth. In other words, the value of their assets would have been subjected to a levy equal in value to that of the increased remuneration provided to wheat producers.

Thus, increasing remuneration through the assignment of false rights does not in any way eliminate the levy that the same governmental action would have required under a true rights system. Quite the contrary, if one considers the aggregate amount of the levy rather than individual distributions, the enacted levy is identically equal to the levy that would have been required in a civilization with true rights. The only difference is that under a false rights system, the true nature of a levy has been concealed, since it appears not as a direct levy but merely as the consequence of the simple inability to sell. This impossibility of selling, in people’s mental confusion, will be attributed to the misfortunes of the era, or to buyers’ ill will, but not to government intervention, although this is the only cause. And the government will therefore escape responsibility for its own actions.

In the more general case of financing through the overvaluation of Treasury bills, it is the rights of the individuals who are forced to buy these bills that become false rights.

Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that the bills in question bear interest at a rate that would have ensured market equilibrium if they had had to be redeemed at their nominal value upon reaching maturity. The overvaluation, hence the additional resources provided to the Treasury, equals the difference between the price at which the bills are sold and the price at which they will actually be redeemed.

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Their authoritative assignment effects a levy on the assignee’s assets equal to this difference. This levy, however, is exactly equal to the amount of taxation that would have allowed the bills to be redeemed at their nominal value, or to the authoritative levy that would have made people demand the bills under the influence of constraint, the loss involved in the purchase of the bills notwithstanding.

Thus, contrary to all appearances, the overvaluation of claims does not create any purchasing power.

The overvaluation of claims increases the purchasing power of the issuing state, but it does so by reducing the purchasing power of assignees of these claims by a corresponding amount: it therefore effects a levy on assignees’ assets, which equals the amount that would have allowed for the financing of the same government intervention in a civilization with true rights, by use of either the liberal or the authoritarian method.

A government based on false rights is not a government that governs free of charge, but only a government whose cost is not explicitly and consciously levied.

§6. Government Based on False Rights, Cause of Social Disorder

The creation and assignment of false rights impair the effectiveness of the legal mechanism. In the affected markets, the volume of the rights to be emptied is no longer necessarily equal to the volume of the rights to be filled. Certain suppliers may well be unable to fill their rights with the contents of their choice: the unconditional nature of their sovereignty as owner of property is irremediably compromised.

The situation of those who hold wheat whose price is controlled and who cannot find a buyer, or the situation of workers who desperately try to offer labor services that nobody wants under a minimum wage system, shows that this analysis is not just theoretical.

Such people retain ownership rights over the wheat or the services they produce but—up to the amount of false rights generated by price-setting measures—cannot dispose of these in the way they see fit. They remain the owners, but are no longer sovereign.

Holders of false claims not eligible for discount would be in a similar situation. In actual fact, however, such a situation is highly unusual, because the state nearly always forces its central bank to buy without limit the false claims it creates. The 628 resulting system will be described in greater detail in the second part of this chapter. If, however, the state did not assign false claims to the central bank—as the French government did when it paid war damage compensation with overvalued, but nondiscountable, bonds—the rights of assignees would become false rights. Within the limits of the overvaluation of the wealth that these rights enclose, their holders would no longer be able to alter the contents of these rights; within the same limits, the privilege of being able to dispose freely—a privilege that is attached to the rights—therefore becomes purely illusory.

Thus, the assignment of false rights keeps up the appearance of the legal mechanism, but removes the legal mechanism’s essential virtue, which is the all-powerful sovereignty of owners.

In the social state generated by the creation of false rights, certain articles of wealth necessarily remain enclosed in rights where they are not wanted. The fundamental rule of social orders, which places each article of wealth in the position where the persons who have the authority to move it would wish it to be located, is no longer respected.

Moreover, this fundamental rule is explicitly violated for all the articles of wealth that are supplied but not demanded.

Now, the existence of excess supplies is bound to generate competition among suppliers who fear that they may not be able to find a counterpart. These suppliers attempt to capture a share of the insufficient demand by making various sacrifices: hidden rebates on the legal price, ancillary advantages, bribing buyers, etc.

Thus, by all their specific features, and regardless of whether they are respected or not, systems based on false rights will be systems marred by social disturbances.4

Their true nature, however, would be inadequately described unless we were to stress that the preceding analysis was intentionally limited to the economic aspects of the situation considered. Simply stating that civilizations with false rights bring about social disorder is to run the risk of concealing under an abstraction the disturbances and sufferings that ravage societies whose regulat629ing mechanism has been shattered, and it is to omit the human aspects of those disturbances: the discouragement of producers without customers, the desperate wait of unemployed workers, and the generalized corruption that is the outcome of any rivalry between suppliers or demanders.

To the economist, social disorder is an equation that is not satisfied; but to the sociologist, social disorder is a civilization that dies in the throes of a painful agony.

II. The Substitution of Price Rises or the Depletion of Metallic Reserves for Social Disorder, through the Eligibility of False Claims for Discount

§1. The Eligibility of False Claims for Discount, a Means of Turning False Rights into True Rights, Hence—for Holders of False Rights—a Means of Turning Appearances into Realities

Substituting false claims for true articles of wealth gradually depletes the asset base of the person who receives the false claims. If the deficit responsible for the creation of false rights is prolonged, it is bound to reduce the recipient patrimonies to a state of insolvency.

These patrimonies—once they have reached a state of insolvency—will no longer have any saleable asset, and therefore will no longer be in a position to exchange true wealth for false claims. We have also shown, in the “Journey to the Land of False Rights,”5 that if the party in deficit has to maintain the valuable ability of running a deficit beyond that stage, there will be no solution other than to make the false claims it creates eligible for discount.

When these false claims have been made eligible for discount, they will always find a taker at their nominal value, subject only to an agio resulting from discounting charges, as any claim supplied but not demanded is obligatorily taken up by the discounting institution.

Anyone holding false claims will then enjoy the certainty of being able to fill his right with money, within the limits of its nominal volume, and thereby substitute for the false claims he has received, within the limits of this same volume, any articles of wealth supplied in the market.

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Through eligibility for discount, false claims will have become true rights: the party in deficit will be able to remain in deficit indefinitely.

Any state whose expenditure exceeds current income relies on this procedure.

Within the limits of the amount of its deficit, this state freely creates, out of thin air and for its own benefit, the rights from which are emptied the false claims assigned to the central bank. Eligibility for discount, by allowing these rights to be filled with money—actually, with true rights—provides these rights with universal purchasing power in the market.

The state also uses this method to finance deficits that specifically result from increasing the rights of certain producers. The upvaluing of wheat prices through authoritative price fixing, for instance, generates false rights up to the limit of the volume of wheat supplied but not demanded at the legal price. The state gives them reality by forcing agricultural cooperatives to purchase any unsalable wheat, and provides these buyers with the means of financing their purchases indefinitely by making the bills representing the value of these purchases eligible for discount.

Similarly, authoritatively setting wages higher than the equilibrium level creates false rights on a daily basis, up to the volume of the labor services supplied but not demanded, at the price resulting from regulations in effect. The state transforms—only partially, it is true—false rights into true rights by imposing on a public agency the obligation of purchasing these services through the payment of unemployment benefits.

The labor services thus purchased cannot, of course, be supplied in the market, because their supply would only increase the volume of the services supplied but not demanded by the same amount, hence the volume of services purchased by the Unemployment Office. On the other hand, these services cannot be stockpiled in the expectation (usually in vain) of a market reversal. The assets of the Unemployment Office are therefore valueless.

The state, nevertheless, makes the claim that represents these assets eligible for discount, by giving the claim its guarantee or, more generally, by representing these claims through simple Treasury bills, upon which it confers the same privilege.

In all cases, eligibility for discount provides recipients of false rights with the certainty of being able to dispose, at their discretion, of the unsalable articles of wealth that fill these rights, regardless of the value that has been assigned to these 631 articles of wealth. Eligibility for discount therefore restores to the rights that enclosed these articles of wealth their key feature, that of conferring upon their holders the ability to dispose freely, which is the distinguishing mark of the rights’ veracity.

§2. By Making Money the Main Drain for False Rights, Eligibility for Discount Substitutes a Price Rise or Depletion of Metallic Reserves for Social Disorder

The eligibility of false claims for discount removes, from those claims that are undesired, the rights that enclosed them and substitutes money for these rights. It does not, however, make these false claims disappear. These false claims only leave their birthplace because the central bank was forced to purchase them with money: the false claims become part of the bank’s assets either under the category “Portfolio” or, more frequently and more justifiably, under a special category, “Claims on the State.”

In becoming part of the assets of the central bank, however, they do not lose their nature of being false claims. With this original defect, they are simply included in the bulk of the assets that constitute the aggregate, indistinct counterpart of the claims of which money is made.

As soon as false claims have been made eligible for discount, monetary circulation will inevitably drain all undesired false claims, regardless of whether they arise from a general Treasury deficit or from specific deficits, such as those that may result from the operation of the Wheat Office or the Unemployment Office.

The rights of currency holders will therefore become, by a corresponding amount, false rights.

In our “Journey to the Land of False Rights,” we demonstrated the outcome of this transformation as well.

Let us simply recall here that, if the additional amounts of money issued against the acquisition of false claims are themselves desired, they will not generate any additional demand in the market. They will therefore have no monetary consequences.

We can see, here, that any increase in the desired cash balance provides a perfectly harmless means of advances to the state. We also see that hoarding 632 money, contrary to popular belief, is the most valuable help for states running a deficit.

If, however, the deficit is permanent, it will increase, on a daily basis, by the volume of undesired false claims, the amount of monetary circulation. The deficit will necessarily bring the amount of monetary circulation to a level that will exceed the aggregate amount of desired cash balances.

From the moment this level is reached, holders of undesired cash balances will demand in the market, on a daily basis, the true articles of wealth that they wish to substitute for these cash balances.

This additional demand, which tends to push up the general price level, will lead in the first instance to a reduction in the commercial portfolio of the central bank. To the extent of the amount that reach maturity each day, the true claims that constituted the commercial portfolio of the central bank will be gradually replaced by the false claims stemming from the deficit.

When the commercial portfolio has been reduced to zero—or rather, to the bare incompressible minimum associated with collection purposes—the upward tendency of the general price level will no longer be inhibited by the popping of true claims reaching maturity.

If the currency is inconvertible, the general price index will rise, on a daily basis, to the extent necessary to bring the value of the articles of wealth supplied in the market to the level of the rights intended to enclose them, these rights consisting of the rights from which these articles of wealth have been emptied, plus those rights that previously enclosed the undesired cash balances.

At the same time, the rise in the general price level will increase necessary cash balances and thereby absorb, on a daily basis, the undesired cash balances generated by the deficit.

If the currency is convertible, the undesired cash balances will automatically be reabsorbed by the convertibility mechanism. This mechanism will prevent a rise in the general price level, but will substitute for it a daily decline in metallic reserves, equal to the amount of undesired cash balances generated each day by the deficit.

Thus, the eligibility of false claims for discount, in transferring to the community of currency holders ownership of the false claims generated by the deficit, will have substituted a daily rise in the general price level or a gradual depletion of metallic reserves for the social disorders that the creation of false rights would otherwise have brought about.

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§3. The Rise in the General Price Level, or the Depletion of Metallic Reserves, Yields a Levy of Exactly the Same Amount as the Levy That Would Have Covered—through Taxation under a Liberal System, through Constraint under an Authoritarian System—the Deficit Responsible for the Disturbances

Eligibility of false claims for discount allows the issuer to obtain true articles of wealth, even when (these claims being undesired) no buyer is prepared to accept them in exchange for the true articles of wealth he owns.

It is by this consequence that eligibility for discount appears like a magical formula, which can somehow confer existence on nothingness.

We know full well, however, that magicians are merely clever tricksters: yes, magicians can certainly conceal the origin of a rabbit they suddenly pull from their hat, but they cannot create a rabbit where there is none.

We should now describe the origin of the articles of wealth with which eligibility for discount fills the void of false rights.

The rights enclosing the bills that a state may issue on a daily basis to finance its Treasury are true rights insofar as the bills issued are not themselves undesired. The articles of wealth that the state acquires in that case are those that buyers of Treasury bills relinquish, because these buyers wish to substitute, within their rights, a claim for true articles of wealth during the period of the loan that they consent to.

When, however, some of the Treasury bills issued daily are undesired, nobody is prepared to acquire these by parting with true articles of wealth in exchange. These bills are then purchased by the central bank, which can only give, in exchange, the money by which it represents them.

If this additional money is itself desired, the persons who want this money will—in order to obtain it—empty true articles of wealth from those rights they want to fill with additional cash balances. The contents of these rights will have provided, without causing any disturbance, the true articles of wealth necessary to fill the false rights generated by the deficit.

If the additional cash balances are undesired, their holders will demand, on the market, the articles of wealth they want to substitute for them. Their demand will be added to the demand of suppliers of true articles of wealth. At each market session, the volume of the rights to be filled will exceed the volume of the rights emptied of true articles of wealth, by the excess of false rights in search of true contents.

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Under an inconvertible currency system, the excess of rights to be filled will lead to a rise in the general price level, to the extent that will bring the value of articles of wealth supplied to the level of the aggregate volume of the rights that are intended to enclose them.

Such a rise will reduce the purchasing power of the suppliers of these articles of wealth.

This rise will prorate the articles of wealth supplied in the market, among the holders of the rights from which they have been emptied and the holders of the false rights generated by the deficit.

The latter are therefore served by a levy that is effected on the assets of the former.

The rise in the general price level will have reduced the capacity—measured in terms of all articles of wealth except money—of the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied in the market have been emptied.

This reduction in capacity will be such that it leaves available the articles of wealth that can fill the false rights generated by the deficit—in other words, the articles of wealth that can be substituted, in these rights, for undesired Treasury bills (whose money equivalent will itself not be desired).

Now, this volume of undesired Treasury bills whose money equivalent is not desired measures the additional taxation that would have been necessary to ensure, under a liberal system, equilibrium in the Treasury, or the additional forced loan that would have had to be imposed, through constraint, in order to achieve the same result under an authoritarian system.

In either case, the rise in the general price level will impose a levy on market suppliers as a whole. This levy is equal to the levy that would have allowed the emergence of false rights to be avoided by the use of either the liberal or the authoritarian method.

Under a convertible currency system, the rights that enclose the Treasury bills whose money equivalent is itself not desired are filled with gold at the central bank. The false claims thus pass from the rights of the persons who received them into those of the central bank’s creditors: essentially, currency holders. Since these false claims are unsalable, their true value is zero. They therefore reduce, by their amount, the capacity—in terms of true wealth—of currency holders’ rights. Currency holders are thereby subjected to a levy, exactly equal to the levy that would have been required to avoid—through either the liberal or authoritarian method—the emergence of false rights through the depletion of the metallic reserves of the central bank.

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§4. The Omelet Principle: A Summation of Financial Wisdom

The preceding analysis shows that financing a deficit through the assignment of false claims eligible for discount does not avoid the levy that would otherwise have been necessary to cover the deficit through taxation or borrowing. To the contrary: the rise in the general price level or the depletion of metallic reserves imposes levies on the contents of certain rights, levies that equal the levies that the fulfillment of the same governmental tasks would have required in the framework of a balanced budget or Treasury.

The assignment of false rights is therefore a governmental procedure that is costless only in appearance. In actual fact, the levy imposed is set, ne varietur, by the extent of government intervention. The time at which a government levy occurs is not when a government chooses its methods of financing, but rather when a government spends. And if the government does not cover its expenditure, financing will not be avoided, but will be effected spontaneously, through the rise in prices or the depletion of metallic reserves.

The selection of the financing instrument does not, therefore, determine the scope of the levy that results from a government intervention, but only determines to whom the levy will be assigned. Failure to choose is itself a choice, as the levy is imposed on market suppliers and prorated to the volume of their supplies (under an inconvertible currency system), and on the central bank’s creditors (under a convertible currency system).

The intrinsic feature of these methods of spontaneous financing is unawareness. The apportionment of the sacrifices they inflict is automatic and blind, and therefore indifferent to any consideration of social justice or equity.

A false right, whether eligible for discount or not, is a tax, but without a basic exemption or progressivity; from the social point of view, it is therefore the worst kind of tax.

A false right is also a hypocritical and misleading tax. It does not prevent the sacrifices associated with the government intervention it finances, but enables the government to proclaim that it did not intend for the sacrifices that will have been the false right’s inevitable consequences. A false right can even enable a government to ascribe such sacrifices to influences that are not responsible for it whatsoever, and thereby deceive public opinion as to the true nature of its management.

The rise in prices and the depletion of metallic reserves are merely a defense that reality puts up against the methods that purport to liberate governments from any obligation to be subjected to reality.

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Their inexorability, under a system in deficit, should constantly remind governments of this commonplace but fundamental rule, known to all housewives, but which most statesmen would prefer to ignore: One cannot make an omelet without eggs, and the number of eggs that is required is inexorably determined by the size of the omelet that one wants to make.

III. The Imposition of Planned Order

§1. The Secret [Financial Method] of Hitler: The Art of Not Filling False Rights

Governing without levying may yield the pleasant fruits of a deficit, but is far from being harmless.6 If prolonged for any extended period of time, as soon as the false claims assigned become undesired, this system necessarily leads to the depletion of metallic reserves and the imposition of forced currency.7 From that moment on, this method of government generates a continuous rise in the general price level, at a steadily increasing rate.8

The disorders caused by the practice of governing without levying ravaged the world after the First World War and took on, notably in Germany and Austria between 1920 and 1921, an especially dramatic turn. These disorders inflicted grave sufferings on the bulk of the population that was affected, reducing to hunger those living on fixed incomes and diminishing, during extended periods of time, the standards of living of many social classes whose incomes only follow price increases with a considerable time lag.

Wherever they raged, such disorders have completely shaken the social structure, by alleviating or wiping out debts denominated in money. In this way, 637 these disorders bear a large share of the responsibility for postwar political disturbances.

All the disorders generated by the system of governing without levying stem from one single cause: the desire of recipients of undesired false claims to substitute true articles of wealth for these false claims; in other words, from the desire to fill their false rights with real values.

To avoid such disturbances, it will be sufficient to compel owners of undesired false claims, or those holding rights of equivalent volume, to want as contents of their rights—even though they may be otherwise inclined—these undesired false claims or the money that represents them.

If this effort is successful, then the creation of false claims will have no effect. It will be possible to govern indefinitely without imposing any levy, hence to develop armaments, construct buildings, provide assistance, etc., without demanding any sacrifices from the people. This was indeed Hitler’s major discovery. This could only provide him with power and popularity, since he could obtain and give, without ever requesting.

The secret [financial method] of Hitler, therefore, lies in the process that will forcibly keep rights holders from filling a certain volume of rights—equal to the volume of the false claims created—with true articles of wealth. And since any right allows its holder to select its contents, the problem, in the last instance, is only a problem of constraint.

This is simply about rendering undesirable, to certain rights holders, the acquisition of true articles of wealth, thereby inducing them to want to acquire, or retain, the false claims or the money that the deficit has created.

If this can be achieved, then the volume of the rights to be filled with true articles of wealth will—despite the deficit—remain equal to the volume of the rights from which the articles of wealth supplied have been emptied; any threat of a disturbance will be avoided.

§2. Price Fixing and Rationing, the Basic Principle of Solutions That Ensure Equality between the Volumes of the Rights That Their Holders Wish to Empty and Fill with True Articles of Wealth in the Market

To ensure equality between the volumes of the rights that their holders wish to empty and fill with true articles of wealth in the market, one idea comes to mind first: limit the volume of the rights that any individual may fill with true arti638cles of wealth to the volume of the rights that he has emptied of true articles of wealth during the same period of time.

And since any right emptied on the market is filled with money, it would be sufficient to attach tickets to the rights that had been emptied of true wealth, with the value of the original article of wealth written on these tickets. In order to purchase any other article of wealth, the purchaser would be required to pay money and present a ticket of equivalent value as well.

Such a solution would, however, deprive money of its essential feature: its unconditional acceptance by all suppliers in the market. The monetary medium would soon fall into disuse, and only the tag representing true articles of wealth would be retained as a medium of exchange. In actual fact, however, such tags would be nothing more than money issued under a system where true claims alone are eligible for discount.

Moreover, the creation of a tag representing true articles of wealth transferred would deprive of any purchasing power anyone who had not supplied such articles of wealth in the market. In other words, a state running a deficit, which can empty only false claims onto the market, would have no purchasing power.

This system, then, would resemble in every respect the one established by monetary systems under which only true claims are eligible for discount.

This system would ensure stability in the general price level and metallic reserves, but would do so by limiting individual purchasing power to the volume of true articles of wealth supplied in the market.

In order to maintain stability of the general price level and metallic reserves without depriving the state of the ability to cover its deficits by creating false claims, it will be necessary to limit the aggregate volume of the rights that may be filled with true articles of wealth to the volume of the rights emptied of true articles of wealth during the same period, without requiring that such an equivalence be maintained within each patrimony. In this way, a system will be established that would enable the state, or any recipients designated by the state, to have priority in drawing from the market the true articles of wealth with which they want to fill the rights they emptied of false claims earlier on; this system allows private individuals to fill the rights previously containing true articles of wealth supplied to the market, only to the extent of the wealth remaining available after the state or its agents have made their privileged drawings.

Thus, the state or its agents will enjoy the privilege of filling all of their rights with true articles of wealth, including those rights they created out of thin air 639 by assigning false claims resulting from the deficit; private individuals, in contrast, will see this very ability reduced, to the extent that the state will have levied true articles of wealth without emptying any onto the market.

Such is the system that rationing and price fixing, whose forms we have previously described,9 tend to establish.

Under such a system, each individual may only demand one of the given articles of wealth supplied in the market, to the extent of his allotted rations. At the same time, all prices are fixed by force of law.

Any purchase in excess of the quantitative limitation set by the ration, or concluded at a price above the maximum price set by the existing regulation, is rendered undesirable by the imposition of appropriate constraining sanctions.

If rations are calculated in such a way that their aggregate amount, for each article of wealth, does not exceed the quantities that remain available after the state has filled the rights that it has previously emptied of false claims, during each market session the total volume of the rights to be filled with true articles of wealth will not exceed the volume of the rights that have been emptied of true articles of wealth. The general price level and, under a convertible currency system, the amount of metallic reserves will remain unchanged.

But the aggregate volume of the rights that private individuals can fill with true articles of wealth will be less than the volume of the rights emptied by them, by a margin equal to the volume of the rights that the state has emptied of false claims and filled with true articles of wealth.

The holders of these rights, being forbidden from acquiring any true articles of wealth, have only one choice: fill them with false claims or with the money that represents them.

Thus, the false claims emptied by the state onto the market will insert themselves exactly within the rights that rationing and price fixing have kept empty of true articles of wealth.

Rationing and price fixing will have indirectly constrained the community’s individuals to “desire” all the false claims supplied by the state, however reluctant they would have been to acquire these, had the individuals been shielded from the constraining effects of rationing and price fixing.

As a result of rationing and price fixing, the rights that enclose these false claims therefore lose their character of being false rights; at the same time, the 640 disturbances that would have resulted from their holders’ demand for true articles of wealth to fill them will be avoided.

§3. Rationing, the Source of a Levy That Covers the Deficit Generating False Rights, and Which Equals the Levy That Would Have Been Obtained through Taxation in a Liberal System and through Constraint in an Authoritarian System

Rationing prevents the disorders generated by a deficit, but it does so by constraining certain rights holders, against their will, to fill their rights with the false claims created by the deficit.

Rationing thereby substitutes an undesired and illusory asset for the true articles of wealth that the rights—which rationing fills with false claims—had enclosed. Therefore, rationing inflicts a levy of a certain value on these rights holders, whose amount we will now specify.

To take a concrete example, suppose that a deficit suddenly occurs in a community where the supply of and demand for money against claims are represented by curves S and D as in figure 34, the discount rate being set at the level r, which is the market equilibrium rate.

lf1981_figure_034.jpg

Fig. 34. [D: Demand; S: Supply]

The deficit increases by its amount—this amount being independent of the market rate—the ordinates of the curve representing the demand for money against claims, which hence becomes curve D′.10

The supply curve can be derived from the S curve by adding, for each rate, the portion of false rights generated by the deficit, or their equivalent, that holders intend to keep filled with claims.

Under a system where rights holders are free to fill their rights as they see fit—in other words, under a system without rationing—this portion increases 641 with the market rate. Because of the deficit, the supply curve of money against claims therefore gets a shape of the type S′.

By contrast, under a system of general rationing that is properly calculated, holders of rights that have been emptied of true articles of wealth can only fill, at each market session, rights equal to the value of the articles of wealth still remaining after the false rights generated by the deficit have been filled. Regardless of whether they want to, holders of these rights must therefore let a portion of the rights they have emptied—equal to the volume of these false rights—be filled with false claims or with the money that represents them. The supply of money against claims will thus be increased, directly or indirectly, by the amount of the daily deficit: the curve that represents this supply will become curve S″.

We assume that the bond rate was fixed at the level r, which had ensured—prior to the deficit—market equilibrium.

Under a system without rationing, the deficit would have generated an additional demand for money against claims equal to the amount ss″. This additional demand would have been served, to the extent of amount ss′, by market supplies, and the remaining balance s′s″ by discounting at the bank.

Within the limits of the former amount, the true articles of wealth captured by the holders of false rights generated by the deficit would have been provided, voluntarily, by persons wishing to empty their rights of these articles of wealth so as to replace them with claims. Within the limits of the balance s′s″, they would have been drawn (if under an inconvertible currency system) 642 from the mass of articles of wealth supplied in the market, through a rise in prices, and (if under a convertible currency system) from the assets of the central bank’s creditors, through a reduction in metallic reserves.

Rationing, if it is properly calculated, ensures that this balance of undesired bills will be absorbed by suppliers in the market in exchange for true articles of wealth. Rationing therefore forcibly inserts these bills that they do not want, or the money that represents them, into their rights, by prohibiting these rights from having any other content.

Rationing thereby prevents a rise in the general price level or a depletion of metallic reserves, and the indirect levies that these procedures would otherwise have involved.

But the possession of Treasury bills or additional cash balances does not increase the rations of their holders. If these individuals wish to fill with true articles of wealth the rights that enclose these bills or these additional cash balances, these individuals will need to reduce—by a corresponding amount—the portion of the rights that they have emptied of true articles of wealth and are authorized to fill in the market each day.

Owning Treasury bills or additional cash balances therefore does not increase the purchasing power of their holders. As a result, these assets impose a real levy upon their owners, to the extent that—although undesired—these assets cannot be emptied from the rights that enclose them.

The aggregate value of this levy, at each market session, is of the amount s′s″. Yet under a liberal system, taxation of an equal amount would have allowed the state to forgo supplying the undesired bills.

Therefore, the difference between the fiscal procedure [taxation] and the rationing procedure lies not in the amount of the levy they effect but in the method that is used to obtain it.

The former [taxation] fills the rights whose contents have been transferred to the state with a nonnegotiable tax receipt, which has no value; the second [rationing] fills the rights whose contents have been transferred to the state with Treasury bills or with money, which the regulations in effect keep from ever being exchanged against true articles of wealth.

Taxations voids the rights that are emptied of their contents, whereas rationing keeps them from being filled.

Under an authoritarian system, a forced loan could have ensured, without rationing, the absorption of undesired bills. The procedure of rationing is simply an indirect means of imposing such a loan.

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Hence, rationing does not in any way reduce the volume of levies required for the fulfillment of governmental tasks. Rationing reduces the aggregate value of the articles of wealth that private individuals can dispose of, by the same amount as would have been the case, by taxation or through voluntary or forced loans (under a true rights system), or by a price rise or depletion of metallic reserves (under a false rights system).

Rationing is therefore simply an indirect method of levying, which reduces the population’s standard of living to the precise extent necessary to release the articles of wealth the state intends to use. The method is a hypocritical and covert one, however. Without reducing in any way the sacrifice required for a given governmental intervention, rationing allows the blame to be placed on inadequate production or on the misfortunes of the era, thus severing the link between cause and effect. In the entire arsenal of financial lies, this one is the most insidious and the most mendacious.

Stripped of its misleading characteristics, however, rationing shows once again that the volume of the levy that the state imposes in actual fact depends only on the tasks the state carries out, and not on the methods that are used to finance these tasks.

Thus, rationing brings the problem of financing back to the solid ground of economic realities, by freeing it from the bizarre illusions of financial appearances.

§4. The Distribution of the Levy That Is Effected through Rationing

Some will nevertheless argue that even though, for the carrying out of certain government tasks, rationing levies indirectly the same total amount that taxation or borrowing would levy directly, rationing allows for a more equitable distribution of the levy’s burden.

It is correct that rationing sets at one same level the quantities of rationed goods that each member of the community considered may acquire in the market. Such an equality does not in any way, however, involve an equitable apportionment of public costs.

If rationing is properly calculated, it will limit the volume of the rights that private individuals can fill in the market to the volume of the rights emptied by them during the same market session, less the rights filled by the state in exchange for the undesired false claims generated by the deficit.

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Therefore, rationing’s primary feature is that it affects only those who empty rights onto the market. The landlord and the farmer who live off their land can escape any levy. One can reach these groups, of course, if “commercialization” is imposed upon them, meaning that they are forced to supply onto the market the entirety of their production. Experience has always shown, however, that it is practically impossible to prevent them from keeping the portion of production that they intend to use for their own personal consumption, thereby evading rationing, and thereby also increasing—by a corresponding amount—the levy that is imposed upon other parts of the population.

Rationing’s second feature is that it subjects producers to a levy equal to the excess of the value of their daily production over the aggregate value of their daily rations. Therefore the higher a producer’s production, the more severely he is affected by rationing.

Hence, far from rewarding each person according to his own merits, rationing constitutes a veritable method of penalizing production, and it is therefore an essentially Malthusian procedure.

We can see that for each rationing system, whether egalitarian or differential, there is a given distribution of the burden of financing public expenditure. In theory, the same distribution could have been arrived at by levying a tax on the producer’s income and allowing him to retain only those resources representing the aggregate value of the rations that one intends to allot him.

There is no doubt, for instance, that obtaining the daily indemnity of 500 million French francs—which occupying Germany imposed on occupied France—through taxation would not have reduced the standard of living of the French people more than did the rationing policy required by the Treasury deficit. Moreover, however paradoxical this may sound, the French people could have been spared all the inconveniences, all the disorders and scandals, and all the production declines that production controls brought about. Furthermore, taxation would have been preferable to rationing as it would have permitted the tax assessed on each citizen to be suitably adjusted to his personal, or his family’s, ability to contribute.

Implementing such a tax might perhaps have been difficult, but its theoretical possibility demonstrates the crude nature of the fiscal mechanism that rationing represents; it shows that rationing cannot take into account the aggregate resources of the taxpayer, and therefore cannot ensure an equitable distribution of the tax burden.

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§5. The Need for a Plan

For a system of financing based on price controls and rationing to be effective, it is necessary that rations be established in such a way that they limit—at any period of time—the aggregate volume of the rights that may be filled in the market to the volume of the rights that have been emptied there.

This limitation has to be ensured, with the volume of false rights filled by the state running a deficit taken into account; it therefore has to reduce, by this same volume, the purchasing power of market suppliers, and thus force them to demand only that which remains supplied after the state has served itself.

Any rationing policy therefore presents a dual problem: calculating the rations and putting an enforcement system in place.

The aggregate value of the rations allotted have to be equal, during any period of time, to the value of production. So as to avoid any changes in the price scale within an unchanging general price level, however, and also for the sake of simplicity, practical systems of rationing do not restrict themselves to this aggregate equality; they directly equalize the volume of the rights emptied and the volume of the rights filled in each market sector, thereby achieving—through this intermediary—the sought-for aggregate equality in the market as a whole.

To ensure these partial equalizations, the rationing authority must be informed, at any period of time, as to the volume of rights emptied onto each market sector, and it must adjust the volume of rations in that sector accordingly. This adjustment process constitutes the planning process, which is the basis of any rationing policy.

The plan is the document that compares the quantities of each article supplied with the rations allotted. If a plan is balanced and implemented precisely, it will ensure Treasury equilibrium, regardless of the scope of governmental action.

Thus, the problem of a plan is the search for a solution to a vast system of equations. As such, the problem is infinitely complex, because all its elements are interdependent and none of them are set.

Once individual prices are immobilized, production is no longer adjusted to consumers’ tastes by the price mechanism. The planning authority will therefore have to choose, from among countless possibilities, the use it will make of available production resources.

This very volume of available resources is undetermined, however. Furthermore, since rationing inflicts a higher levy on those who produce more, 646 rationing constantly encourages producers to limit production to the level of the rations allotted to them. This level of rations, however, always has to be lower than the volume of production, since the difference is the amount necessary to fill the false rights of the state running a deficit. Therefore rationing will tend to reduce the volume of production to zero.

The state can escape this consequence only by making mandatory the production it considers essential—in other words, by “organizing” production by force of law.

The plan, therefore, cannot limit itself to passively adjusting the rations to a volume of production taken as a certain given; instead, the plan will have to determine both the nature and the quantity of this production.

As a result, the planning authority will have to replace the individual wills in determining productive activities.

The planning authority will manage to do so without too many difficulties when the needs to be satisfied are the state’s. A state at war, for example, knows what it needs and can set the hierarchy of needs to be satisfied.

When it comes to individual needs, however, the choice will be more complex if the choice is to be made consciously. The planning authority, because of an inability to base this choice on a direct knowledge of individual desires or needs, will have to presume them. The planning authority will establish consumer categories: children, adults, the elderly. It may even differentiate rations within each category, depending on age or the kind of labor supplied. The hierarchy of needs at the base of this plan will, however, be only a crude and largely arbitrary approximation of the hierarchy that the price mechanism would have constructed on the basis of the diversity of individual tastes, so as to directly adjust—in the best interest of the community—the allocation of productive resources to this hierarchy.

It goes without saying that rationing will ensure Treasury equilibrium only if it prevents the rights to which no “ration” has been allotted from being filled with anything other than Treasury bills or the money that can represent them.

Therefore, the plan will need to cover all articles that may be acquired: if it is to exist at all, the plan will have to be comprehensive in scope.

It is therefore in the immense area of all possible disorders that the plan will have to sketch, at the discretion of the authorities in charge, the order it will impose on the community whose fate it determines.

For the plan to succeed, it will not be enough for it to be balanced; the plan also has to be implemented effectively. Implementation raises a tremendous problem of constraining all individual wills as a whole, those of producers as well 647 as those of consumers. We have already 11 sought to describe the nature of the required solutions and the scope of the police problem this presents for governments that are devoid of any supernatural power to scan consciences and that are often unable to inspire faith in the effectiveness of their constraining power.

§6. The Philosophy of the Plan

a) Rationing: The Art of Erasing the Consequences of Lying, through Further Lying

It is often said that rationing is simply the inevitable consequence of scarcity and the means of ensuring an equitable distribution of this scarcity.

However reasonable such statements may appear to be, they are mendacious: we have already shown that an appropriate system of taxation could produce the same results as rationing and be even more equitable.

Under a true rights system, scarcity would have required no rationing and no plan; the volume of the rights assigned would have been limited exactly to the volume of the articles of wealth capable of filling them, however insufficient these may have been relative to the needs to be met.

Under a false rights system, rationing and planning are essential, not because of a shortage of articles of wealth but because of an excess of rights to enclose them.

It is because the state has created rights without content that the state has to prevent these rights from being filled. The state created false rights because it wanted to govern without acknowledging that it imposes levies, and not because it wanted to govern without imposing levies.

Rationing and planning are simply specific means of financing, but means of the basest kind, because they only tend to conceal the levies they impose.

This is not without precedent. If you should find some “pernicious innovation,” Tocqueville contends, try to get to the root of the evil, and you will find some financial expedient that has become an institution: “To pay the debts of a day, powers were created which lasted centuries. These institutions [Tocqueville refers here to the system of venal offices] were devised in order to obviate the necessity of convening the Estates-[General], and to conceal from the public eye taxes which the government dared not exhibit in an honest light.”12

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In forbidding rights created without content from being filled, rationing is only the art of erasing, through further lying, the consequences of the lie.

b) The Black Market, the Consequence of Governmental Duplicity

Unlike taxation, rationing does not eliminate the rights it prevents from being filled with true articles of wealth. Neither does rationing prevent the holders of these rights from wanting the content for these rights that is, in their eyes, the most desirable content. Rationing merely attaches a constraining sanction to the act through which rights could be filled with articles of wealth in excess of the rights holder’s rations. If a rights holder manages to successfully evade a constraining sanction, he will increase the total desirability of his holdings.

The quest for maximum desirability therefore creates the black market. It is in the black market that tend to be filled—shielded from constraining sanctions—those rights that the plan intends, through constraint, to provide with a content consisting of claims or money.

Certainly, someone who buys in the black market breaks the law and can be convicted. But if he is set on breaking the law, it is because the state practically encourages him to do so by giving him rights that he is immediately forbidden to fill but that are not distinguishable from those rights that provide their holder with full freedom of disposal .

Rationing is like distributing rifles and cartridges while forbidding people to hunt. “To give and retain is not permitted,” holds the wisdom of nations.13 Allowing and forbidding at the same time is even more contradictory.

In truth, the attitude of governments indignant at the existence of a black market, which they have not only made possible but sustained by creating the rights that are filled there, would simply be laughable if it did not entail profound and probably irreparable damage to economic life and public morality.

c) The Plan, an Instrument of Economic Malthusianism

If rationing were eliminated overnight, nearly all rights holders would change the makeup of their assets. This simple fact is sufficient to show that rationing forces rights holders to accept assets that do not provide maximum desirability in their eyes.

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The reduction in the desirability of their patrimonies 14 results from two factors.

In the first instance, people emptying true articles of wealth onto the market are indirectly forced to fill a portion of the enclosing rights—the portion exceeding the volume of the allotted rations—with money or with claims.

Note, however, that the taxation that would have rendered rationing unnecessary, if it had been distributed in the same manner as the levy resulting from rationing, would have led to the same reduction in purchasing power.

But it is within the very rights filled with true articles of wealth that rationing, in reducing the freedom of choice of owners, reduces in an absolute manner the desirability of the articles of wealth they acquire.

We do not intend, here, to return to the points of production theory. Let us simply observe that freezing prices and limiting the quantities that may be acquired creates a situation where producers and buyers supply and demand articles of wealth that are different from those they would have supplied and demanded if they had been left free in their choice—articles of wealth, therefore, that are not those that provide them with maximum desirability.

The planning authorities can, it is true, set themselves the task of providing individuals with the greatest possible desirability, within the rights that the planning authorities allow individuals to fill.

Although such an objective can, in theory, be attained at a given instant of time—even though it is highly improbable—it cannot be attained on a permanent basis.

The circumstances of production, the state of the art of technology, and consumers’ tastes are ever changing. The rigidity of the plan rules out the continuous adjustment of productive resources, which is the only means of providing the maximum desirability to which the price mechanism leads.

The output of the productive apparatus is impaired not only because of the imperfection of planning, however, but also—and foremost—because a plan creates a situation where producers are disinterested in this output, since the volume of the rights that they can fill depends not on their own production but only on the rations allotted to them. When one knows to what extent exerted effort depends on the will of the person who is engaged in the effort, when one is aware of the constant strain that productivity requires, it is not possible to doubt that a system that makes a producer disinterested in the results of his 650 production will inevitably result in a tremendous decline in the volume of available goods.

Thus, a plan is Malthusian in every respect: it enables the state to increase its share of national income, in an obscurity favorable to unmentionable purposes, but a plan does this by reducing welfare more than the level of government interventions would require if these interventions had been financed—by either liberal or authoritarian methods—without any false rights being assigned.

§7. The Technique of the Plan

The technique of the plan comprises two separate domains: preparation and implementation.

The preparation of a plan involves determining the nature and quantity of the rights that will have to be emptied and may be filled during each period of time, and constantly maintaining the latter at the level of the former.

Designing such an operation is different from grasping its full complexity, however. In order to appreciate this, consider that, in order to be effective, a plan has to cover all goods traded in the market, that all productions are interdependent, and that these different productions have to be coordinated in space and over time.

To be developed consciously, the plan will have to be a choice from among all possible solutions, but these solutions are literally infinite in number. Each one of them can only be judged by determining its aggregate desirability, with regard to the goals the planning authority has set itself.

Note, however, that when these objectives are public ones, for instance when a state is at war, the state’s direct knowledge of the needs to be met allows for a hierarchy of needs to be established with some degree of certainty. When these needs are individual needs, however, the planning authority can only assume them, unless it prefers to force upon consumers those products it considers to be the most desirable ones.

Once a plan is prepared, regardless of whether it is well suited to the needs to be met, it will have to be implemented.

Its implementation requires strict compliance, on the part of all producers and consumers, with its edicts.

For producers, this condition will be met only by instituting a discipline that eliminates any freedom or initiative in the use of their productive resources. Their only task will be to carry out the plan.

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This discipline will require a hierarchical organization and mandatory participation.

The forms of this organization can be quite varied: organizing committees, trusts, [economic] cartels, corporatist organizations, total or partial nationalization—all of these are means of subjecting the productive apparatus to a directing will.

Whichever form it takes, the organization will require authoritarian allocation of labor, thus the elimination of any freedom of movement and choice of trade for workers; authoritarian allocation of raw materials; imposition of techniques; control and monitoring of inventions.

This organization will have to be applied not only to industry proper but also to artisanry and agriculture. In agriculture, it will involve an authoritarian determination of which crops will be grown, the allocation of seed, and mandatory commercialization.

For consumers, the implementation of the plan will require the establishment of procedures limiting their demands to the volume of rations that have been allotted to them. Ration coupons, mandatory registration, and authoritative distribution will enable the governing authorities to substitute, for the demands that individuals would have freely chosen, the demands that the planning authority has chosen for them.

This distribution mechanism will naturally eliminate all choice based on difference in quality or on the subtle differences that can differentiate a product by its origin and circumstances of production. Thus, for instance, ordinary wine from official supplies will replace the diverse vintages that local soils can produce. Consumers will no longer be able to obtain this or that cut of meat on the basis of their preference, but will simply obtain “meat.”

It should be observed, however, that the impossibility of distinguishing among products on the basis of quality will inevitably lead to quality assurance being neglected or, more likely, to the unfortunate diversion of those products that are less bad than the others to some kind of black market.

We will not belabor the point; we will only observe, in conclusion, that the system of total planning is the one that the creation of false rights has forced all governments—be they conservative or revolutionary, liberal or socialist—to follow. For example, the Vichy government both wanted to be and saw itself as being conservative, but without realizing it and by the sole imperative of its deficit, the Vichy government was forced to impose a degree of socialization on the country that no socialist government would ever have dared to put into place.

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IV. Social Disorder or Slavery, the Only Choice Offered to Governments Based on False Rights

The preceding analysis casts light on the choice available to governments based on false rights.

If they are content to increase the volume of certain rights without providing rights holders with the certainty that they can empty the content of their rights as they wish, such governments create social disorder, which is characteristic of markets with controlled prices.

This is the case of governments that pay for certain expenditures with claims that are priced above their market value.

This was the case, also, of the French government in 1934, when it set a minimum price for wheat without providing for the absorption of the excess wheat supplied but not demanded at that price.

Lastly, this is also the case of all governments that set minimum wages above the equilibrium level, or allow them to be set above that level, without introducing a system of unemployment benefits to ensure the purchasing of the labor services that are supplied but not demanded at the legal price.

In creating unsalable articles of wealth, all these procedures render the ability to dispose, which is promised by property rights of ownership, illusory. They thoroughly debase legal systems and give rise to social disturbances, of which long lines of people waiting outside stores, accumulations of inventory, and unemployment are the deplorable manifestations.

If governments based on false rights wish to ward off these disorders without eliminating the cause that gave rise to them, they have only one option available to them: make eligible for discount the false claims they have created.

In so doing, they transform the rights that enclosed these claims into true rights, by restoring to these rights the ability to dispose, which is characteristic of true rights. But [in so doing] they transfer ownership of the false rights to currency holders. They thereby substitute the gradual depletion of metallic reserves (under a convertible currency system), or a continuous rise in the general price level (under an inconvertible currency system), for the disorders resulting from their initial intervention.

The depletion of metallic reserves, however, necessarily leads to currency inconvertibility and thus also to a continuous rise in the general price level. Yet a sustained rise in the general price level is, itself, the cause of profound social 653 disturbances such as experienced by Germany, Austria, most central European countries, and, to a lesser extent, France between 1920 and 1925.

The eligibility of false claims for discount therefore does not eliminate the social disorder that is inherent in a government without levies, but simply restricts itself to altering the form of disorder.

Thus, if it wishes to eliminate the disturbances necessarily associated with monetary debasement, the government that is unable or unwilling to restore financial order has only one option: impose the planned order upon the disorder generated by false rights.

To succeed in so doing, however, the government has to abolish the general privilege to dispose, which is attached to holding a property right of ownership. Therefore, the government has to create a situation where a buyer can buy only that which the government wants him to buy, and where a supplier has to supply everything the government wants him to supply. Hence, a producer will no longer be free to choose what he produces, nor will the worker be free to choose his own job. Man will no longer be able to change his trade or his residence without jeopardizing economic equilibrium. He will be bound to the plan, just as serfs were once bound to the soil.

Not only man’s labor but also the use of his own leisure will need to be controlled. Any unforeseen demand would disturb the equilibrium that has been so painstakingly achieved. No individual dreams, no choices dictated by circumstances will be allowed: the only desires that may be expressed are those whose satisfaction has been anticipated and provided for under the plan.

People will say, indeed, that ordered around in all that relates to his material life, man will remain free in his spiritual activities. Who does not see, however, the fragility of the freedom that will in this way be left him?

In the technical field, any innovative activity will have to be strictly controlled. The only inventions that may be implemented will be those wanted by the authors of the plan. The only research that will be encouraged, if not authorized, will be research they approve of. All discoveries and all inventions, however, have always been made against “competent” authorities. There are practically none that were not, initially, opposed by nearly all experts. Progress is the work of rebellious people; to control it is almost always to prohibit it.

Even in the realm of pure thought, however, the plan will require strict discipline. Any new concept, any change in collective sentiment, will threaten its equilibrium. The planning authorities will not resist the temptation to extend their grip to the realm of ideas, because there are few ideas that could not—654directly or indirectly—influence the behavior of private individuals and thereby have economic and social consequences.

Does our recent lived experience not suffice to dispel any doubt? Is there one single area in which the Frenchman subjected to the plan, be it as a producer or consumer, worker or tradesman, landlord or person of means, student or teacher, thinker or scientist, felt that he remained free between 1940 and 1944? Everything—the choice of his food just as the choice of his activities, the choice of his newspapers or books, his movies or lectures, his likes or dislikes—everything was dictated by a constraining power, unless he had, by renouncing any human dignity in advance, sold his soul to the constraining power by becoming part of its enterprise.

Under a system of total planning, there is no such thing as a free man. Every man, like cattle in a barn, receives his daily ration and has to perform the tasks assigned to him by the plan.

Thus, if a government in deficit wants to avoid disorder, it will have to impose slavery.

Certainly, such a government can cover up the constraints it imposes on people by an ideological veil. Like the National Socialist government, or the Vichy government, it may present these constraints as living up to lofty egalitarian objectives or as constituting a program of social progress. It may adorn them with community goals or with considerations of national unity.

These are only fallacious appearances, however, which are moreover emphasized by the contradiction between the stated goals and the results that are achieved.

In reality, slavery will be the bitter fruit of the deficit. Policies of planning became widespread throughout the world after the 1929 crisis, because price declines—in the absence of the monetary devaluations that could have been able to prevent them—had created serious budget deficits nearly everywhere. Germany was aware of the policies required by the deficit earlier than other countries, because Germany added to this general financial disorder an enormous armaments program, which it did not want to, or could not, finance in full light of day.

It is because governments, consciously or not, wanted to govern without levying that they were forced, so as to avoid the disorders inherent in their deficits, to impose a planned order upon their respective populations.

To populations that live in a state of financial disequilibrium, the only choice available is that between social disorder and slavery.

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Chapter XXXVI: Conclusion to Part VI: The Ethics of Human Societies

Readers were no doubt surprised that we referred as civilizations to systems that seemed to differ primarily in their economic characteristics: civilizations with true rights and civilizations with false rights.

We shall show, however, that this qualifier is fully justified, because they are based on opposite conceptions of man, his nature, and his purposes, and that they are, by their consequences, the very basis of the human condition.

§1. The False Right, an Instrument to Govern Immature Peoples

Societies need to be governed because certain necessary tasks would not be carried out if individuals were left to themselves.

In order to carry them out, a government removes, from its nationals’ ability to dispose freely, a portion of their wealth, which varies with the degree of government intervention.

Under a true rights system, this levy is systematically effected, through taxation in a liberal system, and through legal or regulatory restrictions upon property rights of ownership in an authoritarian system.

The levy is perhaps more apparent, therefore more consciously deliberate, under a liberal system than under an authoritarian regime, but in either case, the levy is effected, and in either case, the governmental intervention cannot be dissociated from the decision that provides the means of performing the intervention.

Thus, any act of government raises the question of the desirability of the end pursued, compared with the undesirability of the means used.

By contrast, under a false rights system, the government spends but does not levy. It is true that the levy is collected, but independently of any govern656mental decision. The levy results from the unsalability of certain assets, from the rise in prices, or from the depletion of metallic reserves.

In all cases, the levy strikes people in their standard of living, but not in their bookkeeping. The levy is not directly related to its cause.

Such a method of government prevents any comparison between the benefits of government intervention and the sacrifices involved. This method highlights the benefits and conceals the costs.

As a result, it makes possible acts of government that would otherwise have appeared intolerable in relation to their financial consequences.

A government based on false rights enables all the aesthetes of the social structure, the champions of the small producer, and the admirers of ancient techniques to turn their dreams into reality, without having to openly ask this simple question: Does the beauty of the result justify the sacrifices it inflicts?

A government based on false rights is an instrument for spectacular achievements. It can build pyramids and amphitheaters, super highways and magnificent town halls. It makes possible the construction of railroads with no traffic and of ocean liners without passengers, or the undertaking of municipal works plans and the grandest of “public works” projects. Everything is allowed to this government, because the hard accounting reality never forces it to weigh the benefits of its undertakings against the suffering they will cause.

A government based on false rights can carry people away in seeking satisfactions that would vanish in the full light of conscious thought. Living space, the right of access to raw materials, and all the myths of economic autarky can be guides to government action only to those who do not recognize the immense reduction in well-being they imply.

False rights constitute the instrument of policies whose aims are not, or cannot be, acknowledged. False rights allow such policies to be imposed upon populations, because they conceal these policies’ costs.

False rights constitute a method for governing immature peoples, those whom one leads like children, by obfuscating the true consequences of the acts carried out in their name, and doing it in such a way that people cannot relate to their actual causes the sacrifices these acts inflict upon them.

§2. The Mockery of Democracies with False Rights

The practice of a government based on false rights appears particularly ridiculous in the systems that make control of governmental authority by the people 657 the very principle of their constitution. False rights effectively deprive popular sovereignty of one of its essential features: the ability to precisely determine the amount of levies imposed for the financing of governmental action and to ensure the levies’ distribution among individual patrimonies. False rights hand over the implementation of these levies to blind and indiscriminate mechanisms, such as unsalability, a rise in prices, depletion of metallic reserves, or rationing. False rights allow for no basic exemptions, no progressivity, and no possibility of any conscious management of the sacrifices involved.

When the deficit is considerable in scope, the portion of the levy effected through taxation, or through legal or regulatory restrictions on property rights of ownership, is small compared with the portion that is automatically distributed by the interplay of forces set into motion by the deficit.

Voting on taxes then becomes a ceremony devoid of any real meaning. Under a false rights system, democracy is nothing more than a fool’s plaything, just good enough to divert the attention of the general public away from a tragedy it is not allowed to see.

§3. False Rights, Destroyer of Individual Responsibilities

False rights not only alter the nature of governmental action, but they also profoundly affect the status of private individuals, at least as long as false rights are not drained by the monetary drain.

Man cannot be held responsible for his actions unless he controls their consequences.

How could a defaulting farmer be penalized, if his wheat has been rendered unsalable as a result of a decision that is totally beyond his control?

How could a man be expected to be gainfully employed in a world where, even though he wishes to work, he may be unable to find a taker for his services?

How can an entrepreneur hold himself personally responsible for the contractual obligations he takes on if, tomorrow, a quota forbids him from trading for coal the cash balance he has built up for this purpose?

How can a manufacturer be sent to bankruptcy if he is forced to produce under a system where costs and sales prices are set by the state or by an organizing committee?

Finally, how can a man be responsible for his fate and that of his family if the savings he has accumulated for old age or against possible misfortunes disappear as a result of inflation he could neither foresee nor avoid?

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Man can be held legitimately responsible for the consequences of his actions only if he chooses them freely, and he will choose them freely only insofar as he can actually exercise the ability to dispose that which his rights promise him.

In a system where this ability becomes contingent, individual responsibility disappears.

A man who has lost control of his own fate no longer deserves either the joys or the sorrows he experiences. Ethics and law can still be taught to him, [and can] perhaps even be applied to him, but to such a man, these can only be the illegitimate relics of a bygone era. They will inevitably fall into disuse, because the type of man for whom they had been established no longer exists. Along with them will also disappear all the ideas that our religious teachings, our morals, and our codes had taught us to respect, and which made for human greatness and dignity.

§4. True or False Rights, Foundations of the Human Condition

The preceding analysis shows that the human condition is in no way set in stone by nature.

In a society with true rights, man has the certainty that he can actually perform, within the domain he owns, all possible acts. Under the constant outward push of his desires, his imagination can run its free course: no obstacle will thwart the wills to which it gives rise. And his acts, however unpredictable they may be, will never bring about social disorders, or a rise in the general price level, or depletion of metallic reserves.

In contrast, in a society with false rights the owner of an object can dispose of it only to the extent he finds a counterpart prepared to receive it. Every day, certain rights holders—rights whose aggregate volume depends only on the level at which prices have been arbitrarily set—are forbidden from performing acts that they have the right to perform and that they wish to perform.

Their expectations, their disappointments, and the efforts they make in order to avoid them generate social disorder.

If, in spite of everything, one wants to ensure the veracity of their rights, the false claims enclosed in these rights will be made eligible for discount. The continuous rise in the general price level or the gradual depletion of metallic reserves will then substitute collective disorder for the disturbances that result from controlling or fixing certain prices.

Quite rapidly, and inevitably, these disorders will be felt to be intolerable.

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To avoid these disorders, without wanting to or being able to eliminate their causes, there will be no alternative other than to impose a planned order upon the disorder resulting from the deficit. To succeed in this endeavor, however, the use that each private individual will make of his own rights will have to be set by force of law. These rights will cease to be areas of freedom and will become “rations.” Man will only be able to perform, within his own domain, those acts that others have chosen for him. His appetites and desires will cease to be the only source of his will. He will no longer be a person striving for the ends that he has freely chosen, but rather an object controlled from the outside, like a slave commanded by his master or a piece of machinery controlled by its operator.

And in this way, the legal system acquires its full significance. In its original purity, it is the admirable instrument of human dignity, forged by thousands of years of painful experience, to provide men with freedom’s benefits without inflicting upon them its disorders.

Its mere existence does not, however, ensure its effectiveness. The jurist may decree it, but it remains illusory unless brought about by the economist. If the volume of a right is set a priori by immobilizing the price of the article of wealth it encloses, the effectiveness of the legal system will be irremediably compromised. The system retains the appearance of its virtues, but loses all of their substance. And man, upon whom the legal system conferred the remarkable privilege of being, in the social order, a responsible and free being, is relegated to the status of cattle in the barn before being brought down to the level of a slave in a labor penitentiary.1

The legal system is the invisible foundation of the freedom of men. Anyone who jeopardizes its integrity, regardless of his underlying motives, is guilty of a crime that nothing can atone for: the crime against human dignity.

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Part VII: Political Conclusions

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Chapter XXXVII: Require Financial Order or Accept Slavery

§1. Since Hitler, the Option Facing Governments Based on False Rights Is Only a Theoretical One: Any Major and Prolonged Deficit Will Necessarily Lead to Slavery

A government based on false rights leads to this choice: social disorder or slavery.1

Until 1930, the deficit always placed the countries that engaged in it on the path to social disorder.

Germany, Austria, Hungary, and even, to a lesser extent, France had this painful experience after the First World War. The rise in the general price level—which was the unavoidable result of disorders resulting from the deficit—itself helped to restore normalcy, however. In reducing the burden of fixed charges, the rise in the general price level created conditions favorable for the restoration of financial order. It entailed considerable injustice and extreme suffering, however, in particular among the classes most worthy of concern. This was tolerated only because it was perceived as a kind of natural catastrophe, just as unavoidable as a tidal wave or an earthquake.

Since Hitler, however, prospects are entirely different.

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History will assess his role in developing the system that neutralizes false rights. In any case, since Hitler’s accession to power, governments have been aware that the tidal wave is no longer inevitable: from now on, they will never refrain from avoiding it.

The events that reduced to nothing the German and Austrian currencies between 1920 and 1924 will never recur, at least as long as some kind of governmental apparatus remains. As soon as the effects of a deficit are felt, as soon as the first signs of social disorder appear, a decisive remedy will be applied: false rights will be neutralized through the imposition of general rationing.

General rationing and the economic organization it entails destroy all individual liberties, however. In bringing these about, the deficit will have veritably created a state of slavery.

Thus, since Hitler, the choice facing governments based on false rights is merely a theoretical one. In fact, any major and prolonged deficit will necessarily lead to slavery.

§2. The Deficit, However, Only Provides One Privilege: That of Lying

It is true that some people will be gladly prepared to relinquish their freedom in exchange for an increase in welfare. They will accept life in the cattle barn, if this means safety and plenty.

The entire preceding analysis shows, however, that a deficit does not increase governmental capabilities.

Nothing more can be obtained from the deficit than can be obtained, under a government based on true rights, from the liberal method of taxation or from the authoritarian method of legal or regulatory restrictions on property rights of ownership.

A deficit does not enable a government to do more, but only to not say what it is actually doing.

A deficit enables governments to pay war indemnities without requiring their population to provide the necessary means of paying for them, to build super highways, to restructure entire cities, to build palaces, without ever levying upon the taxpayer the means of financing their projects. A deficit, above all, allows governments to carry out massive armament programs without increasing taxes and without subjecting themselves to controls by those who have to pay for the programs.

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A deficit does not increase governmental capabilities. It provides governments with only one privilege, that of lying.

§3. Be Liberals or Be Socialists, but Do Not Be Liars

Any governmental end can be attained within the framework of a government based on true rights, through the direct or indirect transfer to the governing authority of the wealth required.

Under a true rights system, governmental capabilities are limited only by the levies collected. A government based on true rights will be able to govern as long as it pleases it to do so; in particular, it can be as generous as it wishes in its social policy, but only by systematically taking from some people that which it gives to other people—in other words, only if it does not conceal the existence, or the cost, of its interventions.

In theory, the levy can be collected by using either the liberal method of taxation or the authoritarian method of legal or regulatory restrictions on property rights of ownership. In fact, however, each of these methods is more or less suited to the specific problem to be resolved. We have shown that when government intervention is a straightforward act of disposal, such as is implied in the provision of public services, the fiscal method of taxation is generally the most economical method, whereas, in contrast, for governing mores, such as regulating work hours or labor conditions, the authoritarian method is the only practical one.

Thus, for reasons of expediency, there are very few cases where one or the other method is not necessarily called for. Personally, I have never seen a socialist, however “progressive” he may be, who is opposed to taxation for the purpose of financing public services, or a liberal, however “reactionary” he may be, who did not agree that only authoritarian methods are suitable for the regulation of work hours.

The choice between the liberal and the authoritarian methods—polemically, the latter would be referred to as socialist—is therefore generally imposed by the nature of the proposed intervention. The problem it raises is nearly always a pseudoproblem.

In contrast, the choice between a systematic and consciously assessed levy and a hidden and spontaneous levy—in other words, the choice between a government based on true rights and a government based on false rights—is a substantive problem: that of a choice between truth and falsehood.

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In opting for truth, one chooses the path to dignity and human freedom; in opting for falsehood, one chooses the path to debasement and slavery.

Can all of you, who wish to remain human beings and whom recent years have taught what slavery means, doubt the seriousness of this problem?

France was no longer at war and yet she lived in slavery. The reason why the government of France forced slavery upon her people was because the government had to pay Germany without saying so to the French people. Rationing, which was justified by preposterous ideological arguments, has been nothing but a fantastic vehicle for falsehoods.

And do you truly believe that it is by pure chance that all countries running a deficit have resorted to the same policy?

Is this the kind of system that you wish to have? Certainly not. You want a humane and generous policy, but you would like this policy to be conducted in freedom and dignity.

Therefore, please heed me: be liberals or be socialists, but do not be liars.

§4. The Number One Problem of the Postwar Period: The Fate of Human Civilization

The problem of choosing between a government based on true rights and a government based on false rights will arise with particular acuteness after the war. The privations suffered and the enormous devastation caused will create tremendous needs. To these needs will be added pressing social claims justified by the inhumane wage levels that the desire to finance through rationing has maintained.

If these needs and claims are satisfied consciously and the necessary wealth has been levied through taxation or borrowing—therefore without creating any false claims eligible for discount—then the problem can be brought under control. The mass of false claims will cease to grow, and consolidation of those inherited from past deficits will be possible. Within a relatively short period of time, men will regain freedom.

If, on the contrary, these needs and claims are satisfied without the necessary resources being levied through taxation or borrowing, if, therefore, they are met through the creation of false claims eligible for discount, then the problem will be unsolvable.

Not only will it be impossible to consolidate existing false claims, but their mass will increase each day by the amount of additional claims resulting from the daily deficit.

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Men will escape disorder only by accepting to live in the system of the cattle barn, forever. They will eat whatever food they receive from their master and will perform the work that has been chosen for them, at the location that will be imposed upon them. They will read the books and the papers that their master has provided to them, listen to whatever radio programs he has allowed them to listen to, and—if they are still able to think—they will have the thoughts that have been suggested to them.

Everything that makes for the beauty and grandeur of human life will be irretrievably lost. And this immense disaster, which will have eliminated man so as to leave in his place only a creature devoid of any human features, will have only one sole purpose: to enable governments to lie freely, without the people experiencing, through disorder, the effects of the budget deficit.

The very existence of human civilization—this is what is at stake in the postwar period. Whether we lose or save it depends on us alone.

If we choose financial order, then we will have restored man to his remarkable dignity as a conscious and free being. If we opt for deficits, we will have definitively condemned him to debasement and enslavement.

In the latter case, the war will have had the paradoxical outcome of consolidating the regime it opposed.

We stand at the crossroads. Our choice will determine our future, the future of our children, and that of our children’s children. If they are to remain human beings, there is only one solution: forget Hitler’s teachings and reject, with all our might, financial falsehood, which drags toward the abyss the accumulated treasures of the whole of human civilization.

§5. A Few Suggestions concerning the Art of Politics

The postwar political problem is thus revealed in its cruel simplicity: Is there any prospect of governments, whatever their objectives may be, reverting to the methods of conscious levies, which are characteristic of financial order?

I cannot hide that, in the absence of a tremendous rectification effort, the prospects of this happening appear, to me, to be extremely bleak indeed.

The establishment of financial order has always been a difficult task, because it requires giving up concrete advantages in exchange for a mere abstraction in the form of equilibrium between revenue and expenditure.

For a government, to renounce a deficit is to remain constantly at the level of its abilities; it is to renounce the glory of bold endeavors, the great conquests 668 that make men immortal, or the edifices that perpetuate their memory; it is to limit economic investment activities, projects that redistribute wealth, interventions that redress inequalities or social injustice, and it is to deny itself all the entreaties of generosity and interest.

Before Hitler’s time, governments’ resistance was strengthened by a sense of the disorders that their weakness would surely have brought about. Now, however, governments have learned that such disorders are no longer inevitable. They know that they can reap the pleasant fruits of a deficit with no injury to men other than a total—but concealed—slavery.

Henceforth, there will be no policy more heroic than the safeguarding of the financial order. Yet men may be courageous either because it is their duty or because they are forced to be courageous.

Any policy aimed at safeguarding human freedom has to either make them clearly understand the fatal consequences of a deficit or render these consequences so undesirable to them that they renounce deficits out of a concern for their own self-interest.

a) The First Key to the Art of Politics: Teaching Economic Theory

To make men understand the consequences of a deficit is to teach them the theory that this book has, quite imperfectly, sought to formulate. Some will smirk at such a method. These are the people who believe that principles can sometimes bring about speeches, but never action.

I, for one, refuse to be so pessimistic. From political experience acquired over the course of a long administrative career, I draw the certainty that government leaders often follow the easiest path simply because they do not perceive clearly enough why they should do otherwise. What they lack is not so much courage as reasons for having courage.

Many people are prepared to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of the general interest, but they have to know what it is that the general interest requires of them.

The complacency of the human mind, however, is such that, outside the full light of conscious thought, it always finds arguments that justify decisions that are inspired by passion or selfishness.

Thus, hazy theories have concluded that deficits hold countless social virtues. Men of good faith thought that a deficit was good policy, and made it their duty, never suspecting that, in developing deficits, they made the subjugation of their peoples inevitable. They did wrong in good conscience.

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These are the men who will have to be enlightened. If they can be convinced, then one of the main causes of financial disorder will have been eliminated.

In order to convince, however, it is not enough to declare; one has to demonstrate. The main purpose of this book is to provide convincing arguments. The analysis has at times been taken almost too far, in order to bring the demonstration to the point where it would become a motive for action for those who could be convinced.

The skeptics will of course observe that this book can only reach a narrow elite, whereas governments in modern states are guided, if not entirely determined, by the will of the masses.

The masses, however, are said to be beyond the reach of any economic theory, however rational it may be.

On this point also, I distance myself from the skeptics. I do not believe that it is impossible to make the simplest of human beings understand the consequences of a deficit. They have to admit that, if one has one hundred francs in order to buy an article that is worth fifty, the price will double, and that if one wants to avoid the price increase, then there is no alternative but to prevent the demander from spending half his resources as he would like.

This, people can understand. And when they have understood, only people of bad faith will be left to impose or accept a government without levies.

For the people to be taught, however, teachers are needed who believe. Only economic education can provide solid convictions to the people.

It is therefore in the teaching of economics that the first, the most important, and the most effective of all the keys to the art of politics is to be found: the one that leads men of goodwill to not believe that in the government of human societies, the best solution is the most desired one. It will inspire in them the conviction that all decisions are not equivalent, that there are allowable things and forbidden things, and by setting their line of action, economic education will give them the courage that ignorance—rather than cowardice—had deprived them of.

b) The Second Key: The Extension of Accounting Controls to the Decisions from Which the Account Is Derived

In addition to men of goodwill, however, there are people who are cynical and perverse. To such people, reason offers no rescue whatsoever. Only constraint can alter their behavior.

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Constraining people in government to financial equilibrium is to render undesirable to them the disequilibrium they wanted on the basis of its own consequences.

At present, there is no mode of constraint within the range of political remedies that has this objective. The cynical and perverse politician may reap the electoral fruits of a deficit without their desirability being reduced at any time by constraining sanctions.

It is such sanctions that have to be imposed.

The great weakness of financial jurisdictions is that they pass judgment on accounts, not on men. They will stigmatize a deficit, but never those responsible.

It is true that financial responsibilities are often diffuse. The proper role of a leader, however, is to take full responsibility upon himself.

The creation of false rights may result:

  • — from a budget that includes a patrimony deficit at the outset, because it assigns rights on the Treasury without any matching increase in the Treasury’s assets;
  • — from a breach of budgetary stipulations, during the implementation of the budget;
  • — from extrabudgetary operations, such as irrecoverable advances, or guarantees in favor of insolvent debtors.

In all these cases, a deficit can be traced back to an action taken by a cabinet minister or forced upon him by a sovereign decision of Parliament.

Even in this latter case, the minister does indeed incur responsibility, if he has not formally informed the Parliament of the financial consequences of its decision.

The judgment of the Audit Office will have no constraining influence unless it relates the deficit to the cause that brought it about, and unless it allows this cause to be imputed to the authority responsible for it.

For this to be so, it is necessary that the name of the minister who proposed the budget, and the name or names of the implementing minister or ministers, be indissolubly associated with the budget.

It is necessary that the Audit Office trace the origin of the disorders it finds, and that it identify and publicly shame the authority that made these disorders possible.

Lastly, it is necessary that Parliament and public opinion be sufficiently informed of the consequences of financial disorder so as to consider unfit for the 671 management of public affairs any cabinet minister who has committed, without justification, a crime against liberty.

Naturally, such a procedure would profoundly alter the functions of the Audit Office. The Audit Office would be vested with a formidable power of interpretation and appraisal, which would turn it into a supreme court in the full sense of the term. Would this power not be comparable, however, to the power exercised by the Council of State 2 when called upon to judge and assess certain administrative acts?

It will be said that such power of reprimand would seriously detract from parliamentary sovereignty. Determinations by the Audit Office, however, would concern only ministerial acts, and not decisions of Parliament. A determination by the Audit Office would only rule on whether the relevant minister has discharged the informative duties with regard to Parliament that are incumbent on him. Therefore, these determinations would fully respect popular sovereignty.

c) The Third Key: The Thesmothetae

Financial order would nevertheless remain exposed to grave dangers if Parliament remained free to disturb it at its will. Such dangers could only be avoided if some constitutional provision barred—except for reasons of public safety—any decision to create false rights.

In implementing such a provision, any democratic constitution should revert to the Greek tradition of the “Thesmothetae.” In the ancient Athenian republic, they were the supreme guardians of constitutional stability.3

The task of safeguarding financial order against any parliamentary initiatives likely to disturb it should be entrusted to these authorities.

The task of the Thesmothetae would consist in appraising not the social utility of the proposals submitted to Parliament but rather the proposals’ immediate and long-term financial impacts.

The Thesmothetae ought to hold an absolute veto power over any measures that might lead to the creation of false rights, except in those cases where it will have been solemnly established and proclaimed that public safety is at stake.

Their action would not prevent the Parliament from imposing the policy of its choice; it would merely force Parliament to provide for the means to successfully see the policy through while ensuring order and freedom.

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Their action would not undermine popular sovereignty; rather, it will have the effect of making popular sovereignty effective.

Indeed, the Thesmothetae would be invested with formidable power. Every arrangement will have to be made in order to ensure that they not fail in their mission.

They would have to be appointed for life by a body of the highest moral authorities in the nation. Like their ancient Athenian forerunners, they would have to be “nourished at the expense of the State.”

They would be, in the full sense of the term, the guardians of human liberties.

d) The International Nature—under a Metallic Currency System—of the Financial Problem

These various safeguards against financial disorder present a national character. Under a metallic currency system, however, the financial management of each gold standard country affects the fate of all the others. Financial order is therefore no longer a national matter, but first and foremost an international one.

Any community of nations that has as its main objective the safeguarding of human liberties would therefore have to include institutions that would endeavor to impose upon its members respect for the common principles of financial rectitude.

Such a community would also need to include, in conjunction with a supreme court of justice, an international audit office, which would pass judgments on national budgets and would be, in an incidental capacity, the sole effective guarantee of a disarmament policy, because of its investigative and inspection powers. National Thesmothetae should be designated by the supreme international authority, which they would represent.

It follows that such an organization would seriously infringe upon national sovereignties. No federal policy is feasible, however, unless national sovereignties are reduced in this way. And if these reductions cannot be achieved, then there can be no federal policy.

§6. Political Conclusion: It Is through the Deficit That Men Lose Their Freedom

Whatever they may be, technical recommendations will never be anything more than fragile obstacles on the road to deficits and slavery. Nothing can prevent a country that seeks catastrophes from obtaining them.

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Man’s future will be exactly as we make it. It is up to us to decide whether we will continue to accept or demand policies whose fruits will be entirely different from those we think we want.

A policy suited to its objectives, a conscious policy, such are the conditions for a turnaround on the road that leads to the abyss.

It is because it casts some light on the erring ways through which men cease to be free that this book hopes to bring a modest contribution to the immense effort of common sense and wisdom necessary to save, a second time, in the wake of victory,4 the precious heritage of human civilization.

For this book to bring action to bear, it is not enough for its conclusions to be true; its conclusions also have to be regarded as such.

In the political realm, the conclusions can be summarized as follows: it is through the deficit that men lose their freedom.

Such is the proposition on which every citizen seeking to preserve or recover his human quality has to express himself. If the proposition is false, let it be refuted; if it is true, let it be believed, but then ruthlessly debar from governmental activity all those who purport to give without taking, govern without levying, and lie without atoning.

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Bibliography

The first section of this bibliography is from the 1981 Collected Works (Plon Edition) version of The Social Order and contains references to writings by Rueff on, or related to, The Social Order.

The second section includes the references compiled by the French editors of the Collected Works, Emil-Maria Claassen and Georges Lane, primarily reviews of The Social Order cited by Claassen and Lane in their note to the reader, as well as works that are referred to by Rueff in the text but not directly referenced (such as De Maistre’s The Pope, quoted by Rueff but not cited in the original bibliography, and Strohl’s work on accounting) and other works to which I refer in footnotes to explain various translation decisions, as well as English versions of French works cited in the original text (where applicable, for the benefit of the Anglophone reader).

Works by Jacques Rueff

Note: Citations in this section are arranged chronologically.

Des Sciences Physiques aux Sciences Morales: Introduction à l’Etude de la Morale et de l’Economie Politique Rationnelles. Preface by C. Colson. Paris: Alcan, 1922. Second edition, with introduction, Paris: Payot, 1969.
In English translation (first edition): From the Physical to the Social Sciences: Introduction to a Study of Economic and Ethical Theory, introduction by H. Oliphant and A. Hewitt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929).
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 1.
“Le change, phénomène naturel” [Foreign exchange, a natural phenomenon]. Revue Générale des Sciences Pures et Appliquées 33 (November 1922): 645–656, and (December 1922): 680–687.
Reprinted in Bulletin de la Société d’Encouragement pour l’Industrie Nationale 135 (February 1923): 85–115; and Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris 64 (March 1923): 101–112, (April 1923): 155–164, and (May 1923): 196–206.
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Abridged version in L’Opinion (Revue de la Semaine Illustrée), December 1, 1922.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter VII.
“Sur une théorie de l’inflation” [On a theory of inflation]. Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris 66 (February 1925): 41–42, and (March 1925): 83–108.
Reprinted in Bulletin de la Société des Amis de l’Ecole Polytechnique, July 1925, 37–54, and October 1925.
Reprinted as a booklet: Sur une Théorie de l’Inflation (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925).
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter I.
“L’Economie politique, science statistique” [Political economy, a statistical science]. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, October–December 1925.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Théorie des Phénomènes Monétaires [A theory of monetary phenomena] (Paris: Payot, 1927), 7–20.
Reprinted in E. M. Claassen, ed., Les Fondements Philosophiques des Systèmes Economiques: Textes de Jacques Rueff et Essais Rédigés en son Honneur [The philosophical foundations of economic systems: Texts by Jacques Rueff and essays in his honor] (Paris: Payot, 1967), 69–78.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 2, Introduction.
Théorie des Phénomènes Monétaires (Statique) [A theory of monetary phenomena, static]. Paris: Payot, 1927.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 2.
“Les repercussions monétaires d’une politique douanière: l’application du tarif Fordney aux États-Unis en 1922” [The repercussions of a customs policy: The implementation of the Fordney tariff in the United States], in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 2, Ch. VIII section d, 417–426.
“Une erreur économique: L’organisation des transferts” [An economic error: The organization of transfers]. L’Information, November 4, 7, and 8, 1928.
Reprinted as a booklet: Une Erreur Economique: L’Organisation des Transferts (Paris: Doin, 1928).
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Le Lancinant Problème des Balances de Paiements [Balance of payments] (Paris: Payot, 1965), 95–114.
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In English translation: J. Rueff, “An Economic Error: The Organization of Transfers,” in Balance of Payments (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Chapter 4, 82–101.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II, Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter VIII.
“Les idées de M. Keynes sur le problème des transferts.” Revue d’Economie Politique 42 (June–July 1929): 1067–1081.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Le Lancinant Problème des Balances de Paiements (Paris: Payot, 1965), 115–129.
In English translation: “Mr. Keynes’ Views on the Transfer Problem,” Economic Journal 39 (September 1929): 388–399.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Balance of Payments (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Chapter 4, 101–115.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter IX.
“Les fluctuations anormales du pouvoir d’achat de l’or.” In Organisation Econonomique et Financière de la Société des Nations, ed., Documents Sélectionnés Soumis à la Délégation de L’Or du Comité Financier, 42–56. Geneva: Société des Nations, 1930.
This entire publication, including Rueff’s article, was published in English: “Undue Fluctuations of the Purchasing Power of Gold,” in Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations, ed., Selected Documents Submitted to the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee (Geneva: League of Nations, 1930), 42–56.
Reprinted in Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter II.
“Défense et illustration de l’étalon-or” [A defense and illustration of the gold standard]. In François Piétri et al., Les Doctrines Monétaires à l’Épreuve des Faits [Monetary doctrines put to the test of reality], 177–224. Paris: Alcan, 1932.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, L’Age de l’Inflation (Paris: Payot, 1963), 47–77.
In English translation: J. Rueff, “The Case for the Gold Standard,” in The Age of Inflation (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), 30–61.
Similar versions: “Face à la crise: La défense de l’étalon-or” [In the face of the crisis: A defense of the gold standard], Revue des Deux Mondes 102 (April 1932): 883–903; and “L’étalon-or et monnaie dirigée” [The gold standard and managed currency], X Informations 12 (April 1932): 252–253.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. III: Economic Policy (Paris: Plon, 1980), Book 2, Part 2, Section B, Chapter VI.
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“Une erreur économique du protectionnisme: L’argument de la balance commerciale” [An economic fallacy of protectionism: The trade balance argument], in Revue d’Economie Politique 46 (March–April 1933): 403–416; L’Européen, March 3, 1933.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, “Une proposition de marché commun, vieille de vingt-quatre ans” [A common market proposal, now twenty-four years old]. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche Commerciale 4, no. 12 (1957): 1–14.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Le Lancinant Problème des Balances de Paiements (Paris: Payot), 1965, 131–144.
In English translation: J. Rueff, “An All-Time Fallacy: The Trade-Balance Argument,” in Balance of Payments (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 116–129.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. III: Economic Policy (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 1, Chapter XIX, §2.
“Les problèmes économiques et financiers de la guerre totale” [The economic and financial problems of total war]. February 5, 1940. Unpublished.
Published in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. III: Economic Policy (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 1, Chapter XIV.
“Economie et finances de guerre” [War economics and finances]. Compiègne, 1940. Unpublished.
Published in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. III: Economic Policy (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 1, Chapter XV.
“Sur les fondements de l’ordre dans les sociétés humaines” [On the foundations of order in human societies]. Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, July–September 1947, 70–85.
“Sur la théorie quantitative et le phénomène de la régulation monétaire” [On the quantity theory of money and the phenomenon of monetary regulation]. Econometrica 17, Supplement (July 1949): 295–306.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter III.
“Economie de guerre” [War economy]. February 14, 1950. Unpublished.
Published in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. III: Economic Policy (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part 1, Chapter XVI.
“La régulation monétaire et le problème institutionnel de la monnaie.” Revue d’Economie Politique 63, no. 1 (January–February 1953): 5–43.
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Reprinted in J. Rueff, Le Lancinant Problème des Balances de Paiements (Paris: Payot, 1965), 149–189.
In English translation: “Influences Regulating the Amount of Currency and the Institutional Problem of Money.” Economia Internazionale 6, no. 3 (August 1953): 99–136.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Balance of Payments (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 137–178.
In German translation: “Die Quantitäts Theorie in neuer Formulierung,” Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Kreditwesen 6 (August 1953): 569–573.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Appendix to Chapter VI.
“La défense nationale dans l’Etat” [National defense in the framework of the state]. September 1955. Unpublished.
Published in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. III: Economic Policy (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 1, Part I, Chapter XVII.
Preface to P. Simon and L. Paves, Le Crédit à Moyen Terme [Medium-term credit], vii–xx. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955.
Reprinted as “Le crédit à moyen terme et la flexibilité monétaire” [Medium-term credit and monetary flexibility], Banque, February 1955, 72–77.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory, Book 2, Part 3, Chapter V.
“Eléments pour une théorie du taux d’escompte et de la balance des comptes.” Revue Economique 8, no. 4 (July 1957): 529–559.
Reprinted in J. Rueff, Le Lancinant Problème des Balances de Paiements (Paris: Payot, 1965), 191–229.
In English translation: J. Rueff, “Elements for a Theory of the Discount Rate and the Balance of Payments,” in Balance of Payments (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 179–214.
Abridged version: “Facteurs et mécanismes déterminant la quantité de monnaie en circulation” [Factors and mechanisms determining the quantity of currency in circulation]. Cahiers du Séminaire d’Econométrie, no. 7 (1964): 8–21.
Reprinted as “Une théorie du taux d’escompte” [A theory of the discount rate], in J. Rueff, Collected Works, Vol. II: Monetary Theory (Paris: Plon, 1979), Book 2, Part 3, Chapter VI, pp. 101–133.
Les Dieux et les Rois. Paris: Hachette, 1967; 4th ed., 1968.
In English translation: The Gods and the Kings (New York: Macmillan, 1973).
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