BackOn Religion Considered in Its Source, Its Forms, and Its Developments
Contents
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on religion
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benjamin constant

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On Religion
Considered in Its Source, Its Forms, and Its Developments
Benjamin Constant
Translated by Peter Paul Seaton Jr.
With an Introduction by Pierre Manent
Liberty Fund
iv

This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

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The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motif for our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word “freedom” (amagi), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 bc in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash.

Translation, introduction, editorial matter, and index © 2017 by Liberty Fund, Inc.

This English translation is drawn from the integral French text of De la religion, by Benjamin Constant, presented by Tzvetan Todorov and Etienne Hofmann. © 1999 by Actes Sud.

Frontispiece: Portrait of Benjamin Constant by Lina Vallier (fl. 1836–1852), from the Musée du Château de Versailles. Photo credit: Gianni Dagli Orti / The Art Archive at Art Resource, NY.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Constant, Benjamin, 1767–1830, author. | Seaton, Paul, 1954– translator.

Title: On religion considered in its source, its forms, and its developments / Benjamin Constant ; translated by Peter Paul Seaton, Jr. ; with an introduction by Pierre Manent.

Other titles : De la religion considérée dans sa source, ses formes et ses développements. English.

Description: Carmel : Liberty Fund, Inc., 2017 | Includes index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017026123| ISBN 9780865978966 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780865978973 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH Religions. | Religion—Phliosophy. | Polytheism.

Classification: LCC BL80.3 .C66713 2017 | DDC 200—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017026123

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Contents

  • Translator’s Note by Peter Paul Seaton Jr. xiii
  • Introduction to On Religion by Pierre Manent xv
  • On Religion
    • Preface 3
    • Notice to the Second Volume (1825) 15
    • Notice to Volume Four (May 1830) 17
    • Third Notice (October 1830) 19
  • first book
    • Chapter 1: On the Religious Sentiment 23
    • Chapter 2: On the Necessity of Distinguishing the Religious Sentiment from Religious Forms in Order to Understand the Development of Religions 38
    • Chapter 3: That the Moral Effect of Mythologies Proves the Distinction That We Just Established 48
    • Chapter 4: That This Distinction Alone Explains Why Several Religious Forms Appear to Be Enemies of Liberty, While the Religious Sentiment Is Always Favorable to It 56
    • Chapter 5: That the Triumph of Emerging Beliefs over Older Ones Is a Proof of the Difference between the Religious Sentiment and Religious Forms 61
    • Chapter 6: On the Way in Which Religion Has Been Envisaged until Now 64
    • Chapter 7: The Plan of the Work 79 vi
    • Chapter 8: Concerning Questions That Would Be a Necessary Part of a History of Religion but Are Irrelevant to Our Purpose 84
    • Chapter 9: The Precautions That the Special Nature of Our Inquiry Obliged Us to Take 88
  • book ii: On the Crudest Form That Religious Ideas Can Assume
    • Chapter 1: The Method We Will Follow in This Book 111
    • Chapter 2: On the Form the Religious Sentiment Takes On among the Primitive Savages 112
    • Chapter 3: The Religious Sentiment’s Efforts to Rise above This Form 130
    • Chapter 4: On the Ideas of Another Life in the Worship of Savages 137
    • Chapter 5: On the Errors into Which Several Authors Have Fallen Because They Failed to Note the Struggle of the Religious Sentiment against the Form of Religion at This Period 148
    • Chapter 6: On the Influence of Priests in the Primitive State 152
    • Chapter 7: Consequences of the Influence of Jongleurs on the Worship of Savages 161
    • Chapter 8: Why We Believed That We Needed to Write in Such Detail about the Worship of Savages 170
  • book iii: On the Causes That Favor the Growth of Priestly Power from the First Steps of the Human Race toward Civilization
    • Chapter 1: The Object of This Book 175
    • Chapter 2: On the Social State That Is the Closest to the Savage State 176
    • Chapter 3: On Causes That Could Contribute Only in a Secondary Manner to the Increase of Priestly Authority 180
    • Chapter 4: On the Cause That, Whenever It Exists, Gives the Priesthood Much Power 185
    • Chapter 5: Facts That Support the Previous Assertions 189
    • Chapter 6: On Two Apparent Exceptions 195
    • Chapter 7: On the Variety in the Organization and Forms of Priestly Authority 198
    • Chapter 8: On the Division into Castes 199
    • Chapter 9: On Priestly Corporations Replacing Castes 210 vii
    • Chapter 10: On the Various Competences of the Priesthood among the Nations It Dominated 213
  • book iv: On the Influence of Secondary Causes on the Extent of Priestly Power
    • Chapter 1: An Enumeration of These Causes 233
    • Chapter 2: On Climate 234
    • Chapter 3: On the Fertility or Sterility of the Soil 244
    • Chapter 4: On the Necessity of Material Works and Products for the Physical Existence of Societies 246
    • Chapter 5: On the Phenomena That Engender Astonishment or Terror 248
    • Chapter 6: The Influence of the Character and the Customary Occupations of Peoples 250
    • Chapter 7: On the Effect of Great Political Calamities 252
    • Chapter 8: On the Effect of Migrations 253
    • Chapter 9: On the Struggle of Political and Military Power against the Priestly Power 255
    • Chapter 10: Continuation of the Same Subject 265
    • Chapter 11: A Necessary Explanation of What We Just Said about the Jews 270
    • Chapter 12: That the Struggle between the Priesthood and the Temporal Authority Must End to the Advantage of the First, as Soon as the Principle of Priestly Authority Is Admitted 287
    • Chapter 13: The Summary of the Foregoing 298
  • book v: On the Priesthood’s Small Amount of Authority among Peoples Who Worshipped Neither the Stars nor the Elements
    • Chapter 1: That the Little Authority Priests Have among Nations That Do Not Have the Worship of Stars Is Demonstrated by the History of the First Times of Greece 303
    • Chapter 2: That It Is Nonetheless Possible That at a Time Prior to the Heroic Age the Greeks Had Been Enslaved by Priestly Corporations 311
    • Chapter 3: On the Religion and the Priesthood of the Earliest Times of the Greek, According to the Testimony of Greek Historians 319 viii
    • Chapter 4: On the Influence of Colonies on the Social State and Religion of the Greeks 325
    • Chapter 5: On the Modifications the Independent Spirit of Greece Always Caused in What Came from Elsewhere 338
    • Chapter 6: The True Elements of Greek Polytheism 367
    • Chapter 7: The Results 372
  • book vi: The Constitutive Elements of Priestly Polytheism
    • Chapter 1: On the Combination of the Worship of Elements and the Stars with That of Fetishes 389
    • Chapter 2: On the Popular Part of Priestly Polytheism 391
    • Chapter 3: On the Secret Doctrine of the Priestly Bodies of Antiquity 395
    • Chapter 4: Example of the Foregoing Combination in the Egyptians 413
    • Chapter 5: Example of the Same Combination in the Religion of India 427
    • Chapter 6: On the Causes That Modified This Combination in India, without, However, Winning the Day against the Priesthood 466
    • Chapter 7: That We Would Be Able to Find Examples of the Same Combination among All the Peoples Subject to Priests 486
  • book vii: On the Elements That Constitute Polytheism Independent of Priestly Direction
    • Chapter 1: That the Combination Described in the Previous Book Is Alien to the Polytheism That Is Not Subject to Priests 505
    • Chapter 2: On the State of the Greeks in the Barbaric or Heroic Times 507
    • Chapter 3: On Some Questions That Must Be Resolved before Proceeding Further in Our Investigations 509
    • Chapter 4: The Point of View under which We Will Envisage the Polytheism of the Heroic Times 520
    • Chapter 5: The Embellishment of Divine Forms in the Homeric Polytheism 523
    • Chapter 6: On the Character of the Homeric Gods 527
    • Chapter 7: On the Greek Notions concerning Destiny 541
    • Chapter 8: On the Means Employed by the Greeks to Penetrate the Secrets of Destiny 545
    • Chapter 9: On the Greeks’ Notions of the Other Life 550 ix
    • Chapter 10: On the Efforts of the Religious Sentiment to Rise above the Religious Form We Just Described 557
  • book viii: A Necessary Digression on the Poems Attributed to Homer
    • Chapter 1: That the Religion of the Odyssey Belongs to Another Epoch Than That of the Iliad 567
    • Chapter 2: A Question That Results from the Previous Observations 577
    • Chapter 3: That the Composition of the Odyssey, and Hence Its Mythology, Belong to a Period after That of the Iliad 579
    • Chapter 4: Conclusion 593
  • book ix: On the Priestly Religions Compared with Independent Polytheism
    • Chapter 1: The Purpose of This Book 597
    • Chapter 2: On the Form of the Gods in the Priestly Religions 598
    • Chapter 3: On the Character of the Gods in the Priestly Religions 605
    • Chapter 4: On a Singular Notion Whose Traces Are Found in Greek Religion, but Which Is Found Developed and Reduced to a Dogma in Priestly Religions 616
    • Chapter 5: On Priestly Notions of Destiny 621
    • Chapter 6: On the Priestly Means of Communication with the Gods in Sacerdotal Religions 623
    • Chapter 7: On the Notions of the Future Life in Religions Dominated by Priests 630
    • Chapter 8: On the Abodes of the Dead, and the Description of Infernal Torments, in Priestly Religions 637
    • Chapter 9: On Metempsychosis 642
  • book x: On the Teachings Peculiar to Priestly Polytheism
    • Chapter 1: The Object of This Book 649
    • Chapter 2: On the Supremacy of One God over the Others in the Priestly Religions 650
    • Chapter 3: On the Inferior Gods or the Priestly Demonology 654
    • Chapter 4: On Malevolent Divinities 659 x
    • Chapter 5: Consequences of This Teaching in the Priestly Religions 669
    • Chapter 6: On the Notion of an Original Fall 671
    • Chapter 7: On a Mediating God 674
    • Chapter 8: On Triple or Ternary Divinities 676
    • Chapter 9: On the Doctrine of the Destruction of the World 679
    • Chapter 10: On the Phallus, the Lingam, and Hermaphroditic Deities 684
  • book xi: On the Fundamental Principle of Priestly Religions
    • Chapter 1: Exposition of this Principle 691
    • Chapter 2: On Human Sacrifices 694
    • Chapter 3: On Privations against Nature 710
    • Chapter 4: On Licentious Rituals 713
    • Chapter 5: On the Sanctity of Pain 719
    • Chapter 6: On Some Doctrines That Could Have Been Introduced into the Priestly Religions as Consequences of Those We Just Discussed 726
    • Chapter 7: A Demonstration of the Previous Assertions, Drawn from the Composition of the Polytheism of Ancient Rome 731
  • book xii: On the Development of Independent Polytheism to Its Highest Point of Perfection
    • Chapter 1: How the Progress of the Social State Introduces Morality into Religion 755
    • Chapter 2: On the Contradictions That Characterize This Period of Polytheism, and the Way in Which These Contradictions Disappear 759
    • Chapter 3: That the Poems of Hesiod Are Contemporaneous with the Revolution We Are Describing 762
    • Chapter 4: On Pindar 769
    • Chapter 5: On the Underworld of Pindar Compared with That of Homer and Hesiod 773
    • Chapter 6: That the Same Progression Can Be Seen in the Historians 777
    • Chapter 7: Of the Same Progression among the Greek Tragedians 785
    • Chapter 8: On Euripides 796
    • Chapter 9: A Few Words on Aristophanes 806
    • Chapter 10: Why We Do Not Speak Here of the Greek Philosophers 811 xi
    • Chapter 11: On the Relations of Morality with the Two Religious Forms 812
    • Chapter 12: On the True Relations of Religion with Morality 823
  • book xiii: That the Greek Mystery Cults Were Institutions Borrowed from Foreign Priesthoods, and Which, While Contradicting the Public Religion, Did Not Modify It at All in Its Popular Portion
    • Chapter 1: How Much the Subject of This Book Is Beset with Difficulties 829
    • Chapter 2: What the Mystery Cults Were among the Nations Subject to Priests 830
    • Chapter 3: How These Mysteries Were Transported into Greece, and What They Became 833
    • Chapter 4: The Conformity of the Teachings of the Greek Mysteries with the Priestly Rituals and Teachings 839
    • Chapter 5: On the Spirit That Reigned in the Mysteries 862
    • Chapter 6: Summary of the Composition of the Greek Mysteries 865
    • Chapter 7: On Gradual Initiations, as the Initiation into the Priestly Hierarchy 868
    • Chapter 8: On the Real Object of the Mysteries 870
    • Chapter 9: On the Explanations That Have Been Given of the Mysteries 872
    • Chapter 10: That Our Way of Envisaging the Mystery Cults Alone Explains the Often Contradictory Attitude of the Greeks toward These Institutions 874
  • book xiv: On the Scandinavian Religion, and on the Revolution That Substituted a Priestly Belief for Independent Polytheism in Scandinavia
    • Chapter 1: Preliminary Observation 879
    • Chapter 2: How the Scandinavians Passed from Fetishism to Polytheism 881
    • Chapter 3: Revolution in the Scandinavian Polytheism 886
    • Chapter 4: That the Question Whether There Was a Third Religious Revolution in Scandinavia Is Irrelevant to Our Subject 899
    • Chapter 5: That the Two Revolutions of Scandinavian Polytheism Confirm Our Assertions concerning the Nature and Differences between the Two Polytheisms 900
    xii
  • book xv: Results of the Work
    • Chapter 1: Question to Resolve 905
    • Chapter 2: On the Disadvantages of the Principle of Stasis, Even in the Religions That Do Not Confer an Unlimited Power on the Priesthood 912
    • Chapter 3: That the Purity of Doctrine Diminishes Nothing in the Dangers of the Principle of Stasis in Religion 916
    • Chapter 4: How Harmful to Religion Itself Is Every Obstacle to Its Progressive Perfectibility 919
  • Index 923
xiii

Translator’s Note

The reader has here the first full-length English translation of Benjamin Constant’s (1767–1830) massive De la religion considérée dans sa source, ses formes et ses développements, published in five volumes between 1824 and 1831 (with the last two appearing posthumously). It is drawn from the integral text presented by Tzvetan Todorov and Etienne Hofmann in Actes sud (“Thesaurus,” 1999).

Constant’s prose is rich, complex, and in places lush—in a word, it breathes the air of nineteenth-century romanticism. It thus presents translation challenges, but none that are insurmountable. My first principle of translation has been fidelity and accuracy; the reader will find no paraphrase here. He will be able to follow Constant’s employment of key and even characteristic terms. Insofar as possible, his word order has been respected; and his paragraph divisions have been strictly observed. The reader of a translation of a nineteenth-century French author should feel that he is reading something from another time and place; we don’t go to Constant to hear contemporary French, much less the various dialects of America. My aim has been to reproduce a distinctive nineteenth-century French voice and manner of thought speaking in comprehensible twenty-first-century English, albeit with an accent.

Constant worked on this survey and analysis of the human religious experience from fetishism to monotheism throughout his life, in wildly different circumstances. The text bears these marks. Different editions of texts are cited; spellings are not entirely consistent; there is a palpable feel of working à batons rompus. Constant himself acknowledged all this. I have made no effort to smooth these features. In an age like ours when individuality is extolled but often fails to be genuine, much less philosophically employed, it is good to encounter a brave mind that took on the most difficult subjects—religion and politics, the soul and its xiv nature—with persistence and gusto. Rather than diminish his achievement because it falls short of contemporary scholarly standards, Constant’s warts are pardonable signs of a focus and capaciousness we should admire. What Pascal wrote applies to Benjamin Constant in spades: I went to a book expecting to find an author, and I found a man.

Since Pierre Manent’s magisterial introduction to the man and this work is guidance enough for the prospective reader, I can dispense with that task. I only wish to express my thanks to Christine Henderson of Liberty Fund, Inc., who approached me about this project; Colleen Watson, who exercised infinite patience in awaiting its conclusion; and my primary reader and good friend, Dan Mahoney, who introduced me to the adventure of French thought and provided moral as well as translation assistance during the long durée of this project. To all, cordial thanks.

Paul Seaton
xv

Introduction to On Religion*

In France, Benjamin Constant’s fame today is principally due to his literary work, which is largely autobiographical in character.1 In his own day, he was above all famous for his political activity: across the dizzying succession of regimes that France knew starting in 1789, this man of Swiss origin was constantly at the head of the battle for all the liberties. One could say that when he died shortly after the July Revolution, in which he had fully participated and which had placed the “bourgeois king,” Louis-Philippe, on the throne, Constant had embodied the most systematic and combative version of French liberalism. Only recently, however, have people begun to take the measure of the amplitude and complexity of his political and philosophical thought. With Tocqueville, although not quite at the same level, he is the most eminent representative of the “troubled liberalism” that is so characteristic of the French political philosophy of the nineteenth century.

What characterizes the spiritual physiognomy of Constant is that he was a man who was profoundly divided between his mind and his soul, or his heart. On one hand, he adhered without reservation to the doctrine of Enlightenment liberalism, which he defended with as much constancy as trenchancy. According to him, the wellspring of modern history is the struggle between the hereditary principle and the elective principle. The French Revolution marked the definitive victory of the latter over the former, a victory that manifested the perfectibility of the human race, a perfectibility equivalent to a tendency toward equality.2 On the other hand, xvi his soul suffered from, and therefore was troubled by, certain moral effects of the improved civilization of perfectibility that was in the process of triumphing. The reign of utility and self-interest narrows and weakens souls. They leave idle certain of their highest faculties, and end by putting liberty itself in danger. How to make up for this deficiency in strength and vitality? In order to resolve the problem introduced by the triumph of enlightenment for which he had worked so zealously, Constant’s solution was one that would have surprised Voltaire, and even Montesquieu: religion, or a certain version of religion.

Constant’s thought on religion is contained in the immense work that the reader of English now has, thanks to this translation. For a long time little appreciated and read in France itself, where it was out of print, this work merits serious study because it is rare that the religious phenomenon is addressed with so much candor and amplitude. The outdated character of Constant’s erudition—immense as it was—does not warrant us to treat his enterprise with condescension. It was motivated and borne along by a sincerity whose high quality and constancy are always quite rare, but especially so today.

Benjamin Constant was one of the first authors to give voice to a sentiment that has become quite familiar to us, one without which we could not live, so much has it become constitutive of our self-consciousness: the sentiment of living in history, that is to say, in a movement of irreversible progress. To be sure, certain disappointments prevent us from formulating this sentiment and conviction with the self-assurance of the first modern generations. It is therefore instructive for us to see how this axiom organized both the form and the content of Constant’s thought.

Constant starts with the observation that the reign of religious intolerance is over in Europe. The form of life that gave plausibility, and for a long time its evidence and legitimacy, to the constraint brought to bear on actions, words, and even thoughts in the name of “the true religion,” this form of life has been definitively discredited by certain intellectual, political, social, and moral changes—by “progress.” The main danger to fear from now on is found less in what remains of barbarism than in the excess of civilization. By giving itself the goal of well-being, and self-interest as its guide, civilization tends to produce a “system of egoism” that confines the individual to himself and makes him the slave of his needs. It is therefore xvii important to bring another perspective to bear on the human world, by giving man the goal of constant self-perfecting and interior sentiment for his guide.

Now, precisely because intolerance has been irrevocably discredited, and the aggressive unbelief that responded to it has lost its raison d’être, today it is possible to consider the religious phenomenon impartially. What does that mean? With religion no longer having to be regarded as either a truth that has to be defended by all means or as an error and imposture to attack with the same force, one can and should consider it as a fact, that is to say, as a reality that is inseparable from the human heart, as it manifests itself at all times and places. Here Constant calls into question what one could call the genealogism of the Enlightenment, which sought to base its arguments on the hypothesis of a natural man who would have lived without religion, as well as without society and language. In this optic, if religion had a beginning—being born from the fear of thunder, for example—then it is reasonable to anticipate that it will have an end—precisely, when men no longer fear thunder. But according to Constant these are untenable conjectures. Religion, like society, like language, belongs to the very constitution of man; and it is as impossible to imagine man without religion as it is to imagine him without society or language.

At this point, one can see a tension between the two aspects of Constant’s thought that we just developed. How can religion be the universal and unchanging fact that Constant wishes to place before us while humanity obeys the law of progress; that is, of continuous and irresistible change, an axiom to which he attributes absolute validity? It would seem that, according to Constant, one must say that in human history everything changes and nothing changes.

As it happens, this is the case! With the candor I already mentioned, Constant simultaneously affirms that everything changes and nothing changes in the human phenomenon during the course of history. He escapes from contradiction by having recourse to the distinction between form and substance: the substance is unchanging while the form obeys the law of progressive change, the law of progress. The substance, the substance of man, is therefore the religious sentiment, which is always the same, immutable and eternal. The form is the ensemble of ideas and institutions in which, at each period, the religious sentiment formulates itself and takes form. In the same way as Marx, according to whom the principle of historical change resides in the contradiction between productive forces and the relations of production, according to Constant the wellspring resides principally in the contradiction between the religious sentiment and the forms in which it successively xviii expresses itself. More precisely, change occurs when the sentiment separates itself from the form, and this happens when the latter no longer suits the human spirit. Thus, it is “the human spirit” that ensures the connection between the religious sentiment that does not change and the religious forms that constantly change. One has to acknowledge, however, that Constant hardly explains how this delicate and decisive operation takes place. Historical examples, both numerous and varied, are deemed to furnish the verification of a process, or a mechanism, that is presupposed or postulated rather than described or explained. In fact, the way in which Constant comprehends the religious sentiment makes it difficult to conceive of its relationship with “the human spirit.” We should pause on this point.

What is the religious sentiment, according to Constant? It is very much a sentiment, which is to say, an involuntary disposition that we do not have the power to govern, much less to suppress at will. In other words, it is a disposition that cannot be translated into strictly rational terms; it necessarily possesses a vague and mysterious character, but one that allows us to glimpse a domain where interest does not reign. Instead of dissimulating this vagueness or obscurity, Constant underscores these characteristics of the religious sentiment: it is in this type of emotion resistant to clear and distinct ideas that, according to him, human life above all experiences its disinterested desire for something better. If one has to give the word “sentiment” its most exact equivalent, it would be “revery.” It cannot escape the reader, however, that revery excludes judgment, and first of all, the judgment of real existence. The religious sentiment neither affirms nor denies the existence of the object of its desire or revery. The most that one can say, it seems, is that the religious sentiment does not positively rule out the actual existence of God or a divine object.

One would be wrong to call Constant’s sincerity into question. To be sure, he positively affirms nothing apropos to the existence of God, and one can see that even if he invokes certain Christian teachings with respect, his reticence is equal to his respect. His sincerity demands this reserve. To his eyes, the mystery that surrounds human life is so profound and encompassing that one cannot claim to dispel it by any judgment of the mind. The three great parties that claim to judge with certainty—the orthodox, the unbelievers, and the partisans of natural religion—all suppose that man can come into possession of an absolute truth, one that is always the same. On this point, says Constant, they all are equally mistaken. This does not mean that one must renounce every idea of truth. But it does mean, as the Germans were the first to recognize, and it is the sole general truth available xix to the human mind, that “everything is progressive in man,” or as we would say today, “everything in man is historical.”

This is not the place to comment on what one could call Constant’s “historicism.” One can, however, point out a consequence of this “historicism.” In his eyes, the period in which one lives determines, or in any case circumscribes, the possible religious attitudes. There are epochs when it is impossible to cast doubt on the established religion; there are others when it is impossible to shore up religious conviction, that is, to escape from doubt. As Constant never tires of underscoring in all his works, the time in which he lives is of the second sort. The moderns cannot escape from doubt, from the fear of being mistaken. Their habit of constant reflection weakens and hampers the movement of the soul necessary to affirm anything of importance with certainty. This being his diagnosis, one can understand why Constant brings the religious quest for the divine object back to the human subject. There is always a truth to grasp and to cherish concerning religion, but it is not a truth concerning God, it is a truth concerning man. At the core of man there is always and everywhere this indestructible but mysterious sentiment by which man experiences, paradoxically, that he is greater than himself, and that his destiny is not measured in terms of his pleasures and his pains but according to a perfection that is found in the way he approaches the joys and challenges of life. According to Constant, it is only in these terms that one can understand the idea of divine Providence. Understood in these terms—the joys and pains are the means of perfecting man—divine Providence equates with human self-perfecting, and vice versa.

Constant’s immense investigation, which, we should note, essentially leaves Christianity and Islam to the side, is organized by a determinate polarity—that between priestly religions and the religions free of the priesthood. In his presentation, the difference that one could call “political” between the sacerdotal religions and the others is more determinative than the properly religious differences between fetishism, polytheism, and theism (this last notion approximately covers what we call monotheism). To be sure, Constant shows religion progressing along with society from the fetishism of savages to the polytheism of barbarians, with the latter tending with the progress of civilization to theism. However, this vector of religious progress is subject to a decisive influence, according to whether the religion is priestly or independent of the priesthood. The priesthood, whatever the religion might be, by claiming the monopoly of all the human goods, or at least the most precious (for these are at the root of all priestly powers), installs a system of castes that, even when they are not institutionalized as they are in India, xx hampers the natural movement of human faculties and gives, as it were, a vicious form to human life. Even if he takes the precaution to concede that all the ills and evils of men do not flow from the priesthood, there is no doubt that for Constant the priesthood as such is simultaneously the great inhibitor of human progress and the great corrupter of human life. After having sequestered and protected what religion has of properly religious in the religious sentiment that the Enlightenment had ignored, Constant takes up again its aggressivity (against which he was otherwise very severe) in a political analysis that absolutely condemns a social and political form: the priesthood.

Constant’s argument therefore combines the idea of a continuous progress of civilization and the idea of an alternative between priestly religions and those without priesthoods. The first are essentially enemies of progress; or, as he regularly says, they are “stationary.” The second are open to the progress of the human spirit. Now, and this is the decisive juncture of the investigation, in human history there has been only one religion independent of the priesthood, that of the Greeks. At least since heroic times, that is, barbaric times, the Greeks were free from priestly power. He finds the proof of this in the subordinate place in which Homer places them in his poem. Hence, too, the importance that he accords to the dating of the Homeric poems in order to understand human history: the Iliad furnishes the authentic portrait of the religion of heroic times. To be sure, the Greeks welcomed many divinities brought by foreign colonies, in particular Egyptian and Thracian ones, but they nationalized these imports, purifying the divinities that had become Greek of what they contained that was originally bizarre, somber, abstract—in short, priestly. In particular, the Greeks never adopted astrolatry, which is the decisive element in priestly religion. Thus Constant celebrates the “national sovereignty” of Greece, without which the human race would have remained in a petrified state and would have everywhere been what it once was in Egypt. It is “a hundred times fortunate,” he says, that the Greeks won the victory over the priestly corporations that oppressed the rest of the earth. By keeping themselves free from the priesthood, the Greeks made themselves available to the natural development of religious ideas. Under their independent polytheism, all the aspects of the social state developed in a spontaneous and measured way. Far from crushing men, the qualities attributed to the gods were human qualities on a larger scale. In short, while everything in the priestly religions is obscure, enigmatic, abstract, and contradictory, with the Greeks nothing shocks reason at the time, that is, nothing hampered the progress of human faculties that had already begun.

xxi

It is also true that Constant underlines the limits of the religion of the Iliad. If the figure of the gods answers to the Greeks’ need for ideal beauty, the external and moral beautification toward which the Greeks advanced was disturbed by the intervention of interest. Hence the gods, created by the need to adore, became the objects of fear and hatred, and the Greeks conducted themselves vis-à-vis the gods in as self-interested a manner as the savages do with their fetishes. But the Greek soul is not only divided between the religious sentiment and self-interest. A third element intervenes, which Constant calls “reasoning.” We would perhaps say: the logic of the idea. At the same time human society crystalized, the Greeks formed an idea of the divine society, which was going to develop according to its own logic, with the gods turning away or growing distant from men. Henceforth, the gods and men were two different species who lived apart. No less than self-interest—but for a different, even opposed, reason—religious sentiment struggled against this religious form, and while self-interest wanted to make the gods mere human auxiliaries, the religious sentiment wanted to make them judges. Now in the final analysis, sentiment is always stronger than interest. As little moral as was the individual conduct of the Homeric gods, the love of order inherent in man entered the divine world, and sentiment postulated that the gods protect the weak and punish iniquity.

This is the moment to pause over what Constant says about the relations between morality and religion, because it is here that the most significant difference between priestly religions and free ones is found. Considered in themselves, morality and religion are notions or realities that are essentially distinct, with religion defining the relations of men with the invisible world, and morality defining the relations of men among themselves. In fact—as just noted above—the life of the gods of the Iliad is essentially lacking in morality. Priestly religions, on the contrary, operate an artificial fusion of religion and morality. The gods (in truth, the priests) are its direct legislators, which leads to the fabrication of unprecedented virtues and vices; hence the imposition of an artificial moral code, one very distant from morality as it develops spontaneously in human life when it is left to its free movement. Priestly moralities are therefore, according to Constant, more corruptive than corrective. Does this mean, however, that the free religions remain, and ought to remain, distant from morality, as was the religion of the Iliad? That is not the case at all.

As essentially distinct as they may be, free religion and human morality ought to encounter one another, and their relation assume a certain form. This is the xxii teaching of the Odyssey, which according to Constant is not by the Iliad’s author and presents the portrait of another society, one more advanced and milder. In the Odyssey, morality becomes a constitutive part of religion because the gods intervene, as it were, ex officio in the relations of men among themselves. The progress of civilization from one poem to the other is seen in particular in the progress that marks the condition of women in the Odyssey. As soon as civilization develops according to its natural movement, the morality that expresses and sums it up enters more and more into religion, and affects it in every way. It becomes the touchstone of religion, in fact. And by a necessary consequence, the introduction of morality into religion implies a progress in unbelief, since the gods henceforth can be done without as the tribunal of morality.

It is because it is essentially distinct from morality that free polytheism leaves morality free to develop according to its own movement, that is, according to civilization’s progress. Numerous and different gods, thus necessarily in disagreement, can hardly be recognized as competent judges, and even less as moral legislators. In contrast, constituting a type of public that, while it is neither infallible nor incorruptible, but is still more impartial and respected than mortals typically are, they naturally will be regarded as the guarantors of morality or justice, such as men spontaneously and gradually come to understand them. On the contrary, by pretending to put the divinity in the position of a moral legislator, the priestly religions are led to construct a moral code that corresponds to a surpassed phase of civilization, and in the final analysis to impose a morality that is both artificial and barbaric.

One does not know quite how to reconcile the progressivism that is so marked in Constant’s general conception with the unique value he accords to Greek life and experience. Civilization has made great progress since the Iliad, and that ought to be seen in particular in modern religion, that is, in Christianity. Now, not only does Constant halt his inquiry even before the decline of polytheism, not only does he include a good part of historical Christianity in his critique of priestly religions, but without making any explicit reference to this, he points out the features of priestly religions—the notions of a fall, of sacrifice, of a divinity that is triune and mediating—that are so many Christian teachings, confessed by the Catholic as well as the Reformed churches. Everything that makes for the properly religious content of Christianity in its various confessions seems marked with the stamp of priestly construction, as Constant understands and condemns it. This does not xxiii mean that the praise directed at the Christian religion is insincere. In order to understand it, however, one must consider what Constant has to say about tolerance. He emphasizes that ancient tolerance was essentially different from modern tolerance. While the latter rests on the respect owed by society, and first of all by government, to the opinions of individuals, the tolerance of Greek or Roman polytheism was “a species of national tolerance.” Each people admitted that other peoples had their gods. Under the regime of ancient tolerance, no one had the right to adopt a foreign cult, even though the cult was authorized for the foreigners who practiced it. As Constant points out, the emperor Julian particularly reproached Christians for having abandoned the religion of their fathers. Thus, by appealing to the new possibility that is conversion, Christianity freed the individual from the constraining bond that attached him to the community in which he was born. In this way, in Constant’s eyes, it was radically liberating, and one can understand that he would say in all sincerity that Christianity constituted the most important and decisive of all the progress that the human race has made to this very day. To be sure, the benefits of this liberation were largely shackled and distorted by the priestly interpretation of Christianity, but the irresistible ending of intolerance warrants the hope that the highest potentialities of the religious sentiment will soon be deployed in a Christian society delivered from the monopoly of priests.

Many things have changed, many sorts of progress have occurred, in the direction Constant desired since the time he wrote. In particular, the abolition of the priestly monopoly has largely taken place in the Western societies marked by Christianity. Have Constant’s hopes therefore been fully realized? One would hesitate to say that the depth and vigor of the religious sentiment in our societies effectively correct or counterbalance the concern for material well-being and the reign of self-interest. Despite this observation, however, far from making Constant’s perspective anachronistic, it confirms its relevance. The material means of civilization have been perfected to an extent that Constant could not anticipate. The risks to the vigor and refinement of the superior human faculties, however, have grown in tandem. Among other things, if the domain of the exact sciences has infinitely enlarged, the part of things that we do not know, and especially human things, has not diminished at all, and it is always on the borders of this mystery that the religious sentiment takes its flight. Constant’s investigation into religion was prompted by an anxious questioning of the ambivalence of civilization and its xxiv progress. Progress today has not ceased aggravating the disequilibrium between the external and the internal. To this disequilibrium there are doubtless other remedies than the one Constant recommends. In his eyes, however, the religious sentiment has a very particular advantage by rendering our lives especially precious, because it is our means of improvement, of making us capable of even sacrificing our life because there are things greater and higher than it.

1

ON RELIGION

On Religion

Considered in Its Source,

Its Forms, and Its Developments

Μεμνημένον ώ ό λέγων, ὑμεῖ τε οί κριταὶ

ϕύσιν άνθρωπίνην ἕχομεν.

Reminding ourselves that the one who speaks and

the one who judges are only human.

—Plato, Timaeus, 29d

2 3

Preface

The fragmented way we went about publishing this work has been criticized several times. The criticisms are well founded. A work such as this does need to be presented in its entirety if it is to be correctly assessed. Parceling it out necessarily leads to many objections. Although subsequent portions will answer them, the objections can appear to win the day since they are not immediately addressed.

We therefore would never have willingly chosen such a way of proceeding. But an understandable suspicion made us doubt that the public would pay attention to a work on such a subject, given the grave circumstances that surround and trouble all of us. Moreover, these investigations appeal to no particular passion, and they neither threaten nor serve momentary interests.

However, once we were reassured on this point, we would have willingly changed our procedure if commitments we had already made were not absolutely binding. The only thing we thought we could do in this case was to join the two books and publish them together. In this way we hope we have adequately treated each period. And we think that the first volume will give a clear enough idea of the perspective in which we view the important subject with which we are concerned.

The inconvenience, however, is only partly attenuated. There will be impatient judges who will take advantage of the fact that we were not able to talk about each thing immediately, but waited until its proper place.

Thus, for example, when in the first volume we establish that the majority of the notions that constituted the worship of primitive peoples are found again, taken up and consolidated, in the priestly religions of Egypt, India, or Gaul, some will oppose to this claim the profound sorts of learning attributed to the priests of Memphis, the often subtle philosophy of the Brahmins, or the sublime doctrine of the Druids. We will not be able to address this objection until the next volume, when we can treat the learning, philosophy, and doctrine themselves.

4

In the same way, when we later deepen our understanding of Greek polytheism and we show that the views borrowed from the priestly religions, and presented to the Greeks by travelers, philosophers, and priests themselves, were constantly rejected by the popular genius of this nation, some will counter with the fact of the mystery religions. Our answer will be complete only when we have later proven that the mysteries were the special depositories of foreign doctrines, traditions, and ceremonies precisely because there was an incongruity between them and the public religion.

On these points, and on many others that are no less important for the development of beliefs, and for the history of religious ideas, we have to ask for the fairness of our readers. Since the different volumes will follow one another rapidly enough, the patience we ask for will not be exceedingly demanding as readers wait for the evidence for various claims.

We also ask for such fairness in order to forestall another objection, one of another kind.

We would be deeply pained if we were put in the camp of those writers who, full of a brutal vehemence, or unscrupulousness in the choice of means of succeeding, take aim at all the objects of respect that humanity has created for itself. It was the evidence of established facts, however, that compelled us to express ourselves with a certain severity (that we nonetheless believe justified) concerning the baneful influence of the priesthood among many peoples of antiquity.

To affirm that we are speaking only of ancient nations and the priests of polytheism would only be to remove ourselves from the field of battle rather than defending ourselves from attacks. So it is best to declare our entire thinking; it contains nothing that we fear to avow, and we will thereby gain the advantage of not being thought to have wrapped ourselves in allusions. Allusion is a type of aggression that is rather timorous, and it joins the inconvenience of distorting facts to that of giving animosity an impertinent cast of fear.

Thus I declare that among the accusations against the priesthood of the ancients, especially those concerning its adverse influence on the civilization of that epoch, there are many which are totally inapplicable to the priests of modern religions.

In the first place, the priests of antiquity were condemned to deception by their very functions. They had to have wondrous communications with the gods, they had signs to read, oracles to utter; all this made fraud a necessity. Our beliefs today, which are more purified and refined, have freed the priests of our day from these corrupting obligations. Happily for them, as organs of prayer, as consolers in affliction and confessors, they no longer have any miraculous attributes or functions 5 such as those mentioned above. Such is the progress of our knowledge, and such is the calm that less material doctrines have bestowed upon minds, that fanaticism itself (where it continues to exist) has been forced to respect the limits it was the essence of the ancient priesthood to transgress, because the source of its influence was placed beyond them.

Even if certain individuals attempt to overthrow these barriers, these attempts—partial, interrupted, and resisted—are wrongs, not dangers, objects of blame and not means of dominion.

Secondly, the unlimited power of Druids or magi can never become the lot of our priests. Inclined as we are to understand, and even to find reasonable and well-founded, the apprehensions of those who warn that the priesthood tends to constitute an independent body in the State, we would nevertheless think we were much too sensitive if we supposed that the prerogatives they possess, or those they might momentarily usurp, placed them on the same level as the castes that formerly dominated royalty and deposed kings. Those who monopolized all learning and even literacy, and even created an independent esoteric language, and, presenting themselves as judges, doctors, historians, poets, and philosophers, closed the sanctuary of science to all who did not share their privileges; that is, the vast majority of mankind.

Against the tendencies of some individuals who aspire to resurrect what an interval of twenty centuries has made impossible to revive, we can trust in collective prudence. There is an instinct in social bodies which instructs them about what is unfeasible. And if misguided calculation urges this-or-that effort at restoration, this same calculation instructs them to disavow any such thing at the least sight of danger.

Moreover, if political authority is mistaken about its interests and sometimes seems to lend itself to the undue extension of so-called spiritual authority, still the conditions of the pact between the two are clear and precise. If there are monarchs who desire that Leo XII would denounce certain political doctrines, none of them wants to see in his hands the lightning bolts that Gregory VII launched against thrones. At the moment I write, a once redoubtable religious body was just banished from the States of a prince in whom it had probably invested high hopes. Let us have confidence in the times, and let us not exaggerate the threat of the clouds that two countervailing winds bring together, and which they eventually will disperse.

Therefore nothing that we have to say about the immense power of the theocratic bodies of India, Ethiopia, or even the West should be turned—even with 6 the best intention in the world, joined with the greatest talent for interpretation—into an attack on the priests of the contemporary communions to which we owe respect as citizens, or special regard as Protestant.

As a matter of fact, our judgment against the priesthood of certain polytheisms is less harsh than the verdict brought against them by the Fathers of the Church or the theologians who followed them. We have even sometimes softened the severity of their indictments. We have pointed out the relative good that the ministers of an erroneous worship could do, because, in our judgment, when it comes to the religious sentiment, error is better than absence.

In the previous century, our attitude in this regard would perhaps have drawn much different criticisms. We would have been accused of too much indulgence. This, however, would have been an impolitic and rash act on the part of the priests of a regnant cult, to declare that they make common cause with those of an overturned cult.

As for the various measures of blame which could be applied to the priests of all religions, independently of the beliefs, epochs, and forms of the institutions, it will be obvious to anyone who knows how to read and reflect that today this blame can be merited only by those individuals who misunderstand the character of their own ministry.

The Brahmins wanted to pour burning oil into the mouth of every profane person who opened the Vedas, so much did they fear the instruction of the people and what they called the “indiscipline” of the people resulting from it. By exposing this narrow, albeit cunning policy, we do nothing to wound a clergy which claims the honor of having powerfully encouraged the rebirth of letters. And if there exist today a few individuals who would proscribe the means of extending the various sorts of knowledge to all classes, and thereby improving citizens by enlightening them, the clerical body as a whole would join us in criticizing these reborn Brahmins.

The priests of Meroë deprived their kings of the crown or put them to death. By rising up against these regicide priests, we will only scandalize those who make the throne the footstool of the altar.

The magi declared to Cambyses that his commands were above the laws. Our critique of this alliance of the priesthood and despotism does not touch at all a Church in whose name Fénelon, Massillon, and Fléchier constantly told monarchs that the laws were the foundation and limit of their power.

These explanations seemed necessary to us. As faithful historians, we have not 7 distorted any fact nor sacrificed any truth to secondary considerations. We have attempted to forget the present century and contemporary circumstances and opinions when writing. It is from this scrupulously observed resolution that we have drawn the sort of courage that was most difficult for us: that of separating ourselves, on questions of great importance, from many men whose principles we otherwise share, and whose noble character we greatly respect.

Struck by the dangers of a sentiment that exalts itself and errs, and in whose name countless crimes have been committed, these men set themselves against all religious emotions and want to substitute for them the exact, dispassionate, invariable calculations of self-interest rightly understood. They say that such interest is sufficient to establish social order and to cause the laws of morality to be observed.

We ourselves are far from sharing the pious exaggeration that attributes all the crimes of unbelieving epochs to the absence of religious sentiment. These deplorable results of blind passions, effects that are independent of beliefs, are common to religious and unreligious centuries. Under Alexander VI communion preceded, and confession followed, murder.

We likewise recognize that the necessity of the religious sentiment is not adequately proven by the excesses of the revolutions invoking liberty during which rebellious peoples took pleasure in trampling underfoot venerable ancient customs. Revolutions are stormy times in which men, forced to precipitous judgments and hasty actions in the midst of all sorts of tumult and violence, without any guides to direct them, without observers to chasten them, even with the best of intentions, can easily be mistaken and become criminals with the purest of motives. The revolutions caused by religious convictions in their turn have not been exempt from the criminal, even savage, actions liberty herself has inspired. The violence and chaos of the Protestant wars, their thirty years of massacres, were equal in misdeeds and anarchy to those that darken the pages of the French Revolution. The fierce piety of the Puritans showed itself to be no less bloody than the shameless atheism of our demagogues.

But after having begun with these well-known concessions, we still would have to ask whether, by rejecting the religious sentiment, we fail to distinguish among the forms of religion, and if by solely operating according to the rule of self-interest the human race would not deprive itself of everything that constitutes its superiority, thereby abdicating its most beautiful titles, falling away from its true destination, and confine itself to a sphere that is much less than its true stature? In short, whether we condemn it to a diminishment that is against its nature.

8

Self-interest rightly understood must destroy everything that is contrary to itself. If man, directed by this motive, triumphs over the passions that would lead him contrary to it, it also must overcome all the emotions that simply distract it from that end. Much then will be lost. If rightly understood interest is powerful enough to defeat the delirium of the senses, the hunger for wealth, and the fury of vengeance, it will overcome even more easily the movements of pity, of tenderness, of devotion, which are constantly under assault by considerations of prudence, egoism, and fear. Without doubt, by listening to the precepts of self-interest we can renounce present pleasures; but this can only be in order to obtain future advantages. We therefore ought to abstain from everything that would harm us in a lasting way. And this very rule—the sole morality acknowledged by interest—ought to apply to our generous passions and our virtues as well as to our selfish passions and our vices.

Thus, there is no noble movement of the heart against which the logic of interest cannot be directed. There is not one that, following this logic, is not a weakness or a blindness. There is not one that interest does not overthrow by its exact calculations and its convincing equations.

In response, do you tell me that interest itself opposes the foregoing depravation of our nature, since it invites us to seek the inner satisfaction that comes from the accomplishment of a courageous duty in the midst of trial and misfortune? However, do you not see that by your own words you return to these involuntary emotions which transport us into another order of ideas? And as they are alien to all calculation, they disconcert and call into question the arid doctrines of self-interest. In order to escape the consequences of the system you adopt, you falsify the system—which in truth is unworthy of you. You reintroduce into it an element it officially rejects. You give the human soul the faculty (for it truly is a faculty, and the most precious of all) to be subjugated and dominated, but also exalted, independently of, and even contrary to, its interest.

If this self-interest triumphed completely, man would not experience any regret except when he was mistaken concerning his interest. He would feel only the satisfaction of having carefully observed its precepts.

But no, nature did not place our guide in self-interest, but in an intimate sentiment. This sentiment tells us what is evil and what is good. Rightly understood, interest only lets us know what is advantageous or harmful.

If you therefore do not want to destroy the work of nature, respect this sentiment in each of its emotions. You cannot bring an axe to bear on any of the branches of the tree without sooner or later cutting the trunk and causing death.

9

If you treat as chimerical this indefinable emotion which seems to reveal to us an infinite being, the soul, creator, or essence of the world (what do the imperfect names we give it matter?), your criticism will go even further despite your intention, and even against it.

What happens in the depths of our soul is finally inexplicable; and if you always demand mathematical demonstrations, you will end up with only negations and denials.

If the religious sentiment is folly because it cannot be proved, love is also a folly, enthusiasm a delirium, human sympathy a weakness, devotion an irrational act.

If the religious sentiment must be silenced because, you say, it misleads us, one would also have to eradicate pity because it has its perils, and often troubles and torments us. One would have to reprimand the high-heartedness that moves us to fly to the aid of the oppressed, because it certainly is not in our interest to call upon us blows not destined for us. Above all—pay especial attention here—one must renounce the liberty that you so cherish. From one end of the earth to the other, the soil upon which mankind walks is full of the corpses of its defenders. It is not self-interest that erects altars to this deity of proud and noble souls! It waits for others to do so, and to provide a safe haven for it; and if strong winds come up to shake that edifice, you will see it desert liberty’s worship or, at most, take a shameful pride in neutrality.

Has not experience proven this? What have we seen the past twenty years in Europe? Self-interest rightly understood reigning without rival. And what has been the fruit of this reign? (I repeat: we are not speaking about crimes. We grant that interest rightly understood condemns them, and that its counsels would have spoken against them.)1 But this indifference, this servility, this persistence in calculation, 10 this versatility in endless pretexts—what is that but interest rightly understood?

It served, it is true, to maintain order in times of disaster. Order is necessary to well-being. But interest sacrificed to external order all the sentiments whose appearance and exercise could be hazardous. Order is always, at least in appearance, on the side of force. Self-interest placed itself alongside force, if not to second it at least to remove obstacles to it. It bemoaned its victims, but when they were being taken to the place of execution it made sure that order was not troubled. It allowed heads to roll, and it guaranteed property. It called for the end of pillage while facilitating legal murder.

It served the development of the intellectual faculties, yes, but while developing them it degraded them. It claimed to be “spiritual” because intellectual, but the mind so construed directed itself against every sentiment that was not egoistical. Self-denial became the object of derision. Human nature itself was mocked by irony, even disdained, while interest’s advocates claimed to offer a “reasonable” appreciation of things (or at least a witty barb).

By the very fact that it was held to be “truly intellectual,” its adherents flattered themselves as a sort of loyal opposition. As long as there was no danger, interest rightly understood allowed itself the luxury of criticizing indifferently good as well as evil. Once danger appeared, though, self-interest counseled the prudent applause of evil along with the good. In this way, under moderate authority one was rebellious, and under violent power one was servile.

The virtues suffered the same degradation as the faculties. They lost the charm that attests to their celestial origin. They were so prudent, so reserved, so anxious that they might do too much, that one could guess that the soul played no part in them, and that the real source of virtue had dried up.

One was charitable because interest said to the wealthy that poverty without hope is to be feared. But charity was thereby denatured. The alms that flow from pity and compassion were forbidden by interest. Moreover, one deprived the poor of his liberty in exchange for his subsistence. The rich thought they were benevolent when they gave the poor bread through prison windows.

Calculation did not stop there. Intruding in advance upon the generations to 11 come, the indigent was reproved for his natural inclinations to procreate, and his children for their very existence. People calculated just how many human arms were needed to do necessary work. The rest of the human race was proscribed as being superfluous. Life was transformed into a carefully tended park, its owners empowered to close its walls to outsiders, entrance to which depended wholly upon their good pleasure.

The domestic virtues were practiced, it is true. It is more in keeping with interest to enjoy life in peace at home than to encounter hostility there, and sexual scandal troubles a quiet life. But the domestic virtues themselves were lowered and abased as a result. Now one considered one’s family with an egoistical eye. One’s threatened friend was turned away for fear of alarming an anxious spouse. The country’s cause was abandoned because interest demanded that a daughter’s dowry not be compromised. Unjust authority was obeyed because interest did not want to inhibit a son’s career.

It was said that there were no vices in all that; in fact there was prudence, what we could call moral arithmetic. We had the logical and rational part of man, but separated from his noble and elevated part. In a word, this was interest rightly understood.

To be sure, honorable exceptions consoled our gaze. But these exceptions, were they not incompatible with, even deviations from, the system of egoism? Were they not the homage paid to the reality and power of our emotions?

And please note: the picture we just sketched supposes prosperity, calm, a state of things in which nothing disturbs calculation. A situation in which interest calmly and without any effort always knows what it ought to do, and can always make itself heard and understood. It is a beautiful ideal, that of a society governed by rightly understood interest. But what does it possess that goes beyond a group of industrious beavers or the well-regimented activities of bees? And if circumstances change, if serious dangers trouble this methodically arranged society, the system will have other consequences.

Its natural effect is to make each individual his own center. But when each is his own center, isolation results for all. And when all are isolated, the result is dust. When the storm comes the dust is scattered.

O friends of liberty, it is not with such elements that a people obtains, establishes, or preserves liberty. It comes from habits absent from your system, an elevation of soul that your system was not able to destroy, a generous disposition that inspires and transports you yourselves despite your teaching. You are mistaken 12 about the human race and, perhaps, about yourselves. Contemplate the man dominated by his senses, besieged by his needs, softened by civilization, and more enslaved to his pleasures as civilization makes them easier to obtain. See how many opportunities it offers for corruption. Take stock of the flexibility of language that surrounds him with excuses and masks the shamefulness of egoism. Are you going to deprive him of the sole disinterested motive that does battle against so many causes of degradation?

All moral systems reduce to two. One gives us self-interest as our guide and well-being as our goal. The other proposes improvement, betterment, progress in perfecting ourselves as the goal, and interior sentiment as our guide, a certain abnegation of ourselves, and the capacity for sacrifice.

By adopting the first, you will make of man the most able, the most astute, of the animals. But it is in vain that you put him at the top of this material hierarchy. He still will be below the last rung of any moral hierarchy. You in fact put him in a sphere different from the one you think you are assigning him. And when you have circumscribed him within this sphere of degradation, all your institutions, all your efforts, and all your exhortations will be useless. You will triumph over all external enemies, but the interior enemy will be invincible.

Institutions are empty forms when no one will sacrifice for them. When it is egoism that overthrows tyranny, it knows only how to distribute the spoils of tyranny.

Once before, the human race seemed plunged into the abyss. Then too a long period of civilization had enervated it.2 The intelligence that knows how to analyze everything had cast doubt on truths as well as errors.

Self-interest and calculation united the enlightened classes under their standard. 13 An iron yoke held the laboring classes immobile. In this situation, how many useless efforts, how many victims, were found among the small minority which harkened back to a less abject past and which looked forward to a less miserable future? Everything was fruitless, even success was sterile. After Caligula, after Nero, even much later under the reigns of Galba, Probus, and Tacitus, noble citizens believed for a moment that liberty could be reborn. But liberty struck down saw its defenders fall with it. The times failed to support them. Self-interest abandoned them.3 The world was populated with slaves, either exploiting servitude or suffering it. Then the Christians appeared. They placed their point of reference outside egoism. They did not dispute the material universe, which material force held enchained. They did not kill, they died, and it was by dying that they conquered.

Friends of liberty, proscribed first by Marius then by Sylla, be the first Christians of a new empire. Liberty is nourished by sacrifices. Return the power of sacrifice to the enervated race that has lost it. Liberty always needs citizens, sometimes heroes. Do not extinguish the convictions that serve as the basis of the civic virtues. Create heroes by giving them the strength to be martyrs.

14 15

Notice to the Second Volume (1825)

In order to forestall as much as we can certain objections that will be leveled by that portion of our critics whose critical art consists in pointing out minutiae in order to discredit the essential, we believe we need to forewarn our readers of the following. Having pursued our researches at different times and in different countries, we have been obliged to use different editions of the same works and to draw the facts we have made use of from books written in different languages, sometimes even from French works translated into English or German. We therefore have a diversity of citations and a variety of spellings for the same proper names. For example, while speaking of the Jews we have cited the Books of Samuel sometimes by that title, sometimes by the customary title of Books of Kings. And when, in order to demonstrate the absurdity of certain arguments of theologians, we have extracted certain passages from The Monarchy of the Hebrews, a work translated from the Spanish of the Marquis de Saint-Philippe, we were not always able to indicate the exact page. Yet again, while treating the Indians we have written either Bhaguat Geeta or Bhaguat Gita, Petrees or Pitris.

Our intention was to clear up these disparities, no matter how insignificant they were. But several escaped our attention and we noticed them too late. We also have often preferred designations more generally known to those with a more scientific appearance, and more familiar spelling to what was more exact. We used the word paria, for example, instead of using tschandala. Most of the time we wrote Oromaze instead of Ormuzd, and we always wrote cuttery, instead of kchtriya, and so forth.

These statements were not needed for readers who do not have a parti pris, either for or against our views. But we do anticipate some who are ill-willed, from whom we cannot expect good faith. We therefore believed we needed to deprive them of the facile pleasure of trying to be more erudite than we are in matters we know as well as they.

16 17

Notice to Volume Four (May 1830)

We now publish the last two volumes of a work that we could not finish sooner. Political duties prevented us from making it less imperfect than it no doubt is. We however do not say this to excuse ourselves: the reader judges the intrinsic merit of the book, not the personal situation of the author.

One observation, however, is necessary, especially concerning the first half of the fourth volume. There we deal only with the externals of the priestly religions, and we bring together indiscriminately the facts that pertain to them and characterize them.

This is because for the peoples dominated by priests, the externals were the entirety of the religion. Because the self-interest of the priests was everywhere the same, everywhere they had the same teachings and the same rites, except for modifications owing to climate and circumstance.

If we had disdained and dismissed this popular aspect and had occupied ourselves only with its mystical sense, we would have given an air of profundity to our work that would have charmed many readers.

There are those who still swoon when they hear about the priests of Egypt, or the Brahmins, or the magi. One would say that by admiring these purported sages they become as wise as them.

We say this of the gullible portion of our readers; there are others, however, of a different stamp.

They extol what was, because what was powerfully suits them. What is, and above all what announces itself, suits them very little.

We have been criticized for having taken as our point of departure the primitive state, because, we are told, it has not been proven that it was the first state of mankind.

18

But we recognized long before our opponents that the origin of our species is enveloped in shadows impossible to dispel. We made clear, though, that wanting to follow the intellect in its development and progress, we have had to start at the point where this progress began. That the primitive state was the first state matters little to us: man fell into it. All nations indicate a time when this was their state; that is enough for us.

Some have claimed that we ought to have taken as our basis some universal revelation, showing it being gradually lost and then rediscovering its traces in the midst of its corruptions and distortions.

If there was a universal revelation, it was gradual, individual, and entirely interior. Does one want us to be even more orthodox? The revelation restricted to one people remained alien to other peoples. They operated in the midst of the errors of darkest ignorance, barbarism, and the fiercest or most licentious superstitions. May it never happen that we seek the traces of a divine revelation in the human sacrifices of Tyre or the debauchery of Ecbatana!

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Third Notice (October 1830)

These two volumes ought to have appeared at the end of last July. The happy events of the time delayed the publication. But since the entirety was printed except for the analytic index, nothing has been changed except for a note of five or six lines (bk. XV, ch. III, n. 2). The readers therefore should not be surprised by a few statements that three months ago perhaps may have taken some courage and which today would only be anachronistic, or of a few rather severe judgments concerning some men who at the time called for our heads. They have been defeated. But forgetting offenses is one thing, esteeming the perpetrators, another. While we impose the former as a duty, we do not feel obliged to feign the latter when we do not feel it.

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FIRST BOOK

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CHAPTER 1: On the Religious Sentiment

Montesquieu, the author of The Spirit of the Laws, rightly said that all beings have their laws, the divinity as well as the world, the world as well as men, men as well as the other species of animals.1

These laws constitute the nature of each species. They are the general and permanent cause of the mode of existence of each species; and when external causes bring some partial change to this mode of existence, the core resists and always reacts against the modifications.

One therefore should not want to assign causes to these primordial laws; rather it is from them that one should explain particular phenomena.

Why does this class of animals live in groups while in another each individual lives alone? Why is the union of the sexes more or less lasting in this one while in another, once desire is satisfied, the primitive instinct regains its power?

One cannot say anything beyond “these species are this way.” It is a fact whose truth is established and for which explanations are arbitrary. For the weakest among these species are not, as one might expect, the most sociable. Even in coming together they do not extend any assistance to each other. What they do is obey their nature, which imposes laws upon them, that is, a disposition that characterizes them and determines their mode of existence.

If, therefore, there is in the heart of man a sentiment not found in the rest of living beings which always occurs, whatever the condition in which he finds himself, is it not plausible that this sentiment is a fundamental law of his nature?

In our judgment, such is the religious sentiment. The primitive hordes, the barbarous tribes, the nations which have attained the social state, those that languish 24 in the decrepitude of civilization—all experience the power of this indestructible sentiment.

It triumphs over all interests. The primitive for whom fishing or a difficult hunt provides bare subsistence will devote a portion of the catch to a fetish. A bellicose people will lay down their arms to come together in front of an altar. Free nations will interrupt their deliberations to call upon the gods in their temples. Despots will grant their slaves days of respite.

Passions as well as interests yield to it. When suppliants grasp the knees of sacred statues, vengeance is halted, hatred appeased. Man imposes silence upon his most imperious passions. He forbids himself pleasure, swears off love, launches himself into suffering and death.

This sentiment, however, joins itself to all our needs and all our desires. We ask the gods for everything that we do not sacrifice to them. The citizen calls upon them for the sake of his country; the lover separated from what he loves confides his beloved to them. The prayer of the prisoner pierces the walls of the cell that encloses him; and the tyrant is disturbed on his throne by powers invisible, and can hardly be reassured by imagining them to be mercenary.

Would one oppose to these numerous examples a few miserable peoples who are described as wandering on the earth without religious ideas? Their existence, however, is based upon the dubious testimony of a few travelers who are probably inaccurate. One certainly can doubt the accuracy of writers who on the basis of mere report affirm the atheism of a people they have never seen or visited,2 or those who, failing to see the religion that was actually in place, have concluded from the absence of another form of it that it does not exist.3 In any event, how 25 important an exception can be the tribes who eat human flesh, and whose condition resembles that of brutes?

We therefore can consider this sentiment to be universal, even if it is nothing but a great error.

From time to time, some men affirm that it is just such an error. To hear them speak, the real first causes of religion are fear, ignorance, authority, and cunning.4 In this view, one would have to say that external and accidental causes have changed the inner, permanent nature of man, and have given him another nature. What is even stranger, he would not be able to undo this nature even when the causes no longer exist!

For it is in vain that his knowledge grows, in vain that having the physical laws of the world explained to him, he is taught to no longer ascribe any causal power to beings to whom he can pray. The teachings of experience cause religion to be relocated to another domain. But they do not banish it from the human heart. As he is progressively enlightened, the sphere from which religion withdraws becomes larger. Again religion retires, but it does not disappear. What mortals believe, and what they hope for, always places itself, as it were, on the circumference of what they know. Cunning and authority can abuse religion, but they cannot create it. If it were not already in our souls, authority would not have been able to use it as an instrument, and ambitious castes make a trade of it.

But if it is found deep within the human soul, where does the opposition to this general conviction, to this universal assent of mankind come from? Should we suspect their motives or their understanding? Should we charge them with a presumptuous ignorance or accuse them of being interested in rejecting a teaching which, while reassuring to virtue, is threatening only to vice?

No. In many eras these men are the most educated, the most knowledgeable, the most respectable of their times. In their ranks we find generous defenders of liberty, irreproachable citizens, philosophers devoted to the search for truth, and ardent enemies of all arbitrary or oppressive power. Most of them, being devoted to sustained and difficult study, are preserved from corrupting temptations by the pleasures of study and the habit of reflection. How, then, can religion, which has 26 nothing frightening for such men, become such a repugnant object? Is its absurdity so clear and evident to them? But they themselves recognize that reasoning leads only to doubt. By what singular reversal of ideas, then, has the natural and innocent recourse by such an imperfect being as man to beings deemed capable of helping him sometimes provoked their fierce hatred instead of exciting in them the sympathy that it appears to call for?

Casting a glance on the entirety of life’s trajectory, who would dare to say that this recourse is useless or superfluous? The causes of our misfortune are numerous. Authority can pursue us; lies can publicly injure us. The bonds of a thoroughly artificial society wound us. Fate strikes what we hold most dear. Old age comes toward us, a somber period of life when objects grow dim and seem to withdraw, when something cold and dark casts its shadows upon what surrounds us. We seek everywhere for consolation, and almost all of our consolations are religious. When the world abandons us, we form an alliance beyond the world. When men persecute us, we create an appeal above men. When we see our dearest illusions—for justice, liberty, the homeland—vanish, we console ourselves by believing that there exists somewhere a Being who will be able to reward us for being faithful to them, despite our adverse circumstances. When we regret the loss of a beloved object, we erect a bridge across the abyss and cross it in thought. Finally, when life escapes us, we thrust ourselves toward another life. Thus religion is the faithful companion, the ingenious and indefatigable friend, of the unfortunate. It would seem that it is especially the one who regards all these hopes as erroneous who ought to be most profoundly moved by this universal agreement of all suffering beings, by these requests and pleas of suffering rising from all points on the globe toward a heaven of the coldest, sternest bronze, where they are bound to remain unanswered.

But religion has been perverted. Some have pursued man even to this last haven, into this intimate sanctuary of his existence. Persecution, however, provokes revolt. Deploying itself against this or that particular opinion, authority stirs all worthy minds to demonstrate on that opinion’s behalf. There is in us something that grows indignant at any intellectual constraint. To be sure, this principle can go as far as fury; it can be the cause of many crimes, but it belongs to what is noble in our nature.

Hence, in all the centuries when men demanded their moral independence, one saw this resistance to religion. This resistance appeared to be directed against the sweetest of affections, the religious sentiment, but in fact was really directed against the most oppressive of tyrannies. By placing force on the side of faith, one 27 placed courage on the side of doubt. The zeal of believers gave rise to the vanity of unbelievers, and men made a point of pride a teaching whose principal merit lay in the audacity it took to profess it.

I have often been struck with horror and astonishment when reading the famous System of Nature. This lengthy diatribe of an old man who wanted to close any possible future ahead of him, this apparently inexplicable hunger for destruction, this enthusiasm against a gentle and consoling idea, seemed to me to be a bizarre sort of madness. But I eventually understood what was going on by recalling that authority had lent violent and artificial support to this idea. Hence, from a sort of repugnance felt toward the writer who triumphantly presented to his reader the great void as the truth of what awaited him and the objects of his affection, I passed to a certain esteem for the intrepid opponent of an arrogant authority.

But now the reign of intolerance has passed. Notwithstanding the efforts a narrow and antiquated policy might still make to reestablish it in a few countries of Europe, we will not see it reappear. The civilization of our day rejects it; it is incompatible with it. To return the human race to these iniquitous laws, it would be necessary for a new invasion of barbarous peoples to bring about the overthrow and destruction of our present societies. This danger is not to be feared. No part of the globe today harbors such primitive conquerors of civilized nations. And if probabilities do not deceive, the excess of civilization is the sole danger we have to fear.

But with the demise of intolerance’s dominion, the animosity engendered by oppression must go away as well. Whoever makes such hostility his chief point of pride must cease and desist. Unbelief has lost its greatest charm, that of danger. Where there no longer is peril, there no longer is attraction.

The moment therefore is auspicious for us to take up this vast subject without partiality and without animosity. The moment is favorable to consider religion as a fact whose reality no one can contest, and whose nature and successive developments need to be considered and grasped.

The inquiry is immense. Even those who have seen this have not appreciated its full extent. Even though many have already written on the subject, its principal question remains unrecognized. For a long time a country can be a theater of war and yet still remain in all other respects quite unknown to the troops that crisscross it. They see in plains only fields of battle, in mountains, possible command posts, and valleys as transportation channels. It is only in peacetime that one can examine the country for its own sake.

This has been the fate of religion, a vast country that has been attacked and 28 defended with equal tenacity and violence on both sides, but which has not had a disinterested visitor able to provide a faithful description.

Until now only the exterior of religion has been considered. The history of its inner sentiment remains, in its entirety, to conceptualize and execute. Dogmas, beliefs, practices, and ceremonies are the forms that the interior sentiment takes, and then subsequently breaks and remakes.5 According to what laws, though, does 29 it take these forms? According to what laws does it change them? These are questions no one has examined. They have described the outside of the labyrinth; no one has penetrated to its center, no one could. Everyone sought religion’s origins in circumstances outside man, the devout as well as the philosophers. The former would not believe that man could be religious without some particular and local revelation; the latter, without the action of external objects. Both shared in a fundamental error from which followed a series of errors. Yes, to be sure, there was a revelation, but this revelation was universal, it is constant, it has its source in the human heart. Man needs to listen only to himself. He needs to listen only to that nature that speaks to him in a thousand voices in order to be brought irresistibly to religion.

To be sure, external objects influence beliefs, but they only modify the forms, they do not create the internal sentiment that serves as their basis.

It is this sentiment, though, that they have constantly misunderstood. We have often been shown the primitive filled with fear at the sight of the often harmful phenomena of nature. In his fear he divinizes rocks, tree trunks, the skins of beasts—all the various objects that offer themselves to his sight.

From this some have concluded that terror is the sole source of religion. But in reasoning this way it is precisely the fundamental question that is neglected. Where the terror at the idea of hidden powers comes from is not explained. No one accounts for the need that man experiences to discover and to adore these occult powers.

The more one considers the various systems that are expressly developed against any religious idea, the more this disposition becomes difficult to explain. If man does not differ from the animals except because he possesses a higher degree of the faculties with which they are endowed, if his intelligence is of the same nature as theirs but only more developed and extensive, then it follows that everything that intelligence produces in him it ought to produce in them (to a lesser degree, to be sure, but to some degree). But it does not.

If religion comes from fear, why, then, are animals—many of whom are more timorous than we—not religious? If it comes from gratitude, and the gifts (as well as the rigors) of physical nature are the same for all the living beings, why 30 does mankind alone have religion? If ignorance of causes is the cause of religion, we are obliged to apply the same reasoning to animals. Since ignorance of causes exists more for animals than for man, how does it happen that man alone seeks to discover unknown causes? At the other extreme of civilization—that is, at times when ignorance of natural causes no longer exists and man is no longer subject to the terrors of a nature he has subjugated—do we not see the same need for a mysterious correspondence between the world and invisible beings reappear?

When one attributes religion to our more perfect constitution, one fails to see a very essential distinction. Do you understand by “constitution” the ensemble of all our faculties, our organs, our judgment, our power of reflecting and synthesizing, as well as our sentiments? I agree. But what you call our constitution is nothing but our nature, and you should therefore recognize that religion is in our nature. Do you understand by “constitution” only the superiority of physical means with which man is endowed? But if that superiority was the root of the religious sentiment, since there are animals that are better organized than others, one ought to see in them some signs and expressions of this sentiment, which would be more or less proportionate to the perfection of their constitution.

If by means of memory and foresight man combines ideas and derives from the facts he sees the consequences that follow from them, then we have to acknowledge that animals too have memory, they too have foresight. The dog corrected by its master avoids repeating the same behavior. How, then, does it happen that being no less exposed than man to physical accidents, the canine does not seek to know their causes, while he does seek to avoid, or at least disarm, the anger of an offended master?

Moreover, whatever foresight you attribute to a primitive human being, of all creatures none is more forgetful and careless of his present interests than he! When his needs are satisfied, the Eskimo sleeps in the crease of rocks, meditates about nothing, observes nothing. The Carib Indian does not extend his reflection beyond today. However, when it comes to religion the Eskimo becomes curious, the Carib farsighted. This is because religion is for them a need more vital and more imperious than all the others, a need that takes precedence over the rest of their nature, over their indifference, their apathy, and their lack of curiosity.

Even supposing that the religious sentiment, and the hopes and enthusiasm it inspires, are empty illusions, they still would be illusions peculiar to man; they would distinguish him from the rest of living things. And from this there would result a second, no less singular, distinction. All beings perfect themselves insofar 31 as they obey their nature. Man would perfect himself the more that he departs from his. The perfection of all other beings is found in truth; that of man would be found in error!

We will go further. If religion was not natural to man, the superiority of his constitution would lead him away from it rather than to it. Why? The result of this superior constitution being that he better satisfies his needs by the forces and powers he has come to understand and has arrived at controlling, he would have fewer motives to suppose or invoke unknown powers. The better he finds himself on the earth, the less he would be inclined to raise his eyes to heaven.

This observation is applicable to all the states of human society. There is no condition in which, if you do not recognize religion as being inherent in man, it would not be a superfluous ornament to his existence. Look at our civilized institutions. Agriculture serves our need for food. Our walls and our roofs protect us from the seasons. Laws protect us from violence. Governments are charged with maintaining these laws, and for better or worse they acquit themselves of this duty. There are punishments for those who break them. In another vein, there are luxury, refinements, and pleasures for the wealthy. There are sciences to explain to us the phenomena that surround us, and to parry those which threaten us. There are doctors for the ill. As for death, it is an inevitable accident, needless to worry about. Is not everything wonderfully arranged? What need does this arrangement not meet? What fear or worry is there without ways of assuaging it? Where, therefore, is the external cause that makes religion necessary? Religion, however, is a necessity that everyone feels, some always, others from time to time. This is because it is not found outside us, it is within us, it is part of us.

People have never really wanted to recognize what man is. They have questioned external objects concerning man’s inherent dispositions. It is not surprising that they have not been able to provide an answer. People have sought the origin of religion in the same way they sought the origin of society and the origin of language. The same error was at work in all these investigations. One began by supposing that man had once existed without society, without language, and without religion. But this presupposed that he could do without these things because he had been able to exist without them. From this false presupposition error proceeded. Society, language, and religion are inherent in man; the forms vary. One can ask about the cause of the variety. One can seek to know why man in society has this or that sort of government; why in this religion there is this practice or that dogma; why this language has affinities with that one. But to claim to go back before all of them is 32 a fanciful effort, a sure means of arriving nowhere. To assign religion, sociability, and language to anything other than the nature of man is to be mistaken, and wilfully so. Man is not religious because he is fearful, he is religious because he is human. He is not sociable because he is weak, he is sociable because it belongs to his essence. To ask why he is religious, why he is sociable, is to ask the reason for his physical structure and for what constitutes his very mode of existence.6

People have fallen into a second error. They have believed that because we are dealing here with something that has a great deal of influence on men, one must either destroy it or maintain it. And in the various projects of either destruction or preservation they have confused what was transitory and perishable with what was necessarily eternal and indestructible.

As we have said, there is something indestructible in religion. It is not a discovery of the enlightened human being which is foreign to the ignorant, nor an error of the ignorant from which the enlightened can free himself. But one still must distinguish the substance from the forms, and the religious sentiment from religious institutions. Not that we intend here to speak ill of either these forms or these institutions. We will see during the course of this work that the religious sentiment cannot do without them. We will go even further. At each stage, the form that was established naturally was good and useful. It became noxious only when individuals or castes took control of it and perverted it in order to prolong it. But it is no less true that while the substance is always the same, immutable and eternal, the form is variable and transitory.

Therefore, that this or that religious form is attacked does not mean that man is able to do without religion. The philosopher may direct his arguments against it, the irony of his sarcasms, the indignation of his intellectual independence—in Greece Epicurus may dethrone the gods of Olympus, at Rome Lucretius may proclaim the mortality of the soul and the vanity of our hopes, Lucan may insult Homer’s teachings, or Voltaire other religious dogmas, an entire generation of men may applaud the contempt directed at a longtime respected belief—this in no way entails that man can do without religion. It indicates only that the current form 33 no longer suits the human spirit, that the religious sentiment has separated itself from it.

But someone will ask, how do you get at the religious sentiment independently of the forms it assumed? We never find it thus separated in reality, to be sure, but by entering into the depths of our soul it is possible, we believe, to grasp it in thought.

When one examines the human species through the prism of the relations that obtain between the place it occupies in the world and the goal it appears destined to attain on earth, one is struck by the harmony and the just proportions that exist between this goal and the means man possesses to attain it. To master the other species; to press a large number of them into its service; to destroy, or keep at bay, those that refuse to obey; to compel the earth it inhabits to abundantly satisfy its needs, and to provide enough variety for its pleasure; to climb the summit of mountains in order to submit them to cultivation; to descend into the abyss; to extract metals and to employ them for its purposes; to master wave and fire, to make them cooperate in marvelous transformations; to brave the weather by clothing, and time by buildings; in a word, to subjugate physical nature; to enslave it and to turn its own forces against it: these are only the first steps of man toward the conquest of the universe. Soon enough, raising himself even higher, he directs his reason enlightened by experience against his own passions. He imposes a uniform yoke upon his internal enemies who are even more rebellious than the external obstacles he defeated. He obtains from himself and others sacrifices that one would have said were impossible. He manages to have property respected by the one who has none, the law by the one it condemns. The few exceptions that are easily put down do not fundamentally disturb the general order.

Thus man—again, considered only in his earthly relationships—seems to have arrived at the peak of his moral and physical perfection. His faculties are admirably combined to guide him toward the goal. His senses are more perfect than those of inferior species (if not in particular at least in their ensemble) by the assistance they lend each other. His memory is so faithful that it allows him to retrace different objects without confusing them, his judgment allows him to classify and judge, his mind each day reveals new relationships. All cooperate to lead him rapidly to successive discoveries and thus to consolidate his dominion.

However, in the midst of these successes and triumphs, neither the universe he subjugates nor the social organizations that he establishes, neither the laws he proclaims nor the needs he has satisfied, not even the pleasures he refines and 34 varies, are sufficient for his soul. A desire constantly rises within him and asks for something else. He has examined, traversed, conquered, even decorated the worldly manse within which he finds himself, and yet his gaze still seeks another sphere. He has become the master of visible, limited nature, and he thirsts for an invisible, unlimited nature. He has provided for a variety of interests that, because more complicated and artificial, seem to be of a higher order. He has known all and calculated all. And still he experiences a weariness, that of only being occupied with interests and calculations. A voice cries from his very depths and says to him that all these things are but mechanisms, more or less ingenious, more or less perfect, but they cannot serve as either the goal or the final boundary of his existence. What he has previously taken as the goal turns out to be a series of means.

This disposition must be inherent in man because there is no one who has not been gripped, more or less strongly, by it, perhaps in the silence of the night or on the shores of the sea or in the solitude of the fields. There is not a human being who has not, at least for an instant, forgotten himself and felt himself carried away, as it were, on the waves of a vague contemplation, plunged into an ocean of new and disinterested thoughts without any strict connection to this life. The man who is the most controlled by active and self-interested passions nevertheless, sometimes despite himself, has felt these movements which take him away from all particular and self-regarding ideas. They arise in him when he least expects it. Everything that in the physical order belongs to nature, to the universe, to immensity; everything that in the moral order stirs tenderness and enthusiasm—the spectacle of a virtuous action, of a generous sacrifice, of a danger bravely confronted, the pain of another attended to or comforted, disdain for vice, devotion to the unfortunate, resistance to tyranny—all these reveal and nourish in the soul this mysterious disposition. And even if the ingrained habits of egoism prompt it to smile at this momentary exultation, it does not do so without a secret shame, one it hides beneath the mask of irony. A silent instinct tells it that in doing so it is disrespecting the noblest portion of our being.

We should add that in studying ourselves at these moments—admittedly so brief and so unlike the rest of our existence—we find that at the very moment when we fall back from this exaltation and find ourselves recaptured by the interests that constantly solicit us, we feel ourselves having descended from an elevation into a denser, less pure atmosphere. We have to do violence to ourselves to reengage with what we typically call reality.

There is therefore a tendency in us that is in contradiction with our apparent 35 goal and with all the faculties that help us to advance toward that goal. These faculties, all adapted to our use, correspond among themselves in order to serve us; they aim toward our greatest utility and they make us our sole center. The tendency we just described, however, impels us outside ourselves and imparts a motion that does not have utility for a goal, but rather seems to bear us toward an unknown, invisible center, one without any analogy to our habitual existence and our mundane interests.

This tendency frequently creates great disorder in us. It nourishes itself with what our logic calls chimeras. It entertains emotions that our intellect cannot account for. It disinterests us in our ordinary interests. It forces us to believe despite our doubts, conversely, to afflict us in the midst of prosperity, to make us sigh in the midst of happiness. It is remarkable that traces of this disposition are found in all of our noble and refined passions. Like it, all these passions have something mysterious and contradictory about them. Ordinary reason cannot explain this in any satisfying way. One finds it in love, in the exclusive preference for an object which we have been able to do without for a long time, and which many others resemble;7 in the need for glory, that thirst for a fame that will last beyond us; in the pleasure we find in devotion, a joy that is contrary to the habitual instinct of our nature; in melancholy, that sadness without a cause, but in whose midst we find a pleasure that escapes analysis; and in a thousand other indescribable sensations that cannot be explained by reason.

Here we will not seek the origin of this disposition which makes of man an ambiguous and enigmatic being, and sometimes makes him not at home on earth. Believers can see in this the memory of a fall, philosophers the germ of a future perfection. This is a question we will leave undecided.

But we do affirm that if one connects this disposition to the universal sentiment we spoke of above that moves man to address himself to invisible beings, to make his destiny depend upon them, to place more importance on the relations he has with them than on the more immediate advantages of the visible world, one cannot 36 deny that these two things appear to go closely together, and that the second is, in a certain manner, but the practical application of the first.

We experience a confused desire for something better than we know: the religious sentiment presents us something better. We are troubled by the boundaries that hem and offend us: the religious sentiment announces to us a time when we will transcend these limits. We are tired of the troubles of this life, which never go away completely and thus render any repose impossible: the religious sentiment gives us an idea of an ineffable rest, one that is exempt from the surfeit of satiety. In a word, the religious sentiment is the response to that cry of the soul that no one can silence, this élan toward the unknown, toward the infinite, that no one can entirely master, no matter what the distractions are with which he surrounds himself or the dexterity with which he deafens or abases himself.

If someone charges this definition with being obscure or vague, we will ask, how can one precisely define something that transforms and modifies itself in every individual, in each country, in every epoch? All our intimate sentiments seem to mock the efforts of language. Words fail what they express by the very fact that they generalize, serving to designate and to distinguish rather than to define. An instrument of the mind, they render well only the notions of the mind. They fail in everything that belongs either to the senses or to the soul. Define the emotion that the consideration of death causes in you, the wind that echoes through ruins or tombs, the harmony of sounds or those of form. Define reverie, the inner stirring of the soul, in which all the pleasures of the senses or of thought come together in a mysterious confusion.

In placing the religious sentiment at the peak, but in the same category as our most profound and pure emotions, we are not thereby denying the reality of what it reveals or divines. In order to deny that this sentiment has a real basis, we would have to suppose that there is an incoherence in our nature, which would be even more strange and implausible because it would be the only one of its kind. Nothing appears to exist in vain. Every symptom indicates a cause; every cause produces its effect. Our bodies are destined to perish, thus they contain the seeds of destruction. These seeds, even when they are combatted by the vital principle that ensures our temporary existence, eventually triumph. Why would the tendency that we have described and which is perhaps determined by a seed of immortality, why wouldn’t it also triumph? We feel our bodies led toward the tomb; the tomb opens before them. But we feel another part of ourselves, a more intimate part (although 37 less well known), attracted to another sphere. Who would dare to say that this sphere does not exist? Or that it is closed to us?

If you wander in the night, knowing only the idea of darkness but still experiencing a secret pain at the darkness, when suddenly you see in the distance the horizon gradually lighting up, would you not think that behind the dark horizon is a luminous universe, one that your inexplicable desire had already indicated?

Thus, even though the religious sentiment never exists without some form, it can still be conceived independently of every form by abstracting from everything that varies according to the different situations, circumstances, and relative levels of knowledge in society and history, and bringing together everything that remains unchanging in them.

It is because this sentiment adjusts itself to all conditions, all centuries, and all conceptions that the appearances with which it clothes itself are often crude. But despite this external deterioration one always finds in them the traits that characterize it and cause it to be recognized. Even when it associates itself, as we have already seen, with the most common interests, with the most vulgar calculations, it nonetheless resists this alliance. In this it is like a celestial envoy who, in order to give order to a barbarous tribe, accommodates himself to their highly imperfect mores and language. His voice and his visage nonetheless will always attest that they come from a superior race and originate in a happier kingdom. What is more ignorant and more superstitious than the ignorant savage who daubs with mud and blood his primitive fetish? But follow him to the tomb of his deceased; listen to the lamentations of warriors for their chieftains, of the mother for the child she lost. You will discern something in them that will penetrate to your soul, that will stir your emotions, that will revive your hope. The religious sentiment will seem to you to break free of its present form.

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CHAPTER 2: On the Necessity of Distinguishing the Religious Sentiment from Religious Forms in Order to Understand the Development of Religions

The distinction that we attempted to establish in the previous chapter has gone unrecognized, or been misunderstood, up until now. However, it is the key to unlocking a host of problems to which no one has been able to provide a solution. Not only is the origin of religious ideas inexplicable if we do not acknowledge the existence of the religious sentiment; but one also encounters a thousand phenomena during the course of religious development that it is impossible to account for if we do not distinguish the sentiment from its forms. Nothing must be neglected, therefore, to make this truth clear and to support it with ample evidence.

The religious sentiment is born of the need that man experiences to put himself in communication with invisible powers.

The form is born of the need that he equally experiences to render both regular and permanent the means of communication he believes he has discovered.

The consecration of these means, their permanence and regularity, are things he cannot do without. He wants to be able to count on his belief; he must find it today as it was yesterday; it must not seem to disappear like a cloud at each moment. Moreover, it is necessary that he see this path supported by those with whom he has relations of interest, habit, and affection. Since he is destined to live with his fellow human beings and to communicate with them, he does not even enjoy his own sentiment unless it is connected with the universal sentiment. He does not like to commit himself to opinions no one else shares. He desires the approval of others for his thoughts as well as his actions; and external approval is necessary for his internal satisfaction.1

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From all this it results that at each period a positive form is established that is proportionate to the level of development of the period.

But every positive form, no matter how satisfactory it might be for the present, contains a seed of resistance and opposition to the progress of the future. By the very fact of its permanence, it contracts a dogmatic and unchanging character which refuses to follow intelligence in its discoveries and the soul in its emotions. Each day, however, renders the latter purer and more refined. In order to make more of an impression on its followers, the form is forced to make use of almost material images. Soon, the religious form offers to the human beings who are tired of this world simply another world that resembles it. The ideas that it proposes become more and more narrow, like the earthly ideas of which they merely are a copy. Finally the time arrives when it only presents to the mind assertions it cannot accept, to the soul practices that do not satisfy it. The religious sentiment then separates from this petrified form. It demands another form that does not offend it. It seeks and strives until it finds one.

Behold the history of religion. You can see from it that if the sentiment and its forms are confused, one understands nothing.

Without this distinction, how can you explain a whole series of religious phenomena that strike any reader of the annals of different peoples?

Why, for example, when a religious form is well established and civilization has developed to a certain degree, does unbelief inevitably manifest itself, and with growing boldness and audacity? Greece, Rome, modern Europe: all show this.

To want to explain it by the prominence of a few individuals who all at once (one knows not why) took it upon themselves to undermine respected beliefs is to confuse an effect for the cause, a symptom for the disease.

Writers are but the organs of dominant opinions, and their consonance with these opinions and their fidelity in expressing them are the basis of their success. Place Lucan in Homer’s time, or merely in Pindar’s, have Voltaire be born under Louis IV or under Louis XI, and neither Lucan nor Voltaire will even attempt to shake the belief of their contemporaries. If they did, it would be in vain. The plaudits 40 they obtained in their day, the praise that encouraged them, came less from their own merit than from the conformity of their teachings with those that were beginning to gain credit. They said without restraint what everyone thought. Each reader recognized himself in their writings, he admired himself in his interpreter.

It is not an arbitrary fact that peoples are devout or irreligious. Logic is a need of the mind, as religion is of the soul. No one doubts because he wants to doubt, just as no one believes because he wills to believe.

There are times when it is impossible to sow doubt; there are others when it is impossible to revive conviction.

Where do these contrary impossibilities come from?

When the intellect has progressed but the religious form remains the same, the form is no more than deceptive. The religious sentiment struggles against it. True, despite the intention of those who have it, it sometimes slips into positive religion, but the ministers of the religion detect this and fight the sentiment.

The philosophers of antiquity, up to but not including Epicurus, for the most part expressed only this tendency of the religious sentiment.2 They did not have irreligious or antireligious intentions. Their efforts to purify belief were so unhostile 41 to religion that with great conviction they defended the ensemble of beliefs while they wanted to modify (and sometimes discard) a few details. But the positive religions know nothing of this sort of benevolence. For them reformers are enemies. The death of Socrates and the exile of Anaxagoras are well known. Two thousand years later Fénelon’s doctrine of pure love, which was nothing but the religious sentiment seeking to find a place among fixed dogmas, was condemned as a heresy.3

Persecution, however, has inevitable effects. The desire to break the vexatious yoke of a form that reveals itself to be oppressive becomes the sole purpose toward which thought works.

The imagination’s own activity, and reasoning’s subtlety, turn against what reason formerly found plausible and what imagination was formerly pleased to revere. In a word, the religious sentiment separates itself from the old form.

Then, however, the persecution intensifies. But it causes a sort of fanaticism of unbelief in the rebellious souls, one that intoxicates the enlightened portions, the superior classes, of society. Soon enough, this unbelief attacks the religious 42 sentiment itself. Previously merely hampered by the material form of the religion, that sentiment now finds itself subject to the frontal attack that unbelief makes on religion. Just as revolutions against despotism are ordinarily followed by a period of anarchy, so too the shaking of popular beliefs is accompanied by an unchecked hatred and disdain for all religious ideas. And even though the religious sentiment continues to possess its rights even in the face of this assault, the overall appearance is that unbelief is total, that man has abjured forever anything belonging to religion. This is despite the enthusiasm for Nature, for the great Whole, that we note among the most unbelieving authors and which, truth be told, is the religious sentiment in atheism itself, reproducing itself under a different name.

But a new problem presents itself, and again it is only the distinction between sentiment and form that can resolve it.

Why does it happen that whenever positive religions are entirely discredited, men give themselves over to the most frightful superstitions?

Consider the inhabitants of the civilized world during the first three centuries of our era. Look at them as they are described by Plutarch. He was an honorable writer who would have wanted to be a believer, who sometimes imagined himself to be one, but was drawn away, despite himself, by the current of contemporary unbelief and caught the contagion of skepticism.

First of all, at that time there is skepticism, invincible in its arguments, peremptory in its denigrations, and triumphant in its ironic tone. But alongside it one finds a torrent of crude, often wild superstitions sweeping through the civilized world. The old polytheism had fallen, but another replaced it, the latter given to the occult, the somber, and the bizarre. Individuals gave themselves over to it while also being ashamed of it. The official ceremonies of the pontiffs were succeeded by the tumultuous processions of the priests of Isis, the last auxiliaries and (suspect) allies of the dying cult. They were alternatively summoned and rejected by its ministers, who despaired of their own cause. The newcomers included unruly and despised emissaries; indecent dancers; fanatical prophets; intrusive beggars; men with disheveled hair, lacerated bodies, and bloodied chests; and eunuchs deprived of the gender they had foresworn, as well as of the reason they numbed. They paraded images and even relics of divinities throughout the towns and cities. They filled the air with their cries, they astonished the crowd with their grotesque contortions and frightened it with their hideous convulsions. But remarkably, this crowd, no longer moved by the ancient pomp and ceremonies, felt its devotion 43 revived by this troupe of crude charlatans and tricksters. All this occurred among peoples who were believed to be enlightened.4

The practices that no longer sufficed were replaced by the hideous bloodbaths of bulls. Despite the best efforts of civic magistrates, revolting rites came streaming into places of worship from the most despised peoples. Human sacrifice was reintroduced into religion and thus dishonored its fall as it had sullied its birth. The gods exchanged their elegant forms for monstrous deformities. In fact, imported from everywhere, these gods were better received the stranger they appeared. It was as a group that they were invoked, it was as a group that the imagination wanted to deal with them. Terrified of finding the heavens empty and silent, it wanted to repopulate the deserted heavens with any sort of being. Sects multiplied, individuals claiming to be inspired wandered everywhere, and political authority no longer knew how to deal with the disbelief that threatened the status quo as well as the mad doctrines that wanted to replace it. Authority contracted unavailing alliances with the priests of the undermined cults. It exhausted itself with exhortations that were more useless than pathetic. It sought to defend the past,5 but it succeeded only in maintaining deceptive appearances. Reason meanwhile disputed the future with the unexpected errors that also claimed the future as their conquest.

Nor were these errors the sole possession of the ignorant classes. Madness invaded all the ranks of society. Even the most effeminate Roman males and the most delicate females made their way face-down up the steps of the Capitol and congratulated themselves for arriving at the top with bloodied knees.6 In the palaces of emperors and in the apartments of Roman ladies one found all the monsters of Egypt, images of dogs, wolves, and sparrow hawks. Once upon a time these were symbols of creative power in the mystery religions, but now they were simultaneously 44 objects of derision and of public veneration. They indicated the enigmatic character of the current mixture of all the gods.7

All this, however, still did not satisfy the human race. It rediscovered religious terror but sought in vain for belief, and it was of belief that it had need. The same Plutarch shows us men of every condition—rich, poor, young, old. Sometimes without any visible cause they are seized by a frantic despair, they tear their clothes and roll in the mire, crying out that they are cursed by the gods.8 Sometimes they talk about the gods in bantering and ironic tones, then they repair to obscure locations and consult with sorcerers and sellers of amulets and talismans. Sometimes they go at night to cemeteries to disinter the dead or to sacrifice infants or let them expire on tombs, so that they can read their own fate in their entrails. And finally, despite their enervated natures, braving both pain and the law, they sometimes submit their weakened bodies to incredible lacerations in order to compel the unknown power they blindly seek, in this way snatching from hell what they no longer hope to obtain from heaven.

Where did this moral disorder come from, at a time when philosophy had spread its teachings everywhere, and when enlightenment seemed to have dissipated the darkness of ignorance?

At that time, men applauded themselves for having overcome all the prejudices, errors, and fears that had previously bedeviled them—and yet every prejudice, error, and fear seemed to be unleashed. The empire of reason had been proclaimed, and the entire universe was struck by madness. All the systems were based upon calculation and appealed to self-interest, they permitted pleasure and recommended repose—and never were aberrations more shameful, human endeavors more disordered, pain and suffering more poignant. This was because in its attacks against the religious form, skepticism also attacked the sentiment that the human race cannot live without. Having emerged victorious from the battles he waged, man cast a look at the world he had created, one deprived of protective powers, and he was astonished at his victory. No longer did the excitement of battle, the thought of danger that had animated his courage, and the desire to regain contested rights sustain him. His imagination, previously preoccupied with an uncertain victory, was now released and, as it were, deserted; it turned upon itself. Man found himself alone on an earth that eventually must swallow him.

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On this earth, the generations pass one by one, transient, isolated, subject to chance. They appear, they suffer, they die: no bond connects them. No voice prolongs the existence of the previous races of men, and the voice of living ones must soon be swallowed up in the eternal silence. What will man do without memory, without hope, poised between the past that abandons him and the future that is wholly closed before him? His petitions are no longer heard; his prayers remain without answer. He has rejected all the supports with which his predecessors had surrounded themselves. He is reduced to his own powers. It is with them alone that he must confront old age, remorse, and the innumerable ills that besiege him. In this violently unnatural state, his actions constantly belied his reasonings, his fears and terrors were a constant atonement for his mockeries. One would say that he was struck with a double vertigo: sometimes insulting what he should revere, sometimes trembling before what he ought to disdain.

An eternal law that one must acknowledge, whatever opinions one might otherwise have on questions that we believe are insoluble, seems to have willed that the earth is uninhabitable when an entire generation no longer believes in a wise and benevolent power watching over men. Separated from heaven, this earth becomes a prison, and the prisoner hits his head on the ceiling and walls that contain him. The religious sentiment beats wildly against the broken forms because a form is lacking that advancing understanding could acknowledge.

Let this form appear and opinion will gather round it, morality attach itself to it, and authority, even if resistant for a time, will end by yielding. Everything returns to order, and restless spirits and troubled souls rediscover repose.

This is what happened when the Christian religion appeared. The religious sentiment took hold of this purified form. Its vague, melancholic, and touching part found asylum in Christianity at the very moment when man had acquired knowledge of the laws of physical things and the existing religion had therefore lost the support that ignorance gave it.

Under the dominion of the ancient form, religion had raised itself from earth to heaven; but its basis had eroded. By giving it a foundation, the new form caused religion to return to earth from heaven. One can consider this period as the moral resurrection of the human race. The political world remained subject to chaos, but the intellectual world was reconstituted for several centuries.

One more thing remains to be observed. At this period the religious sentiment was full of the memory of what it had suffered in the confines of a positive form. It feared in the new form everything that resembled the shackles imposed on it by 46 the previous form. It enjoyed all its freedom. Happy to have rediscovered axioms that it believed were certain and truths that seemed undeniable to it, it savored the delights of believing, but it also rejected creeds for which it had no need, as well as practices that to it were indifferent or superfluous and hierarchies that reminded of the previous yoke that had so much injured it.

It wanted no priesthood. We are all priests, said Tertullian. We are all consecrated as such before the heavenly Father.9

It disdained the magnificence of ceremonies. It was concerned only with the infinite, universal, invisible Being, to whom every man should erect a temple in his heart.10 Wearing the humblest of clothes, and sometimes only half-covered, Christians disdained pagan pomp, the ornate decorations of sacred buildings, and pontifical vestments; they did not erect altars, they did not revere images. Tolerant because it was sincere, the religious sentiment joyfully opened admission to Heaven to all nations, to all prayers, to all times.11 It delighted in sharing its happiness 47 with the entire human race because this happiness was purely spiritual. A time will come, though, and under a form that already was being prepared, when temporal goods would again be the objects of desire, and religion would come to be prodigious with exclusions and stingy with benefits, because its ministers became avid for gold and power.

The religious sentiment also claimed this same liberty with regard to rituals and ascetic practices. It proclaimed man freed from every man-made obligation; no one could impose upon him an artificial duty.12 No external thing could stain him, no fast was prescribed for him, no food was forbidden him.13 So much did the religious sentiment at this period of its rebirth take care to declare itself independent of forms, and so much did it fear to sully its purity by practices that likened it to the old cults it had come to disdain.

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CHAPTER 3: That the Moral Effect of Mythologies Proves the Distinction That We Just Established

It is not only in order to understand the general development of religion that one must distinguish the religious sentiment from its forms. One must also recognize the distinction in order to resolve particular questions of detail that have been unanswerable until now.

Powerful and civilized nations have worshipped gods that provided examples of all the vices. Who would not have thought that this scandalous example would corrupt the worshippers? On the contrary, as long as they remained faithful to this worship these nations presented the spectacle of the highest virtues.

That is not all. These same nations abandoned their beliefs, and it was then that they were plunged into the abyss of corruption. The Romans were chaste, austere, and disinterested when they burned incense to the pitiless Mars, to the adulterer Jupiter, to Venus the immodest, and to Mercury the protector of fraud. When they deserted the altars of their cruel or licentious deities, they showed themselves depraved in their mores, insatiable in their greed, and barbarous in their egoism.

How did this strange phenomenon arise? Do men become better by adoring vice? Do they become perverse when they cease to worship it?

No, of course not. But as long as the religious sentiment dominates the form, it exerts a reparative power. The reason for this is simple. The religious sentiment is an emotion of the same sort as all of our natural emotions. Therefore, it is always in harmony with them. It is always in accord with sympathy, pity, justice—in a word, with all the virtues.1 It follows that as long as it remains united with this religious 49 50 51 52 53 54 form, the weak ones of this religion can be scandalized, its gods can be corrupt, and this form nonetheless will have a positive effect on morality.

The tales of a religion are the object of an incredulity that neither requires nor provokes reflection. They are lodged in a separate compartment of the human brain and do not interact with the rest of its ideas. Just as arithmetic is the same in India as elsewhere despite the Indian Trimurti, so morality was the same in Rome as elsewhere, despite the traditions that seemed contrary to it. The people that attributed its own origin to the love affair between Mars and a vestal virgin nonetheless inflicted the strictest punishment upon any unfaithful virgin.

Nor does the moral character of the gods have the influence one might suppose. Whatever this character, the relationship established between the gods and men is always the same. The gods’ particular misconduct does not affect this relationship, much as the misconduct of kings does not affect their laws established against the misdeeds of individuals. In Alexander the Great’s army, the Macedonian soldier convicted of murder was condemned even though his judge had assassinated Clitus. Like the great of this world, the gods have a public character and a private one. In their public character they are the supports of morality; in their private 55 character they obey only their passions. But they do not have a relationship with men except in their public character.2 It is to this that the religious sentiment exclusively attaches itself, since it is pleased to respect and admire what it worships, even to the point of casting a veil over everything that might detract from it.

But when the sentiment separates from the form that it formerly purified by its powerful action, everything changes, even though this might not be immediately perceived. The corrupting traditions that it left in the shadows, or that it interpreted in a way to avoid their adverse consequences, reappear and add their support to depravation. Thus, in a paradoxical manner, one could say that the less man believes in the gods, the more he imitates them.

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CHAPTER 4: That This Distinction Alone Explains Why Several Religious Forms Appear to Be Enemies of Liberty, While the Religious Sentiment Is Always Favorable to It

There is another problem even more difficult to resolve, about which error is even more dangerous.

Take according to the letter the fundamental precepts of all religions, and you will find them always in accord with the most extensive principles of liberty. One could say that they extol a liberty that is so extensive that even to this day applying them has seemed impossible in political life.

But now consider the history of religions, and you will often find that the authorities they established worked in concert with earthly authorities to banish liberty. India, Ethiopia, and Egypt show us the human race subjected, decimated, and, as it were, penned in by priests. Some periods of our modern times present, albeit under somewhat more attractive traits, a hardly different spectacle. And not so long ago the most complete despotism we had known had taken hold of religion as an obliging, even zealous, auxiliary. During fourteen years of servitude religion no longer was the divine presence come down from heaven to astonish, or reform, the earth. Dependent and timid, it had bowed before the throne of power, received its orders, and passively observed its deeds, giving flattery and receiving disdain. It no longer caused ancient walls to resound with the sounds of courage and conscience. And far from instructing the great of this world about a severe God who judges kings, it sought the haughty gaze of its earthly master in the way it should have sought its God. It judged itself happy if it was not constrained to command invasions and wars in the name of a message of peace, or to undermine the sublimity of its teachings with the sophistries of politics, or to ask heaven to bless successful injustice. This would be to slander the divine by accusing it of complicity with evil.

These contradictions between the theory and practice in the majority of religious systems have accredited two opinions that can be extremely harmful and are 57 equally false. The first is that religion is a natural ally of despotism; the second, that the absence of the religious sentiment is favorable to liberty.

Only our distinction between the sentiment of religion and its form can spare us from this double prejudice.

Considering the religious sentiment in itself, and independently of all the forms it can assume, it is obvious that it contains no principle or any element of servitude.

Liberty, equality, and justice (which is but equality) are, to the contrary, its favorite ideas. The creatures who have emerged from the hands of a god whose goodness directs his power, who are subject to the same physical destiny and endowed with the same moral faculties ought to enjoy the same rights.

By studying the epochs when the religious sentiment triumphed, one sees that in every one liberty was its companion.

In the midst of universal servitude under the Roman emperors, whose thirst for absolute power had degraded them even below their slaves (which is saying something), the first Christians resurrected the noble doctrines of equality and fraternity among all men.1 In another case, nothing was more independent (we would say: more democratic) than the Arabs when Islam was in its first fervor.2 Protestantism saved Germany from universal monarchy under Charles V. Present-day England owes to it its constitution.

The absence of religious sentiment, on the other hand, favors tyranny’s pretensions. If the destinies of the human race are handed over to the vicissitudes of blind material fatalism, is it surprising that they often fall into the hands of the most unfit, the most cruel or despicable of human beings? If the rewards of virtue and the punishment of crime are only the vain illusions of weak and timid imaginations, why, then, should we complain when crime is rewarded or virtue proscribed? If life at bottom is only a strange and transient appearance, without 58 a future, without a past, and so short that one would believe that it is hardly real, why should we sacrifice ourselves for principles whose realization is in the future? It would be better to profit from each present hour, uncertain as we are that the next will come, and enjoy pleasure as long as it is possible. Thus, closing our eyes before the inevitable abyss of death, we should prostrate ourselves and, rather than resisting, give ourselves over to servitude, perhaps making ourselves masters if we can or slaves if that place is occupied, becoming betrayers rather than betrayed, torturers rather than victims.

The period when the religious sentiment disappears from the souls of men is always close to the time of their subjection. Religious peoples can be slaves, but no irreligious people have remained free. Liberty cannot establish itself, nor can it preserve itself, without disinterestedness, and every morality in which the religious sentiment is lacking can base itself only on calculation. In order to defend liberty, one must know how to sacrifice one’s life, and what is more than life for the one who sees in death only his annihilation? Thus, when despotism joins forces with the absence of religious sentiment, humanity is left prostrate in the dust; everywhere force is deployed. In their disdain for everything connected with religious ideas, men who styled themselves enlightened are seeking a miserable recompense for their slavery. One would say that their certainty that another world does not exist is their consolation for their shame in this one.

Nor should one think that what we call enlightenment gains by this. When the inquisitor’s whip is raised, this unbelieving host returns to the foot of the altars on its knees, and while leaving the temples, atheism joins itself to hypocrisy. What a deplorable condition for a nation arrived at this state! It asks nothing from authority but wealth, from the law only impunity. It separates action from speech, speech from thought. It believes itself free to betray its own opinion, provided that it can congratulate itself on its indifference to its own duplicity. It considers force as legitimating everything that it pleases. Flattery, calumny, and ignobility pretend to be innocent by claiming to be commanded. By declaring himself compelled to act, everyone regards himself as being thereby absolved. Created by heaven for magnanimous resistance, courage makes itself the executor of unworthy decrees. One risks his life not to overcome oppressors but to kill victims. One fights heroically for causes one disdains. Dishonorable speech goes from mouth to mouth, idle noise, which because it does not come from any real source, nowhere imparts conviction, allowing truth and justice no expression that is not gravely marred. The mind, the basest of instruments when it is separated from conscience, still proud of 59 its miserable flexibility, elegantly parades itself in the midst of the general degradation. People laugh about their own servitude and their own corruption without being any less enslaved, any less corrupt. And this sort of joke, lacking both judgment and limits, is itself the truly ridiculous symptom of an incurable degradation.

When a nation has for a long time suffered a religion that in itself is defective, or is disfigured by its ministers, the friends of liberty can become unbelievers, and often these unbelievers are the most distinguished men of the country. When a vexatious government has maintained by force the superstition which supports its injustices, the friends of liberty can become unbelievers, and these unbelievers can then become heroes and martyrs. Their virtues, though, are based on the memory of another teaching. It is a noble incoherence in their system, the heritage of the religious sentiment. They owe their internal strength to this inheritance.

Is not this sentiment the refuge where, above the action of time and beyond the reach of vice, the ideas come together which are the true worship of all virtuous men on earth? Is it not the center where the grand tradition of what is good, great, and noble is preserved across the baseness and iniquity of the centuries? Does it not speak to virtue in its own language when the discourse of everyone around it is that of baseness and servility? When the friends of liberty are deprived of these consolations and this hope, their souls always try to regrasp the support denied them. Raised on the maxims of Epicurus, like him denying any existence after this life, in the midst of his great struggles Cassius invoked the shade of the great Pompey. And in his last conversation with Brutus he said: “Yes, it would be beautiful if there were genii who take an interest in human affairs. It would be beautiful if we were strengthened in such a noble and holy cause not only by our infantrymen and our fleet, but also by the assistance of immortals.”3

This is the invariable tendency of the religious sentiment. Between it and liberty, between the absence of this sentiment and tyranny there is an identical nature, a principle of homogeneity.

But something of an opposite nature sometimes enters into religious forms. A spiritual authority, born from the need of establishing regular communications between heaven and earth, may ally with political power. Religion that had proclaimed the liberty and equality of all too often becomes the auxiliary of someone’s tyranny.

Note the following, though: even then, it is not truly religious men who sign 60 this pact. The members of the priestly bodies in Egypt that tyrannized the people, or which in other countries, Persia for example, lent their support to political oppression, did not regard the cult they abused as a divine thing, which they then abused. The religious sentiment had nothing to do with this abuse. One does not compromise things one believes to be divine.

Thus, to resolve this question, as well as all others, one has to distinguish the religious sentiment from the forms that make it visible.

Far from being the author of the evil that certain forms of worship can cause men, this sentiment is the victim. Far from sanctioning these oppressive forms, it rejects them and protests against them.

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CHAPTER 5: That the Triumph of Emerging Beliefs over Older Ones Is a Proof of the Difference between the Religious Sentiment and Religious Forms

Last of all we ask each reader of good faith, if one does not admit the difference between the religious sentiment and the religious form, how can one explain the immense advantage that new forms have in the struggle with those worn by time?

Let us return to the period that has already provided us numerous examples.

Two religions disputed the universe.

One was supported by authority; it was strong with ten centuries of continuous existence. Better put: its origin was lost in the mists of time. Poets had embellished it, philosophers had purified it, it had cast far from itself everything that might shock reason.1 It was the religion of all civilized nations; it was the authorized cult of the dominant people.

The other had neither the protection of authority nor the support of ancient traditions. Poetry gave it no ornamentation. It was not accompanied by philosophy’s brilliance. It certainly had not contracted an alliance with the imposing profundities of metaphysics. It was born in an obscure country, among a people odious to the rest of humanity (even among them, from the least respectable portion of that people); hence it was an object of universal disdain.

Who would not believe that the first religion must triumph over the second? All enlightened men thought so; all smiled when rumor brought to their attention the existence of a few fanatics who were scattered, unknown, and persecuted.

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How did it happen that the event overcame these proud predictions? It was because, separated from the former form, the religious sentiment had sought refuge in the new one. And why? Because despite the purifications the ancient form had received, it still recalled the epochs that the sentiment now rejected, especially the vices and imperfections of the former times. The names of these gods were attached to the memories of crudeness and ignorance. Shaken from every direction by human investigations, it had lost its charm and had become, as it were, profane. The new form, on the other hand, was devoid of every noxious memory. The name of its founder and of the God it taught recalled no previous epoch that had harmed the religious sentiment. That sentiment therefore gave itself enthusiastically to the new form. It adopted its banner; it was by the mouth of its followers that it spoke. They owed to it that consciousness of strength and the certainty in their speech that contrasted so strikingly with the timidity and hesitation of their opponents’ language. The apostles of the new form went forward surrounded by miracles, which were undeniable by the sole fact that those who affirmed them were full of an unshakeable conviction. The defenders of the old form based themselves upon wonders that they themselves doubted, worn copies of no longer imitable models. The former made fearless use of both faith and reason, of reason against their opponents, of faith for their own teaching. Engaging in philosophical dialectics, they did not fear to compromise a cause that could not be undermined by such reasoning. Their attack-weapon was critical examination, their banner a deep and personal conviction. The others hesitated between a reason that threatened them and an enthusiasm that paled before the one opposed to it. The skepticism they wished to direct against their adversaries turned against them, and because they were not firm in their belief they were timid in their refutations. Their apologies were marked by condescension, by avowals that were first extorted, then retracted, with insinuations that allowed others to see that the religion they recommended was intended only for the weak, and that the strong could do without it. To be sure, they placed themselves in the camp of the strong, but one is a poor missionary when one places oneself above one’s own profession of faith.

One could believe that they were zealous for yet another reason. They were moved by their interest, while the martyrs of the other side were far from the time when the victory of their faith would procure personal advantages to those who espoused it. But disinterestedness is the first of powers. In areas when it is necessary to persuade and convince, obvious self-interest weakens rather than strengthens one’s case.

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So, please note how all these ideas congregated around the religious sentiment and, obedient to its least indication, were modified, even transformed, to serve it. In the older belief that philosophy had subjugated, man had been lowered to the rank of an imperceptible atom in the immensity of the universe. The new form made him the center of a world that had been created for him. He was at once the work and the aim of God. The philosophical notion is, perhaps, truer, but how much more is the other one full of warmth and life! And from another point of view it possesses a yet higher and more sublime truth. If one locates grandeur in what really constitutes it, there is more grandeur in a proud thought, in a profound emotion, in an act of devotion, than in all the mechanisms of the celestial spheres.

Thus see the older form constantly propose exchanges and deals with its rival, and how these offers were met with disdainful refusal. What a remarkable thing! Looking only from the outside it was strength that hesitated and weakness that wanted the battle. This was because true force was entirely on the side of apparent weakness. The ancient form was dead; it aspired only to the peace of the dead. The new form wanted to fight and conquer because, being full of the religious sentiment, it had reanimated the life of the soul and had awoken the skeletons in the tombs.

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CHAPTER 6: On the Way in Which Religion Has Been Envisaged until Now

If we now apply the previous reflections to the way in which religion has been envisaged until now, you will not be surprised that almost all those who have engaged this vast topic have been misled. In general, three groups have emerged, who fell into grave errors because they mistook the nature and the progressive development of the religious sentiment.1

The first group considers religion to be inaccessible to man by his own lights and efforts; it is communicated to him by the Supreme Being in a positive and unchanging manner. Religion suffers diminishment only when it is modified by the human spirit. Therefore, when this occurs it must be brought back as much as possible to its original state, to its primitive purity. Shaken beliefs at all costs must be shored up. However, this view did not ask if such an endeavor is in the power of any existing authority. History reveals that all precautions in this vein were useless, all rigors powerless. Socrates drinking the hemlock, Aristotle fleeing Athens, Diogoras outlawed—none of this halted Athens’s unbelief. Greek philosophy came to Rome. Initially chased from Rome, it soon returned and triumphed. And the austerity of Louis XIV’s old age only prepared France for an even greater, more open, and bolder irreligion.

The second group was rightly sensitive to the evils produced by fanaticism and intolerance. However, it saw only falsehood in religion, sometimes quite vulgar, sometimes sophisticated, sometimes rather material, sometimes more abstract, but always more or less harmful. This perspective concluded that it was desirable to 65 found morality on a wholly mundane basis, and to extirpate the religious sentiment. Had it consulted human experience, however, it would have seen that religion is always being reborn at the very moment when enlightenment proudly thinks it has killed it. Juvenal wrote that only children believe in another life. However, at the same time an unknown sect arose in the empire, its eyes fixed on a world to come, and the present world became its conquest. If religion is necessary to us, if a faculty is found in us that demands to be employed, if our imagination needs to transcend the limits that enclose us, if the suffering and troubled dimensions of our being need a world they can make use of and embellish, in vain would one reproach religion for its drawbacks or its dangers. Necessity will always conquer prudence. The one who can no longer inhabit the land must confront the waves, no matter how littered with reefs the ocean may be.

Finally, the third group takes what it believes to be the golden mean between the two extremes. They acknowledge only what they call natural religion, which they reduce to the purest dogmas and the simplest notions. But this group differs from the other two groups, the orthodox and the unbelievers, not by their path but only by their goal. Like the others, they believe that man can be put in possession of an absolute truth, hence that he can remain always the same, totally stationary. Whoever maintains these dogmas possesses this truth. But whoever falls short of them by his unbelief, or goes beyond them by acknowledging miraculous revelations, is equally mistaken.

With these three perspectives, we can say that until now no one has considered religion under its true aspect. A glance at the religious and the anti-religious writings of France, England, and Germany will provide irrefutable proofs of this claim.

Before the eighteenth century all the works published in France by the defenders of the different religious communities were dedicated to the victory of their own sect. However, they all shared an underlying consensus that ruled out the fundamental questions or dispensed them from raising them.

A fruitful source of disputes, heresy was seen by Catholics as a voluntary fault and was treated as a crime.2 The adherents of this view agreed with their opponents on the basics and contested only some of their consequences.

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Even more discredited than heresy (although less persecuted), unbelief was rejected by a French public opinion drawing, on one hand, on the lively interest stirred by the wars of religion, and, on the other, on the prestige of a king who had made belief fashionable and a means of advancement.

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When Bossuet thundered against the pagans in his History or prosecuted Protestants in his Polemics, he appeared as a judge condemning the guilty rather than as an impartial narrator of events or a calm examiner of various doctrines. And when he directed his blows against unbelievers it was verdicts he issued, verdicts, to be sure, that were accompanied by arguments, but arguments in which authority played a much greater role than reasoning.

Far be it from us, though, to diminish the real merit of a great man. If the perspective in which Bossuet viewed religion necessarily lacked impartiality and scope, it was admirable in its nobility and elevation. In his mouth religion spoke a dignified and proud language, one it, sadly, has abandoned since then. Despite the orator himself, led (perhaps even overcome) by his own genius, the last sparks of liberty found refuge in his eloquence. What he did not say to an absolute monarch in the name of the fundamental laws and the people’s true interest, he said in the name of the God before whom all creatures return to their original equality.3

Nonetheless, while rendering justice to a writer whose panegyrists praise only what is violent and hateful in his works, we believe that we can say that nothing Bossuet has left us—and a fortiori, nothing left us in the other works of the century—can be usefully applied to the new questions we have raised. This includes anything concerning the distinction between the substance and the forms of religion, the development of religious ideas, the gradual changes in beliefs, as well as those successive and irresistible improvements found in mankind’s religious experience. These questions were unknown, and completely foreign, to the earlier religious debates.

After Louis XIV the scene changed. Freed from the authority of an old king and from the etiquette of an old court, France launched itself on the path of license. This was the natural effect of a longtime repression. Madame de Prie succeeded Madame de Maintenon, and ecclesiastical honors went from Bossuet to DuBois. Unbelief emerged from hypocrisy’s tomb.

To be clear, I am not simply presenting the unbelievers of the last century as the heirs of the orgies of the Regency. Nobler motives inspired many of them. A slow but sure reaction prepared itself over a long period of time. The Saint Bartholomew Day’s Massacre had repulsed everyone. The murders of Henry III and Henry IV 68 had stirred opinion against religious assassination. Then Louis XIV succeeded in enlisting all the sentiments of mankind against priestly oppression. He did so by means of the cruelties that accompanied the revoking of the Edict of Nantes. He did so by ordering the stationing of troops, by confiscations, by torturing fathers and incarcerating mothers, and by kidnapping children. The philosophers’ indignation against him was both just and sincere. But even this anger and the works it inspired, the sorts of associations they formed to wage war against the doctrines they accused of so many crimes and evils—all these things inculcated in them the spirit of a sect. And everywhere this spirit dominates, it employs the same means.

Voltaire had said that it is better to strike hard than to strike justly. And all his imitators, a great and active throng who ran from the literary heights to the most obscure ranks, raged against religion. They did so with a fury that was almost always the inverse of the learning they possessed and the talents at their disposal.

In some circumstances Voltaire’s maxim is useful. While violent persecutions had ceased, less obvious ones remained to be overcome. Every means seemed legitimate to inspire horror at any sort of persecution. But disarming fanaticism is not the same as adequately understanding and appreciating the religious sentiment. From these tactics came an insulting and sarcastic way of talking about something dear to the majority of human beings. And while this style is always certain to attain momentary success in an old and corrupt nation, it necessarily inspires disgust in refined and sensitive souls—those who are a powerful if unnoticed minority, who will always end up laying down the law even in the midst of general decadence.

Those philosophers who, even while they attacked the existing religion wanted to preserve the principles serving as the basis of all religion, considered the principles only in their most ignoble and crudest version, as a supplement to criminal laws. Reading their writings, one sees that they wanted religion to serve them immediately, as a sort of police force; they wanted religion to help guarantee their property and their lives, to discipline their children and maintain good order in their marriages. They are so utilitarian that they seem to fear believing for nothing.4 They want religion to repay them for believing in it.

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This narrow and partial way of looking at religion has several drawbacks.

Just as by seeking in the beauties of nature immediate utility, and their direct application to society, one tarnishes all the charms of this magnificent spectacle, so too one degrades religion by seeing only what is useful in it. Secondly, practical utility does not at all imply the truth of the theory, and men are not more religious because they are told that religion is useful; one does not believe in utility. Finally, the social utility of religion serves as a pretext for rulers to violate the consciences of the governed. In arguing this way, authors give unbelieving peoples masters who persecute them.

This need for immediate and, as it were, purely material utility is the characteristic vice of our national spirit.5 It has some advantages, to be sure. It gives greater regularity and more coherence to the concatenation of ideas. People walk more directly to the goal and do not lose sight of it. But when one examines every question in only one way, one runs the risk of failing to see all of its aspects. In following this path, one rejects all involuntary sentiments, impressions, and emotions. They, however, are sometimes exactly what is needed to cause strict reasoning to take another look; sometimes they possess the key that logic by itself does not.

Three authors, however, sometimes rose above this narrow and degrading view. One we have already spoken of: Fénelon. We saw, however, that he was stopped in his tracks by the authority of the Catholic Church, which indicted him for having maintained that man can love God with a pure and disinterested love. The second author was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Some of his writings are imbued with a genuine religious sentiment that is pure, disinterested, entirely devoid of ulterior motives. But Rousseau was complicated. He teemed with a thousand contradictory thoughts, and he combined them in confused and discordant ways. This was as true of religion as of politics. He who was the most positive and affirmative of men was also the most impatient with the affirmations of others. He shook everything, not because he wanted to destroy everything, as some have said, but because everything seemed to him out of its proper place. With prodigious force he shook the foundations and toppled the columns upon which human existence had rested, for good and for ill, until then. But he was a poor architect, and he could not construct 70 a new edifice from these scattered materials. Only destruction resulted from his efforts, and from the destruction a chaos that still bears his mark.

Lastly, Montesquieu—more by his penetrating mind than by his soul—would have been able to shed new light on religion. There was no subject he approached without detecting many new truths. And since all truths are connected, he advanced truth. Ascending from the facts that he discerned and put forth with admirable sagacity, he rose to the cause common to these numerous effects. Turning to religion, he might have been able to detect the general principle in the midst of its infinitely varied modifications. But besides the fact that even a genius can surpass his century only to a certain extent, in the Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu examined religion only tangentially, as it were. He said only what he had to say. Reading this great work of the eighteenth century one gets the impression that the author dismissed a host of ideas that presented themselves to him as being beside his purpose.

The French Revolution occurred because we had too much enlightenment to live any longer under arbitrary authority. It lost its way, however, because we did not have enough enlightenment to profit from freedom. The Revolution unshackled a multitude totally unprepared by any experience or reflection for the sudden emancipation they experienced. It quickly transformed itself into a merely material force, one without rule or brake, directed against all the institutions whose imperfections had provoked it.

Religion became the object of a detestable persecution. Then, what followed had to follow: the reaction was as strong as the original action had been unjust and violent. Among contemporary authors in France, many present themselves as defenders of religion. They, however, are no less ignorant of history than their predecessors, the demagogues. No less obtuse concerning what history teaches about the consequences of all tyrannical measures, they propose the old strictures that failed under François I, Philippe II, Mary of England, and Louis XIV. Pitiful sophists, they betray both governments and peoples!

Thus, religion has always been treated in France in a partial, and often in a superficial, way. It has been defended with virulent pedantry and attacked with indiscriminate hostility.

What about England? There, did religion find less obstinate partisans or more equitable opponents?

Thanks to a fortunate set of circumstances, even though established by force under Henry VIII, because of the cruelties of Mary and the fruitless efforts of the 71 Stuarts, Protestantism became identified with the constitution that was England’s glory for so long. In addition, however, there also resulted from this that religion, more so than in any other enlightened country, became a dogmatic matter6 immune to all free and impartial discussion.

Warburton, Hurd, and Tillotson possessed the domineering spirit of Bossuet but without his genius. The English Church was for them what the Catholic Church was for the bishop of Meaux, with this difference, that intolerance is even more absurd in their case. By denying others the right to be heretics, they abdicated their own right to be Protestants. Writers in England of a lesser order generally have more classical learning than our theologians, but their perspective is no broader. They understand no better the animating spirit of ancient times or foreign peoples. Nor is their thought more liberal, while their logic runs in the same vicious circle.

To be sure, the English sectarians have shed some light on the first Christian centuries. Every controversy generates some light. But these dissidents (who are as subject as the defenders of orthodoxy to the dogmatic spirit that characterizes the entire nation) do not depart from the narrow circle traced by dogmas. They fight over their interpretation. Even here, though, all the parties share common presuppositions, so no one addresses more fundamental matters and primary truths. Their dispute is over how far to go in developing principles they all agree to be true.

Unbelievers are looked down on more in England than elsewhere because the English recall that one of the means Charles II used to destroy the nation’s liberty was to ridicule religion. Among the unbelievers, Collins, Tindall, Woolston, and later Toulmin occupy a lesser rank. We intentionally omitted Hobbes. Religion appeared to Hobbes as a means of tyranny, and he publicly massaged it without believing it. He cannot be considered religion’s friend, because he dishonored it, nor as its enemy, because he recommended it. Toland owes whatever is meritorious in his thought to Spinoza. Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Cherbury, and Hume are the 72 only writers in this category who have real value. But they all also have the defects of the French thinkers: an imperious tone, epigrammatic utterances, bitterness, malevolent insinuations, deliberately distorted facts, and artfully mutilated narratives.

In his Natural History of Religion, Hume showed a good deal of wit but little profound learning. His irony is effective because of its apparent mildness, and his sallies often hit their mark. But the work is nonetheless quite unworthy of its serious subject.

With a sometimes treacherous adroitness, which he used when he thought he could get away with it, Gibbon spoiled his immense learning, his tireless research, and the often remarkable subtlety of his views. He did so as well by a complete lack of sympathy for enthusiasm. Sympathy for it, however, is the necessary condition for describing a young religion. And, finally, he did so by a revolting indifference toward both misfortune and courage.

Thomas Paine only reproduced in a commonplace and often crude style the shallow metaphysics of Baron Holbach. Embracing a widespread error, he saw in religion only an enemy of the freedom he cherished (without, however, understanding freedom). Because he exaggerated the principles of liberty, he misunderstood the nature of religion.

Even though Godwin is much more profound and ingenious than Paine in developing his sometimes utopian political ideas, when it comes to religion he barely goes beyond Paine. Dominated by the prejudices of a vulgar philosophy, he abdicated his characteristic penetration. In his attacks against an indestructible sentiment, he appeared to be ignorant of the human heart, which in many ways he was able to describe with remarkable fidelity.

Between the two, religious dogmatism and violent (or frivolous) unbelief divide the minds of England. But neither speaks to the human soul. And the essence of religion is found in neither the subtleties of dogma nor the abstractions of unbelief.

Looking closer at the religious attitudes of the two countries we just surveyed, one can detect a certain likeness, although one must look closely. The English sects are limited in their religious aspirations by the letter of the dogmas they wish to retain. The upcoming generation in France, which is beginning to experience a need for religion, is doubly inhibited. On one hand, by a tradition of unbelief that has become a kind of philosophical dogma, one they do not dare abandon, and, on the other, by the unfortunate alliance of religion and politics. These causes inhibit among us and among our neighbors the development of the religious sentiment.

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Protestant Germany presents a better scene. Almost all the Germans have the great merit, or great good fortune, of recognizing a fundamental truth without which one discovers nothing true nor establishes anything good. This truth is that everything in man is progressive. None of his ideas remains fixed; they develop even despite resistance, coming to light through various obstacles. At the end of any significant interval of time they are found to have undergone modification, having received essential improvements.

Of all truths, this is the one most rejected in France. We have a certain self-complacency, which at any given time makes us believe that we have arrived at perfection, and therefore the human race should stop and admire us.

Germans are less content, less satisfied with themselves in the present, and less envious of future generations. They know that each generation is placed at some point on a great continuum in order to draw profit from what came before and to prepare what is to be done later. Social, political, and religious forms appear to them as they are: indispensable supports for man, but which must be modified when he changes. This attitude by itself is an excellent criterion for judging religion.

For the past century, a particular circumstance has confirmed them in this attitude and caused them to make progress on this path.

Previously, Protestantism in Germany was what it still is in England: a belief-system as dogmatic as the Catholicism from which the reformers broke. The ministers of the two main dissident communions forgot that their leaders could not justify their reforms except by proclaiming freedom of belief in matters of worship. They rose indignantly against the limits laid down by the Roman Church. But in an absurd and cruel contradiction—one for which their leaders had provided the model—they claimed to be authorized to propose no less arbitrary ones. They demanded liberty for themselves but refused it to their enemies. They railed against the injustice and folly of intolerance, and they made use of both.

Frederick II ascended to the throne. The literature of his country was in its infancy. He granted all his favors to French letters. Excepting Voltaire, who could not live for long in an atmosphere of patronage and dependency, these writers were second-rate, even mediocre. Vain, ambitious, and second-rate, as are all those who condescend to become the entourage of power, they had founded their reputation in France on glib unbelief and were totally lacking a spirit of serious investigation. Depending upon how you look at it, seriousness of purpose either motivates or excuses unbelief. In any event, called to a foreign court, they brought with them this unbelief, the instrument of their success. Therefore Christianity saw itself under 74 constant assault from this philosophical monarch, his sycophants, and their eager imitators. All the sides of the faith which appeared weak were ruthlessly exposed; all legends were mercilessly ridiculed.

A few German writers, much superior to their French models, joined this audacious, impious order. From among them came the Wieland-school in poetry, the school of Nicolai in prose, and Lessing himself. We would be embarrassed to compare him to the Marquis d’Argens and La Metrie in terms of good faith, learning, and genius, but sometimes he resembled them. The vexations by authority in several German principalities furnished the adversaries of religion more than pretexts. Professors denounced for their views and preachers persecuted for heterodoxy indicated the need for more intellectual freedom. And the hatred generated by the persecutions extended to the ideas that the persecutors claimed to vindicate.

But the German spirit finally repudiated both of these sterile dogmatic approaches. It is naturally meditative, too serious to be distracted for long by such superficiality, too sincere to sacrifice what it deems true to applause. The German character itself inclines to enthusiasm, and it finds happiness in religion—as in love—only in exaltation and reverie. It therefore rejected the two quarreling parties, one advancing as proofs only sarcasms that every equitable judge knew were unjust, the other propounding as facts what every learned man knew were not so.

As a result, many defenders of threatened belief presented themselves. Because of the liberty of writing and publishing that Frederick allowed, the new apologists of religion made their case, each in his own way. Thus there was an army, but one without a general and with all-important differences among the troops.

Some attached themselves to the old system and propped it up as much as they could on the old supports of miracles and prophecy. Others renounced these means and restricted themselves to the purely moral aspect of religion, casting into the shadows the historical, traditional, and, especially, the miraculous parts.

This did not occur at once, however. This was an honorable retreat, with each post successively abandoned, the better to preserve all the others. What were later called improvements at the time appeared to be sacrifices.

Then Frederick died. Now authority adopted a policy toward religion contrary to his. It wanted to reunite under a common banner all the different theologians. Those who refused to do so came under attack from those who had remained faithful to the old doctrines. Their previous modifications were termed crimes, their previous sacrifices were called apostasy. You have extreme parties in religion just as you do in politics. Edicts of persecution appeared, apparently dictated from the tomb.

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In this way many zealous supporters of Christianity were declared to be enemies. They did not accept this title, though. From their efforts to defend themselves, combined with the impossibility to reprise the doctrines they had disavowed (or simply left behind), emerged a system which contained the germ of an idea we believe is eminently just.

In this system, man, having emerged from the hands of the supreme power, was guided by the divine from his first steps. But the creator proportioned his assistance to the condition and faculties of his creatures. The Jewish religion led the Hebrews to the point where they were capable of a purified faith. Christianity then replaced the Law of Moses. The Reformation made Christianity compatible with the Enlightenment to come in the next century. Other improvements will some day come to reform the Reformation.7

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We will leave to the side the supernatural aspects acknowledged by this system, aspects that will fail to satisfy the devout and will displease the philosophers. But, as we said, it contains the germ of a new and important thought, one we will develop in a moment. For now we need to finish our investigation into Germany’s religious condition.

The system we just sketched is consoling and noble. There was only one more step to take to rid religion of that narrow and threatening tendency which consists in supposing truth to be a gift of chance or caprice and condemns to eternal damnation those who without any fault of their own are deprived of it.8

However, lacking all historical, metaphysical, and moral proofs, and stamped with anthropomorphism, the weak spot of all beliefs, this system could hardly satisfy the mind which demands demonstrations nor a certain sentiment of the heart. This sentiment loves to clothe the Being it adores with infinite benevolence and goodness. Propose faith as a matter of revelation, it can triumph over objections and doubts; and the most bellicose prophet has proclaimed a very similar idea as the source of his divine mission. But as something proposed by man to man, like all other human inventions it had to float in the ocean of conjectures that surrounded it, only to reappear when oblivion had given it an air of novelty.

At the end of a few years, the Germans went beyond this hypothesis and embraced another, broader one. In some respects it was more satisfactory.

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Since we have to explain it in a few words, we beg the French reader’s pardon for the vagueness he may experience at first. It will go away, we hope, and we also hope he will see that the fog contains a clear idea.

The advocates of the new system say that religion is the universal language of nature but expressed in different signs, doctrines, symbols, and rites. All peoples, or at least the enlightened class among them, the priests, spoke this language. The differences one observes are only temporary anomalies, unimportant forms, that the one who desires to understand and judge religion must set aside in order to enter into the mysterious vital center in which they all converge.

This newer point of view, the one through which learned Germans view religion today, has been of immense utility. To it we owe admirable discoveries concerning the relations of religions among themselves, concerning peoples’ interactions, and the common thread among mythologies. To it we owe the knowledge we have of antiquity, both in its depths and in its charms. Our savants have studied the monuments, records, and traditions of long-ago times much as geologists study the earth or zoologists the skeletons of extinct species. The Germans have rediscovered the nature of man in these traditions and monuments. This nature is always the same, although diversified. Consequently, it must be the living basis for every investigation and for all systems of explanation. In the writings of Fréret, Dupuis, and Sainte-Croix, Greece and the Orient resemble dessicated mummies. Under the pens of Creuzer and Goerres, these same mummies become elegant and admirable statues worthy of Praxiteles and Pheidias.

Everything serves the intellect in its eternal search. Systems are instruments by which man discovers the truth about details while being mistaken about the whole. When the systems are superseded, truths remain.

Moreover, there is a just side to this hypothesis, one that appeals to the religious sentiment chased from its haunts and seeking a refuge. Moreover, this occurs at a time when dogmatic unbelief inspires a sort of fatigue among us. I predict we will soon enough see it arrive in France and replace the narrow and arid system of Dupuis. This will be a triumph of the imagination and in some respects a gain for science.9

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However, its adherents seem to have misunderstood a connected truth, without which this system will suffer from the defect characteristic of all systems.

Without doubt, religion is the language in which nature speaks to man. But this language varies; it has not been the same in every epoch, whether coming from the people’s mouths or the enlightened classes that governed them. Religion for both classes is subject to a regular progression. Priests obey it, as well as the tribes they dominate. This progression is more mysterious in the priestly doctrines because under the priestly yoke everything is more mysterious. Sometimes, too, it is slower, because the priests do everything to slow it down. But for all that it is no less inevitable and determined by fixed laws, which have their origin in the human heart.

One is therefore mistaken when, instead of seeing a purer teaching as the result of the labors and the progress (in a word, the moral and intellectual amelioration) of the human race, one supposes that this or that doctrine came before all the other ones for no particular reason, or when it is placed at a time when man in fact was incapable of conceiving it, simply in order to protect the honor of the priestly caste. These priests, however, even though more learned (and, above all, craftier) than the mass of people, were very far from being able to rise to the level of certain ideas that could only be the result of constant efforts, accumulated discoveries, and uninterrupted meditation.

To want to make religion something immutable and veiled only to the vulgar, to hope that one will discover this single natural language and that, then, the cults, dogmas, and symbols of all the nations will reveal themselves as parts of this sacred language, is to be captive to an empty hope. It is not in these symbols or in the doctrines that this unity can be found. But if you penetrate into the nature of man, you will gain access to the unique source of all religions and the germ of all the modifications they undergo.

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CHAPTER 7: The Plan of the Work

The sketch we just provided of the different ways in which religion has been considered up until now seems to us to prove that there is an important lacuna in the treatment of this subject. In this work we have tried to fill it in as much as our powers allowed.

In doing so, we have not declared war on any doctrine; we have not attacked the divinity of any faith. But we have thought that we could respectfully set aside the thornier questions connected with religion and begin with an obvious fact. That fact? That the religious sentiment is an essential attribute, an inherent quality, of our nature.1

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We studied the forms that this sentiment can assume. We found them necessarily commensurate with the situation of the individuals or peoples who profess a religion. Is it not obvious that the primitive human being who is solely occupied with subsistence cannot have the same religious notions as a civilized one? When society is established, but the physical laws of the world are unknown, is it not understandable that natural forces would be objects of worship? But at a more advanced period when the laws of physical nature are better known, adoration retreats to the plane of morality. Later still, when the causal relations in the moral order are known, religion retreats to metaphysics and spirituality. Later still, when the subtleties of metaphysics are abandoned as powerless to explain anything, it is in the sanctuary of our soul that religion finally finds its impregnable asylum.

This therefore was our first principle. We said: since civilization is progressive, religious forms must be tied to this progression. History confirmed us in this first result of our researches.

We next examined what were the different periods of this progressive development. We noticed that each religious form divides into three distinct periods.

Man first of all runs toward a religion. That is, in accord with his instinct and level of intellectual development, he seeks to discover the relations between him and invisible powers. When he believes he has discovered them, he gives them a determinate and regular form.

Having provided in this way for this first necessity of his nature, he develops and perfects his other faculties. But these very developments render the form he had given to his religious ideas unsuitable to his subsequently developed faculties.

At this point the destruction of the form is inevitable. The polytheism of the Iliad is unsuitable to the century of Pericles. In his tragedies Euripides makes himself the spokesman for the naissant irreligion.

Now, if the disappearance of the former belief is inhibited by existing institutions—and this is the natural course of things—this artificial prolongation is only a matter of inertia; the human race then seems deprived of life. Enthusiasm and real faith desert religion. There are only formulas, practices, and priests left.

But this unnatural condition cannot last. A struggle ensues, not only between the established religion and the intellect it offends, but between the religion and the sentiment it no longer satisfies.

This struggle leads to the third period: the destruction of the old form, followed by crises of total unbelief. These are disordered and sometimes terrible moments, but they are unavoidable when man must be liberated from what has become a 81 shackle. These crises are always followed by a form of religious ideas better adapted to the faculties of the human spirit, and religion itself emerges younger, purer, and lovelier from its ashes.

From his most primitive state man follows this path. But he does encounter obstacles of various kinds along the way. Among them there are some that are external and some that are internal.

The internal ones are, first, his ignorance; then the domination of his senses and domination by the objects that surround him; his own egoism; and, finally, his own reason, at least in certain respects.

There is in reason when it is separated from sentiment what I could call a material part, one that opposes all élans of the soul.2 We saw earlier that it cannot account for any of our intimate emotions. To apply it to religion, with its coolness and inherent limitations, is to apply arithmetic to poetry. One denatures reason and falsifies it when applying it outside its sphere. In our daily lives it shows us very well the obstacles and pitfalls before us. But turned toward heaven it is only an earthbound torch, one that obscures the splendor of the stars.3

The external obstacles are, first, the calamities which by troubling the physical 82 existence of man, retard his moral progress; and, second, the various interests that lead other men to cause him, willingly or not, to take the opposite path.

Man is thus placed among three opposing forces which contend for control. One could say that heaven calls him from on high, earth retains him below, and his fellow human beings attend to him horizontally. Nonetheless, even in the midst of the various obstacles he must overcome, he advances in conformity to the impulse his nature imparts to him. His progress is set; it is necessary. It can be contravened or suspended for a time, but over the long term nothing can give him a different orientation.

This is the series of ideas, or rather facts, that we propose to prove. If we are successful, the result will be salutary in several ways.

Since religion is inherent in human nature and always reemerges under a new form when the previous one is broken, and since religion naturally adjusts itself to the developments and progress of each epoch, it follows that philosophers, while working to purify religious ideas, ought to renounce any effort to fight against the religious sentiment, to try to destroy what is indestructible. On the other hand, authority neither can nor ought to try to shackle, redirect, or even speed up the improvements brought to religion by the labors of the intellect.4

We said it ought not even attempt to speed them up. This is because as much as free and gradual improvements appear to be desirable, we find premature and violent reforms to be repugnant. We detest intolerant authority, although we fear philosophical authoritarianism too. Louis XVI’s persecutions did much harm, but the purported enlightened learning of Joseph II caused almost as much. The imprudent decrees of the Constituent Assembly caused no less harm, if not by their immediate effects at least by their proximate consequences.

Let authority be neutral. Human intelligence, heaven’s gift, will take charge of the rest. It is not religion’s enemy except when religion persecutes. It will better accomplish its tasks of impartiality and improvement if it is not hampered by artificial obstacles, troubled by artificial threats, and forced to overreach in order to overcome stubborn resistances.

The neutrality of authority will even serve to preserve a while longer the religious forms to which habit or conviction ought to attach some importance. These 83 forms will last longer when they do not resist imperceptible improvements. It is normally in the midst of conflict that they break down. It was the priests of Athens who first broke the entente that existed between philosophy and polytheism, which philosophy still wished to respect. The inflexibility of Leo X precipitated the full-scale Reformation that Luther himself did not envisage when he began his attacks against the abuses of the Catholic Church.5

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CHAPTER 8: Concerning Questions That Would Be a Necessary Part of a History of Religion but Are Irrelevant to Our Purpose

Having explained to our readers our aims and our plan, we need to explain why several questions that would naturally enter into a work of history will be omitted here. We also need to indicate the precautions we have had to take in order to attain the goal we set ourselves. We will speak of them in the following chapter.

To discover how man rises from crude beliefs to more sophisticated ones, we had to go back to the least advanced stage of human society, the primitive or savage state.

Here a question presented itself. Was the savage state the original state of our species?

The philosophers of the eighteenth century declared themselves in the affirmative, but with inadequate arguments and reflection. All their religious and political systems are based upon the hypothesis of a human race originally found in the condition of brutes, animals wandering in the forests, competing for the fruits of trees and the flesh of other animals. But if this was the natural condition of mankind, how did men emerge from it?

The reasonings attributed to early human beings for them to adopt the social state contain a clear petitio principii. They suppose an already existing social state. One cannot know its benefits unless one has experienced them. But in this view, society itself is the result of the development of human intelligence. In truth, however, the development of intelligence is the result of human social existence.

Some philosophers invoked chance. To do so, however, is to employ a term without definite meaning. Chance does not overcome nature. Nor has chance civilized the lower species. But according to these philosophers, they too were subject to chance, including what we could call fortunate chance.

The civilizing of primitive peoples by foreign ones leaves the problem untouched. 85 Superiors may instruct inferiors, but who instructed the teachers? It is a causal chain suspended in mid air. In addition, primitive peoples reject civilization when it is presented to them.

The closer men are to the savage state, the less given they are to change. Scattered at the ends of the earth, the wandering hordes we have discovered have not taken one step toward civilization. The inhabitants of the shores that Nearchus visited centuries ago are still today as they were two thousand years ago. Today, as then, they gather an uncertain subsistence from the sea. Today, as then, wealth consists in sea-borne bones thrown up by waves upon the shore. Physical need has not instructed them; wretched poverty has not enlightened them. Modern-day travelers have found them just as Alexander’s admiral did twenty centuries ago.1

The same is true of the savages described in antiquity by Agatharchides,2 and in our days by Lord Bruce.3 Even though surrounded by civilized nations, and living next to the kingdom of Meroë with its well-known priesthood (equal in authority and learning to that of Egypt), these hordes have remained in their primitive condition. Some sleep under trees, bending their branches and fixing them in the ground; some capture rhinos and elephants and cure their skins in the sun; some chase ostriches; others collect the locusts the wind wafts to them in the desert or the cadavers of crocodiles or seahorses washed up on the shore. Therefore, the diseases that Diodoras described centuries ago as the result of these filthy foods still afflict the descendants of these unfortunate races.4 The centuries have passed them over with no improvements, no progress, no discoveries. We acknowledge this truth.

We therefore will not take the savage state as the original condition of mankind. We do not place ourselves at any purported cradle of mankind. Nor do we attempt to determine how religion began, but only in what way, when it is in the crudest state one can conceive, it rose and gradually arrived at purer notions.

We do not positively affirm that this crude state was the first condition of mankind. Nor do we put ourselves in opposition to a point of view that sees this condition as a decline, a fall. But it is the point furthest removed from perfection. That 86 is enough for us to feel compelled to place ourselves there in order to better survey the distance the species has traveled to arrive at the opposite pole.

To be sure, one could make the following objection.

When one returns to the most obscure historical periods, one can see only the outlines of enormous masses that the darkness both covers and renders more imposing. Moreover, the different masses present remarkably similar traits even when separated by chasms.

Surveying Europe, Asia, and what we know of Africa; starting from Gaul, or even Spain, and passing through Germany, Scandinavia, Tartary, India, Persia, Arabia, Ethiopia, and Egypt, we find everywhere similar practices and cosmogonies, and religious bodies, rites, sacrifices, ceremonies, customs, and views all with undeniable similarities. And we find these practices, cosmogonies, corporations, rites, sacrifices, ceremonies, and opinions in America, in Mexico, and in Peru.

It is vain to assign some general dispositions of the human spirit as the cause of these similarities.5 In many details and particulars there are such minutely exact resemblances6 that it is impossible to find the reason for them simply in nature, 87 much less in chance. However, given what we are daily learning about the antiquities of India, in which English scholars recognize the principal dates of Jewish history and the tales of the Greek, Roman, and Scandinavian religions, a nearly certain hypothesis has emerged. It posits a single people as the common source—the universal stem—of the human race, long since disappeared. Is it not from this people that we ought to seek religion’s point of departure, instead of the miserable hordes whose nature barely resembles our own?

To be clear: we are not saying that it is impossible for a diligent scholar or inspired genius to one day come to the great truth, the great, decisive fact that can reconnect in a single chain the scattered links we deal with here. We wish to acknowledge those learned men, indefatigable seekers, who aim at such a discovery. We certainly admire their infinite patience, the courage that nothing daunts and which braves unimaginable difficulties. For this can occur only by studying each people in its smallest particulars and details, by comparing the smallest practices and the most confused traditions; by collecting the debris of many ancient languages. And we are not here speaking of the languages that are ancient for us, but those that were already dead for our predecessors. It is, perhaps, only by traveling through the entire world and, as it were, excavating the accumulated layers of history that they will be able to amass all the materials required for the final success of the work in which a truly noble hope sustains them.

But as precious as it would be, this success would only lead to the point where we are now. The hypothesis of an original people creates an additional difficulty for those who adopt it. On one hand, since this takes them back beyond recorded history, they have to study geological history as well in order to discover the physical revolutions by which this original people was destroyed. (Here is another example of the great truth that whenever you wish to thoroughly pursue a question, you have to attend to everything.) On the other hand, the destruction of an original people being uncontestable, many of its surviving parts were forced to recommence the great work of civilization. One can at most suppose that some countries retained memories of a previous situation, some traditions and practices from it. But these memories would be vague, the traditions confused, the practices unintelligible because their original motives were forgotten. The system one develops, therefore, will have to begin with this condition of crudity and ignorance from which we believed we were obliged to commence.

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CHAPTER 9: The Precautions That the Special Nature of Our Inquiry Obliged Us to Take

Many precautionary measures have been necessary for us to attain the goal we proposed in this work.

The first has been to distinguish the different epochs of each religion.

A nation does not have at the end of a century the same beliefs it had at the beginning. Even though it worships the same divinities, it does not preserve the same ideas for long.

By entering into civilization, peoples contract an impulse that never ceases, but the changes it prompts are imperceptible. No visible sign indicates them. The exterior of a religion remains unchanging, even when its doctrines are modified. Only the names of the gods do not change, which is a new cause of error in understanding religion.

In the minds of many learned readers, each mythology contains an ensemble of opinions without any particular chronology. Homer’s religion and Pindar’s seem to them to be exactly similar; and finding on the shores of the Tiber the same celestial agents as those they find on the shores of the Simoeis, they believe that Homer and Virgil described a fairly similar religion.1

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This is not true. The gods of the Iliad, far from being those of the Roman poets, are not even exactly those of the Odyssey. The gods of Greece have nothing in common with those of Ovid and of Virgil except the names and a few stories whose meaning has changed. Their moral character, the relations they have with men at the two different periods, have no connection.

Until now, people have collected rather than critically appreciated the materials. In connection with Greek religion, people cite indifferently Homer and Virgil, Hesiod and Lucan. Modern mythologies have been consulted to understand the 90 most remote periods, not to mention referencing ancient philosophers whose clear aim and interest was to purify ancient polytheism.2

Running together both dates and doctrines, the authors of most systems have 91 brought together the views of different periods; they have failed to distinguish teachings borrowed from abroad from indigenous ones, stories that always belonged to the nation’s beliefs from those that were gradually introduced or that entered suddenly by some unexpected event.

It is true of the ancient religions as it is of their geography: everything is progressive. Homer’s geography is not Hesiod’s, Hesiod’s is not that of Aeschylus, Aeschylus’s is not Herodotus’s. One has to factor progress into everything concerning antiquity.

But what further complicates the difficulty is that almost all the mythologies have suffered chronological distortions. More recent views have been placed in the most remote times, and the most ancient views have been presented as being degenerations of earlier ones. Why this has occurred is easy to understand, however, once it is pointed out.

When the progress of enlightenment has broken the connection between religious ideas and the rest of a people’s ideas, a thousand refinements, a thousand subtle explanations, are introduced into the religion. But the inventors of these refinements do not present them as deviations from current worship. The majority of political innovators do not say they want to establish a new order. To hear them, they want only to restore institutions to their original purity. It is the same with religion.

Philosophers and enlightened minds claim the mantle of antiquity for their additions, as well as their more or less ingenious (abstract or learned) interpretations.3 This is also, even especially, true of priests. As we will show elsewhere, they are subject to two impulses. The first is to preserve current views because it is their immediate interest. The second is to introduce into religion (which they tend to regard as their property) all of their subsequent discoveries because this is the long-term 92 interest of the priesthood. In order to better control the present generation, they borrow the voice of past generations.4

The Bhagavad Gita is a work composed with the obvious intention of substituting a more philosophic teaching for the Vedantic doctrine.5 Krisha says to his disciple that he earlier revealed to others the sublime truths he is communicating today. The lapse of time had covered them over. Like all reformers he attributes his teaching to antiquity. Similarly, in a dialogue falsely attributed to the Egyptian Mercury and translated by Apuleius,6 addressing himself to Egypt, this legislator exclaims that a time will come when instead of a pure cult there will be only ridiculous fables. This is the utterance of a philosopher who, while depending upon the forward march of the human spirit moving from ignorance to enlightenment, reverses the movement in order to give his views greater authority.7

One can see an analogous procedure among the wise men of Greece. Empedocles, Heraclitus, even Plato8 tried to identify their hypotheses with what they called the ancient theology. Plato, for example, attributed the worship of stars to 93 the first Greeks, a practice which was always alien to them.9 It is only on the basis of his testimony, against the entire historical record, that people believe the Greeks began with star worship.

It is obvious that all the refinements of religious beliefs are subsequent to an initial simple credulity. In the same way it is obvious that civilization follows barbarism.10 But another quite natural motive caused these innovations to be placed before the original popular stories and fables. Placed there, they contribute to making religion respectable. They are imposing phantoms that add to the somber majesty of an ancient edifice. If they were overtly substituted for traditional belief, they would appear to be impieties.

This observation is verified among almost all the ancient peoples. In Persia, we see the refined and mysterious views of the old Bactrian Empire attributed to Persian barbarians and the vestiges of their early, cruder religion presented as the corruption of a purer worship.

If we accepted the history of Scandinavian mythology as it is recounted today, we would believe that the peoples of the North began with theism and allegory and ended with fetishism. We are told that the first of the Scandinavian deities was called Alfadur, All-Vater, Father of All; then came Odin and his two brothers. The Norns (or Fates) initially numbered three, and presided in a general manner over the past, the present, and the future. It was easy to see its allegorical character, but later it was lost sight of. Then there were as many Norns as there were human beings; they became the fetishes of individuals. This development would be inexplicable, however, if we accepted it as it is recounted. But it becomes easy to understand when we note that it was brought in by the Drottes, or priests, who had acquired great authority among the Scandinavians.

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In the same way in Greek polytheism, cosmogonic deities—Chronos, or Time, Rhea, Sky, Erebus, Night, Ocean, and Earth—apparently preceded real divinities.

It is essential to have these observations in mind as one reads this work. Its nature does not allow us to bring in all the facts, to enter into all the indispensable details, to demonstrate how well-founded the distinctions we establish between the different periods of beliefs in fact are. We do need to ask the readers who may think that a particular fact contradicts our theses, whether it was introduced later than people today believe. Who was the first author to report the fact? When did he live? Did he, perhaps, confuse the opinions of his time, or his own conjectures, with earlier views?

The second precaution we had to take was to set aside the scientific explanations of ancient worship that have been given by several distinguished scholars. To be sure, the works of these learned men were very useful. They have shed a great deal of light on little-known portions of the history of remote times. They have illuminated several essential questions. They have offered often-interesting conjectures, sometimes probable ones. No truth is to be disdained. The solution to a much smaller problem, one whose investigation seemed rather unimportant, has cast an unexpected light on subjects of the greatest importance. Science is always salutary, as ignorance is always harmful.

Nonetheless, these learned men, we dare to affirm, have committed a grave error.

For some, religion was nothing but the symbolic representation of agriculture, for others, of astronomy; for still others, only historical facts distorted by traditions or allegories misconstrued by ignorance. In certain respects, each and all of these explanations contain some truth. In all the countries of the earth a class of more or less powerful men has sought to make religion the depository of human learning. But to conclude from this that religion was invented to contain this hidden treasure, and that popular views were only the disguise, or corruption, of this teaching, is to fall into error. Religious fables only gradually became the hieroglyphs in which the learned class registered its observations and calculations concerning facts, or its hypotheses concerning causes.

The error of these learned men does not consist in the fact that they attributed some scientific meaning to religion, but that they put it before the popular or literal meaning. Instead of considering religion as a sentiment, they envisaged it as a combination of ideas; instead of recognizing in it an affect of the soul, they wanted to transform it into a work of the mind. Instead of seeing nature, they saw only art.

Moreover, as if this fundamental error were not enough, each one chose one particular hypothesis as the sole source of religion. Thus, a system that is defective 95 at its base became fanciful and strained in its details.11 One system took no account of the most natural inclinations of man; another called into question the most credible testimony of antiquity. Another rejected both what the direct study of ourselves reveals and what history teaches.

Open The Primitive World. There you will find neither the sentiment of that profound and virile piety, that intimate and serious conviction that characterized the Romans, nor knowledge of the events that occasioned the introduction of national festivals into worship and made it a source of political patriotism as well as religious veneration. The Regifugium (the King’s Flight), obviously intended to commemorate the expulsion of the Tarquins,12 while also connected with priestly traditions borrowed from abroad, becomes exclusively the departure of the sun at the end of the year. Jupiter Stator is the sun that comes to a halt. The Fortuna of women ceases to recall the mission of Veturia. An author changes it first of all to a festival of Victory, on the pretext that it recalled a victory of filial piety. Then it became the triumph of the sun over winter. Nero founded the Juvenalia13 to celebrate the great event when he first cut his beard; that is, when he offered the spectacle of the emperor of the world presenting himself as an actor and poet.14 It became an emblem of the renewal of the seasons.15

Thus distorting everything, scholars arrive on the scene, each one carrying his 96 favorite banner,16 behind which he drags captive facts, bizarrely clothed.17 One of them sees the flood everywhere, another, fire. One sees a succession of months, another a succession of dynasties.18 None of them, however, has pushed the audacity and ingeniousness of this genre as far as the man who dominates the field in France;19 for him all the gods and heroes from Osiris to Mohammed were only the 97 98 99 sun and the stars. But the truth is that agriculture, astronomy, history, metaphysics, and above all allegory in any of its forms were subsequent to religion. They became parts of religion but are not its basis. Religion took them to its bosom but does not owe its existence to them. Scientific systems have been introduced into every religion, but no one has ever made a scientific system into a religion.20

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Once admitted into the worship, however, these scientific systems have never had a direct relationship with the moral effects of the beliefs. They were never in popular circulation, if I can put it that way. The most allegorical portion of the Greek religion, that which dealt with the origin of the world, the Titans, and Prometheus, was what the people occupied themselves with the least. The allegorical divinities played almost no role in the national religion. Uranus, Ocean, Saturn were the objects of neither hope nor fear nor petition. Herodotus seems to be ignorant of what Homer meant by Ocean, so little were the cosmogonic personifications connected with popular views.21 He never spoke of the anger or the protection given by the beings of this class.22 Their festivals were of another sort than those of the reigning deities. They were ceremonies with no other point than commemoration without practical effect, and they assumed no reciprocal influence of gods on men or men on gods.

Nothing is more likely than that the mutilation of Uranus is an allegory; that a philosopher (probably before the Greeks) in this way wanted to represent the end of creative force, a cessation that dates from the beginning of (natural) order because by subjecting generations to the cycle of procreation, nature seems to forswear the creation of new forms. Or that the philosopher attributed this mutilation to Chronos—that is, Time—because the idea of time is inseparable from that of a fixed and regular succession; or that Hesiod, who had gathered together priestly doctrines from everywhere in order to introduce them into Greek religion, painted this allegory in poetic colors. But what moral or political effect could this allegory have on the people?23

It is certain that in the astronomical language of the Roman religion Pan represented the sun. But if in the public worship this god was only a subordinate divinity, 101 rather malign in his intentions, grotesque in his forms, and the object of the people’s high spirits rather than their fear or adoration, who cannot see that the “astronomic Pan” had no real connection with the national religion? What does it matter if Heracles is said to be the sun and his twelve labors the zodiac, or that Jupiter and Juno, or the loves of Mars and Venus, are physical systems, if the nation that worships these divinities sees them as real beings upon whom its destiny depends, and if in the stories told about their actions, it only seeks ways of propitiating them?

What we are saying here in no way is intended to denigrate the usefulness of the works to which we refer. It is worthwhile penetrating to the hidden sense of ancient cults. But even the discovery of this secret meaning does not suffice to help us understand religion in its essential relationships. The mass of men take religion as it presents itself. For them the form is the substance.24 It is in the letter of mythologies that one can observe the progress of morality and the successive modifications that religions underwent. Allegories and symbols can remain the same in all periods because they express ideas that do not change. Popular fables change because they express ideas that do change.25

Thus, to choose an example known to all our readers, Apollo’s anger at the Greeks was leveled first against animals; subsequently it was directed against men. It is clear that by this the poet wanted to depict the advance of a plague and its ravages. Just as well as Homer, Ovid (or, for that matter, any modern poet who would employ ancient mythology) can use this allegory to convey a natural phenomenon.26 But the popular account—that is, the one that refers to Apollo’s character 102 and to the motives that moved him—was necessarily subject to the changes that took place in the moral views of the religion. If, as in the polytheism of the Iliad, the gods are simply egoists, the anger of the sun-god was motivated by the fact that he was not offered enough sacrifices or because someone offended one of his priests.27 If, however, a purer morality is an essential part of the religion—which happens as civilization progresses—the poet will recount that the god was angry at the Greek army because of its crimes.28

Scholars,29 however, have unfortunately always had a certain disdain for this part of mythology. One of them says that it is more important to know the real teaching of philosophers and savants about divinity, the universe, the soul, and nature than to collect the stupid fables of the vulgar and the absurd embellishments of the poets.30 We think the exact opposite. The philosophers’ doctrines produced hypotheses and systems; the stories revered by the vulgar constituted the real influence of religion. They decided the morality of peoples. They prepared and introduced all the religious struggles, wars, and revolutions.

Nor is it correct to say that the scientific theology was the sole religion of the learned and the philosophers. We find traces of popular religion in the most learned men and among almost all the sages of antiquity. If one day we treat Greek philosophy, we will show Socrates consulting the Pythia, Xenophon following oracles, Plato according implicit faith to divination.31

Even when men depart in many respects from the teachings professed by those before or around them, these doctrines do not lose all their rights. They resemble a defending army that is dispersed and yet which goes to battle in small platoons. 103 At first glance the terrain belongs to the invader. But the defenders have their refuges, their redoubts, their strong places, which they defend and from which they sally forth to counterattack from time to time. Even when philosophy is ascendant over the learned class, fragments of the popular religion continue to be found in the opinions of this class. And even to understand these opinions one has to study this vulgar religion.32 When they invent, poets themselves still conform to the received religion in order to give their inventions the appearance of truth. As the most judicious of Romans (Varro) said,33 the ancient religions were for the people what the poets represented at each period. To consider only their hidden meaning is like wanting to analyze the history of drama by describing the pulleys and ropes that help move stage scenery.34

Finally, men have neglected to distinguish carefully enough the religions dominated by priests from those that remain independent of sacerdotal direction. It is obvious upon minimal reflection, however, that the path of religion is different depending upon the degree of authority possessed by the priesthood. This is true from the first developments of religious ideas.

It is not necessary for us to seek here how it happened that some peoples were subject to priests from the first moment of their coming together in society, while others enjoyed complete independence for a long time and were never wholly subjugated by them.

We will enter into the examination of the facts when we treat the Greek religion of Homeric times, and when we describe the Egyptian religion as it existed until the mixing and destruction of all the cults of antiquity. Now it is enough to establish the difference between the two species of religion that are often confused.

When a priestly body takes control of a religion from its beginning, the religion follows a different path than when the priesthood, gradually establishing itself, 104 arrives later at constituting itself as a regular and recognized body. The authority of priests has to be unlimited when it exists from the formation of the society. The more intellectually crude the belief, the more authority the ministers of this belief have if they form an independent class.

The little influence that the jongleurs of many savage tribes possess comes from the fact that, since the condition of the tribes is one not organized by fixed rules, everything in them is hazy and uncertain, everything follows momentary impressions and unreflective habit. Nothing has the force of law, the priesthood no more than everything else. But when a people sees a priestly institution arise before there is any political institution capable of fighting against it or restraining it (as was the case with Egypt), it must suffer the yoke of this priestly power. Henceforth religion, which left to itself is composed of all the sentiments, all the notions, and all the conjectures natural to man, in the hands of priests becomes the subject of premeditated calculation and systematic arrangement.

When man occupies himself with religion as something that belongs to him, example and habit lead him to prefer the worship he sees in use around him. Wanting to have the targets of his prayers listen to him, he speaks to them in the words spoken by his ancestors and his contemporaries. Nonetheless, everything in the worship is individual. The individual adds or subtracts or changes without anyone else arrogating the right to be offended. He runs the risk of displeasing the gods, but not of being punished by other men. Prayers and sacrifices, whether offered on domestic altars, in forest retreats, or at the tops of mountains, rise directly to the invisible world without having to seek a privileged channel. Everything is free and open between heaven and earth.

In priestly religions, on the contrary, heaven is closed; a triple rampart encloses the immortals. All access is guarded by jealous intermediaries. Everything is submitted to priests: all the individual’s conjectures, his fears, his presentiments of the future, the accidents that happen, the strange things that surprise him, the phantoms he perceives in the darkness, the noises he hears, the shadows he sees in his dreams. From these, the priests compose laws and a special science. Every victim not offered by them is rejected as impious; any incense offered by others is sacrilegious. In order to obtain divine assistance or protection, it is necessary to gain their favor along with that of the gods.

The character of the gods also changes significantly. The person who asks religion only to bring about divine benevolence seeks to discover what the gods want. The priest who expects from religion the means to govern men seeks how he must portray the beings in whose name he wishes to govern. One must not exaggerate, 105 however, the priest’s activity. While submitting religion to different changes in accordance with his calculations, he invents nothing, he makes use only of what already exists. His work is not a work of creation but of arrangement, of form and order. Nor does one invent religious opinions; they arise in the minds of men independently of their wills. Some adopt them, others make use of them. The priesthood has found the seed of all religious notions in the heart of man,35 but it then despotically directed the development of this germ. In this way it imprinted a development on religion that it would not have followed naturally.

It is because of the failure to distinguish these two types of belief that people have committed so many mistakes in the history of religions. By confusing them, they attempted to blaze a path that led at the same time to two opposite extremes, and they exhausted themselves in vain efforts for a chimerical end. The distinction between religions subjected to a priesthood and those that are independent is the first condition for conceiving adequate ideas in this area.

One can see how vast is the range of ideas that we have to deal with. It is so huge that to comprehend it, both in its entirety and in its details, is above the powers of man, and perhaps above the public’s capacity to attend to in the present circumstances. In this work, therefore, we restricted ourselves to indicate and to demonstrate, both by reasoning and by facts, the fundamental truth from which all the others flow.

We have begun from the crudest form that religious ideas can assume. We have shown the religious sentiment creating this form then struggling against it, and sometimes arriving, by means of its own marvelous and mysterious energy, at rendering the form noble and heart-touching despite itself. We then said how this form was modified, whether by sacerdotal bodies or by the progress of the human spirit among peoples who were free of sacerdotal authority.

We began with the priestly religions. To be sure, one cannot follow the human spirit in its natural progression except by studying the independent religions. All the changes occur openly in these religions, while under the empire of priests the work goes on behind closed doors, in the mysterious interior of these privileged corporations. But the cults that the priests dominated are historically the oldest; and the very small number of nations among whom the priesthood had little authority were most likely emancipated from the former rather than preserved from it. It follows then that the simplicity of religions left to themselves comes above all 106 from the fact that the human spirit successively removed the crude notions that belong to the infancy of belief, ideas that the priesthood, in contrast, had turned into dogmas. Because of this, in order to understand the simplest cults one must have profoundly studied the most complicated ones.

One will see, we hope, that the majority of the reproaches that are addressed to religion really touch only some of its ministers. The religions that have struggled with the greatest success against their power have been the gentlest, the most humane, the purest. If our readers accept this, and derive from it appropriate consequences, we believe that the admiration customarily bestowed on the Persian, Egyptian, or Frankish priestly bodies will be much diminished.

We have limited ourselves to this part of religious history.

With the fundamental truth being recognized, it would be easy to deduce its consequences and to follow it in its innumerable and admirable modifications. After having seen how the two forms that religion takes are constituted, one that the human spirit creates for itself and one that priests most often have imposed upon it, the reader can discern the principle of perfectibility that presides over one and the principle of stasis that weighs on the other. When peoples come together these two forms encounter and are mixed. If it is human intelligence that emerges victorious, its ideas concerning the divine nature are improved and undergo a rapid and positive development. But one can also see the seeds of decline that even these improved ideas contain, as well as the irresistible religious impulse that will lead to even greater refinement.

At that point the most purified and refined religious form becomes the only one that is admissible, it becomes the imperious need of the civilized world. Then, the collapse of the old and discredited beliefs leaves man grief-stricken amidst the rubble he has called down upon himself. He does not regain his courage except by means of a new belief. But this one too undergoes decline. It seems to take a few steps back toward the periods of ignorance and resuscitates barbarous doctrines. But the nature of the human spirit being the same, it reacts as before against these temporary relapses. Each century considers whatever is proportionate to its learning and enlightenment to be the final and unchangeable attainment of the good and the true. But a new century arrives and the limit is pushed back. New ones are then posed, which subsequent generations are destined to replace by pushing them even further back.

Therefore, it is not a detailed history of religion that we have undertaken. To retrace the religious revolutions of all the nations would be to write the history of all 107 nations. Religion is connected with everything. Just as it penetrates into the most intimate regions of man, everything that touches him touches religion. As it modifies everything it touches, it is modified by everything that touches it. The various causes come into contact, clash, and modify one another. In order to explain the development of a religion, one has to examine the climate, the government, the present and past habits of the people who profess it. What exists certainly influences, but what no longer exists does not cease influencing. Memories are like Epicurus’s atoms, elements that constantly enter into new combinations. To embark upon these investigations would be to write a universal history. We therefore have tried to avoid a strictly historical form of writing, both because of the length that would be required and because of the infinite repetitions it would entail. One cannot simultaneously develop the history of every religion. Since all peoples have not advanced in the same way because of the changes in their opinions brought in by events and circumstances, we would have had to constantly repeat observations made about one nation when dealing with another.

However, it is impossible to give to these investigations the purely didactic form that Montesquieu gave his reflections on the laws. Laws are written; consequently their revolutions can be precisely connected to definite periods. But religion, existing in large measure in the heart and in the spirit of man, changes insensibly without being perceived;36 and some of these changes can only be treated historically.

We have tried to present to our readers only results, based, to be sure, upon many facts. We have refuted some objections, but we have passed over others in silence. Perhaps we have failed even to think of others. If we had developed everything, this work would have been too long to read. The history of exceptions would have become longer than that of the general rule. The rule is one and simple, the causes of exceptions innumerable and complicated.

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BOOK II: ON THE CRUDEST FORM THAT RELIGIOUS IDEAS CAN ASSUME

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CHAPTER 1: The Method We Will Follow in This Book

We have defined the religious sentiment, the need man experiences to put himself in communication with the nature that surrounds him and the unknown forces that seem to him to animate that nature.

The religious form is the means he employs to establish this communication.

It is obvious that the choice of this means is not arbitrary. Man does not decide from pure caprice for one form over another. He is determined in his choice by the sentiments that are found naturally in his soul, by the ideas that reflection suggests to his intellect, and by the demands that egoism inspires. Some have wrongly considered self-interest as his sole motive. While this is an overstatement, its action is quite powerful inasmuch as it is constant and ineradicable.

In order to detect the results of these different causes, two ways present themselves. One can try to observe and describe the work of each one of the faculties separately, and then the work of them together when a religion is created. Or one can bring together the best-established facts relative to the religious beliefs of the most ignorant peoples, and then seek to find what in these beliefs should be attributed to sentiment, to intelligence, and to self-interest.

The first method seems to us to be too metaphysical and abstract. It is better to start with the historical facts, in order to ascend to the causes of the facts.

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CHAPTER 2: On the Form the Religious Sentiment Takes On among the Primitive Savages

Many of the primitive tribes we know of are in a state little different from that of animals.1 Some are ignorant of the use of fire; others provide for their subsistence like beasts of the forest, while others, even less industrious, use neither cunning nor force to feed themselves, but simply wait for the death of other animals and eat their wretched and unhealthy flesh. Some only have five or six barely articulate cries as their language.

The hordes just above them are more or less advanced in their means of survival. They have invented some instruments for hunting or fishing. They have developed greater variety in the articulate sounds they make use of to express their passions or their needs. They have built huts. Some have tamed animals. The union of the sexes has acquired a more stable form, or at least it has been extended beyond mere desire and enjoyment.

The first groups resemble wolves and foxes, the second, beavers and bees.

The primitive savage is born into this crude state. When he suffers, he cries; when he is hungry, he hunts or he fishes. The need to reproduce makes itself felt, he satisfies it. He grows old, he dies, or his children kill him.

Nonetheless, what we have called the religious sentiment stirs in him. He sees himself surrounded and dominated, or at least influenced, by forces whose nature and origin he cannot grasp. And an instinct that is peculiar to him2 among all the beings on earth appears to inform him that the power that animates these unknown 113 forces is not without some relationship to him. He experiences the need to establish relations, to determine them in some fixed way. He seeks, haphazardly, this superior power. He speaks to it, he calls upon it, he adores it.

As we have demonstrated, it is not simply fear that causes this instinct to appear within him. The objects of fear are neither the sole nor the principal objects of his worship. To be sure, he sometimes places among them some that caused him harm. But he often adores some that do not inspire any fear in him.

To conclude from the terror he feels when he believes that some objects are full of a divine nature, that it was the terror that caused him to adore them, is to mistake an effect for a cause.

Nor is it any idea of self-interest that creates his first worship. He prostrates himself before objects that cannot be of any use to him. After having deified them, he seeks to make them useful, but that is another movement of his nature. To consider it as the primary is again to confuse effect and cause.

The savage worships different objects because he must adore something. But what objects will he worship? He consults his environment. There is nothing that can enlighten him. He turns to himself. He draws his answer from his own heart. This response, though, is commensurate with the weakness of the reason he barely employs and his profound ignorance. This reason does not have the faintest notion of the idea of Divinity of a later period. This ignorance especially deceives him concerning the causes of natural phenomena.

As we have already said,3 man always places his religious ideas in the sphere of the unknown. For the savage everything is unknown. His religious sentiment therefore will apply itself to everything he encounters.

Everywhere there is motion he believes there is life. The stone that falls seems to be either fleeing or following him. The torrent that rushes heads toward him; some angry spirit dwells in the steaming waterfall. The wind that moans is the expression of some suffering, or some menace. The eerie echo of some canyon foretells the future or answers a query. And when a civilized European shows the savage a magnetic needle, he sees a being taken from its native land and anxiously desiring to return home.4

Everywhere there is movement the savage assumes there is life. And everywhere he supposes there is life, he supposes that there is some action or intention that 114 has him in view. Man exists for a long time before he recognizes that he is not the center of all things. The infant imagines himself to be this center toward which all tends; the savage reasons like an infant.

Surrounded by powerful, active objects that constantly impact his destiny, he adores those among these objects that strike his imagination most forcefully. Chance decides this.5 It can be a rock, a mountain, sometimes a stone, often an animal.

This worship of animals seems to us to be strange. Upon reflection, however, it is very natural.

In animals, there is something that is unknown—we could say mysterious—that must dispose the savage to worship them.

So much makes them enigmatic beings: the impossibility of comprehending 115 and judging them (which we share with the savage, although habit inhibits us from seeing it); their instincts, which are surer than our reason; their facial expressions, which so vividly express what is going on within them; the variety and wonderful strangeness of their forms; the often frightening rapidity of their movements; their sympathy with nature, which allows them to sense approaching natural occurrences that man cannot foresee; finally, the eternal barrier between them and man because of the absence of language.

“It would be necessary,” said the judicious Heeren,6 “to have been a primitive oneself, to understand the relationship he believes he has with animals.”

As long as he has not stripped them of their aura by domesticating them, he shares both his life and his dominion with them. They are his equals in the forests, while they defy him by taking wing or by plunging into the depths of the seas. They possess to an eminent degree many of his individual faculties. They take turns being his prey or his predators. One can easily see why he sometimes places the hidden seat of the invisible forces in the beings whose existence he finds utterly mysterious, not to mention their purpose.

Primitive veneration for animals even survives into the time when man domesticates them and uses them for his purposes. In fact, the acquisition of domestic 116 animals produces such an important revolution in his life that he is even more disposed to attribute an almost divine nature to this new companion of his labors.7

The Kamtschatka have domesticated only one species of animal. After their death they have themselves torn apart by the members of that species in the hope of rejoining their ancestors. The faithful dogs that shared life’s adventures with them become their guide to the future world.8

The preference that a savage accords to one sort of animal over others comes from chance circumstances rather than the complicated reasons that many have tried to come up with.9 The Troglodytes that Pliny talks about simply worshipped the tortoises that swam to them.10 Striking colors, the sheen of their scales, the rapidity of their movements were, perhaps, what garnered religious respect for serpents, who then acquired a distinguished place in the majority of mythologies.11

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But in all these cases, the idea of utility has so little place in the motives for worship that often when the idol is alive, the worshipper kills it in order to be able to carry it around with him.12 And it is even more true that the unknown is the sphere where adoration takes place, that at the time when man adores almost all the animals he never renders worship to his fellows. Man is what he knows best; this is the source of a great exception that has struck many writers without their being able to explain it.

This crude worship is so natural to man in his ignorance that he returns to it as soon as he is freed from the bonds, or cast away from the advantages, of public religion.

The pariahs of India are denied all interaction with the other castes; being neither admitted nor subject to any other worship, they have reprised this belief. We are told by travelers that each of them chooses his own deity, sometimes this or that animal, sometimes a stone or a tree.13

In China, where religion is only a form and the mandarins are pantheists or atheists,14 the people worship serpents and offer them sacrifice.15

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However, the activity of the religious sentiment does not limit itself to the creation of this narrow and crude form. Above the fetishes16—material deities, if I can put it that way—that are created, invoked, and then destroyed by the successive needs of the moment, there always hovers a vaguer notion, one that is more mysterious and less applicable to ordinary life, which nonetheless fills the soul of the worshipper with an even more profound respect and a more intimate emotion.

With the savage, as with the civilized human being, the religious impulse directs itself toward the idea of the infinite and the immense. From this comes the idea of the Great Spirit, which resides in the clouds high above the mountains or in the depths of the seas. Always invisible, it is rarely invoked because it takes so little part in the destiny of the inhabitants of the earth. But the soul rises toward it, as if it were trying to mount to nobler thoughts than those that ignorance provides.

This tendency is very imperious; it is found even in the most savage of hordes. The Cucis, the mountain people of Tipra found in northeastern India and Bangladesh, are the most ignorant and wildest of savages. They think that there is a divinity in each tree. They have no positive laws. Murder among them is punished only by the relatives of the deceased, if they have the ability to avenge the death. Society does not intervene at all. They cut off the heads of the females of their enemies if they find them defenseless; and when they kill a pregnant woman, it is an occasion of rejoicing and glory. Nonetheless, they recognize a Great Spirit different from all the other deities they adore;17 they do not dare to represent it in any image.18

An American savage who had a bull for a fetish told a missionary one day that he did not worship the bull itself but the manitou of bulls, who was hidden beneath the earth and animated the animals of that species with his breath. He added that those who adored bears also believed in a manitou of bears. And when he was asked if there was one for men, he replied in the affirmative.19

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This is obviously an effort on the part of savages to generalize their conceptions. It is the religious sentiment struggling against a crude form that encloses and hampers it.20 This effort on the part of the religious sentiment to rise to a notion of a god superior to fetishes suggests to the savage an even more abstract conception, one that in the philosophies of civilized periods will undergo immense developments.

At this point we would like to speak of a division into two substances, or of a spiritual nature. While it will occupy a large place in our subsequent investigation, here, when it is but an imperceptible seed, we can say only a few words about it. It is enormously important in religious history, especially to the battle that all philosophical systems wage against positive religions, as well as playing a great role in the hidden or esoteric doctrines of all these religions.

To be sure, we do not claim that the savage himself conceives a division into two substances, or a spiritual nature, in the same way that the ancient or modern philosophers do. The ease with which he attributes life to all objects in fact seems to be an obstacle to being able to divide them into animate and inanimate. However, continuing his observations concerning the nature that surrounds him, he notes two aspects in all the phenomena that present themselves: rest and motion. Since the cause of motion is never visible to him, he is very quickly led to suppose that it belongs to another nature from the being to which motion is communicated. Hence, there arises a distinction between the substance that impresses the movement and the one that receives it.

The element (air) within which we exist, and which simultaneously envelops and enters into us, is by itself capable of suggesting the idea of a spiritual nature. The invisible and, in a certain sense, intangible air acts upon us constantly, but also variously. Sometimes it is an unseen benefactor, refreshing us in the midst of stifling heat; sometimes it is a terrible enemy, freezing us with a chilly blast; sometimes moaning all around us, it shakes the earth, stirs waves, and with unimaginable 120 violence overturns our walls and pursues us into our last shelters, destroying our most impregnable refuges. In these ways the idea of active but invisible and intangible beings naturally comes to mind, which we are easily tempted to conceive of as incorporeal.

Turning to himself, man notes a quite obvious struggle between the active principle that controls his organs and the passive being in which this principle seems to be enclosed. The soul controls the body; the body, though, resists the soul, which in turn sighs, or becomes indignant at being disobeyed, and accuses the body of its own defects. It is the body’s organs that are deceived and deceive, its senses that mislead and seduce the soul. The same complaints to this effect are found with the primitive and with the philosopher, in the forests of the New World and in the academy. The old Iroquois gives to his son the same counsel that Socrates gave to the youth of Athens. From this it results that the more that man wants to conceive a perfect being, the more he frees it from matter.

The religious sentiment eagerly grasps this distinction and applies it to the divine nature. In it, the religious sentiment finds liberation from all limits and a grandeur, immensity, and purity that please it.

All the travelers who have reported the religious opinions of the Tahitians report that they distinguish the supreme Deity from the matter it puts in motion.21 The same opinion is found among several tribes in Florida. And if we give credence to the observations of more than one attentive observer, it is not wholly absent from the beliefs of some tribes of Siberia.

If these primitive conjectures are vague, if their hypotheses are confused, this only better proves that sentiment precedes intelligence when the human race takes its first steps; it glimpses what intellect cannot conceive, what it does not even dare conceive, and what it often combats with the severe strictures of logic.

Up until now we have spoken only of the action of sentiment in the creation of the religious form. But man possesses other powers, other faculties, which also cooperate in this creation and which cannot do so except by following the rules of their nature.

If sentiment nourishes itself with vague emotions, the intellect is more demanding; it wants reasoning whose rigor satisfies it. The inner need that man experiences to adore beings who communicate with him, whose protective cares watch over him, is enough for sentiment to conceive of tutelary deities. Intellect in contrast 121 observes before judging. It collects and compares external phenomena and from them draws somewhat different conclusions. If several of these phenomena declare a benevolent force, others indicate hostility and hatred. This opposition shows itself at each moment, and in each particular, of physical and moral nature; at each epoch it is an insoluble enigma for the most developed minds. Who does not know the multiple efforts of the philosophical schools to resolve the problem of the origin of evil?

The much less subtle and less scrupulous intellect of the savage determines the question more simply. In the world there is good and evil. Therefore, there are hostile gods and benevolent ones. Dualism, which plays such a great role in the sophisticated religion of Zoroaster and which almost triumphed in Christian belief, in principle goes back to the religious notions of the savage.

The Araucanians believed in a hostile god,22 and the Iroquois exhorted one another not to listen to the perverse deity whose pleasure was to destroy them by leading them astray.23

But sentiment always rises up against this distressing conception. Not being able to destroy it because it conforms to the rules of logic, the sentiment at least softens it by maintaining the supremacy of the good principle over the evil one.24 This supremacy, which we will see presented in brilliant poetic colors in the Persian religion, is a fundamental dogma in the worship of primitive tribes.25

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If sentiment has its emotions and intelligence its laws, self-interest has its desires and wishes. Religion must accommodate itself to them. The less man is enlightened, the more his self-interest is impetuous, while at the same time enclosed in a narrow and base sphere. His passions are more violent, his ideas of the useful limited to the present moment.

Therefore, as soon as the religious sentiment creates objects of worship, man is pressed by self-interest to employ them for his use. He thus enters into a new path on which self-interest works to falsify the religious sentiment.

Sentiment had led him toward the unknown; self-interest leads him back to known quantities. Sentiment had raised him above himself; interest brings him back to his own level.

We are going to follow him on this new path. We will show religion as self-interest made it. Later we will return to the struggle that the religious sentiment wages against self-interest.

As soon as man believes he has found the hidden power that he sought so persistently, as soon as he has before him the object that he supposes possesses supernatural forces, he works to turn these forces to his advantage. He studies from this point of view the object he adores. It is no longer the religious sentiment that dominates; it is the mind, working for self-interest, that reflects upon the object originally presented to it by the religious sentiment.

To please this object, to obtain its favor, and to interest it in its projects is now the purpose of the primitive. It is no longer a need of the soul that he satisfies by worshipping, but some benefit for which he hopes. He no longer obeys the sentiment; he pursues a calculation.

In order to attain his goal, he tries to judge this mysterious object. Now, he can only do so by analogy, and by analogy with the single thing of which he has some knowledge—himself. Since he grows angry when someone offends him and he is appeased when someone apologizes, or he becomes benevolent when someone serves or pleases him, he concludes that the object he worships will do the same. When some calamity strikes, he seeks the cause in the malevolence of the idol that he has unwittingly offended.26 He then tries to disarm it with prayers and praise by all the means his own experience suggests to him and which would be successful with him. All this presupposes that his relationship to the unknown is similar to men’s among themselves.

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Soon he takes another step. Having appeased this being, he seeks to render it favorable. The same means he used to disarm its anger are used to attain its favor.

The idea of sacrifice is inseparable from every religion. One could even say that it is inseparable from every lively and profound emotion. Love is pleased to sacrifice everything it holds dear to the beloved; it even loves consecrating itself to the beloved by the cruelest of sufferings and the most painful of deprivations. Turkish lovers beat their breasts and tear their arms beneath the windows of their beloved. The knights of the Middle Ages inflicted voluntary sufferings upon themselves and imposed difficult trials in order to honor the ladies whose colors they bore.27 And in the ecstasies of her tender yet passionate devotion, Madame Guyon sought everywhere for antipathies to vanquish, repugnancies to overcome.

Like all the movements of man, this movement is found in the savage. Barely are there gods, when the idea of sacrifice presents itself.

Initially lacking all refinement or sophistication, the idea leads him to share with his idols everything he finds agreeable, depriving himself of some portion of his food, his clothing, or the spoils he has acquired by some victory, which he attributes to supernatural assistance.

But soon the notion of sacrifice becomes more complicated. It is not only material offerings that the gods demand; they require from their worshippers proofs of submission, of devotion, of self-denial. From this come fasts,28 self-lacerations, and voluntary austerities.29 The shores of the Orinoco in Spain and the steppes of Tartary have seen penances as austere as those once found in the deserts of the Thebaid; and the celebrated celibacy of our saints has its own martyrs among the savages.

It seems to us that philosophers have not sufficiently reflected upon this tendency 124 of men to constantly refine sacrifice. They have too often attributed to artifice and calculation what in fact is nature’s doing. For example, they have seen only the caprice of priestly tyranny in the ideas of impurity connected to the union of the sexes found among almost all peoples. These ideas, they say, are an attempt to afflict human beings with arbitrary denials. To be sure, the priests have profited from this notion of impurity in order to extend their power over that part of human existence that seems to be the most removed from their despotism. But the original notion has deeper roots than priestcraft. If it did not have such roots, it would not be found among savage tribes as well as civilized nations.

Everywhere nature has connected the need for secrecy, the sentiment of shame, to the tenderest of sentiments. It does so with an artfulness that one might initially call bizarre, but which reveals itself to be quite admirable when one follows it through all of its consequences.

Everything delicate, touching, and pure in the relations of love rests upon this marvelous connection; we also owe to it everything that is regular and orderly in our social organization. It is by yielding to one man alone this mysterious reserve whose divine rule is imprinted on her heart, that a woman devotes herself and her modesty to him. For him alone she pulls back the veils, which continue to be her refuge and her glory. From it comes the deep trust of the spouses, the fruit of an exclusive relationship. Each recognizes the sacrifice as well as the exquisite combination of desire and respect it entails. Because of it they share a thousand intimate memories that time only embellishes, kept even more pure and profound by the fact that they finally cannot be expressed in words.

Now, this instinct that attaches a sentiment of shame or modesty to the pleasures of love could easily have suggested to men the idea of a certain degree of wrongdoing attached to these pleasures, while the great intensity of the pleasures that accompany love made forgoing them a sacrifice worthy of being offered to the gods.

Like all the instincts that civilization develops and refines, this instinct is not the work of civilization. It is also found in the savage heart. The Iroquois have their sacred virgins;30 and among the Hurons there are many who profess a vow 125 of perpetual chastity. Young blacks, both male and female, despite the hot climate in which they live, oblige themselves to practice strict abstinence from the pleasures of the senses.31 The greater number who cannot wholly resist their attraction atone for this fault by painful penances, or make newly born infants expiate it by such cruel procedures that their lives are put in danger.32 Man is always shadowed 126 by the thought that he is not here simply to enjoy himself, and that to be born, to procreate, and to multiply are not his only destiny.

Later we will see the priesthood of more than one ancient people make perverse use of this indefinable but indestructible sentiment; we will see that what nature engraved in the heart of human beings to bring the two sexes together by means of a common modesty, and which means that each for the other is the sole beloved on earth, was interpreted by priests as entailing the rejection of the first law of this nature, the union of the sexes. An absurd celibacy became a slow but terrible torture that ignores the senses, overturns the imagination, and brings acute pain and trouble to the most delicate souls. In the priestly religions it became the best way of honoring the gods. But even as we bring this criminal abuse to light, we also have to recognize that the primitive notion of impurity preceded the abuse.

Self-interest, however, did not wait long to intervene in this powerful notion of sacrifice, which when it seizes hold of men takes turns perfecting, then misleading, them.

Sentiment wanted sacrifice to be disinterested. Interest wants it to be an exchange of services. Religion is thus reduced to commerce. And worship ceases when its profitability does. Man goes from one fetish to another, always seeking a more faithful ally, a more powerful protector, a more zealous accomplice.

Directing religion toward this ignoble aim, self-interest deprives it of every moral aspect. The fetish is a greedy, egotistical being allied to a human being as egotistical as it is, although weaker. The sacrifices it rewards only refer to it. The duties it imposes consist in victims, in offerings, in expressions of submission—agreed-upon currency that will be required in the future. It is payment demanded by the fetish for the protection it accords. Let this payment be given exactly, neither of the contracting parties cares one whit about a third party.

Religion then becomes such a commercial exchange that man establishes, as it were, an account with his god. He looks to see if this god has adequately acquitted itself of the engagements he supposedly contracted. And if the balance does not 127 square, the worshipper abandons or punishes the deity, strikes it or breaks it, consigns it to the flames or the deep.33

It would be unreasonable to protest too much at the absurdity of such revenge. Such puerile conduct has its counterpart in more enlightened times,34 and the most refined religion has not always preserved its more ignorant followers from it.35

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When one savage becomes the enemy of another their fetishes do, too.36 Later, when two nations fight, the gods divide and each nation has its heavenly auxiliaries. This is the same thought adapted to the social state of each period. Among civilized peoples, as with ignorant tribes, divine assistance is given not because of the justice of the cause but because of the liberality of the worshippers.

Here, too, we have to caution our readers against the hasty disdain that civilization lavishes upon savages. Whatever the belief might be, the main thing is to see if sentiment or self-interest predominates. If it is self-interest, the purity of the doctrine does not matter. Religion then is only worship of fetishes. And in civilized souls corrupted by egoism and blinded by fear, this fetishism is as revolting as it is among the Iroquois. Louis XI put himself on the level of these miserable tribes when, prostrate before Our Lady of Cléry, he tried to atone for a fratricide by bribing the saint with magnificent gifts.

In times of great danger the savage does not rest content with his customary fetish, he seeks the assistance of all those of which he has any knowledge; their number can mount into the thousands.37 In the same way, when their harvest has been poor Russian peasants (whom absolute power believes it has converted) borrow their saints from their more fortunate neighbors, because they have shown themselves more effective.38 Before the battle of Marathon, the Athenians instituted the cult of Pan, whom they had not worshipped before that time.39 Louis XI, of whom we just spoke, when he was on his deathbed gathered relics from everywhere on earth.40

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Once he has entered this path, man is forced to follow it to the end. Having conceived gods who are similar to him by their passions, he has to conceive them similar to him in their needs, their habits, and their destiny. The goddesses of the Kamtschatka carry their newborns on their backs, like human women do. These divine infants suffer and cry like human infants. And every night coming down from the mountains, the pregnant Olympia runs to the river as eager to fish as humans, but more adroit and fortunate than they.41

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CHAPTER 3: The Religious Sentiment’s Efforts to Rise above This Form

Such is the worship of man in the primitive state.1 It is religion at the most animal-like period of the human spirit. It is behind all the forms that we will describe in the sequel. The gods are not brought together in a body, as with the polytheism of civilized nations. Its vague notions of the Great Spirit do not rise to the level of theism. It chooses its protectors from a much lower sphere. It does not have the zealous spirit of theocracy, which, by placing its god in perpetual hostility to all other gods, by means of intolerance creates the national spirit and patriotism.

In this narrow and undeveloped conception, however, is contained the seed of all the elevated ideas that will be developed later.

The sacred objects of primitive worship are negligible, useless, monstrous, and ridiculous. But is this not another proof of the need that man has to worship?

He attributes life and intelligence to all objects. He thinks that all concern themselves with him, that they speak to him, threaten him, and warn him. The spiritualist who sees nothing in nature that is not animated by the divine spirit, and the pantheist who conceives divinity to be inherent in every part of the physical world, only follow the path originally blazed by the savage with his confused notions and halting steps. His worship is but the religious sentiment in its original form. It is man asking the nature he neither understands nor can understand where force, power, and goodness are to be found. No matter how crude it may appear, this religious sentiment is nobler, and even more rational, than all the systems that see in life only a matter of chance, and in intelligence a transient accident.

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We have already indicated some of the efforts that the religious sentiment makes to purify its form. We saw such efforts in the prototypical Manitou, the Great Spirit of the heavens or the seas.

To clearly see the struggle this effort entails, it will help to contrast the prayers the savage addresses to his fetishes with those he offers to the Great Spirit.

The Koryak says to his idol (while sacrificing dogs and reindeer to it): “Receive our gifts, but in turn send us what we expect from you.” In this prayer, everything is base, egoist, greedy.

In contrast, the Delaware Indians’ battle hymn, sung in honor of the great Manitou of the earth, seas, and skies, is characterized by an entirely religious, and entirely moral, resignation.

To arms to fight the enemy!

Unsheathe your axe and brandish your mace.

Will I ever see my father’s roof, the wife of my marriage bed, or the infants she carries on her back and nourishes at her breasts?

Supreme Spirit, Great Spirit above, take pity on my spouse and watch over the children she has given me.

I am a weak and powerless creature, not an instant of my life belongs to me, not one of my limbs.

I go where duty calls me for the honor and freedom of my nation. Let not the tears of those close to me flow because of me.2

The religious sentiment does not limit itself to distinguishing the infinite being toward which it rises from the vulgar idols that self-interest has created. It exerts its influence on the idols themselves, which it constantly seeks to ennoble and embellish.

As we have seen, the savage does not attribute human form to his fetishes. He likens them to it as much as he can, however, because for him this figure is the ideal of beauty. He sculpts them, he decorates them. The Laplanders, the Caribs, the inhabitants of New Zealand, those who live on the banks of the Amazon, the Africans of Loango, the tribes of Central or South America—all fashion idols of mud, stone, wood, and the cloth they acquire from more civilized peoples. They attempt to give them a human form. Pieces of coral or pebbles represent the eyes, 132 animal skins serve as clothes, then they decorate them in a thousand ways.3 The Russians subjugated the Tamertones and the Tartars of Attai but without civilizing them, and forced them to submit to a few Christian practices without eradicating their penchant for fetishes. In their world, they knew no more beautiful apparel than the uniforms of the Russian dragoons. They therefore believed their fetishes were dressed like the officers.4 It is difficult not to smile at this. But this is the poor savage’s attempt to attach to his god everything magnificent that he knows. Thus one sees in this creature the germ of the idea that with Phidias’s chisel will produce the Olympian Jupiter.

We have shown that morality remains foreign to the contract established between man and his fetish. In truth, it is very possible for reason to conceive of religion apart from morality. The relations of men with the gods constitute religion. The relations of men with one another constitute morality. These two things have no necessary relationship with each other. The gods can be simply concerned with men’s conduct toward them without any interest in men’s behavior toward one another. And men can be concerned with the gods simply in connection with the duties of worship. Morality can exist in complete independence.

One cannot conceive of a religion that does not represent the gods as powerful. But it is easy to conceive a religion that grants them no other attribute but power. This in fact would be very natural if terror was the sole source of religion. Natural phenomena only suggest the idea of power. There is no affinity between the lightning that strikes, the flood that carries away, the abyss that swallows, and moral good or evil. Even after having personified the accidents of nature by attributing them to intelligent beings, and after having established the communication with them that serves as the basis for the exchanges between the two parties, man still has many steps to take before imposing upon them disinterested duties or gratuitous actions.

If sentiment, therefore, did not succeed in altering the state of things established by self-interest, religion would inevitably become harmful to morality. The worshipper of a mercenary god, counting on an assistance paid for, would trample on justice with more boldness if he thought he was assured of supernatural assistance.

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Fortunately, even in this degraded condition sentiment calls upon morality, and in a thousand ways causes it to enter religion.

First of all, we can look at the relationship in its narrowest form; that is, the contract between the two parties. It implies the idea of fidelity to engagements, which is a moral notion.

In the second place, even in the primitive state a kind of human association exists. The individuals of a tribe are united by a common interest. This common interest needs to have its tutelary divinity.5 Religion takes the association under its protection. It protects the association against its own members, and the members of the association against one another.

The greatest and most difficult problem of society consists in finding some sanction for the engagements that men assume among themselves. The need for this sanction makes itself felt during each human transaction. We never deal with someone whose interests differ from ours without trying to read in his eyes if his real intentions correspond to his words. And sad experience constantly informs us of the inadequacy of our efforts. Voice, gesture, and look can all be the accomplices of deceit.

Religious conviction creates a safeguard: the oath. But with the disappearance of the conviction, the guarantee disappears as well. All too often in the course of history an irreligious people goes from one oath of obedience to another, but not really believing that it is bound by either. It considers them to be mere formulas that authority has the right to demand; therefore the current authority supersedes the previous. For their part, authorities who are as hypocritical as they are irreligious repudiate the promises made the night before, without any concern for the public scandal thus caused. In such a situation, all bonds are severed, justice no longer exists; duty disappears with it, and mere force reigns. Perjury on both sides makes society a permanent state of war and deceit.

But in the primitive state the oath has greater force. One should be grateful to religion that from the very origins of societies it creates this guarantee. The Malabars,6 blacks,7 Kalmucks,8 and Ostyaks9 all call upon their fetishes as witnesses 134 on solemn occasions. In this way they submit their momentary passions and changing humors to an invisible yoke.

To be sure, egoism fights this salutary influence of religion; it persuades itself that the gods it invokes will never come forward against it. Several fetish-worshipping tribes believe that they can perjure themselves with impunity when they deal with strangers: they believe their fetishes cannot take up the latter’s cause.10 We will see this contradiction continue among civilized peoples.

Nonetheless, it is an advance to have created a guarantee within a people. The notions at the base of this guarantee will not be slow to expand beyond the narrow confines of a particular territory. Exerting its influence from savage to savage, later religion will exercise it from nation to nation; in fact, it already prepares this move.

The beliefs of American tribes imposed a duty upon them of respecting the envoys of neighboring nations. Placed under the protection of the Great Spirit, these envoys could not be mistreated without committing a crime, and the guilty were delivered over to immediate death. Thus, continues the missionary from whom I borrow this fact,11 messengers who were charged with declaring a war of devastation and extinction were listened to in silence, then escorted with respect to the borders of the territory.

Thus even in its crudest state religion is beneficial. To be sure, this direct utility is neither the sole nor the most important aspect of it, and we adamantly oppose 135 the idea that it should go in first place. In a moment we will show that it is even more salutary because of the emotions it causes than the crimes it forbids. But we should spend some time on this first sort of usefulness even though it is subordinate. We wish to prove that it follows even from fetishism.

According to a traveler,12 on the island of Nuku Hiva all the laws and all social order rest on religion. These laws and this order consist in declaring that such-and-such a thing is sacred; that is to say, that the owner alone has the right to touch it. This consecration takes place by means of the priests. They call taboo everything they have consecrated. The persons and the properties of all the inhabitants of the island are taboo. No one dares to steal from them or attack their lives. Their wives share the same guarantee, and no one dares to perpetrate violence against them. When a baby is born, one or two fruit trees are declared taboo and reserved for his use alone. Since two of these trees are sufficient to nourish a man during the entire year, each has his subsistence assured. The person who violates a taboo is universally condemned and cannot escape the punishments the invisible spirits inflict upon such a one.

We must confess: we feel real emotion when we see religion even in its most imperfect form, as found among the most ignorant peoples, associating itself with the ideas of justice and beneficence, and, even as childish as it may be, doing the work that the wisdom of legislators has always recommended: providing for the lives of citizens, the subsistence of the poor, the chastity of women. It is truly moving to see the savage employing his confused ideas and finding in them a safeguard for everything dear to him.

The sentiment that we feel will become even livelier and more profound when we come to see the human spirit making progress, when we see, for instance, the taboo of Nuku Hiva at work in the Greek Jupiter, the protector of the weak and suppliants.

If man derived his religious ideas only from the material actions of external objects; if religion was only the work of the mind, a result of self-interest, ignorance, or fear; its alliance with morality would be neither so rapid nor so inevitable. But morality is a sentiment. It associates itself naturally with the religious sentiment because all sentiments cohere. The worship of invisible beings and the ideas of equity encounter and join together from the earliest days of societies. The savage’s fetish to us seems to be a vague and ridiculous chimera; it however is a great boon to his moral development and to his future improvement.

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The reader will see in what follows that we have not at all concealed the abuse suffered by the religious sentiment when it was captured by a class that wanted to monopolize it and make it an instrument of power, an object of calculation, the privilege of a few directed against all. But just as much as we believe we have to highlight and condemn the assaults on such a noble sentiment, we also believe we have to show the advantages of religion left to itself.

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CHAPTER 4: On the Ideas of Another Life in the Worship of Savages

It is above all by carefully considering the conjectures of primitive tribes on the state of the dead and on the life to come that we can clearly discern the struggle between the religious sentiment and self-interest.

If, as we think we have demonstrated, religion always places itself in the unknown, the center of all religious conjectures must be death, because death is the most imposing of all unknown things.

By his nature man is not at all disposed to believe in another life. Even when his reason adopts the idea it remains foreign to his instinct. In the universe he conceives only himself, and about himself, only life.

The closer he is to the primitive state, the stronger instinct is and the weaker his reason. Therefore his intellect refuses to think that what lived can die.

Blacks,1 and several peoples of Siberia,2 attribute death to heaven’s anger or to magic; savages of Paraguay,3 each time one of them dies, seek its soul in bushes and, not finding it there, say that it is lost. The Daures bring food to the dead for several weeks: so extraordinary does the phenomenon of death appear to them, despite so much experience of it.

Finally, however, the terrible conviction settles. The dark abyss opens, but no look can penetrate it. Man immediately fills the abyss with religion. The immense void is peopled; the darkness takes on colors; and terror, even if it does not wholly disappear, is calmed and softened.

It is from the idea of death that the religious sentiment receives its most expansive 138 and most beautiful developments. If man were fixed on earth forever, he would end by so identifying with it that religion would flee his soul. Calculation would have too much time, cunning too many advantages, and experience—whether sad or fortunate—would end by extinguishing all emotions that belong neither to egoism nor to success. But by interrupting these calculations, death renders success futile; it dethrones authority, strips it bare, and casts it naked into the pit; it is an eloquent and even necessary ally of all the sentiments that transport us beyond this world, which is to say: all of our generous and noble sentiments. Even in the primitive state, all that religion possesses of the most pure and profound stems from this idea. When the forest-dweller of America displays the bones of his forefathers and refuses to abandon them, when the captive warrior chants while braving the most painful torture and is worried about only one thing: that he bring no shame to the shades of his ancestors, this heroism is entirely religious. It is composed of memories of the past and promises for the future. It triumphs over the present; it presides over his entire life.

However, the degradation we have already noted in the savage’s conceptions of his gods also tarnishes those of the next life. Self-interest wants to arrange this imagined world for its own use; the intellect wants to describe it; and because it cannot create from nothing and has to use existing materials, the ideal world becomes a copy of this world.

The inhabitants of Paraguay think that in the next life the individual is exposed to hunger and thirst, to the inclemency of the weather and the attacks of wild beasts, and that the shadows there are divided into rich and poor, masters and subjects.4 The savages of Louisiana refuse to believe one can do without food there.5 Tahitians believe they are reunited with their wives and can have new children with them.6 The people of Guinea, those of Greenland, the tribes of South 139 America, fear a second death after which all is over for the individual.7 So strong is the human inclination to envisage what will be from what is.

The conjectures about the next life differ according to climate and local or individual situation. But they do not differ in fundamental nature. The one who has never left the place of his birth points to the mountains in the distance, beyond which one day he will live with his ancestors; there in his canoe he will ride the waves and cast his spear. The Indian taken to Europe awaits the fetish who can take him on the wings of the wind back to his native country.8 He wishes for a speedy death, so as to escape from the European monsters and return to his former pleasures.9 The unfortunate soul born into slavery has more humble hopes: one implores his idol that he will no longer be the slave of a white man.10

The anthropomorphism that affects the ideas of the savage has a negative consequence. It removes morality from every idea concerning the state of the dead. Even those tribes that distinguish a place of happiness and one of torments do not populate the former with the virtuous and the latter with criminals. The difference of destiny depends upon accidental circumstances. The inhabitants of the Marianne Islands, even while they acknowledge a place of sufferings and one of happiness, do not connect them with the ideas of punishment and reward. Those who die a violent death are the damned of this mythology; those whose death is easy are the elect.11

However, it should be noted that every time that travelers or missionaries have made use of the distinction in order to introduce the idea of distributive justice, 140 and have asked the savages if guilty souls were not separated from innocent ones, the savages eagerly embraced the separation. Even if nothing in their previous stories had said so, this immediately became part of their beliefs. One would say that the religious sentiment was merely awaiting this ray of light, and that it took over this hope as if it were its natural possession.

Nonetheless, from this likening of the next life to this life, a certain abasement of religion results, and for man, constant restlessness. A host of practices emerges aimed to place the deceased beyond the needs that even the tomb does not guarantee. And long in advance, the living take prudent precautions, providing for their stay in the place that, sooner or later, awaits them. The hunter has his arrows placed beside him, the fisherman his nets.

When a Greenland child dies, the most faithful dog is buried with him in order to lead him to the relatives who have gone before him.12 The same victim, placed at the foot of the bedside of a sick Huron, is to announce their arrival to the shades that await them. In days gone by the Iroquois placed beside each deceased warrior weapons, skins, and colors with which to paint himself.13 Some even buried their fetishes with them.14 Even today the Laplanders place flint and tinder in their silver coffins in order to light their way.15 And the islanders of Car Nicobar in India consider depriving someone who just died of the future service of the animals he owned to be a sacrilegious theft.16

Who can fail to see in this a combination of self-interest and sentiment? What the savage does for himself is only egoism; what he does for the deceased that he loved belongs to religion. Religion, from this time on a consolation, trumps sadness. The father who buries with his young warrior son his bow and arrows thus represents the son to himself as running through the forests of another world, full of the vigor that recently caused the heart of the father to swell with pride. Having stopped at a cabin, a traveler found two savages, male and female, in despair over the death of a four-year-old child. The father died a few days later; the mother’s tears ceased immediately; she appeared calm and resigned. Queried by the traveler, her sadness had been caused by the idea that her son of four years could not find 141 his own subsistence in the land of the souls; now that her spouse had rejoined him she was not worried about him and looked forward to rejoining them.17

Unfortunately, however, as consoling as they initially are, these opinions and the practices they confirm become cruel. In Nigeria,18 and among the Natches19 and the Caribs,20 slaves were buried with their masters, prisoners with their conquerors, even wives with their husbands. The Yakuts only recently gave up this practice. American tribes torment their captives in honor of their ancestors;21 and while they torture these unfortunates they invoke the shades of the heroes who died in battle.22

On the island of Borneo, the inhabitants believe that those whom they kill become their slaves in the next life; this idea has infinitely multiplied assassinations.23 Among all these peoples time is split between ambushes to capture potential victims and negotiations to redeem them. Such is the danger, too little observed until now, of applying known ideas to the unknown.

In order to inhabit a world similar to ours, the soul must resemble the body. Primitives compare it to the shadow that follows them on earth. Earthly shadows probably suggested this comparison.24 Many believe it to be of an invisible and intangible material.25 Sleep and dreams give them the idea that the soul can exist independently of its organs. Greenlanders say that when it abandons its crude envelope, the soul hunts, dances, or travels to far-away places. But it nonetheless 142 always remains dependent upon its body, whose accidents and sufferings affect it. When the body is mutilated, it is also. It feels this mutilation even beyond the grave and forever bears the marks. Blacks fear much less to be put to death than they do to be deprived of any member.26 And one of the abilities with which the angekoks of Greenland flatter themselves, which especially recommends them in the eyes of believers, consists in healing—or in their own parlance, stitching up—wounded souls.

A strange thing! This same opinion that seems absurd to us, almost beneath the first stage of society, reproduces itself at the other extreme of civilization. When the Mogols conquered China, they ordered the conquered to shave their heads the same way they did. Throngs of Chinese preferred torture, fearing that if they appeared before their ancestors bald, their souls would not be recognized and they would be rejected.27

One might be tempted to think that the idea of metempsychosis is incompatible with these ideas. But in the wave that tosses him, man is close to this contradiction.

In and of itself, the idea of metempsychosis is a very natural one. The instinct of animals sometimes resembles reason. And when one recognizes the motives that direct humans’ actions, one is tempted to seek in their bodies the souls that have disappeared. We therefore observe some version of metempsychosis among almost all the savage tribes. But this hypothesis does not satisfy any of the subsequent needs of the imagination. Therefore in religious practice it is more or less rapidly abandoned, or at least separated from the consequences that would follow. Even though, as we saw, Greenlanders believe in it, and the poor among them make use of it to obtain benefits from the rich,28 they nonetheless bury with their children dogs who are destined to serve as guides. As for the Iroquois, they also speak of the next life where the dead reprise the occupations of this life.29 Among them, as is the 143 case with the mystery religions and the Gospel itself, the grain that is cast in the ground is the symbol of immortality, and they bury the remains of their relations on the side of paths so that their souls may be closer to vivify the bodies formed in the bellies of pregnant women.

Nonetheless, the religious sentiment—which improves everything that falls under its influence—in the primitive state appears to prevail over the idea of metempsychosis by making it a mode of gradual purification and an exercise of divine justice. According to the mountain dwellers of Rajahmahal, the body of animals is the abode of degenerate souls,30 and if vice likens man to beasts, virtue must liken him to divinity. Nothing more resembles the migrations of souls in the priestly philosophy of Egypt and in the Greek mystery cults where this philosophy was transplanted.

After having fashioned his future dwelling place after the image of what he conceives rather than what he desires, the savage wants to decorate it in brilliant colors. He wants it to be richer in pleasures than his earthly dwelling. Tormented in this life by a hostile sky, the Laplander hopes for a milder climate and a better species of reindeer.31

However, despite the hope he gives himself, the savage is struck by an invincible terror. Despite himself, he depicts the situation awaiting him as miserable.

The drama of his last moments, the anguish and convulsions of his final agony, shed a somber hue over the unknown abode that defies every effort of the imagination to dispel.

The Patagonians say that souls dwell in the bodies of aquatic birds characterized by their halting flight and their doleful cries. According to the inhabitants of Chile, the food of the deceased is bitter to taste and black in color. In the Homeric netherworld, the stars are dimmed and flowers are darker. This is the conception of the primitive, decked out in the images of poetry.

The dreams and imaginings of self-interest, whatever they are, speak only to the egoistical part of our nature; they do not satisfy the religious sentiment, which alone can achieve victory over the repugnance the image of destruction naturally inspires in every living being. This sentiment takes no part in these fantastic paradises that address themselves only to the eyes and the senses. And from time to time an unexpected idea shines through, like lightning lighting up the night. The 144 idea of an eternal reunion with the Great Spirit appears among the vague conjectures of the savage; it is thus that in the midst of barbarism the noble hypothesis vaguely hovers that one day will console Socrates. It is the core of a sublime system that nourishes man with the sole hope able to satisfy his soul, fill the martyr with exaltation, and the dying with confidence.

Nonetheless, at the period we are now considering the uncertain glimmers that the savage glimpses from time to time do not suffice to reassure him. He yields to visible impressions, and they dishearten and frighten him.

He would like to place the deceased in a place of pleasures, but he sees them wander miserably around their old dwelling places. Hunger, thirst, and cold torment them, and their constant suffering inspires resentment and hatred toward men.32 According to Caribs, they take on the form of venomous reptiles or of malevolent demons.33 The inhabitants of Tahiti and of New Holland, the island-dwellers of Ambon, think that they enter into huts and drink the blood of those they surprise while asleep.34 The Tschermisses encase tombs so that the dead cannot get out and eat those who survive.35 The women of Matamba dive into the sea in order to drown the souls of their husbands, who otherwise may return and revenge themselves on them.36 Several tribes do not even dare to pronounce the names of those who no longer exist, and become angry at the rashness of the individual who would utter them and thus trouble their sleep.37 Others silently ride the waves and fish in silence so that the manes do not get angry at being awakened.38 Among the Abipones, when a family loses one of its members, it burns his clothes and weapons, leaves its hut, and changes its name.39

Let us pause a moment and reflect upon these diverse movements, incompatible and contradictory. When it comes to the dead, where do this respect, this horror, and this calculation, all found together in his spirit, come from? First, whence the respect that he barely satisfies by multiple commemorations, sacrifices, and honors 145 of every sort? Then, the horror that he calms only by the distancing, disappearance, or forgetting of the being who no longer exists, and everything connected with his memory? Or calculation, which transports egoism beyond physical destruction and forces him to create a place in an imaginary universe, which he furnishes and provides with everything he finds useful or agreeable?

We find nothing similar among the other animals. The sole instinct that belongs to their nature moves them to seek and find a solitary place where they can expire without witnesses. They seem to be instructed about one thing alone, that they must get rid of the ugly remains and not foul the air with noxious odors. As for anything else, no foresight, no anxiety about their individual destiny after death; no memory, no commemoration of those who have lived by those who survive. There may be some dubious exceptions, perhaps produced by the habits contracted by a few domesticated animals, but which probably are exaggerated observations of those who have a certain prior view. In no way do they change the general rule.

Man, on the contrary, while he is instinctively repulsed by the dead, finds himself again attracted to them by a movement that overcomes this instinct. Everything that strikes his eyes frightens him; everything that comes to his senses wounds him; nonetheless he constantly returns to these beloved (and fearful) objects.40 When decomposition renders this back-and-forth impossible, and being forced to separate from the body, he attaches himself to their tombs. The warrior reddens them with his blood; the virgin deposits a lock of hair; the mother pours her milk on it or sprinkles flowers.41 Friendship makes it a duty to descend, living, to the netherworld.42 Even egoism, sacrificing the present for the future, puts aside the better part of its possessions so as to preserve them intact for another world.

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And despite all this, some do not recognize that man is totally different from the rest of animated matter! From the beginning of the social state, when nothing is yet developed in him, death, which for the animals is only the sign of a dissolution that it undergoes without foreseeing and fearing it, without being aware of anything but the present moment, death occupies in the soul of the primitive a place greater than life itself. He does not live except, as it were, to prepare himself to die. He employs his faculties here-below only to arrange—in accordance with his still-childlike desires—the invisible abode where he must live. He is the owner who has taken lodging in a small house in order to oversee the construction of a palace. And some would have us believe that this instinct has no other cause than the vague imaginings of an ignorant, animal-like creature! But what, we must ask, would have suggested to this creature these vague imaginings? Why are they so deeply inherent in him, reserved so exclusively to him?

The obvious crudeness of the hopes and fears of the savage, therefore, do not undermine our arguments. We have already explained how the religious sentiment, the original source of all worship, is not the only faculty of man that contributes to their form. Here, as elsewhere, one sees the traces of the different impulses that share this being who is at once egoistical, rational, and moral. To logic belongs everything that is anthropomorphic, to self-interest everything that is calculated, to sentiment everything that is emotion. Reason, at once guided and deceived by analogy, brings to the abode of the dead the imitation of life. Making its calculations on the basis of this imitation, self-interest suggests to the master the barbarous requirement of sacrificing captives or slaves, to the husband the cruel affection that leads his spouse into the grave or upon the pyre, to the hunter or the warrior the desire to bring with him his bow and his arrows, his spear, or his mace.

Finally, sentiment struggles against a limited intellect and an ignoble self-interest and binds up religion’s wounds. The regrets and the respects it devotes to the dead ennoble the narrow religious conceptions. It makes use of the limited images of anthropomorphism, but it purifies them. Sometimes it teaches disinterestedness and controls avarice.43 Sometimes it wanders into metempsychosis, but 147 there is still something touching and affectionate in the savage’s commiseration for the soul that suffers, being separated from the body, and in his efforts to find another for the suffering soul. At other times, it makes use of the crude notions that lower the next life to the level of this one, but inserts self-denial and sacrifice. Finally, by its prayer—which combines regret for the departed and hope in the deity—it purifies cruder notions concerning the nature of this divinity. In this way he elevates the material form, animating it with a spirit in which one can already recognize something divine.

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CHAPTER 5: On the Errors into Which Several Authors Have Fallen Because They Failed to Note the Struggle of the Religious Sentiment against the Form of Religion at This Period

The struggle of the religious sentiment against its form in the worship of primitive tribes leads to contradictions that have given rise to many errors.

Because the savage, in addition to the fetish that is his customary protector, recognizes a Great Spirit, an invisible god to whom he attributes the creation and even the general direction of this universe, some have concluded that a pure theism existed from the beginning as the religion of primitive tribes.

The theologians of the seventeenth century, and the historians of the eighteenth century who had not overtly enrolled under the banner of philosophy, imposed upon themselves the adoption of this hypothesis as a sacred duty.

In vain did all the monuments, narratives, and annals of antiquity agree in attesting to the polytheism of all peoples during the first reported period of their history. Modern authors dismissed this concert of witnesses with truly remarkable ease.

Since theism was the sole natural religion, when they were asked where polytheism came from they replied, “Worship was corrupted, men grew weary of seeing so simply.” But what sudden cause produced the fatigue? “Because it is difficult to conceive that a single mover impressed on the universe of beings so many contradictory motions.” But the difficulty could not have been less when men were very primitive; and if they were unable to remain at the heights of theism, they hardly could have attained it with their first steps! To this it was replied “that polytheism was the result of the human tendency to worship the things that fall under his senses.”1 But this tendency has existed at all times, with all men; how could it happen 149 that they ceased fighting it precisely when their reason was more developed and provided them with greater means of resistance?

Nonetheless, this conventional opinion was oft repeated and the priority of theism 150 acquired the force of received wisdom. Then a small number of minds, more reflective and less disposed to simply parrot sonorous phrases, demonstrated the error of such a system. However, as it often happens in times of philosophical or political parties, going from one error they passed through the truth and ended with new errors.

They say that the admirable regularity of this universe could not have struck intellects still in their infancy, since nothing yet manifested it. Order seems to an ignorant man to be a simple thing. He does not seek its cause. What captures his attention are convulsions and disruptions. The harmony of the spheres says nothing to the savage’s imagination. But he lends an ear to the thunder that crackles or the lightning that shakes the forest. In its meditations on invisible forces, science occupies itself with fixed rules. Ignorance is wholly captive to the disorder of exceptions.

Now, these exceptions suggest to the mind notions that are entirely contrary to a single god. Different forces seem to do battle in the heavens and on earth. Human fortunes are exposed to a thousand unforeseen and contradictory influences. One is therefore tempted to attribute these different effects to different causes.2

Up to this point, everything is correct in these reasonings. But the philosophers then inferred that in its primitive state the human race had adored only pebbles, animals, and tree branches, and had worshipped them only out of self-interest and fear. To see man prostrate before such base divinities was a triumph for unbelief. Our ears had been worn out by a century of pious embellishments concerning the purity of primitive theism, as well as pious lamentations concerning its deplorable degradation; they were no less pestered the next sixty years by equally monotonous and ill-founded declarations concerning fetishism, presented as an absurd and shameful concept, the source of all religious ideas.

The error was obvious in both directions. If it is certain that ignorant man cannot rise to theism, it is equally certain that even in fetishism there is a movement that goes far beyond the adoration of fetishes. The savage who invokes them certainly considers them to be beings stronger than he; in this they are gods. But when he punishes them, breaks or burns them, they are enemies he mistreats, and no longer gods he adores. The Great Spirit, on the contrary, the prototypical Manitou, is not exposed to these vicissitudes of worship and outrage. It is in this idea that the savage concentrates his ideas of perfection. To be sure, he thinks about it less, he 151 only does so at irregular intervals. The interest of the moment calls him away; it constantly distracts him. Perhaps even a mute instinct informs him that he ought not to bring the being he so respects into the vulgar conflict of base passions.3 But he returns to it each time profound emotions or tender affections stir in him.

One therefore can envisage primitive worship under two points of view, depending upon whether one considers what comes from sentiment or what interest is doing. Sentiment distances the object of worship in order better to adore it; interest brings it closer, the better to use it.

Hence, on one hand, there is a certain tendency toward theism, one, however, that must remain without fruit for a long time, because divinity so conceived is much too subtle for a barely awakened intelligence. On the other hand, this is the source of crude notions that cannot soon fail to be insufficient for developing intelligence because they are too material. As it advances, it is forced to reject them.

Only to see fetishism in the belief of ignorant savage tribes is to fail to see the élan of the human soul and the first efforts of the human spirit. But to see pure theism is to anticipate the later progress of the human race and to honor primitive man with the difficult discoveries that come only later from a more developed reason.

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CHAPTER 6: On the Influence of Priests in the Primitive State

As soon as man has conceived the idea of beings superior to him with whom he has means of communication, he must acknowledge that the means are not all equally sure. It becomes important to distinguish among their degrees of reliability. If he does not hope to find the best and most sure ways by his own efforts, he naturally turns to those whom he believes are knowledgeable because of more experience, or who declare themselves to possess greater knowledge. He seeks around him privileged, favored, confident organs of the gods; and as soon as he seeks them, he finds them.

Hence, one finds among primitives the class of men whom the Tartars call schammans; the Laplanders, noaïds; Samoyeds, tadiles, and whom travelers typically designate by the generic name of jongleurs.

This still-undeveloped seed of the sacerdotal order is not the effect of fraud, ambition, or imposture, as is often said. It is inseparable from religion itself. It is not established by priests themselves; they are established by the force of things.

But as soon as the savage has created priests, the priests tend to form a corporate body.1 Here too one should not accuse them; this is also natural.

Give a certain number of men an interest distinct from the common interest: these men, united by a particular bond, by the same token will be separated from 153 everything not belonging to the body. And they will think that bringing everything under the influence of the caste is legitimate and meritorious. Bring men together around a banner and you will have soldiers; bring them around an altar and you will have priests.

The jongleurs of the savages therefore work to construct an enclosure the vulgar cannot penetrate. They are no less jealous about everything that pertains to their sacred functions than the Druids of Gaul or the Brahmins of India. They become indignant at anyone who encroaches on their territory without obtaining their permission. They impose trials and a novitiate upon those who seek admission into the privileged body.2 The novitiate lasts several years. The trials are long and painful, even bizarre. At every period, fasts, self-lacerations, flagellations, sufferings, and vigils are the customary means for approaching the invisible powers.3 The primitive jongleurs are already led by the somber, lugubrious spirit of hierophants and mystagogues.4

When profane individuals reject this severe apprenticeship and declare themselves priests on their own authority, their rivals refuse to grant this title. They are called magicians, and whatever they are able to foretell is attributed to immoral dealings with genii hostile to humans.

Here one discerns, albeit obscurely, a distinction that will become quite important in the development of religion, the distinction between religion and magic.

Properly speaking, magic is nothing but religion separated from the religious sentiment and reduced entirely to the notions that self-interest suggests. All the characteristics self-interest gives to religion are reproduced in magic. A more than human power, the assistance obtained from this venal force by sacrifices detached from morality (and sometimes in opposition to its precepts)—in a word, the employment 154 of unknown forces to satisfy the passions and desires of men—this is what devotion motivated by egoism seeks in every land, and what sorcerers promise in every country.

Even though they promise the same things by the same means, the priests of the primitive tribes distinguish themselves from sorcerers. This is because the rivalry that occurs between priests forces them to seek accusations against their rivals, but these accusations cannot undermine the basis of priestly authority.

Accusations that are based on the existence of malevolent gods (whose origins we analyzed earlier) marvelously combine these two objectives. They fortify belief instead of undermining it; they create two supernatural empires, rivals to one another. They employ the same weapons, appeal to the same hopes and fears, and both condemn to similar reprobation. Therefore, to the applause of Iroquois5 or Indian6 tribes, pyres are lit to devour sorcerers, or they are cast into the waves to drown. This savage acclaim was echoed in the great satisfaction expressed by the equally ignorant populaces of Paris or Madrid of yesteryear.

It is only when reason’s progress has discredited magic that priests come to see only impostors, not rivals, in magicians. They, however, delay such progress as much as they can. For how many centuries did men have to believe in lots, under penalty of impiety?7

We will return later to this subject. We will see the ministers of defeated cults 155 proscribed as magicians, and their gods portrayed as malevolent genii. The erstwhile objects of a Saxon’s legitimate devotion became demons of the underworld in Charlemagne’s capitularies. And the pagan Roman pontiff’s prayers to the most high Jupiter will become damnable words for Christians, issuing from a dark and illicit power. Here, however, we will limit ourselves to a brief indication.

The difference between the two notions was not so clear, the boundary line between the two professions was too fine, for the savage to give it serious attention.8 More than other factors, success decides the degree of respect and confidence. Jongleurs who fail are treated as sorcerers.9 The chiefs of African blacks or Caribs put them to death indifferently as soon as they are suspected of imposture or found guilty of impotence.10

Priests or magicians, sorcerers or jongleurs, have the same functions. Their mysterious operations obtain the protection of a fetish or preserve the savage from the snares hostile fetishes extend before him. If he is dissatisfied with his god, jongleurs recommend another or fabricate one.11 When prayers are inadequate, violence is allowed, and, like the magi, the shamans pride themselves on being able to compel the immortals.12

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They conduct these operations at night in far-away locales, howling and convulsing horribly,13 accompanied by the beat of drums,14 their fires emitting only a somber flickering light.15 They use every means of inspiring fear; their costumes, for example, leave the human form barely recognizable.16 Sometimes they walk on burning coals, sometimes they pierce bodies with swords.17 The approach of the god is announced by a noise similar to an oncoming storm, and it is probably by means of an art we Europeans employ for entertainment that they make the voice of an invisible fetish respond to their requests.18

Their invocations are cast in a language that is unintelligible to those who attend the ceremony, which makes the priestly monopoly an even more inaccessible secret. Nigeria and Greenland, like Egypt, have their hieroglyphics and, like India, their sacred languages.19

The jongleurs deftly draw advantage from everything in nature or life that departs from the norm, because everything that does not follow the common rules strikes the savage with surprise and fear. Imbecility and dementia are revered. The 157 hair of albinos serves as talismans for the blacks of Loango.20 The islanders of the South Seas worship madmen.21 Their priests make use of this natural disposition. Epilepsy becomes a gift and a privilege. In fact, it is upon this malady that they found their dynastic pretensions, requiring it to be inherited, or at least required for admission.22

Three things especially favor their authority: the fear, or the memory, of nature’s disturbances; the astonishment that dreams cause in the ignorant; and his ardent desire, his illusory hope, to know the future.

At different times, all parts of the globe have suffered violent disturbances. Everywhere the earth bears the imprint of these upheavals, which so many times have disrupted the great work of civilization. We live atop volcanoes; we walk over abysses; the sea surrounds and threatens us. While death each day leisurely chooses its victims among us, nature silently prepares even greater devastations. And in its implacable although undetected work, it views with disdain our foolhardy hopes, our fragile accumulations, and foresees the future of our vain efforts. By a single motion, with one turn of the globe, it can blot out the future while erasing the past.

The religious sentiment loves to plunge into the contemplation of these great catastrophes. Either because, being convinced of its immortal nature it flatters itself with being above the wreckage of the world, transcending a destruction that cannot touch it; or because (with a secret pleasure) it discerns the overturning of all the obstacles that separate it from the infinite Being, and which signal its reunion with this Being. Even today, when all our habits turn us away from extensive meditations and propose as life’s goal the interest of the day, we become silent and absorbed when our modern natural scientists tell us about the accumulation of strata in the earth, the remains of a thousand destroyed generations that seem to call to us and alert us as to our end. The savage meditates in his hut in his own way, not on what he knows, but on what he fears. Among all tribes one discovers traditions relating the annihilation of the world.23 Benevolent gods barely forestall the terrible 158 moment. To whom can the primitive address himself in order to have his protectors encouraged and his enemies disarmed, if not the jongleur whose prayers are thought to be efficacious and whose terrible voice can compel, after having merely petitioned? When the stars are veiled, when eclipses diminish the pale light of the moon, the tribes, gathered on the summits of mountains or the shores of the sea, accompany the cries of their priests with their own; the lugubrious ceremonies found among all peoples24 are but the terrors of the savage submitted to a regular order, and reduced to a systematic form, by the priests.

Dreams have no less of an influence on him.

Habit familiarizes us with even the most astonishing phenomena; let the unexplained last awhile and it seems simple to us. But dreams must produce an impression on childish peoples whose depth is impossible for us to measure today. They are bizarre parodies of reality, fantastic images of life, that cross both reality and life and stir up trouble that even our reason, which has become quite rigorous and demanding, can barely contain. Not so for the savages. Those of America and Siberia begin no expedition, they conduct no exchange, they enter into no pact without the encouragement of dreams.25 These dreams take the place of inspirations, guidance, and prophecy.26 Whatever they possess that is most precious to them, that which they would defend with their lives, they abandon on the authority of a dream. Kamtschadalian women yield to whomever says he possessed them in his dream.27 An Iroquois dreams that someone cuts his arm, and he cuts it himself.28 159 Another dreams that he kills his friend, and he does so.29 Entire tribes head out to conquer whatever one of their members dreamed they would.30 One can easily see the power that this conviction would confer on the interpreters of heavenly signs.

Finally, the need to read the future is a cause of the dominion of these men.

It has been observed more than once that the ignorance of the events that threaten us is the greatest of the benefits that we owe to nature. The past already makes life hard enough to endure. No one has arrived at the one-third milestone of his life without having had to weep over broken bonds, dashed illusions, and disappointed hopes. What would be the case if man was provided with real foresight? Next to the tombs of those who no longer exist, he could see the grave that must welcome those who still remain. Wounded by the ingratitude of a perfidious friend, he would recognize in advance a traitor in the friend who replaced him. The present itself, transitory, barely perceptible, would be placed between two frightening phantoms. The moment that no longer exists and the one that is not yet would come together to poison the time that does exist. But man escapes the past because he forgets it, and he believes he has a future because he does not know what it contains.

However, he constantly seeks to overcome this salutary ignorance. As soon as he believes he can make religion serve his self-interest, he asks religion for the means of penetrating the beneficent obscurity that surrounds him. And the less extensive is his knowledge and the less diversified his experiences, the greater, more explicit, and affirmative are the promises he extorts from religion. Knowledge of future events is therefore placed on the first rung of the attributes that give credence to primitive jongleurs. Superstition asks them for it, ignorance implores them; if they acknowledged their own ignorance, they would abdicate their authority.

In order to preserve it, they obey the demands of superstition and ignorance. And what they reveal comes closer to the goal that is proposed, the more they are connected to the two things that most inspire fear in men: the appearance of malign genii and the return to life of those that have departed. It is the Nitos, the hostile powers, that the jongleurs consult on the island of Amboina. It is the dead that they invoke among the Iroquois, against whom the savage defends himself with so much care, these manes that he imagines to be transformed into fierce monsters, into bloodthirsty vampires. The credulous Huron hears the shades of his ancestors respond by moaning. The Carib and the black see their hair moving 160 at the bottom of the vase in which they are kept, from which prophetic sounds emerge.31

Other epochs of religion will recall these dismal notions. In order to pierce the darkness of the future, Ulysses will go down to the netherworld to consult his mother.32 Men have always concluded that because the dead belong to the past, the future belongs to them. Or rather, it is because, in the depths of his soul, he worries about death that he interrogates those who have already experienced it.

Ministers of these frightful ceremonies, the jongleurs share (or pretend to share) the fear that they cause. They do their best not to trouble the peace of the shades. They fear that the disturbed shades would revenge themselves upon those who troubled their eternal rest. They also fear that these gods who know what destiny holds might punish the temerity of those who want to steal its secrets. It is telling to the observer that in all cults the act of prophesying is painful.33 This idea probably owes its origin to the fact that when the imagination receives one of these violent commotions that appear to raise it above its customary sphere, this commotion is accompanied by pain and contortions. But in this area, as in others, working with the givens of nature, the jongleurs have adroitly profited from this to raise the price of their activity. Even today those who arrogate to themselves the gift of prediction affect profound terror. It is with great regret, as though confronting immense dangers, that they resign themselves to unveil what the future holds.

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CHAPTER 7: Consequences of the Influence of Jongleurs on the Worship of Savages

As one can well imagine, the appearance of a priesthood in the worship of savages is accompanied by very important consequences.

We have depicted man, in matters of religion, besieged by two conflicting movements.

One is disinterested and is nourished by the very sacrifices that it imposes upon itself, while it delights in devotion and in all elevated and sublime conceptions. It spreads a sort of general perfume over these conceptions, and in its rapid, unpremeditated élan sometimes places the beliefs of the most ignorant tribe on a par with the most purified doctrine.

The other movement is egoistical, demanding, and mercenary; it transforms sacrifice into commerce, admits only positive notions, and casts worship into the narrow and turbulent sphere of mundane interests.

It is to the second movement that jongleurs must initially apply themselves in order to become masters. Their authority grows with every support they give to the notions suggested by self-interest. They therefore turn the attention of the savage as exclusively as they can toward this portion of religion. They distract it from the idea of the Great Spirit, who, in its immensity and distance from the human race, is far beyond daily supplications and the needs of the moment. They concentrate the desires of the tribes that listen to them upon their material relationships with fetishes, subordinate powers who are more at man’s level, and who belong to the one who offers them the most. They confirm men in the supposition that the gods make their favors a subject of commerce, that one assures oneself of their protection by satisfying their voracious hunger or by flattering their unpredictable vanity. By means of a calculated exaggeration, they dilate on the avidity and wickedness of these idols. The tales of blacks concerning the god 162 Nanni,1 and of the Kamtschatka concerning their god Kutko,2 give an idea of the perversity that goes beyond the fictions of the Iliad.

The path along which the jongleurs guide their docile disciples thus seems to prepare the inevitable victory of egoism over sentiment. Resignation to suffering is a more difficult and rarer achievement than is fervor in devotion. The worship that flatters immediate desires accords better with the demands of passion than that adoration which is inapplicable to the details of life.

But after having profited from the cruder side of religious notions, the priesthood soon notices that it can derive even greater profit from their exalted and enthusiastic part.

We have already spoken of the tendency of men to refine things connected with sacrifice. As much as the effects of this tendency are admirable when sentiment is at work, it can become terrible when imposture and calculation make it an instrument.

From the fact that, in order to be agreeable to the gods, sacrifice must be painful to the one who offers it, it follows that new sacrifices will constantly be invented, always more painful and hence more meritorious. From the fact that the gods are pleased with the deprivations of their worshippers, it results that their number will be multiplied and the nature of the deprivations constantly refined. Man launches himself into an endless series of exaggerations, errors, extravagances, and barbarities, whether inflicted merely upon himself or upon himself and others. Disoriented superstition is frightened by its own hopes, and it desires to atone for them by new pains or cruelties.

Human sacrifice no doubt has had several causes.

The dedication of a portion of the booty taken from defeated enemies was extended to captives. The victor felt he had to immolate a percentage of them proportionate to the number the fortunes of battle had given him.3

We have already seen that the assumption that the future life resembles this life causes the dead to be buried with their living slaves or concubines, or burned on the same pyres with them.

The leaders of tribes have sometimes thought that by slaughtering other men they would forestall the time fixed by nature for their own demise, or that these 163 victims would serve them as messengers to the invisible powers, that is, as conduits of their homage and their prayers.

Finally, the desire to steal from the future the secrets it contains, which the gods perhaps have hidden in human viscera, has moved primitive curiosity to bloody its hand by digging into their victims’ entrails.

These various causes introduced human sacrifice into a great number of primitive tribes.

But the principle of refining sacrifice had to favor the practice of these despicable rites in a special way. The shedding of human blood had to become the most precious offering, because in man’s eyes life is the most precious thing. And among these horrible offerings the most meritorious had to be those that struck down the dearest of victims. Nothing is more terrible than logic at work in absurdity.4

It is in accordance with this principle that we find that terrible denial of blood ties among the inhabitants of Florida and the coast of Africa:5 children immolated in the presence of their mothers. These are horrifying customs that we were habituated in our childhood to admire when it was a matter of Abraham’s obedience, but which revolt us now in the tribes we are in no way accustomed to respect.

It is so true that these practices are the effects of the calculation and authority of jongleurs that the less a tribe is subject to them, the less one encounters these barbarous rites. Then, however, it is the soothsayers who demand them as an indispensable condition for the revelation of the future.6 Moreover, we will note when we treat the peoples who have entered into civilization that human sacrifices always fall into disuse among peoples not subjugated by priests, while they are continued among all the nations who are broken to their yoke.

It is the same with the notion of chastity that we saw earlier win out in the heart of the savage over his most imperious passions. As we have already observed, not 164 only does the priesthood make use of this idea to recommend cruel and exaggerated abstinences, but it soon demands an abnegation of a totally different sort, one that is even more bizarre and outrageous.

In the kingdom of Whydah female priests take the daughters of the most distinguished families and, after having subjected them to the most rigorous trials, instruct them in the arts of pleasure, then dedicate them to the profession of courtesan.7 Among other blacks, a priestly corporation or a religious confraternity8 composes obscene hymns that are publicly sung at solemn festivals.

In this way, by returning to the savage state, we can detect the hidden motive of the prostitution of female Babylonians and the immodest dances of the women of Memphis, established facts that are denied all too easily by writers who do not know their cause.9

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From his first steps man has believed that he has never done enough to honor his gods. His nature invites him to seek pleasure, he sacrifices pleasure to please them. Nature prescribes modesty, he offers it as a holocaust to them. But this last refinement comes from the priests. The priesthood discovered in the conflict arising between the religious sentiment and obscene practices the opportunity for a new triumph for religion, one that is the contrary of the one it had earlier attained over sexual attraction. After having forbidden the young virgin the chaste embraces of her spouse, it brought her before hideous divinities in order to profane and demean her.

This truth will become evident when we later show in the religions subjected to priests—and in them only10—terribly scandalous feasts that were authorized, even mandated, by the priesthood, the same priesthood that, on one hand, punished the least deviation from the commands of chastity with the most terrible pains, and, on the other, condemned any hesitation before prescribed obscenities and mandated orgies.11

Therefore, it is not the religious sentiment that one should accuse when it comes to these deplorable deviations. It is susceptible, to be sure, of being mistaken, as are all the emotions of our soul; but it finds in these very same emotions an assured remedy against its excesses. Purity, pity, sympathy, and that heavenly virtue which in religious language is called charity, and which is nothing but the impossibility of seeing another’s pain and misfortune without being moved to attend to it, are its inseparable companions. Soon enough, it is forced by their common nature to abjure the wild or licentious practices that foul its cradle. During the course of our 166 work we will furnish a number of incontestable proofs that they are prolonged only by an authority that has nothing in common with the religious sentiment.

This terrible, implacable authority regularizes human folly and transforms delirium into doctrine, the terrible into a system, and barbarism into duty.

Then appear the baneful results that have often been attributed to religion. It is complicated by a thousand cruel and ridiculous practices. Hideous in form, the gods are fierce in character. The religious sentiment seeks to beautify them, the priesthood keeps them horrible, and their very success transmits these repulsive figures to more civilized periods.12

Bloody offerings, revolting rites, and terrible holocausts must be offered to such idols.

This disastrous influence of priestly artifice crosses the centuries. If we were to take according to their letter the epithets that most often accompany the mention of divine forces or divine will in more purified belief-systems, we would think that man found a strange pleasure in trembling before the odious and barbarous beings to whom he submitted his destiny. All the evils with which the human race is afflicted, man sees their origin in the malevolence of these frightening opponents. Sometimes they sow disease, unleash storms, raise floods, arm the sun with devastating heat or winter with unbearable cold; sometimes they conspire against the very world they have created and are eager to destroy it. They shake it to its foundations; the moon and the stars are threatened by monsters;13 the abyss is set to swallow it. Thus the doctrine of the destruction of the universe (about which we spoke earlier) becomes even more terrifying; soon enough, under the imposing forms of a dark cosmogony it will occupy an eminent place in the doctrines of the priests.

The foregoing considerations appear to indicate that we must consider the existence of jongleurs as a scourge of savage tribes. But other reflections must cause us not to pronounce so quickly on the question.

In the first place, the influence of the sacerdotal caste is rather limited in the primitive state, despite the efforts of the caste. The fetish of the black and the manitou of the American Indian are portable, even disposable beings. To be sure, they are the faithful companions of the hunt or war, the allies of his hatreds, the confidants 167 of his loves. But as we have seen, he not only can consult his idol in every circumstance, he can leave it for another or punish it when it has disappointed his hopes.

This volatility in his relations with his god inspires little reverence for its ministers; and the ease with which he can interact with his god and treat directly with it often makes the intervention of others either intrusive or superfluous.

In all of South America, jongleurs limit themselves to indicating the sacrifices that will please the gods. It is the fathers of the family, or the most eminent in each hut, who by right preside over the ceremony.14 It is the same with the Tscheremisses and several neighboring, or dependant, tribes of Russia.15 Thus, whatever they do, the jongleurs have only what we could call accidental and precarious credit. They are hardly less ignorant than the rest of the tribe that they govern. And while they are associated in a corporate body, they are rivals at each particular moment; they therefore criticize one another more often than they band together.16 And despite their efforts, others—adventurers without authority—dispute their authority.17 At bottom their trade is but a dubious means of personal gain, one that is diminished by competition.18 Their authority is at the mercy of varying and fluctuating opinion. Creatures of this opinion, they rarely become its masters.19

Secondly, the quite real and very serious drawbacks connected with the influence of jongleurs are only one aspect of the question.

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In order to grasp it in its entirety, one must recognize that the less a people is enlightened, the more the priesthood is inseparable from the religion. Therefore it is not a question of simply deploring an inevitable evil; one must seek to find out if the evil exceeds the good with which it is necessarily connected.

Would it be better if the savage had no religious notions and, at this price, was freed from the jongleurs? There would be many fewer human sacrifices, terrifying rites, painful self-lacerations, and voluntary deprivations. But there also would be neither religious sanction for his emerging morality nor hope for another life (or any of the consolations that lighten the weight of his miserable existence). He would be only a wild animal, but more miserable than the other ones, his equals and his rivals. Consider the picture of American tribes drawn by a traveler known for his talent for observation and his accuracy.20 Look at these tribes tormented by physical suffering, by constantly recurring needs, by the prospect of being abandoned when they receive incurable wounds, diseases, or old age; often they take their own lives to end their prolonged agony. Cast into such an abyss, can man pay too dear for the hope that revives him? His communications with the gods, his dreams concerning future existence, his preoccupation with the dead he hopes to rejoin, the emotions religion causes in him, the duties it creates—these are all inestimable treasures for him. It shifts the weight of reality, whose burden crushes him. It transports him into the world created by his imagination; and his labors, his pains, the cold that freezes him, the hunger that devours him, and the exhaustion he feels are but the tossing and heaving of the vessel carrying him to the other shore. To be sure, the actions of the jongleurs trouble him, even in his religious consolations. But to take away this noxious influence it would be necessary to do without its consolations. It is better that he possesses them, even in an imperfect, burdensome way.

Moreover, is it certain that the jongleurs do only evil?

Without them, entire peoples would die of torpor and wretched poverty.21 They rouse them out of their apathy and force them to activity. The tribes without priests are those that are the most animal-like.22 The jongleurs, whether ignorant 169 or crafty, deceptive or mistaken, nonetheless preserve certain medicinal traditions, some part of which is salutary.23 For the slothful savage, they make a duty of the hunt or fishing. They make a duty of the pleasures of love, to which certain climates render him almost insensitive.24 They entertain him with dreams that are not without a certain sweetness. They spread a certain charm over an otherwise deplorable life, grief-stricken by nature. We should not begrudge them that they know how to embellish desolate shores, and place their inhabitants’ hopes beyond the mountains or on the other shore of the seas.

Evil is never in what exists naturally, but in what is prolonged or reestablished by craft or force. The true good is proportion. Nature always maintains proportion when it is left free. All disproportion is pernicious. What is overripe and what is premature are equally noxious. Institutions much less crude than the priesthood of jongleurs can cause much more harm when they become unsuited to the ideas inevitably developed by the advancement of the human mind.

When we later compare the actions of jongleurs with those of the priestly bodies so lionized by writers down through the ages, the reader will perhaps be surprised to see the preference remain with the former. Priestly bodies inhibit the human race in all its progress, while jongleurs, despite themselves, push it toward an imperfect civilization. One should see in them a bit of fraud and a good deal of superstition. The others, though, will have at most a bit of superstition and certainly a good deal of fraud.

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CHAPTER 8: Why We Believed That We Needed to Write in Such Detail about the Worship of Savages

We have entered into detail in treating the religion of primitive tribes. This was necessary because in this religion are contained the seeds of all the notions that make up later beliefs. This truth must have struck our readers, even if they paid only the slightest amount of attention.

We saw not only the worship of material objects, multiplied to the infinite, but unexpected intimations of the purest theism, as well as the division into two substances and the presentment, as it were, of spiritual nature;

Not only the natural idea that the gods are pleased with sacrifices, but the need to refine them; hence human victims and children placed on the paternal pyre, the merit of celibacy and the mysterious price of virginity, and the holiness found in voluntary self-torture, as well as decency offered up on the altars;

Not only the fear of malevolent gods but the classification of divinities into two categories ranged eternally against one another, and the distinction of religious practices into licit ceremonies and perverse rites;

Not only the hope of a new life after death, but abstractions concerning the state of souls and their reunion with the infinite Being;

Not only metempsychosis, but with it the migrations and purifications of souls;

All the things, finally, that we will later see more developed among civilized peoples and cast in clearer terms, clothed with more sublime images and endowed with more attractive colors, the instinct of the savage already divines, grasps, and works with them in every way, trying to arrange them in some order that his intellect either conceives or senses. (Our proud disdain has much too much overstated the limits of this intellect.)

Whether man be a savage or civilized, he has the same nature, the same basic faculties, the same tendency to employ them. The same notions, only less subtle, must 171 therefore offer themselves to him; the same needs and the same desires must direct him in his conjectures. However, distracted by the struggle he must wage against a natural world not yet mastered, and against a moral state devoid of guarantees, he cannot persevere in a straight and regular path. His conjectures arise and evaporate like clouds in the sky or like the phantoms of our dreams when our reason leaves us to our vagabond imagination.

Nothing, however, disappears without leaving its traces; later epochs collect them, elaborate on them, and give them regularity and consistency.

It was therefore important to describe them with some precision; they serve as the baseline of our subsequent inquiries. We will see how the human spirit works on these givens, and how it purifies them when it is left to itself and operates independently of every foreign influence. The crudest aspects are effaced, and more reasonable ones are combined and coordinated. But when it is reduced to servitude, the more reasonable ones are corrupted and perverted while the cruder ones are preserved in all their primitive absurdity.

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BOOK III: ON THE CAUSES THAT FAVOR THE GROWTH OF PRIESTLY POWER FROM THE FIRST STEPS OF THE HUMAN RACE TOWARD CIVILIZATION

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CHAPTER 1: The Object of This Book

In the previous book we described the religious notions of savage tribes. Our readers were able to be convinced of two truths: one, that these notions were commensurate with the ignorance and crudeness of these wretched tribes; the other, that the religious sentiment made itself felt through this inchoate and repulsive envelope.

Now we are going to seek what religion must be at the lowest rung of the social state.

The passage from the savage state to the social state is an enigma, one for which no historical fact provides the key. We therefore will take no position on the way in which the transition occurred. We have already recognized that the savage state could have been a degradation rather than the initial state of mankind, one perhaps caused by some material calamity, or a fall, the sad result of a moral fault.

This question, however, is totally outside our investigations. The only truth we wish to demonstrate is that as soon as a revolution occurs in the state of mankind, religion undergoes an analogous change. We will base our reasonings only on facts we believe are established, and we seek to explain these facts. We have no intention of talking about things on which history sheds no light. We have therefore prescribed to ourselves a law: never to speak about what we do not know. If this rule has the drawback of necessitating more than one regrettable lacuna in our treatment, it has the advantage of keeping us from more than one fanciful hypothesis.

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CHAPTER 2: On the Social State That Is the Closest to the Savage State

We will consider as the first rung of the social state the condition of those peoples larger in size than the Tartar, African, or American tribes, who cultivate the earth rather than hunt for their subsistence; who no longer content themselves with the shelter of isolated huts but build permanent buildings in proximity to one another; who know how to work with metals; and, finally, having more or less mastered physical nature, they begin to develop their moral forces, acquiring notions of property, laying down fixed laws, and, according to circumstances, choose or recognize leaders whose authority commands obedience and inspires respect (although it is still contested from time to time).

This state of the human race is generally designated as barbarism; it is in-between the animal-like stage we described in the earlier books and civilization, which will occur only much later. At this stage, peoples are just above the savage state and just below the civilized state. An almost equal distance separates the Samoyed or Iroquois from the Greek contemporary of Theseus, and the latter from the Athenian citizen under Pericles.

To be sure, the general characteristics of the barbarous centuries are modified by secondary differences determined by local factors or accidental occurrences. Nonetheless, looked at in connection with religion, the period is subject to a common rule. The notions suggested to the savage by the narrow horizons of egoism no longer satisfy the human being who has taken his first steps to a better state. Even though he is ignorant of the laws of nature he has discovered some aspects of its workings. Religion must withdraw itself from them. Man has consolidated his empire over inanimate matter and the majority of living species; he no longer can solely worship pieces of wood, animals, and stones. At the same time, the vague 177 élan of the religion sentiment that propelled the savages toward more sublime and mysterious notions now wants them to be clothed in more fixed forms, to give them more constancy and more reality, as it were. In this way, by a double work unnoticed by him, the human being progressing toward civilization tries, simultaneously, to have what is too far above him come down to him and to raise up what is base and beneath him.

Likewise, the isolation in which fetishes live ceases being suitable to the gods of peoples united in societies. Men brought together in social bodies need to be united in their sentiments. To see these sentiments shared is itself a pleasure. They put their gods in common; in fact, this reunion of the gods occurs necessarily as soon as the coming-together of men occurs. Human society being formed, a celestial society forms too. The objects of worship compose an Olympus as soon as worshippers form a people.

By a similar necessity the gods divide power. Being the god of an isolated individual, the fetish had to satisfy all the needs of its devoté. All the fetishes, therefore, had the same functions. Now the gods have distinct functions.

In some way, this revolution is the counterpart of the division of labor among men that occurs with the development of society. In the savage state each individual alone provided all his needs. In civilized society, devoting himself to a particular occupation, each one provides not only for himself but for the similar needs of others. In fetishism, the fetish is responsible for everything that pertains to the individual; when nascent polytheism succeeds it, each deity is charged with one thing, although for everyone.

For this same reason, the gods then take on distinctive names, while fetishes did not have individual names. It was at the moment when, thanks to the arrival of Egyptian colonies, the Greeks passed from fetishism to polytheism that they assigned special names to each of their divinities.1

It is not that fetishism disappears entirely with the appearance of this new form. We have already shown that even at much more advanced periods, under different guises it remains an essential part of religious ideas. Even more so, therefore, must it continue in those peoples among whom whatever imperfect knowledge there exists remains the property of a class interested in the perpetuation of ignorance; and among other peoples that are occupied with war and pillage, 178 who concentrate their indomitable passions and developing understanding on the struggles and conflicts of this world. Thus we find traces of fetishism both among the Greeks of the heroic period, when the priesthood had no influence, and among the Egyptians, whose priests subjected them to an iron yoke. Only, these vestiges of a belief the human spirit has risen above combine with the worship that replaces it, and the old fetishes, now disciplined, submit themselves to the greater national deities.2

These are the first developments of religious notions that the birth of civilization causes. Whatever the power of priests may be otherwise, the steps are the same. However, if we wish to go further, two paths open before us that grow further apart the further they go. One is the path man follows when he is left to his own powers and his own instinct. The other path is the one that priesthood leads him on when it reduces him to slavery.

Here appears the distinction we established earlier between priestly religions and those in which no priesthood succeeded in subjugating it. Our first concern, therefore, must be to name the causes that favored, and those that limited, priestly authority.3

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CHAPTER 3: On Causes That Could Contribute Only in a Secondary Manner to the Increase of Priestly Authority

While they favored the accidental influence of isolated jongleurs, the religion of the savage state and the character of the tribes that professed this religion worked against the regular establishment of priestly power. Despite the superstition of these ignorant tribes, they harbor at the bottom of their hearts a deep aversion to this class of men. The Chiquitos of Paraguay once massacred them all, saying they were more harmful than useful.1 The Kalmuks and Laplanders often express the same opinion about their soothsayers.2 How, then, does it happen that emerging from this condition of savagery, men often grant an extensive authority to these purported organs of heaven? To the contrary, given that they are growing in knowledge, should they not liberate themselves from a dominion that rests only on their ignorance?

In order to solve this problem—which contains all of history’s problems—one has to discover a cause whose action is uniform. That means one in the absence of which the priesthood would have only precarious, limited authority, while being present confers awesome, immense, unlimited credentials upon priests.

Should we seek the cause of this development in the religious disposition itself, which, when it takes control of the soul, elevates it above all present and visible interests? If so, the priesthood would everywhere have unlimited influence.

Should we attribute it to the factors that in certain countries restrained its influence? To rivalry with political authority or the ascendancy of a warrior caste? But the contest between the interpreters of heaven and the rulers of the earth occurred 181 everywhere. All have seen a warrior caste arise among them. From the identity of the cause, the sameness of the effect ought to exist.

Should we attribute it to climate? It is easy to think that in countries where the climate disposes man to contemplation and gives great energy to his imagination at the same time that it dispenses him from material labor because of the fecundity of the soil, that the class that has assigned itself the task of providing for the needs of this imagination greedy for tales and terrors would rapidly acquire unlimited power.

Nonetheless, the climate cannot be considered the primary cause of the subjection of the human race to priestly corporations. The priesthood has been invested with an unlimited authority in all climates. The Druids of the Gauls in their forests; the magi of the Persians on mountaintops; the priests of Egypt in their marshes: they not only have exercised an equal authority, but owe this power to a similar organization. The Brahmins of India and the Drottes of Scandinavia, the former under burning skies, the others in the midst of snow, are brothers wearing different clothing owing to the degree of heat or cold. They nonetheless display an unmistakable family resemblance.

On the other hand, there are very hot climates where we find no powerful priesthood. The jongleurs of several black tribes have little more power than the shamans of Tartary. Among the Greeks, the priesthood always had very little power, while its influence among the Gauls was almost unlimited.

Now, for a cause to be recognized as sufficient, it is not strictly necessary that the effect exist only because of that cause, because it could have occurred for another reason; on the other hand, it is at least indispensable that, everywhere the cause exists, the effect is found. In this light, we have to see climate as a secondary, accessory cause.

It is the same thing with the terrors inspired by the calamities of nature.

There is no doubt that one must place natural catastrophes among the factors of social, and especially religious, institutions whose memory is preserved in the traditions of almost all the peoples of the earth.

In ordinary circumstances, man is threatened only by the dangers resulting from the customary actions of the objects that surround him. Even then, however, he is propelled by the fear these objects inspire to address himself to those who say they are heaven’s confidants, the gods’ favorites and intermediaries. How much more, therefore, when all the elements are unleashed and he experiences great calamities, 182 must he rush headlong into all the excesses of superstition and fall at the feet of whomever appears to have some credit with the powers that now threaten him? It is not fraud that engenders terror, but terror that solicits fraud. It presents an easy target, which in fact runs under the yoke, crying out for divine assistance and supernatural support in the face of inexplicable calamities.

However, there are peoples among whom great natural disasters have occurred who are not subject to priests. The annals of Greece are full of traditions relative to a flood. Everywhere this country experienced terrible upheavals. But at least since the heroic age, the Greeks are remarkable for their independence from priestly authority.

It is the same with the effects of colonies.

All nations attribute their departure from the primitive state to the arrival of some foreign colony. The Indians speak of the Samaneens come from the North, who removed them from a condition very little different from that of brutes.3

According to plausible hypotheses, Egyptian civilization comes from Ethiopian4 and Indian colonies. Greek civilization was the work of Phoenicians and 183 Egyptians. Etruria was inhabited by primitives when the Lydians, then the Pelasgians arrived. It appears that Phoenicia civilized Gaul, and that Gaul rendered the same service to portions of Germany. To this we can add that the inhabitants of Scandinavia did not know the social state when the victorious Dacians made their way there.

But one must distinguish four sorts of colonies in antiquity. Some were wholly military, others both military and priestly; others, purely sacerdotal; a few, finally, neither military nor sacerdotal.

By military, we refer to those colonies that took over the entire country. A few partial victories do not justify the designation. No colony is established without battle, but when the result is the mixing of the two peoples, this is not military in the sense we give the term.

Purely military colonies do not advantage priestly authority. The effect of the conquest is not theocratic government but military or feudal government (if we can use a modern term in talking about antiquity). The conquest sometimes even destroys, or at least limits, priestly authority. This authority was much less in the new establishments of the barbarians in the Roman Empire than in their former homelands.

Purely sacerdotal colonies introduce a priesthood that becomes all-powerful only by degrees. Such was probably the Phoenicians’ influence on the Gauls.

Colonies that are neither military nor priestly eventually mix with the indigenous people. Civilization progresses as a result, but priests as a body do not gain in stature. We will see the Greeks civilized by colonies that came from a country that was wholly subject to priestly authority but remain free of this authority because these colonies did not have priests for leaders.

Finally, sacerdotal and military colonies establish a priesthood that, if it is not the sole power, is always the first of powers. Ethiopians5 exercised this influence on Egypt.

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It is certain, therefore, that colonies could extend the dominion of priests over countries in which they would not have naturally arisen. But it also is obvious that their action cannot be regarded as a first cause. To say that one colony has imposed certain institutions on another is to explain why the latter has received them. But one still has to explain why they were established in the home country of the colony.

It therefore is not in man’s nature nor in the climate, not in natural catastrophes nor in the migrations of peoples, that the cause we are seeking can be found. It resides in a circumstance that, because it is connected with the ideas that man conceives of the beings he worships, is both necessary and sufficient to solve the problem.

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CHAPTER 4: On the Cause That, Whenever It Exists, Gives the Priesthood Much Power

There are peoples whose entire existence depends upon the observation of the stars. This may be because their geographical situation invites or requires them to sail and navigate; or because the nature of their soil requires, as a condition of their subsistence or their safety, precise astronomical calculations.

There are other peoples among whom natural phenomena of all sorts abound that are helpful to foresee or at least natural to observe with attentive curiosity.

When man finds himself in such circumstances, because of the nature of the religious sentiment he must infallibly direct his adoration toward either the torches in the sky or the unknown forces he supposes govern the terrestrial phenomena.

Once again, it is not his gratitude toward one or his terror before the other that initially suggests to him the idea and the need of worship. But the idea that possesses him, the need that torments him, leads him to seek objects of worship. He naturally puts in first place those that have the most influence on his existence.

Therefore there are peoples who have been led to substitute the worship of stars for the crude worship we described earlier. There are others that an equal necessity forced to worship the elements.1

Often these two kinds of divinities are invoked together: the sun, at once a 186 globe of fire and the king of the planets, is the center or common feature of the two religious systems.

Now, these two systems immediately create a priesthood vested with an authority that the jongleurs of savages could not have had. It is impossible to transform the elements or stars into individual fetishes. No one can claim them as his exclusive property. They necessarily become collective deities, and priests are needed to represent the nation to them.

Moreover, to come to know the movements of the stars—to observe natural phenomena in general—a certain amount of attention and study is required.

From the beginning of societies, when the mass of people is still quite ignorant, this necessity establishes corporate bodies whose occupation is the study of 187 the stars and their goal, the observation of nature. Their discoveries become their property.2

Since these corporations make themselves the exclusive depository of the emerging science, they cannot fail to acquire a greater influence than naturally belongs to the priesthood in religions whose gods are not the objects of scientific observations.

There is more. Alongside the study of the regular movements of the stars, soon there is the study of their supposed relations with men. Next to the observation of earthly phenomena is placed the interpretation of these phenomena, which seem to speak a sacred language to mankind.3 The worship of celestial bodies that leads to astronomy also leads to astrology,4 the worship of elements leads to divination:5 two quite extensive, and much more immediate, means of influence for the priesthood.6

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As a consequence, one finds that priests, while they have little authority over fetishistic peoples (or who come to polytheism from fetishism), have an immense authority over the nations given to the worship of the stars and the elements.

The religion natural to the savage neither requires nor allows for priests other than the isolated jongleurs. Worship of the stars calls for astronomers; worship of the elements, natural scientists, or at least men who claim to know and control the hidden forces of the universe. From all this comes an indefinite increase of authority.

Now let us consider the facts. They will support the reasonings just provided.

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CHAPTER 5: Facts That Support the Previous Assertions

Let us return for a moment to the savage tribes. It will convince us of this truth.

In America, the inhabitants of Florida principally worshipped the sun and the moon.1 All-powerful priests maintained them subject; and the cruelest as well as most lascivious priestly practices characterized their worship.2 In Africa, the Jagas3 hold the sun as the highest deity; stars direct them in their wars; and temporal as well as spiritual authority is united in the hands of the calandola, or high priest.4

We do not deny that accidental circumstances could have subjected some peoples among whom star worship was not present to theocratic authority. Thus, among the blacks of Whydah, whose national deity is a serpent of a particular type, the priesthood forms a powerful body. But this is because formerly, at the time of a decisive battle, this serpent deserted the enemy and became their miraculous ally: adroit jongleurs took advantage and devoted themselves to its service.5 This small example does not weaken the general rule. The neighboring tribes were not seduced by it; and since no other event caused them to deviate from their natural path, and because they do not render exclusive worship to the sun, their own priesthood has remained without influence or regular authority.

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If from savage tribes we pass to civilized peoples,6 the same fact will strike us with the same evidence.

The Egyptian religion was founded on astronomy.7 The authority of the Egyptian priesthood was unlimited. Near to Egypt, Ethiopia was also inhabited by tribes that worshipped stars; it was also famous for the absolute power of the priests of Meroë. Syrians adored the sun and the moon under the names of Aglibolos and Malachbul.8 All the world knows of the shameless orgies, the fanatical rites, and obscene mutilations of the Syrian priesthood. Similarly, the veneration the Persian religion had for the elements is too well known to need proof.9 These 191 peoples put to death anyone who sullied either fire or waves.10 Among them, this worship was combined with star-worship.11 Therefore, even though they were often threatened by kings, and sometimes were the victims of cruel persecutions, the magi successfully fought their enemies and always regained authority.

The observation of the stars was an essential part of the Indian religion,12 and 192 India has always recognized the dominion of the Brahmans. Everything leads us to believe that China, while atheistic today, in the midst of the crudest superstitions, in former times professed a religion that subjected the people to priests.13 And we find astronomy14 at each stage of its records, and in its rites, vestiges of the worship of the elements.15 Mexican priests exercised a terrible authority; the sun was the principal divinity of Mexico.16 The bloody despotism of the Carthaginian priesthood is attested to by all historians.17 The Carthaginians were devoted to 193 star-worship.18 The nations that neighbored the Jews were for the most part subject to a tyrannical clergy, and they led the people of God into astrolatry. When Ezekiel wanted to depict its guilty defection, he showed the Levites turning their back on the tabernacle and rendering homage to the rising sun. And when Josiah declared a war to the death on idolatry, he confiscated the horses and burned the chariots devoted to this fiery idol.19

If we leave the East and South for the West and the North, we will find that the worship of the elements produced the same effects in Germany and Gaul20 as astronomy did in India and Egypt. We will see the forests of this part of the globe still harboring the hideous monuments of the absolute and bloodthirsty authority of the Druids: at the head of the idolatrous objects proscribed by Canute are the Sun, Fire, Moon, and the Earth.21 This last deity was invoked under the name 194 of Hertha by the tribes described by Tacitus;22 the Slavs adored the god of Air; Chen-Yk, with his Tatars, sacrificed to Heaven, whose son he said he was.23 And when a new Odin, simultaneously a warrior and a priest, wanted to subjugate the Scandinavians, he preached the identity of their supreme god with the sun.

Thus in quite different countries, among peoples with very opposite customs, thanks to the worship of elements and the stars, the priesthood acquired a power that we can barely conceive of today.

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CHAPTER 6: On Two Apparent Exceptions

History appears to present two exceptions to the principle we just articulated. These two exceptions, the Arabs and the Germans, are found in two different climates and at almost the two extremes of the world.

Caesar tells us that the Germans recognized only visible gods: the sun, the moon, Vulcan.1 The worship of stars and the elements is clearly indicated. Caesar, however, adds that the Germans had no Druids presiding over sacred matters. They built no temples and only rarely offered sacrifice. In this way we have peoples who both worshipped heavenly bodies and remained independent of sacerdotal power.

But Tacitus contradicts Caesar.2 According to Tacitus, the Germans had all-powerful priests, and by the ministry of these priests they sacrificed not only animals but humans. People have tried to reconcile these two impressive authorities by supposing a forced migration of Gallic Druids into Germany. This migration would have taken place under the reigns of Tiberius and Claudius; both persecuted the Druids with implacable hostility.3 The fugitive priests would have brought with them the institutions of their former homeland. All this would have occurred in the interval between Caesar and Tacitus.4

This hypothesis, however, is refuted by several uncontestable facts. The unlimited power of the priests of Germany goes back long before the time when, according to the hypothesis, the priestly authority would have been established. The Germanic divinities have indigenous names that rule out a Gallic origin. The German priests sang hymns and canticles that were peculiar to them, and that were composed 196 in their own language. They were preserved without change after the arrival of the fugitives from Gaul. The latter were received as brothers, not teachers.5

Caesar knew only the frontiers of Germany. Tacitus, writing a century later when the interior of the country was invaded if not conquered by the Romans, had to have more exact information and ideas. His testimony is therefore preferable. The Germans do not make an exception to the rule.

We cannot say the same thing about the Arabs. It is certain that even though the stars figured among their divinities, the authority of the priesthood among them was almost nil. Until Mohammed, each tribe and each family created, and changed at will, the objects and rites of its worship.6 This is because the Arabs were a tribe of hunters, with man being the prey. They laid in wait for travelers in order to plunder them. As hunters, they were fetishists. They worshiped lions, eagles, gazelles—in a word, all the animals of which their environment abounded.7 Stars were placed among their fetishes,8 as we showed must happen. But the worship of rocks, a clear indicator of fetishism, held first place.9 They washed them in oil and wine, a practice we will find among the Greeks. Such was their attachment to one of these idols that we will see this stone resist the efforts of Islam and reappear in the temple of 197 the Kaaba, where, despite the Prophet, it received the homage of Muslims.10 The character of the Arabs constantly triumphed over the circumstances that could have subjected them to priestly power.11 Dispersed after Alexander’s conquests, the magi took refuge in the desert and lived with its wild inhabitants.12 But their influence did not survive into the safe haven, and at most they introduced a few of their rites into Arab fetishism. Even these were isolated and barely recognizable.13 In fact, these rites, which we will speak about later, will allow us to prove several of our assertions concerning the character that the priesthood gives to religion.

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CHAPTER 7: On the Variety in the Organization and Forms of Priestly Authority

The organization of the priesthood was not the same among the nations that star-worship, or the worship of the hidden forces of nature, had subjected to the power of priests. Nonetheless they can be reduced to two categories: hereditary castes or tribes, and corporations in which elections seem to have played a part in their composition.

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CHAPTER 8: On the Division into Castes

The division into castes could only have had a religious notion as its primary cause. The other causes that have been put forth—the superior beauty of privileged races, the legislator’s will, conquest, or the reasonable submission of peoples—are inadequate and superficial explanations.

The beauty of the races upon which some have wanted to endow this sort of superiority itself requires an explanation. The difficulty is postponed rather than resolved.

With modern scholars,1 we acknowledge that the two or even three superior castes that dominated in India originally formed only one nation, and that when this nation came down from the mountains and defeated the indigenous people, it was distinguished from them by a whiteness of color and regularity of features.2 It confirmed its rule by fixed institutions clothed with the authority of religion. We, however, must also recognize that these fixed institutions had already existed in the highlands of the Himalayas and the Caucasus before being established on the plains of Indostan. It is impossible to believe that the second caste, that of warriors, at the very moment when victory would have swelled its pride and stoked its courage, would have agreed to an innovation that was to its detriment. Soldiers guided by priests, however, can preserve in the midst of their military successes a superstitious respect for the mysterious theocracy to whom they attribute their 200 victories. But this theocracy must rest on earlier customs and habits. Altars can be brought into camp, but they cannot be raised there de novo. As long as we have not discovered the cause of the priestly preeminence, of which the division into castes is only the development, we will be no closer to a solution. Thus the beauty of the conquerors and the deformity of the defeated, even granting them their fullest extent (and despite notable exceptions),3 do not explain the establishment of castes. One has to seek among the conquerors to find the principle.

When Aristotle4 attributed this to Sesostis, he followed the custom of the Greeks, who attributed all the institutions of whose origin they were ignorant to this conqueror. No legislator, however, assaults natural equality in this way, unless he finds some support in preexisting opinion.

The Indians of today speak of an earlier experience of anarchy and the sentiment that then would have led the people to avoid it at all costs by establishing innumerable barriers against disorder. Like us, however, they are civilized men who when they form conjectures concerning very distant times lend them the refinements of their own civilization. In the abasement of the inferior castes and their acquiescence in it there is something that neither the exhaustion caused by anarchy nor the desire for order explains. Nor can it be the result of a simple political arrangement. It must go back to a social state where the majority of human beings did not yet possess knowledge of their rights or the awareness of their strength.5

As we said above, priestly government is not the result of conquest. Nothing resembles these mysterious barriers raised among the inhabitants of the same country. In a military government, the inequality of ranks has a real difference, that of force, as its principle. The principle of the inequality of castes owes to an opinion of an original stain, an indelible mark that no disproportion between forces can efface. The Brahmins of India did not acquire political authority by right. They do not form the caste of warriors from whom most often kings are drawn.6 We, however, see these kings and these warriors try in vain to enter into the sacred caste, and finally sheathe their swords before the barrier separating them from the 201 unarmed Brahmins. Niebuhr7 notes as a most unusual occurrence that during his time in India a prince had succeeded in entering the order of Brahmins by means of gifts and adroitness.8

It is not that we consider the division into castes exactly as a priestly invention. It could have found its source in a natural disposition of man. He is inclined to render his institutions more fixed by a more or less regular distribution of the different occupations of life among different classes. This tendency, which sometimes prevails in the bosom of civilization, already is seen among savage tribes. The Iroquois and the Algonquins joined together a few centuries ago, on the condition that one would be farmers, the other hunters.9 Among some African tribes, there are hereditary fishermen and hunters.10 Among the Turks,11 the administration 202 of justice is the property of certain families who practice it, if I can put it this way, hereditarily. The Laplanders have races of magicians;12 and among the mountain dwellers of Scotland one finds races of doctors and poets up to the end of the eighteenth century.13

Without the self-interested calculations of the class, therefore, men could consider the children of those they believed favored by the gods to be called to inherit this favor. But the priesthood took advantage of this human inclination, as it does with everything in nature; and in order to better profit from it, the priesthood combined it with an equally natural idea, the distinction between purity and impurity.

There are climates that render certain foods harmful and certain illnesses widespread or contagious. Very hot climates oblige their inhabitants to frequent baths and ablutions. From this came the abstinences or precautions that are indicated by necessity, and soon are consecrated by habit. Priests find in these precautions or abstinences the germ of a mysterious notion that they develop and extend. A thousand indifferent circumstances, a thousand fortuitous encounters, in their doctrine become causes of impurity. Nothing will seem so understandable if one reflects on the multitudes of ceremonies, expiations, and purifications that this notion entails, and in which the intervention of priests was always presented as being indispensable.

Thus the ideas of impurity occupy an important place in religions subject to priests. One sees in Strobius’s purported extracts from Hermes that the elements complain of being defiled.14 The respect the peoples of the West and the North had for them is well known; the fear of profaning them by mixing them with unclean objects; and the view that placed in this latter category everything connected with man—his breath, his hair, and his mortal remains.

What proves that these ideas had become the subjects of an interested calculation is that arbitrariness was soon introduced in the interdiction of various foods. Their healthfulness or lack thereof ceased to be the primary concern. The distinction being already established, people wanted to explain prohibitions in that way, but in most cases this was found to be false.15

The religious sentiment itself also can have a role in the establishment of castes. 203 The idea of purity is one of those ideas that it cherishes the most; and it had to eagerly adopt what was laid down in this regard by the privileged mortals who commanded both respect and fear.

Once the notions of purity and impurity were admitted, it had to happen that among the occupations necessary for life, several had to condemn those who performed them to different sorts of taint. With these professions rather naturally passing from father to son, a sort of gradation was established among the classes. No one could approach a member of another class without a preliminary purification, and soon enough each one took the greatest pride in being approached by the fewest possible number of individuals, because those whose contact he avoided seemed to him to be creatures of an inferior order.16

Placed at the summit of the social hierarchy, the priesthood encouraged these ideas, which were most favorable to its views because they established a distinction that was permanent, because hereditary; incontestable, because the will of the gods; applicable at every moment, because it prescribed forms that had to be observed in the most everyday relations. In a similar way the Egyptian priests, not content to keep from them foreigners who ate unclean foods, obliged all those who appeared before them to perform repeated ablutions.17

In this way, separations that nature and custom had introduced into the different classes, but which their own will and the progress of civilization could have reversed and would have overturned, became insurmountable barriers because of the priesthood. In this perspective, the establishment of castes could be regarded as their work. The interpreters of the divine law, they supported this institution with their authority. As accidental and precarious as it was, they made it sacred and inviolable. The priesthood, if I can put it this way, penned in the human race and subdivided it into isolated fractions, thus preventing it from uniting against the tyrants who said they were its guides.

The countries where the institution of castes is found most clearly and solidly established are precisely those that combine the worship of stars and the heat of climate; the latter is a secondary cause, as we said, but still very favorable to the 204 power of priests. They therefore always attribute this division of the human race to the gods. Among the Indians, Brahma is its author.18 Isis established it among the Egyptians. Directed by a hero under the direct inspiration of Oromaze, Diemschid divided the inhabitants of Bactria into four classes.19 And in ancient Assyria it was Mahabad,20 the first legislator and king, but also the first prophet and the inventor of the first language, who divided the subject people into castes.21

In general, this division is rather uniform. The unimportant variations found 205 in the accounts of travelers do not disturb the reality, and change nothing of the nature, of the principal fact.

In our day no less than in the remotest past, the first order in India is that of the Brahmins,22 while the second belongs to warriors.23 It does not much matter that reports differ concerning the inferior orders.24 The institutions of a country constantly exposed to invasions and perpetually subjected to foreigners necessarily had to be affected by this series of disturbances. But it still is the case that the individuals of the different castes are separated by a religious barrier, and even in the ordinary encounters of life can approach one another only at the distance prescribed by religion.25 When this distance is violated, the member of the superior caste is expelled from his rank, and he escapes servitude only by apostasy or flight.26 The 206 same fate awaits the one whose lips touch food prepared by someone of an inferior caste.27 The poor Brahmins who are employed as secretaries by wealthy Indians believe they are degraded by eating with their masters.28

So great is the authority of these ideas concerning the distinction of castes among these peoples that they even override the interest of religion itself. Indians who have become unclean seek refuge in Islam, even in the face of the threat of being sold as slaves. The Muslim author who reports these details attributes this intolerance to the will of God, who in this way compels his enemies to facilitate the triumph of his faith and the increase of the faithful.29

A fortiori, marriages between unequals are forbidden. Formerly, death was the inevitable punishment. The softening of mores has substituted banishment, and Brahmins have arrogated the right to take wives from the warrior caste.30 But even if time and nature have mitigated the severity of the institutions, the mixed races that result from these impious alliances are still looked upon with disfavor, and the ignoble professions are assigned to them.31

At the lowest rung of this tyrannical hierarchy one sees a proscribed race cast outside the social state. The unfortunate pariahs, for the most part fishermen and tanners, are not found among the ranks of men.32 They are excluded from all society, not allowed on roads, at fountains, or in temples. Their touch, their mere presence, and even their breath are impure. Formerly, one could kill them with impunity. Even today, the other castes would think twice about lending them assistance.33

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By a singular reversal, in the midst of oppression men seek to console themselves by exercising it themselves rather than resisting it. Pariahs are divided among themselves into orders that transmit the disdain others bear to them. The horror they can display seems to them to be a recompense for the horror they inspire in others.

The institution of castes was consecrated in Egypt in an equally immutable way.34 The main divisions were the same. The differences in details that owe to incomplete enumerations or misrecognized subdivisions are of little importance.35 It suffices for us that the priests are always, by heredity, the first of all the classes,36 208 and the warriors form the second.37 It is also remarkable that the shepherds in Egypt, like the pariahs in India, were the objects of universal disdain.38 Herodotus tells us that alone among the Egyptians they could not enter the temples. And no one wanted their daughters to marry them, nor to marry theirs. They only intermarried.39

One, however, must not fail to note the differences between the Indian and the Egyptian institutions. They perhaps owe to politics as much as religion.40 The 209 passage from Herodotus to which we just referred points to an exception made against shepherds. It gives rise to the thought that the hereditariness of professions was reinforced more rigorously than that of races. This would mean that marriages between and among the inferior castes were not as reproved as they were in India. India’s castes, in contrast, were treated more with despotic harshness than with religious horror. Calculating everything in view of social utility, Egyptian policy did not cast them from the social state, but made them bear all its burdens and pains.41 In India, the division into castes was purely a matter of conscience; in Egypt, it was linked with administration.

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CHAPTER 9: On Priestly Corporations Replacing Castes

The Ethiopians, the Indians, and the inhabitants of Egypt are the peoples of Antiquity among whom one most clearly perceives the division into castes. Among many other peoples, various signs seem to indicate that this division had existed, but then had weakened. For example, it is probable that in the original country of the magi, in Media and especially in Bactria, this order was a veritable caste. But the revolution that transported them to Persia properly speaking, having placed it more or less under the royal power, denatured the institution. Even though formally prescribed by Zoroaster,1 the division into castes was never scrupulously put into practice. Among the Persians, we see a class of nobles, one of warriors, and one of laborers, but nothing proves that the classes were necessarily hereditary. The hereditary priesthood is the only one attested by the ancients.2

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The same is true among the Mexicans,3 the Hebrews, and all the southern peoples subject to the power of priests. But going toward the West and the North, hereditary disappears, and we find corporations that appear to be elective.

Caesar reports that members of the nobility could enter into the order of Druids.4 Porphyry goes even further. According to him, the sacerdotal corporations were composed of all those who, without any distinction of race, obtained the approval of the city or the country.5

However, one cannot maintain that priests invested with an immense authority were disposed to share it with first-comers. It seems probable to us that if these corporations were elective by law or custom, they were hereditary in fact.6 We read in Diodorus that among these same peoples of the North, certain families were charged, descending from father to son, with everything that concerned the worship of the gods.7 Young nobles were constrained to a novitiate of twenty years under the direction of the Druids.8 And even the nations that had preserved the right to elect their princes recognized that the priests had the right to choose the head of the priests.9

Finally, the difference in forms can be explained by the difference in situations. An active, bellicose, vagabond way of life takes away some of the fixity of institutions, 212 even if their strength and intensity of action are not diminished. In the next chapter we will see that the power of the Drottes, the Druids, and all the ministers of religion who governed the nations known under the names Getes, Scythians, Celts, Scandinavians, and Gauls were often as despotic as the Brahmins of India or the priests of Egypt.

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CHAPTER 10: On the Various Competences of the Priesthood among the Nations It Dominated

Among the nations subjugated by priestly corporations, as among those that were divided into castes, the power of priests did not limit itself to matters concerning religion.

To be sure, religious functions always occupied the first place. Priests1 asserted the exclusive right to preside at prayers, sacrifices, and ceremonies, whether the most or the least important rites of the external worship. Among the Persians, the magi were charged with all the offerings: their invocations alone were efficacious,2 and the consecration of victims consisted in a theogony chanted by a member of this order.3 These theogonies, the living transmission of the eternal word, had an irresistible power. The magi repeated them regularly, even perpetually, sometimes alone in the temples, sometimes before the assembled faithful. They varied them according to the sun’s position, the seasons, the time of day, but they must never be interrupted. Deprived of their salutary resounding, the world would have prematurely returned to chaos. The silence of the magi would have been the universe’s last hour.

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Whoever in Egypt sacrificed a victim that was not marked by the sacerdotal seal was punished with death.4 Among the Gauls, only the Druids5 interpreted signs.6 They alone observed the flight of birds. No profane hand dared dig into the entrails of humans sacrificed to the gods.7 Gete,8 German,9 and Breton priests accompanied their armies; they alone could implore heaven for them and consign their enemies to death. Despite their theism, the Jews were not an exception. They closed the sanctuary to all but priests.10 Abiram and Dathan were swallowed up for having usurped clerical functions. Uzzah perished because he involuntarily touched the ark.11 Fifty thousand Bethsamites were struck dead because they looked upon it.12 Even though he had destroyed the worship of idols, Uzziah was chased from the temple by the high priest because he had laid hold of the encensoir.13

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In all the feasts of Indians, Brahmins presided.14 Who could take their place? Brahma existed and lived in them. They are his children. To honor them was to honor him. He received with equal benevolence the homage directed at him and what was directed to his representatives on earth.15 Endowed with a miraculous force and virtue, their hand sprinkled consecrated water on the animals that nourished man, the furnishings constructed for the different needs of life, and the weapons destined for its defense.16 They determined days of rejoicing and days of mourning. They alone taught the faithful their appropriate prayers; and if someone revealed them to another person the latter’s head rolled, a very ingenious way of controlling indiscretion and discouraging curiosity. Divination was reserved to them.17 No one could build a pagoda unless some revelation instructed him concerning the spot preferred by the divinity, and the Brahmins were always the necessary intermediaries of these communications.

All teachings were modified in accordance with this principle. The waters of the Ganges possess a miraculous virtue for the expiation of sins. But it was feared that the guilty, desirous of absolution, would escape the priestly power by plunging into the river on their own. As a result, one had to hold in his hand blades of straw blessed by a Brahmin.18 Even the gods patiently waited while the priests determined their forms and their abodes. The stones worshipped by Indians owe 216 their sacred nature to the prayers of Brahmins, who call down divinity upon them. Before this mysterious invocation, the stones of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva are but profane pebbles.19 The lingam becomes a sacred object only when a solemn ceremony has confined the god within the newly sculpted idol.20 Ancient oaks needed to be sprinkled with blood from the hands of Druids to become worthy of the Gauls’ veneration.21

But the priesthood does not content itself with only, and exclusively, exercising religious functions. It arrogates a considerable part of political22 and civil authority as well. A king, Plato says, cannot reign in Egypt if he has not been admitted to the knowledge of sacred things. Every man from another class who ascends the throne must have himself received into the priestly order.23

The election of kings was reserved to priests and soldiers, but the votes of priests counted one hundred- or two hundred-fold.24 After his election, the king who had 217 acceded to the priesthood25 remained subject to the ones who had elected him. He was served not by slaves but by the sons of priests who were more than twenty years old. He had as regular associates only the ministers of worship. The hours of his walks, those of his ablutions and his baths, the moments he was permitted to enjoy venereal pleasures, all were fixed by them.26 In public ceremonies, after having prayed for the prince, the high priest publicly examined and censured his conduct.27 And just as the priesthood attended him at his installation, the same priesthood calculated each minute of his final agony, and sanctified him with the purifying waters of the Nile.28

Even more powerful, the Ethiopian priesthood not only elected kings but dethroned or condemned them to death.29 It also decided on war and peace.30

During their theocracy, the Jews always consulted Jehovah through the intermediary 218 of the high priest concerning the choice of their generals. Their sacred books show judges in many respects placed in a subordinate position.

Some have claimed that Brahmins could neither ascend the throne nor lead the armies. But credible travelers cite several contrary examples,31 and it was not so long ago that the king of the Marathas was subject to twelve Brahmins who governed in his name.32

The institutions of the peoples of the North and the West present a singular mixture of political liberty and priestly despotism. Far from diminishing the power of priests, the guarantees that citizens had established against their civil and military leaders redounded to the advantage of their spiritual masters. The peoples exercised the right of dismissal against the former, but not against anyone cloaked in the priesthood.33 This naturally gave them a great superiority to the removable detainers of temporal authority.34 Sometimes we see priests unite the two powers. 219 Comosicus, the sovereign pontiff of the Goths, governed them not only as priest but as king.35 Other times, even though it lacked the visible marks of royalty, the priesthood exercised a most formidable authority over it. Kings were not exempt from the human victims that the ministers of the gods had the right to demand. It was even a widespread view that it was a favorable augur when the lot fell on a prince.36

Among almost all these nations, the judicial power belonged to the priests, as well as political authority.37 Among the Germans, they put the accused in irons, they inflicted punishments, they executed criminals, not as administering the justice of men, but as accomplishing the sentences of the gods.38 The Drottes of the Scandinavians were both priests and judges.39 The Druids pronounced on all the 220 disagreements between individuals.40 They gave clemency by offering safe haven in their sanctuaries. This custom has subsisted to our day in Italy and Spain, the countries most dominated by the Catholic priesthood.

It was as the inheritor of these privileges that the Christian clergy obtained from Constantine, Theodosius, and, finally, from Charlemagne that civil tribunals could not take cognizance of cases brought before bishops;41 it is well known that they presided over trials by fire and water, and the judgments of God.42

Independently of the sentences they pronounced in their capacity as judges, priests employed the instrument of excommunication against those who attempted to resist them; and this excommunication involved the loss of all civil and political rights. How so? It banished the guilty from all places destined for worship, but this was where the citizens came together to deliberate about national interests. Likewise, it was in the depths of the forests that tribunals summoned plaintiffs to appear, and where they rendered their verdicts. And last, these forests were the sanctuary of the gods. It was forbidden to the excommunicated to enter these places. In these ways, they could not attend the assemblies of the people or present themselves before tribunals to seek justice. Thus disarmed and without protection, they found themselves subject everywhere to public horror. Everyone fled them, believing they were sullied by their mere presence.43

To be sure, among the Persians and the Indians, from time immemorial foreign domination rendered the temporal consequences of excommunication less terrible. But the priests attempted to compensate with the threat of greater punishments 221 after death. The Sadder is filled with imprecations against the opponents of the magi and frightful descriptions of the eternal torments that await them. “He whom the gods themselves cannot destroy,” say the Brahmins, “he who cannot be killed by Indra, or Cali, or Vishnu, will be consumed by fire if a Brahmin curses him.”44 Today, one can see as a vestige of the excommunication formerly in use, the loss of caste these same Brahmins claim to inflict on the members of other castes when they refuse to comply with even multiple requests. This spiritual demotion causes them to descend into an even lower caste.45

As one can easily anticipate, so many and so diverse a number of prerogatives were accompanied by vast properties and numerous exemptions. Egyptian priests did not pay any tribute, but were charged with collecting it.46 They said that Isis had given them a third of Egypt47 for their maintenance and the upkeep of the 222 cult. When Pharaoh appropriated the money, flocks, and goods of his subjects, he did not touch the priests’ possessions.48

In India, in the absence of heirs, the Brahmins inherited.49 When Gauls died, they transmitted their goods to the gods and to their ministers.50 Strabo writes of the immense domains belonging to the Druids, and the slaves who cultivated them. There were temples to which more than six thousand serfs were attached.51 Armenia presents the same spectacle attending the altars of Anaitis.52 Moses, whose priesthood was in imitation of the Egyptians’,53 gave the Levites a tenth of the harvest and the yield of flocks, as well as everything that fell under interdiction, everything vowed to the Lord, the redemption of firstborn infants, a portion of all the animals that were killed, and, finally, the first fruits of the harvest. Rigorous laws in this world54 and frightening punishments in the next55 were the protective hedges of these immense estates. The sword and the anathema, laws and social pressure, gods and demons—all were invoked to guarantee them.

Weighed down with wealth and dispensed from every pecuniary burden, the priests had also emancipated themselves from all other dangerous or painful duties. Even in the most warlike nations, they were not obliged to bear arms,56 and they could not be put to death for even the most serious crimes.

For a long time, the Christian priesthood claimed a similar privilege. One still sees traces of this exemption in England in what is called the benefit of the clergy. 223 In India, Brahmins formerly enjoyed the same privilege.57 But now that the time of their unlimited power has passed, this prerogative has become harmful to them, and the punishments that they undergo are even more cruel because of the precautions taken to make sure they do not shed blood when punished.58

To justify the accumulation of so much power and so many privileges, the arguments of priests were everywhere the same. The human race is on the earth only to accomplish the will of the gods. All the actions of individuals have a more-or-less direct relation with this will. Priests know this will, and make it known. It belongs to them, therefore, to judge and punish disobedience.

The identity of means is no less noticeable.

An austere, retired life; a difficult, hence rare, admission to it; an affectation of superior purity; care taken to appear before the profane only on solemn occasions when the priest communicates with the gods;59 ostentatious deprivations and unbelievable austerities: everywhere these make the priesthood appear a separate race. In order to enhance its prestige, no effort is spared. Without any hesitation, it sacrifices its life to its power. Among more than one people, when sovereign pontiffs are struck by dangerous illnesses, they have recourse to suicide or secretly receive death at the hand of an aide in order not to be subject—like the vulgar—to this fatal necessity of our nature.60

It is the exclusive possession of the sciences, however, that above all is the foundation of sacerdotal power. This monopoly established the priesthood as the privileged thinker, one might say, of the human race. Therefore this exclusive possession was everywhere the object of its most attentive and scrupulous vigilance. It reserved to itself the teaching of morality, of philosophy, of eloquence, of jurisprudence, of history, of poetry, of physics, of astronomy. In Egypt, the priests were the sole historians.61 Among the Gauls, poetry was permitted only to the bards, an inferior class of Druids.62 Still, however, the sacred hymns and canticles that contained the elements of the various disciplines had to be composed by the superior 224 class.63 Even as the sole preceptors of the youth—whom they brought into the depths of the forests so as to produce an even greater impression on them—they still refrained from initiating them into their teachings (what they called physiology and magic;64 that is, their interpretation of nature and the means of obtaining supernatural communications). In the same way, the magi had assumed sole responsibility for education in the vast Persian empire;65 instruction could come from no other source.66

Among all these peoples, medicine, a science with many relations to religion (at least as conceived by priests, as simultaneously positive and conjectural), was associated with the priesthood. We saw this in connection with the savage state in the person of the jongleur.67 Certain salubrious elements could be touched only by priests performing certain ceremonies;68 the famous serpent’s egg, the virtues attributed to the mistletoe of oaks, the solemnity with which one gathered the 225 samolus and selago, were only the combination of a few medicinal secrets with mysterious rites.69

All this knowledge, carefully kept in the sanctuary, was shared only with great difficulty with foreigners and the profane.70 The ancients report the obstacles that Eudoxus, traveling with Plato, had to overcome to obtain from the Egyptians a few fragments of their astronomical views.71 And the confidences given were always cloaked in darkness. Iamblichus, whose character (and times) inclined to admire everything that was unintelligible, extolled the wisdom of those men who, as he put it, imitated nature by surrounding it with obscurity.72

Consider the precautions taken against the vulgar. The people of Egypt could not learn to read without thereby committing a crime.73 Two or three species of language74 and of writing,75 each one a new mystery, served as a double or triple rampart against an indiscreet curiosity.76 The Druids too rejected writing; and 226 when it was applied to religion, they declared this to be the greatest of crimes.77 The reading of the Vedas is permitted only to the Brahmins,78 and boiling oil is poured into the mouth of whoever violates this prohibition.79

In this way, since the existence of the priesthood rests on mystery, it gathers together all the developments of force and all the resources of cunning, in order to heighten the darkness surrounding it, and to prolong its existence.

The priests not only put themselves on guard against the peoples they govern: they extend their distrust to themselves. The subdivisions of their hierarchy80 in India and in Egypt,81 as well as among the Gauls, had as their natural effect hiding their most important secrets from the lower ranks. Of the forty-two books of Mercury Trismegistus,82 the first thirty-six were known only by the superior classes.83

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The priesthood showed itself no less farsighted when it came to individuals. Even when he was a member of the sacred corporations, no individual wrote in his own name on religion or philosophy.84

Some moderns have noted as worthy of surprise that history, while transmitting the memory of the great sacerdotal bodies that have reigned on the earth, has almost never mentioned a distinguished individual. This is because the priesthood’s instinct warned it that in order to attain the common goal, the aspirations of individuals had to be suppressed.85 What we have taken as the proper names of Chaldean and Phoenician writers probably were the designation of a class. The word “Sanchuniathon” among the Phoenicians signified a savant, a philosopher; that is, a priest.86 Many Indians assured Lord Jones that Buddha was a generic name.87 In Egypt, all the works on religion and the sciences bear the name of Thot or Hermes.88 In all of 228 Egyptian history, says a German author,89 one never hears of the talents or merit of any priest in particular. No discoverer is known, no individual who had a marked influence on the people.

This supremacy of the corporation, and this absence of any individual preeminence, cannot be the result of chance. The priesthood had decided that the eminent qualities of a few were injurious to the prestige of the rest. They wanted to enjoy in common the veneration of the nation. They wanted to transmit a collective respect to their successors. Everything therefore had to be related to the whole. No one had the right to distinguish himself for his own sake.90

In this way, we have an oft-noted phenomenon whose cause has never been sought. The sciences in Egypt rapidly attained a degree of perfection but suddenly were stunted. And the entire enlightened class occupied the same rung, becoming immobile before a barrier that was never overcome.91

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Thus everything about these domineering corporations, whether within or externally, was monotonous, immobile, and anonymous. This was a discipline analogous to the military, which renders soldiers more terrifying the more blinkered they are; forcing each member to work together without ever separating from the mass and distinguishing himself. If the priests had encouraged the hope of distinguishing oneself, this would have disturbed their common projects by inconsiderate actions and by imprudent conduct. They wanted their forward progress to be in lockstep, they wanted their look uniform, because they wanted to enslave the earth rather than enlighten it, to dominate by their collective weight, not their individual glory.

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BOOK IV: ON THE INFLUENCE OF SECONDARY CAUSES ON THE EXTENT OF PRIESTLY POWER

232 233

CHAPTER 1: An Enumeration of These Causes

By placing all the nations subject to priests into a single category, we do not claim that priestly power has been exactly the same among these different nations. An infinity of events and circumstances had to modify it in many ways.

Among them there is the climate, which, although it is not a primary cause, nonetheless exercises a good deal of influence because it sometimes renders institutions stationary and sometimes encourages their upheaval or their development; the fertility or sterility of the region; the peaceful or bellicose spirit of peoples; their active or indolent character; national independence or subjection to a foreign yoke; great political revolutions, which, shaking states to their very foundations, extend devastation to palaces as well as huts and, by destroying worldly security, compel the unfortunate to seek repose and place hope in another world; geographical isolation or commerce with others; the more or less imperious necessity of physical labor; accidents caused by the nature of the soil, the density of the air, or exhalations coming from the earth; strange phenomena that constantly strike the inhabitants of certain countries with terror; finally, migrations, whether chosen or compelled. All these things had to produce different effects that it is essential to recognize.

We will attempt to point them out.

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CHAPTER 2: On Climate

As we demonstrated earlier, climate does not create the authority of priests, but it does contribute to increasing or prolonging it.

To call its influence into doubt, as Helvetius did, is to close one’s eyes to the most manifest evidence. Take a trip to the frost and snow of Iceland, Lapland, and Greenland, then to the smiling, clear skies of India. On one hand, you will see rocks white with snow, arid valleys, and lakes covered with thick fog; on the other, mountains crowned with immense, magnificent forests and fragrant retreats where the air itself appears to be an eager benefactor to man, lavishing upon him its harmonious sounds, sweet freshness, and exquisite scents. In one zone, you will see mournful pines rise above, while moss provides a carpet below; in the other, prodigious amounts of vegetation covering the plains and decorating the hills; in the former, a few animals that seem to reflect the hostility of nature and who in vain ask the companion of their misery, their human master, for a meager nourishment, which he can provide only with great effort; while elsewhere there is an abundance of living beings clothed in resplendent colors, found in sometimes elegant, sometimes gigantesque forms, but always marked with the imprint of a superabundance of life. The mineral kingdom itself, the most imperfect realm because the most material and the most distant from intelligence, is nonetheless subject to the same law dividing the two. In the North it offers only pebbles and rocks, while in the South it displays the splendor of an exuberant wealth, depositing gold in the midst of sands and causing precious stones to lodge in the cavities of the earth. One can easily sense the numerous differences that must result for the inhabitants of these two zones from locations that are so dissimilar. The religious need remains the same, but its expression is not the same, and its appearances vary.

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Compare the tales of the Skalds and the songs of the Sacontala. In the former, the cow Audumla has to lick with great effort the frozen snow, and only slowly does a restless, petulant, and suffering race of men appear. A cold sweat that condenses, dark blood that congeals, mutilated members that grow stiff—these are the hideous elements of creation. Depicted in bizarrely poetic colors, the serpent Mitgard, the wolf Fenris, and that prophet of destruction, the raven, all of them witnesses or agents at the birth of the world, offer only dark, repulsive images. One would say that struck by the hostility of everything that surrounds them, the inhabitants of these severe climates find a sad pleasure in noting the rigors of heaven. On the other hand, Brahma rests indolently on the lotus, his cradle; Vishnu emerges from the blossom of a flower; Krishna, when he opens his ruby mouth, displays all the marvels of the universe; and the young Sacontala, in the delightful garden that her presence embellishes, is an emblem of the affection of nature for man. The inhabitants of the woods rejoice around her. At her approach, flowers blossom and spontaneously form lovely garlands. The elements themselves rival one another in serving and pleasing her. She is in the midst of all visible and invisible beings like a favored child in the midst of a family that cherishes and protects her.1

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Indigenous to some climates thanks to astrolatry, transplanted by migrations to others, the priesthood makes its calculations and modifies these different impressions. The South is its natural domain, the North is its conquest.

Northern climates, when the cold is not pushed to excess (because the extreme of cold, as well as the extreme of heat, almost entirely deprives man of his faculties),2 northern climates, I say, give an extreme tension to human organs. From this results strenuous activity. Physical needs are satisfied only with difficulty. From this comes a tendency toward theft and violence. When northern peoples fight, they have fierce wars. A life that is always tumultuous leaves them little time for religious ideas. Their risky expeditions make necessary protective gods who are within reach. Priests therefore would have little influence over them unless colonization brought them in contact with an already established priesthood.

Southern climates, on the other hand, when their influence is not counteracted by other circumstances, simultaneously form slothful bodies and active imaginations, and the former encourage the latter. Physical indolence leaves an open field to imagination’s reveries. While the body is immobile, the religious sentiment is excited, and the human spirit wanders in its conjectures, exalts in its hopes, and loses itself in its terrors. And those who come in the name of heaven to give order to these terrors, hopes, and conjectures, are listened to with respect and approval.

Thus the roots of priestly authority have always been less profound in northern nations than among the peoples of the South. In India, invasions, conquests, and the devastations wrought by foreigners—calamities that go back to the most 237 remote times, and which have been constantly repeated to today—have barely affected the authority of the Brahmans, while the Romans in less than two centuries destroyed, if not the hidden influence, at least the official rule, of the Druids in Gaul and in Britain.

One does not find in the North the great tenacity of belief that is so astonishing among the peoples of the South (because it seems so difficult to reconcile with their lack of energy). Terribly timid in war, Indians brave the cruelest deaths and the most refined tortures rather than abjure their religion or break its least precept. Much less obstinate, the barbarians of the North have always easily embraced foreign cults.3 It is also to be noted that while the northern religions have never exceeded their frozen environs, the warm climates have sent their beliefs to the entire world. The men of the North have conquered the South. The opinions of the South have conquered the North.

The need for repose and aversion to every form of struggle deprive southern peoples of every means of shaking off an established yoke. In the same way that Indians cannot repulse the invasions of foreigners, they remain passively subject to the dominion of Brahmins. No one should object to this the religious innovations that under the form of divine incarnations or philosophical systems have taken place in India during different epochs, or the multiple sects that divide it. These innovations appear to us to be so frequent because we see them brought together, while in actuality they were scattered at widely different times; moreover, they have not dispossessed the sacerdotal caste; its power has always been so great that dissidents have always returned to its yoke. Among these dispirited nations, external activity directed toward others is almost impossible. They therefore seek refuge in a sort of interior activity, one that is more compatible with their effeminate disposition, and to which their imagination grants miraculous power.

From this comes the singular teaching of the efficacy of penitence and self-laceration. This doctrine gives their fables a character different from those of all other mythologies. Their penances are not solely directed at the expiation of crimes or to correct mistakes. Their aim is much vaster, and their import much greater. Austerities, fasts, and invocations dominate nature, chance, other men, and the gods themselves.4 The people of the North present to us nothing resembling 238 this Indian notion of penitence. The interior vigor that animates them dispenses them from painful lacerations, or from placing their strength in curses. Even in dominating them, the priesthood does not change their nature. Born for battle, it is for battle that they are called upon. Disappointed by certain gods, Scandinavians threaten to scale Valhalla in order to lay hold of these gods. Indians, on the other hand, moved by the sentiment of their impotence, refuse any and all combat, and fall back upon themselves and pray or curse instead of fighting. It is by prayer that they defend themselves; it is by prayer that they revenge themselves. It is by prayer that they shake, or shore up, the world. It is even by prayer that they have children. The five children of Pandu owed their birth to the power of a magic 239 prayer.5 Anathema, which is a sort of inverted prayer, has no less power. The curse of a single penitent penetrates heaven, chills its inhabitants, and compels them to submit.6 And this irresistible influence is not reserved, as one might think, solely to believers. Rebellious giants and shades of the dark possess the same advantage.7

Indians bring this mysterious weapon into their ordinary relations, the only one that fits with their weakness. They have recourse to it in the business of civil life as well as in their religious interests; they use it against their earthly persecutors as they do against heavenly ones; against the English who oppress them as well as their own inexorable divinities; against their creditors or debtors as well as Brahma or Vishnu.

Any other sort of resistance is beyond their moral faculties. Suicide therefore is very easy for them, and it is by a unique combination of strength and apathy that they often place their resistance in suicide.8 Disarmed by their own nature, they 240 are conquered in advance, as it were, by the priesthood, which, peacefully atop a hierarchy, receives their homage without having to take the trouble to demand it.

Their power finds an auxiliary in another effect of the climate.

One would say that nature’s creative force in the South is exclusively concentrated in the development of material beings, in the profusion of vegetation, in the enormous number of forms and the wealth of colors in the animal kingdom, and that it neglects the principle of the moral life that is progress. In the majority of the countries of the East and the South man is not occupied, as in Europe, with varying the objects that surround him, nor, if I can put it this way, in varying himself. Time, which destroys individuals, changes nothing with the species. The generations replace one another, without being distinguished from one another. The Arab wears the clothes and sandals he wore at the time of Abraham. The Bedouin of today bakes his cakes and buries his dead like the Bedouin who was Moses’s contemporary. The past three centuries, the Indian has seen in the European his master and his scourge. He accepts his yoke, but would be embarrassed by his finery, and rejects his ways. Everything in these burning climates bears the imprint of a necessity that is as invariable as it is irresistible. Custom takes the place of the will. Everything seems to be imposed by chance, but calculated to last eternally. Everything is marked with immobility, and by a natural consequence effects become causes.

The immobility that results from climate’s action on the faculties of man further 241 enhances this action. The theocratic despotism that it favors keeps its slaves at a distance from one another. The regular communication of individuals and classes among themselves, in Europe the principle of progress and perfecting, is foreign to the East and the South. Religious barriers separate castes, and thanks to polygamy (which is always brought back by the climate whether it be in accordance with religious law or not),9 the family itself is no longer a united society. Isolated in this way, and without any external distractions, the human species is entirely handed over to the constant, monotonous influence of the priesthood.

On the other hand, while rendering this empire more indestructible, the climates of the South also temper its effects. When man does not stubbornly contradict nature, it almost always adds some sort of remedy to a great evil. The climates that are the most favorable to priestly authority are at the same time those that impart the most gentleness to the character, habits, and customs of peoples. Priests themselves do not remain strangers to this salutary softening. However, when priestly omnipotence is the effect of a transitory accident and thus rests on institutions that have no source in nature (something that has to happen in northern climes), no such compensation can occur. All the periods in the history of the Gauls or of Great Britain attest to the ferocity of the Druids, while Brahmins often show themselves to be benevolent and approachable. The general precepts of their moral teaching are pure and sublime.10 Their souls are open to pity. All suffering beings stir their sympathy.

This disposition extends itself to their cruelest rituals and somewhat veils the monstrosity of human sacrifice. It is forbidden to sacrifice anyone who has not volunteered. 242 Even in this barbaric practice, the humanity of Indians has need of the consent of the victim in order to excuse in its own eyes what it is doing. This same desire is even manifest in the very words pronounced by the sacrificing priest.11

It is to the mildness of the mores12 the climate inspires that one should attribute the spirit of tolerance that shines in the religious books of almost all the Indian sects.13 But watch out: let the priests think their interest is slightly compromised, 243 and the priestly spirit awakens. It is then in vain that benevolent nature appears to lead them away from bloody superstition. The priesthood triumphs over nature. Then the religions of the South pass quickly from the most affecting tolerance to the most terrible ferocity, from the deepest compassion (even for animals) to the most pitiless cruelty toward men. If one wants proof, let him reread the following passage from the pen of a fine translator: “‘From the bridge of Rama to the Himilayas white with snow, whoever would spare Buddhists, whether young or old, let him be put to death,’ cried the pitiless Koumaril-Bhatt to his merciless followers, as he ordered the massacre of Buddhists.”14

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CHAPTER 3: On the Fertility or Sterility of the Soil

The fertility or sterility of the soil also ought to enter into account. The Indians and the black peoples of coastal Africa inhabit an equally hot climate. They equally despise work. But the African finds himself compelled to work because nature has condemned him to wrest from the soil the subsistence she otherwise refuses. He thus acquires and retains a habit of action and movement that follows him into his very pleasures. The Indian, on the other hand, whose needs are furnished by a soil that is both fertile and spontaneous, places his supreme happiness in an almost total repose. And after repose, the Indian rests some more, as if fatigued by repose itself. The African, in contrast, after working seeks boisterous games and dances that giddy and numb him. From this it results (with only a few exceptions owing to chance accidents) that the blacks of Africa are much less preoccupied with religion than the inhabitants of India, and the priesthood has much more power over the latter than the former.

In addition, wherever the vegetal kingdom is rich and diverse, the knowledge of medicinal plants acquires a much greater importance than it can in regions of arid soil. The practice of medicine thus becomes an additional cause of priestly influence.

The fertility of the soil has yet another effect. In countries where work is a necessary condition of subsistence, the number of ceremonies that interrupt or suspend work has serious consequences which do not exist when the earth provides for men’s needs. It is then that priests profit from their ascendancy to multiply ceremonies, and the great number of solemnities then increases the ascendancy of those who have instituted them. Everything we know about Egyptian religion is proof of this. But as it happens that these institutions can be transported from countries where they were, if not suitable at least harmless, into those where different circumstances 245 render them harmful, the commands of the religion contradict local necessities. In order to overcome these necessities, the priesthood is obliged to exercise its authority more imperiously, and to arrogate to itself even more authority in areas where, according to nature, it ought to have less.

Sometimes the same cause, or better put: two opposed causes, assist the priesthood in its usurpations by suggesting teachings favorable to it. Thus the fertile Delta suggested the idea of the good principle to Egyptians. But by the same token, the aridity of the deserts of Libya appeared to manifest the activity of a malevolent divinity. Now, there is no doctrine that priests seize hold of more eagerly than the notion of a god of evil.

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CHAPTER 4: On the Necessity of Material Works and Products for the Physical Existence of Societies

A remarkable thing: while the love of repose and indolence favors the dominion of priests, so too does the urgent necessity for manual labor and material objects on the part of a society; perhaps even more than the former. “No one,” writes Diodorus,1 “by looking at Lake Moeris, could calculate how many thousands of men, and what huge number of years, had to be employed in constructing such an object.” Now, its construction naturally fell on the lower castes. Its direction was confided to the ruling caste. This caste had only to indicate what needed to be done and compel its execution. Why? It knew the secret of flooding, it could calculate its return and its phases; it knew how to distribute its waters, how to stop them from being destructive, how to contain or to expand them, to divide them into canals, to construct dams. Under pain of death, the people were condemned to obedience because it was a matter of defending against the return of the waters in a country that had been seized from water’s dominion. From this came the most severe oppression, justified initially by necessity, later prolonged by interest, then transformed into a duty by religion and sanctioned by habit.2

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This circumstance had to imprint a much more somber character on the worship and priesthood of Egypt than was ever the case with Indian religion and its ministers. Thus, we see among the Egyptians no trace of the mildness, humanity, and spirit of tolerance that honor the people of India.

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CHAPTER 5: On the Phenomena That Engender Astonishment or Terror

To this cause peculiar to Egypt is joined another, which also operated in Etruria. The rebirth of Egypt seemed to be an annual miracle. The phenomena that accompanied the arrival of the waters, their stay, and their withdrawal astonished observers. Meteors, fumes, and the fetid fogs1 that rose from the lime of a country submerged under water, upon which the burning sun cast its harsh rays; the numerous and various events that necessarily resulted from the movement of the people fleeing the flooding, then descending from the mountains as the waters receded—so many causes could not fail to dispose souls to superstition and submission to its ministers.

In the same way, earthquakes, frightening apparitions, and noxious miasmas2 in 249 Etruria encouraged the triumph of the priesthood which had been transplanted in the country by colonies of Pelasgians who had left Greece before the heroic times.3

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CHAPTER 6: The Influence of the Character and Customary Occupations of Peoples

Priestly authority is no less affected by the pacific or belligerent character of peoples. Egypt lived for a very long time as peaceful. The humor of its inhabitants was never warlike.1 In this country there were never, as in Greece, leaders of armed peoples who limited, much less destroyed, theocratic domination. Nor were there, as at Rome, political institutions that constrained the priesthood by incorporating it into itself. The efforts of soldiers or princes to become independent were fruitless, or at least what success they achieved was temporary, and Egypt was always delivered over to the priests, at first its kings, and tutors of its kings, after they had descended from the throne. These priests recognized so well the advantages a lasting peace held for them that the conquests of Sesostris and the expeditions of his successors were always considered scandalous. The kings of Egypt were condemned to inaction. Their names serve only to designate a succession of years marked by no memorable enterprise. And 330 of them succeed one another like gray shadows that nothing particularly characterizes or distinguishes.

On the other hand, it is probable that without their passion for war the Scandinavians would not have struggled for so long against the usurpations of the Drottes, and that it would not have been necessary to have three revolutions and two foreign invasions in order to overcome their resistance.2 If we knew the details of the history of Germany and Gaul, it is probable that we would see the ascendancy of the Druids shaken from time to time by the efforts of military chiefs.

In general, the more that man is occupied with earthly interests, the less he 251 allows himself to be dominated by other men who speak in the name of heaven. Everything that calls him back to the business of life places limits on a power whose justification is found elsewhere than in this world, whose promises can be fulfilled only beyond the grave.

If, despite the scattered facts that indicate the terrible power of the Carthaginian priesthood, priests are rarely spoken of in what is reported to us about Carthage, this can be explained by the spirit of enterprise and the mercantile activity that, among these rivals of the Romans, doubtless had effects comparable to those of the martial spirit of the followers of Odin.

But such is the complicated action of different causes that combine and modify each other, that the same commerce that limited the power of priests in Carthage enhanced it in Ethiopia.

The colleges of Ammonium and Meroë inhabited the fertile oases scattered throughout the sandy deserts. These oases were the resting places of the caravans that crossed the country. Only there did they find water, vegetation, and shade. But they also sought directions to where they were going, as well as the distance and location of places they would have to cross. The priests gave them such information in their temples, in the form of oracles;3 while indicating to the travelers their route, they also revealed to them the destiny that hung over them.

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CHAPTER 7: On the Effect of Great Political Calamities

Great political calamities also influence the extent of priestly power. In the same countries where the climate establishes the narrowest limits to this authority, these limits cannot resist the extraordinary circumstances that lead men back to superstition. Great defeats as well as great misfortunes—a famine, a plague—give it fierce new life, analogous to the bloody character of warlike peoples. Theocratic despotism reappears in its most terrifying extent, along with the most frightful rites. Prosperity, wealth, perhaps even the beginnings of enlightenment, had diminished the empire of the Carthaginian priests; but then Carthage was threatened by Agathocles. The organs of the gods then suddenly regained the fullness of their authority; the children of the most illustrious families were dragged to the temples, and their blood was offered in expiation and sacrifice.1

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CHAPTER 8: On the Effect of Migrations

At first glance, far-off migrations would seem to be prejudicial rather than helpful to priestly power. Even when it is not their primary aim, war is their inseparable companion. Personal courage and military talent, faculties that need regular exercise to develop and which propel men into the active life, as well as force them to have regular contact with the multitude, are hardly compatible with the prestige with which the priestly order covers itself. It thus gives them formidable rivals.1 We thus observe several nations free themselves from their priests, at least for a time, during the long voyages they undertake to find a homeland. In the migration from Egypt to Greece, and the blending of Egyptian colonies with Greek tribes,2 the priesthood almost entirely lost its authority. And much later in the New World it was a migration (instigated and directed by a priest, it is true) that led the Tenochtitlán tribe into Mexico, and to choose as its chief Acamapitzin. Even the colonies that were particularly devoted to the sacerdotal cause, those of Ethiopia,3 for example, which left their country in order to advance this cause, did not always completely escape from this natural effect of expatriation. While in Meroë the king had to be drawn from the sacred caste, history teaches us that in Egypt Sethos, a priest of Ptah who took over the throne, was considered a usurper.

Nonetheless, special circumstances can cause even these migrations to serve the advantage of the priesthood. The Jews are an example. The exit from Egypt, the sufferings of the Jews, and their sojourn in the desert certainly consolidated the rule of Moses and the Levites. This is because the Jewish people had a fixed goal; 254 and before departing the land of their slavery, their prophet had fixed their gaze upon a country that God promised them. The entire expedition was religious. It rested entirely upon hopes that had faith for their basis and the promise of Jehovah for guarantee.

Moreover, the weakening of priestly authority by migrations is often only temporary. When a fixed and stable life replaces the wandering life, the priesthood, even if it does not always resume its title, reprises its power. It was thus in Egypt and in Mexico, and it did not happen in Greece only because of the reason we will lay out in the next book.

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CHAPTER 9: On the Struggle of Political and Military Power against the Priestly Power

Independently of the accidental or temporary causes that can more or less significantly modify the extent and forms of priestly power, there is one that, without having obtained among ancient peoples the more decisive or durable results we just discussed, nonetheless produced very remarkable effects and cast the human race into an all-too-frequent state of turmoil. We therefore think it is our duty to give this subject some development. We mean to speak about the struggle that took place in all the countries subject to priests between them and the holders of the other powers.

This contest is found in the nature of things and is therefore inevitable.

Even in the countries where the priesthood is originally the sole power, a subordinate authority is not slow to establish itself. Occupied with the care of dominating the peoples by religion, priests are forced to delegate to subordinates the administration of the State and its defense against foreign invasions. As a consequence two new powers are formed: the political power and the military power. At the beginning, they appear to be mere emanations from the priesthood. Its delegates receive a revocable mission, and they fulfill a duty of obedience rather than exercise an authority. But henceforth power seems to be divided. Its different branches appear to be confided to different hands, and this appearance soon enough turns to reality. The temporal heads of government and the generals of the armies are gripped by the sentiment of their strength, and the moment arrives when, whether by a spontaneous impulse or because public opinion invites them, they reject their subordination and claim independence. It is the signal of a struggle that, once commenced, will never end.

This is the spectacle that India, Egypt, Persia, and, above all, Judea, present.

Sometimes the cutteries, or warriors, puffed up with pride, shake off the authority 256 of the Brahmins. But some avatar avenges the sacred caste and punishes the rebels with terrible severity.1 Sometimes an impious monarch, having forbidden the worship of the gods, and having provided the example of a sacrilegious mixing of castes, the priesthood’s curses strike him dead, and his more compliant successor submits to the sway of the ministers of the altars.2 Other times, the periodic destruction of the world is attributed to the diminishment of respect for the priestly order, and once again, Brahmans rise from the chaos to govern the restored world.3

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It is plausible that analogous revolutions occurred in Egypt during what is called the reign of the gods.4 The caste of warriors, the second in the State, appears to have risen against the first.5 But the latter won the victory. The later establishment of the monarchy did not end the struggle.6 Refractory monarchs succumbed during their lifetime or after their death.7 And in the division of Egypt among the twelve kings, he who separated from the others in order to place himself at the mercy of priests8 soon obtained the sovereignty of the entire empire, which he resigned himself to not ruling except in accordance with their orders.9

We will mention Ethiopia, which was the scene of much bloodier revolutions, only in passing. We have already seen that the priests of Meroë condemned their 258 kings to death. In revenge, one of these, Ergamenes, a contemporary of the second Ptolemy, had all the priests massacred in their own temple.

The history of ancient Etruria has remained quite obscure. But the order given to the Etruscans by their king Mezentius to give him the first fruits they were accustomed to devote to the gods, can probably be seen as an attack against the priesthood.10

We have already said that we will treat in a later book the religion of the Scandinavians and the revolutions that ended with the triumph of the head of a colony of priests.11

The same struggle occurred in Persia. But it was complicated by particular circumstances. To be understood here, we need to lay out these circumstances. The digression will be brief.

Three powerful empires, the Babylonians, the Lydians, and the Medes, divided Asia. The nomadic Persians, who lived in a state of extreme barbarism, obeyed the Medes as much as wandering hordes in the vigor of barbarism can obey masters rendered soft by lengthy civilization. In the midst of Persia, mountain-dwelling clans, sometimes defeated but never subjugated, lived in inaccessible retreats.12 Cyrus, who originally was named Agradatus,13 had himself proclaimed head of these divided tribes. His efforts and their success, as recounted by Herodotus, confirm how close these tribes still were to the savage state.14 Having united them, 259 Cyrus led them against their effeminate masters, who were weakened by the refinements of luxury, the extent of their possessions, and by the despotism that is as fatal to masters as to their slaves. Cyrus’s victory was easy.

What he did otherwise—his conquests, his ruses, and his oft-vaunted institutions (which ended in bequeathing Asia to a madman and founding a dynasty that lasted a mere seven years)—all that is beside our point. What is of interest to us is what his conduct was vis-à-vis the priesthood of the old empire he conquered.

The religion of Bactria was a priestly religion. It sanctified the division of castes.15 And the caste of priests, itself hereditary and powerful, took part in government and marched at the head of the pomp and ceremony of the court.

The chief of the barbarians was greatly taken with these solemnities and ceremonies. He hastened to surround himself with them, moved by that naïve vanity that is not at all unknown to kings born on the throne, and which can mark even more nonhereditary ones. The Median civilization worked a change in him comparable to the one that Chinese civilization operated more than once on the Tartars. All the Median customs were imitated,16 and religious institutions were not 260 exempted from this imitation. Nothing being less in keeping with the rustic and barely developed intelligence of the Persians than the abstractions and mysticism of an old cult, the Zend Avesta (which from then on ruled the Medes)17 never became the national book.

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The mass of Persians retained their ancient gods, their “paternal gods” as historians call them.18 Sometimes the religion even modified its own practices, which the magi wanted to compel them to preserve.19 It was probably not the intention of the magi that Zoroastrianism became the popular religion. Like that of the Indians, Egyptians, and other eastern or southern peoples, this religion of the Medes was the property of the priests. Its adoption in Persia consisted in the admission and presence of magi at the court, rather than the dissemination of their teachings. The worship of Media thus became that of the Persian palace.20 Cyrus welcomed it as a portion of the ceremonial that flattered his pride, rather than as a conviction of his soul. The demanding activity of a martial life and the cares of despotism rendered him little susceptible to that. In addition, he wanted his authority to profit from it. The religious and political code of an empire long given to servitude contained a fine model21 for the government he was establishing or 262 reviving, and it offered a means of reconciling the formerly insubordinate tribes to the new government. These tribes were once instruments of the warrior, but now they were objects of distrust on the part of the despot. Cyrus surrounded the royalty with divine honors.22 He turned to his advantage the ideas of purity and impurity that in other countries were useful only to the priesthood.23

Whether because he despaired of destroying the magi or because he believed he had found a support in them, Cyrus preserved their dignities and several of the prerogatives that they had enjoyed in their former country.24 They continued to be the ministers of worship, the counselors of kings, the judges of the people. But authority sells its benefits at a price. Cyrus kept the magi dependent upon him. Corporations, however, possess a kind of flexibility that comes from the certainty of survival and eventual victory. The priestly spirit was preserved, hidden but intact. The dementia and death of Cambyses opened a path to its hopes.

From this time on, the magi constantly attempted to recapture their former power. In these efforts they invoked not only the respect the Medes had for their native priests but also the hatred they had for their foreign conquerors. The usurpation of the false Smerdis was a revolt both of the magi against the kings and of the Medes against the Persians. The kings defended themselves and opposed the priests 263 with not only tyrannical, but sometimes terrible, means. The strange, and certainly garbled, anecdote of satraps compelling Darius to forbid praying to gods during thirty days25 appears to be an obscure indication of some despotic political violence against the power of the clergy. Better known is the annual feast celebrated in all the empire in memory of the massacre involving the priestly order. Already under Cambyses a magus had undergone a terrible torture.26 Under Darius, another had been suspended on a cross, and before ascending the throne Smerdis had been shamefully mutilated.

Despite these terrible cruelties, the magi continued the struggle with a perseverance that was rewarded.

Several circumstances that we previously indicated as contributing to the power of priests militated in the magi’s favor. If they had against them the climate of Persia, properly speaking, where high mountains covered with snow for several months transform the South into the North, as it were, they had for them the climates of Bactria and Media.27 In this vast empire there was a struggle of climate against climate.

For the same reason, if the bellicose character of the Persians could show itself resistant to a priestly domination that was contrary to their wild customs—a domination founded upon notions much too abstract for their still undeveloped intelligence—the refinement of the civilized portion of the empire and its long habit of seeing the magi as their guides and instructors, had to have won out over the repugnance of the population, itself the artificial aggregate of formerly scattered tribes.

Finally, the action and influence of the phenomena of nature that we spoke about in connection with Egypt and Etruria were no less powerful in several regions either subject to or close by Persia. As Mr. Creuzer observed,28 Azerbaijan is famous for its sources of coal tar. Its soil is full of resinous substances; bitumen floats on the surface of lakes. Often in the midst of the darkest nights columns of flame rise which seem to the astonished eye the miraculous appearance of an 264 avenging or rewarding deity. The priesthood would have turned to its advantage both the astonishment and the fright that such phenomena elicited.

Thus profiting with great address from the prerogatives the conqueror of their country had granted them, the magi extended them under his successors. From the time of Xerxes they were about as powerful as during the time of Astyagus. And during the course of our inquiry we will see all the characteristics pertaining to cults subject to priests gradually reintroduced, if under more or less mitigated forms, in both the teachings and the rites of the Persians.

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CHAPTER 10: Continuation of the Same Subject

The Hebrew books provide the most precious and detailed information concerning the causes that lead to the separation of the two powers, and the way in which this separation occurs. It is also in these books that one finds the most detailed discussion of the dissensions and hostilities that result from it.

Initially, Jehovah governs without division. In his name, Moses exercises the supreme authority. Even though invested with the priesthood, Aaron himself obeys the prophet.1 The two powers only form one. Nonetheless, succumbing to the weight of multiple burdens, Moses delegates the civil and judicial functions to men whom the people present to him.2 These men are but his instruments; but already the popular choice contains the seed of an authority different from the theocratic authority.

This seed seems to disappear under Joshua. He concentrates both powers in his hands, speaks to Jehovah, transmits His will to the Hebrews, commands the priests as well as the elders of the tribes, sacrifices victims, presides over ceremonies, pronounces judgment, and leads the army. But after his death, invasions and defeats give the military power new importance separate from the priesthood. Warriors, imprecisely called judges, take their place immediately below the high priests, and an independent spirit is not slow to take hold of them. They demand hereditary rights; a portion of the Jews recognize them;3 and a first appeal is made to establish 266 a monarchy.4 This effort is repressed, and the judges remain on the second rank. They are not named until after the pontiffs, and their borrowed and restricted authority is nothing compared with the priests’.5 The priests, however, seem dissatisfied with even this supremacy; the priesthood wants to take back temporal authority. Eli was simultaneously judge and high priest, and Samuel, who replaced him, united the two functions at the battle of Masphat.6

But finally the idea of the separation of powers triumphed.

The people demanded a king.7 In vain, the priesthood resisted, in vain, they told the people of the Divine’s indignation,8 and the punishments this anger prepared.9 An unheeded threat! The priesthood was compelled to accede.10 The different powers appeared and henceforth will do battle.

One cannot fail to recognize in the history of Saul and Samuel (even though presented from the perspective and for the sake of the priests) the revenge of theocracy against the monarchy it had grudgingly established.11

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The prince, chosen from an obscure rank by the priesthood that wanted to remain his masters,12 subject to obligations that were equivalent to servitude, consecrated at the hands of the high-priest,13 obliged himself to take the priesthood as his guide and counselor on every occasion. In his very first expedition, it was in the name of the high priest that he ordered the people to follow him.

This transaction preserved all the advantages for the priesthood. Soon, however, a sacrifice offered in the absence of the high priest,14 an act of clemency contrary to its orders,15 stirred its indignation.16 The monarch defended himself, but in vain. Sometimes he employed force. He had Achimeleck and eighty-five priests who helped his rival killed.17 Sometimes he prostrated himself at the feet of his rival and besought him not to take revenge against his family when he ascended the throne. Finally, though, he succumbed and bequeathed to his successors (sprung from another race) the sad duty of submission or the dangerous option of resistance.

It is also true that the overthrow of Saul was not the spontaneous movement of the people, that among the twelve tribes of Israel only one declared itself against him, while all the others remained faithful to his family and his person.18

After his fall, the Hebrew annals are full of the attempts of priests against the kings and of kings against the priests. Solomon banished the high-priest Abiathar, who had taken sides with his brother Adonija.19 Asa cast the prophet Ananias 268 into a cell.20 He punished with death several prominent men of Judah who had declared themselves for the prophet. Jehoiada had Athalia killed in order to place the young Joash on the throne.21 Joash, who owed his throne to Jehoiada, publicly accused him of dilapidation and later, without any regard for the memory of his benefactor, ordered that his son Zechariah should be stoned.22 This murder was avenged by the assassination of the king.23 Even though he reestablished the Mosaic cult in its purity, Azariah24 wanted to shake off the yoke of the priests. The Levites had transformed the temple of the Lord into a stronghold where they could defend themselves; it was their fortress and arsenal. Azariah having forced the doors of the temple, the high-priest called armed Levites against him, and the monarch was chased from the sanctuary.25 Jeremiah was arrested by the order of Zedekiah, and Joachim punished Uriah with the ultimate torment.26

We draw only these episodes from the part of Jewish history that pertains to the two faithful tribes, because one could attribute the active conspiracies of the priests and the violent persecutions of the kings to the idolatrous portions of Israel who resisted belief itself, rather than to a struggle between powers. One clearly sees in the history of Jehu a priestly rebellion parallel to that of Saul and David. Elisha secretly anointed this usurper.27 Jehu killed Jehoram, had his mother Jezebel killed, as well as seventy-two sons of Ahab and forty-two brothers of Ochosias, the king of Judah, and he assembled all the priests of Baal in a temple and had them slaughtered.28 As his reward, Elisha promised the kingdom of Israel for him and his posterity until the fourth generation.

The Hebrew kings sought everywhere for help against the always threatening priestly influence. Hence their eagerness to form alliances with neighboring nations, even though they were appalled by those nations’ worship. Barely crowned, David sought the friendship of Hanun, king of the Ammonites. Solomon married 269 the daughter of Pharaoh29 and made a treaty with Hiram, king of Tyre.30 Asa allied with the king of Syria.31

In vain the prophets thundered against these alliances. Fearless imitators of Moses, threatening instruments of heavenly decrees who were equally independent of the priesthood and the monarchy, they filled Judea with their denunciations. Their faces dark with ashes, their bodies belted with the skins of animals, they left forests and caves to fill the cities with their cries and the councils of kings with their anathemas. All their writings are full of severe descriptions of the luxury, tyranny, corruption, and infidelity of the Hebrew monarchs. Hosea employs every conceit, all the allegories, all the metaphors of oriental poetry to depict the excesses and degradation of these princes, the hedonism of the court, the lethargy of the government, the abasement of subjects, and the apostasy of masters.32 Amos left Judah to condemn Jeroboam in the very heart of his empire.33 Micah depicts the earth shaken, the mountains falling, and valleys opening beneath the feet of a guilty people and an oppressive monarch.34 But by indicating what their weaknesses were to the holders of temporal authority, these threats also made clear the necessity of shoring up the throne.

This conflict of the two powers, more than anyone has noted up until now, contributed to push the kings of the Jews toward idolatry. The condemned worship, observes Spencer, was above all introduced under the kings. All the judges remained faithful, while there were very few princes who did not turn toward idols.35 They saw in them a weapon against their rivals and a refuge against their implacable enemies. In this way, it could be true of the Jews—as it was among many other peoples—that the priesthood itself caused damage to the cause it believed itself to serve, and that religion had to bear the consequence of the faults, or the ambition, of its defenders.

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CHAPTER 11: A Necessary Explanation of What We Just Said about the Jews

While expressing ourselves on the Hebrew priesthood with a candor we have tried neither to hide nor to soften, it was far from our intention to attack the religion of Moses in itself. We are very far from wanting to join with those who have placed the Jews at the lowest rung of ancient peoples and have presented their doctrine as a fierce and fanatical superstition. The writers of the eighteenth century who treated the holy books of the Hebrews with disdain mixed with hostility judged Antiquity itself in a terribly superficial way, and the Jews were of all the nations the one they least understood, whether it be their genius, their character, or their religious institutions. In order to join with Voltaire against Ezekiel or Genesis, one has to combine two things that make his mockery rather sad: deep ignorance and a most deplorable frivolity. Far from sharing this view, which became popular at the end of the previous century, we regard the Hebrews as very much superior to the tribes that surrounded them, and even to the despotic empires that reduced them to slavery. However, we recognize (which no impartial judge can contest) that their annals are filled with revolting facts and cruel actions that we have no intention of justifying. In order to explain this apparent contradiction, here we will lay out our entire thought, making use of the right our own faith grants us. This right is to examine and study the records upon which this belief is founded. And nothing obliges us to hide the results this examination yields.

If one admits revelations—that is, direct and supernatural manifestations of the Divinity to man—one ought to consider these revelations as assistance granted by a powerful and benign being to one who is ignorant and weak, when his forces are not enough for him to improve his lot on earth.1

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Then a ray breaks through the darkness covering the uncertain traveler seeking his way. But the goal of man is perfecting himself. He cannot do so except by his own efforts, by the exercise of his own faculties, by the activity of his own free will. If he is protected by a wise and benevolent power, whom his sentiment needs to recognize despite the doubts that logic can raise, this power itself must limit its assistance to instruction, by revealing truths proportionate to man’s intelligence. These revelations enlighten him without enchaining him, they leave him free to use this gift at his own risk and peril; he can abuse it, even reject it. The struggle that good and evil wage within him, his halting efforts, his fruitless attempts, his errors, and even his crimes do not disprove the revelation he has received. These things belong to the struggle that is his lot, and this struggle itself is the means of perfecting himself. Led toward this goal by a power that would enslave his will, he would lose his quality as a free agent; and reduced to the status of a machine, his perfection would become mechanical. Amelioration would have nothing moral about it. Therefore the Divinity confides truth to man, which he must defend, preserve, and develop. This is the mission of his intelligence. But in charging him with this mission, it changes nothing in his nature. It leaves this nature as it was—imperfect, subject to error, able to be mistaken about means, often choosing defective, bad, even culpable ones.

Apply this framework to the revelation of Moses. We see him born in a country given over to the crudest superstitions, in the midst of a tribe regarded as impure, and even more ignorant than the rest of the people. Now, theism is not compatible with such a degree of ignorance. How, then, could Moses have been in advance of his century? Some have attributed this theism to Egypt. They have thought that, adopted by an Egyptian priest, he must have known the secret teachings of the priesthood of this country and constructed his religion from them. This opinion seems to us to be completely mistaken.

When we later put forth the different philosophies of barbarous peoples, and the mystery religions of the Greeks into which these philosophies were introduced, we will have the occasion to show just how little the theism (which then combined with pantheism) resembled the idea of the unity of God of the Hebrews, presented in a simple and clear way in their books, and entering into moral relations with men. This last characteristic constitutes the essential difference separating the two species of theism: the supreme God of the priestly philosophies had only cosmogonic features. This God was only the union of the hidden forces of nature, personified in an abstraction (even though the two words seem to contradict each other), or the combination of all the attributes of this sort scattered 272 among the popular divinities. The absence of any particular providence, and the denial of intelligence and individuality, were its distinctive features. It is true that at the decline of polytheism, with all sorts of opinions having been introduced into Greece via the mysteries, a less abstract theism, one more susceptible to becoming a real religion, was admitted, not as the dominant system but as one of the systems among which the priests chose what was most suitable to individual initiates.

But this has no relation to the theism of Moses, which existed twelve centuries earlier. With a marvelous sagacity, Moses spoke to unlettered men the language that was suitable to them, while only rarely adjusting his teaching to the exigencies of their limitations. Moreover, his concessions consisted more in words than in things;2 they were passing clouds that obscured only for a moment what was sublime in the ideas he taught concerning the Supreme Being. Idle questions and insoluble problems were carefully avoided. The legislator of the Jews did not seek, like the priests of Egypt and India or the philosophers of Greece did, what God’s substance was, if He exists with, or without, extension, if He is finite or infinite, if His existence is eternal and necessary, or if it was the result of some arbitrary will. The prophet of Mount Sinai avoided those flights of an uncontrolled imagination of the sort found in popular cults that give them a ridiculous and repulsive cast, and those useless intellectual subtleties that ushered the philosophical theism of India into a labyrinth whose end was necessarily either atheism or pantheism. Atheism because reason, forced to proceed by negation, finally transforms the Divinity into a negation. Pantheism because recognizing only a single substance under a thousand illusory appearances, it absorbs the universe in its author, and substitutes for the religious sentiment a certain enthusiasm that pleases itself with sonorous phrases, but deprives religion of everything consoling, tender, and moral, leaving it at most an imposing form and sterile majesty. In the Genesis account of creation, to which one must accord everything the genius of the East merits, one finds neither an inert rebellious matter nor a mysterious egg, nor a giant cut in pieces, and no alliance between blind forces and atoms devoid of intelligence, neither a necessity that chains reason nor a chance that disturbs it.

This superiority of the religion of Moses is not limited to doctrine; it extends 273 to its rites. Those that the Jewish books prescribed, no matter how bizarre they appear to our minds formed by a more advanced civilization, are less bloody, less corrupting, less favorable to superstition, than those of the peoples subject to priestly polytheism.3 When we later consider the ceremonies, the customs, and the modes of worship of these peoples, we will always see in first place human sacrifices and obscene feasts. The Hebrews owed to Moses their being preserved from this double opprobrium.4

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We say all this with so much more conviction because our view was formed slowly and, as it were, despite ourselves. The appearance and duration of Jewish theism, in a time and among a people equally incapable of conceiving the idea and preserving it, are in our eyes facts that cannot be explained by reasoning. That subsequent to this acknowledgment, what we call revelation, the instruction of Providence, a light due to His wisdom and goodness, others call an interior sentiment, the development of a seed deposited in the human soul, does not much matter to us. For the one who believes in God, every illumination comes from Him, as well as everything in us that is good and noble; and revelation is found wherever there is something true, noble, and good.

But in the particular case of Moses, what constituted what we call revelation, if not the knowledge of the unity of God and the religious sanction given by this unique God to the moral duties and obligations of man?

The deliverance of the Hebrews, slaves in Egypt, their being brought together in a body as an independent nation, their wanderings, their conquests, all these things are found within the sphere of human things. They therefore ought to be judged like all human things.

Doubtless, Moses’s enterprise was noble and generous, and in a certain sense one can say that liberating his fellow citizens is a mission come down from heaven. But this enterprise did not exceed the forces of our nature. Others have tried it, and others have succeeded as well as Moses.

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No doubt also, it was always in the name of Jehovah that he commanded. It was in the name of Jehovah that he inculcated humanity in the Jews, fraternity among themselves, and even hospitality toward strangers. And yet it was also in the name of Jehovah that he drew the sword against the Amorrheans5 and that he had the Midianite women killed.6

It therefore requires readers with an upright spirit and an equitable heart—that is, friends of both the truth and religion—to distinguish what the exigencies of Moses’s position forced him to confound. We would go further and say: things that in good conscience he had to combine.

According to his deepest, most intimate conviction (and truth, as it is given to man to experience, is entirely found in his convictions), Moses regarded as an inspiration from God the project that he had formed of delivering his compatriots, of rescuing them from the most humiliating conditions,7 the most burdensome labors,8 as well as the recurring cruelties constantly suggested to their oppressors by the suspicions they entertained of the oppressed. The year of his birth had been marked by an execrable act9—the slaughter of the newly born—on the part of harsh masters whom they had served in an expedition against Ethiopia.10 A little while later, the murder, certainly legitimate, of one of the agents of the tyranny11 connected his self-interest with his patriotism. He therefore raised the banner of independence, and the exodus from Egypt was the first fruit of his courage and his perseverance.12

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But dangers of every sort threatened the tribe he guided and of which he was the mainstay. Fearful, indecisive, and weakened by 430 years of slavery,13 it had contracted habits that even its hatred of Egypt could not break. Moses always had to fear that it was going to ask again for its fetters, and that even far from Egypt it would become an Egyptian-like people. It was to prevent this backsliding that he designed all his institutions. This aim is as discernable in his fundamental laws as in the most minute regulations; it dictated what he said about clothing, it presided over food, it directed the work of the poor and oversaw the luxury of the rich; it likewise presided at the funerals of all.14 This aim, however, was never perfectly attained, and Moses was constantly forced to concessions that both angered and grieved him.15

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While he prepared victories against the countries that he had to invade, it was necessary for him to achieve an ever more difficult victory over the people, more difficult because it could escape him at any moment. Hence the need to inoculate his people from the memories of the past and the seductions of the present.16 Hence those severe laws against the vanquished, who were more numerous than their victors.17 Hence those horrifying punishments of Jews who fell back into idolatry. Greater indulgence toward the first would have led to the alteration, then 278 the destruction, of the nascent Jewish nation. Less rigor against the second would have allowed every trace of the theism that was far from consonant with their intellectual development to disappear. This, however, was their only distinctive characteristic and the sole point of cohesion among them. Nonetheless, it is obvious that revelation, properly speaking, this act of supreme power manifesting itself to man in order to explain the meaning of his existence to him and to clothe his duties with a religious sanction, has nothing in common with these steps of a legislator to govern his people, or of a conqueror to consolidate his success.

Even though he was instructed in the great truth that one day would transform the entire human race into a single family, is there any surprise that in order that his people would not lose this knowledge, Moses adopted the means that seemed best to him? That these means had features of the barbaric customs of a time when human life was little respected?18 That he did not fully gauge the disproportion between his teaching and the level of intellectual development of his compatriots and contemporaries?19 That even while recognizing this disproportion, he was prematurely condemned to a violent struggle? That this struggle compelled him to excessive severities? That in order to have faithful guardians of the truth of which his soul was so convinced, he established a priesthood invested with a terrible power? That this priesthood abused its authority? All of the foregoing is in the purely human order and has nothing to do with revelation.

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These were the things that have been confused. The sectarian spirit has maintained that not only did Moses’s doctrine about the Supreme Being come from a divine source, but the Hebrew books themselves were divine—even their material redaction. The facts recounted by Moses and the writers who came after him were not judged as historical facts and in accordance with the rules of morality, which 280 are the first and most intimate of revelations. People have seen in these facts acts of the divine will, and they have imposed upon themselves the duty of approving what in other circumstances they would have condemned, and of praising what in the annals of any other people would have been judged to be awful.20 This blindness 281 in one direction produced blindness in the other direction. Our philosophers are enlightened, learned, and friends of the truth, at least at the outset of their career, until the point when the struggle with religion provokes their vanity and tests their impartiality, then they turn to the Jewish books and make them the object of their mockery and their harangues. These attacks in turn provoke defenders who base themselves on a principle that is equally false. These apologists have often had to produce apologies of crime and cruelty.

The distinction we established above would have spared unbelievers many pointless and puerile critiques, and religious men from having to defend many contradictions. Let the Inquisition rise again and the orthodox of every sect threaten us with their anathemas, we do not recognize revelation in massacres or towns reduced to rubble, or in children torn from their mothers. We see in the bloody records of a barbarous epoch, first, necessity imposing its cruel laws on a conqueror, which perhaps can be excused, but certainly do not merit praise. Later, we see the jealous, implacable priestly spirit. On the other hand, we recognize the revelation made to Moses in the parts of the Hebrew books where all the virtues are recommended, filial love, conjugal love, hospitality toward strangers, chastity, friendship (which no other legislation raised to the ranks of virtues), justice, and even pity, even though the epoch of pity had not yet come, for this epoch is Christianity. Here is the divine voice. Here is the manifestation of heaven on earth. And it is only here that one cannot be mistaken in giving praise, because it appeals to all the sentiments, ennobles and purifies all affections, comes well before enlightenment, and even in the midst of barbarism penetrates the soul with truths that reason would discover only much later.21 Readers, however, have confused facts and doctrine. 282 Because the priesthood was established as the guardian of the divine law, as the redactors of the annals of the nation subject to the law everything these annals contained was said to be the divine law. Because the law of the Jews was holy, some wanted to use it to sanctify every event in Jewish history.

People at least should have recalled from what sources, as well as by whom, this history was assembled. Redacted at different epochs, and always by Levites; several times destroyed, notably at the taking of Jerusalem and the Babylonian captivity;22 reconstituted by Esdras,23 who belonged to the priestly line,24 and, his zeal sharpened by misfortune, who exaggerated the severity of Moses’s laws:25 the Hebrew books had to be thoroughly suffused with the priestly spirit.26 As a comparison, 283 let us suppose that after several thousand years, when the centuries and the changes that they give rise to have reduced our books to bits and pieces, people recover as the records of Christianity the Gospel and a few historians during our times of barbarism, or degradation, when the massacre of the Albigensians or the horrors of the Inquisition or Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre are taken to be acts willed and approved by Providence. Is it not certain that a priestly corporation enriched by these heirlooms, and arrogating to itself a monopoly of them, would bend them to its caste interests, and while exalting what cannot be too exalted, the admirable morality of the Gospel and its no less admirable gentleness, would also extol the zeal of the inquisitors and the obedience of the torturers?27

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This is what has happened, and it is in keeping with this confusion of distinct ideas that the Hebrew books have been judged.28 For our part, we have already said how we think they should be judged. From the principle we adopt, it follows that the purity of teaching is not compromised by the acts that are foreign to it, and that culpable acts are not excused by the purity of a doctrine that does not command them. The Jewish priesthood certainly could have commandeered the truths that heaven had communicated to Moses in order to monopolize them, to bend them to its interests, just as more than one pope or Christian monarch has taken hold of the Gospel and tried to corrupt it. But in the same way that Christianity contributed nothing to the massacres committed by priests in its author’s 285 name, Judaism did not contribute to the attacks ordered by other priests in Jehovah’s name. One therefore need not accept absurd sophisms in order to legitimize terrible acts. Bossuet, who praised Samuel killing Agag and the Levites deposing Osias,29 resembles the Italian Capilupi30 and the courtier Pibrac,31 who present Charles IX as directed in his hypocrisy and his murders by the all-powerful will of God.

We will end this chapter with a reflection that has always resonated with us, and which we think will do the same with the reader.

There is no doubt the Jewish religion has its terrible parts, and no one can peruse its annals without walking in blood and over ruins. Nonetheless the world owes Moses an enormous debt. When in late Antiquity, devoid of every belief, desolated by doubt, degraded by corruption, the whole earth required new worship, and given the state of enlightenment this worship could only be theism, the theism of the Jews served as the standard. And one saw man reborn to all that was noble and precious in life by being reborn to religion. What a marvelous dispensation of the power that decides our destinies! Things that seem to have no relation among themselves, either by their time or by their nature, combine at the right moment to direct the human race to its end.

Twelve centuries before Plato, Moses gave theism a body that permitted this sublime idea to be preserved until the moment when intelligence became capable of conceiving it. Twelve centuries after Moses, Plato prepared minds in such a way that in adopting theism they were able to receive it purified by the divine author of the Christian religion, and to resist the violent and obstinate attempts of a sizable portion of Jewish converts who wanted to take Christianity back to Judaism. Without Moses, it is probable that all the efforts of philosophy would 286 have only plunged mankind into pantheism or a hidden atheism. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, this was where the philosophy and the religion of the Indians ended. Without Plato, it is possible, humanly speaking, that overcome by the efforts of Judaizing Christians, Christianity would have become a Jewish sect.32

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CHAPTER 12: That the Struggle between the Priesthood and the Temporal Authority Must End to the Advantage of the First, as Soon as the Principle of Priestly Authority Is Admitted

The picture we drew of the warfare the priesthood waged against political and military power should have demonstrated to our readers that even if the priests have not always emerged victorious from this struggle, they have always retained vast prerogatives that have aided them in regaining those they lost.

This result of a rivalry that has continued from century to century, and which still continues, should not surprise us.

Once the principle of priestly authority is recognized, those who exercise it have in their favor both the religious sentiment that resides in the depths of souls and the constant and irresistible action of habit, which moves men to respect the object of their forebears’ reverence. In addition, there is the influence of their particular superstitions, which are the companions of all their days, the solutions to all their doubts, the explanations of every phenomenon, and the soothing of every fear. And, finally, there is logic itself and rigorous reasoning.

When religion is independent, the religious sentiment can defend itself against the usurpations of the priesthood. It believes it is inwardly invested with a mission, and in its inner forum it is its own authority. But when the struggle is engaged, not between consciences but between powers, the religious sentiment must declare itself for the power that most resembles conscience and that, being without visible arms, least resembles power itself. If it were to enlist on the side of force, it would belie its own nature. There is no common ground between it and force. If it were to render homage to force, it would enter into the domain of human calculations and would die of suicide.

But it is not in this sentiment alone that the attacked priesthood finds a defender. Reason, which the laws of its nature constrain to proceed from initial givens to consequences, and from principles to applications, lends the assistance of incontestable arguments.

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As soon as man has need of privileged intermediaries in order to communicate with invisible beings, omnipotence belongs by right to these intermediaries. In order to deflate the pretensions of these exclusive favorites of heaven, one has to suppose that religion is the common property of all. Each one, bearing in his breast the torch designed to enlighten him, compares the light offered to him with the one he possesses. But when the monopoly of this light is granted to a small number, how can the ascendancy of this few have any limits? According to what warrant could the temporal power establish its independence? Such a title would be redundant if it were in accord with celestial decrees, criminal if different from them.

In the priestly system, what is the goal of the world? The accomplishment of the divine will. What are political organizations? Means of ensuring this accomplishment. What are the heads of societies? The detainers of a subordinate authority that has no right to be obeyed, except because it obeys the authority that founded it. What, finally, is the natural organ of this sole legitimate authority? The priesthood.

These Jewish or Egyptian kings, these rajas of India, chosen by the gods from among their equals, possess all their rights from the goodness of the gods, as manifested by their priests. These priests consecrate their ascension, pour sacred oils on their heads, command the peoples to consider them their masters; they also observe their actions, listen to their confessions, absolve them from their faults, wash them of their guilt, reprimand them during their lifetime, and judge them after their death. Prostrate at the knees of these dispensers of supernatural favors, these kings begged permission to ascend the throne; they walked up its steps humble and suppliant. Then suddenly they are to declare themselves the equals—the superiors even—of those who made them? They are to raise their authority to the level of the divine authority, treat it as an equal, and assume there are interests other than those of eternity, and declare themselves the guardians of these material interests even against heaven?

Such patent contradictions cannot be admitted. To try to impose them on the mind is to insult it.

To say to peoples: Profess the religion that pleases and reassures you; if it is your desire or your need, take men as ministers of this religion, as the mediators of your worship and praise; and as long as you consider it just and fitting, subject yourself to the direction and instructions of these men. Nothing is more reasonable. But when you say to them: Behold priests who are infallible when it comes to you and to whom an implicit submission is due, as long as they only attack your rights, only restrict your faculties, only limit your thinking. But when it comes to us, your 289 earthly masters, these priests lose their infallibility. When it comes to your interests, resistance is a crime, but it becomes a duty when ours are threatened. For us you will brave the anger of heaven, which we otherwise exhorted you to fear. Then we will punish obedience, when otherwise we punished disobedience.

These arguments apply to modern times as well as to ancient times, to Gregory VII as to Samuel or Joad, and the concessions of priests transformed into courtiers and the arguments of statesmen become sophists equally run aground against them.

Therefore, every time the priesthood has seen itself attacked by authority, religious souls have supported it with all their might. A secret voice told them that when heaven and earth have become divided, heaven must be obeyed. Religious prohibition has struck all peoples with terror. Anathema has depopulated courts and camps. As the Indians say: a single word has always done more in the mouth of a priest than the sword has in the hands of a warrior.

And if we reflect a moment, we will not be tempted to bemoan this inevitable result.

To be sure, if one were to place on one side the Egyptian castes, the magi, or the Brahmins, and on the other, freedom of belief and of worship, the choice would not be in doubt. But between Chephren or Cambyses and the priests who contest their power, the preference is due to the priests. Not that they were worthy, but if tyranny in the name of religion is terrible, tyranny in the name of material force is both terrible and degrading.

Under the first, at least conviction can be found among the slaves, and only the tyrants are corrupted. But when the oppression is separated from faith, slaves too are depraved and become as abject as their masters. We candidly acknowledge that we have never felt much sympathy for Louis the Pious doing penance at the feet of a papal legate, or for the emperor Henry IV waiting in bare feet for a pope to absolve him. We have reserved our compassion for other objects. We have extended it to those obscure populations, outlawed and proscribed because they listened to the voice of their conscience, and refused to commit what for them were betrayals and sacrileges. For those Vaudois who asked only to be able to exercise their peaceful worship in their valleys; for those Jews who throughout the centuries were tormented, dispossessed, and burned; for those Hussites who at least were able to avenge their leader delivered to the fire in violation of imperial promises; for those Scots who were put to death by the abominable Duke of York1 because they 290 refused the Oath of Test, which he himself did not swear; for those Huguenots suspended on the fence or pressed into galley service. As for the unfortunate members of royal families who declared themselves independent of the power that was the mysterious sanction of their despotism, we have been able to see in this belated resistance (according to their own view) only an incoherent rebellion,2 and we are not sure if Europe would have been better off because of their success.

A great example is before our eyes, and this example raises certain doubts.

Among the priestly nations of Antiquity, the result of the conflict between the temporal and the spiritual authority was always the triumph of the latter. But in a nation that is ordinarily placed among the moderns, because it still exists and because it occupies no place in ancient history, the priesthood has been defeated.

The reader can surmise that we mean to speak of China.

It is incontestable that the ancient religion of China was a priestly religion based like all in this category on the worship of the elements and the stars.3 Vestiges of this worship show themselves in all the solemn ceremonies preserved till today by the custom that survived the belief. The Chinese cosmogony bears the imprint of the ingenuity of priests. Here one finds the cosmogonic egg,4 the Trimurti,5 the misshapen figures,6 the incestuous gods,7 the reunion of virginity and fecundity,8 291 evil-doing divinities,9 fanciful animals,10 mystical conceptions (whose origins we will talk about later,11 and which independent religions never admit into their native accounts). Among their ancient rites one finds human sacrifice.12 Finally, the annals of China speak of a high-priest named Tai-chi-ling, whose authority formerly was very great.

But by events that have been transmitted in much too vague a manner to allow for detailed accounts or satisfactory explanations, the priesthood succumbed in China. Chased from the altar, religion descended to the throne. The emperor declared himself the principal minister, or the absolute master, which is the same thing. The entire learned class affected a proud disdain for the priests.13 It is because 292 of this disdain that our philosophers have lavished praise upon the Chinese.14

But let us examine what was the real result of this so-celebrated victory.

Religion, reduced to trivial and fastidious ceremonies that recalled only disdained or dead beliefs, mere etiquette substituted for sentiment, dead letters replacing 293 real belief, rites devoid of meaning, practice without theory, irreligious abstractions for the enlightened class, stupefying superstitions for the populace; a worship of ancestors, but no hope for a future life;15 a worship of spirits and the 294 crudest, most positive materialism;16 and for the rest, the weightiest oppression, the most absolute arbitrariness,17 barbarous tortures,18 limitless corruption, cunning at the service of fear, a complete absence of all generous sentiments, an apathy that coexisted with the love of gain, and even the human figure taking on the degraded traits of a frightful immobility. Behold what we see in China. Without 295 detracting from its truthfulness, we could add features to this portrait that would render it both shameful and ridiculous. To wit: in this country where civil authority affects such a proud independence vis-à-vis everything that pertains to belief, there have been many emperors who have surrounded themselves with monks, and lavished on them the treasure of the State, in order to acquire from them the famous elixir of immortality.19 This has cost the lives of those who have obtained it, the reward of their prodigality and promises.20 Thus in China, as elsewhere, magic replaces religion.

In vain, some emperors disturbed by this extreme of degradation have wanted to revive religious belief. As means to do so, however, they only had their authority, and in this sort of endeavor its fate is to fail. They have thought that by rendering religion more reasonable, by subjecting it to a more imposing uniformity, and above all by recommending it as useful, they would make it acceptable to the people. But it is not as reasonable or as clothed with regular forms or as useful to its followers, but as divine, that it can be accepted. When utility is placed in the scales, it interferes with religion’s earthy foundation. When religion is declared an instrument of the State, its mystique is destroyed. The classes to whom it is destined are by a secret instinct alerted to disdain what other mortals treat with such an arrogant familiarity. The concordat of the emperor Yung-Lo, which in certain respects recalls the Augsburg Interim of Charles V, could never take root among the Chinese, and Qianlong, who, whether out of cunning or madness, proclaimed 296 himself the Buddha incarnate at the end of his life, did not at all disturb an indifferent public; he encountered neither support nor contradiction.21

By stripping priests of their influence, the temporal sovereigns of China seem to have inherited their spirit. Their despotism was no less stagnant, only the people it degraded lost the excuse of conviction. Instead of being the effect of a sincere error, its slavery is one of ignoble fear and craven servility. In a manner of speaking, China is a theocracy of atheists, or if you wish, of materialistic pantheists, who replace religion with the sword and bamboo. The faculties of man are as compromised under the emperors as they were under the priests. The yoke is as harsh, the opprobrium greater. We have to bemoan, but we can also esteem, a nation subject to superstition and ignorance. Even among its errors, this nation preserves its good faith. It continues to obey the sentiment of duty. It can even have virtues, even though these virtues are badly directed. But a race that has only fear as its psychological 297 wellspring, and as its motive the salary bestowed from above by the power that oppresses it; a race without any illusions that elevate it, and without errors that excuse it, has fallen from the rank Providence assigned to it. The faculties that remain to it, and the intelligence it continues to display, are for it and for the world only one more misfortune and shame.22

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CHAPTER 13: The Summary of the Foregoing

One can see from the content of this book that we are far from closing our eyes to the exceptions (or to put it better: the variations) that have slipped in under the general rule. We recognize these variations, and what we have said about them can guide the reader in applying the general rule to what needs to be said about each people in particular.

We therefore ask our readers not to become distracted by objections based upon particular details that are always easy to gather, but which when generalized yield only error. We are quite aware that someone might point out that we say that the priesthood dominated both under the beautiful skies of India and in the dark forests of Gaul, in order to accuse us of putting on a par the religion of the Brahmins and that of the Druids. In doing so, though, one would be attributing to our researches a systematic character that would suffice to discredit us with every impartial reader. Proceeding in this way lacks only one thing, however: good faith. To deprive our opponents of this pretext, we forewarn our readers. The priestly power was different in its forms, its extent, and its intensity in each of the nations of which we have spoken.1 Many things mitigated, combated, and modified it. In 299 India, the climate; in the North, war; in Persia, the monarchy; in Carthage, commerce. But these softenings, resistances, and modifications were accidental and temporary inflections. The principle remained the same, and the power itself resisted, survived, and overcame.

If some think that we have painted this power in colors that are too unflattering, that we have misunderstood its relative usefulness, at least in certain periods of an imperfect society, and that instead of showing it subjugating, oppressing, and maintaining in ignorance a race created for perfectibility and enlightenment, we should have recognized that more than once it elevated savage hordes, softened the mores of barbarians, united dispersed tribes against the elements that threatened them, imposed fertility on a harsh soil or wholesomeness on a dour nature; that in a word, by means of its special and precocious knowledge, it was the very first author of the civilization that later would dethrone it, we would grant a certain degree of force to these claims. But we would point out to these readers that we have said nothing contrary to them. At such a stage of the social state, the priesthood could have contributed to the great work of the human race and done its part to realize the views of a benevolent Providence. We will not deny this at all.

We say only that the priestly spirit, the enemy—as is every esprit de corps—of the progress and prosperity of the mass of human beings, because this prosperity and these advancements lead them toward independence, has dearly sold its benefits to mankind. We will also say that it is quite fortunate that a people we will speak about shortly liberated itself from this empire. If thanks to the priesthood, the lot of the Egyptians was better than that of today’s Eskimos or Samoyedes, it would be quite deplorable if the fate of the entire human race had not differed from that of Egypt. If men were able to gradually elevate themselves to the point of being able to comprehend and embrace a religion like that which all enlightened peoples profess today, it is because there was one people in history who, because of fortunate circumstances and their own energy, were able to escape from priestly power.

Let each one, then, after having well considered the facts, have his reservations. Pointing out these possible exceptions (which, however, were only few and limited) is the most an impartial reader could ask of us.

More extensive developments would have broken the thread of our inquiry. We will frequently be compelled during the course of this work to trust in the learning of those who read us. Our task is already sufficiently vast and difficult, and wanting to fulfill it without violating the limits we earlier laid down, we have neither the time nor the space to take part in discussions and controversies over details.

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BOOK V: ON THE PRIESTHOOD’S SMALL AMOUNT OF AUTHORITY AMONG PEOPLES WHO WORSHIPPED NEITHER THE STARS NOR THE ELEMENTS

  • A great order of the ages arises anew. . . .
  • Now a new generation is sent down from high heaven
  • —Virgil, Eclogues, book IV
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CHAPTER 1: That the Little Authority Priests Have among Nations That Do Not Have the Worship of Stars Is Demonstrated by the History of the First Times of Greece

Among the nations who have worshipped neither stars nor the elements, the priesthood has possessed only a very limited authority, and what we could call an accidental ascendancy. The Greeks are the proof.

While the security of Egypt entirely depended upon the precision of calculations based upon astronomy, the geographic position of Greece made the study of this science not particularly necessary. For a long time it was merely a subject of curiosity. The small number of stars that Homer or Hesiod mention indicate only elementary observations and rather traditional, or perhaps imported, ideas rather than those obtained by methodical personal investigation. Greek progress in astronomy goes back at most to the fortieth Olympiad, or to the origin of the first Ionian school.1 And their astronomical tales are clearly put forth only in their lyrical poetry. Therefore, whatever Plato may say—who is only expressing an opinion2—they never professed the worship of the stars.3 As a consequence, at least 304 from the moment when we see them appear on the world stage, we find that alone among all peoples they were free from the power of priests.4

Consider the subordinate rank they occupy in the poems of Homer, the oldest records of Greece. The heads of nations and the generals of the armies preside over the rites of religion; and in the interior of families the same functions are exercised, and the same privilege claimed, by the elders and the fathers. Agamemnon constantly bears at his side a sword to fight and a sword with which to offer sacrifice.5 He immolates victims with his own hand.6 Nestor7 and Peleus8 do the same, and the poet adds that everything is done according to custom. Alcinous presides over the religious ceremonies of the Phaeacians.9 In all the descriptions of these ceremonies, the name of priests is not even mentioned,10 but rather that of the head of the 305 peoples.11 Moreover it is heralds who, before the prayers, sprinkle sacred water over the hands of suppliants.12 No priest intervenes in the purification of the Greek army.13 Now, if on this solemn occasion, when it was a matter of ending a terrible plague, the Greeks had employed the ministry of some priest, it would doubtless have been mentioned. After the victory, the army deliberated to know if they should offer sacrifice. The opinions of the leaders were divided. Some acquitted themselves of this religious duty; others did not. Each consulted only his own sentiment and will.

Men eminent among the people and in the army often read the future. Covered with glory, the gods appeared to these mortals.14 Each individual could declare, on his own authority, that he communicated with heaven.

Among the Trojans, whom despite himself the author of the Iliad depicts as more civilized than the Greeks,15 Theano, a priestess of Minerva, lives in the 306 temple of the goddess (or at least opens its doors), offers her gifts, and addresses prayers to her.16 But this priestess was named by the people,17 and among the Trojans, no less than among the Greeks, the warriors were augurs. The habitants of Olympus communicate directly with them. Helenus; Polydamas; Laogonus;18 Eunomia;19 Cassandra, daughter of Priam; and Oenone, wife of Paris,20 have the gift of prophecy.

Often this faculty is united to royalty, as with Amphilochus21 and Theonoe, daughter of Proteus.22 At other times, the gods bestow it upon men without them desiring or hoping for it. Amphiaraus had never been initiated into the mysteries of the future. One night in the house of Phliunte—behind it, specifies the precise Pausanias23—the prophetic spirit took hold of him, and henceforth never left him. We cite Pausanias even though he is a very modern author because he gathered on site, with the scrupulosity that is his mark and merit, the most ancient traditions. After the death of Amphiaraus, Apollo chose Polyphides24 and his son Theoclymenus25 to be oracles. Neither, however, appears to have been a priest.

Direct communications were much more respected than those obtained by the intermediary of priests. Priam, receiving from Jupiter the order to go and ask for the remains of Hector from his murderer, did not consult the priests about the will of this god, but he asked for a sign, which he received. He expressed himself on this score in a way that merits attention. If a priest, he says, an interpreter of heavenly signs, had given me this counsel, I would have accused him of lying, and I would have turned from him with contempt.26 Later, though, these same direct communications will be considered criminal. This is due to a natural progression of ideas.

Those who devote themselves exclusively to the worship of the gods, and pride 307 themselves on their special favors, gain nothing from this devotion, neither special prerogatives nor uncontested authority. They lead a wandering life, following in the train of the armies, present in councils and at feasts despite generals and kings who typically hate them.27 They are not called for, they are not sought, except when someone thinks he needs them. Their interpretations of divine wills are often called into question, and they sometimes are the objects of shabby treatment. Banished and outlawed, Theoclymenus escaped from his fellow citizens only by embarking with Telemachus. This is evidence that at the time the gift of prophecy conferred no privileges. Leiodes claimed it in vain as he sought to disarm the anger of Ulysses.28 Hippotes, one of the Heracleidae, killed the oracle Carnus.29 Calchas hesitated to speak before Agamemnon out of fear of arousing his anger. I am only, he said, a common man, without defense before a king.30 When, reassured by Achilles that he revealed the will of Apollo, Agamemnon showered him with reproaches.

Three verses of the Odyssey indicate in a very remarkable way the inferior rank the priests occupied. They are represented as men at the service of the public, and put on a par with doctors, architects, and singers, those to whom one grants hospitality, and who subsist on the charity of those who employ them.31

It is true that Homer in general appears to be favorable to the priestly cause. In his poems, heaven almost always backs up the organs of its decrees. But the Homeric poems are after the heroic ages of Greece by at least two centuries, and the attitude of the poet in favor of the priestly estate is the natural effect of a development we will describe later.32

One would be wrong to consider the existence of priestly families, which were 308 numerous in Greece33 and are mentioned in the Odyssey itself,34 as a proof of the power of priests. The idea of the Greeks concerning the gift of prophecy seems to have some analogy with that of modern peoples concerning nobility. They thought that this divine favor was transmitted from father to son. Calchas came from a family that had enjoyed it for three generations.35 Mopsus owed his birth to Manto, daughter of Tiresias.36 Amphilochus was a prophet like his father, Amphiaraus. Herodotus recounts that Evenius had received the gift of divination from heaven because the Apollonians had unjustly deprived him of sight. The historian adds, as a natural consequence of this fact, that Deiphonus, son of this Evenius, fulfilled the functions of an oracle in the army.37

The foreign origin of these priestly families is of no importance to this question. We will see later that if some had descended from the colonies by which Greece was civilized, and had retained the direction of certain special rites as their patrimony,38 they nonetheless never became a legally established institution. The public religion did not belong to them at all. Their true monopoly was in the mystery 309 cults, and the mysteries were separate from the public religion.39 This is a yet stronger reason to think that these families exercised no influence in the times described by the epics, since their authors appear to know nothing about the place of mystery cults in the Greek religion.40

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CHAPTER 2: That It Is Nonetheless Possible That at a Time Prior to the Heroic Age the Greeks Had Been Enslaved by Priestly Corporations

The considerations we just submitted to our readers do not, however, lead us to affirm that the Greeks were never governed by priestly bodies. Several facts that have come down to us through the obscurity of the centuries and the confusion of fables, even though they are more or less scattered, seem to indicate that at a period prior to the one we call mythical Greece was momentarily subject to an order of priests, whether indigenous or foreign.1 We encounter in Homer some indications of the weakening of this power. The priests of the ages that preceded were invested with a greater authority and occupied a rank higher than those that are shown to us under the walls of Troy. Like the kings, Tiresias carries a scepter of 312 gold; he himself is called a king.2 The tradition—certainly false—that attributed to Theseus the division of the inhabitants of Attica into classes, similar in some respects to the division into castes, seems to be the confused memory of a far-off time when this classification existed in Greece.3

We also find in the traditions that have come down to us concerning the customs of the first Pelasgians, teachings and rites that characterize priestly cults. Herodotus speaks of a phallic Hermes, not Egyptian but Pelasgian.4 Several authors attest that they saw phalluses on the bas-reliefs of the walls of Mycenae, Tirynthe, and other Greek cities, as at Bubustis in Egypt.5 The Pelasgians had offered human sacrifices.6 Vestiges of the worship of the elements and stars appear in some ancient Greek temples. The sacred fire burned perpetually in the Prytaneum of Athens.7 In the same city, there was an altar formerly dedicated to the earth.8 Elsewhere, the sea was worshipped as a divinity distinct from Neptune. Cleomenes sacrificed a bull to it by having it cast into the waves.9 The Argiens cast horses into the lake of Argolide in honor of the Seasons;10 and Titania, the worshipper of the winds, was celebrated over a long period for her quadruple holocausts and magic invocations that go back to Media.11 The worship of the Arcadians 313 was noticeably marked with astronomical ideas.12 The hideous forms of some of the divinities of a much more remote time13 differed from the elegance of those that embellished the temples and were celebrated by the poets of Greece.14

But even while granting to these scattered facts the authority it is reasonable to accord them, what we proved earlier must still be admitted. Formerly enslaved to priests, the Greeks became independent of them.

How did this revolution occur? How did the priests, triumphant in all the other countries they governed, so completely succumb in Greece?

On this question we can only offer some conjectures.

In this matter, however, we have to decline the help of the two principal guides that moderns employ.

Homer gives no indication of a period when the Greek priests would have enjoyed a less limited power than what he attributes to them. He is silent about the event that would have deprived them of their privileges and cast them into a tenuous and subordinate position. Herodotus says nothing about how the phallic cult was banished from the public religion and took refuge in the mysteries. The assertions of these two authors have the character of vague reminiscences rather than of accurate accounts. Such reminiscences can cross the upheavals of the centuries without being affected and inexplicably appear in the midst of a state of things with which they have no relation.

But does the history of other nations yield light that Greece’s denies? In an earlier book, we saw that the military or political authority attempted everywhere to break the yoke of priestly authority.

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What was attempted everywhere else could have happened in Greece. The mild and temperate climate of this country disposed its inhabitants to develop their intellectual faculties. They did not have to irrigate their territory with large hydrostatic devices. Natural limits divided their country into small States, which were often attacked by their neighbors. The small boundaries that confined them made absolute despotism on the part of an order or caste almost impossible, and the constantly recurring necessity of defense had to make the military authority prevail. Finally, the worship of stars was foreign to Greece. This circumstance was decisive. Without astrolatry’s absence, the Greeks would never have been a fortunate exception to the common rule. Etruria was divided like Greece into small, warring principalities, and India could do without material works; but until the third century of Rome, priests governed Etruria, and they still dominate India.

Favored by their location, the Greeks could have been favored by chance; and what did not succeed in Egypt, Persia, or Ethiopia could have succeeded in a country where circumstances rendered the endeavor easier, and obstacles less insurmountable.

We will not try to determine when in the development of Greek civilization this revolution could have occurred. The endeavors of this sort undertaken by various nations took place at different times. But if the thing did occur in Greece, it is certain that the Greeks were not in a completely primitive state, because their priestly corporations possessed learning in astronomy,15 and the warrior caste had arrogated to itself the possession of lands. In this way, one finds traces of science and notions of property.16

The tradition of Danaus and his fifty daughters killing the fifty sons of Egypt, would not this be the garbled memory of a massacre of the warrior caste by the priests? Supposing the type of anachronism that is rather natural to times when no one observed exact dates, could not one assign a similar motive to the attacks on the oracle at Delphi by Pyrrhus, son of Achilles? Would it not be the same for the religious wars that several historians speak about, and locate in various places in Greece,17 wars the poets cast as the battle of the gods against the Titans? Modern scholars have believed that here they recognized the struggle of the Pelasgians against eastern or southern colonies. (This opinion, however, will be refuted later.)

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What is beyond dispute is that the Titans professed the worship of the elements and the stars, of the earth and the sky,18 which is to say: a type of worship that necessarily establishes priestly authority.19 What is also sure is that the Titans were chased from Greece.20 Is it not probable that they formed a corporation similar to those we have seen in Egypt, India, Persia, and among the Gauls, and that this corporation was defeated and made to flee by men who no longer wished to wear the shackles their ancestors wore?

Perhaps divisions among the priests contributed to their expulsion. A rather plausible although obscure tradition recounts battles at Argos between the priests of Apollo and Bacchus.21 These battles recall the internal discord of the Egyptian 316 priesthood. It most often is by means of dissension among possessors of power that power falls.

If one reflects on the fact that everywhere the Titans went after their defeat they established mystery cults, priestly corporations, and all the customs that characterize peoples subject to priestly control; if one considers that in Etruria, for example, it has been demonstrated that the teachings and ceremonies of religion were brought by a colony of Pelasgians,22 with colleges of priests invested with a limitless authority, while no such power appears among the Greeks descended from the Pelasgians who remained there.23 Given all this, the existence of an earlier priestly religion in this country, and its destruction before Homeric times, acquire great probability.

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This hypothesis would explain the emancipation from the power of priests of which the Greeks offer the sole example. We will prove later that the liberty enjoyed in this respect by the Scandinavians lasted only for a time.

The same hypothesis would explain the disproportion between Homer’s elegant language and the social state presented in the Iliad. In this way, it is less astounding to see an idiom that one could regard as the chef d’oeuvre of civilization employed to depict still semibarbaric mores. By it, one can go back to the origin of those bizarre portions of mythology that contrast so starkly with the customary mythology of the first Greek poets. There is an obvious analogue with the teachings and fables of all countries where the priesthood reigned. These ill-fitting portions thus show themselves to be the fragments of a destroyed whole, disconnected fragments preserved by men who survived its destruction. Certain oddities that struck us in some of the priestly institutions of Greece, especially the most ancient and the most foreign to the popular Greek religion, become easy to explain.

We therefore do not reject the assumption that at a time that is now covered by a thick night there was a priestly religion in Greece, as well as powerful corporations created by it devoted to its maintenance. But a violent revolution destroyed this religion and its priests, along with all the civilization of which they were the authors. All the historical information going back to the first times of Greece shows its inhabitants reduced to the savage state.24 Nothing is simpler to understand, and more inevitable. Along with the priests, everything of science, arts, and learning had to disappear, at least for a time. In fact, their overthrow cast Greece beyond barbarism. The tendency of priestly power being to hold the people in ignorance, the destruction of the priesthood in the country where it had reigned without challenge must have led to the destruction of all the earlier civilization. This is what has been noted among all peoples subject to priests, the Hebrews, in Egypt, in Phoenicia. The sciences always follow the fate of the priestly order.25 The question 318 is to know how, when this order is destroyed, the human race begins its march forward again. If, as in the East, it falls beneath the yoke, along with servitude it reprises the small portion of knowledge that its masters tolerate.26 If it is emancipated, as were the Greeks, its progress, while slow at first, is subsequently inhibited by nothing. Free but ignorant, the Greeks fell back into fetishism because they professed a priestly polytheism, which, as we will see, is always composed of two parts: on one hand, a secret doctrine; on the other, fetishism. The priestly corporations being destroyed, the secret doctrine was forgotten and fetishism alone remained.

For the rest, we ought not to deplore this retrograde movement. Under the domination of the priests, the sciences (contained in a narrow and mysterious enclave) could only be the property in Greece—as elsewhere—of a small number who made it the basis or the instrument of its despotism. In all things, poverty is better than monopoly.

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CHAPTER 3: On the Religion and the Priesthood of the Earliest Times of the Greek, According to the Testimony of Greek Historians

Cast back into the primitive state, the Greeks had to cross its phases by degrees, and practice its form of worship.1 Like the primitives of all periods, they must have assumed that the different parts of nature were animated by a divine spirit, and they worshipped this divine spirit in animals, stones, trees, and mountains.

These, in fact, are the divinities all the Greek writers indicate as the oldest objects of the religious veneration of their compatriots.

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In olden times, says Pausanias, the Greeks rendered honors to entirely inanimate stones which, since then, they offered to the images of the immortals.2 The Thespians adored a branch;3 the inhabitants of the isle of Euboea and the Carians, pieces of wood;4 the mountain dwellers of Cythera, the trunk of a tree; at Samos, a simple plank had altars; and the oldest images of the Pallas and the Ceres of Athens were stakes, similar to the idols of the Tongouse.5 The Venus of Paphos was a stone. Three stadia from Gytheio there was a featureless rock. It was said that Orestes, having sat upon it, recovered his reason. In commemoration of this event, this mysterious rock bore the surname Jupiter.6 It is probable that it originally was an object of worship, and that the homage rendered it was preserved after the religion was modified, and a tale was invented to explain it. Often the fables that are presented as the source of ceremonies are really their consequences. The Orchomenians maintained a profound respect for stones that had fallen from the sky and were gathered, they said, by Eteocles.7 But there are two passages in Pausanias that are even more striking.

“In Phares, a town of Achaia,” he writes,8 “by the statue of Mercury Agorean, thirty squared stones are worshipped by the inhabitants in the name of a divinity; this is conformed to the ancient religion of the Greeks.” “The statue of Cupid at Thespiae,” he recounts elsewhere, “is, as in the earliest times, a shapeless rock that no one used for any other purpose.”9

We find at Phlius in the Peloponnese the worship of animals. In the middle of the public square arose the divine image of a goat.10 At Thebes, weasels had obtained celestial honors.11 And according to an ancient tradition, the citadel of 321 Athens had a serpent as its protecting god. This tradition existed at least until the time of the war with Persia, because the purported disappearance of the serpent was one of the means Themistocles employed to cause the Athenians to depart their city and set sail.12

It would be easy for us to point out in the practices of the Greeks, even in later eras, the traces of the fetishistic primitives. They washed the feet of statues in blood. And what is even more remarkable, the devotées of Athena poured sacred oil over certain consecrated stones.13 In the same way, the Ostiacs, the Tongouse, and other peoples smeared their fetishes with blood.14

Like the primitives, the Greeks of the earliest times mistreated their divinities. Theocritus reminds the god Pan of this in one of his Idylls.15 And the author of the Theogony16 writes of the destruction of their temples, their altars, and their statues as the punishment of perfidious gods.

To be sure, there is a difference between the fetishes of Greece and those of the modern savages that travelers have helped us to understand. Those of Greece were already national. This is because the information we have concerning this fetishism dates from a period when the Greeks already began to form societies. The fetishes of the association had to replace those of individuals. But the latter were not wholly replaced. The Greeks carried on their persons little pygmy gods that they constantly invoked.17

Some writers have regarded these diminutive simulacra as mere images, made to recall invisible divinities. But any distinction between divinities and simulacra 322 is premature when it concerns peoples who are still quite ignorant. Among them the simulacra are gods because they move, they cry, they speak, they predict. Superstition is so inclined to confuse the two things that the confusion persists despite subsequent enlightenment and the different spirit of centuries. In contemporary Madrid, Lisbon,18 and Naples, Madonnas lower their eyes, cover themselves, and sigh; Saint January sheds tears. Fetishism is always in the wings, as it were, ready to reenter religion. It does not succeed today because the priesthood, while profiting from the popular tendency to enhance its authority, is monitored by the learned class and therefore rejects or disavows whatever in fetishism is too absurd. But among the Greeks fallen back into savagery, and among whom there was neither a regular priesthood nor an educated class, fetishism had to triumph.

The roots it put down were profound. We just spoke of the serpent of Themistocles. But at another period a plague produced the same effect as did the invasion of the barbarians. Struck by the plague, the Athenians recalled that their ancestors had killed the inventor of the vine, Icarus, for having led them to the drunkenness that they believed was fatal. They also raised altars to a faithful dog who had not been able to survive his master.19

This Greek fetishism had jongleurs for priests, little different from modern ones.20 It is in vain that the priests of later times attempted to present them in a favorable, even imposing, light. They attribute to crude customs mysterious motives. But the priests of today’s savages provide approximate ideas concerning those of yesterday, and the Greek tragedies all agree in the matter, which confirms us in the conviction that the two priesthoods were identical.21

If we turn to the words of Homer, we would not elevate even the priests of Dodona above the category of jongleurs. He shows them sleeping on the hard ground, covered with mire, braving the rigors of the cold with naked feet, improvising their oracles.22 Leather bowls23 suspended from old oaks, whose prophetic 323 sound announces the future, are much like the drums of the Laplanders. And despite the equivocation detected by Herodotus, the inspired doves resemble fetishes,24 and the bag in which Aeolus gives Ulysses the four winds has an unmistakable likeness to the bags full of wind that the sorcerers of the North sell to sailors. Nonetheless, it could be the case that these priests of Dodona were the relics of a destroyed priestly corporation.25

More than one writer affirms that they disposed of their manhood, and we will see that this mutilation was practiced in the majority of religions dominated by priests. They were bound to rigorous abstinences and to follow severe rules. This is yet another agreement with the customs of priestly peoples, and a new difference between the Selles,26 the priests of Dodona, and the later priesthood of the Greeks. Not forming a corporate body, the Selles in Homeric times were not subject to any fixed rule. Herodotus27 tells us that they treated the popular anthropomorphism 324 with great disdain, and called the genealogies of the gods “fables invented only yesterday.” This was because in the midst of their present ignorance, the past bequeathed to them traditions that contradicted the new teachings of Greece. We do not think that to explain this opposition of teachings (if such an expression can be used when it is a question, on one hand, of crude notions, and, on the other, of garbled memories) it is necessary to attribute the origin of the priests of Dodona to Egyptian colonies.28 They would have acted in the same way if they were the descendants of indigenous priests.

Scattered members of a dispersed caste, they had to affiliate themselves with everything that recalled their former power. Everywhere that a priesthood encounters priestly privileges, teachings, or customs, it recognizes itself in its works. There is a natural confraternity among all priesthoods. Rivalries may suspend it, but they do not break it. Behold in the Iliad the Greek diviner embracing the cause of a foreign priest. The priesthood has for its homeland only the priestly order itself.

Whatever may be the case with these different hypotheses, whether the priests of Dodona were simple jongleurs, the products of fetishism, or the disfigured remains of a destroyed priestly corporation, it is certain that they remained throughout the entirety of the heroic age in a state of degradation and obscurity, which made their influence absolutely nil.

It was not to them, therefore, that Greece owed its return to civilization, and even when it had entered onto this path, as much as they could, they persisted in not following it. Greece’s return to more civilized mores was the work of Phoenician or Egyptian colonies who landed on their shores around three centuries before the Trojan War. Here, however, we encounter new problems to illumine and new errors to refute.

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CHAPTER 4: On the Influence of Colonies on the Social State and Religion of the Greeks

People have greatly exaggerated the influence of foreign colonies, especially Egyptian, on Greece.1 They have thought, and continue to think, that the Greeks, having received from these colonies their doctrines, rites, and belief, along with the initial learning suitable to their social state, that the development of their religion 326 was not the result of the natural development of the human spirit, but a chance event that gave this religion a distinctive direction.

This error goes back to the Greeks themselves. Consumed by an insatiable thirst for learning, their historians and philosophers believed that they had to derive all their knowledge from these countries of the East and the South, which were regarded as the sanctuaries of the sciences and wisdom. They therefore found in these renowned regions everything that could strike their already receptive imaginations, as well as their minds rendered credulous by their curiosity. Priests cloaked in darkness listened to their questions with haughty condescension and responded with proud reserve. They offered symbols, images, enigmatic ceremonies, everything that the most striking pomp and the most august mysteries could do to dazzle eyes and penetrate souls. Their revelations were craftily calculated to accord with the dispositions of the hearer. Varied, and only partial, revelations added the greater value of the unknown, of what was still covered in silence, to the value of what was taught. Even the spectacle of a uniform and peaceful despotism contained something seductive for these sages exhausted by the turbulence of anarchy. The sanctuaries of Memphis and Thebes appeared to them more suitable to meditation than the agora of Athens. And when they returned to the midst of their fellow citizens, who were constantly agitated by hostile passions and ephemeral interests, the profound peace and unshakable stability that they had exchanged for the convulsions of democracy seemed quite regrettable.

To these motives rooted in a natural and understandable bias, add the inclination of men to extol what they took so much time and trouble to discover and convey. By elevating the wisdom of Egypt, Herodotus and Plato vaunted their own learning, their studious investigations, and indefatigable zeal.

From this it has followed that today we generally consider the Greeks to be the docile disciples of Egyptian colonists, and we give little weight to the facts that argue against this opinion, one we have adopted on trust. Therefore, we first must examine what sort were the colonies established in Greece by the Egyptians who were their leaders, what teachings they brought with them, what interest they had in causing them to prevail, and the authority that they naturally obtained over the indigenous peoples.

As we have said, the Egyptians were divided into castes. Their priesthood was a monopoly. Their religion was dual: abstract, on one hand, crude on the other, symbolic or material, depending upon the point of view in which one considered it. The people knew only the exterior of this religion, and this exterior, which 327 consisted in the worship of animals that the multitude took to be gods, barely raised the public belief above the level of fetishism.2 From this country, which was divided into such different classes carefully separated from one another, came the colonies. If these colonies had been composed of priests, and these priests had been victorious, we would have seen in Greece what was seen in other countries: an enslaved people and an all-powerful priesthood, a fetishistic people and a learned, metaphysical, and astronomical priesthood.

But the Egyptians had a great horror of the sea, for them it was the evil principle.3 No member of the superior castes participated in sailing. Any maritime voyage was forbidden to priests.4

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Perhaps this circumstance ought to cause us to make a distinction among the colonies come from Egypt. Diodorus, speaking of those that Belus led to Babylon, says that this prince established priests there on the Egyptian model and exempted them from all taxes and public duties. But he says nothing similar about the colonies established in Greece.5

The emigrants who made up the latter were probably only men of the people, forced by need to overcome the national repugnance, and at most guided by a few leaders of distinguished birth, but much less occupied with science and religion than with the risks of their endeavor.6 Such colonies can know only the externals 329 of a religion whose secret meaning was scrupulously hidden from the vulgar.7 It has often been noticed among all nations that men devoted to war, sailors, and all those who, braving great dangers and undergoing violent trials, find little leisure in their adventurous lives for reflection, ordinarily fall into a wholly external superstition.

Therefore, there was not the distance between the colonies and the first Greeks that has been supposed. The gap was only of a few degrees, and this circumstance was very favorable to the civilization of Greece.

For a colony to civilize savages, there cannot be between them too great a disproportion of force or learning. When the colonies have too great a superiority of force, they do not civilize the natives, they enslave them or destroy them. When they have too great a superiority in enlightenment, the native savages cannot rise from their crude ideas to the much more refined opinions of the colonists. Intermediaries are lacking. The American tribes have remained savage and fetishist because they were able to remain in barbarism and polytheism before attaining theism and civilization. The Europeans have never civilized the savages they discovered, because they have always proposed mores, ideas, and a religion entirely beyond the savages’ grasp. The distance was too great.

It was not thus in Antiquity. The difference between the colonies and the natives was much less, communication had to be easier, instruction more effective. But by the same token, an amalgam had to result, rather than a revolution.

The Egyptian colonies had as their goal neither to convert nor to civilize the peoples they discovered. The sole object was to find a soil that would feed them, a shore that could become their new homeland. It, therefore, was in their interest not to have irreconcilable dissonance between their religious ideas and those of the former owners of the land. What was in their interest was also in keeping with their inclination. Polytheism always believes it finds itself in other religions. It sees allies where monotheism sees adversaries.

To be sure, the priesthood seeks to strip polytheism of this character. When they encounter their neighbors or their enemies, peoples given to priestly polytheism 330 destroy temples, overturn statues, and massacre suppliants. But this is because they come as conquerors.

The colonists who landed in Greece, in contrast, came as fugitives and almost as suppliants themselves. They therefore worked at mixing their opinions with those of the indigenous peoples. The difference of languages offered a great means for presuming a similarity of opinions. The necessity of being understood caused ideas that were not the same to be translated into a very imperfect language, and translation became a sort of concordat by which a mixed idea was formed of the two primary ideas without anyone noticing. It was by means of a similar process that our missionaries to China, obliged to express the Christian religion in Chinese, were accused of apostasy by those who remained in Europe.

We should add that a distinctive characteristic of polytheism in all periods is that in this sort of belief man does not remain exclusively attached to these gods, but only when they protect him effectively. Titus Livy tells us that the Albans, having lost to the Romans and been brought to Rome, were thoroughly incensed at their gods and gave up their worship.8 In a moment, we will see polytheistic nations appropriate the divinities of even their enemies, when they believe they find in them more powerful, or more loyal, auxiliaries.

Now, the colonies that arrived in Greece had to have experienced many misfortunes during their crossing. Leaving their native land, battered by winds, menaced by waves, exposed to hunger and to all sorts of physical difficulties, only with great efforts did they attain the soil that promised them a better future. It was natural that they conceived a kind of anger against the gods that had so poorly protected them, and that their souls were open to finding more propitious gods. If they had debarked among peoples whose cult was already established, they would have adopted it without hesitation. But since the fall of their priesthood, the Pelasgians professed only a primitive fetishism, whose anonymous idols were not combined and regimented in a body like those of Egypt. The colonists borrowed what they could from the indigenous belief. As Herodotus tells us, they gave names to gods who until then did not have any.9 With their own memories they filled in whatever lacunae appeared. They combined some of their own with the opinions of their new fellow citizens; these they also coordinated, some with their own traditions. 331 For their part, the Pelasgians had to have easily given themselves to this sort of amalgamation. Ignorant peoples think about their gods as about themselves. They believe that foreigners know and can do many things that they do not know and cannot do. They similarly believe that foreign gods (who have the merit of being unknown and the advantage of never having failed) can do and know more things than their own gods.

If one were to argue against this mutual tolerance on the basis of the counterexample of the special intolerance of Egyptian polytheism, that is, by referring to the wars that occurred from time to time in Egypt over sacred animals, we would reply that these wars were started by the rivalry of priests among themselves, and had as their causes not disputes over opinions, but insults leveled at the objects of worship. The absence of priests and the change of place had to return the polytheism of the colonies to the natural spirit of polytheism. This spirit is not tolerant in the sense that moderns attach to the word, which is to say, the respect governments have for all the religious opinions of individuals; but it is a species of national tolerance, of people to people, tribe to tribe. We see this spirit in the permission granted the Pelasgians to consult their oracle concerning the innovations proposed to them.

What we just said about Egyptian colonies applies with a few modifications to those of Thrace.10 Among all the countries that the historians of Antiquity help us understand, Thrace is distinguished by its barbarous worship, its fanatical rites, and its fierce enthusiasm. There the priesthood was clothed not only with the regular sacred authority possessed by the priesthood of Egypt,11 but with an even more redoubtable power because it drew from a sort of religious delirium, one inspired and nourished by ceremonies in part obscene, in part cruel. It seems certain that Thrace sent colonies to Greece, and that these colonies had priests for leaders who attempted to have their bloody customs and wild orgies triumph. Their efforts were not without some partial successes, which stained the Greek religion from time to time. But it always did its best to reject these noxious importations, and in general it succeeded. It is probable that the Thracian priests wanted to initiate the Greeks into Orphic teachings (which we will talk about later),12 which combined 332 in an unsurprising mixture (once one understands the cause) the most subtle metaphysics with the most revolting external worship. But neither this metaphysics, which was introduced into the systems of philosophy, nor this external cult, which was transformed in the mysteries into a secret cult, prevailed in the public religion.13 The Thracian colonies were always odious to the leaders of the Greek tribes; they often fought them openly; and the transactions with them that they proposed or allowed had for their purpose and their result preserving the peoples’ beliefs from the contagion of a foreign fanaticism.14

Nonetheless, some have supposed that whatever their origin, these colonies arrived 333 in Greece animated with fervent zeal and an ardor for war; that they waged religious wars against the Greeks; and that having been victorious, they changed the beliefs of the country they conquered.

This conjecture is destroyed by a single fact, however, which no one can contest. The religion purportedly established by the victorious foreigners was in no way the same as that of the country from which they came. Now, one cannot reasonably see how these foreigners, so attached to their religion that they would wage war to the death against the Pelasgians who refused to accept it, nonetheless would have abandoned it on their own in order to embrace an entirely new one. One cannot understand any better where this new religion would have come from, which was neither that of the former homeland of the foreigners nor that of the people they conquered. One would have to suppose that they would have immediately and spontaneously composed a religion different from the two older ones. This supposition runs against everything that reflection tells us about the development of the human race, as well as all that history confirms.

When a conquering people succeeds in making the conquered people adopt its beliefs, the belief that it imposes is precisely the same as that which it professed in its own country, at least during the first phases of its adoption. It is not altered by the change of place, except later. How, then, to explain that after colonies from Thrace15 or Egypt arrived in Greece, having waged war against the inhabitants of the country to establish their cult, and having triumphed after several fierce battles, a completely different worship resulted than that of Thrace or Egypt?

Nothing is less congenial to the spirit of primitive peoples than the form of intolerance that causes or fuels wars of religion. Even the advocates of this hypothesis had to have sensed this, because they compare the priests of what they call the ancient cult with the American jongleurs of our day.16 There is no trace of intolerance in the character of these jongleurs. They and their disciples listen with great curiosity, and no hostility, to the Europeans who speak to them about the Christian religion.

I do not know from what secret chronicles, in what contemporaneous memoirs, certain savants have drawn their information concerning times that we know about 334 only by the works of authors who were separated by more than twenty centuries from the times in question.17 They speak to us of Cyclops, Corybants, and Curetes as if they had lived in intimate familiarity with them. They know all the particulars of the life of Prometheus, who they say was a very enlightened man worthy of living in a less barbaric century, and who wanted to reconcile the two parties. For this purpose going from one party to the other, he became the victim of his own zeal and saw himself attacked by unjust calumnies that have lasted until today.18 In a word, they write the history of these long-gone epochs like someone recounting the intrigues of the court of Louis XIV or Louis XV.

Herodotus, who conveyed with great clarity everything he had gathered relative to the establishment of Greek religion and the influence colonies had exercised on its formation, does not make the least reference to religious wars occurring at this time. “Formerly,” he says, “the Pelasgians offered sacrifices accompanied by prayers, as was told to me at Dodona. But they did not distinguish by particular names the beings they worshipped,19 because they had not received any instruction on this score. They simply called them gods, in order to designate the rulers of all things. Much later, Egyptians taught them the names they had to give them. They consulted the oracle to know if they ought to obey these instructions come from barbarians. They received permission. From then on they made use of them in their religious ceremonies. . . . But they still were ignorant, almost up to our own time, of where each god came from and if they all had existed as they do at present. . . . Homer and Hesiod composed for the Greeks the genealogies of the gods . . . assigning to them their functions and their dignities, and limning their forms.”20

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Even though more learned and philosophic than Herodotus, no more than Herodotus did Thucydides attribute the revolution brought about in the Greek religion to religious wars.21

The influence of colonies on the formation of Greek polytheism was therefore very limited.22 The Pelasgian fetishism furnished most of the materials. The colonies 336 added several fables and, above all, many rites.23 But they did not substitute by force24 one cult for another. They did not transport the beliefs of the former homeland to their new establishments. In point of fact, they had rather imperfect ideas about this belief in the first place. They did not give the Greeks a religion. They only placed them in a state of civilization that had to modify their own religious ideas.

As for a small number of priestly institutions brought from Thrace, Egypt, or Phoenicia, these took root only in a few cities whose particular location favored them; for the longest time, though, they occupied only a secondary rung. Thus, for example, nature had brought together around Delphi everything that nourished and stimulated superstition and enthusiasm. Vast hollows exhaled vapors that rendered those who inhaled them delirious. Countless springs bubbled everywhere. Hidden grottos made it easy to forget the world, and seemed to promise communication with invisible powers. The deep shadows of ancient forests struck minds with religious terror. Moreover, it is plausible that a colony of priests come from Thrace and Macedonia early on established itself in that marvelous place, applying itself to introducing and maintaining priestly ideas and ceremonies. At Delphi, therefore, are found many customs, traditions, teachings, and rites that are imported from elsewhere.25 But the relations of the priesthood of Delphi with 337 the national worship were neither regular nor habitual. They did not exist at all in Homer’s time; the name Delphi does not appear once in the Homeric epics.26

Thus Greece, having regained its independence from a priesthood whose organization we only imperfectly understand, also maintained it against the colonies that civilized it. It maintained it equally against the repeated efforts of the priests of Thrace, Egypt, and Phoenicia to introduce their institutions and found their empire by hook or by crook. This, however, required a long, sometimes violent, struggle. It also did not occur without admitting some portions of the priestly mythology and, especially, more than one foreign rite. Even the institutions a people rejects influence its own; combatants are changed by combat, even victors by victory. But Greece subjugated everything it admitted. We will demonstrate this truth, the most important of historical truths, because the victory of Greece decided the fate of the human race.

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CHAPTER 5: On the Modifications the Independent Spirit of Greece Always Caused in What Came from Elsewhere

If the Greek genius was hardly favorable to the introduction of priestly teachings and opinions, the geographic position of the Greeks seemed to invite their barbarian neighbors to try frequently to introduce them.

Greece was everywhere surrounded by islands that foreign sailors had chosen for refuge or as a new homeland, and where they brought their religion.

As much as it is possible to conjecture, a priest whom the historians named Olen, whom they place even before the mythical time of Orpheus; or—and this seems more likely to us—a colony of which Olen was either the leader or the collective name, came to Delos via Asia Minor,1 singing the story of Diana and Apollo in its hymns, as well as of the offspring of Latona;2 that is, professing an astronomical religion. As a consequence, we see in the religious practices of Delos 339 many ceremonies that are different from the rites of Greece. There we see sacred virgins3 and fragments of the hymns sung by the islanders that resemble invocations in the Zend books and the Vedas.

Lemnos and Samothrace, formerly named Leucosi,4 were another route by which priestly religions came to Greece. Situated between this country and Asia, whose shores were not yet populated by any Greek colony, these islands received the first emigrants from Phrygia, Lydia, and Lycia. By their physical circumstances they were favorable to priestly power; they bore the imprint of nature’s revolutions. The destruction of the neighboring islands of Lemnos was an accredited prophecy,5 and Mr. de Choiseul-Gouffier6 saw traces of the disappearance of Chryse, swallowed up so long ago after having become famous by the misfortunes of Philoctetes.7 The most ancient sailing people, the Phoenicians, landed in Samothrace. They brought there their Cabiri, misshaped divinities that we will see reappear in the mystery cults, whose name goes back to Indian mythology.8 They seem to have lived for a long time on this island. It even seems probable that for some time the Phoenician language was the sole in use.9 Other colonies composed of Phrygians taught there the art of working in metals,10 and Diodorus speaks of the astonishment that their metal workers occasioned in the inhabitants by their charms and superior knowledge.11 These metal workers worshipped the elements; they rendered homage to the heavens and to the earth. Since priests bring into their religion everything that they know, this priesthood combined its metallurgic knowledge with astronomy. The dances they conducted while armed retraced both the dominion of man over the iron he had subjugated and the movement of the celestial spheres.12

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Each military expedition of the Greeks established relations between them and peoples subject to priests. From the time of the siege of Troy, they encountered the Phrygians, to whom Homer attributes Greek mores, but who clearly were a priestly nation. The cult of Cybele and her mutilations were of Phrygian origin.13 The Trojans had purchased their palladium from Abaris the Scythian; in other words, they had the same religion as the Scythians, or one not much different.14 They cast living horses into rivers,15 a type of sacrifice that expressed the worship they rendered the elements.16

From the most remote times commerce had united Greece to the East. At an even more remote and legendary time (because it precedes the era of Semiramis), we see the opulent and celebrated city of Ephesus arise on the site where the Cayster runs into the Aegean Sea. On one hand, it was the entrepôt of the wealth of Asia, on the other, one of the principal refuges of the Ionian colony. What antiquity tells us about the construction of its temple is a combination of traditions whose details differ but whose meaning is the same.

The son of the Amazon Penthesilia, Caistrus was the father of Semiramis by means of his dalliances with Derceto. He was also the father of Ephesus, who built the temple of Ephesus.17 Others attribute the construction of this edifice to the Amazons. These enemies of males, proud of their virginity and worshippers of a bloody deity Artemis, the Amazons very much resemble a priestly idea or institution.18 The priests of Ephesus also submitted themselves to mutilations that we also find in Syria,19 and the flame that burned perpetually on their altars was a souvenir 341 of the worship of fire. The Greeks also began early with Colchis. The inhabitants of Colchis came from an Egyptian colony. One can see an analogy between the fables of the two countries. In Colchis there was a river that bore the name of Isis.20 Greek merchants must have carried fables from there, which they garbled.

Finally religion itself, even while distinguishing the Greeks from the barbarians, established bonds between these two races of men that reinforced their mutual superstition. Very early on the Greeks consulted the most faraway oracles. Envoys from Elis crossed the deserts of Libya to query the oracle of Ammonius.21

It follows from all this that from the first moments of Greek civilization there were paths traced by which priestly opinions laid siege, as it were, to Greek polytheism, and endeavored to penetrate into it. Under a certain aspect and up to a certain point, they succeeded. The Greeks near to Homeric times must have been disposed to eagerly receive marvelous tales and solemn rites, which they did not understand well enough to see how incompatible they were with their own ideas and their national character. Their ignorance, a quality common to all infant peoples; their poetic imagination, which loved everything offered it to explain natural phenomena by supernatural causes rather than the mechanisms of the world (a sad discovery they had yet to make); a lively and spontaneous constitution; their respect for everything that came from afar, a respect that contrasted starkly with their disdain for barbarians; and finally, the constant struggle of their inner sentiment with the form of their belief—all these things prepared a rather easy entrance to foreign teachings. A tradition that many men repeat, said Hesiod, becomes a divinity. This phrase clearly expresses the profound and credulous curiosity of nascent societies, their need to know everything, whose impatient inexperience receives without examination everything told to it, and confounds together everything it receives.

Hence those countless borrowings from foreign nations by the Greeks of the most remote period. There is almost no Greek divinity whose actions or attributes are not a mixture of fables and priestly teachings. But the Greek spirit always triumphed; it reworked the fables, nationalized the imports, modified the teachings, and stripped them of what in the minds of the priests was their essential character.

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Let us support this with few examples, without trying to put them into a regular order. We do so because it seems useful not to leave this fundamental truth without proofs. We, however, have to confess that in so doing we are anticipating a later section in our work, one that requires a good deal of development. It is only in another book that we will present the complete exposition of the dogmas and rites that enter into the composition of the priestly religions of antiquity. There perhaps is a slight inconvenience in showing how the Greeks rejected them before talking about them as a whole. On the other hand, we think we have already sufficiently indicated what these composite religions were; we have seen that they contained science, cosmogonic hypotheses, personifications of physical forces, symbolic language and rites, a metaphysics that ends in pantheism, while being overlaid and mixed with popular fables, falling back from time to time into fetishism. These general ideas suffice for the moment, and it is important to support with evidence our claims concerning the immense distance that separates the Greeks from the rest of ancient nations.22

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In order to be better understood by the majority of our readers, we will take examples from among the best known divinities, among those, that is, who appear most frequently in the poems of Homer. This way people will better appreciate the supremacy of the Greek genius that while admitting far-off, mysterious traditions concerning these different deities, transformed them into indigenous tales, and removed from the divinities that had become Greek what was bizarre or somber, abstract or frightful, in a word: sacerdotal.

This method will also have the advantage of putting to the side several difficulties concerning details that we will be forced to consider later when we present the tableau of Homeric polytheism. No one will object that we took too literally this brilliant mythology, since we will have already indicated the elements that composed it; the philosophical, metaphysical, or cosmogonic teachings to which it alludes; and how the genius of Greece reworked and completely nationalized it.

Let us first recall an observation we already made in the first book.

The Greeks admitted tales that hardly differed from priestly cosmogonies into their own hypotheses concerning the creation of the world because these tales, at once confused and foreign, did not really interest them. The physical force and moral character of the gods, the relations of these gods with men, their regular influence on the destiny of their worshippers, these were—these had to be—what interested the religious sentiment in its anxious ignorance; they were objects of a constant attention and active curiosity. The Greeks wanted their gods to resemble them because they wanted the means of dealing with them at all times. But that these supernatural beings and the human race that worshipped them owed their existence to Chaos, to Night, to Earth, to chance, even; that they were intended to give a clear signal to following generations that they were no longer subject to fixed laws; that by uniting the dual creative force in themselves, or the active and passive principles, they could reproduce independently of sexual union by mysterious and often obscene procedures, or by strange mutilations, none of that was of any importance to a young people. And the Greeks put up no resistance to the fact that these foreign traditions brought such symbolic and sacerdotal ideas. According to Hesiod,23 the virgin Earth gives birth to the Sea, the Mountains, and the Sky without the cooperation of a spouse. The Sky produces Time, or Saturn, 344 and Saturn raises a sacrilegious hand against the generative power of his father. In all this, the stamp of the East has to be recognized, and the Greek genius made no effort to change these cosmogonic absurdities. It sensed that in the future it would have nothing to do with them, and in order not to be burdened by them, it put them in a separate sphere. Sky, Earth, Ocean, and their entire race of fabulous monsters—Cyclops, Centimanes and Gorgons, Chimera, Hecate, and Echidna, mother of the sphinx—are the object of no national cult. In their depictions, poets allude to them from time to time, and philosophers in their systems. For the rest, these grand shadows remain immobile, as it were, in the dark precincts where they are confined.24 They never came forth to join with active divinities, those invoked by the people in their temples, objects of prayers and sacrifices. It was upon the latter that the Greek spirit operated, and while examining these divinities one after another, we will see what its action was.

In Homeric polytheism, Minerva is not exactly, as is often said, the goddess of wisdom and prudence. To define her in this way would be to make her an allegorical divinity; the period of allegory, however, has not yet arrived. Minerva is proud, irritable, driven by a thousand human passions, as are all the inhabitants of Olympus. She however is in general more prudent and wiser than the other gods. This is because she is to be identified with the Phoenician Onga, brought with Cadmus to Thebes in Boetia,25 and because under obscure forms this divinity 345 represented the intelligence of the universe. But how did it come about that instead of being produced by the couplings of Jupiter, her birth is a marvel, that she has no mother, that she suddenly emerged, entirely armed, from her father’s head? This is because the Onga of Phoenicia, who is a cosmogonic divinity, and under this heading either virginal or hermaphroditic,26 is not subject to the common laws of generation, but came miraculously from the abyss that contains, engenders, and absorbs everything.

Why does this goddess of wisdom, the intelligence of the world, preside over domestic works, the small cares of women in the interior of their homes? This is because to her attributes have been joined those of the Egyptian Neith,27 transported to Athens by a colony of Sais. This Neith had received from Ptah the canvas of nature and worked on this mysterious cloth.28

How is it that Minerva, who thus did not disdain such peaceful occupations, is also the goddess of war and, bearing resplendent weapons, finds herself at home in the melée, in the midst of carnage and death? This is because the caste of warriors in Egypt was devoted to Neith, and bore her symbol, the beetle, on their rings.29 What connection is there between this bellicose Minerva and the tale that recounts that she invented the flute, but then cast it far from her because it disfigured the nobility of her features? This is because the flute was invented by the Phoenicians, and music and dance are the typical attributes of priestly divinities, expressing the harmony of the spheres.30 Finally, why did this goddess, bearing all the ideal beauty that characterized the gods of Greece, carry on her standard the terrifying head of Medusa? This is because the Libyan Pallas had appeared for the first time in Libya on the Triton lake,31 and the dress of the young girls of this country bore a remote resemblance to the serpents of the Gorgon;32 or perhaps 346 (here the traditions lose themselves in one another) it was the urn of the Nile, capped by the head of a man and surrounded by serpents, a mute symbol in Egypt but become for the Greeks the object of a detailed poetic account.33

Thus the Greek Minerva was originally a composite of incoherent ideas drawn from the different mythologies of foreign countries and reassembled. From this union, however, resulted a divinity who was perfectly conformed to the spirit of Greece’s polytheism, an elegant divinity, passionate and majestic, who descends to the earth and takes part in the actions of men, pursuing or protecting heroes. The intelligence of Onga, which in the priestly version had no relation with the destiny of mortals and signifies only the overcoming of chaos, in Greece is applied to the active interests of men, to their daily struggles. The mystical cloth that in the fingers of the Neith of Egypt represents the world is now the emblem of female industry. The head of Medusa, which recalls the terrifying attributes of priestly divinities, becomes the monument of the victory of a warrior whom Minerva assisted;34 the goddess mounts a chariot, arms herself with a spear, and puts on a breastplate: all these images are purely Greek. In order to finish the task of making her indigenous, her birth is transported to Arcadia.35 And last, the olive is her favorite tree. Now she is completely Athenian.36 All traces of her foreign origin are gone. There is nothing more different from the Egyptian Neith than the Minerva of the Iliad, and no one would recognize in the protector of Diomedes and Ulysses one of the dark forces personified by the priests of Tyre.37

The Egyptian colonies38 that had brought the worship of Apollo from Egypt 347 into Greece also had to introduce the traditional tales and rites practiced in their country. We find therefore the same animal, a wolf, dedicated to the sun at Lycopolis and likewise at Delphos; by his sideways gait he can image the indirect course of the sun.39 This figure brought into Greek traditions tales relating to the battles of Osiris. Under the figure of a wolf, this god came to help his son Orus;40 and Latona, leaving the Hyperborean countries to seek refuge at Delos had taken on the same form, it was said.41 Nor can one fail to recognize in the Daphnephoria42 that the Thebians celebrated every nine years in honor of the Ismenian Apollo, an astronomical feast. It took its name from the laurel carried by the comeliest adolescents of the town. It was surrounded by flowers and olive branches. From an olive tree, itself decorated by laurel branches and woven flowers, and covered with a purple veil, were suspended balls of different sizes representing the sun and the planets, decorated with garlands whose number was a symbol of the year. On the altar burned a flame whose movement, color, and crackling revealed the future; as we have observed, this was a species of divination peculiar to the priesthood, and 348 was especially in vogue at Olympus, the second city of the sacred land, and under this title the center of many priestly customs.43 The god of the sun was the god of music by a natural analogy to the course of the stars. And the sparrow hawk, the standard image of the divine essence in Egypt, in Homer was called the favorite bird of Apollo.44 As soon, however, as this Apollo of Egyptian origin took a distinct place in Greek mythology, the national spirit worked to strip him of these astronomical attributes. All the mysterious or scientific ideas disappeared from the Daphnephoria; they became the commemoration of the love of a god for a girl who resisted his desires.

A new god, Helios, fulfills the functions of the sun. In his quality as the son of Uranus and the Earth,45 this god was placed among the cosmogonic personifications.46 He played no role in the tales of the poets. He is mentioned only twice by 349 Homer.47 He had no priests, no cult; no solemn feast was celebrated in his honor. Thus stripped of all abstract signification, Apollo appears in Olympus, takes part in celestial feasts, intervenes in the quarrels of the earth, is the tutelary god of the Trojans, the protector of Paris and Aeneas, the slave of Admete, the lover of Hyacinth and Daphne. It is so true that the genius of the Greeks was the author of all these changes in the character of the divinities that we see Apollo retain in the mysteries where the priestly traditions had relegated them the astronomical attributes stripped away by the public cult. Later, the Neoplatonists will seek to give him the same attributes when they attempt to make polytheism an allegorical system of science and religious philosophy.48 But in the popular religion, instead of being the god who makes humans fruitful, he is a simple shepherd who guides the flock. Instead of dying and rising again, he is always young. Instead of burning mortals with his devouring rays, he shoots terrifying arrows from his quiver of gold. Instead of announcing the future in the mysterious language of the planets, he prophesizes in his own name. He no longer directs the harmony of the spheres by means of his mystical lyre; he has an imperfect lyre invented by Mercury, one 350 he perfects. He no longer leads the dance of stars, but walks at the head of the nine muses, each one presiding over one of the beaux-arts.49

Diana was subject to a no less remarkable alteration. At Delos, she is obviously a cosmogonic power because she is the mother of Eros, who in the theogonies is always taken as a creative force.50 Among the Scythians, she is a fierce goddess, thirsty for the blood of men, with a frightful form. This is how she initially appeared to the Spartans, because on seeing her they fell into a state close to delirium. At Colchis, she is so little Greek that she defended the Golden Fleece against the Argonauts. Her guardian dogs and their menacing teeth guarded the seven doors of the sanctuary that contained this precious treasure, and her voice commands monsters whose forms recall the fictions of India.51 At Ephesus,52 a mere look at 351 her figure reveals the priestly imprint. How different she is in Greek mythology! Yet a closer examination shows that none of these attributes entirely disappeared. If she is the goddess of the hunt, this is because Isis, accompanied by her faithful dogs and Anubis with a dog’s head, had sought the body of her spouse,53 and the companions of Isis became the pack of Diana. If from the heights of heaven she directed the bronze globe that scatters the darkness of the night, and if the half-moon decorated her head, it is because Isis is the moon, and the half-moon is part of the adornment of the goddess of Ephesus. If she is the cause of the infirmities of women, if she strikes them with madness, sometimes with death;54 if, in the same way, she sacrifices the children of Niobe; it is because she remembers being the Tithrambo of Egypt, that is, the moon considered in its malevolent aspect.55 But such is the repugnance of the Greeks to transport into religion what belongs to science that in the same way they separated Apollo and the sun, they separated 352 Diana and the moon,56 thus rendering her freer, more individual, and more independent. A virgin, she defied the power of Love; she harshly punishes the weaknesses of her nymphs. This understanding of virginity, which we have even seen in the worship of primitives,57 is an idea natural to man, but which the priesthood adopts and amplifies. For the Greeks whom the priesthood does not dominate, this attribute is only a secondary trait, the effect of the caprice or modesty of a young girl; and the poets call into question sometimes its reality, sometimes its duration. Even as a virgin, Diana presides over births, a combination that echoes that of the power to create and the power to destroy.58 One sees how incoherent are the remnants of the priestly notions that survived this metamorphosis, and at the same time how much they accompany it. They hardly touch upon the fundamental idea. The Hertha of Scythia, the Bendis of Thrace,59 the Isis of Egypt, and the Diana of Ephesus are no longer; now they have become the lithe young huntress who as swift as the wind pursues the frightened inhabitants of the woods.

Recall what Hermes was in the Egyptian religion.60 But the Greek Hermes is a 353 wholly other god. He presides over neither sciences nor writing, nor over medicine or astronomy. He has not composed divine books that contain their elements. The interpreter of the gods in Egypt, in Greece he is only their messenger. This is why he retains the wings that elsewhere were an astronomical symbol.61 If in memory of the directions given by the priests of Ammonium to the caravans crossing the desert he is the protector of commerce, the Greeks stripped all its somber gravity from this attribution. By a grotesque analogy that belied this function, Mercury became the god of fraud and lies.62 Is this, perhaps, a reaction of the Greek spirit against the pretentions of the priesthood, by way of a recollection of what the Egyptian Hermes had been? Please note how, even if all the priestly attributes are done away with in popular belief, they reappear in the mystical portion that the hymns, whether Orphic or Homeric, have preserved. The Hermes of these hymns has almost nothing in common with the Hermes of the Iliad or even the Odyssey. He rather recalls sometimes the qualities of the Egyptian Hermes, sometimes the legends of the avatars of India. Born in the morning of the union of Jupiter with Maia (whose name leads us back to the Indian Maia), Hermes escapes from the arms of his mother four hours after his birth, finds a tortoise on the ground, makes a lyre out of it, and sings of the loves of which he is the fruit, and of the nymphs of the maternal grotto. Behold, he is the inventor of music. He later steals the flocks of Apollo, hides them in a cave, kills fifty cows, and roasts them on a brazier: behold, 354 the inventor of fire. He offers sacrifice to the gods; that is, like Thot-Hermes, he regularizes the religious ceremonies. He eats the flesh of his victims, covers the flame he lit, and returns to the grotto. Malleable as a cloud, he enters by the key-hole and settles in his cradle: nothing more resembles the childhood escapades of Krishna. His mother is wroth; he reproaches her for seeing in him only a child, and declares that no one better distinguishes good from evil than he. Is this not Krishna, who, reprimanded by his nurse, simply opens his mouth, and to her great surprise she sees all the worlds united in all their splendor? Apollo pursues him. The flight of a bird, a witness or indiscreet confidant, directs the pursuit and betrays the hiding place of the fugitive. But come to the grotto, Apollo sees only a cradle in which a newly born infant sleeps. He nonetheless grabs him and wants to throw him into the depths of Tartarus. Hermes invokes the infirmity of his age and swears on Jupiter’s head his innocence. Apollo brings him to Olympus, and after a thousand burlesque ruses, totally incompatible with the refined tastes of the Greek poets,63 Hermes returns his flocks to the god and is admitted by the gods.64

We will not speak extensively about the stories relative to Hercules. Their foreign origin is well enough known,65 and their occult meaning has been the subject of tireless researches. Nonetheless, since it is one of the parts of Greek mythology where the triumph of the Greek genius is most obvious, a few words will not be out of place.

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Adored at Thebes in Egypt, Hercules is the sun at the renewal of the year.66 It is he who, by leaving footprints on the earth, ensures a fruitful year.67 He holds the phoenix in his hand, the symbol of rebirth.68 He was killed by Typhon, a new proof of his identity with Osiris. He rises from the dead, like the sun after the winter.69

Struck by all these allegories, Herodotus tried to reconcile them with his previous ideas. But soon enlightened about the uselessness of the attempt, he declared (while imploring the indulgence of the gods of his homeland) that it was in Egypt and not in Greece that one must seek the etymology of the name of Hercules, and the meaning of the traditions connected with him.70

In fact, the Greek Hercules is only a hero. It is not the signs of the zodiac that he traverses, but monsters from which he delivers the world. Civilized and given to agriculture, Egypt saw in him fecundity. Uncultivated and savage, Greece saw only physical force. Each of his exploits is susceptible to a secret meaning, but it was the literal sense that was adopted. And if the epithets that the poets gave him recall the hidden meanings, the external sense soon enough replaces them in the popular interpretation.71 What did it matter to the Greeks that the victory over Antaeus of this son of Jupiter was, as a very ingenious French savant explained,72 the triumph of art and work over the burning sands of Libya? What did it matter that Hercules, disposing of his enemy by removing him from the earth that gave 356 him his strength, is really the Nile divided into a thousand canals, thus preventing the arid sand from returning into desert? For them, Antaeus was only a giant and Hercules, his conqueror. Neither the idea they conceived of him nor the homage they bestowed upon him contrasted with the rest of popular mythology. Only, at the end of his glorious career the Greek Hercules reprised in certain respects traits of the Egyptian Hercules. The latter, after having obtained from Jupiter Ammon the privilege of looking upon him, was plunged into an ineffable, all-absorbing contemplation that incorporated him into the infinite being.73 Here one recognizes the doctrine of the priests—found in the majority of their philosophical systems—of the reunion of partial beings with divinity. Consumed by a fatal tunic, the Greek Hercules desired to return to the earth all that he had received from an earthly mother. He placed himself upon the fire, the flames consumed him, and the divine breath that animated him was lost in the soul of the universe.74 Thus Greece offered him a double cult. On one hand, he was adored as a hero, on the other, he was worshipped as a god.75 From this resulted a singular construction in Homeric mythology, unique in its kind. The deified Hercules enjoyed an unalloyed happiness in Olympus while the shadow of Hercules moaned in the netherworld.76

We will be even more concise concerning Bacchus. The worship of this god is certainly of Indian origin. But to arrive at Greece it had to cross other lands: upper Asia, Phoenicia, Egypt, and Thrace, and in this crossing its tales had to change and become embellished. It is impossible to deny his identity with Osiris.77 It is equally impossible not to recognize in him the Shiva of India and the Lingam, his symbol.78 The way in which his cult arrived among the Greeks, probably by 357 several successive migrations across very far-off countries, will always be an insoluble enigma, at least with respect to the dates of these migrations and the particular events that accompanied them.79 The fables of which he is the hero,80 the rites these tales animate—rites that are sometimes of a profound sadness, sometimes of a delirious gaiety, alternatively bloody and licentious, lugubrious and frenetic—never became part of the Greek religion.81 Everywhere they appeared they excited horror and fear. The misfortunes and destruction of several dynasties were attached to their sudden and terrifying appearance. Agave tore to pieces her son Pentheus. Ino dove into the sea with Melicertes. Having gone mad, the daughters of Mina committed horrible murders and underwent a hideous metamorphosis. Later, a similar madness seems to have seized the virgins of Athens and provoked 358 them to commit suicide. No matter how fictitious these accounts, they nonetheless indicate a widespread opinion that better established facts support.82 The style of the poets who entertain us with these traditions is grave and mysterious, and betrays a priestly origin. The philosopher Euripides and the mocker Ovid, who express themselves with so much levity concerning other legends, in describing the death of Pentheus seem to share the bloody pleasure, fierce irony, and fanaticism of the bacchants. One would say that the priestly genius had mastered the unbelieving poets, and that even after ten centuries the frenzy of ancient orgies dazzled their senses and troubled their reason.

At the time of Homer, these melancholic accounts were unknown or dismissed. Bacchus is spoken of only once, on the occasion of the victory he won over Lycurgus.83 And the scholiasts were astonished that the poet, having placed Bacchus among the divinities, had him take no part in the affairs that divided them. This is because the Greek genius early on refused even to modify this too heterogeneous idea. But they compensated with the companions and satellites of Bacchus.

Silenus, whom we will later see was one of the chief figures in the priestly demonology, Silenus, intermediary between the gods and mortals, son of the still virgin Earth and born without the assistance of a man,84 became a drunken, ridiculous old man who only recalled grotesque ideas.

The god Pan, who made the woods resound with the music of his flute and who followed behind Bacchus leading choruses of nymphs and satyrs, in Egypt85 359 was one of the eight superior gods, and even the first of the eight. He was the great Whole, the Demiurge, the Firmament. Three cities were dedicated to him: Mendes, found on one of the arms of the Nile; Hermopolis at the center of the country; and Chemnis in the Thebaid. In their secret doctrine, the priests formed an abstract and metaphysical idea of him, while the people’s fetishism represented him with horns and cloven hoofs.86 But the allegory combined apparently opposed ideas. His cleft hoofs were the emblem of prolific force,87 his horns, the rays of the sun and the moon, his visage with a shining aspect, the lit-up sky; while his furred feet were the image of the earth, the forests, and the animals who lived in them.88 Taken over by Greek mythology, Pan retained all his external attributes, but each one took on a different significance. His head and his feet, far from expressing a cosmogonic idea, made him the god of shepherds. Once representing the harmony of the spheres, his dances became the dances of the inhabitants of hamlets. His jowls, shining a florid red, witnessed to drunkenness. His flute composed of seven reeds that alluded to the seven planets became a rustic pipe. In a word, he was now a secondary god or a demi-god.89 It was not that the original ideas were not preserved, but they were preserved in a way to astound those who encountered them with their contradictions.90

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“The temple of Pan,” says Pausanias, “is in Arcadia. There it is said that this god, the most powerful of all, answers the prayers of men, and severely punishes the wicked. Next to his statue burns a sacred fire that never goes out; and at Olympus his altar rises in the interior of Jupiter’s temple.”91 This worship, this opinion of the distributive justice of Pan, his place next to Olympian Jupiter, these are things that hardly go together with the status of a field-god. Some purely Greek traditions seem marked with the same foreign souvenirs. Pan assisted the Athenians at Marathon and Salamis.92 He helped the Macedonians win a victory over the barbarians. He came to the aid of Antigonus Gonatas, who was attacked by the Gauls. Finally, it was his terrible voice that struck terror in entire armies and put them to rout. How can one reconcile such power with the idea of a subordinate, almost laughable deity, whom his own worshippers treat with a levity very close to disdain?93

We will leave Vulcan to the side, whose very name directs our thoughts to Egypt,94 and in whom we could point to the eternal, uncreated fire, the active principle of the world.95 This fire that burns in the stars, that circulates through 361 all the parts of the universe, that organizes inert matter in a thousand different forms,96 becomes a god whose halting gait and conjugal calamities give rise to inextinguishable laughter on Olympus. We will end with a last example, that of the Cabiri.

In the language of priests, the Cabiri designate the two great opposing forces.97 They are the earth and the sky, wet and dry, body and soul, inert matter and vivifying intelligence. Their original figure was unshapely and ugly. They were monstrous dwarf gods.98 They were brought to Samothrace in this form. There, they were called the grand gods, strong and powerful. They were sometimes hermaphroditic and sometimes each of a different sex.99 Their cult consisted in orgies rather similar to those of the Phrygian Cybele. Loud music stirred their worshippers to wild dances. Greek mythology in turn took them over, and the poets examined what features could be used in the necessary transformation. The statues of the Cabiri had been placed in the port of Samothrace. They presided over the winds. They were made gods favorable to sailors and terrible to pirates.100 They appeared at the peak of masts in the form of shining flames, announcing the end of storms.101 They expressed the opposition between light and darkness. One of the gods had to be hidden under the earth while the other shone in the sky. They had emerged from the cosmogonic egg:102 the two new divinities emerged from an egg, fruit of the lovemaking of Jupiter and Leda. In order to further nationalize them, they became the protective heroes of Sparta and watched over the Olympic 362 games.103 They were identified, via Helen, with the family of the Atrides. Warrior adventures104 were attributed to them, to provide a motive for their apotheosis.105 The gods gave them winged chargers.106 They were named Castor and Pollux, and the hideous Cabiri became the handsome Tyndaridae.107

The application we just made of this principle to a small number of Greek divinities would yield comparable results if we extended it to all the Greek gods. Juno, who in the Orphic teaching was the air or atmosphere and was the moon among the Phoenicians, retained among the Greeks only very contradictory remnants of her priestly characteristics. In this way, she is both the wife and the sister of Jupiter. And people allude to her original personification of the atmosphere when they recall that, once upon a time, she was suspended among the clouds.108 In the hymns that contained the foreign teachings entering Greece via the mysteries, Juno was incensed that her spouse had caused Minerva to spring from his head. She addressed the Earth, the Heaven, and the Titans, in order to produce by herself 363 Typhoeus, who had a hundred arms and one hundred heads. The Earth responded with a groan that announced the fulfillment of her prayer, and soon the birth of the monster caused terror among both the gods and men.109 Nothing is less Greek than this fiction. Therefore we find no trace of it in Homer. Juno is a jealous and vindictive divinity with human interests, passions, and desires, but supernatural force. But nothing is allegorical in these desires, or cosmogonic in her forces.

The Mars of Thrace, to whom the poets frequently allude,110 and the Mars of Phoenicia, who served as the chief text for Dupuis111 and his astronomical hypothesis, and for the German Canne,112 whose etymological subtleties were no less ingenious and just as admissible, are probably the archetypes of the Homeric Ares.113 But as indomitable and fierce as the latter might be, he equals neither in excess nor irrationality the priestly version. His forms are more noble, his worship more humane: the human sacrifices offered at Sparta when he first arrived have fallen into disuse.114 And if we draw from authorities subsequent to Homer, we would see that the impetuous and cruel Mars, formerly avid for human blood and carnage, was called the avenger of the innocent, the guide of the just, and the protector of mortals.115

In the cult of Adonis, composed not only of the traditions of various countries but referring to different divinities116 imported into Greece at different times from 364 Syria, Phoenicia,117 Egypt, Cyprus, and later Alexandria; in the cult of Adonis, as we were saying, which involves a mixture of science, lamentations, and obscenities (the mystical images of death and resurrection),118 the Greeks at first saw only the poetic side, the unhappy loves of Venus and a handsome adolescent. And when they later admitted some of his foreign rites, they separated the Greek Venus from the Syrian Venus, and the feasts of Adonis were exclusively attached to the latter.119

The entire history of Pasiphae is borrowed from an astronomical cult;120 but only the sordid passion of Pasiphae for a bull remains in the Greek fable. The daughter of Inachus is Isis; she gives birth to Epaphus, who engendered the celestial Bull, like Apis born of a heifer impregnated by a moonbeam. But in Greece she retains from her Egyptian origins only the horns on her head, which embellish rather than disfigure her.

The wild, indecent races of Isis or Cybele for their spouses or their mutilated lovers,121 in Greece becomes the touching story of a mother who seeks a beloved daughter throughout the entire universe.

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Jupiter122 owed to Egypt several of the objects of his love;123 to Libya his shield, one of his mistresses,124 and his brother Neptune; to Phoenicia his father, his grandfather, Ceres his wife, and his daughter Proserpina; to Thrace his son Mars; to the ancient indigenous cult of the Pelasgians Juno, his wife and sister; to Phrygia his cup-bearer Ganymede; to Scythia his rival Prometheus; finally to India the divine bird, bearer of his thunder; his eagle is clearly a Greek imitation, and thus embellished and stripped of strange additions, but nonetheless a recognizable imitation of Garudha, the king of the birds in India, with a piercing gaze, rapid flight, golden plumage, a wonderful combination of human, eagle, and sparrow hawk, and the mount of Vishnu.125 Nonetheless, despite this priestly mosaic (if the expression is allowed) the Jupiter of Homer is exactly what the master of the gods ought to be at this period of polytheism.126

If Greece in this way incorporated so many foreign ideas into its beliefs, which it subordinated to its genius; even more so it ought to have received from elsewhere many practices and rites. Rites in fact are introduced more easily than opinions can be shared. From this came many customs in Greece that the Greeks themselves could not explain. For example: the invectives that women hurled at one 366 another during the feasts of Damia and Anxesia, which were in imitation of Egyptian women during the feasts of Bubastis. From the same source came the duties of continence or even virginity imposed upon certain priestesses.127 But more compassionate than priestly polytheism, Greek religion ordinarily was more indulgent to the infirmities of nature or sought to anticipate them. Among these priestesses, some exercised their functions only until the time when they became nubile; others made such rigorous vows only when age rendered them incapable of violating them.128 Finally, from this cause came the theoxenia found in several cities in Greece—in Athens, Delphi,129 and Achaia130—which were solemn commemorations of the admission of foreign gods. But even while engaging in these rites, the Greek people did not inform themselves about their meaning. They were content with the accumulation of striking ceremonies, of dances and pomp, which they enlivened with their own spirit and gaiety. Their previous views remained intact. The practices borrowed from abroad were for them spectacles in which they were both actors and spectators, occasions for celebration and means of coming together.

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CHAPTER 6: The True Elements of Greek Polytheism

If our readers were to bring together what they just read, they would recognize the truth we have attempted to establish. In its spirit, or its tendency, Greek religion has nothing that likens it to the tendency or spirit of religions subject to priests.

Its initial element was fetishism; but the colonies that brought civilization combined the fetishes and changed them into national gods.1

To this first modification of fetishism was added a circumstance that completed the transition of this belief to polytheism: the apotheoses of several leaders of the foreign colonies.2

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Nothing is more natural than these apotheoses. Men who arrived among the savages with some knowledge of indispensable arts, and who not being the strongest could only be the benefactors of those they instructed, had to appear to be gods. The unfortunate inhabitants of America display the same tendency to divinize the Spanish whom they see sailing their ships or mounted on their horses; 369 and these pitiless conquerors do not disabuse them of their errors, except by the combined force of their cruelties and crimes.

By these apotheoses, a certain number of divinities took on human form. Gradually, all the others followed this example. Rocks, stones, trees, and mountains ceased to be worshipped under their natural form, and events were assumed to explain their metamorphosis.3

In their former countries, the colonists had seen priests deify the great phenomena of nature. The memory of these deifications mixed with the apotheoses. From this resulted gods whose character was dual, whose attributes were mixed. But the part of the character and these attributes that was due to the priests disappeared by degrees, and the time of this disappearance can be determined. It was the substitution of the cult of Jupiter for that of Saturn. Jupiter is the center of the popular mythology.4 Everything prior to his reign is somber, mysterious, incoherent. The vague conceptions of the savages struggled with the strange traditions of foreigners. Everything that follows the advent of Jupiter is elegant, regular, applicable to the needs of a people advancing toward civilization. New gods succeeded old ones. These new gods have a more individual existence that more conforms to that of men. Jupiter and Neptune replaced Uranus and Ocean. In Venus, a seductive deity, passionate like mortals, the generative force was personified, which formerly was scattered among Night, Discord, and the Sea, obscure figures without any direct action on human life.5

The same colonies had brought ceremonies and rites whose meaning they had forgotten. Vestiges of these rites were preserved, but without any explanation of their motives.6 The imagination of the Greeks invented them. Become enigmatic, 370 priestly practices gave way to fables. Sometimes when the practice fell into disuse, the fable survived it, but without being able to recall the original practice.7

Once entered onto this path, the Greeks never stopped. Everywhere one sees a variety of ingenious traditions flower. Some owed their birth to the meaning of a proper name; others to a distant resemblance between two objects that otherwise have no relation; some to an oddity of nature, or to an effect of chance. The river that flows by Mantinea is called Ophis; this is because a serpent served as guide to the inhabitants of this city who were seeking a homeland.8 The myrtle of Trezene has pierced leaves; this is because Phaedrus, consumed by a deadly love, pierced them with a golden pin when he was in despair.9 The rock by Mount Sipylus resembles from afar a woman bent toward the earth; this is Niobe bent under the weight of her sadness.10 An olive tree makes itself noted in the Argolida by its crooked form: Hercules shaped it that way in order to fix the limits of the country of the Asineans.11 Sometimes the traditions express the patriotic desire to nationalize discoveries claimed by foreigners. Thus, it is no longer the Egyptian Cecrops but the Athenian Triptolemus who was the inventor of the plow.12

Each of these traditions served to make the Greek religion more indigenous. They established new bonds between the gods and those who worshipped them, between the soil and those who lived on it. At the death of a hero, the trees, rivers, heaven, and the earth mourned, like his compatriots.

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These scattered traditions were concentrated and, as it were, circumscribed in a span of time determined by a fictional chronology.13 This length is manifestly too contracted to contain the many confused events found in it. Recalled only by rare and obscure memories, the infancy of nations becomes rather dense and appears much shorter than it was in reality.

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CHAPTER 7: The Results

These are the several heterogeneous elements of Greek polytheism. It is a mixture of some remnants of a crude cult with memories of the past, as well as those of far-off countries, together with tales of travelers. It is the history of the migrations and establishment of each people, the settling into each country, the foundation of cities, the exploits of leaders, and the rivalries and misfortunes of their dynasties. It is the story of science disguised as fables, precepts put into action, metaphysical subtleties personified and unrecognizable. In a living religion, these things are commingled. Imagination and belief do not distinguish among them as do reason and reflection. Classification is a kind of anatomy that is exercised only on corpses.

From all these heterogeneous elements, however, a uniform whole results, animated by the same spirit.

If, as we agree was the case, the Greek religion was more than any other enriched by foreign borrowings, these never altered its constitutive genius. The customs and opinions that the Greeks received at different times from different nations entered only partially, separately, some in one place, others in another, but without reconstituting the whole they had formed when in the hands of priests, and without ever dominating the mass of Greek opinions.1 The changes the latter underwent were always the effect of the progress of enlightenment and the natural development of 373 thought. Privileged by nature and by chance, by their own interior force this people subjected to their national spirit the multiform materials from which they composed their religion. The superb climate, the almost unique good fortune they had of being civilized by foreigners without being subjected by them—a combination of circumstances that was never reproduced in history—allowed them to never depart from the natural development of religious ideas. At each period, the religion had the character that the epoch had to imprint. The traditions, ceremonies, truths, and errors come from abroad always bent to this character. The Greeks never accepted these discordant materials, except on the condition that they could fashion them at their pleasure.2 Drawing from the fetishism of their ancestors some of the fundamental traits of their gods, they ennobled their inclinations and beautified their forms. They accepted from the East only names and rites. While sacralizing the memories of their ancient (and confused) history, they painted these vestiges of barbarous times with more brilliant, and softer, colors. Placing some of the men who had civilized them on Olympus, they so clothed them with celestial attributes that their earthly origin was covered with a veil.

Later we will notice more than once that when the Greeks adopted fables from other peoples, portions of which did not fit with the ensemble of their ideas, they 374 rejected these parts. And if much later the progress of thought made them more fitting, they would reprise what they had rejected.3 So much did the national spirit exercise a despotic sovereignty over all these opinions!

A fortunate and salutary sovereignty, without which the human race—become stationary and petrified—would everywhere today be the same as it was in Egypt!

Instead of developing and purifying itself, the religious sentiment struggling under unnatural fetters would have become disordered because of the lack of progress, delirious because of the lack of liberty. This truth will be manifest in all its evidence when we follow the development of Greek polytheism step by step, embellishing the forms of its gods, improving their character, introducing morality into religion, and separating from belief everything that no longer accorded with the new notions concerning humanity and justice.

Priestly polytheism, in contrast, preserved all the deformities and vices of these idols. Wounded by this oppressive disproportion between them and itself, the religious sentiment experienced only terror where it needed to place confidence. It resembled the legendary giant who was immortal but captive, who because of the crushing weight of an enormous burden moved only by convulsions. Sometimes he cast himself into bitter sadness,4 sometimes he gave himself over to irrational 375 joys.5 The latter, however, were a kind of inebriation, even more troubling than the melancholy he tried to escape. One would say that among priestly nations, tired of being prey to constant sadness, man foreswears reason in order to escape the suffering that haunts him. But the result of these efforts is not a happy or even calm condition. The shouts of a disordered and artificial exhilaration degenerated into lamentations; frenetic dances were marked by mutilations, battles,6 and dark commemorations; and debauchery itself was mixed with deep sadness. It was at the somber ceremony of Adonis at Byblos that Syrian women offered the sacrifice of their chastity.7 Peoples subjected to priests passed from abasement to license, and from orgies to despair. By a singular effect of the symbolizing spirit, sensual ideas combined with lugubrious ones.8 The gods who presided over death were honored by obscene rituals; those who presided over life by cruel ones. The phallus was planted on sepulchers,9 and the same phallus was drenched in blood.

Today, it is only with great difficulty that one can conceive the full extent of the evil done to man by the priesthood of Antiquity. At this period, religious notions felt the effects of the unreflective and petulant impulses of the human race in its infancy. In contrast, the excess of civilization of our days condemns the generations to premature fatigue. The past centuries weigh heavily on us; experience takes hold of us from the cradle, and our youth already bears the imprint of the caducity of time. But at least as a kind of recompense, we possess science and enlightenment. Among nascent peoples, man was intoxicated by the fullness of his forces and the pleasures of his new life. All of nature seemed to speak to him, while it is silent to us. Religion had its childish joys, which it has long since lost. It had not put on the robe of the adult. But the priests, merciless preceptors of the nations they controlled, 376 deprived them of these joys without giving them enlightenment in return. They wanted them to be at once as docile as children and as sad as men.

Greek polytheism was the only one that in its public part—we are not speaking here about the mysteries—protected itself from the dual extremes of sadness and license.10 In the majority of Greek cities, nocturnal rites were forbidden.11 The Olympic games, both the Pythian and the Isthmian, occupied in the Greek national worship the place that the festivals of Sais, Hierapolis, Memphis, or Bubastis played in Egypt. In Egypt, one’s gaze was offended by revolting objects, one’s ears struck with discordant clamors; and in order to worship the gods, man seemed to descend from the level where nature originally placed him. While in Greece, elegant games, harmonious choruses, and a noble contest of talents, as well as the beautiful alliance of all the arts, raised him above the earth, as it were, and encouraged both the beauty of forms and the sublimity of thought.

It is therefore fortunate—a thousand times fortunate—for the human race that the Greeks12 followed the path that nature laid out for them. They alone preserved that liberty of thought that allows the soul its most sublime flights, the spirit its noblest developments. The victory they won over the priestly corporations who oppressed the rest of the earth was the signal and sign of the high destiny reserved to man by the beneficent being who created him. We owe to the Greeks the life of the mind and moral strength. They have passed on these precious goods to us as our heritage.13 We must carefully guard this inestimable 377 deposit. Ancient Greece knew how to acquire it, may modern Europe know how to defend it.

But we must not flatter ourselves that because of the brilliant period of civilization in which we find ourselves, we have no dangers to fear. It is less impossible than one might think to return generations dominated by egoism and weakened 378 by luxury to the situation of those ancient peoples that an all-powerful priestly order kept in subjugation and immaturity. If one constantly attacks instructing the laboring classes; if one forbids the most efficient modes of communicating even elementary education to them; if one goes so far as to forbid them the use of the alphabet;14 if one lavishes terribly misguided admiration upon the priests of former times, whose teachings, rites, and doctrines reason disdains, thus making sincere piety an object of repugnance, the danger becomes great.

We will not go as far in our alarums as the dean of German scholars, who accuses the ingenious commentators on the philosophies and symbolic cults of Antiquity of presaging by means of their learned systems the return of theocracy, subjection to thrones, and the corruption of nations.15 His fears, however, do not seem to us to be entirely fanciful. A great question is thereby clearly posed, and upon its 379 answer depends our future. How did man emerge from the mire in which he lived with the animals?16 Did he raise himself to the awareness of his celestial origin by the power of his soul and his intellect, divine gifts of his creator, or does he owe his new being to the partial and parsimonious17 instructions of those corporations 380 that earlier swaddled him in crude fictions, enervated him with subtleties, and frightened him with wild ceremonies or brutalized him with shameful rites?

That the imitators of the magi or the heirs of the Druids would adopt the latter view, nothing is simpler. The independence enjoyed by the Greeks is a scandal for them. The few facts that can please them, the death of Socrates or the exile of Anaxagoras, cannot satisfy them. They demand the entirety, the whole, which charms them by its vast silence, its enormous weight, and its solemn immobility.18

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But in a truly strange incoherence, the philosophy of the eighteenth century, because of its irreligious passion, lent its assistance to these enemies of all enlightenment. It declared itself the admirer of the enslaved peoples who bordered the Indus and the Nile. Their worship differed from Christianity: this was enough to obtain the favor of the unbelievers. Basing their superficial learning and biting harangues on dubious witnesses and apocryphal writings, these philosophers wanted to humiliate Christian priests by the praise they lavished upon Brahmans, and to denigrate the Gospel—which they poorly understood—by exalting the Vedas, which they knew not at all. And in a patent non sequitur, in order to mock the Christian Messiah, born of a virgin, dying on a cross, and redeemer of man, they 382 extolled the disciples of Krishna, himself the son of a virgin, killed too by the wood of arrows, for the salvation of the human race.19

A general prejudice resulted from this absurd alliance between two opposed fanaticisms, one that continues to influence even the better minds.20 This prejudice is not without danger, and it would be wrong to view it as merely a historical error. The theocracies of the Middle Ages justified themselves by means of the example of ancient theocracies. Today, some propose the sanctuaries of Eleusis and Memphis as models, and the philosophical panegyrists of ancient Egypt wonderfully serve the aims of those who would like to impose an Egyptian yoke on modern Europe.

Against this yoke, civilization is insufficient. Civilization enfeebles souls; it disposes them to support everything, because it offers them easy resources to withdraw from everything. By teaching the slave to mock his master, it renders obedience less humiliating for his vanity. Servitude believes it is less vile when it can console itself with irony.21

Child of civilization, industry is no less ineffective. It hardly worries about oppression, because for a while it can escape from it. It confines itself to a sphere 383 where it believes freedom of thought is superfluous; and when its eyes are opened, the light comes too late.

The sciences obtain protection for their material aspects, which they pay for with adroit concessions. Admitted into the inner circle, they become complicit with the monopoly they share.

Left to itself, philosophy is without force. It leads to doubt, and doubt saps the energy of the soul.

The religious sentiment alone can save us. By enhancing the price of life, by surrounding it with an air of immortality, it ensures that this life itself can be an object of sacrifice. It is even more precious, though, because it is our means of improvement. Nor is this all. Because of it, our thoughts are no longer circumscribed in a narrow sphere. And persecution, injustice, and death are but the steps that lead to the source of all good.

We have already said this: the current crisis is the same that threatened human nature at the time of the establishment of Christianity. But one circumstance today is more favorable. At that time, no rallying point offered itself to the dispirited human being. Everything was vague, confused, and uncertain; he sought some form—and every form fled from him like a cloud.

Today we are in possession of Christianity. And of all the forms the religious sentiment can assume, Christianity is at once the most satisfying and the purest. As it was taught by its divine author, it soothes all the pains of the soul. It respects all the liberties of the intellect while also delivering it from doubt. And with its subtle and varied sympathy, it offers to all—from the palace to the cottage—the consolations they need.

Unalterable yet flexible, it engraves essential truths on hearts, it receives the tributes of the centuries, as well as the improvements they bring. Religious people should not be offended that we speak of the improvements of Christianity. In its moral doctrine, in its precepts, in everything that comes from its author, it is not perfectible because it is perfect. But in its forms, and above all in the partial opinions its followers have adopted, it has room for improvement.

Experience shows this. The most ardent defenders of Catholicism, those whose express mission would seem to be to maintain its doctrines in all their rigor, involuntarily witness to this. They themselves reject those harsh and fanatical maxims against which our more enlightened reason and our gentler mores have long since rebelled.

Do we not read in a recently published book by the head of a university in 384 France, an author who thus, as it were, legally represents the religion of State, did we not read a vigorous refutation of a doctrine that almost the entirety of Catholics believed, and still believes, is imposed by the Roman Church?22 To be sure, men versed in the history of dogma know that Catholicism, no matter how severe certain of its ministers have made it out to be, never formally pronounced the condemnation of unbelievers who were so because of the chance of birth, or because of invincible ignorance or other circumstances beyond their will. In a spirit of justice, as well as a desire for fraternal tolerance, we are quite pleased to acknowledge the following: the Catholic religion does not question Providence, it does not level terrible anathemas at those who can only be characterized as subject to an involuntary misfortune. The famous maxim, outside of the Church there is no salvation, has been wrongly interpreted; and the Sorbonne itself has restricted the meaning of the axiom, even in writings that continued to display its easily provoked spirit and its hatred of independent thought.23

It cannot be denied, however, that an interpretation that both reason and religion reprove has been constantly proclaimed as an article of faith; that it motivated bloody proscriptions and great cruelties; that the Spaniards invoked it when massacring the unfortunate inhabitants of America; that the Sorbonne—to which we just rendered due justice—adopted this interpretation without noting or calling 385 attention to the actions contrary to it that its own zeal had prompted;24 that fanatical preachers, whether from the pulpit or in works directed against other Christian communions, consign to eternal damnation the child who professes the worship imposed on him by birth, as well as the savage of the New World who is ignorant of the name of Christ.

This is therefore an immense step, an uncontestable improvement, in the practical doctrine of a Church proud of its immutability, when it disavows the maxim that, as we said, was never embraced in theory, but which she permitted or accredited for the longest time.

Thus Christianity is perfected, in the sense that it removes the additions that disfigured it less than a century ago. And even in the midst of the retrograde movement that some want to impart to the human race, men of all opinions are following—whether freely or out of compulsion, by craft or conviction—the new path that time guides them on. Time is always active, always irresistible.

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BOOK VI: THE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF PRIESTLY POLYTHEISM

388 389

CHAPTER 1: On the Combination of the Worship of Elements and the Stars with That of Fetishes

To a certain extent we have prepared our future path. We have indicated the first cause of priestly power, described its extent, and pointed out the path that priests have an interest in pursuing from the very origin of societies; we have shown the different direction, imprinted by nature on the free human spirit, taken among nations independent of priesthoods.

We therefore can proceed without fear of well-founded objections to the examination of free and progressive cults, as well as those that are imposed and immobile, determine their respective forms, and seek what the action of the religious sentiment is under one and the other of these forms, an action that is less perceptible the more dogmatic the collective authority is, and the more individuality is constricted. This sort of action therefore is harder to discern in priestly polytheism than in independent polytheism.

We will first of all treat priestly polytheism, then compare it with the latter. Before that, however, we need to tell the reader that even though we will show the path taken by the priesthood, we do not at all claim that in acting in this way it conceived such a determinate plan from the beginning.

The circumstances that we have described had to create its power.1 According to the demands of the moment, these circumstances suggested its employment. By the fact that such a power existed, it imposed on its possessors the necessity of maintaining it; they were gripped by the need to extend it. Every class whose authority depends upon an intellectual superiority that it cannot preserve except by a monopoly is in a dangerous position. Every progress that happens outside it is a threat to it. And this danger, the same even in variety, imparts a uniform response 390 to the class. It then seems to have conceived a plan, while it only follows the direction daily dictated by the threat of the day. This plan, however, which could not have been conceived at the beginning, soon results from the very prosecution of it. Experience enlightens; the priesthood sees that immobility, ignorance, and the degradation of everything not belonging to it are the very conditions of its existence. It encloses itself in an impenetrable enclosure, where it keeps everything of knowledge and science that it has harvested; it then declares a war to the death upon all science and all knowledge that show themselves without.

We therefore do not attribute to the priests of semi-savage times the gigantic project of governing the world. We only say that once formed by necessity into priestly bodies in different countries, given the position in which they found themselves, like all corporations they obeyed their interest. This interest led them to acquire and defend an empire that their successors over the centuries rendered even more unlimited.

We do not write out of hatred for the priesthood. We would have wished not to have to speak against any class of men, if only to avoid an appearance of partiality in investigations that, as we said, were intended to remain entirely apart from the debates and agitations of the moment. Is it our fault, however, if in the most remote ages we encountered an enemy we were not seeking? Is it our fault if this enemy, so little to be feared on the banks of the Orinoco or the steppes of Tartary, shows itself much more terrible on the banks of the Nile or the Ganges? Finally, is it our fault if we write at a later time when many memories have been effaced and many resentments have subsided, at a time when, as we love to acknowledge, an even milder and purer divine form has most fortunately distinguished the modern priesthood from the priestly despots of ancient times, tyrants at once of kings and peoples, that an imprudent audacity, confusing such different things, would awaken all the memories and take pleasure in reviving all the resentments?

Our work was written well before today’s circumstances. If it appears in a few of its parts to be a book of circumstance, we are not to blame.

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CHAPTER 2: On the Popular Part of Priestly Polytheism

In the climates that force men to observe the heavenly bodies, the first form of worship is astrolatry. In the countries where star worship is not natural, but where natural phenomena favor the power of priests, the first cult is the worship of the elements. However, the stars that follow their eternal course in the heavens above, and the elements, abstract divinities, so to speak, because their underlying unity escapes our senses, are not entities susceptible to being employed by the still-childish human being; he therefore cannot be satisfied with them.

The religious sentiment could be content. The more its gods are vague, mysterious, and above him, the more they please him.

It is otherwise with interest. Interest demands that its gods descend to earth to protect the human race at a more immediate level. Thus, while the privileged sacerdotal corporations put elements and stars at the top rung of the divine hierarchy, the multitude, finding itself outside these bodies, seeks or retains gods commensurate with its intelligence. Now, since it is kept away from all science and all study, its intelligence is barely more developed than that of the primitive. The gods of the multitude and those of the primitive are therefore pretty much of the same nature.

Among almost all the peoples subject to priestly polytheism, the worship of animals, of stones and trees, and of crudely fashioned little simulacra, and among tribes of a more martial bent, the worship of spears and swords, come to fill the immense distance separating the inhabitants of heaven from those of earth.

The Germans, whose priests offered worship to invisible or heavenly divinities, the air, water, night, sun, the vault of heaven, also worshipped animals1 and trees 392 as fetishes. They washed the trees in blood;2 they cast victims into rivers.3 In other words, this was a combination of the two worships. The superstition still found today that each river in Germany is attended by a seductive, deceiving nymph, called by the people Nix, and who is charged with the death of those who perish in their waves, is probably a memory of this.

The astronomic religion of the Etruscans excluded neither the worship of betyles—that is, animated stones4—nor homage rendered to the prophetic woodpecker,5 to the warrior’s spear,6 or to oaks covered with moss in the forests of ancient Latium.7

It is with the gods of this second sort that communication is the most frequent and direct. All the Egyptian festivals, those of Heliopolis excepted, were devoted to animal-gods,8 and it was in their name that oracles were given.9

Individuals divided these secondary deities. Each man or each tribe chose a special protector from among them. This is what happened in Egypt with the animals. This is what still occurs in India with consecrated stones.

But priests have a great interest that man cannot approach his gods without an intermediary and conclude his business directly. As a consequence, the priesthood takes over the fetishes and brings them into a single body. Each is no longer, as among the blacks or the Iroquois, the personal ally of the worshipper who chose it. Grouped under a common banner, they form a regular army, as it were, subject to 393 the laws of a mysterious discipline. In the assistance they give to those who ask for it, they are directed not simply by the consideration of the meats offered to them or the honors given, but by a will that comes from even higher and that substitutes calculation for instinct and despotism for anarchy. Each species of fetish is brought together under a head, the archetype of the entire species.

We have found10 the germ of this idea in the worship of savages. The priests took hold of it and developed it.11 Apis, Anubis, and Bubastis were gods of this sort.12

The priesthood thus diverts toward a single individual deity the worship that previously extended to all his peers, while orienting the latter to their natural objectives: work, death, and everything for which men wish to employ them. It thus reconciles the exigencies of superstition with the needs of society. In addition, it gives a more solemn character to the consecrated object. Each individual no longer has an idol that belongs solely to him, but a generic divinity. To please this divinity, he has to have recourse to its ministers.13

In principle, this is the make-up of priestly polytheism. At the beginning, it differs from crude fetishism only by, first, the introduction of celestial or invisible divinities that have little relationship with their worshippers, and, second, the putting in common of once-separated idols who continue to be the gods of the people. 394 It later distances itself even further as these idols are likened to human form. This happens independently of the will of priests, or even in defiance of it. Finally, it is distinguished from the primitive savage cult by the symbolic meanings that establish certain relations between the fetishes and the gods of a higher nature. As we will explain, these relations unite, but without identifying, the science of the priests and the belief of the people.

None of these things, however, addresses the religious sentiment in order to be purified or ennobled by it. Considered from the moral point of view, religion has made no progress. A small number of men have monopolized its influence; they have robbed from the majority of their fellows what until then had been their property. As for the rest, no improvement occurs; the form is different, but without being better. It even has this further vice, that it opposes an obstacle to any improvement that did not exist in the former order of things.

But the intellect has laws it is constrained to follow, despite its calculations and even despite its interests. These laws govern the priesthood, it resists them in vain; they force it to open another path besides the public religion; they oblige it to create a secret doctrine wholly different from the fables believed and the doctrines imposed. Priestly polytheism then becomes a much more complicated system; we will talk about it in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER 3: On the Secret Doctrine of the Priestly Bodies of Antiquity

In order to form a clear idea of the secret doctrine of the priestly corporations of Antiquity, we first of all have to note that this doctrine divided into two very different branches. The first was composed of the results suggested to priests by the observation of stars and planets and the phenomena of nature. It constituted a science rather than a religion.1 This science upon which the power of the sacred caste rested had to be preserved for it, and made inaccessible to the rest of the people. Hence, the oral traditions that never left the sanctuary; hence, the mysterious books that remained eternally closed to the multitude.2 In them were placed the astronomical calculations, the physical discoveries, the remedies indicated by the barely begun study of disease, and the effects of medicinal plants on the human body; in addition, the means of reading the future with the aid of the stars or 396 natural phenomena. In a word, everything that two thousand years later Varro will designate under the name of natural theology or sacred physics.

But the very existence of books or traditions of this sort was an invitation to the priests to add to them whatever suited them, a possibility of which they made ample use. Accounts that attributed to them the invention of all the arts, the establishment of laws, the founding of cities, and, finally, the transition from the savage state to civilization;3 the marvelous modes of communication that had established such intimate relations between heaven and its favorites; rites destined to eternalize the memory of these revelations; institutions dictated by the gods, the division into castes, and all the privileges of the priestly order were enshrined by these traditions or saved in these books.

History itself entered, although under a legendary guise. Expeditions undertaken by the order of priests or directed against them; the prosperity of the kings they had served; the misfortunes, crimes, and fall of the tyrants who had resisted them; natural calamities, the chastisement of peoples, political upheavals, the punishment of kings: all were combined in a fictional chronology and presented with a gilded mythology. These accounts, these annals, and these ceremonies had only a superficial connection with the priests’ secret doctrine. The priests, moreover, had an interest in letting them escape in bits and pieces from the darkness that covered them. The crowd was thus struck by an even greater respect for its teachers and guides.

The second part of their secret doctrine is of a more elevated nature, and consequently truly mysterious. The study of celestial bodies and natural phenomena starts by observing certain facts. These facts have causes. It is in the intellect’s nature to seek them. To be sure, at the period we are describing the intellect was confined within a narrow circle; and it was the monopoly of a very small number of men who worked assiduously, often with success, at stifling its impulses. But these dark monopolists, these merciless privileged priests, were after all men themselves, and nature had to make itself felt across the fetters they imposed on the disinherited class, and which they attempted to impose on themselves.4

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The priests therefore asked themselves what were the beings that presided at the creation or ordering of the world, why did these beings have the will to do so, how were they invested with creative power? Of what substance were they? To what did they owe their lives? Are they one or many? Dependent or independent of each other? Self-movers or compelled by necessary laws?

These questions inevitably present themselves to the mind; and in whatever situation in which it finds itself, in whatever circle it encloses itself, the mind wants to answer them. Its nature constrains it to want to do so.

Here the priests entered into an entirely new career. Without abandoning the sacerdotal character, they took on that of metaphysicians and philosophers. And if they maintained the public religion unchanging and stationary, they also gave themselves over without scruple to the boldest and most abstract speculations.

Independently of mythical accounts and prescribed rites, the Indian books contain numerous, quite different, metaphysical systems. The magi were divided into several sects; and we can discern the same diversity among the Egyptians.

What is truly remarkable is that the hypothesis that most dominated in the sacerdotal doctrines was subversive of all religious ideas. It was pantheism, an abstract theism that implied the uselessness of all worship and the unavailing character of all prayer. In the final analysis, it was atheism under different forms. In their secret doctrine, the Chaldean priests attribute the origin of the world to a necessity without intellect, a force without will. This same necessity, this same force, they say, governs the world through immutable laws. All the beings that exist—products without purposes, forms without permanence—emerge from chaos and return to it. Thought itself is only the chance result of blind elements. There is no life to come where virtue will be rewarded or crimes punished.5

This absence of religion in the secret doctrine of a caste whose power is rooted in religion can be explained by the position of this caste. When in possession of its native liberty the human mind reflects upon the infinite, upon eternity, on 398 the relations of the invisible world with the material world; sentiment takes its place among the judges and participates in the decision. But the position occupied by the priestly corporations of Antiquity had to suffocate and destroy the religious sentiment within them. Everywhere there is calculation, cunning, and self-interested aims, that is, the project of making religion an instrument and bending it to a goal not its own; the religious sentiment first withers, then it disappears.

From their beginnings, the priestly corporations of ancient peoples saw themselves called to transform religion into a means of power. For the Brahmin, the magus, and the priest of Heliopolis, the cult was a trade, as it was for the jongleur. In this respect, it does not matter whether it was exercised with finesse or not, ignorance or learning. Fraud, deception, and lies were its constitutive elements. In excluding belief, fraud degraded the worship. The priest who invents the purported means of communication with heaven knows even more firmly that his inventions are a fraud when he has artfully arranged them to make an impression on the credulous crowd. Profiting from his knowledge of astronomy when he announces the return of an eclipse as the frightful sign of divine anger, he cannot deceive himself concerning the falsity of the cause he is affirming. While the multitude prostrates itself, he remains a stranger to what is truly religious in the emotions of the multitude. He shares neither its terrors nor its hopes, because it was he alone who stirred them by proclaiming himself the interpreter of a voice he does not hear, the minister of an intervention that does not exist. He wants to deceive, so how can he believe?

Thus, the priestly corporations had to lose the capacity for religious sentiment by the mere fact that they degraded religion by employing it for their own self-interest. The only thing that remained to guide them in the meditations the religious sentiment would have contributed to if the priesthood had not stifled it was dry, severe logic. However, every time one puts the soul and its emotions, the conscience and its interior revelations, outside the pale, disbelief, doubt, and even denial fight with at least equal arms against the hopes that our heart constantly demands.6

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Atheism opposes to these hopes striking contrary arguments. It shows the universal order—invoked by belief in its favor—being disturbed every day by exceptions whose roots are found in the universe itself; these call into question the intelligence or power or goodness of the supreme cause. They mock final causes, charging their proponents with begging the question, or arguing in vicious circles. In a way that is truly deplorable, they exult at the gradual enfeeblement of the soul, which they say is the result of the body’s organs and thus shares their decline, and dies when it does. Great is the disadvantage of the religious person who wants to fight by reasoning alone! It can only end badly if he only calls reasoning to his assistance, and not the certainty imprinted by heaven on the bottom of our soul.

The rival of atheism, pantheism presents itself with arguments no less strong, and even more seductive colors.7 At the sight of all these partial beings, similar 400 to fantastic dreams, reentering into the indefinable whole only to reemerge, then return again, who has not been tempted to call these appearances into question, and to see in the universe only one real substance, whose brief modifications are similar to shadows cast by objects or stars reflected on the water?8

We would go even further. When the religious sentiment is not halted by the imperious need for moral hopes, it finds some attraction in the prospect of plunging into pantheism. There exists between us and all the parts of nature—animals, plants, the winds, the waves, the heavens—a mysterious and ineffable correspondence that seems to reveal to us that we are all parts of the same being, torn from its bosom by a violent separation, but in so transitory a way that it is all but illusory, and that we must return to in order to overcome the division that torments us, as well as the individuality that weighs so heavily upon us. The disposition of our soul to pantheism is such that the mysticism of all the religions, as well as the extreme abstraction found in all the philosophies, ends with this result. Compare the verses of Xenophanes, the eloquent prose of Pliny, the symbols of the Brahmins, the hymns of the Persian sufis, the allegories of the Neoplatonists, the expressions of certain Muslim sects, and those of Japan and the Chinese educated class, the intoxication of our quietists, and the new metaphysics of a German philosophy, and you will find pantheism differently put forth, sometimes in words that are remarkably similar. Yet pantheism is no less destructive of the distinction between the Creator and the creature, of all retributive justice, and all special providence in the first, and moral merit and efficacious prayer in the second; in a word, of everything that could satisfy the religious sentiment.

To be sure, in recognizing that dry and haughty logic gives these doctrines certain unfortunate advantages, we do not insinuate that the hopes of the religious sentiment are false. The reader has already seen as early as our first book that we contest the jurisdiction of reason in whatever does not relate to physical nature and to the relations established by men among themselves. For everything that is not restricted to these spheres, an élan of the soul seems to carry more conviction than the most rigorous syllogisms of logic. Still, the point we have articulated is nonetheless true. From this it follows that irreligion among the philosophers of independent peoples who follow the natural course of their thoughts has often been combated, even overcome, by the invincible resistance of the religious sentiment. On the other hand, irreligion in the bosom of the priestly corporations of Antiquity 401 encountered nothing that resisted and moderated it. Open what remains of the sacred books of the nations bent beneath the theocratic yoke, remembering that these books were exclusively destined to priests. In them you sometimes will see a pantheism that, by identifying the world and its author, reduces all beings to seeming modifications of a single eternal substance; sometimes the denial of any intelligence presiding over the order of the universe, that is, a blind material necessity, substituted for all the conceptions the religious sentiment suggests or demands.9

This has been noted long before us by a great number of learned observers who by different routes have arrived, sometimes surprising themselves, at this unanimous, although strange, conclusion: that the secret doctrine of the ancient priesthoods was subversive not only of the particular religions in whose name they ruled, but of all religion whatsoever. We distinguish ourselves from them on only two points.

First of all, they noted a fact; we have sought and pointed out the cause.

In the second place, they have concluded from this fact that these irreligious systems exclusively made up the secret doctrine, which they considered as a coherent whole, one that was connected to a single thought around which were grouped secondary parts of a regular edifice, with ideas all of the same sort, homogeneous among themselves, exempt from contradictions, and contributing by their combination and harmony to the demonstration of the chief thought. Our view is wholly opposite. We believe that the priestly corporations of antiquity did not 402 have a single doctrine, and we see the proof of this in the facts, and their explanation in the manner in which their secret doctrine was formed.

Born with the priesthood at the very moment when necessity imposed upon it the law of acquiring the various sorts of knowledge without which society could not subsist, this doctrine was the receptacle and depository of these various forms of knowledge. As they grew, as others came to swell the mass, or as conjectures, suppositions, and systems, true or false, were associated with them, the gradually observed facts, the successive discoveries, and the hypotheses resulting from these facts and discoveries were all placed there in layers, as it were.

Priests always add, and they never subtract. They always add because these additions were required to maintain their doctrine at the level of their own understanding; they never subtract because each retrenchment is an innovation; moreover, the unity of doctrine does not matter one whit to the corporations taken in their entirety. What do these corporations want to do? Dominate. They have the public cult as means, imposed as a yoke and maintained by inflexible laws. Their inner doctrine had relevance to the vulgar only because it inspired more admiration for the holders of the august and impenetrable secrets. From this point of view, the nature and coherence of these secrets was rather irrelevant: individuals attach themselves to different opinions; but the esprit de corps chooses arms, and views with equal indifference truths and errors. In fact, the variety of hypotheses served the priests even better in the explanations they had to give to initiates and foreigners. Partial responses tailored to the dispositions of hearers were most suitable; and the more numerous and different these systems, the more inexhaustible the arsenal of the priesthood.

Let us take the priests of Egypt as an example. They satisfied the gullible Herodotus when they showed him the similarity between their fables and those of Greece; they flattered Plato’s inclination when they showed him the most subtle metaphysical notions as their inner doctrine, while they lowered themselves to purely human interpretations with Diodorus, with the events of history reworked in symbolic form being the basis of the religion that the people revered without understanding. They thus flattered each in his preferred opinion, accordingly as he strongly held it or had the flexibility to modify it.

The most opposed hypotheses thus coexisted under the same veil and were designated by the same name. Side by side, atheistic or pantheistic systems, theism, dualism, perhaps even skepticism had their place, and each of these systems was divided into several branches. Pantheism sometimes allied itself with spiritualism, 403 with matter then being conceived as an illusion of the pure spirit. This is how it is presented in modern India, and probably was presented in ancient Egypt. Other times it identified itself with materialism, and what was only one form became the sole substance, spirit only being a deceptive result of these merely apparent modifications of this substance. In this version, it reigns in Tibet, Ceylon, and China.10 Elsewhere, the unique substance was infinitely divisible, and countless imperceptible atoms were made the constitutive parts of the great Whole, which nonetheless remained changeless and always the same.

Theism also separated into two distinct categories. Submitting to the yoke of logic, sometimes it lost everything that was mild and consoling and no longer offered man that particular Providence whose immense love receives our prayers, accepts our repentance, absolves us of our faults, and has pity on our sufferings. God, creator of the world, had impressed upon it general unchangeable laws that no supplication, no merit, no appeal to justice or goodness could alter. From the instant that this world had received the divine impulse, all events—we would go further: all sentiments, all thoughts—were subject to a chain of necessity which nothing had been able, nothing could, break. Causes had had to produce, they would produce forever, their inevitable effects. In this way, at bottom theism was only a more vivid form of invincible fatality:11 a sad and disheartening hypothesis which repels sentiment; for it does not demand, like the self-interested fetishism of the primitive, that the being to whom one offers homage should satisfy earthly passions or lend a mercenary support to even culpable desires; nor, on the other hand, does it implore a voice that could answer it, an approval that would sustain it, a heavenly sympathy that would revive it when injustice or adversity assail it. 404 By thwarting this hope, you cast it back upon itself disconsolate, and it is then tempted to sunder itself from a belief deprived of all warmth and life.

Other times, deviating from its original rigor, theism combines with emanationism. Beings separated from God, and always less pure as they grow farther from their source, nonetheless can return to it by successive purifications. This system, which is obviously contained in the secret doctrine of the Egyptians, soon enough emerged from the sanctuary and was introduced into the public belief. Only (and here we commend the priesthood) it was acts of liberality, obedience to priests, and the exact observance of the rites commanded by them that were the means of purification.

Dualism itself was presented in two forms: one that granted a complete parity, an equal force, and an equal duration to the principle of good and the principle of evil; and one that reduced the latter to the status of an inferior being, reserving a definitive victory for the first.

Some have maintained that skepticism was always foreign to the occult doctrines of the priesthood.12 We grant that of all the systems skepticism was the one the priests had to most carefully conceal. Affirmation always has something imposing: it announces science or it implies authority. It can present itself as a discovery, gather together those who profess it, and give them a common interest. But skepticism, which does not allow affirmation, brings its adherents together only to disperse them, like light troops who by chance fall upon whomever they encounter. Skepticism, whose tendency is to dissolve and disunite, and which calls into question every authority, its own included, is what is most repugnant to the priestly spirit. However, a writer13 who has long and carefully observed the Brahmins tells us of a school of Brahmin skeptics, and even though we cannot ascribe extensive learning or solid critical skills to him, when it is a question of a positive fact, his testimony is not without value.

In truth, it is impossible to think that among men protected by the darkness that surrounds them, and taking on from every angle those questions that are eternally insoluble, none would have been led to skepticism, which is the natural term of all these investigations, a conclusion that reason comes to consider as a shelter as 405 soon as it ceases seeing it as a stumbling block. If one has not detected skepticism in the doctrines of the priesthood, it is because this system more than any other had to be hidden from the inferior classes marked out for belief, who must not suspect that their masters were reduced to doubt.

All these doctrines were jammed into the secret philosophy of the priests, more ready to mix and blend than to do battle with one another; two causes combined to make this sort of confusion easy.

The first was the terminology that the priests saw they were obliged to employ to express their metaphysical hypotheses. At the moment when they began to occupy themselves with the arduous questions of the origin of things, ignorance on several points was still quite profound, while the knowledge of other points was mixed with many errors. Language, above all, was very imperfect. To convey the notion of cause and effect, it only had words derived from the simplest and crudest ideas, those for example of to engender and to be born.14

These words were applied in a thousand ways. To be born does not only mean to be produced, but to be subsequent to an object, or to be inferior to it, or even simply to have borrowed some quality from it, or having received some modification from it. One said of all the properties, all the forces, all the attributes of a substance, that they were born of it, that they had been engendered by it. Applied without distinction to all the systems, this terminology established among them an apparent likeness that made their real opposition less striking and pronounced. The pantheist showed the great Whole engendering the illusion that deceives us by making us see diversity in the unity; the god of theism equally engendered the creatures who become corrupt by going away from their source; and to express the production of the world by an eternal necessity, the atheist had recourse to the image of generation, or, more fantastically, he said that the necessary being had broken up and the universe was born of its fragments.

In a moment, we will return to another effect of this priestly language. Here we limit ourselves to indicating how it brought together divergent hypotheses under similar expressions.

A second cause favored this confusion.

Even though looked at collectively the priestly corporations of Antiquity could not feel any respect for the religion molded by their hands and bent to their purposes, from time to time the religious sentiment that always returns reasserted its 406 rights over certain members of these corporations, or over initiates honored with their confidences. Then suddenly reintroduced into the most unbelieving doctrines was an enthusiasm that denatured and disguised them. The soul struggled against logic, and the native emotions of one imposed a form that appeared to be religious upon the arid conceptions of the other.

Listen to Apuleius depicting the pantheism of Egypt, or the disciple of Krishna giving thanks to his master for the revelation with which the heavenly incarnation had just favored him. “O Nature!” cries the former, “sovereign over all the elements, daughter simultaneous with the origin of the centuries, supreme divinity, queen of manes, first of immortals, unchanging figure of gods and goddesses, who with a nod gives the heavens their luminous shafts, winds their healthful breath, to the netherworlds their terrible silence; the unique being whom the universe venerates in a thousand ways by varied rites, under different names, and whom those who are versed in the ancient doctrine call Isis, it is you whom the Egyptians know how to worship by suitable ceremonies that they have transmitted to the Greeks; it is you who surrounds the globe, inflames the sun, governs the world, treads underfoot Tartarus. The stars answer you, times obey you, gods rejoice because of you, the elements are subject to you; at thy breath the winds breathe, the clouds swell, and seeds germinate and grow. Your majesty strikes with a holy terror the birds that tremble in the air, the wild animals that cross the mountains, the serpents that slide in the grass, the monsters that the Ocean contains in its depths. You are the constant and holy protector of mortals, whom you care for with a maternal affection in their afflictions, and whom you receive in your bosom after their death, where everything returns, because everything has come from you.”15

“Great god,” cried Arjuna when Krishna appeared in his true form to him, wearing brilliant robes and magnificent garlands, with countless eyes and mouths, holding in his millions of arms swords, ready to strike, exuding celestial perfumes, and covered with all the marvelous things that shine separately in the universe; “Great god! I see in your breast all the divinities brought together, and all the classes of different beings. I see Brahma on his lotus throne, and from the saints to the celestial serpents. I see you yourself on all sides, with your infinite forms, your eyes, your mouths, your arms that no one can count; but I cannot discover either your beginning or your end, nor your middle, universal lord, eternal source of the worlds. I see you with your resplendent crown, armed with a bludgeon and a terrible sling, 407 like a shining globe that no one can look upon. You are resplendent with an ineffable brilliance, like fire in all its force and the stars in all their glory: the sun and the moon are your eyes; your mouth is a volcano that spouts flames. The celestial hosts do not know whether they ought to flee or approach you. Some seek shelter with you; others, frightened, extend suppliant hands and sing your praises. When I contemplate you surrounded with so much light, decorated with so many colors, my courage abandons me. When I regard your menacing teeth, emblems of time, which devours all beings, I remain motionless and confounded. I see the warriors of armies and the sovereigns of the earth fall into your mouth, as into a burning furnace. Some remain suspended between your teeth, their bodies severed. But finally all of them, all these heroes of the human race, are engulfed in this abyss, like the rivers that run rapidly and lose themselves in the Ocean, or like a swarm of insects casts themselves into the flame that draws them in to consume them.”16

Some of these words are eloquent; several seem to indicate a profound sentiment of immensity, of power, of the supremacy of a God distinct from the world he governs and the generations he creates or destroys. But at bottom these are only the fine and touching irrelevancies of individuals who yield to their emotions, which perhaps deceive them into the intoxication of such sonorous expressions.

The symbolic language of the priesthood always introduces into the formulations of pantheism a contradiction that sometimes gives it the external appearance of theism. The principle of pantheism is to not distinguish the whole from its parts. But since when the whole is personified, relations are established that necessarily imply the existence of the parts, the notion of diversity that pantheism would like to avoid reenters the doctrine; and it protests in vain against the accusation of duplicity leveled against it. It is thus that in the same Bhagavad Gita cited above, Krishna says: “I am the humidity in the water, the light in the sun and moon, the entreaty in the Vedas, the sound in the air, human nature in man, perfume on the earth, and devotion in the pious soul; I am the intelligence of sages, the glory of the proud, the strength of the strong. All things are suspended from me, as precious stones on a ribbon that holds and supports them.”17

By this even Krishna, who claims to be the sole existent, differs from the partial existences, as the ribbon from the precious stones. This extorted inexactitude in the expressions, however, changes nothing in the core of the system, and disguises 408 rather than changes it. This Nature, which Apuleius appears to make an intelligent and compassionate divinity, in the Egyptian teaching is nothing but an impassible Whole, of which partial beings are only forms produced aimlessly, and which it annihilates without pity. This universal lord of the world before whom Arjuna prostrates himself is only the universe itself; and the Bhagavad Gita from which we have drawn this enthusiastic passage contains the system of pantheism that is at once the most subtle, the most rigorous, and the most foreign (as we will see) to every heartfelt sensibility, as well as the most destructive of morality.

This is the perspective in which one should envisage the metaphysical part of the secret doctrine of the priests of antiquity. This doctrine does not limit itself to one system. The hypotheses generated by each series of meditations were received and registered in it. Since no religious sentiment had a hold over the corporation (considered as a collective body dominated exclusively by its self-interest), irreligion was not rejected, but rather was admitted as equal to any other theory, on the condition of remaining a mystery. The corporation profited, moreover, from this diversity of systems by adapting its confidences to the character of each auditor, all the while constantly attentive to preserve the external appearances of unity. Thus, those who have seen theism, dualism, pantheism, and even atheism in the priestly philosophies are both right and wrong. They were right: all these things were there; they were wrong: none was there by itself.18

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Let us now summarize what we just said about the composition of priestly polytheism. Its basis is astrolatry, or the worship of elements, under which is placed fetishism. Above this vulgar worship hovers a scientific system that the priesthood works to perfect, and which it always holds beyond the reach of the subject classes. To this system of science, which is but the observation of facts, are joined the efforts to discover their causes, and these endeavors end with philosophical and metaphysical hypotheses. These hypotheses do not at all form an ordered whole; each exists apart, unknown by the people. They therefore can neither scandalize the people by their impiety, nor perplex them by their discordance. Finally, these three elements are clothed in one or several symbolic languages, which result both from the imperfection of language and from the priests’ tendency toward mystery.19 These terminologies in turn express (1) the relations of the superior gods, 410 astronomical or elemental, with the fetishes or gods in human form; (2) those of metaphysical beings or abstractions with the divinities of the people20 and the superior gods; and (3) the relations of cosmogonic personifications with the axioms of science and the objects of public worship. But they have yet another consequence.

From the words “to be born” and “engender” result cosmogonies and theogonies that appear behind the popular mythology at a remote distance, as it were. The infinite, the void, and the creative, preserving, and destroying force become a class of gods heretofore unknown, whose loves, rapes, incests, and mutilations represent the different hypotheses aimed at explaining the creation of this universe.21 Going beyond religion by metaphysics, the priests return to it by the cosmogonies that 411 this metaphysics suggests to them. Personified and endowed with will, life, and action, the cosmogonic beings are all the more imposing as they are vague. These gods hover over the public belief, sometimes entering into it, and above all they imprint on it their somber, mysterious, often obscene and revolting colors. Delayed as much as possible even though they are inevitable, the partial revelations in that way become less unexpected, and have a less dangerous effect because less brusque, and the parts that from time to time escape from the secret doctrine are admitted into the public religion with less trouble, and are harmonized more easily with it.22

The theogonies and cosmogonies furnish it with incoherent fables and overload it with enigmatic ceremonies;23 it is to this cause that one must attribute those wild and licentious orgies that are so strange a part of priestly cults. In order to make more sensible the contrast and the union of the creative and destructive forces, the priests of these cults display with great pomp the bloody signs of their shameful mutilations, or fight fiercely at the foot of their altars in order to express the struggle of the elements.24 Sure of its power, the sacerdotal esprit de corps spares them no pain, and transforms its instruments into victims. Religion, however, in its relations with the multitude remains unchanging, because it is upon religion that the power of the priestly corporations and the authority of the theocracy rest. The priests who within the sanctuary disdain or denature religion with 412 their interpretations, without practice all its rites with remarkable ardor—perhaps the awareness of their indifference toward its opinions serves to warm them for its practices. Be that as it may, convinced of the necessity of keeping the multitude always fervent, and of offering an example of this fervor, they compel themselves to the most minute practices, as well as the most painful deprivations. The Brahmin and the bonze impose fasts, austerities, starvations, and even tortures upon themselves, which only the most sincere devotion should undertake. The Brahmin’s secret doctrine is a pantheism that cannot admit any worship; the bonze25 is a veritable atheist because he recognizes only—albeit under a different name—a material world lacking in intelligence.26 But in exchange, reserving for themselves the inner doctrine that declares only absorption or nothingness for man, in public the bonze and the Brahmin proclaim the immortality of the soul and promise happiness in another life to those who enrich and honor them.

This combination whose fundamental traits we have traced here subsequently differs in details according to climates, local situations, the genius of peoples, their habits, even the accidents that influence their destiny. But the core never varies. We will prove this by successively applying the principles we have developed to the religion of Egypt and that of India.

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CHAPTER 4: Example of the Foregoing Combination in the Egyptians

The combination we just described is clearly seen in Egyptian polytheism.

First of all, we see the worship of animals: the cat receives divine honors at Bubastis; the billy goat at Mendes; the bull at Hieropolis; the eagle and the sparrow hawk at Thebes and Phile; the ape at Arsinoe; the crocodile on the lake of Moeris; the ichneumon in the Heracleotic prefecture; elsewhere the ibis, the shrew, the dog, the cock, the lion; at Elephantine and Syene, the oxyrhynchus, lepidotes, and the eel.1

People have wanted to explain this worship in several ways; none of them bears serious scrutiny.

To speak, as does Diodorus, of the metamorphoses of the gods is to account for an absurdity with a fable.

To go back to the banners that different tribes would have raised is to reverse the order of things. A people can choose as a standard some representation of what they worship; but they do not worship this-or-that object because they have chosen it as a standard.

The policy of kings seeking to divide their subjects by giving them different objects of religious veneration is a maladroit application of Euhemerus’s system, 414 which, as we know, related the origin of all religions to the machinations of legislators. But fetishism was prior to every positive law. Favored by the self-interest of a class, it was able to prolong itself under civilization by the action of authority; but it had to arise freely in the bosom of barbarism.

Finally, we have already shown that the usefulness of different species counts for precious little in the worship that savages offer them.2 It was the same in Egypt. Useful and harmful animals were equally adored.

When a belief is shaken, it is difficult to imagine what its former credibility rested on. Then one attributes a thousand kinds of subordinate utility to it, none of which is enough to cause it to be adopted, and which only provide after the fact an apparent explanation of what has become inexplicable.3 Thus in our days Lent has been justified by saying that it helps fishermen because of the rule of abstinence from meat; but those who first imposed abstinences upon themselves only had in mind pleasing heaven.

If the explanations of Diodorus are superficial, those of Plutarch sin by excessive subtlety.

To hear him, sometimes the worship of animals is owing to metempsychosis.4 But such as primitives conceive it, metempsychosis can hardly serve as the basis of a cult because, vague and erratic in its conjectures, it prescribes neither pity nor respect for the animals whose bodies are the harbors of wandering souls.5

Sometimes, he says, understanding animals as the work of the evil principle, the inhabitants of Egypt would have wanted to disarm the principle by adoring them. But this assertion was dictated to the philosopher of Chaeronea by his tendency to find dualism everywhere; it is belied by the facts. Far from being the creatures 415 of the evil principle, in the Egyptian view the animal-gods were its enemies, and to appease it they sacrificed them.

Sometimes, finally, Plutarch exhausts himself in efforts at detecting and bringing to light an imaginary resemblance between the qualities that characterize certain species and those he attributes to the gods; but these gods had to already exist in order to note the resemblances, and it was only later that they could have enriched the symbolic language.

In his conjectures, Porphyry comes closer to the truth. According to him, divinity embraces all beings; it also resides in animals, and man adores it wherever it is found. But Porphyry expresses here only the first élan of the religious sentiment in fetishism. He does not account for the combinations by which the worship of animals takes on a regular form and continues long after man has placed the divinity high above physical nature.

The writers of our days have been even more unfortunate in their attempts. There are those who have imagined that the Egyptians worshipped animals only in order to recall the meaning attached to each of them in the hieroglyphs.6 But if the Egyptian religion was only a kind of writing, a calendar, or an alphabet, it was not a religion. If its scientific meaning was hidden from the people, what idea could the people have of the forms in which the occult calendar or hidden alphabet was cloaked? How could they conceive gods created to signify periods or letters, but whose meaning was concealed from them?

One cannot repeat this too often: what constitutes a religion is the manner in which its adherents understand it.7

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The discovery of a cult in vigor among the primitives that is perfectly similar to the external worship of the Egyptians ought to put an end to these fanciful hypotheses.8 Place among black tribes corporations of priests who have come to the knowledge of the movement of the stars, and who preserve this knowledge in their sanctuary away from the curiosity of the profane: these corporations will not seek to change the objects of vulgar worship; on the contrary, they will solemnize them;9 they will give them more pomp and regularity. Above all, they will ensure that the assistance of the priesthood is necessary in every ceremony. Then, by means of a mystical or symbolic meaning, they will attach these material objects to their hidden science; and you will have among the blacks exactly the religion of Egypt. Fetishism at its foundation, astrolatry at its ceiling, and within a science founded on astronomy, thanks to which the fetishes, gods for the people, will be symbols for the priests.10

To invert this order is a gross error. What was recognized for a long time as a sign cannot suddenly be transformed into a god; but it is easy to conceive that what passed for a god in the opinion of the masses can become an allegory, a symbol, or a sign for a more enlightened class. In this way Plutarch’s idea receives its application, and frivolous or fanciful resemblances motivate the choice of symbols. The ox Apis11 owed to a few spots, at first accidental, then artfully repeated, the 417 honor of being one of the signs of the zodiac.12 A studied analogy between the productive force and the Mendes billy goat made it the heaven, father of the stars; the cat owed to his shining fur, as the ibis its equivocal color (which appeared halfway between the night and the day), to be the symbol of the moon; the falcon became the symbol of the year.13 The beetle, which spends six months under the earth, was the emblem of the sun.14 And what proves that popular superstition combined with science is that the Egyptian believers wore beetles on their necks as amulets or talismans.15

It was the same with trees and plants,16 fetishes no less revered than the animals.

The leaves of the palm, whose longevity seemed to be a divine privilege,17 decorated the couches of priests, because this tree, putting forth branches every month, marks the renewal of the lunar cycle.18 The lotus, which we will also encounter in India, the cradle of Brahma19 as well as Osiris,20 the perséa brought from Ethiopia by a priestly colony,21 the arnoglossum whose seven sides recall the seven planets, and which for this reason was called the glory of the heavens;22 all these plants had connections with astronomy.23

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The people saw in them objects of an ancient worship; the priesthood found characteristics that helped recall and perpetuate its discoveries.

To these initial elements of worship were added the influence of localities,24 which sometimes disturbed the uniformity that the priesthood attempted to establish, and sometimes combined practices that referred to a particular location with rites founded on the general principles of science.

Hence, on one hand came the diversity of animals that were worshipped by the different tribes of Egypt. If they were only symbols, would the priests who seek to make their institutions uniform have introduced such varied, and irreconcilable, symbols? These varieties are explicable only by the condescension of the priesthood to the previous habits of the peoples.25

Hence, on the other hand came those jumbled allegories not connected by a common bond, forming many separate strata, as it were. Apis, for example, first of all the prototypical manitou of bulls, then depository of the soul of Osiris26 (and in this capacity the sun), finds that he has a third meaning that is somewhat intermediate between the two previous ones. He is the representative of the Nile, the river that nourishes the country; and while his color, the arrangement of his ebony black skin, the spots of striking whiteness that must cover his forehead, and finally the length of his days, which cannot exceed twenty-five years, all come from 419 astronomy; the festival of his birth is celebrated on the day the cresting of the river begins. He is led in pomp to Nilopolis and, when the end of his time has come, is cast into a fountain consecrated to the Nile.27

Historical facts also appear to have entered into the Egyptian religion. Several of its stories seem to allude to the wars of pastoral peoples. The death of Osiris, emblem of the sun in winter, could have been originally the commemoration of a real event;28 Osiris, then, would have been, not exactly a deified man, but a hero later associated with a divinity that had never participated in the human condition. This is why the monuments of Egypt show him sometimes looking like a mummy, and history speaks of his tombs, while Isis always remained a stranger to particular places and the different forms of departing from this life.29

Metaphysical hypotheses came next.

Pantheism is unmistakable in the famous inscription engraved at Sais on the temple of Isis30 and Neith: “I am everything that was, all that is, all that will be.”31 The Egyptian priests added that Neith and Ptah, intelligence and force, were not separate beings but different manifestations of a universal being. Hathor, the boundless, elementary night, was that primordial unity that knew all beings and made one with them. It was the great Whole, the sole existing being, the unique god not yet manifest.32

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Alongside this pantheism, although probably from a less distant period, appear evident traces of theism.

“Escape all these common limits,” says the spurious Hermes Trismegistus,33 “cast yourself far from your body, escape time, become eternity, recognize yourself as immortal, capable of understanding everything and doing everything. Be higher than any height, more profound than any depth; be at once in all the parts of the world, in heaven, on earth, and in the depths of the waters. Grasp in a single embrace all the cycles, all the measures, all the qualities, all the vast extents, and you will be able to comprehend what is God. He has neither limit nor end; he is without color and without figure, eternal and unchanging goodness, the principle of the universe, reason, nature, act, necessity, number, and renovation,34 stronger than any strength, more excellent than any excellence, above all praise, and only to be worshipped by silent adoration.35 He is hidden because he has no need to appear in order to exist. The times manifest him, but eternity veils him. Consider the order of the world, it must have an author—a single author—because in the midst of countless bodies and the most varied movements a single order makes itself seen. If several creators existed, the weakest would be envious of the strongest, and the disorder would lead to chaos. There is but one world, a soul of the world, 421 one sun, one moon, one god.36 He is the life of all, their father, their source, their power, their light, their intelligence, their spirit, and their breath. All are in him, by him, under him. He preserves them, makes them fruitful, and directs them.”37

Nonetheless, even this theism falls back into pantheism. After this listing of all the epithets, this accumulation of all the attributes, the fundamental axiom returns: one alone is all, and all is but one.38 Outside of him there is neither god nor angel nor demon, nor even any substance.

The doctrine of emanation also combines with theism;39 sometimes the movement comes from the bottom, sometimes from the top. In the first case, the soul emanates from matter, intelligence from the soul, God from the intelligence.40 In the other case, secondary gods emanate from the supreme god, demons from gods, men from demons, birds from men, quadrupeds from birds, fish from quadrupeds, reptiles from fish. The lower animals then mount back to heaven by the same path when they are sufficiently purified by their different metamorphoses.41

But soon a bond is established, on one hand, between these metaphysical hypotheses and the astronomical gods, and, on the other, between these same hypotheses and the idols of the people.

The sparrow hawk that can be found on the door of all temples is not only the sun but also the symbol of the divine nature. The shrew that the inhabitants of Athribis worshipped, and whom the Egyptians believed was blind because its eyes are so tiny that they can hardly be detected, signifies for the metaphysician the incomprehensibility of the first principle.42 The ibis is not only the symbol of the moon but also of Hermes, because Hermes measured the rise of the Nile, and the ibis at the time of the flooding eats the serpents and insects that infest the banks of the river. The Ethiopian vulture figures the passive principle because, it was said, there was no male in the species; and for an opposite reason the beetle, born without the cooperation of a female, is the emblem of the active principle. Thus in Egypt, as elsewhere, the errors of physics are sanctified by religion. Upon 422 becoming a victim, the prophetic gazelle43 bequeathed its horns to Hermes Anubis, who learned from her the division of the day into twelve hours; the lotus, a local symbol in its connections with the Nile, an astronomical one in its relations with the sun, cosmogonic as the nuptial bed of the two first principles, reappears in the metaphysical sphere as the emblem of rebirth or immortality. The onion, the most ridiculed and most famous of the fetishes, thanks to the skins that compose it, and which seem to be so many spheres contained one within the other, is the vegetal image of this vast universe, always different and always the same, where each part represents the whole.44 In other words, the symbol of pantheism. In this perspective, one can understand the importance the Egyptians attached to it.45

Finally, for the reason we indicated in the previous chapter, the cosmogonies and theogonies appear. Those of Egypt, like those of all the priestly nations, are the figurative expressions of metaphysical hypotheses concerning the origin of things. Hador, the elemental night, engenders the first gods, Cneph, Ptah, and Neith, who soon dispute their mother for preeminence. They come into the received religion: Neith becomes Isis, Cneph and Ptah both take the name of Osiris. But in their quality as cosmogonic, they cannot remain in the beaten path, and by a mystical nuptial or a forced incest (because contained in the womb of their mother) they in turn engender other divinities. Aroueris is the fruit of the precocious loves of the sister and brother; the birth of Anubis is due to an incestuous adultery, that of Harpocrates to the monstrous union of death and life.46 Variable symbols of different doctrines, these gods represent, accordingly as they apply to one or another 423 of these doctrines, matter and the spirit that coordinates and animates it, the creative forces, both preserving and destructive, that struggle with each other, the two principles of good and evil, or, finally, the apparent divisions of the sole substance, that is, sometimes theism,47 sometimes dualism,48 and other times pantheism.

Obscene images and licentious tales enter into the religion simply by the effect of the words borrowed from the union of the sexes. Isis crosses the earth to find the organs of which a cruel enemy has deprived her spouse, and her journeys are marked by indecencies and new incests (we will later see the influence of these symbols on the public ceremonies and rites).

At the same time, these gods are connected to science properly speaking; they are the planets. Isis is the moon; Typhon the sad and baneful Mercury; Osiris the sun whom death strikes twice a year: in the spring, a period of excessive heat brought to Egypt by the winds of the desert; in autumn, when the country hidden beneath the waters wonders if the waters that submerge it will destroy it or make it fertile. But, once more, these gods take the names and forms of animals. The cow is Isis, Osiris the sparrow hawk, Typhon the crocodile; and the sphinx that is found on Egyptian coins of the time of Hadrian, because of his complicated attributes, is at once the bringing together of the animals worshipped by the people and the figure of unity in the pantheistic doctrine of the priests.49 Thus the theogonies and cosmogonies create a new species of mythology that combines, by means of its mystical sense, with philosophy, and by its literal sense, with superstition.

Another circumstance further complicates this combination. The hieroglyphs have an effect almost parallel to that of the cosmogonies. All the hieroglyphic signs being images, the one who makes use of them cannot render his thought except by clothing it in narrative or fabular form. For example, is he trying to indicate an 424 astronomical discovery? He designates the different stars by animal figures or other objects that are thought to act upon each other. Hence a number of narratives that in the eyes of the people take on the authority of a revelation, or at least of history. Thus are born several sacred traditions of the Egyptian priests concerning their gods or their kings.50

But no matter how the combination of these religious elements happens, and whatever the significance one gives to the symbols, a uniform rule is invariably observed. The gods that the people implore, those that influence its destiny, are always closer to the fetishes than to the symbolic divinities. The Egyptians explicitly said that Osiris, Isis, Horus, Typhon, and his wife or concubine Nephthys were gods of the third class; and even though later they equated them with the planets, they distinguished them in this classification—a contradiction that only better proves the complexity of their doctrines.

It was in their quality as animal or anthropomorphic gods that these beings were worshipped, that they heard prayers and took part in the affairs of mortals. As metaphysical notions or planetary gods, they had meaning only for the priests;51 and if the progress of science sometimes led to modifications in the rites and the legends (modifications of which there are traces),52 the spirit of the public religion never felt these modifications.

This complexity of the Egyptian religion, its symbols, its allegories, its constant stream of significations and meanings, in which the most recent or more subtle did not cause the forgetting of the previous ones—all this explains the contradictions found in the majority of ancient authors.53

When Plutarch considered the gods of Egypt as local divinities, and for him Osiris is the Nile and Isis the earth that the river makes fertile; when he later rises to the astronomical meaning, and Osiris is the sun and Isis the moon; when elsewhere 425 he embraces metaphysical or cosmogonic theories, making Osiris and Isis the active and passive principles, and, following the terminology of the Platonic philosophy, the first is the soul of the world, the second is the matter put in order and animated by this universal soul, and Horus their son is the visible world, the result of the overcoming of Chaos, of Typhon, the evil principle contained in matter, which struggles against the divine spirit that ought to animate it: assuredly Plutarch contradicts himself; but if there is contradiction, there is not error. All these meanings existed in the Egyptian doctrine; and Plutarch did not really begin to be mistaken except when he adopted one over the others.54

One also understands that by reversing the order of ideas and the course of events, one could construct brilliant and rather plausible systems in favor of a purported Egyptian theism. This was what Jablonsky did, for a long time the sole guide of scholars, who became commentators on his positions. If we are to believe them, the Egyptians would have believed initially in theism alone; but the division of the attributes and activity of the Supreme Being would have given rise to several conceptually distinct divinities. And alongside these divinities, others would have been placed that were aimed at striking the senses; these would include the moon, the planets, and the heavenly vault. To these eight gods would have been joined the solstices and the equinoxes, and soon enough the five intercalary days. The worship of the Nile would have been one of the results of the devastation and benefits of the river. Finally, priestly symbols employed to enigmatically signify the divine nature would have introduced an inferior cult.55 We will not point out all the particular errors of this system; we will limit ourselves to saying that one must reverse the series of hypotheses and start from the combined worship of fetishes and stars in order to detect them in the secret doctrine of the priests, transformed sometimes into conceptual deities, sometimes into a single God who creates and 426 directs the universe, sometimes into a sole substance that absorbs in its bosom this universe, these divinities, and the supreme God.

This combination also explains the nature of the gradual communications made to foreigners by Egyptian priests. Even by promising secrecy, Herodotus learns only the least important things from them. Become less insistent, they instructed Diodorus about everything concerning Osiris, without binding the traveler to silence. At the time of the Ptolemies, the priests were constrained to unveil their secret doctrine because philosophy had come to similar ideas and published them; but then the priests had two goals to achieve and several precautions to take. They did not want to let it be known that from its origins their secret doctrine had been so separate from the public religion, that the latter was only an instrument of control. Nor did they want it known that they admitted new ideas. As a consequence, they represented these new ideas as having always been part of their secret doctrine, and this doctrine as being intimately bound—and always having been bound—to the public religion. Hence, the explanation of all the religious customs, explanations that were overly subtle and contrived.56

As the philosophic doctrines multiplied and became contradictory, the priests tailored their divinities and their explanations to each of them, each divinity becoming the symbol of all these discordant doctrines.

When the priests saw their religion wholly discredited, they abandoned philosophy entirely and limited themselves to maintaining the superstition of the people by returning, as it were, to fetishism, by way of sorcery.

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CHAPTER 5: Example of the Same Combination in the Religion of India

The same combination is found in the Indian religion; but it is less easy to recognize.1 A circumstance that at first glance would appear to be favorable to our investigation turns out to be an obstacle rather than an aid. The Indians are a nation that still exists. One could hope that they would provide explanations of themselves and their ancestors. But if their existence has continued for thousands of years despite both time and invasions, it is because they have always harbored a deep repugnance for foreigners and strangers. This repugnance continues today in all its force,2 and our discussions with men who see us as impure masters and unclean oppressors are adversely affected by a religious prejudice fortified by political hatred.

Moreover, the records3 of their belief and worship that we possess, even though 428 429 they are quite numerous and varied, do not at all form a whole. If from time to time, one part sheds light on another, most often they contradict and contend with one another. The exact time of none of these records is incontestable; the authenticity of several is doubtful; and since those that are apocryphal are always marked by a brilliant but bizarre imagination, and by the excessive abstractness that characterizes the literary and philosophical products of this country, one is in even a poorer position to fix the dates, to sift out original opinions, and to determine the development and progression of these opinions.

The original Vedas, the Akho-Vedas, are lost. Even the Brahmins acknowledge this. The details that they communicated to Holwell4 concerning the revelation and transmission of these books demonstrate that even since their restoration, according to tradition, they were reworked again, and consequently the doctrine they contained was often modified.

According to these details, 4,900 years before our era, in order to reconcile fallen spirits to himself, the supreme God initially entrusted the divine law to Brahma in a heavenly language. Having translated it into Sanskrit, it formed the four Vedas. A thousand years later, Brahmins wrote six commentaries on these books. These commentaries are the six Angas, which treat the pronunciation of the holy vowels, the liturgy, grammar, sacred rhythm, astronomy, and the meaning of mysterious words. Five hundred years went by, and new commentators published a second interpretation, in which they departed from the original meaning and interpolated several allegories and many fables. From that came the four Upavedas, containing the rules of medicine, music, the profession of arms, and the mechanical arts; and the four Upangas, in the first of which were later put the eighteen Puranas.

Finally, three thousand years after the appearance of the original Vedas, five inspired writers presented a new redaction. One of them, Vyasa, the author of the Puranas, is also the author of the great epic poem of the Indians, the Mahabharata. But this Vyasa could very well have been a generic name designating a series of commentators on the Vedas, just like the name Homer probably indicates the authors of the first Greek epics.5 The uncertainty that covers the time of Vyasa, and which the efforts of Mr. Bentley have not been able to resolve,6 incline us toward 430 this view.7 The contradictions of the Indians themselves in this regard are obvious and striking. On one hand, they separate the Ramayana, a poem they attribute to Valmiki, from the Mahabharata of Vyasa by a distance of 864,000 years; and on the other hand, they affirm that these two poets often encountered and consulted one another concerning the redaction of their poems. When this absurd chronology is brought to their attention, they avoid the objection by recurring to a miracle. Vyasa is, moreover, a mythological person; sometimes he is the regeneration of Brahma, born in the third age four years after his mother’s intercourse with a rishi, sometimes he is an incarnation of Vishnu in the womb of the young Caly, who remained a virgin after giving birth.8

The second redactor of the Vedas was Manu, more known than the first as the legislator of the Indians.9 The collection of his laws is their oldest code; but this code is probably neither the work of a single man nor the work of a single century.10 The three other redactors are suspect of heresy, as even the Brahmins acknowledge.

We will not examine the truth of the foregoing narrative; but it clearly indicates the repeated reworkings of the Indian religion. Everyone knows the important statements of Wilford concerning the falsifications of the pandit who had furnished him materials for his comparison between the fables of India and those of Egypt.11 It seems to us that one can draw from this some important consequences concerning the falsifications of Indian books in general. The Indians themselves do not contest these falsifications, but limit themselves to excusing them by saying that the corruption of the world forces the sages to lend the support of a legendary antiquity to more sublime truths.12 If it were further argued, as Abbé Dubois does, that the climate rather rapidly destroys all records and forces the Brahmins to recopy them each century, one can imagine how many interpolations and alterations of doctrine must result.

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If one also considers that during twelve to fourteen hundred years these records thus mutilated, these copies thus reworked, these commentaries—whose authors sought to have a favorite opinion win out—served as either an occasion or a pretext for works of philosophy or metaphysics that each sect believed was the sole original and true system, then one will appreciate the wariness that must be brought to them and to their examination. In fact, it is enough to read them with a modicum of attention to recognize that far from containing a received doctrine, for the most part they are the work of reformers or inspired men who wanted to interpret and purify—that is, modify and transform—the received doctrine. The Neardirsen, for example, which the Hindus of Bengal and of all the southern provinces of India regard as a holy Shaster, while those of Deccan, Coromandel, and Malabar reject it, is a pure system of metaphysics, admitted into the holy books thanks to the progression of ideas; so too could have been the case for the works of the eclectics, if the polytheism purified by them had been maintained.13 It is the same with the Bhagavad Gita; the effort to replace what is already there with something new, the mark of a reformer who fights and argues with the extant, is found on every line;14 and when Krishna releases the souls of women from the curse that condemned them to pass into the body of a Brahmin before ascending to heaven, here one recognizes the reformer battling a prejudice sanctified by the ancient religion.

Therefore, to seek in these books the primitive popular mythology is to take, as many have done, Neoplatonism for the religion of the first centuries of Greece or 432 Rome. Nothing is more similar to the India Shasters, as far as the content of ideas, than the works of the pagan philosophers who in the second and third centuries of our era worked to dress up Greek polytheism as allegories, and to ascribe to it subtleties that were quite foreign to its genius, and wholly unknown to its first adherents.15

To the difficulties that result from the alterations of the sacred books, we must add those that arise from the revolutions that the Indian religion underwent.

One must recognize at least four, and even five, principal ones: Brahmanism; Shivism; Vaishnavism, which Krishna did not invent but perfected; and Buddhism, which was expelled from India properly speaking after fierce wars and terrible massacres,16 but which is triumphant in Tibet and shares Nepal with the religion of the Brahmins.

Everywhere on the surface of India are striking proofs of these revolutions. Several temples are considered to be the work of evil genii, and no one dares to practice the rites of the abolished cult. Now, among all peoples abandoned cults pass for sacrilegious magic: their priests are sorcerers, and their gods blameworthy and malevolent beings.

The Vedas also acknowledge these religious upheavals in India. They order bloody sacrifices, and even human sacrifices.17 The repugnance of Indians for the shedding of blood, even though it has always been inspired in them by the climate, 433 was therefore not a part of their original worship. But when civilization prevailed (despite the priests) against this barbarous custom, the honor of its abolition was given to Vishnu18 in his incarnation as Buddha,19 thus attaching all successive reforms to the ancient divinities, as was the custom.20

The incarnations reported in the books of Indian religion are for the most part periods of reform. The Bhagavata Purana (the Bhagavatam) says that Vishnu becomes incarnate each time his presence is necessary to combat error and to have the truth triumph.21 In his fifteenth incarnation,22 Vishnu corrects the Vedas; Krishna, the great reformer who following one tradition attempted to banish obscene ceremonies from worship, is the eighth or the seventeenth incarnation of Vishnu. Buddha, who undermined the system of Brahmanism by abolishing castes, is, according to different chronologies, the ninth or the nineteenth.

To be sure, this last revolution is subject to much uncertainty. Scholars are divided over the person and epoch of Buddha. Some23 regard his cult as a deviation, a reform or heresy that was introduced into that of Brahma, and Buddha therefore was later than him. Others24 have adopted the opposite view. They identify Buddha with Baouth, an ancient idol; one still finds here-and-there shapeless simulacra and ruined temples dedicated to him. They suppose that his religion, which was before Brahmanism, was proscribed and supplanted by the Brahmins and found refuge in Tibet and Ceylon, in Tartary, Japan, and China, while also preserving itself in a few Indian tribes.25

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This question is very difficult to resolve. On one hand, the worship of Baouth does appear to be older than Brahmanism. The traditions attached to it and the crude exteriors of its figures indicate fetishism. On the other hand, the Buddha who meditated the abolition of castes was certainly subsequent to Brahma. As we argued much earlier, the castes had to be established originally without any contradiction, or they would never have been established. Buddha could have attacked them after they were sacralized, as modern philosophers attacked existing institutions; but these institutions preceded the philosophers.

The difficulty would resolve itself if we admitted two Buddhas: the first would be the same as the ancient Baouth, and the second would be the author of the religion that divided India and was introduced into China, substituting the name of Fo for that of Buddha.26 Then, there would be nothing in common between the second Buddha and the ancient Baouth, if not that the first preceded the division into castes and the second was later than its establishment. In other words, one would have been ignorant of an institution not yet existing; the other, finding it established and sacralized, would have fought it.27

We, however, can leave the historical question undecided. Today Buddha is nothing but a legendary figure, like Vishnu, Rama, and all the Indian avatars become incarnate for the regeneration of the human race. His adventures are for the most part those of Rama in the Ramayana.28 Buddhists have transferred them to their favorite incarnation.

“When he descended from the celestial region in order to enlighten the angels and mortals,” recount these heretics, “the beautiful Mahamaya, wife of the rajah Sutah, monarch of Ceylon, received him in her chaste womb, which immediately became as resplendent and transparent as the most diaphanous crystal. The divine child, beautiful as a flower, awaited the hour of his birth, supporting himself on 435 his hands. After ten months and ten days of a mysterious pregnancy, Mahamaya obtained permission from her spouse to visit her father. The roads, bordered on either side by trees that spontaneously put forth fruit, refreshed by urns full of limpid water, and lit by the light of a thousand torches in her honor, made themselves smooth and straight before her. Not far from the route she followed, a garden offered itself to her sight. She wished to rest there and gather flowers. The pains of childbirth came upon her. Trees bent their heads toward her so as to shelter her from others’ eyes. The air was filled with delicious perfumes, sounds at once melodious and sad resounded from afar, and nature itself felt an indefinable shudder, prophetic of divisions, struggles, and misfortunes. Buddha was born, and Brahma received him in a vase of gold; but already endowed with marvelous strength, the future avatar jumped onto the earth and, taking seven steps, rejoined his mother, who brought him back to her home. A holy man, withdrawn into the forest in order to practice silent worship, was alerted to the birth of Buddha by a secret voice. The virtue of his penances enabled him to fly through the air, and he presented himself before the rajah in order to give homage to the new-born god. Seeing him, he displayed alternately an immense joy and a profound sadness. Asked about these contradictory appearances, he replied: I am in pain, he said, because Buddha, once raised to the rank of avatar, will leave me far from him, perhaps will reject me; but I rejoice at his current presence, which absolves me from my sins.

The god—who was not yet one—was named Sacya, and lived unknown for sixteen years. At that time, a famous rajah offered the hand of his daughter Vasutura to the one who could bend a magic bow. A thousand rajahs tried in vain. Sacya, happier in the endeavor, wed the daughter of Chuhidan. He became a father; but a revelation having enlightened him, and followed by a single servant, he left his palace, his son, and his wife, and having crossed the Ganges, he even sent away his companion, along with his horse and armor.

Five flowers, contemporaries of the creation of the world, were put in the hands of Brahma. Sacya discovered in the calyx of one of these flowers clothing of the sort worn by hermits whose humility is maintained by alms. He put them on. Thus disguised, he continued his pilgrimage. A traveler passing by him, weighed down with eight bundles of sweet-smelling herbs, did reverence to the pilgrim, who laid his sacred body on the herbs. All at once a temple rose from the earth; it was thirty cubits high, and in the sanctuary was a throne of gold. Brahma descended in the midst of clouds, holding a dais over the head of Sacya. Indra came to refresh him 436 with a fan, and Naga, the king of serpents, led to him the four tutelary deities that sat enthroned at each corner of the universe.

But the Assurs29 came running, full of rage, to attack the avatar. The gods abandoned him; defenseless, Sacya implored the Earth, who, more helpful, opened a vast mouth to its subterranean waters. Defeated, the Assurs were put to flight. The five sacred codes proclaimed the divinity of Sacya, who under the name Buddha, after confirming his new dignity by twenty-one days of rigorous fasting, was seated above the highest of the world,30 enjoying the ineffable happiness of an absolute impassability. He left behind him the sacred codes. By reading them, the faithful delivers himself from the machinations of unclean spirits, opens the paths of redemption, removes his soul from reincarnation, preserves himself from poverty, arrives at honors, heals himself from illness, and obtains by faith nieban or nivani, the eternal felicity that consists in the absence of all change, in the loss of all individuality, in the annihilation of all sentiment, all knowledge, all thought.”

This is the legend of Buddha. Designated Sommonacodom in Ceylon, Godama in Siam, Fo and sometimes Tamo in China, and represented in Tibet by the Grand Lama,31 he nonetheless has all the characteristics of an Indian incarnation, even though the sect he founded subsequently substituted apotheoses for incarnations. One recognizes these characteristics in the miracles that established his superiority to Bommaza, a god who disputes his empire, and who imprudently defies his skill. Hidden in the center of the earth like an imperceptible grain of sand, Bommaza was discovered by the penetrating look of Buddha, who in his turn was commanded to hide himself. He placed himself in Bommazo’s eyebrow and let his rival seek in vain for him in the four great islands, and in the two thousand islands of lesser extent, in the depths of the Ocean, and on the inaccessible summits of Zetchiavala, and even on the peak of Mienmo,32 thus frustrating all his efforts and compelling him to acknowledge his defeat. In another legend, Buddha is only 437 Vishnu who becomes incarnate to destroy the Tripura, three fierce giants living in enchanted cities with walls of gold, leather, and iron, cities they transported everywhere they wanted to extend their works of destruction with the aid of immense wings and by invoking the Lingam. Vishnu-Buddha defeated them by his preaching and his great works.

He nonetheless is considered to be the author of a detestable heresy, and the malevolence of Brahmins in his regard shines through all of their accounts. After having, almost despite themselves, adored Buddha, the gods of Brahmanism refuse him their assistance, and if he is sometimes confused with the three great objects of Hindu worship, most often his rank as an avatar establishes only accidental and temporary relations between him and them. However, the disfavor cast on the enemy of the caste system does not weaken his divine character. The fundamental difference between Brahmin spirituality and Buddhist materialism becomes perceptible only when one leaves aside public rites and the traditions that animate them, and attends exclusively to the philosophic or secret doctrine. The externals of the religions—their ceremonies, their sacrifices, their priestly establishments, their tendency to the contemplative life—have maintained a resemblance between the two that disguises, albeit unsuccessfully, their mutual hatred.

The Cheritras, or sacred books, of one have an evident analogy with the epic poems of the other. The Ramakien of the Siamese appears to be only a translation of the Ramayana, albeit with less poetry and charm. Throughout their fictions, as well as in the orthodox mythology, one sees sometimes a penitent seized with mystical devotion at the sight of a withered fig tree command the elements by his austerities; sometimes a rajah pierced by a magic spear because he wants to make his own a beautiful woman whom this living spear protects; here an alligator plunges into the Ocean, embracing a young princess who miraculously escapes from this frightful lover; there an elephant aspires to the hand of another princess, who is not preserved from this bizarre match except by the penance of a hermit and the valor of a hero; further on, the tiger and the bull, united in close friendship, obtain human form through the prayers of a rishi. Krishna, Bhagavatti, and Rama are found in these tales under slightly modified names.33

This uninterrupted succession of reforms, whose dates the priesthood deliberately inverted or confused, this absence of any non-falsified records, this priestly effort to disguise the ancient doctrines by amalgamating them with the new or 438 explaining them by them,34 all these things render the religious history of India a chaos. Light shines only on certain isolated details, although each day the portions that are illumined grow; but it will take more than a century for the whole to be revealed to our eyes.

Nonetheless, one can discern in this religion the same elements as in the Egyptian: fetishism gradually transformed into anthropomorphism, the worship of elements and stars, initially as a cult, then as a science, metaphysical hypotheses, and cosmogonies.

The worship of trees, of quadrupeds, of birds, of stones is preserved in India even to our day by being associated with the worship of the superior gods by the mystical union that assigns them material objects as abodes.35 Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva are deemed to reside in the Kolpo, and sometimes to be born in certain pebbles. Routren36 is pleased to confine himself in the outrachou;37 the god of the pagoda of Perwuttum is only a shapeless stone;38 and every time some malady or accident strikes the inhabitant of a village, all his fellows come together to seek a black stone, the mysterious sanctuary of the divinity. When they have found it, they carry it in pomp and raise altars to it.39

The Indians worship the elephant, the eagle, the sparrow hawk, the crow, the ape, the beetle (who is among them, as in Egypt, an astronomical symbol, because his antennae and the shine of his wings figure the day star); the swan, whose striking 439 white color braves contact with the water that surrounds it, is the emblem of the soul winding its way without blemish through the temptations of the earthly world in order to unite with God. They choose their sacred bulls following the same rules as the Egyptians;40 and the followers of Shiva regularly observe the day dedicated to this quadruped divinity,41 who bears Shiva in the air, whose three horns are the Vedas, and who is so redoubtable to injustice that the latter’s reign cannot begin, except where the tail of the celestial bull ends.42

The cow is invoked as representing Surabhi, the dispenser of felicity; Budrani, the well beloved of Shiva, is represented in the figure of a heifer; Lachmi, the beautiful companion of Vishnu, who sometimes assumes the same form and rests on the bosom of his lover. The history of the cow Nandini, so poetically recounted by Calidasa in the Rhagu-Vansa; that of the cow Bahula, who asks life of a tiger, a charming episode of the Itahasas,43 are embellishments of these memories of fetishism.44 The fantastical birds Garuda45 and Aruna are idealized fetishes who are connected to astrolatry. Aruna, weak and imperfect, is the dawn that precedes the sun and emits only a dubious light; Garuda is the sun in all its pomp, the type of the truth, the mount of Vishnu.

The same reminiscences can be seen in the more modern sects. The Jainists, heretics detested by the Brahmins, and about whom we can speak here only in passing 440 without digressing from our subject,46 associate each of their saints or deified penitents with an animal that serves as its emblem.47 Finally, in the forests and on the mountains of the Carnatic region, as well as on different points of the coast of Malabar, fetishism still exists in its integrity. Several tribes of nomadic savages worship only their individual demons or genii, and do not worship the great divinities of the country.48

The association of this fetishism with an anthropomorphism that can only be regarded as a change of external forms is manifest in the fables that, in attributing the human figure to gods, add to them characteristics borrowed from the animals that were previously worshipped alone.49

Alongside this combined fetishism and anthropomorphism is placed the worship of the elements and the stars. One of the very ancient authors who transmitted to us exact information about India saw close by the coast of Coromandel a 441 temple dedicated to the five elements.50 The air, fire, and earth invoked under their true names, with the sun, the moon, and the planets, are designated at the same time under the appellations of Brahma, Vishnu, and Buddha (always honored, although always suspect). The origin of the Vedas is attributed to the elements. The Rig-Veda is born of fire, the Yajur-Veda of air, the Sama-Veda of the sun.51 Sometimes the tendency of the Indians to deify everything transforms the Vedas themselves into divinities. In the Varaha-Purana, Narada recounts that one day he saw on a lake an astonishingly large flower that was resplendent with the most vivid colors. One the banks of the same lake was a radiantly beautiful girl. She rested indolently on the grass, her eyes half-closed and her bosom exposed. Who are you, I said to her, continued Narada, O unknown beauty, the most perfect of virgins, as slender as the birch that rises to the sky? She closed her eyes and kept silence. Then the memory of divine things left me; I forgot the Shasters and the Vedas themselves, and I approached her who had captivated all my thoughts; three celestial forms were on her bosom. The eyes of the last shone with an indescribable éclat, like the sun. After having displayed themselves, they disappeared. The unknown girl remained alone. Tell me, I cried out, how I lost my Vedas. The first form that you saw on my bosom, she responded, was the Rig-Veda or Vishnu, the second was the Yajur-Veda or Brahma, the third was the Sama-Veda or Shiva. Reprise therefore, O Narada, your Vedas and your Shasters, make your ablutions in this lake, which is the Veda-Sarovara, or the lake of the Vedas, and you will recall the different transmigrations that you have experienced.52 Thus the Vedas are three gods, but three elemental gods who celebrate themselves in mystical chants; for the Rig–Veda begins with a hymn addressed to fire, the Yajur-Veda by a hymn to air, the Sama-Veda by a hymn to the sun.53

Above appears the scientific religion—astronomy, astrology, its companion, the observation of natural phenomena—and its application either to religious uses such as divination or to practical ones like medicine.

The history of Krishna is entirely astronomical. The twelve nymphs that constitute 442 his retinue are the signs of the zodiac; and the inconstancy that carries him from one to the other is the passage of the sun through these various signs.54 His victory over the great serpent Caliga-Naga, like that of Apollo over a monster of the same species, recalls the action of the day-star purifying the atmosphere. Before the dawn, the Brahmins ask the sacred Trimurti to give to humans the light of the heavens.55 They associate with it the immortal torches that warm and enlighten us; and it is also to these scientific gods that the vanaprastas who sanctify themselves in solitude offer the most meritorious and efficacious sacrifices.56

The Surya-Siddhanta, the most ancient of the astronomical treatises, is considered to be a revelation.57 Its author, Meya, received it from the sun as a reward for his penances.58 Shiva has his Tontros, which have made known to men the revolutions of the months and the days. Brahma and Vishnu-Siddhanta indicate by their names alone their divine origin. Other Siddhantas are written by simple mortals, but under a supernatural inspiration; all of them together number eighteen, and like the Puranas they bear the title of Shasters, expressive of their superiority over subsequent commentaries, profane works of the human spirit;59 and what finally gives these Shasters the priestly stamp is when one notices the attempts of the priests to reconcile the infallibility of their teachings with the successive rectifications that were brought on by the development of knowledge. The movements of the planets can change, it is said in the Surya-Siddhanta, but the principles of the science remain the same; and in order to soften the contradiction that exists between the discoveries that have been made and the absurd tales of the Puranas and the Vedas, whose authority one dare not dispute, the pandits have recourse 443 to interpretations. Sometimes the fables refuse. Thus, the Vedas positively teach that eclipses are occasioned by the dragon Rahu, a horrible monster whose head was cut off by Vishnu. This monster, who would have stolen from the gods a few drops of their amrita, the ambrosia of India, bequeathed his immortal head to the heavens and his tail to the earth, from where, rising up, it furiously pursues (like the Fenrir of the Scandinavians) the sun and the moon in order to devour them. The pandits say that the fact is certain; but obliged to apply human intelligence to astronomy, they write like philosophers, and not like theologians. The physicists of the eighteenth century expressed themselves in the same way. The similarity of circumstances necessarily produced similarity of language.

Astronomy is not the only science that religion takes hold of, that it enlists, that it identifies with its fables, and that it submits to its authority. Legislation is contained in the Dharma-Shastra. Medicine is also the gift of a god who revealed it in the Ajur-Veda, of which only a few fragments exist; and one of the Upanishads of the Vedas contains a treatise on astronomy.

In several Puranas, a special section is reserved to geography, and the Brahmins proscribed geographic treatises in the vulgar language. We have the divine Puranas, they said, what more does the human race need?60

The seven musical notes are placed under the protection of seven divinities in the Rama-Veda. This divine art was communicated to our species by Brahma and Sarasvatti, his daughter; and their son Nared is the inventor of the lyre, like Mercury among the Greeks. The further divisions of the different tones are personified as so many nymphs in the Sangita-Ratnakara;61 or at other times associating one science with another, that is, astronomy to music; the Indians reduce the musical notes to six so that they can correspond to the seasons of the year.62 They devote a particular harmonic mode to depict the melancholy of the harsh months, the gaiety of the return of spring, the harshness of excessive heat, or the rebirth of nature when the rains refresh the burning air; and constantly reducing fables to science, they suppose six Ragas, beings intermediary between gods and men, playing in the air, bestowing their favors upon five companions with unparalleled beauty, each the mother of eight genii, who flutter in their wake on the summit of mountains 444 or even the folds of clouds, a most graceful family, one that rivals the most elegant fictions of Greek mythology.63

Grammar, finally, the ingenious organization of the most decisive and most inexplicable discovery, the discovery of language, which the animals approach but never attain, and which, serving as the instrument and bond of the faculties of man, assigns him his rank in creation; grammar has the serpent Patanjali as its author, who fixed its laws in his Morabashya.64 Another famous grammarian, Panini, is extolled in the Puranas as inspired and a prophet.65 The history of his commentator Catya-Juna is connected to legends;66 and Bhartri-Hari, a didactic poet who put in verse the rules established by his predecessors, is the brother of Vicrama-Ditya, whose austerities, wars, and miracles figure on each page of the sacred poems.67 The Agni-Pourana is a system of prosody; and the invention of this art to which the Indians attach so much importance goes back to Pingala-Naga, a legendary being represented (like Patanjali) under the form of a reptile, or perhaps identical with Patanjali himself.68

Thus in India as in Egypt, it is always from religion that science comes, it is by religion that it is preserved; and as in Egypt, its possession is a privilege claimed by the priestly order. Misfortune to the one who would try to pry it from them! When the kings of Magadha permitted the educated of their court to publish writings destined for the instruction of all the classes, indignant Brahmins cursed 445 his kingdom with anathemas and declared it a sacrilegious country where no believer could live.69

In a more elevated sphere, we find the metaphysical hypotheses, subtler than in Egypt, and subdivided, diversified, and nuanced in such a way that in this work we renounce any effort to treat them, or even to list them. To be sure, like so many others we could give a show of erudition by leaving their native names to these systems and their infinite subtleties. Two or three extracts from Colebrooke and Schlegel would furnish us with more than sufficient material; and by translating these authors without attribution we would appropriate to ourselves the honor of their erudition. But we will not needlessly tire the reader; we do not need to treat these views in themselves, but rather in the way in which the priests, whether Brahmin or Buddhist, introduce them into their learned doctrine, and the influence that the introduction of this doctrine exercised on the public worship. As a result, instead of taking each Indian system and dealing with it, we will remain faithful to the great divisions we have already established: theism, pantheism, emanationism, dualism, and atheism.

Theism is found in almost all the sacred books of India. The Brahmins’ creed teaches that the worshipper of the sole god has no need of idols. The Bedang, which in a very long fable concerning the creation of the world, personifies the attributes of this unique god and relates the origin of all things to him alone. The Laws of Manu70 combine this teaching with that of absolute fatality; the Dirm-Shaster proclaims it, reducing all the accounts that seem to contradict the unity of God to particular manifestations of Providence;71 and the Bhagavatam recounts fables without number to inculcate and emphasize this unity.

446

Sometimes it recounts that one of the fathers of the human race, wanting to know the divine nature, imposed upon himself severe penances, and by the force of his fasts and self-afflictions caused a brilliant flame to shoot out from his forehead. All the gods were frightened and sought shelter near Brahma, Shiva, and Vishnu. These three superior divinities presented themselves to the penitent. Then prostrating himself before them, he said: I recognize only one God; which of you is the true God? Tell me, so that I can adore it. The three gods responded: there is no difference among us. A single being is at once the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer. To adore him under one of these forms is to honor him under all three.72

Elsewhere, we learn that Sati, daughter of Daksha, the wife of Shiva, scorned by her father, stirred her spouse to avenge her. A giant with a thousand arms produced from one of the hairs he had plucked in his anger entered into the assembly of the gods and cut off the head of Daksha, who cursed his daughter. The gods complained to Brahma, Shiva pardoned his father-in-law. The head of a billy goat replaced the head cut off and consumed by fire, and Vishna declared again that the three gods, depositories of the forms of nature, comprise one essence and are one and the same God.73

Theism is equally manifest in another tale, which is also connected with the historical event of the abolition of the worship of Brahma.

Proud of his power to produce, Brahma one day wanted to rival Shiva the destroyer, and claimed to be superior to Vishnu, who maintained all created things. A terrible battle ensued between Vishnu and Brahma. The celestial spheres were shaken; the stars fell from the sky; the earth trembled. In the midst of this terrible tumult, a column of fire appeared; one could perceive neither its summit nor its base. At this sight, the two antagonists were convinced that supremacy would belong to the one who could discover the foundations of this column or who could attain its summit. Vishnu in the form of a wild boar dug in the earth for a thousand years, digging a distance of three thousand leagues each minute. But the foot of the column remained hidden in the abyss. Vishnu recognized his impotence. Brahma changed into a swan and rose into the air to a height that speech cannot describe. In an hour he crossed thirty-six thousand leagues, and his flight lasted one hundred thousand years. Finally, his exhausted wings refused to carry him further. As he re-descended to earth he encountered a flower. He took it in his hand and 447 would not release it except on the condition that it would testify to the success of his endeavor. It had barely uttered this false testimony when the column of fire opened up. Shiva appeared, laughing with a terrible laughter, and as punishment for his lie he condemned Brahma to no longer have temples or images or followers. The repentence of the god disarmed Shiva’s anger, but he did not retract his sentence, and Brahma was worshipped only by Brahmins, without any public cult and without external ceremonies. In this way, the superiority of Shiva,74 supreme god, sole master of all, whom all the beings serve and sacrifice to, was recognized.75

It is remarkable that in this tale, as well as in several others, the Indians give preference to the destructive principle. This characteristic of their mythology is explained by their disposition to consider annihilation as the supreme bliss. It is a misfortune for all beings to put on earthly forms; the power that destroys them, the power that delivers man from the individuality that weighs so heavily upon him, ought to have preference over the principle that maintains these forms and this individuality. Moreover, for a contemplative people, the idea of destruction is more unchanging, infallible, and hence more imposing, than that of preservation, which is always varied and occurs in time, while destruction is in eternity; hence preservation is always defeated by destruction. Thus, in the wars of the gods against the giants, Shiva is almost always the principal god. Brahma is the head of his army, and four Vedas are his steeds; Vishnu serves as his arrow.

We will not cite the Ezouvedam, since it is now proven that we owe it to the pious fraud of a zealous missionary.76 But the ease with which the missionary 448 could deceive the most careful readers of authentic books thus demonstrates that theism was one of the philosophic doctrines of the Brahmins.

However, should we therefore conclude—as more than one author preoccupied with a single idea has—that theism is the religion of India, or at least that by itself it constituted the entirety of the Brahmanical teaching?

This conclusion would be false. Who does not see that for the ignorant and credulous crowd, the literal sense of these narratives in which the gods fight, destroy one another, and reconcile, or the vestiges of fetishism that appear in them, and where it is a question of their births and their marriages, can hardly be counterbalanced by a metaphysical axiom that, by offering only an abstraction, most often causes the divinity to descend from the rank of a moral being to merely being a substance? This is the formulation of a philosophy, and not the teaching of a religion.

What these fables inculcate, rituals confirm. In nuptial ceremonies, one invokes Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, Devendren, the twelve Adityas, the eight Vanuras, the nine Brahmas, the eleven Rudras,77 the Siddas, the Saddias, the Navadas, the seven great penitents, the nine planets, and finally all the gods whose names come to mind.

Theism therefore was never the public belief of India. Even the sects that profess it deviate from it constantly. The exclusive worshippers of Shiva78 associate with him Bhavani, his wife. Those of Vishnu79 render at the same time worship to Radha, one of his favorites. Others who claim to offer homage only to Rama80 include Sita, his spouse, or venerate the two spouses together.81 One sees in Indian mythology gods struggling with giants, often oppressed by them, compelled by penances,82 or subjugated by curses, and despite their power submitting to what is most painful to them. Each temple, each pagoda, witnesses to the plurality of gods, their metamorphoses, their weaknesses, their vices. The temple of Tirumaton recalls the triumph of the giant Eruniaschken over gods and men combined, the 449 prayers of Brahma, which moved Vishnu to pull the earth out of the abyss where this giant had plunged it, the wiles of this god to defeat this terrible adversary in the form of a boar.83 The figure of Devendren recalls his illegitimate loves and his punishment, at first indecent, then bizarre.84

The proof that theism was never the belief in vigor jumps out of the writings of the philosopher-priests who adhered to it. Some of them, more timid and reserved, opened themselves to followers only after prescribing a profound silence. Thus in the Oupannayana, when the father of the neophyte teaches him the existence of a sole god, sovereign master, principle of all things; he adds that it is a mystery not to be communicated to the unintelligent vulgar, to do so would draw the greatest calamities upon the guilty one. Others who were more candid openly combat polytheism.85 But one does not fight unless the doctrine already 450 exists. No one today, among either Muslims or Christians, would write against polytheism.86

If theism seems to dominate in the Bhagavatam and the Dirm-Shaster, it is impossible not to see pantheism in the other sacred books. In point of fact, the Vedas do not contain a pure pantheism. They teach that there are three worlds; one is the thought of the divinity, the second the realization of this thought by the production of an ideal world, the third the material world of which the ideal world is the type. But the commentators on the Vedas have applied themselves to give 451 a pantheistic interpretation to the texts.87 The universal power, says one of them, this power that shines in the sun and rules the spirit of man, is the luster in the diamond, the sap in trees and plants, in living things their soul; is also the creator, and Providence, and the force that preserves; it projects and absorbs all; it is the sun and all the gods, everything that moves and everything that is motionless in the three worlds. The Vedantic philosophy goes further; it rejects this trinity of worlds (Trilokya); it admits only one, which is multiplied by an illusion. The recognition of this illusion constitutes the divinity that alone exists, and the universe is but a phantom without reality. The substance of the soul, the sentiment it has of its existence, its various knowledges, its perceptions, all these things are God himself, says the creed of the Brahmins.88 Everything that was from all time is God, all that is, is God, all that will be, is still God.89 You, me, all the beings are Vishnu.90 Reject all notions of diversity, and see the universe in your soul.91 And the Bhagavatam, suddenly forgetting its favorite theme, teaches that there is nothing in the world that is not Vishnu; that this unique being takes different forms; that it acts in different ways; but that all is only one with him, and that the substance of all bodies, of all souls, is nothing but his own, returning to itself after an apparent separation.92

But it is above all in the Bhagavad Gita that this doctrine is developed. It is there that Krishna defines himself, saying that he was at the beginning of all things, all that exists but is not perceived; that since then he is all that was and all that will be, and that outside of him there is only illusion. I am, he continues, the sacrifice and the cult, the perfume and the invocation, the fire and the victim, generation and destruction, the sun and the rain, immortality and death, being and nothing.93 452 Pantheism shows itself even in the particular notions concerning each divinity. Brahma is at once each man individually and collectively the human race, which means that he is born and dies every day, because at each instant human beings are born and die; and he also dies every one hundred years, because this is the term of the longest human life.94

But in the same way that we have seen the adherents of theism carefully attach their doctrine to popular fables, so too the pantheists, far from disdaining the tales, include them in a system that would seem to exclude them. When, in order to better inculcate this pantheistic hypothesis, Krishna describes himself to his disciple and says: I am the soul contained in the body of all the beings, the beginning, middle, and end of all things: among the Adityas95 I am Vishnu; among the stars, the sun; I am one of the cardinal points of the heaven in the midst of the winds; and the first book of the Vedas; among the faculties, I am life; and in animated beings, reason; I am the most powerful of the eleven destinies, and among the genii, that of wealth, among the elements, fire, and Merou among the mountains;96 among the sages I am their head Vrischapati;97 among the warriors, Scandra, the god of war; among the rivers, the Ocean; among words, the mysterious oum;98 I am the head of the celestial choirs,99 and the first of the mounis among the pious penitents; among the cults, silent adoration; among the trees of the forest I am Asvatta;100 among the horses, Urchisrava, who emerged from the waves with the 453 so-sought-after amrita;101 among the elephants, Airavat, and the sovereign among men; among the weapons, thunder; among the beasts, the cow Kamaduk,102 daughter of the sea, I am the fruitful god of love; among the reptiles I am their head, Vasuki, among the serpents the eternal serpent, and among the inhabitants of the tides, the god who governs; among the judges, I am Yama, the judge of the netherworld; among the evil spirits, Prahlad,103 and in all calculations, I am time; among the animals I am their king, and among the birds, the prodigious Vainateya; among the winds that purify, I am the air; in the midst of heroes, Rama;104 among the fish, Makar,105 among the rivers, the Ganges, child of Janhnu;106 I am the first of the vowels, and among words I am duandua;107 I am death and resurrection, fortune, fame, eloquence, memory, intelligence, valor, patience, Gayatri108 among the harmonious measures, glory, industry, victory, the essence of all the qualities; among the months, margasirsha;109 among the seasons, spring, Vyasa among the inspired;110 among the poets, Usana;111 among governors I am the scepter, and the silence among secrets; of all things, be they living or not, there is none that I am not. When Arjuna answered him: You are Vayu, the god of the winds, Agni, the god of fire, Varun, the god of the seas, Sasanka, the moon, Prajapati, the god of 454 nations, and Prapitamaha, the powerful ancestor, is it not obvious that the author of the Bhagavad Gita alters the fables he accredits?

Ourchasrva the steed, Kamaduk the cow, Yama the judge of the netherworld, Jahnu father of the Ganges are so many illusions and, as it were, respects paid to received fictions under which pantheism is introduced, and replaces them; they are like an obligatory set of rubrics; but in the end, all the fables come to pantheism. In his infancy, Krishna stole the milk of their flocks from the nymphs. They complained to Yasoda, his nurse. As his sole response, the god opened his glittering mouth, and Yasoda, totally surprised, saw the entire universe in all its splendor.112 Who does not see pantheism in this account, concealed under a legend that it confirms, all the while establishing a doctrine destructive of all legends?

Sometimes a pantheistic profession of faith concludes a narrative that seems neither to prepare it nor to support it. Trivicrama reigned on the banks of the Godaveri. Each morning a Brahmin presented him a flower. The king received it respectfully, but when it had withered, he tossed it on the floor of his palace. One day, opening the one he had just received, he saw in it a diamond of great value. Queried, the Brahmin promised to explain this mystery if the prince would accompany him into a forest. They set out and, once arrived at their destination, saw a cadaver propped up by the branches of an oak. The Brahmin asked his illustrious companion to carry the body to his home. Overcoming his repugnance, Trivicrama took the corpse over his shoulders; but the dead man, entertaining him with marvelous stories, succeeded in escaping from him twenty-five times. The angry monarch finally took hold of the fugitive stranger, who revealed to him the plot of the Brahmin, who aspired to his throne and was preparing his death by magical rites, for which a body that had ceased to live was necessary. The conspiring priest was punished, and Shiva, revealing himself to the eyes of the prince, said: Three times you came forth from my own essence; two times I have recalled you to my bosom. When ten days will have come, I will receive you again, and you will no longer be separated from me.113

Other times, pantheism reintroduces polytheism in ways whose subtlety is interesting to note. To adore the Supreme Being who contains all the beings is to adore oneself, say the pantheists—and this adoration ought to be prohibited. But it is legitimate to worship the parts of the divinity that are superior to others, and this 455 worship can legitimately be addressed to the idols that the divinity, by the power of incantations, is forced to enter.114

Ceremonies, too, have a double tendency. The apotheoses of all the instruments used in the celebrations—the vessels, the tripods, the pavilions, or pandels, even the herbs that become so many gods who are adored—are a disguised pantheism; and the following is also rooted in pantheism: the homage offered to the instruments of all the professions during the feast of Gauri, one of the names of Paravati, wife of Shiva. The worker prostrates himself before his plows, his picks, his sickles; the mason before his trowel and rule, the carpenter before his saw and axe; the barber invokes his razors, the writer his iron stylus, the warrior his weapons, the fisherman his nets, the weaver his line; the farmer sacrifices to the manure that fertilizes his lands. But if these mysterious rites recall for the Brahmin imbued with the secret teaching its abstract unity, the transformation of material objects into particular divinities inculcates the plurality of gods in the vulgar.

One can say the same about the holy epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Pantheism frequently shows up in the Ramayana,115 and in it one also finds the doctrine of the three worlds taught by the Vedas,116 as well as the priestly notion that attributes to the gods the invention of all the sciences and arts. This idea serves as the introduction to the work, and the episode of the two birds is recounted with particular charm. (One is killed by a hunter and missed by its companion; this touches Valmiki’s compassion and inspires the harmonious rhythm that Brahma blesses.)117 As for the Mahabharata (of which the Bhagavad Gita is a part), the pantheistic doctrine is even more manifest; but its poetry necessarily led the poets to replace abstractions with images and stories in which individuality returned.118 456 If the color of these epics is in a sense more solemn and philosophical than those of Homer, the gods of the Ramayana are no less individualized, no less passionate, no less different in their characters, penchants, and wills, than the gods of Homer. This variety—which is harmonized with pantheism only by means of a series of arguments that are quite difficult to follow—necessarily had to have an effect on the people. The multitude from whom a most jealous prohibition keeps these sacred volumes119 is nonetheless allowed to hear them recited in the ceremonies it attends, and what this teaches them cannot but further confirm them in their polytheistic belief.120

It is certain that the Indian who, while pirouetting twelve times, exclaims in his prayers, I am Brahma, the universe is me, nothing but I exist in the universe, does not attach to these words any philosophic sense. At the moment when he repeats them, his multiplied worship of divinities who are infinite in number proves that he does not adhere to the exclusive conception in pantheism that denies all diversity. To stubbornly see in pantheism the definitive doctrine of India is, therefore, to take a part, even a fraction, for the whole, and to generalize a partial truth, which is the infallible means of committing an error.121

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The system of emanation also presents itself under almost the same forms as in Egypt. The divinity is divided into a multitude of gods who, first of all, take on bodies of human form; these bodies, however, are light, diaphanous, and pure. By degrees, their bodies become darker, heavier, and ever more corrupt; these gods thus descend to the condition of men, in order subsequently to return to their original source. Here there is both theism and pantheism:122 theism in that everything emanates from a single being, to which all are reunited by purifications; pantheism in the tendency of all the partial beings to reunite with the grand Whole, and once this reunion is effected, everything is absorbed in the same substance, and all individuality disappears.123

Dualism also makes itself seen. Having entered into metaphysical doctrine with theism and pantheism, both of which have need of it (the one to absolve itself,124 the other to explain its double appearance), it moves from the sanctuary into the people’s fables. In his countless incarnations, Vishnu appears on earth at each moment in order to combat evil, be it under the form of a hero, a reformer, a penitent, a sage; or of a tortoise, a boar, or a lion with the face of a man. Often the good and evil principles are united in the same god considered in two different aspects. Varuna, the god of the seas, sometimes protects and purifies the mortal race; sometimes, surrounded by crocodiles and serpents, it holds souls captive in its depths. 458 Shiva is beneficent when he rests on Mount Kailash, having a bull for a mount and a gazelle for an emblem, pleased with the happiness he grants when his luminous visage turns to transmit to the corrupted world a refreshing current, source of prosperity and delights; but soon malevolent, he demands blood, is pleased with tears, and his mouth emits devouring flames. Finally, Ganga or Bhavani, this goddess of India, the weaver of nature, the dominatrix of the Himalayas, the primitive water that grants all beings the gift of existence, becomes Cali the terrible, who presides in the other world over the torments of sinners, and here demands human victims.125

What we have just said about theism, pantheism, emanation, and dualism applies to atheism. In whatever way one interprets and even tortures the doctrine of Fo, the beginning and end of this doctrine are the void and nothing. The ancestors of the human race came from nothing, and they returned to nothing; we all will return there. All living and non-living beings are different only in appearance, like snow, ice, and hail, which are but different forms of water. Matter alone exists. Birth, death, crime, virtue, moral blemishes, and purification on this earth—all are illusions. If one wants to avoid the word “atheism,” one can call this a materialized pantheism; but it is based on the same principles as atheism, and it ends with the same consequences; and the special confidence the reformer made to his disciples on his deathbed,126 which, even if it is not a historical fact nonetheless expresses the basis of the system, testifies against the subtleties that these disciples now invoke to ward off the accusation of atheism leveled against them by all the other sects. Nonetheless, among the Buddhists, as among the orthodox Brahmins, all the hypotheses coexist; and what is more, by means of precautions we spoke about above,127 this class of men maintains the people in wholly contradictory opinions. This class conforms itself to the external rites, it imposes and extols them, and tradition shows them going out after their master has expired to astonish the people with the austerity of their penances and the fervor of their religious invocations.

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The elements that compose the religions of Egypt and India are therefore identical. Both contain fetishism, science, and philosophy, the latter giving rise to hypotheses that have presented themselves to the human spirit everywhere, hypotheses of which the priests do not exclusively adopt one, but which they deposit in the sanctuary.128

Finally, a last circumstance completes the identity. Constrained like the Egyptian priests to express the metaphysical hypotheses in figurative language, the Brahmins have transformed them into cosmologies characterized by monstrous intercourse and births, rapes, and incest. It would take too long to enter into the details of these cosmogonies, which are more complicated and incoherent than those of any other people, because the systems they have to explain were more numerous and subtle.

It is enough to show Brahma,129 the first of beings, pure above all purity, excellent above all excellence, the light of lights, engendering the sacred Word, son of God, parallel to God, the Word whose first letter, presided over by Brahma, contains the earth, the world, men, spring, and the past; the second, presided over by Vishnu, the atmosphere, the vital heat, the autumn, and the present; the third, the sun, winter or the season of rains, and the future that awaits Shiva Mahadeva, the god of destruction. Maya, however, Maya the deceiver, sister and daughter of the all-powerful, Maya, the desire of Brahma, the eternal love, and in its quality as love, illusion, embraces her father with ineffable incestuous desire. Languidly lying on the brilliant fabric woven by her expert hands, she receives throughout time the fruitful seed of him who was alone. A tricolored (red, black, and white) heifer, by the combination of these three colors the emblem of the three forces that create, conserve, and destroy, she gives birth to the deceptive forces that people the world of appearances. She changes lies into truth, truth into lies, hiding the universal being that truly exists behind the partial ones who do not.

The fundamental ideas of this cosmology are found everywhere. According to a tradition, the original force, Adishakti, gave birth to the three gods, the Trimurti, 460 brought together in a single body. She fell blindly in love with them, and she espoused her children. Following another tradition, from the seed of Adishakti, the creative energy, was born Siva, the energy that kills. He who existed alone, says the Yajur-Veda, was seized with fear; but he reflected: what do I have to fear, I who am alone? But then he was gripped by love; but what did love do for him in his solitude? He desired the existence of another, and he became like male and female in their mutual embraces. The two halves then separated, and the woman, fearing incest, took on different forms: she changed into a cow, but he changed into a bull; into a mare, he into a stallion; into a nanny goat, he into a billy goat; into a sheep, he into a ram; in this way the different species were created, from the colossal elephant to the imperceptible insect.

In one of the Puranas, the gigantic Atri, one of the first fathers of the human race, was practicing rigorous penance in a withdrawn place. A generative drop fell into the Ocean. It is my son, he cried out, I commend him to you. Lazy Ocean let the seed float at the whim of the winds and waves. Finally, recalling the neglected deposit, he placed it in the heavens. A moon was born, but pale, imperfect, exhausted by the buffetings it had undergone. The gods then cast it into the bosom of the waves, surrounding it with fortifying plants and trees full of precious sap, and soon a new moon emerged in the resplendent air.

According to another story, the visions of the three gods who existed only in idea encountered at a single point. The shock engendered the white goddess, who is the Trimurti, a virgin under a triple form; but who at the same time is Sarasvati, daughter of Brahma, and Bhavani, the wife of Shiva; she celebrated her joy at being created by dancing, and from her bosom escaped the three eggs from which the three gods emerged. Here appears the cosmogonic egg that is found in the traditions of all peoples. This egg, half gold, half silver, of which one portion forms the heavens, the other the earth; whose seed is the day star, whose yoke, the mountains, veins, the rivers, and whose heat, alternately burning and fertilizing, hardens the unfeeling rocks or gives life to living beings. But by a series of contradictions that are peculiar to cosmogonies that contain a subtle metaphysics, the creator himself becomes the creature of the egg he produces; and it is from this broken egg that he emerges, the first time he shows itself.130

However, born from the mixture and confusion of all the seeds, Haranguer-Behah,131 461 sometimes the principle of production, sometimes the collection of subtle elements, sometimes chaos, engenders Pradjapat, at once the first generation, the figure of the world, and the representative of the year. And this Pradjapat moves his hands to his mouth, and this movement engenders the fire of sacrifices, and this fire appears as a steed whose head is to the east, rump to the west, and sides to the north and south; from Pradjapat’s seed comes the earth, and from the union of this seed with the word comes the sun; and in his consuming hunger Haranguer-Behah, like Saturn, wants to devour the newly born; daughter of the fear that he inspires in them, the word opposes him; and dividing itself among the names of the different creatures and the expression of divine thoughts, it incorporates itself in the sacred Vedas. Here one cannot fail to see a universal symbol found in the most opposed cosmogonies. This insatiable hunger of Haranguer-Behah, who devours everything that he produces, and who produces only in order to have more to devour, is the terrifying image of the destruction reserved for all that exists. Creation, a transitory work, seems to be only the illusory means of filling an abyss that is never filled. The Greek Chronos is the Haranguer-Behah of the Indians. Should one conclude that this idea came from India? Is it not more plausible that a law of nature that experience reveals before all others—we mean to say: this rapid tendency of all beings toward the unknown abyss that awaits and engulfs them—in all countries has suggested this image to man as soon as he began to reflect?

But if Indian cosmogonies thus resemble in general ways those of all peoples ruled by priests, their climate gives them a special set of characteristics. The love of inactivity, the passion for a dreamy immobility, and the charms of an inner contemplation that softens the shocks from without—these pass from the character of the worshippers to the character of the objects worshipped; and creation, before being brought into being, encounters more than one obstacle from this disposition. The first being created by Brahma fled to the desert in order to give himself over to contemplation until the end of time. Nine rishis, products of a second act of the will of the Eternal, all refused the work of creation;132 only then was it that Brahma, combining the two favorite ideas of generation by the union of the sexes and the energy of contemplation, united with Sarasvati, and from this incestuous union were born one hundred 462 sons who, in their turn, each engendered one hundred daughters. At the same time, by the force of his thought he drew from the depths of the waters the earth, the gods, and the Rudras, who asked him how they could in their turn form creatures. Brahma entered into himself, meditated, and gave birth to the sacred fire; and all these secondary beings, practicing austerities and penances with this fire, during the course of a year manufactured a single cow, the type of cows, who gave birth to 999 calves.

One cannot account for so many strange inventions that seem to be the crude and confused work of an imagination gone mad, except by attributing them to the need that the priests experienced, for the satisfaction of their own intellect, to attain the first causes of the phenomena they observed, and to show—accordingly as they were inclined to theism or pantheism—sometimes the grand Whole subdividing, sometimes the creative being causing the type of the celestial world to emanate from it, to which the material world would correspond. With respect to the dominion of the priests over the multitude, these cosmogonies were superfluous. This empire rested adequately on fetishism and anthropomorphism. But wanting to register their hypotheses and their systems, and being able to express them only in images borrowed from an imperfect language, they built up a repertoire of the most bizarre and obscene figures, explaining the strangeness by symbolism, and covering the obscenity by allegory.

The mixture of these different elements shines out in India as in Egypt. The Adityas, of whom Vishnu is the twelfth, represent the twelve months:133 behold the astronomical part. These Adityas are the sons of Adidi, the productive force, and of Casyapa, infinite space.134 Here a cosmogonic hypothesis mixes with astronomy. Finally, Vishnu is one of the most active gods of the popular mythology, and as such brings together the belief that offers idols, the science that observes facts, the metaphysics that seeks their causes, and the cosmogony that is forced to personify. Even in their prayers most marked with pantheism, the Brahmins allude to the observation of the planets, and even more frequently to the ancient forms in which the fetishism or the anthropomorphism of its cradle had clothed the gods.135 Combining, for example, on one hand, fetishism with astronomy, 463 and on the other, astronomy with music, they gave Surya the sun the epithet of Hamsa the swan.136

The famous invocation or prayer of the Indians by which Krishna identifies himself,137 the Gayatri, is a mysterious and complicated thing in which all these notions are found: it is a rhythm,138 a sacred language, the text of the Vedas, a teaching, an all-powerful ceremony that the Brahmins are obliged to practice without ceasing, a revelation, and, at the same time, a separate being, a goddess, the mother of the universe, the spouse of Brahma, the female sun; all of which means: superstition, astronomy, abstractions, and mysticism mixed in such a way that it is impossible to separate them.

In Tibet, all of whose doctrines derive from the teaching of Fo and are therefore Indian despite the modifications they have received, Cenresi, represented in the figure of a wheel, which expresses the transformation by which he successively became the substance of all souls and all bodies, Cenresi, at once nature, the world, and necessity, the motor of the world, in popular legends is also an infant descended from heaven, exposed on a mountain, found by shepherds, risen to the rank of legislator by his wisdom and his miracles, but who, despairing of the crimes of men, breaks his head against a rock into twelve pieces, each one of which becomes a head.139 Here the popular fable combines with pantheism by bringing in, rather confusedly to be sure, the idea of a divine sacrifice and redemption by it, an idea we will have to talk about later.

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If one sought a final example of the most extravagant fables combined with science and mystical ideas, one would find it in the history of Trishanku, the most bizarre of the episodes collected in the Ramayana. One of the ancestors of Rama, Trishanku conceived the project of ascending, while alive, to the celestial abode. Rebuffed by the penitents he asked, and whose curses changed him into a pariah, he addressed himself to the powerful Vishvamitra, who prepared a sacrifice to which the gods were invited. On their refusal to attend, Vishvamitra, by the power of his austerities, launched Trishanku into the ethereal sphere. The gods cried to him: “Your place, O tchandala, is not among us.” Cast down from the height of the air, the king spewed torrents of blood. His protector caught him in his fall, and, by a second effect of the penitential practices he had performed, he created new gods, a new firmament, and new stars. The Indian Olympus capitulated; its inhabitants addressed humble supplications to Vishvamitra. Trishanku remained suspended, head toward the earth but surrounded with a brilliant light; and all the stars created by Vishvamitra are maintained in a lower station, resplendent with the light his words communicated to them. This fantastical story obviously indicates astronomical discoveries communicated by the priests in their fabular language; it also contains the customary ideas of India concerning the merit and power of voluntary suffering, the confirmation of the dominion of the Brahmins (who constrain the gods to obey them), and, finally, allusions to geographical science, because the blood Trishanku coughed up reddened the river Sama, which flows in the part of Tibet called Tsan by the Chinese.140

This amalgam of popular fictions with science sometimes introduces contradictions that are difficult to account for when one seeks a chimerical unity;141 sometimes it produces very singular (and often amusing) tales. Suranah or Suranu, the wife of the sun, not being able to support the glare that surrounded her spouse, secretly fled from him. Made miserable by her absence, the sun asked her back from Twashta, his father-in-law. The latter proposed, as the only way to have a lasting reconciliation, to let his rays be shorn. The sun consented, and placed upon a wheel he was shorn of his hair; this is why when the haze clears, he appears without sunbeams, but as a round and reddish mass. But Twashta had performed the operation 465 inexpertly, and his son-in-law had several wounds; hence the spots that sometimes appear in the evening on the disc of the sun.142

Thus, in the priestly religions there is a perfect similarity, not only as far as content but also in the organization of the material. Science is attached to fetishism by way of personifications, to philosophy by symbols; in order to recount the facts observed by science, and to assign them their causes, philosophy borrows fetishism’s images and tales; and fetishism, while associated with science and philosophy without the multitude being aware of it, remains the religion of the people by becoming a part of the priestly idiom.

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CHAPTER 6: On the Causes That Modified This Combination in India, without, However, Winning the Day against the Priesthood

In beginning the chapter one has just read, we announced that it would not contain an exposition of the teachings or the rituals of the Indian religion, and that we simply wanted to indicate the elements of which the religion was composed and the way in which they were combined. As a consequence, many questions had to be postponed. Nothing was said about the character of the gods, their relations with men, the influence of these relations on morality, the notions—whether popular or philosophic—concerning the life to come, and on human destiny. These will be treated elsewhere; one, however, demands some treatment at this point.

Identical with the priestly cults in its materials and their organization, the religion of India is superior to them in many respects, however. Made mysterious by the priests, it seems to experience a need to expand, as it were, that fights against the disposition to mystery. Too often cruel under the empire of a caste, there is an innate sentiment of sympathy and mildness to it that the theocratic spirit cannot stifle. One would say about the Indians that they are a people of children accustomed to respect cruel masters, but contemplating their harsh practices with real astonishment; and who combine with the rites they do not understand a cheerfulness that nothing can destroy, and an innocence that nothing can taint.

One departs from Egypt exhausted, oppressed by an atmosphere where breathing is difficult and existence burdensome. One flees Gaul with horror, haunted by hideous and bloody spectacles over which a somber mysticism near to magic hovers. One finds this oppression, this mysticism, and these bloody spectacles in India as well, yet one comes near it charmed. The oppression weighs less, thanks to the elasticity of an imagination that plays with the yoke that has been imposed. The mysticism is embellished with élans of enthusiasm and songs of love. The hideous spectacles are relegated to a distance that veils them, and, mixing them with 467 fabulous traditions, gives to the reality that still exists an air of fictitiousness that softens its horror.

Whence this difference? From two causes. We have already alluded to one;1 we need to return to it a second time. We will indicate the other, and perhaps these results will appear to be novel and worth considering.

The climate is the first of these causes. Less harsh and more serene than that of Germany and Gaul, no less pure but less monotonous than Egypt’s, India’s climate benevolently cradles the inhabitants of that country under its riant variety. The material world displays itself poetically, and this poetry penetrates the soul, which reproduces it no less brilliantly and even more fantastically.

To be sure, the priests have exercised their power in order to poison these gifts of heaven; but at least in part they have failed before nature; and they themselves have sometimes yielded to its ascendancy: their creeds have become less severe, their songs more harmonious; and despite their efforts, surrounded by images that charm him, happy when he is permitted to be, peaceful when he is not made mad by a fanaticism foreign to his character, the Indian has remained benevolent despite the Brahmins who command him to abhor what does not belong to his caste, as well as tolerant, even though the Brahmins have often dragged him into bloody wars and pushed him to horrible massacres.

In order to understand the effect of the climate on the Indians, one must read their sacred poems. They clothe their most abstract doctrines in vivid colors; when they encounter traditions containing a too shocking ferocity, they envelop them in a profusion of images that barely allows them to be seen, and when nothing in their religion contrasts with natural affections, they express them with an energy and tenderness that cannot be found in any of the masterworks of antiquity, and that one would seek in vain in the civilized poetry of our modern times. What is more innocent, for example, and more gracious, than the description of the courtesans sent to attract to the court the pious Dasharatha, the son of a sage who has withdrawn into the forest? His ignorance of the distinction between the sexes, his astonishment at the sight of the various female forms, the harmonious movements of these unknown seducers, their white skin, their diaphanous garments, the sound of the bells that decorate their agile feet, the sensuality and alacrity of their dance, the first stirrings of a desire unknown until then, and which enters sweetly into an innocent soul, the heavens resounding with ineffable melodies, 468 the gods pouring torrents of perfume on the boat that bears Rishyashringa and his beautiful companions, everything is lovely in this picture.2 What the other cults of the same nature present as an ignoble mixture of superstition and debauchery is transformed under the fingers of Valmiki into a magical combination in which desire and sensuality become religious, and religion invites to pleasure.

And if we transport ourselves next to Dasharatha, forced to expose his son to the perils of war; if we lend an ear to the groans of this old man burdened with eleven thousand years, and who is bound by an oath against which his paternal heart protests; if we see him casting himself at the feet of the powerful Vishvamitra, asking grace from him, and repeating a thousand times this touching refrain: “Rama, my beloved, is my life, my support, my supreme treasure. I cannot live without Rama. How will he be able to confront these ten-headed monsters? O sage! Do not deprive me of Rama,”3 without any hesitation we would place these passages alongside the famous description of Venus’s girdle, where desire, sweet words, and flattering prayer triumph over wisdom itself;4 as well as the goodbyes of Hector and Andromache, or Priam’s lamentations.

In general, the comparison of the Ramayana with the Iliad, whether in literary, philosophic, or religious terms, would be a singularly worthwhile and instructive endeavor. The hatred of priests, a distinctive characteristic of Greek heroes and kings, and the boundless veneration of the Indians for their Brahmins, the contrast of the simple yet sublime poetry of Homer with the exuberant imagination of Valmiki, the similarity of events and difference of mores, would shed light on the changes circumstances and times imprint on the human race.

The first book of the Ramayana presents us with a narrative similar in its details, although opposed in its results, to that which begins the second song of the Iliad. Jupiter sends a deceptive dream to Agamemnon in order to move him to lead the Greeks to battle. Vishnu, wanting to become incarnate in the womb of Kaushalya, brings to Dasharatha, her spouse, the potion that is to prepare the miraculous 469 pregnancy. But the description of the heavenly messenger is laconic in the Greek poet: the master of the gods summons the dream, speaks to it; the dream flies to the son of Atreus, fulfills his mission, and disappears.5 The author, impatient to get to the action, suppresses all the details that would slow it down.

But the Indian poet, in contrast, delights in drawing a picture of everything that would recall the divine splendor. Certain to please his readers, he leisurely depicts the supernatural being that descends from the heavens. “From the midst of the flame that rose on the altar of sacrifice, in the midst of celestial melodies that filled the air, rose suddenly a supernatural being of incomparable brilliance and incomparable stature, clothed in striking purple, powerful, heroic, irresistible; his face was black, his eyes burned with a fire without parallel; his hair and his beard were of an azure color, they covered his breast and his shoulders with tufts of hair; he was equal in height to the highest mountains, strong like a majestic tiger; similar to the sun, his form shone like a burning flame; in his muscles were found the vigor of the lion. His hands were covered with varied jewelry; twenty-seven pearls surrounded his neck; his teeth resembled the king of the stars; he pressed to his bosom, like a beloved wife, the urn of gold with silver sides filled with the divine payousa, the ambrosia of the immortals. Approaching Rishyashringa, he says: ‘See in me the emanation of Brahma; take this drink, and let Dasharatha receive it from your hands.’”6

The same difference between Homeric and Indian poetry is found in an episode of the Ramayana rather similar to the story of Briseis, except that in the Iliad she is a captive, and in the Ramayana, the cow Sabala.

Two verses of Homer are enough to recount the departure of the young prisoner,7 whose mute sadness is recalled only much later. Valmiki devotes fourteen to depict a Sabala who is at once plaintive and threatening: “Sabala, taken away by the monarch with audacious aims, meditates alone while crying, full of despair. How am I forgotten by the penitent with powerful words, and dragged away, the outraged victim of the servants of a king? What did I do to the prophet whose sight penetrates the secret of things, so that the sage exempt from moral taint would abandon me thus, me, so faithful? And meditating, and meditating again, she races away, knocking over thousands of her profane guards, and runs more rapidly 470 than the wind to the threshold of the hermitage. She arrives, tormented with anguish and bathed in tears, and sobs at the feet of the holy man of bitter lamentations. You desert me, O blessed one, learned in the Vedas, rich in austerities, son of Brahma, you desert your humble companion”; and the sage responds to her as an adopted daughter, as a beloved sister.8

Here we are only indicating some examples, but these examples belong to a whole: they demonstrate the opposite character of the two genres of poetry. Homeric poetry is entirely external, ardent, full of movement, squeezed into those of its descriptions that are not indispensable to the action itself, more narrative than lyrical, adapted more to the retelling of deeds than to the vagaries of reverie; as a result, it is little religious, and devotes religion to earthly purposes instead of elevating it above the human sphere. Essentially meditative, Indian poetry concerns itself with the surrounding objects only to draw them to itself, take them in, and, as it were, identify them with itself; one sees in its often overwrought descriptions, its too frequent repetitions, in the accumulation of confused, incoherent epithets that tend by their subtle harmony to give rise to emotion rather than to describe external objects, that it attributes only a relative reality to such objects, and that for it true reality is in the soul, which always aspires to unite itself with God. This disposition makes the poetry of India eminently religious. Movement bothers it, contemplation enchants it; it is never happy except with this daughter of repose; it always leaves her with regret and therefore with a certain effort; and the less that action is its element, the more it employs striking colors and gigantesque forms in its accounts; when it departs from its nature, it does violence to itself, and this violence imparts something convulsive and disordered to it.

Nonetheless, it constantly returns to its native gentleness; it attempts to soften the fierce traditions that revolt it. Omburischa the king wanted to sacrifice a human victim; Indra saved him from the sacred fire. The king persisted. A poor Brahmin sells him one of his sons for millions of the purest gold, heaps of diamonds, and one hundred thousand cows. The unfortunate son encounters Vishvamitra practicing his holy penances. His heart full of anguish, he casts himself at the feet of the famous penitent. “No longer for me,” he says, “is there either a father who protects me or a mother who caresses me, no faithful friend, nor companion on the earth. O you whose voluntary sufferings have endowed with divine energy, save an unfortunate one without hope; let the king’s sacrifice take place, but let me live.” 471 Touched with compassion, Vishvamitra orders his children to replace the stranger who had implored him; they refuse, and his curses make them unclean pariahs. Turning then to the suppliant: “Recite,” he said, “at the instant you are offered as a victim this powerful mantra9 that I give you, agreeable praise in honor of Indra and the other gods.” The ceremony begins, the gods approach with eagerness to participate; but the victim intones the mysterious hymn, and Indra, charmed, delivers him by granting the king the fruit of a vow whose fulfillment he prevented.

Everything in this narrative is significant. The poet allows himself no blame: the immolation of a human victim seems to him to be a virtuous act; the victim himself does not want the sacrifice to be interrupted; the prince is rewarded for his pious intention. The priestly influence is completely manifest here;10 but the Indian character, which does not dare fight against this influence, eludes and triumphs over it by reconciling the merit of the sacrificer and the salvation of the victim.11

What we know of the Mahabharata will provide our claims with new proofs. Several parts of this epic have striking likenesses to the Odyssey. The voyages of Bhima are analogous to the long travels of Ulysses; and the episode of the giant Hidimbo, a monstrous cannibal, resembles Polyphemus. But the Indian poet throughout adds to the strange adventures he recounts gentler and more profound sentiments than the Greek poet. The love of the sister of Hidimbo contrasts with the brutal ferocity of her brother, while nothing softens the half-burlesque, half-repulsive portrait of the savage Cyclops; and the filial and fraternal devotion of Bhima is painted in much more touching colors than the somewhat cold respect that Telemachus has for Penelope, as well as the so-long-delayed reunion of this queen with her husband.

An analogous character is manifest in all the ceremonies and rituals. The celebration of marriage recounts the alliance of man with nature, be it living or nonliving. It is in the name of the thirst-quenching water, the purifying fire, the restorative air, and the gods who reside in the elements that the young spouse is given to her husband, with these words: “Let all the assembled divinities chain your hearts to each other; let water, air, and fire unite you, and above all be united by love, that intoxicating potion. Three intoxicating beverages are drawn from the grain, from 472 milk, and from the flowers of Brahma; the fourth is woman. They intoxicate by their scent, by their looks. It is love that gives this virgin, it is love that receives her. Sama who directs the silver moon, once confided her to a Gandharba who shone in the celestial choirs; this Gandharba passed her to the god of fire; the god of fire yields her to you, and with her, wealth and a numerous posterity. Sun that presides over the divine harmonies, darting rays, nymphs of the sun, brilliant stars, nymphs of the moon, fecund rains, nymphs of the air, and you sacred hymns, nymphs of the intellect, protect this happy couple. Charming Sarasvati by whom all the elements were created, sanctuary where the seeds of the universe developed, hear this nuptial song, glory of spouses. Be my companion, says the spouse in his turn, while pouring over the head of the virgin bride water that cleanses all stains, be my companion, the breath of my breath, bone of my bones, essence of my essence, let no one break our bonds. I invoked the goddess of happiness, and you are this goddess. I am the Sama-Veda and you, the Rig-Veda. I am the sun and you are the earth. Remove by this water endowed with a marvelous power the sinister omens that might be hidden in your eyebrows and your hair, everything that would be sinful in your words or your smiles, everything that would be impure in your gracious hands, in your lithe legs, and your most secret charms. Daughter of the sun, mount upon this chariot similar to the seven-petaled flower,12 painted in various colors, shining like gold. Source of ambrosia, increase the prosperity of your husband; let all be gay, let all be caressing, let all be pleasure and joy.” Finally, the priest comes to command the gods in a solemn voice: “Air, fire, moon, sun, expiators of evil, remove all the marks that would tarnish the beauty of this virgin, everything in her that would harm her spouse. Woman, I banish far from you the threats, dangers, and enchantments of the evil genii, everything that would threaten your beloved, your race, your flocks, your goods, and your name. Now let the sacrificial cow—other times offered in sacrifice—today be put at liberty by the prayer of the young wife; do not kill the innocent cow, the mother of the Rudras, the daughter of Vasus, the sister of the Adityas, who generously gives us streams of delicious milk; let go her reins, let her eat the grass of the prairie, and nourish herself with healthy plants, and drink long draughts of the pure water of the sacred river.”13

These ceremonies which are so poetic are combined, it is true, with obscene practices: the image of the Lingam wounds the sight; the priest offends virginal 473 modesty by bringing indiscreet hands to the generative organ that is to be touched with a holy oil; and it was probably from India that the revolting practice came to Rome in the last days of a corrupt republic that forced the newly married woman to sacrifice the beginnings of the virginity she was to lose to hideous idols.

But here, too, it was the priestly genius abusing the idea of sacrifice,14 and pursuing with its bizarre laws the human race in its most intimate affections and pleasures.

Philosophy itself, even in its rashest speculations, experiences the beneficent influence of the climate. Contrast the pantheism of India with that of China or Tibet. Chinese pantheism offers only a blind and mute force; mechanism dominates in religious thinking, as in political organization. One would call it the ossified debris of a world that no longer exists, whose gigantic forms, while stirring astonishment, present only the idea of death. In India, on the contrary, something living escapes from the priestly clutches: ingenious images, while attesting to the identity of god and the soul, profit from the momentary difference to encourage man to perfection. “Two birds inhabited the same tree: one ate its fruits; the other, not touching them, contemplates and awaits his companion. One is god, the other is the soul contained in the body; it is the plaything of illusion, and deplores its own impotence. But when she discovers the one who lives with her, union occurs, eternal and intimate, and the soul is delivered from all error and all suffering.” There is individuality in the account, despite the doctrine that proscribes individuality; and the marvelous diversity of forms lets them escape from the exclusive unity to which logic and doctrine try to reduce them.

The second circumstance that distinguishes Indian religion from all the beliefs subject to priests is the theory of incarnations; a theory that in truth all these religions endorse, but none of which makes the use of that the Indians do. First inculcated by the priesthood for its benefit, this theory later reacted against it.

As the Indians understand it, it has nothing unreasonable about it.15 They say 474 that as soon as one admits a benevolent power that created man in order to perfect him and make him happy, by what right can one refuse this power its choice of means toward this goal? When corruption or ignorance causes the work of his hands to err, given his pity and his indulgence, how can one prohibit him from sending an emanation of himself to reopen the path to heaven? By recognizing the miracle of creation one has ruled out denying any other miracle. The real absurdity is when one limits to a determinate country or time the action of this benevolent Providence; on the contrary, it begins anew each time the world has need of it, and the world, they add, constantly has need of it.16

This doctrine is found everywhere in the Puranas. The earth complains that under the weight of iniquity it is ready to fall back into the abyss; the gods groan under the oppression of evil genii. Vishnu consoles them by promising a savior who will break this tyranny. This savior, he says, will be born among the shepherds and in the hut of a shepherd; and in a further refinement (which belongs to ideas that we do not need to develop here), this savior becomes incarnate in the womb of a virgin.

In order to parry the specious objections that these strange, sometimes scandalous accounts might suggest to hard-to-please judges, the Indians suppose that once incarnate the divinity does not know himself: subject to all the errors, vices, and infirmities—the unhappy lot of spirit united with matter—the god who becomes incarnates loses awareness of his divine nature. He identifies with the form that he took on. The action of the present effaces the memory of the past.17 Thus Brahma became an unclean tchandala who for a long time lived by theft and murder; 475 but suddenly recalled to his divine essence by the prayers and merits of two penitents, this vile pariah was raised to the first rank of the inspired and the poets. He explains the Vedas, and the wisest humble themselves before his marvelous interpretations. He takes the lyre, and the echoes of his harmonious songs resound in the Ramayana, and the earth is instructed and corrected by learning the history of Vishnu, already descended seven times among mortals, from Valmiki. Finally taking his own flight for heaven, this poet Valmiki, an unclean being who became regenerate, whose name was once the object of horror but is now the object of veneration and enthusiasm: he is Brama atoning for a rash pride, sentencing himself to celebrate Vishnu. In the same way, Vishnu incarnated as Balaramen or Bala-Rama does not recall that he is a god except when, as the destroyer of the giants, he liberates the human race from the sacrilegious worship these giants had imposed.18

This theory of incarnations has continued in India until our day. The Sikhs, a sect of deists who for four centuries have undergone bloody warfare against the orthodox and the Muslims,19 regard Gobind Singh, who won great victories for their belief, as the tenth avatar; Gobind Singh died at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

If one now reflects upon the direct and necessary consequences of this fundamental principle of the Indian religion, one will find it quite favorable to the progressive development of this religion. It prepares the imagination to contemplate new marvels and the understanding to receive new doctrines. It represents doctrine 476 as never being definitively fixed, and always leaves open a space above the law where a better law can appear. As we already said,20 each incarnation is a period of improvement and reform. The learned Creuzer and his able translator felt this truth in their bones, as it were;21 but it seems to us that they obscured or falsified it. To hear them, incarnations would be either systems that were originally different, or the remnants of a single system, the work of time and genius, which came from an ancient and primitive Catholicism that was dissolved and fragmented by time.22 This is an error. There is no unique system; nor were there simply sects with different doctrines. First of all there were crude beliefs, then successive refinements which, despite the priests, the theory of incarnations would favor. To be sure, the times of some of these incarnations could have, even had to have, been inverted, for a reason we gave in our first volume.23 Thus, even though in the Indian narratives the religion of Brahma preceded that of Shiva,24 the latter must have been the older because it is the least advanced; and the religion of Brahma, the most metaphysical of all, had to have succeeded Shaivism.25

But whatsoever the confusions that had to have been introduced into the mythological chronology by this voluntary reversal of dates (which are impossible to determine with any precision), the progression of ideas, and the myths that express them, is not unrecognizable.26 This progression makes itself felt even in the forms 477 of the incarnations. Vishnu first of all assumes the form of a fish. Soon an amphibian, he extends his action to the earth and the sea; later raising himself higher in the animal kingdom, he becomes a strong and frightening boar; even later, the king of animals, he adds a human head to the body of a lion. His teaching, which is gentler and purer than Shiva’s, attests to the march of civilization. The efforts of Krishna against licentious practices,27 Buddha’s efforts against the inequality of castes, are so many steps taken toward less revolting and less oppressive institutions; and these efforts, evaded or proscribed by the Brahmins, nonetheless have the advantage of at least momentarily imparting a salutary direction to minds; and of preserving them from the Egyptian apathy in which the priesthood always tries to keep them.

Unfortunately, the Brahmins constantly fought the salutary influence of the two circumstances we just discussed; and since in this world the good has its inconveniences, as evil has its advantages, the benevolent influence of a climate that bestows so many favors upon the Indians at the same time consolidated the priestly dominion.

A reading of the Ramayana is extremely interesting from this point of view. Everything our travelers have said in blame and disdain concerning the enslavement of the Indians to the Brahmins is surpassed by what we find in the great epic of Valmiki; and his testimony is so much more impressive as it is with real admiration that he reports the proofs of devotion and submission with which they are surrounded. Here it is an opulent city, Uyodhya,28 where no one dares offer a Brahmin less than a thousand rupees at a time.29 There, when the son of a hermit approaches, a king leaves his capital at the head of all his court; he returns, modestly following the holy man at a distance; the entire city is decorated with garlands; it sparkles with burning torches, and hymns of obedience resound in its 478 ramparts.30 Later, speaking to the priests he employs in the sacrifices, Dasharatha addresses humble petitions to them; he calls himself their servant, their slave; he has thousands of magnificent tents built to receive their brothers, foreign and native, and fills them with exquisite meats and wines. None of them, says the poet, even had to express a wish; all were anticipated by the prince. They constantly extolled the food prepared for them by his command. They exclaimed: “Son of Rhagava, how well you have fed us!31 Let prosperity accompany you!” Elsewhere, this same prince on his knees before sacrificed birds and fish publicly confesses his sins; the Brahmins absolve him of them, and the king offers them immense lands; but they answer: “The study of the Vedas is our mission; far from us the possessions of this world; small presents—cows, a diamond, a bit of gold—this is what we can accept from you.” And the king gave them a million cows, one hundred million pieces of gold; four hundred million of silver; seeing that he had pleased the Brahmins, the son of Ikshvaku, his eyes bathed in the tears of a pious joy, prostrated himself at their feet; and their blessings extend in a thousand different forms over the monarch beloved of the gods.32

The history of Vishvamitra is no less remarkable. All-powerful king, conqueror without equal, he has defeated all his enemies. He requires the gift of a cow from a Brahmin; the Brahmin refuses; he takes the miraculous animal, which escapes, and by returning to his master33 reminds him of the superiority of the Brahmin over the warrior. The Brahmin, however, still fearful, doubts his power. “This king,” he says, “has innumerable armies of elephants, infantrymen and horsemen; he has a host of chariots, rolling like thunder; his banners are followed by multitudes: what can I do against him?—O Brahmin, answered the marvelous heifer, the strength of the Brahmin is divine and surpasses that of the cuttery. Frightening is the arm of 479 the latter; but the word of the Brahmin is invincible. Command, and I will destroy his fierce soldiers, and I will break the pride of the impious.” The Brahmin allowed it, and the bellowing of Sabala caused phalanxes to appear (whose name appears to be an allusion to some historical event);34 defeated by Vishvamitra, these phalanxes were replaced by others which themselves were constantly replaced; and Vishvamitra, like a torrent deprived of its channel, like a serpent without its teeth, like the sun blocked by an eclipse, fled like a bird whose wings no longer worked. A century of austerities finally gained him the favor of the gods; he obtained enchanted arms from them and returned to attack the Brahmin, the object of his hatred. But even the gifts of heaven yielded to the priestly power. A baton in hand, a cow at his side, the priest called forth the elements and cast flames that consumed the magical weapons; and he cried out: “Madman, now where is your warrior strength? Do you finally know the word of a Brahmin, you insolent ruler, vile like the dust?” And the defeated prince retired, repeating to himself: “The power of the warrior is but an empty dream. Empire belongs to the Brahmin, and to the Brahmin alone.”35

This is not all: “I too want to be a Brahmin,” says the monarch, and by unheard-of penances he overcame the gods. He forced them to compromise with him, to recognize new gods created by his will; nonetheless, when he asked Brahma for the dignity of a Brahmin, he was refused. Then, beginning anew afflictions that lasted a thousand years, he put the world in danger; the gods ran to the feet of Brahma. “Already,” they said, “a terrible disorder shows itself at the far reaches of the universe. The seas are troubled, the mountains are shaken, the earth trembles, the winds cease, the human race is going to embrace impiety, and the sun is deprived of its light by the incomparable splendor of an irresistible penitent. Hear his prayer, father of the gods, save heaven from an imminent ruin.” And coming forward with the immortal retinue, Brahma addressed himself to Vishvamitra: “We will grant you days without end, power without limits, divine wisdom, unmixed happiness; your austerities have won you the nature and dignity of a Brahmin; be a Brahmin, O Vishvamitra”; thus, alone of all the children of men since the origin of time, Vishvamitra arrived at this eminent and inaccessible dignity.36

Finally, to summarize what India thinks of these priests, let us listen to the advice of the old Dasharatha, ready to separate from his son. “Serve the Brahmins 480 devoted to the study of the Vedas with the greatest diligence. Try to please them; ask their counsel. Let their instruction be received by you like water that gives immortality. O Bharatha! The Brahmins are grand; they are the source of prosperity and happiness. Instruments of the Vedas, the Brahmins are necessary at every moment. In the form of Brahmins, the gods have fixed their abode among mortals in order to ensure the existence of the world. The Brahmins are the gods of the earth; in them reside the Vedas and the Shasters, and incomparable virtue.”37

Raised in these ideas, the Indians have never shaken off the yoke of the priesthood; it has profited from the mildness of the climate, from the happiness that accompanies repose, and from the credulity of an imagination that reverie lulls in its cradle and which critical examination would have exhausted, in order to preserve and extend its empire. It disarmed the reforms that in the form of incarnations would have been unwelcome, by honoring them in theory and ignoring them in practice. It recognized the divinity of Krishna but maintained the cult of the Lingam. It did not contest Buddha’s title as an avatar, but it persisted in the division into castes. Buddhist priests themselves reintroduced it under certain disguises. In a word, the incarnations of India had the fate of the Reformation in more than one country in Europe. The priests unfurled new banners to better establish ancient abuses.

In the final analysis, their fateful skill in manipulation and their invincible tenacity triumphed over the gifts of nature and the developments of the intellect. Cruel in the midst of a gentle people, immobile despite the seed of perfection it contained, absurd in its popular fables, sanguinary and obscene in its rites, fastidious in the duties it imposed,38 monstrous in its cosmogonies, given over in its 481 metaphysical hypotheses to all the aberrations to which our mind is condemned (this despite—and perhaps because of—the forms it created to direct itself): this is the religion that weighs heavily upon India. Its excessive spirituality preserves it from neither the crudest notions nor the most repulsive images. In the polytheism that is independent of the priests, we will see spirituality heighten the divine qualities and perfections. In the priestly religions, it adulterates and disfigures them, sometimes by raising them above the grasp of even the most practiced intellect, sometimes by lowering it beneath the conceptions of even the most vulgar intelligence. There, because of certain sacred words, the pure spirit unites to stones, to pieces of wood, to shapeless idols; the infinite is confined in limited beings; change becomes an attribute of the immutable being; movement occurs within the changeless being; the immaterial gods are at the same time animal-gods; impassible substances experience pains, passions, and the vanities of our nature; these things coexist because no one perceives the contradictions in the unintelligible;39 together they make up the strangest chaos; and the result of this chaos for the slaves of the Brahmins is a sort of permanent delirium, the corruption of every idea of the just and the unjust, and the voluntary abdication of every human faculty.

Would someone accuse us of being too harsh? We can cite authorities. We will choose Lord Jones, known for his partiality toward a people that he, as it were, revealed to Europe, and which he has an interest in extolling beyond measure. “The Code of Manu,” he says, “forms a system where despotism and the priesthood, both apparently restrained by the laws, in reality conspire to give each other mutual support. This system is filled with absurd notions in both physics and metaphysics, puerile superstitions, and teachings dangerous because of their obscurity, which favor the most bizarre interpretations. The ceremonies are ridiculous, the punishments capricious, often atrocious, while other times indulgent to a fault; its morality, even though generally strict, is on several points—for example, concerning oaths that are violated and perjury excused by pious motives—unimaginably 482 lax.”40 This sentence, which seems to be already quite severe, is not harsh enough according to an observer who is less favorably disposed than Lord Jones. The Brahmins, says Buchanan,41 have developed no useful science; they have destroyed history, perverted morality, and erected the power of the altar on the ruins of the throne and liberty. In their hands, the laws attributed to Manu, laws which could suit an absolute monarch, have become the most abominable system of oppression ever invented by artifice and ambition; as well as the most degrading.42

One could counter with several facts. Those that we have provided concerning the natural influence of the climate of India, for example, could serve to counter us. But if our opponents argue in good faith, let them answer the following questions:

Was not fetishism found in India? Is it not still found there?

By dividing themselves among different doctrines which are more refined than the beliefs of the people, have not the priests of this country let a public religion rooted in fetishism impose itself on this people?

Are not the principal doctrines among which the priests divide themselves theism, pantheism, and atheism?

Is not theism going to be lost in the subtleties that detract from what it has of religious, leaving only what is abstract?

Even though they are more or less artfully connected to the public religion, do not these doctrines remain in fact foreign to this religion, and change nothing in its teachings or rituals?

Does not the combination of a metaphysics that often ends in unbelief among 483 the learned classes with an always crude superstition in the mass of the nation produce the most deplorable consequences?

Is it not in vain that theism offers Indians a system that is sometimes consoling by its hopes, sometimes sublime in its severity? Is it not in vain that pantheism invites them to repose, emanationism to perfection, and philosophy in general to disdain for popular superstitions? The divinities of the multitude, are they not individual beings that the faithful beseech according to their desires of the moment, Indra for the pleasures of the senses, Lakshmi for the success of their endeavors, Atri and his ancestors to have children, Agni when they want to seduce with their beauty, Raudra when they want to win with force? Do not the Brahmins persist so obstinately in the teaching of the ancient fables, that those of Gangotri43 still recount that the icicles of the rocks of the Ganges are the hairs of Mahadeva.44 Did not Abbé Dubois see the feast of Nagara-Panchami being celebrated in honor of serpents, who were sought in their dens in order to offer them milk and bananas? And the Pongol of cows, is it not a solemnity in today’s India, where believers prostrate themselves before animals?

At bottom, this is all that matters to us; and none of the foregoing questions can be answered in the negative.

One is therefore wrong to aspire to elevate the religion of India above all the ancient religions, and for believers of a new sort in our day45 to place it almost with 484 Christianity, because they hope to derive from the Vedas (works and instruments of a priesthood) means of bending the Gospel to their despotic views; the Gospel, however, is a heavenly teaching that gave back to man his legitimate liberty and his fundamental dignity.

Like the other priestly religions, this Indian religion has all the imperfections of polytheism sans priests, without any of its advantages, and to these imperfections are joined the enslavement of thought, the perpetuation of the errors of each period, and the impossibility of the human spirit to emancipate itself gradually from these errors, which thanks to heaven is a happy potential found in its nature and its destiny.

In ending this chapter, let us repeat once more that we are far from having claimed to have dispelled all the obscurities that surround the subject we just treated. Our readers were able to see the numerous causes that maintain this obscurity. The confusion of records and the uncertainty of their dates, the simultaneity of conflicting doctrines, the indifference of Brahmins toward the contradictions that do not impair their power, the manner in which in pantheism each god is by itself the great Whole, and when we pass to theism, each god in turn is the supreme god under the name of Shiva, Brahma, Vishnu, Indra, or even Devendren (an otherwise subordinate divinity), the peculiarity of the religion that has it that incarnations are at once celestial beings who do not know themselves and human beings who can die, finally, the necessity in which we find ourselves of having to postpone questions that will be treated later:46 all that has left many lacunae in 485 our exposition. We think we have said enough to be clear and understood, and complete enough to serve as a guide to those who, free of all parti pris, would like to enter into a labyrinth for which, until now, no one has been able to find the thread.

486

CHAPTER 7: That We Would Be Able to Find Examples of the Same Combination among All the Peoples Subject to Priests

The observations contained in the previous chapters apply to all the religions that the ancient priesthoods controlled. Among the Chaldeans,1 we simultaneously see the dog, the cock, and the goat adored by the people;2 anthropomorphism, which modifies their external forms: Saturn with the body of a man and the head of an ape, Jupiter with the head of a vulture;3 Oannes, first of all a fish-god, then a legislator and prophet with the head and feet of a man, entering each night into the sea and reemerging each morning to give laws to mortals and to reveal to them the course of the stars and planets;4 at the same time, gods as symbols of the planets, that is, science bestowing upon these crude conceptions a more elevated meaning; astronomical calculations serving as the basis of the mythology and presented to the vulgar as the actions of the immortals; trees planted in the name of the divinities who preside over each star, which are the dwellings of these divinities when they come near to humans;5 astrology forming a great chain that descends from heaven to the earth, of which one extreme is the science of the priests and the other the beliefs of the people;6 later, metaphysics seeking the causes after 487 science has noted the facts, theism under the name of the primitive fire, the uncreated light, and beside it dualism as a dark spirit, the enemy of the good principle; finally, the cosmogonies clothing metaphysical hypotheses in bloody or obscene images; beings with two heads or hermaphroditic, born of night and water;7 the hideous Omorca cut in two by Bel, her death causing the death of all that has life, her two halves forming the firmament that covers us and the globe we inhabit; Bel cutting off his own head; the living races born of the earth drenched in his blood; Tauthe and Apason, the active and passive principles, brother and sister, husband and wife, engendering the visible world; Bel reappearing as if he were born for the first time; a mythological, historical, and cosmogonic personage, representing the Demiourgos8 or the orderer who gave man intelligence, and created the sun, the moon, and the other planets.9

The same spectacle strikes our eyes among the Assyrians. Their principal divinity is the sun, who, while his brilliant chariot winds its way above their heads, lives in their midst in a rock with a round shape.10 Here fetishism mixes with astronomy. But to avoid repetitions, from now on we will speak only about the features that are particular to each people.

An egg fell into the sea, say the inhabitants of the Assyrian Hierapolis; fish took it to the bank,11 doves hatched it;12 Venus came forth.13 Behold cosmogony animating fetishism. Derceto, they continue, charmed by this same Venus and having given herself to the embraces of a young priest, exposed the fruit of her weakness in a cavern, and in the form of a fish cast herself into the waves. The abandoned infant, miraculously kept alive by doves, adopted by a shepherd, was elevated by a singular destiny to the throne of Assyria, and was immortalized in its annals under the name Semiramis. Behold fetishism combining with history.

Among the Etruscans, the worship of birds, oaks, and spears appears alongside 488 their Tinia, the supreme god, nature, the first cause and immutable destiny,14 and alongside Janus, the preserver, the mediator, who presides over time and who is time itself; there is astronomy and astrology in the books of the nymph Begoë, the theism attributed to Tages,15 dualism under the name of Mantus and Vedius,16 a demonology alternatively astronomical and metaphysical, and the cosmogonic incest of Janus and Cama17 (with the hermaphroditic gods presenting the same combination).

Among the Persians, the symbolic cock, Hufraschmodad, this celestial bird, victor over Eschem, the monstrous enemy of men, who pursues them in order to devour them;18 Hufraschmodad, sentinel of the world, terror of evil genii,19 whose piercing eye scans all the earth,20 whose beak is a sharpened spear, and who three times a day and three times a night, keeping watch over the dwelling of the just, calls the inhabitants of the air to defend the holy fountain of Arduissur,21 the virgin water, emanation of Oromaze; the Amschaspand, several of which have animal forms, and who preside over the seven planets or perhaps are the seven planets themselves; Haoma, the tree of life, at once tree and prophet, dwelling place of the soul of Zoroaster, who later moved to the body of a cow; Honover, the powerful word uttered by Ormuzd, which to this day he has not ceased uttering; the ox Abudad, who contains the seeds of all things;22 the cow Purmaje, sung about in the Shah-namah—these are obviously the alliance of the worship of animals, stones, and trees with a doctrine that is sometimes dualistic and sometimes 489 pantheistic, depending upon whether Zurvan-Akarana, time without end, is the sole principle, or whether Oromaze and Arimanes are two equal principles.

Oromaze, the Word incarnate; this Word that according to common expressions was the firstborn of the seed of the Eternal; Oromaze, sometimes the infinite because light is infinite, and then, similar to Zurvan-Akarana, is alternately eagle and sparrow hawk. Mithra is the sun in science, in the cosmogony a mediating god with whose assistance creation occurs.23 Zurvan-Akarana himself is sometimes a generative power, time without end,24 sometimes an astronomical symbol, the grand period of twelve thousand years.25 Djemschid is the solar year, the inventor of science, and an invincible conqueror. Fabular animals, chimerical mixtures of the bird, the fish, the goat, and the ape, are figures of the stars. An equally fantastical monster26 represents the impure races, the work of Arimanes; and the unicorn is the symbol of the pure species created by Ormuzd. Behram, the Yazd of fire emerging from his breast, is sometimes a young warrior, sometimes a steed full of ardor, a laboring cow, a peaceful lamb;27 the dog Sura, who guards the fixed stars from the top of the heavens, and from there watches over the human race and protects its fecundity.

If the cosmogony of the Persians is less obscene than that of the Hindus, this difference perhaps owes to the period when the Zend books were composed and to the influence of civilization on a belated reform.28 What the Indians explained 490 by the act of generation, the Persians attributed to the separation of darkness and light, of water and fire: nonetheless, the distinction of sexes exists between these two elements, and the reunion of the sexes in the supreme God.29 Mithra is at once the male30 and the female31 sun. Kaiomorts, the first man, also enjoys this double attribute. The seed of the ox fallen to earth and gathered by Ormuzd, purified by the sun, kept for forty years by two tutelary genii,32 transformed into a tree that presented the image of a man and a woman united to each other, and which engendered Meschia and Meschiane,33 contains details that are no less indecent than the stories of Brahma and Sarasvati, and of Bhavani and Shiva.

In the midst of this mysticism, of this homage offered to a sole God, of this dualism, this pantheism, and these monstrous cosmogonies, we find a living polytheism among the Persians, practiced by the people34 and invoked by the kings,35 491 with which the priesthood often consents to associate itself. Xerxes sacrificed on the banks of the Scamander a thousand cattle to the Trojan Minerva; and following his orders, the magi offered libations to the heroes of the country.36 After the storm that destroyed their fleet, the Persians sacrificed to the winds, to Thetis and to the Nereides.37 Their king become master of Athens commanded the exiled Athenians to enter the citadel, and there to worship their gods in keeping with traditional rites.38 Sending an envoy to consult the oracles of Greece, Mardonius recommended that he go everywhere he would be permitted, in order to learn the decrees of the gods.39 Datis, general of Darius, had three hundred talents of incense burned on the altars of Apollo.40 He believed himself obliged to send back to its temple a statue of this god that had been taken by the Persians.41 The respect 492 of Tissaphernes for the Diana of Ephesus42 served as a rhetorical trope for Cicero to increase the impiety of Verres.43 If the Persians marched against the temple of Delphi, it was not because they contested the god’s right to celestial honors but, as Herodotus says explicitly,44 in order to bring its treasures to Darius, who, continues the historian, had full knowledge of the wealth this temple contained.45

The facts we have borrowed from Herodotus do not consist in vague rumors or opinions drawn from unsure sources, as the Greeks were wont to do; they are established facts about which this historian could not be mistaken. Xenophon, who by his expedition into Asia had acquired some knowledge of the principal traits of the Persian religion, speaks of sacrifices offered to the sun, to Jupiter, and to several other divinities. He describes the nature and rituals of these sacrifices; and what is even more decisive, he shows us Cyrus the Younger invoking the tutelary gods of the empire he wishes to conquer. Aspasia or Milto, his mistress, believing herself indebted to Venus for her elevation, erected a statue to her.46 After the death of her lover, she became a priestess of the Assyrian Venus;47 Artaxerxes had established the cult. And the successors of this monarch raised temples to her in their most prominent cities, enriching them with immense gifts.48 The Persians, therefore, despite the Zend books and the learned and abstract doctrine of their magi, remained polytheistic until the fall of their empire;49 under the reign 493 494 of the last Darius, and therefore before the Greek invasion had denatured their beliefs, they worshipped an image of the sun and idols of gold and silver;50 and if we believe Tacitus,51 whose authority we have no reason to doubt, they persisted in polytheism long afterward.52 Thus in Persia as elsewhere, fetishism, polytheism, 495 science, history, metaphysics, and cosmogony all encounter, are combined and mixed.53 If the Zend books, a reform commanded by power and executed by calculation, artificially (and increasingly arbitrarily) rework an already ancient belief, one that also was gradually modified by an ancient civilization, and if they, finally, are a work redone at the order of temporal despotism to fight theocratic authority—if, we say, the Zend books seem to be free of some doctrines and certain revolting practices—the priesthood still regained and preserved its empire, and continued to exercise its ordinary influence; all institutions and precepts were stamped with its spirit; overcharged with practices, the cult left man no moment of relief; the notion of impurity relentlessly pursued and troubled him in all his actions; he was consumed by innumerable prayers, purifications, and expiations. These artificial duties were put in the rank of the primary duties, and the mechanical character of the rites weighed on the religious sentiment and eventually choked it.

Let us move to the West and the North; looking first at the Scandinavians, the 496 Germans,54 and all the nations known under the name of Celts, having for idols trees,55 animals,56 pebbles,57 weapons,58 as well as the sun,59 the elements,60 and the stars.

The principal god of the Livonians is simultaneously a bird and the day star.61 The legends of Regner Lodbrog give the title of goddess to the cow Sibylia, whom this conqueror brought with him to all his battles, and whose terrible bellowings forced the enemies to cut themselves with their own swords.62 The ancient Russians had tame serpents for fetishes; and each village of Poland recognizes a particular god clothed in some monstrous form.63 The newly born in Bohemia were presented to the flames, and mothers recommended them to the protection of the sacred fire.64 This fire was maintained among the Finns by the priests, and if it went out, led to their death. The same people offered cocks to lizards, and humans to the gods, as victims; and these barbarous gifts were given by the Slavs to the Bog,65 the Don,66 and the Danube. A king of Norway 497 worshipped a cow; an Icelandic hero sacrificed to his horse; others venerated stones.67

The country of Wales, the seat of the most ancient Druidism, had its sacred oxen and cows, born of a mysterious ox, son of the ancient world.68 One of these oxen, by the natural linking of martial ideas and religious notions, was the bull of battle.69 Goddesses lived in the lakes of Great Britain. A Welsh bard of the fifth century invokes the god of the air, another the god of fire,70 a third, the sun;71 and in a panegyric of a prince, the memory of the worship of animals seems to be connected with the glory of an incarnation, as in India. Owen appeared, says the inspired singer, in the form of a ringing shield, which a valorous leader wears on his arm before the tumult to come, in the form of a lion with puissant wings, in the form of a terrible spear with sparkling head, in the form of a brilliant sword which mows down enemies and afterward distributes glory, in the form of a dragon before the sovereign of England, and in the form of a devouring wolf.72

The polytheism that was introduced did not replace this first worship; each family of Germany has its particular fetish, which its head carries everywhere with him,73 while the national gods are contained in boxes that take the place of temples, and which are placed on wagons that accompany the wandering tribes.74

Science then borrows images from this dual worship in order to perpetuate its 498 discoveries and calculations without divulging them. The frequent allusions of Welsh bards to astronomy prove their observation and study of celestial bodies.75 In the depths of this withdrawn corner of the world, the Druids had written treatises of a fabular geography.76 The three great festivals of the Scandinavians were celebrated at the winter solstice, the new moon of the second month of the year, and the spring equinox.77 Asgard, their heavenly city, in one of its meanings is the zodiac; and its inhabitants seated on their twelve thrones are the twelve signs.

The same name designates time, the sun, and the citadel where the gods repair to defend themselves against the giants. The dwarfs who occupy such a large place in this mythology, these children of the gods and three female giants who entered into Asgard to seduce them, are thirty-six in number; the first two, Nyi and Nithi, represent the full and new moons, and four others represent the cardinal points of heaven. But since it is necessary that religion brings together all the sciences, these dwarfs also recall the discovery of metals: they penetrate the bowels of the earth, carve precious stones, and fashion gold and iron, from which they forge weapons, the glory of heroes.78

The seven heads and seven swords of the Vandal Rugiavith represent the week. Radegast, sometimes resplendent in white, sometimes ebony black, with the solar symbol of the ox on his breast, and like the god of harmony carrying the swan on his head, recalls the attributes of Apollo.79 Each evening Perkunas, the wife of Ocean, the Thetis of Poland, receives this god covered with dust, who then is refreshed by the bath she prepares, and reappears each morning surrounded by a new luster.80 Libussa, famous for her knowledge of metals, and for the worship of a golden idol of which she was the priestess; Libussa, who wanted to marry only a laborer, and who having found him behind her chariot, married and made him king of Bohemia, brings together metallurgy and agriculture, and brings both into the religion.

The Russian traditions have a triple stamp of fetishism, astronomy, and history. Volkov, an ancient prince of the country, is worshipped by the inhabitants of the banks of the Volga in the figure of a crocodile. Vladimir, the first king converted 499 to Christianity (who had no more to pride himself about in this than Constantine),81 is called the shining sun, the friend of man, in all the national legends; Kiev, its capital, is also named the city of the sun. Its enemies are evil genii, sons of darkness and the cold. All his adventures,82 like the exploits of the Greek Apollo, consist in carrying off young women and fighting serpents and dragons; they contain a scientific meaning; while they also have this remarkable feature: that the introduction of a new cult which was destructive of the one that conferred upon them a religious character only modified them, without depriving them of this religious character. Thus, while the historical Vladimir became a Christian monarch, the astronomical Vladimir remained a planetary god, and in general the priestly symbols survived the abandoned belief. It was only after a persecution of several centuries that they shared the fate of the original belief.

After science comes philosophy. In the language of science, the god who sends a beneficent breeze to melt the ice and thus prepare creation,83 is only the articulation of a law of nature expressing the action of heat on cold. Metaphysics, though, makes him the unknown god, the god not yet manifested,84 which struck us in Egypt as the symbol of pantheism.85 The serpent Jörmungandr, who mixes his poisons with the primordial water; and the children of Loki, Vali and Nari, who, changed into wolves by the good principle, eat themselves, and their entrails serve as chains for the god of evil, are dualistic symbols. A rather pure theism characterizes some of the poetry of the Welsh bard Taliesin;86 and one finds dualism among the Vandals in that singular conception that makes of each god a double being, black and white, evil and good; one finds emanation in a series of beings who come from the great Svantevit, corrupting themselves as they move further away from him; one also finds pantheism in this unchanging, eternal Svantevit, who absorbs all things when the hour marked for them to return arrives.

500

There is more: the Indian Maya, this goddess of illusion, the deceptive daughter of the Eternal, fantastical creator of beings that exist no more than she does, is found in Scandinavia in the imaginary world that the Skalds call Vanaheim.87 There error, chimeras, and dreams reign. Lying appearances succeed one another, astonish the sight, fascinate the imagination, cast the intellect into vertigo, and force it to constantly ask—and always without receiving an answer—whether anything exists, and if it can distinguish what exists from what does not. Thus everywhere philosophy has felt its impotence; and priests, the most affirmative of mortals, have, alongside the numerous systems about which they, like us, argue, placed in the most secret place of the sanctuary the acknowledgment of this irremedial impotence, while surrounding it with veils calculated to most effectively disguise it.

Cosmogony also presents itself with its bloody battles and monstrous generations. The most ancient god of Finland engenders himself in the womb of Runnotaris, the void or nature.88 The Ginnungagap, the infinite space of the Scandinavians, corresponds to the Zurvan-Akarana of the Persians, time without end; the two principles of cold and heat, darkness and light, are not two individuals like Oromaze and Arimanes, but two different kingdoms, Niflheim and Muspelheim. The hermaphroditic sun89 is equated with Odin in the historical traditions: incest unites him to Freyja, his wife and daughter. Chaos90 engenders three sons, water, air, and fire;91 their children hail, the mountains of ice, the fire lit with effort, the calcified ember, and the sterile ash, form a cosmogonic family adapted to the climate. The giant Ymir, endowed like Odin with a dual sex,92 delivers his immense body to the gods, who kill him; similar to the half-gold, half-silver, egg of the Indians, it becomes the visible world or the terrestrial globe; his blood creates the sea and the rivers, his bones the rocks, his teeth the stones, his hair the plants, his 501 skull the clouds.93 Night94 unites with twilight95 to engender day,96 and, each mounted atop an enormous steed, day and night cross the heavens. The horse of one, covering his bit with foam, produces the dawn; the mane of the other, flowing in the air, gives off light. Two wolves pursue them; they fill the sky and the air with blood; hence the eclipses; and the rainbow is a bridge that rises from the earth to the heavens.

Among the Welsh, Ceridwen, daughter of necessity,97 an indefinable blind force, is the object of the love of the primordial ox who came from her womb;98 together with him she gives birth to the cosmogonic egg, which in turn gives birth to the serpent egg of the Druids,99 which served in England as the model for the sanctuaries of Stonehenge and Avebury.100

Thus among the peoples of the north, under forms less gracious than in India, but more vivacious and poetic than in Egypt, the same elements form the same combinations with the same incoherences. This is because the causes and therefore the effects are similar. The coexistence of beliefs and doctrines that are passed on together by means of mystery, and despite their contradictions, this is the first truth one must recognize if one wants to find the thread of the labyrinth.

But it is time to end this chapter; in a work such as ours, we point out the path without taking it ourselves.

502 503

BOOK VII: ON THE ELEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE POLYTHEISM INDEPENDENT OF PRIESTLY DIRECTION

504 505

CHAPTER 1: That the Combination Described in the Previous Book Is Alien to the Polytheism That Is Not Subject to Priests

The combination we just described is not found in the polytheism that priests do not dominate. The beliefs of peoples free of this domination are not an amalgam of several elements with contrary natures; one does not see abstract divinities appear beside or above material fetishes. Cosmogonic forces play no role. Allegories are rare, accidental, and found in the expression rather than the thought. Nothing recalls this double or triple sense that in priestly religions disorients and confuses the intellect. There are no privileged learned men, because there is no science; there is no mystery, because there are no priestly corporations with an interest in mystery. Having elevated itself above fetishism, the human mind never falls back to it; at most it preserves a few obscure traces. Nor does it lose itself in the subtleties of a metaphysics that, becoming ever more difficult and arduous, ends in a vague pantheism or in insoluble doubt, or even in an explicit denial of all existence. Preserved from these two extremes—which are more dangerous at this period because human knowledge is quite limited and conjectures can be bolder—man rests unshakeable on the most solid terrain, that is, the most proportionate to his capacities, a terrain he, as it were, has conquered by himself, and upon which he builds the edifice of his religious notions.

In priestly religions, everything is disproportionate to the rest of his ideas, the most sublime and abstract as well as the most abject and crude. Sometimes the intellect, snatched from the sphere that appears to open before it, finds itself cast into a fantastical world surrounded by clouds that no ray of light is allowed to dispel. Sometimes it is condemned to fall back beneath the limits it has already crossed, and is violently led back to notions it had very much left behind.

In free polytheism, everything is proportionate to the social state, which becomes orderly and progressive. All the qualities attributed to the gods are human 506 qualities on a greater scale. Nothing is enigmatic, nothing is contradictory, once the nature and time of his views are acknowledged;1 nothing shocks his reason just beginning its course and hence imperfect, because it lacks the lessons of experience; but this reason is capable of development when there is no enemy power to impede its progress.

As we always seek facts to support our claims, we are going to demonstrate our assertions by an exposition of the polytheism of the first Greeks, that is, the religion of the only people fortunate enough not to have had these imperious bodies erect themselves over their heads.

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CHAPTER 2: On the State of the Greeks in the Barbaric or Heroic Times

At the time with which we are concerned, Greece was divided into numerous tribes, each occupying a very restricted territory.1 Theocratic authority either had never existed or had been destroyed.2 The authority of the leaders who governed these societies was poorly defined, sometimes oppressive, and often disputed; it left each individual, if not the legal, the material faculty of counterclaim, of resistance, or at least invective; sometimes the peoples and armies assembled to deliberate, and one would have said that the legitimacy of their deliberations was recognized; sometimes the kings decided alone, and their decisions—objects of blame or subjects of complaint—were nonetheless obeyed. Thersites unleashed himself against Agamemnon; Achilles grew indignant; the army remained a spectator and obedient.

These peoples had only imperfect knowledge of the means of providing the needs and pleasures of life; moreover, they owed them to foreigners rather than to their own efforts. Their progress in the arts of luxury appears to be rapid because they were the effects of imitation; for this reason, at this period the superfluous was ahead of the necessary. They, however, had begun to conquer an empire over physical nature: the earth was torn by the plow; the sea had felt the yoke of ships; 508 and the moral faculties profited from the moments of leisure that these developments made possible; but these moments were short, this leisure precarious. Crudely cultivated, the earth often remained stingy; assaulted by frail boats, the sea resisted; and war was still the easiest, most lucrative resource.

The position of the Greek peoples encouraged them in this direction: living next to one another, their relations were customarily hostile. From this came the invasions and pillaging that made the distribution of property so unequal, its possession so precarious, and the vicissitudes of life so incalculable: throne and slavery, wealth and poverty, succeeded one another with frightening rapidity. Hecuba is queen today, tomorrow her arms are in irons.

From this state of things resulted a mixture of perfidy and loyalty, of cunning and candor, of greed and nobility, and vice and virtue that kept moral ideas in perpetual agitation and vacillation.3

During their prosperity, kings—or better put: the leaders—had large herds and vast domains where they exercised generous hospitality; their palaces were decorated with the fruits of their rapine or the presents of their guests; a luxury tainted with barbarism, a demisavage elegance, entered their mores. Their fortunate climate prematurely gave them an exquisite sentiment of the beauty of forms. The arts, especially those that captivate emerging nations, music and poetry, which at that time are never separated, entered their festivals and ennobled even their intemperance. War, devastation, pleasure, danger, songs, festivals, and slaughter filled their active and diversified lives, one after the other.

These are the traits in which the poems of Homer depict for us the Greeks of the heroic times: they occupy the intermediate step that separates the primitive state from the civilized state. In our second volume4 we have indicated the religious form that this period of society needed, and how it created this form.

Bringing fetishes into a corporate body, the division of supernatural power, and distinctive names—these are the initial conditions that are common to priestly religions and independent polytheism. Now, in order to understand the subsequent modifications that characterize the latter, we have before us the most authentic record: the Iliad. Questions, however, present themselves that would arrest our inquiry if we neglected to resolve them.

We are going to try.

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CHAPTER 3: On Some Questions That Must Be Resolved before Proceeding Further in Our Investigations

Two distinct races shared Greece: given the dissimilarity of mores, inclinations, and habits that characterized these two races, do they allow us to ascribe a religion completely the same to them?

Does the Iliad give us a faithful portrait of the beliefs of the time that its author or authors wanted to describe?

Finally, if we grant the Iliad the merit of being faithful and exact, does it follow that we can do without other records to complete the picture?

Let us examine the first question.

We just said that there were two distinct races in Greece; we could have said that there were four: the Aeolians, the Achaeans, the Dorians, and the Ionians; but the first two disappeared or melted into the other two; the Dorians established themselves in the Peloponnese and expanded into Boeotia, Locride, and Macedonia; the Ionians in Attica, the islands of the Archipelago, and Asia Minor.

These two races were very dissimilar to each other, and this dissimilarity extended from language to political and religious organization.

The Dorians were a grave people, constant in their customs, austere in their mores, full of veneration for the aged who were the repositories of the ancient traditions, aristocratic in their forms of government, disdainful of the fine arts, very attached to their religion, whose ceremonies were simple, and carefully consulting the oracles before attempting any enterprise.

Light and mobile, the Ionians easily changed customs, had little respect for ancient mores, an ardent and restless taste for novelty, a limitless passion for perfection and elegance; and because worship, when it is free, always expresses the moral disposition of a people, they sought in theirs brilliance and gaiety, as in their institutions they sought democracy.

The opposition between these two races can be seen at each period of Greek history, 510 and it presides over all the revolutions the inhabitants of Greece underwent. But did this opposition, starting from heroic times, exercise over the polytheism of this country enough influence that from it resulted fundamental differences in teachings, rituals, and, above all, beliefs?

No doubt several facts attest to the dissimilarities; a few examples will enlighten us concerning the general nature of the facts. Placed far from the coasts and in the midst of the land, the Dorians neglected Neptune and the maritime divinities, while the Ionians who inhabited islands or lived along rivers diligently worshipped them. The orgies of Bacchus were much more repugnant to the Spartans than to the Athenians1 and the other peoples of Greece. The character of Apollo, less irritable than the immortals who surround the throne of Jupiter with him, less carried away than Jupiter himself, and distinguished by the haughty calm that his statues convey to us; the character of Apollo, as we were saying, manifestly bears a Dorian imprint;2 and the virile tendencies of Diana, her masculine occupations, her excessive love of independence, perhaps owe to the qualities of the women of Sparta, who enjoyed as much freedom as their spouses, whom they equaled in courage. While the Sappho of Sicyon, Praxilla, celebrates Venus, the lover of Adonis3 and the seductive mother of the god of intoxication;4 while the courtesans of Corinth are devoted to the public pleasures under the auspices of this goddess,5 Sparta has its armed Venus, and its Venus protectrix of the chaste flames of the nuptial hymen. The Lacedaemonian stories about Hercules, the customary center of the Dorian mythology, are of another genre than those that are told elsewhere about the same god. When these legends pass from the Dorian to the Ionian race they are modified; the Ionians join to the worship of the son of Jupiter 511 the memory of Theseus, the Athenian hero par excellence. Finally, the Greek religion is simpler and graver among the Dorians than in Attica, Asia Minor, or the islands; and Plato bitterly reproaches his fellow citizens for the ostentation of their extravagant festivals and the egoism of their prayers, contrasting them with the modest rituals and disinterested worship of Sparta.6

But all these differences between the two races are much later than the Homeric ages: even those who have best observed the differences have recognized this truth. The Greeks of Homer, says Mr. Heeren, all resembled one another, whatever their origin. There is no distinction to make among the Boeotians, the Athenians, the Dorians, and the Achaeans we encounter in his poems. The heroes of these different peoples have nothing local about them. The differences that separate them come from their individual characters and personal qualities.7 It is the same with the gods. Even though Juno is the special divinity of the Argolid; Jupiter of Arcadia, Messenia, and Elidus; Neptune of Boeotia and Aegialia; Minerva of Attica, all these specificities disappear in the Homeric mythology. Greek mythology, says the author of the most ingenious and profound work on the ancient history of the Dorian tribes,8 forms a whole in which different materials become homogeneous by the fusion that is effected, in which all the local colors are blended and unite to make one color.9

Therefore the separation of the races can help us when we treat the subsequent progress of Greek polytheism; but at this point it is of no importance.

As for the doubts expressed by more than one critic concerning the identity between the Homeric mythology and the beliefs of the people, a few words will suffice to dispel them.

What has given rise to these doubts is, on one hand, stubbornness in wanting to attribute to the Greeks notions that are more subtle, more metaphysical, less material than the Iliad does; and, on the other hand, the disproportion some believe 512 they see between a barbarous people and the sublime poetry and harmonious language of Homer.

We think that we have superabundantly proven that the Greek religion as it was when it dominated the spirit of the peoples, either at the beginning, if Greece never knew a priestly caste, or after the destruction of this caste by warriors who revolted against it, contained none of the refinements we encountered in the religions or philosophies of the priests. We saw the Greek genius modify everything that came to it from abroad: mysterious rituals could have continued, enigmatic ceremonies could have been celebrated, even publicly, but their priestly meaning—scientific or abstract—was unknown by those who celebrated them.10

If—passing on to the other objection—we are reproached for considering to be a religious code an entertaining and strange collection of ingenious and brilliant stories that poets have presented as they wished, changed in order to embellish them, and varied according to their fancy, we answer that antiquity did not see these religious epics that way. In its eyes, to attack Homer was to attack religion. This fact is proven by the practices of priests, the arguments of philosophers, and the mockeries of unbelievers. In Greece, the Homeric poems had a sacred authority: Plato refuted the tales they contained as being an integral part of the public teachings;11 and to overturn these teachings, Lucian12 directed attacks against these poems that resemble those of our bold minds against the Bible in the last century. If one reflects 513 on it, one will find that the religion described by Homer is precisely what ought to be the religion of a barbarous and martial people living in a beautiful climate, under a benevolent nature, when no authority inhibits this people. How can it conceive its gods? As beings similar to man but endowed with more colossal strength, more extensive faculties, superior knowledge and wisdom, which, however, do not exclude either passions or even the vices that passions entail. The fetish is greedy and hungry because these physical needs are the sole that the primitive knows. Jupiter is still voracious and mercenary because neither greed nor intemperance has disappeared among the barbarians; but with other passions having developed in the human heart, these also become an integral part of the character of Jupiter.

The moderns, who hardly admit scruples because they have few, or convictions because they no longer have any, have supposed that the Greek poets—and especially Homer (to employ this generic name)—embellished or disfigured the religion and deities of Greece, because this religion and these deities were what the poetic need and genius of a poet would have created; but this is because the nation and the development of the social state were poetic. The poets only followed the lead of their nation and their time.

The Homeric poems, and principally the Iliad (because everything we say here about the Homeric epics applies above all to this epic), are therefore the most authentic and faithful painting of the religion of the heroic times;13 but alongside this precious monument, are there not other sources that we also ought to consult?

What would be these sources? We leave to the side the Orphic hymns, which are a priestly importation or the scattered fragments of a destroyed system to which Homer sometimes alludes,14 but which are completely foreign to his own mythology. We have already spoken of them above; we will have the occasion to speak of them later.

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There remains, therefore, the poets and prose writers who made use of Homer’s narratives, either to decorate later epics, tragedies, or odes, or to recount the same deeds in a simpler style and more methodical order. Let us begin with Hesiod.15

This poet describes a social state that is very different from Homer’s. The development of this truth, and of its consequences for religion, would be out of place here. Hesiod is the representative of a very important revolution in the religious ideas of Greece. The examination of this revolution will find its place. Here we will say only a few words.

Three ideas dominate in what remains to us of Hesiod’s poetry. The first is the necessity of work. It is found constantly in the Works and Days. The poet seeks in a thousand ways to inculcate it. One senses that at this period this conviction had the energy that novelty lends to sentiments that have just emerged: it was a recent discovery, resulting from the change in the situation of the Hellenic tribes.

Returned from their military expeditions, fallen into an exhaustion that inspired them with a great aversion for similar enterprises, the Greeks were further drained by the intestine wars that renewed in their own country the evils that they had experienced in foreign ones. During the absence of the victors at Troy, almost everywhere ambitious subjects or perfidious relatives had usurped their thrones and their wealth. Citizens fought one another; families rose against one another. Chased from their homes, entire clans invaded their neighbors and expelled them. 515 More than once, all the parts of Greece (with the exception of Attica and Arcadia) changed inhabitants, and torrents of blood attended each of these revolutions. The Greeks, therefore, were gripped by a love of repose. The cultivation of the earth, the agricultural life, and hard work in their eyes were the indispensable conditions for their future well-being; penetrated by a profound sentiment of this truth, Hesiod lets himself return to it constantly.16

In the second place, the reiterated complaints against the kings who devoured the peoples, and against the iniquity of their judgments, indicate the fermentation among barbarian tribes that had to precede the abolition of monarchies and the establishment of republics.

When men follow their leaders to pillage, they console themselves for their obedience to them by the oppression they exercise in their turn against the defeated. This savage despotism passes from hand to hand; each tolerates it because each practices it; but when peace has succeeded to war, tyranny, having become the privilege of a few powerful men, presents no recompense to the multitude. The need for a greater liberty and some kind of security is therefore one of the first results of the peaceful life. We will soon show in the Odyssey itself the seed of this tendency and a certain growth in the authority of the people.17 The poem Works and Days, written later than the Odyssey, was probably composed shortly before the birth of the Greek republics, at a time when the great ones of each country abused their authority.

One sees in Hesiod more than in Homer the pressure of the great on the multitude:18 not that this pressure did not exist perhaps even more in earlier times, but then it did not appear to be anything surprising. It takes time for man to discover that he has the right to complain.

Finally, the frequent invectives against women are a third proof of a change in 516 social relations. The poets who describe the heroic times speak almost only about the women of the superior class; now, the women of this class, sometimes guilty of atrocious crimes, did not influence the life of their husbands in any sustained way. They have slaves that they direct in some uncomplicated arts or tasks; but in the more complicated state of the laboring life, women became more necessary to the individuals of the subordinate class, which begins to find its place. The work of women, their diligence, and their obedience are more indispensable; hence, the complaints of their husbands, which Hesiod repeats ad nauseum.

In general, it should be noticed that the class of the people, which is spoken of in Homer only as a buzzing mass, unworthy of attention, emerges in Hesiod from its nullity; just as one saw the communes come to the fore in the history of our feudal monarchies after several centuries during which the lords (who are the kings of heroic times) were the only ones mentioned in the chronicles. Homer paints in a way the feudal age; Hesiod, the age that began to be industrious, agricultural, and almost mercantile.

We will see later how religion proportioned itself to the new needs of a changing society. Here we need only conclude that Hesiod will be a great aid when we have to compare the two successive epochs; but he would confuse us if we consulted him concerning the first of them, to which he did not belong.

Another circumstance makes the testimony of Hesiod of little help on this subject. During the interval that separates the Iliad from the Theogony, the communications of the Greeks with the barbarians had introduced into Greece many fragments of priestly traditions, beliefs, and doctrines that Hesiod brought together in his verses, but without understanding them. In this respect, religion as it is found in Hesiod was the Greek religion of no time. To find something in Greece that is similar, we must go to the mysteries, but we are not at the point of considering them.

The Cyclic poets19 depart less from the actual mythology of the barbarous times; but these poets teach us nothing that Homer does not provide with more 517 detail and greater poetic beauty. Rather dry and cold transcribers, their aim was nothing but to link together fable with fable, narrative with narrative: their sole merit is to reestablish a few minute details or forgotten traditions that the singer of the Iliad had omitted. But since there is no poetry in their souls, there is no religion in their songs.

The lyric poets are in another category. They wrote at a more advanced period of civilization and development; hence the need to conform traditions to the progress of ideas; see Stesichorus and Pindar. The first repents having gathered untoward comments on Helen and declares that, better informed, he knows that she was never at Troy; the second rejects several stories, declaring that they cannot be correct because they are unworthy of the gods’ majesty.20

We will return to this work of the lyric poets when we show the Greek religion walking stride-by-stride with morality, and purifying itself as the intelligence of man develops. Here we mean only to demonstrate that the religion that the lyric poets thus improve is not the religion that the Greeks professed under Troy’s ramparts.

For even greater reason, we must not hope for greater fidelity or precision from the Greek tragedians. They remove what would wound their audience; they invent what would please them. Aeschylus and Sophocles less than Euripides, because Aeschylus and Sophocles were believers, yielded only to a moral sentiment and the gradual purification of ideas, and consequently suppressed only actions that were degrading to the gods, but did not call their existence into doubt. Toward the time of Euripides, however, the progress of enlightenment had caused unbelief to sprout. The death of Socrates had aggravated it. Ambitious for effect like Voltaire, obeying the spirit of his century like Voltaire, by flattering it he influenced it. He bent his mythology to a specific goal; he recognized only natural forces, or abstractions, in the gods of the vulgar.21 Sometimes he brought several divinities together in one; his imagination made sport of the religious traditions, and his desire to impart a new charm to his plays caused him to prefer the most recent or the least known.22 Thus we can find in Aeschylus and Sophocles the Greek religion as their contemporaries understood it, and even in the first of them recollections 518 of earlier traditions. Euripides helps us see the emerging hostility of an already persecuted philosophy; but all these things have nothing in common with the purely martial peoples ruled by Achilles or Agamemnon.

As for the poets of Alexandria, the mythology that one can call the true mythology—that is, that which commanded belief and respect for a long time—is entirely denatured by them under the weight of learned ornaments and pedantic erudition. As a religion, it has no faith; as talent, no more enthusiasm; these are compilers, sometimes elegant, often fastidious, who prefer forgotten traditions to popular ones in order to give their compositions the attraction of novelty and themselves the merit of learning. They are useful in their descriptions of rituals and ceremonies, in their allusions to doctrines created by philosophy or come from abroad; but the moral distance that separates them from the first Greek polytheism is even greater than the chronological distance.

The prose writers hardly give us more certain resources. Some, translators, as it were, of the epic poets, recount in a style devoid of ornaments what the epic poets had surrounded with all the brilliance of a vivid imagination. Others, seeking to put the received stories in a certain order, chose from these stories those that lend themselves most easily to that task, and thus become deceptive guides, since their choice is arbitrary, or the fruit of a system.23 Others, flattering their native country, torture the traditions in order to place among their fellow citizens the greatest number of gods and heroes that they can.24 Still others absurdly introduce historical criticism in the midst of fictions, and discuss if Aesculapius perished by thunder or some other manner, and if he was resurrected at Delphi or elsewhere;25 they calculate the years, months, and days of the battle before Troy;26 and in this way, even though what they work on once pertained to religion, it is no longer religion, but erudition, with which they concern themselves.

Even more imposing by their title and their character are the historians. Their researches take them back to the origin of ancient peoples and mores, and hence to legendary times. But they have no special way of judging the fables; those who 519 were religious, like Herodotus, at most sought to reconcile them when they recounted them, if they dared to recount them at all;27 those like Thucydides, whom no prejudice controlled, rejected them by means of a disdainful silence and simply drew the conclusion of the barbarism of the first ages.28

The triumph of unbelief and skepticism later created a subordinate class of critics29 who undertook the facile task of separating the marvelous from what they claimed to call history. They transformed the gods into mere mortals, into fortunate warriors and deified legislators. These writers aid us greatly when we describe the decadence and fall of polytheism; at this point, however, we can derive nothing from them.

For the same reason, we must leave to the side the philosophers. They either interpret polytheism, without overtly attacking it, in order to bend it to their own hypotheses, or, bolder, they combat it with reasoning and ridicule. The only way they can be useful to us at this point is that they provide even more proof that the Homeric religion was the true polytheism in Greece, since, as we said above, Homer was always the object of their attacks.

In summary, therefore, Homer remains alone, the representative and organ of the heroic religion of Greece; and among the multitude of writers who followed or commented upon him there are only two whom we can sometimes consult when Homer himself seems obscure or incomplete. One is Apollodorus, an unpretentious compiler who gathered everything without distortion because he did not aim to explain anything. The other is Pausanias, a curious traveler, an indefatigable questioner, who profited from the fragments of poets, local traditions, the stories of priests, and the sight of monuments or ruins, to write down in his journal everything he could understand and collect.

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CHAPTER 4: The Point of View under Which We Will Envisage the Polytheism of the Heroic Times

We are now going to present to our readers a portrait of the Homeric mythology among the Greek peoples, still barbarous and ignorant; in doing so, we will ignore all the historical, philosophical, or symbolic interpretations. The contribution of these interpretations has been made: they showed the probabilities according to which one could admit the existence of a priestly caste or religion among the Greeks before the siege of Troy. We will have new developments in this regard when we speak of Hesiod, when we treat philosophy, and above all when we come to the decadence of polytheism. But if we entered on that path now, we would equate notions that must remain absolutely separate. Now it is a matter of understanding the popular belief of the period we are describing, and the work of the religious sentiment on that belief. Here nothing is hidden; nothing is scientific; even the various symbols, an agreed-upon language for the priesthood and its initiates, is for the crowd a language whose terms all have a literal and positive sense, wholly conformed to their popular meaning. Let no one therefore come and tell us that we take Homeric mythology too materially; we take it as the Greeks of the heroic times understood it, and we repeat our fundamental maxim: a religion is always for a people such as the people understand it.

This is not just a personal opinion or something lightly put forth. Even though the defect of the majority of German writers who have occupied themselves with so much sagacity, and in more than one respect with great success, to the study of mythologies has been to seek the mysterious sense rather than the popular influence, the more reasonable among them have come to this same conclusion.

The celebrated Hermann has clearly demonstrated that Homer, even while reporting some symbolic fables and alluding to several others, has not understood 521 their meaning at all;1 and Mr. Creuzer himself, who seeks symbolism everywhere, is forced to conclude as follows: “Ancient Greece could have been during a certain time sacerdotal and oriental, as it were. The founders of the walls, doors, and Cyclopean grottos of Tirynthe, Sicyon, and Mycenae2 could have been priests; but the climate of Greece, the mountains, forests, the rivers that divide it in every direction, the energy of the peoples who invaded it, early on put numerous obstacles before all purely religious power. Their mores and institutions, reflection and poetry, came together to turn the bellicose tribes from abstract teachings and contemplative beliefs; their mythology necessarily became less adventuresome, less extravagant in appearance, but also less elevated, and less profound in reality. Bards presented themselves, saying they were inspired, without being priests: they disdained the hidden science; they formed a separate class that saw in priests their rivals, and were preferred to them by the monarchs and the warriors. While Calchas trembles3 and Leiodes perishes,4 Phemius obtains life, and honors are lavished upon him.”5

Homer, he continues, had his motives for conforming to the popular beliefs. Poetry wishes above all to please. He bent his genius to the reigning mores and 522 opinions. He probably knew Egypt and the East; he could have seen the symbolic sculptures of Thebaid, or Ionian sailors, his compatriots, could have described them to him. But when it was a question of inserting these profound allegories into his poems, as an expert artist he blended them into his narrative, identified them with his characters, took away from them their enigmatic aspects, and, wiser than he might appear, attached himself to the form, passing under silence the teaching;6 and the entire nation, subject to the genius of this great poet, at the sight of his new and brilliant Olympus soon forgot the sublime but half-veiled lessons that they had earlier received from the priests of the East. Beliefs, poetry, sculpture, everything followed this model, which had become the nation’s; all other light paled before his.7

This acknowledgment suffices for us.8 We do not have to seek what Homer thought, but what he said in order to conform to his contemporaries’ thinking. It is this thinking that it is essential to know; it is the influence of these thoughts that it is important to examine.

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CHAPTER 5: The Embellishment of Divine Forms in Homeric Polytheism

The first progress that occurred in the beliefs free of all hindrance and bother is the embellishment of the figures of the gods. This embellishment is a human need; we have already seen it among the primitive savages.1

In satisfying this need, mankind momentarily departs from that tendency toward the unknown that is inherent in the religious sentiment.2 And we will see it depart again, when after having attributed physical beauty to the objects of its worship, it will seek what ought to be their moral qualities. The more it reflects on these questions, the more it will make gods similar to itself. But this is a transition, a preliminary work, to which he gives himself only as long as the gods are inferior to him in their qualities or their forms. As soon as he has made them his equals by ascribing to them what is best in his nature, he makes them his superiors by freeing them from his weaknesses and vices; this new work establishes new differences, incalculable and indefinite, and religion returns to its proper sphere.

This metamorphosis, however, does not occur all at once. For some time, the imagination disfigures the gods by more-or-less bizarre additions. It sometimes gives them several arms or heads as signs of strength or intelligence, sometimes wings as a sign of speed; but these fantastical additions gradually disappear. Taste is purified and brings into polytheism—when this belief can freely follow the direction that is properly its own—the beautiful ideal of human forms.

The most ancient Greek divinities were monstrous simulacra.3 Pausanias speaks of a god in the form of a fish, seen in his day in the sanctuary of Juno at 524 Olympia;4 the Arcadians, near to Phigalia, worshipped Ceres with the head and mane of a horse.5 In the same way, Proserpina had the head of an animal, four eyes, and four horns.6 Larissa displayed its Jupiter with three eyes;7 Amykles its Bacchus,8 Elide its winged Diana.9 But every time the historians or travelers mention these sacred representations, they add that they go back to an antiquity so remote that no one can attribute a date to it.10 This is because these monstrosities had softened, been effaced, and gradually disappeared, without anyone being able to point to the precise moment of the disappearance. Aesculapius, first a jar then a dwarf god, took on at unknown periods (because credit for the development is attributed to several sculptors)11 a more beautiful form; and the sole vestige that remains of his ancient figure was a pygmy statue placed beside him in some of his temples.12 Cecrops having come from Egypt with a double body and the tail of a serpent, thus represented a double nature, said the commentators: one, agricultural, expressed by the whip and reins in his hands; the other bellicose, indicated by the sword and shield carried in his other two hands.13 Little sensible to the allegory, 525 the Athenians got rid of these deformities. Cecrops for them was a divine legislator who presided over marriage, otherwise similar to all mortals. The winged Bacchus of Amykles was stripped of his unwelcome and useless symbol to become the ideal of voluptuous and effeminate beauty, as Apollo was of majestic male beauty.14 Scylla, the monster who was terrible to sailors, first of all a dragon with twelve feet and six mouths always open to devour its prey, was later a woman with the seductive form of the high-drawn belt; and the stories that were told about her hid from view her fish-tail, as well as the menacing dogs whose barking frightened pilots.

If we did not fear to anticipate subsequent epochs, we would show that when circumstances introduced the Greek spirit into priestly religions, this spirit caused the tendency to embellish the divine forms to triumph, despite the resistance of priests. The Serapis of Egypt was originally a head on an urn, surrounded by serpents. At Alexandria, Greek artists protected by the Ptolemies gave it a human figure.15 At Canopus, on the contrary, where the Greek spirit never penetrated, Serapis continued to be worshipped under his ancient form.16

The Phallus, this obscene and hideous idol, which constantly reappears in all the priestly cults; transmitted to the Greeks by the ancient Pelasgian theocracy, or come into Greece from Egypt, the Phallus was initially headed by a human face; soon the indecent organ was removed, and the Phallus did not differ from other statues, except in its mysterious rituals.17

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Thus the intellect works to embellish what the soul adores. The need to contemplate the ideal of beauty in their gods inspired the Greeks with that passion for beauty in itself, the source of masterworks that we will not be able to imitate.18 Even when the mysterious sense had penetrated into their religion, it always remained in second place; beauty was the goal. Symbolism was constantly sacrificed to it.

And let no one think that it was art alone that profited from this disposition. The proportion, nobility, and harmony of forms have something that is both religious and moral. A man of real genius said that the sight of the Apollo Belvedere or a painting by Raphael made him better. Indeed, the contemplation of the beautiful of any sort detaches us from ourselves, inspires us to forget our narrow interests, and transports us into a sphere of greater purity and unexpected perfection. Corruption can cause this enthusiasm to veer, as it can pervert everything; but the effect of corruption is limited and momentary. It does not influence the masses; and it is incontestable that a people who have need of ideal beauty in their worship, their festivals, and their buildings—in a word, all that strikes their sight—is morally better off than a people lacking this need. This difference is therefore a first superiority of the Greeks; it was a first advantage the Greeks received from their religious independence.

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CHAPTER 6: On the Character of the Homeric Gods

The efforts of the religious sentiment left to its free and natural tendency are not limited to the external and, as it were, material embellishment of the gods. The same tendency prompts it to work an interior revolution in them. It wants to attribute to them everything beautiful, noble, and good that it conceives. It works to this end as much as its imperfect notions allow; and in its general propositions it grants the gods beauty, justice, and happiness.

But the same cause of degradation that we have observed in fetishism, the action of the interest of the moment, of that always base interest, both impatient and blind, exerts itself against the new worship that man has just succeeded in establishing.

A double movement therefore makes itself felt, and from this a constant struggle is born. This struggle is further complicated by the credulity and youthfulness of imagination that characterize peoples in their infancy. Fables present themselves in even greater number because they are not the monopoly of priests. Faith receives them, interest takes hold of them, sentiment attempts to modify them; from all this comes an often disparate mythology, full of contradictions that pass unnoticed because no one brings them together to compare them, and because destined one day to do battle, they coexist peaceably at present, not yet having encountered one another.

This is the spectacle that the Iliad’s portrait of polytheism is going to offer; our readers will recall that we will present it here as it was understood by the mass of Greeks; we will follow the counsel of an able critic1 and put aside all the doctrines that distort its simplicity.

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On the summit of a mountain,2 which thick clouds hide from profane eyes, lives the assembly of the gods. Each of these gods presents to the mind the notion of a quality, of a virtue, and of a force superior to those possessed by men. Jupiter is the ideal of majesty; Venus, of beauty, Minerva, of wisdom. We do not mean to say that the Greeks made them allegorical beings,3 but only that they attempted to combine in them all that they imagined was most majestic, most beautiful, and wisest. Mortals respectfully raised their sights to this venerable assembly of supernatural beings who contemplated and protected them. To this point it is the religious sentiment, profound and pure.

But the Greeks wanted to take advantage of their gods the same way that primitives did their fetishes. Self-interest came to tarnish the new form toward which sentiment aspired.

In order to suppose that the gods facilitate our inconstant desires, our greedy or unbridled passions, one has to imagine that they are sensitive to gifts, sacrifices, 529 and offerings. Soon enough: behold, they are mercenary; and such are the gods of the Iliad.

It is not morality, it is not equity, that decides their conduct; it is sacrifice. If Minerva protects the Athenians, it is because they present to her cakes of pure wheat, lambs without spot, rams whose decorated horns she delights in contemplating.4 Jupiter is touched with compassion for Hector, not because this hero defends his father and his homeland, but because he has always loaded the altars of this god with wine, meats, and exquisite perfumes.5 Neglected by the Aetolians, Diana sends against them a wild boar. Proteus declares to Menelaus that he will not return to his homeland except after having offered sacrifices to the gods of Egypt.6 Attracted by the vow of a hecatomb, the inhabitants of the ethereal dwellings descend to intervene in the least significant circumstances. In the funeral games of Patrocles, Apollo himself directs the arrow of Merion, whose rival neglected to purchase his assistance.7 The Greeks address to their gods the same language that the primitives address to their fetishes;8 and in their own conversations, these gods reproach one another for acts of ingratitude that consist in forgetting the oxen, goats, and choice victims the warriors they abandon had immolated to them on their altars.9

Thus the religion was once again perverted. Polytheism is only apparently superior to fetishism.10 The objects that are devoted to the gods have a greater worth; but the relations established between the divinity and man are the same.

The degradation does not end there. The struggle between self-interest and the purity of the religious sentiment is complicated by the intervention of a third power, which comes as a judge to pronounce sentences that the two adversaries are far from expecting.

This power is reasoning. As the human mind is enlightened, it learns to draw 530 consequences from the principles it acknowledges; this is a law of its nature. From whatever point he starts, man is forced to reason correctly, even when his reasonings go against his aim.

It results from this that when he adopts some hypothesis concerning the gods, the mind draws the necessary conclusions; and by means of these conclusions he arrives at a point he did not foresee, which injures both the sentiment that had created the new religious form and the interest that wanted to make use of it.

By the first modifications that occurred in their character, the gods compose a society of beings who are more powerful than mortals, who sell their protection to them in exchange for presents and victims. According their favors out of self-interest, they grant them to the guilty as well as the innocent. Not only can criminals believe that they can regain the gods’ benevolence by offerings and sacrifices—doctrines that are found in more advanced religions—but the same means acquire heavenly assistance for the most blameworthy enterprises. Pandarus promises Phoebus one hundred newborn lambs if he will second his perfidy.11 Aegisthus hangs gifts in the temples, the price of adultery.12 In this way, all confidence is destroyed: the vices of the gods13 multiply by a scale that reasoning makes inevitable, and they arrive at the highest point of perversity and corruption. From venality, they pass to perfidy. Men are not sure of their aid, even when sacrifices please them. They accept them and then prepare new misfortunes for the suppliants.

If one supposed that the authors of the Homeric mythology wanted to portray in the character of their gods the abuses inherent in force exercised on beings incapable of reprisal or resistance, one would be astonished at everything that man glimpsed in this regard from the infancy of society; this is because his instinct precedes his experience. In order to judge the evil occasioned by unlimited caprice and power without check, one only has to go into his own heart. The gods 531 of Homer are what we would be in our excess of passion and violence if we had the certainty of impunity. They do not respect the holiest laws of the peoples who worship them. In this respect alone they depart from the imitation of human actions: they violate even the hospitality that is so sacred in barbarous times. Hercules kills his host, Iphitus, and is still received in Olympus;14 Jupiter leisurely savors the spectacle of carnage;15 he is pleased to see the gods fighting furiously among themselves;16 he spends nights meditating harmful projects;17 he sacrifices all the Greek army to Achilles’s pride and the entreaties of Thetis;18 he sends on earth Até, his daughter, the source of all evils.19 The injustice of this master of thunder is depicted very forcefully by Minerva: he will return, she says, full of wrath; he will seize all of you, innocent as well as guilty.20 But Minerva herself is no less cruel, no less perfidious, when she wants to slake her hatred: she leads Hector to his end by the most revolting ruse.21 She permits Ulysses and Diomedes to dedicate the corpse of Dolon to her, killed by them despite a solemn promise.22 Like Neptune, she applauds the ferocity of the son of Peleus, insulting the corpse of his defeated enemy.23 To deceive Patrocles, Apollo has recourse to a trick a mortal would be ashamed of.24 The children of Latona sacrifice an innocent family to their mother.25 To more fully satisfy her vengeance, Juno delivers to her husband the nations who are most devoted to her worship, the most attentive to her altars.26 All the gods pursue Bellerophon with their unjust hatred.27

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Other times, they are the instigators of the crime. Mercury teaches Autolycus how to steal away with address.28 Angry at Diomedes, Venus corrupts his wife, Aegiale.29 To revenge herself against the mother of Myrrha, she moves her daughter to crime.30 When Helen appears to be shaken by remorse, she forces her to persevere in adultery, and this is not an allegory.31 Love enters not one whit in the new weakness of Helen. Venus constrains her by crude, almost brutal, threats. Yielding to fear, Helen addresses harsh reproaches at Venus;32 and her speech is above all remarkable because of the idea it provides of the relations that the religion of heroic times supposes between the gods and humans.

Nonetheless, it is these gods that are invoked for the sake of morality. Priam beseeches Achilles to merit the favor of the immortals by his humanity toward him.33 Menelaus asks Jupiter to avenge the wounded rights of friendship and hospitality. But one must distinguish what men say from what the gods do. In their prayers, suppliants and the offended speak the language of their interest rather than that of their real belief.

In the examination of religions, sometimes maxims that express more the need that humans have for divine assistance than the gods’ true character are taken for a complete system of morality. Their justice, like that of kings, is praised in order to invite them to be just. What men in their passion ask the gods does not prove that they hope for it: they invoke them because suffering without resource and impotent indignation address whatever object presents itself. Even before religion officially intervened in morality, men implored the gods against injustice; and in Sophocles, lacking all human support Philoctetes asks vengeance against Ulysses of the rocks, the mountains, and the forests of Lemnos—mute witnesses, insensible to his despair.34 This appeal to invisible forces proves misery, not confidence.

This reflection also applies to the punishment of perjury, which the gods are officially interested in punishing. It was Agamemnon, it was Idomeneus, it was the Greek generals who announced to the Trojans guilty of this crime that heavenly 533 anger would fall upon them;35 and it is important to observe that the event did not justify their threatening predictions. It was not because the Trojans broke an oath that the fall of Troy was contained in the decrees of destiny; on the contrary, it was to cause the destruction of Troy, still innocent at least of this crime, that the gods stirred its inhabitants to renew the war by breaking an oath. Condemned to fall the tenth year of the siege,36 Troy did not perish either sooner or later because the Trojans broke a treaty. Olympus remained divided between the defenders and the enemies of this city.37 The gods who protected it did not abandon its cause because it had violated the faith of oaths. They tried no less to delay the fatal hour of the city they cherished by all the means in their power.

Therefore men know too well how much their recourse to the justice of the gods is unavailing. The same Agamemnon who implored Jupiter soon accuses him of lying and perfidy;38 and Menelaus, even while invoking him, blames him for all the evils that overwhelm him.39

In this way, the beings the religious sentiment had created in order to place its need for worship in them become the objects of hatred and fear instead of love and hope. In speaking of Pluto, Agamemnon makes use of an expression that merits being noted. Pluto, he says, is inexorable and inflexible; of all the gods, he is the one that mortals hate the most.40 The peoples therefore put themselves on guard against the powerful but faithless auxiliaries they have placed over them. Some chain them in their temples so they cannot go out and join their enemies, who come swearing oaths and making promises to them;41 others pronounce their 534 sacred names in a low voice, so that foreigners not knowing how to invoke them would have no way of seducing them.42 Ready to fight Hector, Ajax exhorts the Greeks to pray in a low voice so that the Trojans would not be able to hear them.43 All peoples admit that the nations can steal the others’ gods by means of adroit gifts.44 Thus at this period of religion the gods are, as it were, always for hire. Their approval is not a proof of merit; their hatred implies no blame; no shame. Obedience to their orders is a means of pleasing them, but not a virtue; resistance is often a means of glory or even success. It was despite Juno that Hercules conquered Olympus; it was despite Neptune that Ulysses regained Ithaca. If the gods sometimes inspire their favorites with certain qualities—prudence, pity,45 courage—it is in a particular circumstance, and for a particular aim;46 it is a miracle, it is enchanting. It has nothing to do with moral improvement, with a fixed and immutable rule of conduct; because other times they teach the contrary of these qualities. The gods have given you, says Ajax to Achilles, a cruel and pitiless heart.47

Jealousy is an essential part of their character. They are jealous, says Homer,48 not only of success but of ability and talent. All mortal prosperity darkens the divine 535 pride.49 This implacable pride waits for men and empires to attain happiness, in order to cast them into the abyss.50

Thus reduced in the moral qualities which the religious sentiment had been pleased to ascribe to them, the gods also lost a great part of the attributes that it had conferred on them out of respect: infinity, immensity, eternity, even immortality. Their view extends far because they are placed at the summit of the world; but they do not see everything that happens there.51 When they want to know the events of the earth, they send down messengers who report to them.52 In order to see the Trojans and the Greeks simultaneously, Jupiter places himself atop Mount Ida.53 While he has his eyes fixed on Thrace, Neptune, despite his order, gives aid to the Greeks, and Neptune himself would not have known the danger faced by the Greeks he favored if, from the peak of a mountain where he had seated himself by chance, he had not discovered their fleet threatened and the Trojans triumphant.54 Ascalaphus is killed without the knowledge of his father, Mars,55 who only learns of it from Juno.56 Even though perspicuity was her distinctive quality, Minerva bitterly complains about not having foreseen the future.57 The gods do not enjoy the light of day except when Aurora has brought 536 it to them;58 often they yield to sleep59 or succumb to fatigue.60 Juno reproaches Jupiter for making her labors and sweat useless, as well as the exhaustion of her steeds.61 Mercury complains of having to cross the uninhabitable ocean, a vast and deserted expanse unmarked by human habitations. When they want to put an army to rout, they are apprehensive of their natural strength; they have recourse to magical means that betray the insufficiency of the divine forces.62 They display before the eyes of the combatants the fearful aegis that sows terror everywhere.63 To be sure, in general they are stronger than men. Minerva rebuffs Hector’s spear with a breath.64 Juno grows angry at encountering obstacles in an action that even a mortal would be able to accomplish.65 Sighing, Achilles recognizes that Apollo can defy his vengeance.66 But their forces are still limited. The beauty of the goddesses is due to the oil of ambrosia,67 to that immortal oil that gives their charms a new brilliance; the purity of their blood to that same ambrosia, which replaces the wheat broken beneath the stone and the grape crushed by the winemaker;68 the rapidity of their travel to the velocity of the marvelous steeds that bear them:69 for the gods cannot act upon men without coming near to them, and their mere will cannot transport them from one place to another. Minerva and Mercury have miraculous sandals70 that bear them over the immense sea and over the land that spreads so far. They put on the forms that they will;71 but they are often recognized despite their disguises.72 The single faculty of the gods that is not limited is that of hearing. They hear everywhere, even though they cannot see everywhere.73 Men 537 have need for them to hear, and do not need for them to see. A deaf people would give its gods greater sight.

The idea of death detached itself rather quickly from the conjectures of men concerning the divine essence: death being what men fear most, they hastened to free the gods from this harsh condition of man’s own life. However, the gods of Homer are not immortal in the absolute meaning of the term. The infirmities of old age visit them sometimes. Unforeseen accidents, internecine disorders, the audacity of humans can put an end to their career. Hercules stole the tripod of Delphi; Apollo wanted to fight and kill him; Jupiter hastened to separate his two sons. Cast from heaven by his mother, Vulcan preserved his life only thanks to Thetis.74 Deceived by Sleep, Jupiter sought it throughout Olympus in order to make it perish in the waves.75 Enchained by the Aloades, Mars moaned for thirteen months in a dark dungeon; and his strength was depleted when Mercury delivered him.76 Instructed concerning the fate of his son Ascalaphus, the same god swore to avenge him, even if he had to die at the hand of Jupiter.77 Finally, following one of the Greek traditions, and probably the most ancient,78 the oath of the Styx originated in the thought that the waters of this river were lethal for the gods. Subsequently, other traditions replaced this one: swearing by the Styx became an inviolable engagement, Hesiod79 and Apollodorus80 tell us, because Styx, the daughter of Ocean, had fought the rebellious Titans; in this way, fables change when ideas do.

Thus reduced back to human nature, the gods borrowed man’s mores and habits. Vulcan, whom Venus had betrayed, asked her father for the gifts he had given to obtain the hand of this faithless goddess.81 Jupiter gives Sicily to his daughter Proserpina.82 Having killed the son of Neptune, Mars is judged by a tribunal of the gods on the hill where the Areopagus held its meetings. Apollo sings and prophesizes in the celestial feasts, like the rhapsodes and diviners at the banquets 538 of kings. Having killed the serpent Python, Diana and Apollo come to Aegiale to be purified of this murder; and the same god, having killed a brigand who had despoiled Delphi, was absolved of the crime in Crete. As long as the use of chariots was infrequent among mortals, the gods go on foot. The seas, the mountains, and the deserts place obstacles to their travel. In their journeys, they avoid the inhospitable countries that would refuse them the food that belongs to them, food that is often similar to that of men, or that at most differs only because it is made of a purer, more ethereal substance.83

The feasts of the gods are a very striking imitation of earthly ones, at a time when physical pleasures exclusively filled the intervals that war left to the leaders of nations. In these feasts, the gods who at other times seemed to satisfy themselves with the odor of sacrifices took their part in the food of men. Jupiter loves to stop among the Ethiopians whose piety erects to him splendid tables covered with delicious meats, suitable to repair his exhausted strength and soothe his fatigue.84 Sent as a messenger, Iris is impatient to fulfill her commission so as to be able to return to Egypt and take part in a feast.85 At table, Neptune forgets his hatred of Ulysses, spends seventeen days in Ethiopia, and perceives the king of Ithaca only on the eighteenth.86

Man cannot preserve a profound respect for such beings; and their will, ceasing to be respectable, becomes troublesome. He therefore attempts to free himself from it; and among a barbarous people, all of whose habits are bellicose, the idea of resistance is close to that of fighting; thus we see those audacious warriors 539 attacking the immortals, wounding them, putting them in irons. Otus and Ephialtes cast Mars into a dungeon and let him languish for more than a year;87 Idas fights Apollo with javelins;88 Bacchus escapes from Lycurgus by flight;89 Laomedon threatens to transport Phoebus and Neptune to some faraway island and sell them, after having cut their ears.90 In Homer, these battles are not allegories, but traditions that are perfectly conformed to the spirit of a religion that only saw in the gods more powerful men. When Venus was wounded by Diomedes, she suffered cruel pains and would not have regained Olympus if Mars had not offered her his chariot and horses.91 A few minutes later, the god himself escaped the son of Tydeus only with difficulty, and the blow he received almost killed him or at least wounded him.92 Before his apotheosis, Hercules struck Juno in the breast with his arrows93 and Pluto in the shoulder:94 the painful arrow remained embedded;95 and the master of the netherworld dragged himself painfully to heaven, where Paieon with an expert hand staunched the blood and healed the wound.96

Let us stop here in order to consider to what extent, and by what path, the gods have so deviated from their original destination. Man had created them for himself; now behold: they exist only for themselves.97 Even though each of them has a special function and presides over the government of some part of nature, they nonetheless have individual characters. They live among themselves, absorbed by their passions, their rivalries, their quarrels,98 conforming themselves to the ways of mortals but making sport of the inhabitants of the earth. Here in a remarkable way is manifest that empire of logic that we spoke about above. The gods having 540 to answer the prayers of man and to provide his needs, it would have been to man’s advantage not to attribute to them passions that are often contrary to the goods that he hopes to receive from them; but the formation of human society had for its result a divine society. And it is of the essence of society to have separate interests. The society of gods therefore had to take care of its own, and to consider men as mere accessories.99 Human intelligence is subject to laws independent of its desires. Man had hardly made gods for his use and these laws took over and took them away from him. We, however, should wait a moment: we will see him persevering in his attempts and indefatigable in his hopes; he will take up again these gods of which he has need and renew the indispensable alliance with the beings that have escaped from him.

541

CHAPTER 7: On the Greek Notions concerning Destiny

When men have established the divine race with ongoing relations of self-interest with the human race, and religion has become a regular exchange of offerings and favors, worshippers have to find excuses for the objects of their worship if they do not keep the faith they have promised and fail in the exchange.

A confused and mysterious notion offers itself to veil the divine impotence and soften the gods’ infidelity. It is the idea of destiny. It is necessarily subject to many contradictions. Man needs to believe in it in order not to grow thoroughly bitter against the cruelty of the gods he worships; but he needs to doubt it in order to attribute some effectiveness to his prayers; therefore the Greeks at this period considered the laws of destiny as irresistible and as being able to be eluded.

In some places in the Homeric poems, Jupiter limits himself to weighing in the balance the fate of individuals and empires.1 When Achilles’s scale wins out, Hector’s protector Apollo is forced to abandon him.2 But in a host of other passages, no less clear and affirmative, by their own will the gods suspend the accomplishment of destiny. This destiny willed that Ulysses would see Ithaca again, yet the council of the gods assembled to deliberate over his return, and Minerva his protector spoke with doubt and fear when she implored Jupiter on his behalf;3 and even after the divine decrees, together with those of fate, calling upon Neptune, Polyphemus begged him to at least delay the return of the hero to his homeland.4 He thus recognized in Neptune a capacity of resistance similar to that which 542 Phoebus exercised in Herodotus when he answered Croesus that he would be dethroned three years later than the eternal sentence decreed.

The action of the gods does not always stop with this temporary delaying influence. Despite Destiny, says the poet, Neptune would have caused the hero of Ithaca to perish if Minerva had not helped him.5 These words, “despite Destiny,” are found frequently in the Iliad and the Odyssey. The Greeks would have lifted the siege of Troy despite Destiny if not for the vigilance of Juno.6 It was despite Destiny that they would have acquired glory if Apollo had not stirred the son of Anchises to put himself at the head of the Trojans;7 it was despite Destiny that Aeneas, held back in order to rule in Priam’s place one day, would have succumbed to the blows of Achilles except for the miraculous intervention of Neptune.8 Minerva says that the gods cannot save their favorites from death, not even their own children, when the fatal hour has sounded.9 However, Jupiter saves his son Sarpedon despite Destiny;10 and he is ready a second time to grant him the same boon;11 the danger of the example is the only consideration that holds him back. He often shows himself tempted to save Troy from the ruin that awaits it;12 and Juno does not deny that he has the power to do so. You can, she tells him, but the other gods will not approve.13 This disapproval of the other gods is their customary threat when the master of Olympus wants to depart from the decrees of fate;14 the gods are to Destiny what governments are to opinion: they can brave it, but public censure weighs over them.

Thus, ordinarily they respect it, and they make use of it to accuse it for their own faults. Jupiter attributes to its immutable sentences15 the defeats that the Greeks have to suffer until the reconciliation of Agamemnon and the son of Peleus, while 543 it was he himself who promised Thetis that he would satisfy her desire for revenge by granting the Trojans temporary success.16

Men are perpetually sent from one to the other of these views. When they want to find rest in resignation, they justify the gods as being subject to laws that they cannot change; when they want to fortify hope, they grant a sort of independence to these beings, and pride themselves on being able to sway them with their supplications or seduce them with their offerings.17

The relations of men to fate are exposed to the same uncertainties. Sometimes neither knowledge of the future18 nor the precautions of prudence, neither the efforts of courage nor heavenly favor,19 change anything in what the Fates have woven from the birth of humans;20 sometimes, however, even as weak and blind as they are, mortals escape the decrees of fate by valor, by address, even by crime;21 sometimes they have a choice between different destinies. Laius could have had or not had a son; but if he had one, the son would become a parricide.22 At his birth, Achilles had the choice of living a long time but without glory, or of dying renowned in the flower of youth. Amphiaraus was free not to go to the siege of Troy, but death awaited him under the walls of this city. This is a way of allying the doctrine of destiny with a certain human liberty; it is a transaction between the opposed hypotheses.

By rendering divinity useless to man, an absolute fatality would have been destructive of all worship. If some peoples have believed that they were total fatalists, it is because men are often mistaken about their own opinions. They only consider 544 them under an aspect that temporarily suits them, and they abandon them (against their will) as soon as they need a contrary opinion. Thus, when they find in this belief the means of pushing back against the fear of danger and death, Muslims affirm that no one can escape his destiny; but in their ordinary life, they make no fewer vows, they offer no fewer prayers, they perform no fewer ceremonies, all of which would be in vain if man were subject in all things, great and small, to an eternal and immutable law.

In these fluctuations one recognizes the efforts of the human spirit to discover a system that simultaneously would represent the gods as good and powerful and man’s own misfortunes as not implicating them in either injustice or impotence.

Far from resolving this problem, the unity of God appears at first glance to complicate it further. Since polytheism does not attribute omnipotence to its gods, and often shows them to us as divided, one conceives a destiny above that dominates them, which is in some way their common rule. But in the system of the unity of God, his power being without limit, destiny is placed in his will, and at first one has difficulty in reconciling this belief with belief in the effectiveness of worship and man’s free will.

It is only when religion is quite purified, when it has stripped from the idea of God all the remains of anthropomorphism, which in some sense are the inheritance of polytheism (and even of fetishism), that all the difficulties relating to destiny, to fatality, and to free will disappear and vanish. Then, to the notions of necessity or exchange, to these two hypotheses that constantly do battle in a still-imperfect religion, succeeds a notion that combines their advantages and gets rid of what is crude in them. Then we conceive man as endowed with liberty, so that his triumphs over himself have greater merit. We know that in frustrating our desires, fate does better than grant them. We unite ourselves to the unknown cause, not to satisfy our caprices but to attain a higher degree of moral perfection, and we elevate ourselves above everything that is merely ephemeral and personal. Then courage has all its strength and resignation all its consolation.

545

CHAPTER 8: On the Means Employed by the Greeks to Penetrate the Secrets of Destiny

Whatever the transactions of imagination with reasoning, and of logic with terror, men have to seek some means of foreseeing this destiny that hangs over them.

These means are not the same in the two species of polytheism. That which is independent places in the first rank direct and immediate communications; we have shown in our second volume1 how much the Homeric poems place them above those that are obtained through the intervention of the priests. In this state of opinion, no one gives his trust except to the communications he himself receives. Enthralled to the god that torments them, Cassandra and Laocoön seek in vain to obtain the confidence of the people; it is deaf to their voices, and it is only when they perish that it abjures its stubborn disbelief. These communications can never have an extensive influence; and with what little authority it possesses, the priesthood always seeks to supplant them because they make its interventions superfluous; their divinations must replace them.

But in the heroic times, divination is a subordinate and rather contemptible science. In the Iliad, Polydamas speaks with disdain of the flight of birds.2 Constantly under arms, risking their lives, and endowed with great physical and moral energy, the heroes believe they carry their destiny in themselves, and they reject submitting it to the capricious movements of animals or the doubtful signs that inanimate nature lets escape. It is only at a second period of Greek religion that divination will come into favor. At Sparta especially, its credit is unlimited; and that has to be: whatever name it bears, authority soon sees the advantages for it of 546 a systematic interpretation of the most common circumstances. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

After divination comes oracles, transmitted from Egypt into Greece, or surviving among the Greeks the destruction of priestly government; initially, they had little influence: the revolution that had pitted the two castes was too recent, and the warriors’ hatred too vivid. Homer speaks of no oracle, if not Dodona’s, very much in passing, and we have already noted that the name Delphi is not found in his poems. Nonetheless, restless curiosity and credulity win the day. Oracles obtain credit: their origins are attached to the most ancient times, and ordinarily to colonies.3 They are placed next to springs, in the depths of forests, above all near tombs;4 and despite the complaints of philosophers5 and the epigrams of comic authors, they acquire a power that often puts the fate of Greece in the hands of their interpreters.

At the beginning, these oracles did not imply the thought that the gods knew the future; only that since they were imagined sometimes as friendly, sometimes as hostile, they were interrogated not about what had to happen, but what they wished to do; in the way we ask a powerful man, or a judge who has to pronounce sentence, without believing in his general prescience, but because we believe him knowledgeable about his own determinations. As with everything that man tries to do to bend religion to his own views, from this came a new inconvenience, as unforeseen as it was inevitable.

By obliging the gods to predict the future, that is to say, to declare their future intentions, one exposes them to be mistaken or to deceive men; and in order to absolve them of error or perfidy one has to suppose that the suppliants who interrogated them understood them incorrectly.

Hence the ambiguity of oracles; they are always susceptible to a double interpretation, and it is the most unfortunate one that is realized; often the prophecy causes the misfortunes that it seemed destined to prevent: mortals walk into the 547 net, and run to the abyss, by the very precautions they take to avoid them. And please note that the fateful ambiguity of these prophecies does not belong solely to the centuries of fables and traditions. On the contrary, it increases as man is more and more loathe to retain notions unfavorable to the gods. When he is still inadequately enlightened to suppose them capable of lying voluntarily, predictions can be unambiguous; then one regards the lie only as a proof of the divine anger. But the more that the character of the gods is improved, the less one can admit this hypothesis, in order to spare their honor. The predictions of Jupiter in the Iliad are deceptive and not obscure, while in Herodotus the oracles are obscure in order not to be deceptive. Thus, it is not only Laius who, in exposing his newly born son, prepares the accomplishment of the prophecy that he believes he is eluding. It is not only Croesus who runs to his ruin by going before the king of Persia, because the gods told him that by crossing a river he would overturn a great empire.6 It is much later that the Pythia will get the Lacedaemonians, by an answer of the same sort, to do battle with the Tegeates, who put them to rout.7 And it is even later that the priests of Donona, counseling the Athenians to establish themselves in Sicily, will stir them to begin a war against Syracuse that is the first cause of their decline and ruin, while the Sicily indicated by the oracle is rather a small hill near to Athens.8 Finally, it is at a time when enlightenment was universally widespread that Epaminondas, who had always avoided maritime expeditions because the gods had told him to be wary of the pélagos—the sea—died in a wood of this name near Mantinea.9 These anecdotes, even if not authentic facts, nonetheless prove how long lasting was the general belief in this regard, a belief that even influenced the surnames given to the gods.10

548

In this way, everything confirms one of our claims; nonetheless, given its importance we do not hesitate to revisit it. When our intellect has adopted an axiom apparently favorable to our hopes and our desires, we are forced to reason from this axiom with a rigorous precision that disconcerts our previous calculations and deceives our expectation. Instituted to guide human weakness across the dark night of the future, oracles soon became by their inevitable ambiguities even more terrible than obscurity itself; and the human beings who invented them to reassure themselves find in them only a new motive of doubt and fear. One would say that our two intellectual powers are irreconcilable enemies, one of which tries to revenge itself upon the other, even though it cannot arrest it. Imagination projects its bold conjectures; reasoning takes hold of them, and even when it adopts them, submits them to such rigid forms that it draws entirely different consequences from those the imagination believed prevailed.

As for the rest, polytheism is not the only form of worship in which man exhausts himself with vain syllogisms in order to reconcile his confidence in the being he interrogates with the events that belie his answers or which stamp his promises with falsity.

“The Gabasites,” says a pious author, “having defeated the Israelites, the latter asked God if they should continue the war. He answered that they should, and they gave battle. Eighteen thousand were cut to pieces by the armies of Gabaa. It seemed by the result that God had deceived them; but it was they who deceived themselves. No one promised the victory. God had only declared his will of exposing the people to danger, and to have those he destined to death perish. Whoever would judge this event without due reflection would treat the oracle as false: this would be a rash judgment. The response was neither a counsel nor a prophecy; it was a command. In the same way God sent Saint Bernard to order Saint Louis to go on crusade against the Saracens, not because he destined the king to victory, but because he wanted to employ the war to punish the French army.”11

When religions have fallen, the zealous friends of the new belief sometimes find themselves in a contrary embarrassment. Among the oracles, there are those that are fulfilled; and not being able to attribute these to the veracity of the gods in whom no one any longer believes, another source has to be found. “God,” says 549 Rollin, “in order to punish the blindness of the pagans, sometimes permitted demons to gives answers conformed to the truth.”12

At the time of the fall of polytheism, the ambiguity of oracles served as a pretext for the bitter pleasantries of unbelieving authors. Logic always revenges itself with interest against the outrages it has received; but its vengeance is slow, and it is exercised like the courage of nations: on enemies already fallen to the ground.

550

CHAPTER 9: On the Greeks’ Notions of the Other Life

We showed the primitive savage constantly occupied with the idea of death. As civilization progresses, this preoccupation loses its force. Civilization creates so many relations, expectations, desires, and artificial passions that man has too much to think about as he makes his way through the mêlée, always occupied with attacking, or defending himself. Life is so filled with these struggles that the end is hidden, and one might even say that it is avoidable and should not enter into our projects and calculations. Each, however, knows that an hour awaits when he will be separated from everything he saw, and if he loves something, from all he loves; each knows that this hour will be terrible, accompanied by awful convulsions and unknown pains, which no one can really describe and no living being can truly imagine. And after these pains and convulsions comes the silence that will never end. No cry has escaped from this abyss, where for so many centuries so many creatures have gone—some strong and bold, others sensitive and passionate, but all attached to the earth by so many interests and bonds; no information has come to us from this abyss, so full of swallowed-up lives and experiences. The earth yawns and is silent; it is silent again when it closes; and being smoothed over once more, its smooth surface leaves our questions without answers and our regrets without consolation. And yet we walk lightly over these graves, and the daylight that flickers still captivates us; although already dimmed by the night that approaches, to us it seems that it will never have to give way to the thick night it announces.

Less distracted than us from natural impressions, the barbarous Greeks had death more present; and pursued without any relief by this dark phantom, like the primitives they had recourse to conjectures that made it less terrible, transporting the actual world into the unknown world, substituting displacement for destruction. The netherworld of the Homeric Greeks retained all the traits we saw among 551 the wandering tribes, and was modified only in accordance with the development of society.

The son of Atreus is surrounded by his companions, killed at the same time as he was by Aegisthus.1 Achilles walks in the midst of the warriors who fought at his side under the walls of Troy.2 In the portrait of the netherworld by Polygnotus, found on the public square of Delphi, Agamemnon carries a scepter in his hand; a hunting dog is lying at the feet of Actaeon; Orpheus holds a lyre, Palamedes plays dice; Penthesileus is armed with a bow and clothed in a leopard’s skin.3 Feeble imitations of the time that is no longer, the shades still do what they did on earth. The hunter pursues the phantoms of animals fallen beneath his blows; the warrior makes the simulacra of his weapons shine; the poet repeats his songs. But the same repugnance toward death, which in the primitive’s soul overcomes the desire to paint with happy colors the dwelling place that opens before him, is also found among the Greeks.

As with fetishism, in their world-to-come all is gloomy, dull, lugubrious; everything is diminished. The stars have less splendor: they twinkle in the darkness rather than enlightening it. The winds are colder; the foliage is darker; the flowers are painted in more somber colors: everything suffers, everything languishes. Virgins bemoan their sterile springtime; heroes look enviously upon the most abject of the living: all are pained at the sufferings that troubled their lives, all also are pained at having lost them; all of them regret past days. The always desolate shadows 552 (this epithet is constantly repeated)4 recount their misfortunes:5 Hercules6 and Achilles7 speak in a plaintive voice; Agamemnon sheds torrents of tears;8 the king of the Greeks cannot forget the betrayal to which he fell victim;9 Ajax retains his resentment at the unjust refusal that denied him the arms of Achilles.10 Sadness is so much the destiny of the shades that while Hercules tastes the delights of the celestial feasts in Olympus and enjoys the charms of the young Hebe,11 his sad and menacing specter groans in the netherworld.12

Death! O death! All of Homeric mythology bears the mark of the terror that this inexplicable mystery must cause in the young human being. The youthful imagination of the Greeks regards this dissolution of our being as a violent event, and as a marvel. The souls torn from a body that was necessary to them bear this separation with constant torment.

This way of conceiving human existence after this life does not allow morality to be closely connected with notions concerning the state of the dead. Among the Greeks, they share a common abode, with the exception of those who have personally offended the gods. All the tales that cause morality to enter the future life—judges, tribunals, sentences brought against the shades for faults that preceded their descent into the somber empire—belong to a period after the Homeric.

The error of several writers in this regard comes from the fact that the shades, imitating as much as they can all the features of the previous life where kings and the aged pronounced judgment concerning the differences submitted to them, exercise the same functions in the netherworld. They quell the passing quarrels that trouble the eternal silence. This jurisdiction, however, applied only to what happens in the other world, although some have thought that it extended to actions committed in this one. Because the Odyssey represents Minos judging the dead with a scepter in hand,13 they have thought that he judged them for their earlier 553 crimes: nothing is more opposed to the ideas of Homer. Minos judges in the same way as Orion hunts,14 and as Hercules disperses the shades, holding his fearful bow in hand.15 He does after his death what he did during his life. It is only later that we will see his magistracy change, in keeping with the development of polytheism.16 Then also Elysium, which is not yet a part of the netherworld, will be brought there. Now it is a place of happiness, but where the dead do not enter.17 Menelaus, whom Jupiter miraculously preserved from the common law, lives there with Rhadamanthus, who exercises no judicial function there.18

The rivals of the gods are confined to Tartarus,19 who are gods as well as their conquerors, but expelled from the throne. Jupiter keeps the Titans20 there and Saturn,21 who himself cast the race of Uranus into it.22 When the inhabitants 554 of Olympus resist him, he threatens them with this terrible punishment.23 The guilty who are tormented in hell are there only because of the outrages directed against the gods. Tityos, whom two vultures eat, is punished for having violated Latona;24 Sisyphus, for having defrauded death and returned to life;25 Tantalus for having deceived Jupiter.26

Thus the torments that take place in hell are not acts of justice, but of vengeance on the part of the gods. They strike those who have failed to recognize their power, outraged their dignity, or merely contravened their desires. The dungeons that contain these victims are State prisons where merely human-against-human deeds are not punished.

It is not superfluous to observe that the torments are characteristic of the period that gave birth to the tales. Tantalus tries in vain to slake his thirst in the water that surrounds him, and to take the fruit hanging above his head. In vain, Sisyphus rolls the stone to the top of the mountains; it always falls on him. The water escapes the barrel of the Danaids, and the cord of Ocnus is gnawed by the ass whose proximity he cannot escape. One of the harshest penalties that the men of heroic times could imagine was work and useless effort; and this is a new proof that they applied the habits of this world to the ideas of the next. Unlike us, the Greeks of these times did not lead an inactive life, where pain, as it were, can be said to seek us; but an active life that prompted them to brave pain and difficulty in the hope of success. 555 For the peoples softened by civilization, to suffer is the greatest of evils; for the people in the youth of social life, engaged all their days in physical dangers and struggles, the greatest evil was not to succeed.

This absence of all morality in the ideas of the next life is so conformed to the genius of this period of independent polytheism that when moral tales are introduced, they will strip them of their meaning before admitting them. The Egyptians refused passage to Acheron to the dead if they could not justify themselves in the face of accusations against them: this is a moral idea. Borrowing from them the fiction of a river and souls crossing it, the Greeks said that when a dead person was not buried, his soul wandered the banks of the Cocytus for a hundred years: this is a tale without morality.

Thus, the treacherous Eriphyle27 lived in the same place as Ulysses’s mother, the venerable Anticlea.28 Far from receiving reward, virtue shared the universal sadness.29

The fundamental thought of Homer’s netherworld is the unhappiness of the soul separated from the body. If life is sometimes called a baneful gift,30 death is always the greatest of evils, and the soul does not leave the body except by emitting a mournful groan. The idea of this misfortune causes the poet to fall into obvious contradictions. Sometimes the shades recall their past relations and sufferings; sometimes, weak,31 impalpable,32 without form or color, comparable to light dreams,33 borne here and there in the air, and uttering inarticulate cries,34 they flutter about deprived of intellect,35 strength,36 and memory,37 and thirstily 556 drink dark blood38 in order to experience for an instant a passing warmth they quickly lose.39

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CHAPTER 10: On the Efforts of the Religious Sentiment to Rise above the Religious Form We Just Described

We have presented the passage from the fetishism of primitives to the polytheism of barbarous tribes as an important improvement; nonetheless, if one judges by the portrait we have drawn of this polytheism, man has gained little. The gods, proud of their strength and misled by their passions, do not offer a surer guarantee for morality or justice than the shapeless idols of the wandering hordes. These gods have even another inconvenience. Fetishes only take care of their worshippers; the Homeric gods often forget the mortal race and think only of themselves; when they do remember them, it is ordinarily because of an exigency. They want sacrifices, but outside of that the gods and men are two different species who live separately. One is stronger, the other weaker; each strives, suffers, and takes its pleasures apart. Between them there is an unequal alliance, an exchange of favors and honors that sometimes brings about a common good; but the exceptions are frequent. Oppression comes from inequality; power has a jealous and malevolent nature. And, finally, no positive system was established, no fixed rule was observed. No link extended from this world to the other. Heavenly protection was acquired independently of vices and virtues; chance, caprice, and momentary interest decided in each situation; and left to himself, man drew from his own heart all the motives of actions that regard only other men.

Nonetheless, observe the religious sentiment as it struggles against this form and takes hold of it on all sides to elevate it above what it was externally, to extend its limits and make it more suitable to its needs and desires. Its efforts go in the opposite direction from almost all the established teachings, and it exploits the least pretext to remove from the gods everything that wounds it.

The gods are not incorporeal; however, the religious sentiment loves to conceive them as invisible. In vain do numerous examples prove that mortals perceive and 558 recognize them despite their best efforts. Their invisibility pleases the sentiment, because it accords with the still vague conceptions of purity and spirituality that it carefully preserved from the previous belief,1 and that it will later successfully develop in its ideas of the divine nature. The same is true of their immortality: if death is presented in Homer as possible for gods, this possibility is never realized.

Too many facts attest to the battles of mortals against the inhabitants of Olympus for man to be able to entirely reject these traditions; but he compensates by attaching severe punishments to these assaults. The one who raises a sacrilegious arm against the gods is pursued by misfortunes that never fail to strike him.2 Blinded, a fugitive, rendered mad, alone, deprived of his children, banished from his homeland, he wanders without any support, uttering deplorable cries, and death is right behind him. Here man sacrifices himself to the need he has to respect what he worships, so much is it in human nature that sentiment wins out over self-interest.

Logic forces it to recognize that passionate and vicious beings cannot enjoy unmixed happiness. The same passions that lead Homer’s gods to persecute mortals divides them among themselves. They deceive one another;3 they pass their days in rivalries and quarrels.4 They moan over their internal discords and bitterly complain about their destiny.5 Sentiment, however, wants the gods to be happy; it always calls them the blessed immortals.6 With this epithet man belies the stories he admits, and his soul protests against the conclusions his mind imposes on him. All details are modified in this direction. Olympus is not simply a mountain where the gods live, and which belongs to the earth; it is an ethereal dwelling, a brilliant heaven of supernatural splendor poised on columns of immense height that hide it from sight.7

If the gods punish perjury, it is as an outrage against them, not a crime against other men; but it results from this that men begin to call the immortals as witnesses 559 to their mutual engagements. These engagements become more solemn; men are formed in fidelity because they have interested the gods in this cause; the gods are ennobled as the guarantors of pledged faith.

The State prison that is part of the future world receives only the personal enemies of the gods. As we said, this fiction offers no support to morality. But the sentiment that has need of morality meditates on the place of punishment that the objects of its worship created only for themselves. The human being dominated by his self-interest only wants to see in the gods his auxiliaries, but his internal sentiment forces him to make them his judges. He takes hold of this prison, even before religion grants it to him (which will happen later), and already oppressed weakness casts its oppressors into Tartarus by means of its curses.

Would you like an example of the religious sentiment’s resistance to the received tales? Homer recounts that Hercules killed his hosts, and he cries out: The cruel hero does not respect the justice of the gods! This is an exclamation that is even more strange since the murderer, far from being punished, becomes a god himself. But does not this exclamation show us the inclination of man to believe that the gods are just, despite all the proofs to the contrary? And this Jupiter, the father of Hercules, who receives him at his table despite the crime, is he not always called the protector, the patron, the avenger of violated hospitality? The religious sentiment goes even further in its efforts to improve the form. Not only does it turn its eyes from the discouraging spectacle of the vices that this form attributes to the divine natures, but it sometimes transforms these vices into virtues. The venality that offers the conquerors of a country an easy means of seducing the gods this country worshipped, by lavishing gifts and honors upon them, descends from the idols to the worshippers, as a sort of fraternity between the victors and the vanquished, both prostrate before the same altars.

The Greeks employed another artifice to escape from the sad consequences of the anthropomorphism that falsified their religion. They turned from the details and sought refuge in the whole; if the gods taken individually are sometimes depicted with immoral and revolting traits, taken en masse the gods always form an imposing and respectable body; then sentiment gives itself over to all the conceptions of grandeur, power, immensity, and morality that make up its natural atmosphere; there it finds itself at ease, breathing freely. It is for this reason that we will see priestly teachings, if not transported into the public religion, at least received by the public opinion that sees only its external contours. The poets allude to it; the philosophers comment on it. This is sentiment discontent with an imperfect 560 form and seeking elsewhere ideas whose mysterious appearance bewitches it, and which it believes are purer because they are vague.

This tendency of man to form the gods into a corporate body is itself a struggle of the religious sentiment against the polytheism that shocks it, even though contemporary notions did not allow it to free itself from them. The mind, which has need of distinctions, divides and classifies; but it is constrained to do so in keeping with its level of enlightenment; the soul, which has need of bringing together, does not fear to mix or confuse, and it often anticipates the period when greater enlightenment will sanction its efforts. This is what often gives polytheism a deceptive appearance of theism, and it is also what will later—when the intellect has made great strides—replace polytheism with unity.

This is the work of the religious sentiment on Homeric polytheism. There is no part of this belief that it does not try to improve.

The ambiguity of oracles, the ambiguity whose harmful consequences we have pointed out, looked at in a certain light is the result of the effort to improve the form. Dissatisfied with being deceived in the hope that the gods had engendered, interest could conceive of them as voluntarily lying; sentiment, however, revolts against this offensive hypothesis. It does not want to admit voluntary lies, and it accuses itself of having badly understood the oracles when their promises fail to materialize. Having in this way sheltered them from harmful suspicions, it submits them to its influence. Their predictions announce to tyrants their fall, to the unfortunate a better future, or they proclaim salutary maxims unknown until that point; and their verses marked with the harshness of the Attic dialect contribute to the triumph of civilization and the softening of mores.

Polytheism thus becomes a system full of contradictions, but which, improved by man, in turn contributes to his improvement. By attempting to represent the gods clothed in beauty, majesty, and virtue, he reflects upon these things and his morality gains as a result.

Until now, people have emphasized the inconsistencies of Homeric religion and they have drawn two false conclusions: one, that it did not exist in this way, and as a result they have lost themselves in allegories; the other, that man did not have any rule for his religious ideas, and that he simply heaped together without judgment or motive irreconcilable absurdities. But even inconsistency has its laws: man does not poorly reason for the pleasure of poorly reasoning. When he poorly reasons, it is because there is a struggle going on among his faculties and he does not know how to bring them together.

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We now can resolve the question with which we began this chapter. Man has gained in passing from fetishism to polytheism, because he gave himself a belief that is more susceptible to being ennobled by sentiment. To ennoble it sentiment falsifies it, but the belief lends itself to that, which is an advantage. A famous Englishman observes that Homer is better than his Jupiter: this is to say, in other words, that sentiment is better than its form.8 How many crude traditions were rejected even at the period of Homeric poetry, when so many crudities dominated? Jupiter recalled to Juno the harsh treatment she had suffered at his hand; but now it is limited to threats, when previously it meant action. Nonetheless, the heroes of Homer are superior to their gods. Compare the domestic life of Jupiter and Juno with the human domesticity of Ulysses and Penelope; contrast the conjugal quarrels of Venus and Vulcan with the touching affection of Hector and Andromache. Mortals precede their idols in moral perfection; but soon enough, thanks to mortals, the idols take their revenge and, speedily overtaking their worshippers, they will leave them far behind them.

There is also this difference between the influence of fetishism and the influence of the polytheism of this period, that one isolates individuals while the other brings them together, by making it a duty to worship in common the same gods. Thus, what was an effect became a cause; and polytheism, the result of the coming together of primitive bands, consolidated this coming-together. Religion instituted festivals where the different tribes encountered one another and became accustomed to live with one another. It consecrated an entire country to serve as a refuge of peace when enemies or internal divisions troubled it. Elide, at the center of which rose the temple of Jupiter Olympian, which later was decorated by the masterwork of Phidias, could never be the theater of war. Upon entering it, the Greeks again became brothers and fellow citizens. The soldiers who crossed this holy land laid down their arms, which they reprised only when they left.9

It was equally conciliating when it came to private quarrels; religion established 562 expiations that not only appeased hatred and soothed remorse, but formed a bond between the expiated and him whose august ministry caused the forgiveness of heaven to descend;10 it distinguished involuntary homicide from murder, and by a touching refinement, it declared the former sacred because it was a misfortune; it opened the asylums that disarmed the fury of vengeance. Almost all the altars of Jupiter were asylums;11 and on this subject note how much it is true that the usefulness of everything owes to the period of the social state. The right of asylum is a dangerous abuse when civilization is advanced, because the laws ensure to men everything beneficial in the right of asylum, but in times of barbarism, when there are no legal guarantees and weakness is without protection, it is fortunate that there are asylums, because even if they protect the guilty they are the sole refuge where innocence can be safe.

It was thanks to polytheism, no matter how imperfect it appears, that amphictyonies arose. Everywhere they are located in the temples.12 Neptune lends his sanctuary to the amphictyonies of Beoetia, Corinth, and Elide; Diana to those of Euboea; Apollo, of Delos; Juno, of the Argolid.13 Delphi brings together those of all of Greece. Charged with the celebration of the national festivals, these amphictyonies proclaim truces, during which all resentment is put on hold. They are the arbiters, sometimes impotent, often useful, of the differences that arise among peoples. Supported by oracles,14 their judgments maintain or reestablish peace.

Everything that is dear to men—their cities, houses, families, treaties, oaths, 563 hospitality—is connected to religion; it does not yet give morality a positive sanction; but the support it does give resembles that which would result (in a society where there are no laws) from the general opinion of the strongest. A rapid instinct alerts the nations that the gods are the friends of the good; that they want what is just. In the midst of its barbarity, Greece chose the irreproachable Aeacus to beg Jupiter to end the drought that had struck the scorched countryside with sterility.15 This is because the love of order inherent in men is also inherent in the gods, although with frequent exceptions: they embrace the cause of the oppressed, as a hero encountering a traveler attacked by brigands saves him from their blows. This is not as a judge, however, and one would be wrong to infer that the society to which he belongs took measures to punish the crime and to put the innocent out of danger. Nonetheless, it is fortunate that men thus invested with superior strength would defend the cause of justice. These men are the gods of Homer, and it is already much to have created a powerful race that ordinarily protects the weak and punishes injustice.

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BOOK VIII: A NECESSARY DIGRESSION ON THE POEMS ATTRIBUTED TO HOMER

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CHAPTER 1: That the Religion of the Odyssey Belongs to Another Epoch Than That of the Iliad

Before moving on from the polytheism of heroic times to the priestly religions, some explanations are necessary.

We believe that we have proved that the Greek religion of those times provided morality no solid support. The religious sentiment sought to bring notions of humanity, generosity, and justice into it; but it was rebuffed, and there was disaccord between this sentiment and the form it wanted to modify.

It is otherwise in the Odyssey. There morality becomes a rather intimate part of religion. As early as the seventh verse of the first book, it is said that the companions of Ulysses forfeited by their own misdeeds the return to their homeland. And if the principal one of these misdeeds was to have killed the flocks of Apollo1—which pertains to the personal interest of the gods—in many other places their justice is independent of their interest. All crimes stir their indignation.2 If I forced my mother to leave my house, Telemachus exclaims, she would invoke the Furies.3 Jupiter prepares a fatal voyage for the Greeks because they were neither prudent nor just. The gods warn Aegisthus not to murder Agamemnon in order to marry his widow;4 when he does murder him, they are not slow to punish him. Minerva approves and shows the fairness of the punishment; and Jupiter adds that Aegisthus committed the misdeed despite what destiny decreed. This new point of view, which forbids men from accusing fate for their own faults, is an improvement in moral ideas. The same Minerva, reproaching the gods for having abandoned the Ulysses she protects, does not base her intercession on his behalf 568 on the number of his sacrifices, but upon the justice and humanity of the hero.5 I will not retain you by force, said Alcinous to Ulysses, because this action would displease Jupiter;6 and if I were to kill you after having received you, what confidence could I have when I address my prayers to the master of the gods?7 Several times Telemachus threatens the suitors with divine anger.8 Arriving among the Cyclopes, Ulysses sets about informing himself if the inhabitants of the island are well-disposed to strangers and fear the immortals who protect suppliants.9 This sort of protection already characterized the Jupiter of the Iliad; but it belongs even more fully to the Jupiter of the Odyssey.10 The first interests himself only in those who call on him because they embrace his altars, and because their safety is his glory. The second takes in hand their cause because they are without arms and defenseless.

The gods of the Odyssey intervene, as it were, ex officio in the relations of men among themselves. Disguised, they cross the earth in order to observe there crimes and acts of virtue.11

In the Iliad, their resentment is not stirred except by neglected sacrifices or insults directed at their priests; in the Odyssey, the attacks of one man upon another attract their severity. In the Iliad, they confer strength, courage, prudence, and cunning on mortals; in the Odyssey, they inspire virtue, whose reward is happiness.12

If in one place in the poem the suitors deliberate about a murder and appear to believe that the gods approve it—until a sign appears that turns them from it13—this is because every period when new ideas are introduced before the former ideas are completely discredited is an epoch of contradictions. Moreover, the gods themselves protest against this injurious hope of the suitors: the suitors still believe they are addressing the gods of the Iliad; it is the gods of the Odyssey that answer them. One would say that a long interval separated the gods of these two poems, and that during this period their moral education progressed.

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One must not confuse the effects of religion with the use of mythology. This use is perhaps less frequent in the Odyssey than in the Iliad; but the effects of religion, properly speaking, are much more diversified. In it men have better combined the means of rendering the gods not only favorable to their individual interests but also useful to public order.

These gods of the Odyssey have a much higher degree of dignity. The description of Olympus is more brilliant, the happiness of its inhabitants more complete.14 Their dissensions were the results of the observations of a nascent people struck by the disorder and irregularities of nature; and these dissensions calm as man discovers the secret order that presides over the apparent disorder. Thus, the quarrels of the gods, the quarrels that occupy such a great place in the Iliad, are barely recalled in the Odyssey, and are indicated only in traits that are vaguer and softer. Minerva does not dare to openly protect Ulysses, for fear of offending Neptune.15

The distance that separates the gods from men is also greater. In the first of these two poems, the gods act constantly, and they all act. In the second, Minerva is almost the only god who intervenes. In one, the gods act in the way men do; they themselves suffer blows; they utter cries that resound in heaven and on earth; they take from warriors their broken weapons. In the other, Minerva acts only by secret inspirations, or at least in a mysterious and invisible manner.

In place of these battles unworthy of celestial majesty, albeit sung with satisfaction by the singer of Achilles, the poet who celebrates Ulysses shows only once—and this as a tradition, and not as an action in his poem—a rash warrior defying Apollo; but the battle is not even mentioned, and the adversary of the god perishes without offering resistance: he is punished rather than defeated.16

In the Iliad, when the immortals want to hide from view they are obliged to surround themselves with a cloud: their nature is to be seen; the wonder is not to be seen. Often they are recognized despite their efforts. When she comes down from heaven, Minerva is perceived by the Greeks and the Trojans; and in order not to be seen by Patrocles, Apollo envelops himself in thick clouds. But in the Odyssey, Homer says that it is impossible to recognize a god against his will. Thus at this second period the nature of gods is to be invisible. A wonder is needed for them to be seen.

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In the Iliad, Thetis is forced by Jupiter to wed Peleus.17 In the Odyssey, the gods disapprove of the marriages of goddesses with mortals.18 The mixing of the two races seems to them to be an unsuitable misalliance. Jupiter forbids Calypso from wedding Ulysses, and he strikes Jason for having contracted an ambitious match with Ceres.

These differences between the two epochs of Homer could furnish many objections to the portrait we drew of the first polytheism of Greece; but even if they were extended to objects other than religion, instead of complicating this particular problem they would resolve it, because they point to a change in the social state that would explain the change in religious form.

Let us examine the Odyssey from this point of view.

In it, it seems to us that one discerns the beginning of a period that is tending to become peaceful, the first developments of legislation, the first attempts at commerce, the birth of amicable or interested relationships among peoples, when they replace brutal force with voluntary transactions, and conquests and violent spoliations with freely consented-to exchanges.

The uprising of the inhabitants of Ithaca against Ulysses after the slaughter of the suitors19 reveals a germ of republicanism, an appeal to the rights of the people against their chiefs, and everything that we will see more clearly in Hesiod (as we have already indicated).

One of the characteristic features of the Odyssey is a curiosity and a thirst for knowledge that are the proof of the repose and leisure that commence. It is as having observed and learned much about the ways of many peoples that Ulysses is first presented to us. He extends his travels, and braves a thousand dangers, in order to instruct himself. Praise of knowledge frequently occurs, and this thought is incorporated even into fables. The father of Calypso, Atlas, bearing on his shoulders the columns that separate the heavens from the earth, knows what the depths of the sea contain. Calypso herself gives lessons in astronomy to Ulysses, and the Sirens are represented as seductive mainly because their songs are instructive. In order to satisfy this thirst to learn the marvels of far-off countries, the author of the Odyssey gathers from everywhere the deceptive accounts of travelers and inserts them in his poem. Hence Circe, a more primitive version of Armide and of Alcine; the Cyclopes, 571 connected to mythology by their descent from Neptune; the Lestrigonians, whose traces are found in fragments of the first Greek historians.

These features manifestly belong to the period when man, still young enough to imagine everything and childish enough to believe everything, had already advanced to the point when he wanted to know everything. This is obviously a period after that of the Iliad, when the Greeks, preoccupied with the immediate interests of their own lives and employing all their energies in attacking and defending themselves, barely looked beyond themselves.

The condition of women, which always marches in step with that of civilization, is described completely differently in the Odyssey than in the Iliad. The wife of Alcinous, Arete, exercises the greatest influence over her husband and over the subjects of her husband.20 The delicate modesty of Nausicaa, her refined sensitivity, imply a rather developed society. The fear she expresses to pronounce the word “marriage” before her father,21 her description of the gossip, and, if we can use the proper term, the bad-mouthing of the Phaeacians,22 before whom she did not dare cross the city with a stranger, indicate a very refined and reflective observation of social relations in a State that was both peaceful and well regulated.

Some will perhaps say that having to depict the Phaeacians as a commercial people, Homer ably brought to light the characteristics that distinguished the ways of such a people from the martial customs and manners of the rest of Greece. But having to describe in the Iliad a people more civilized and less exclusively warlike than his compatriots, Homer saw only the negative side of this progress in the social state; he still spoke of the Trojans as an effeminate race. On the contrary, it is with approval and pleasure that the civilization of the Phaeacians is described in the Odyssey. The admiration, or rather the surprise, that Homer exhibits in the Iliad toward the luxury of Troy is that of a man who is still unaccustomed to such luxury; but the singer of Ulysses possesses this habit—he appreciates and admires luxury.

The end of the sixth book of the Iliad, the farewells of Andromache and Hector,23 is the sole place where conjugal love is depicted in touching colors; but it is conjugal love in the grips of despair, surrounded by all the horrors of war, subject to all the agitations of a hopeless situation. It is not domestic happiness, the result 572 of the order and tranquility that the laws guarantee. In the Odyssey, in the midst of her grief, prudent Penelope directs her house and gives herself over to regrets only when, after having divided the work between men and women, and after having devoted herself to her domestic cares, she reenters her chamber alone in order to bathe the nuptial bed in tears. Further note that with the exception of Penelope, all the Greek women of heroic times—Eriphyle, Helen, Clytemnestra, Phaedra—are guilty of murder, betrayal, or adultery. Penelope is the transition from this violent and barbarous state to a more moral, more civilized one, hence subsequent to the former which it replaces. The faithful nurse and attentive observer Euryclea, by the regard with which she is surrounded, herself testifies to the importance attached to the administration of women in the state of society characteristic of the Odyssey. Helen who in the Iliad limited herself to bemoaning her faults and to committing them, in the other epic appears with a dignity that causes one to forget her errors.

In order to prove that the state of women had not changed between the two poems, some have pointed to the fate of female captives,24 and to the imperious speech Telemachus delivered to his mother.25 But they have overstated the meaning of the four verses of that discourse, which were obviously dictated by an extraordinary circumstance. Stirred by Minerva herself, who had allowed him to detect that she was a goddess,26 over Penelope’s objections Telemachus desires to leave; he is troubled by them, of course, and he therefore speaks with the intention of dismissing the one who could be an obstacle to his designs. His conduct, therefore, is an exception dictated by special circumstances. The poet adds that Penelope herself was surprised by it;27 and in the rest of the poem the son of Ulysses exhibits the greatest deference to his mother. She commands in his palace; he is obliged to take precautions in order to escape from Ithaca without her knowledge or permission.28 She appears in the midst of the suitors as the mistress of the house they are wasting. There are even two verses that prove that she exercises a direct authority over her son. Euryclea says that Penelope never allowed him to command the female slaves.29 If, however, as the head of the family he inherited all of his father’s rights, he would have had the same power over both sexes as Ulysses, who 573 had them punished for their misconduct. All this ought to have enlightened the readers of the Odyssey concerning the meaning of the four verses that appear to place Penelope in a subordinate position vis-à-vis her son; however, for the most part, people have seen in the writings of the ancients only what they already believed they would find.

The destiny of female slaves is doubtless the same in the two poems. The laws of war, which are more rigorous than the customs of peace, are also slower to be modified. Even when the relations between citizens change and become more relaxed, it is natural that the former barbarism toward enemies continues. However, the fate of female captives in the Odyssey is described in more pathetic terms than in the Iliad. Does this difference not indicate an improvement in domestic mores, one that by way of an invidious contrast rendered the fate of prisoners more terrible? The happier their life in the bosom of their families, the more odious became slavery. The more honorable the rank their spouses assigned them, the more repugnant the experience of having to grant their charms to the arrogant men who regarded them as their conquest. Briseis in the Iliad, whose father Achilles killed, attaches herself to her conqueror without remorse or scruple, while the Odyssey shows us a female prisoner who is forced to proceed by means of blows: this severe treatment presupposes resistance on the part of the unfortunate one, a resistance of which the Iliad offers no example.

We will go further. One sees in the Odyssey not only the proof of a change in the condition of women, but the effects of this change. One there discovers at once its advantages—more gentleness, more charm, more domestic felicity—and its inconveniences, which, to be precise, belong to a later period than its advantages. This probably needs explanation.

The growth in the influence of women has as a natural consequence making men occupy themselves more regularly with their relations with those with whom they share their lives. From this it results that love is considered in a more detailed, more nuanced way than before, and that the perspectives brought to bear on it multiply. Among these perspectives is one that makes love a light and frivolous, more or less immoral thing, one that lends itself to levity and jest. One, however, does not turn one’s attention to it in this way until one has exhausted everything else. The people of thoroughly primitive customs treat love without delicacy, but they do not joke about it. Every time you find witticisms on this subject in an author, be sure that he lives among men already more or less civilized. Now, you can find such features in the Odyssey, while in the Iliad you will find no such thing. The 574 story of the loves of Mars and Venus—which, I will say in passing, belongs to a tradition posterior to the Iliad, because here Vulcan has Charis, not Venus, for his wife30—this story casts upon the cuckold husband a tincture of ridicule.

Helen’s infidelity is treated much more gravely. Menelaus is betrayed, but no one finds, or seeks, a subject of mockery in it. The Mercury of the Odyssey, who jokes with Apollo about Mars’s fate (whom he envies), is a dandy in a society that is already corrupt.31 Barbarous people consider pleasure more seriously. It is with a good deal of seriousness that Agamemnon declares to the assembled Greeks that he claims Chryseis for his bed because he finds her more beautiful than Clytemnestra;32 and it is without any admixture of joking that Thetis proposes to her son, despairing over the death of Patrocles, the distraction of possessing a beautiful woman.33

The characters common to the Iliad and the Odyssey strike an attentive eye with other differences, and these differences are always progressive.

In both poems hospitality is always a sacred duty; but hospitality in the Odyssey has something warmer, more affectionate about it. There is only debt and loyalty in the Iliad, while there is refinement and sensitivity in the hospitality of the Odyssey.

This is not all. These two poems are not distinguished on the moral plane alone; they are dissimilar on the literary one as well. And these dissimilarities, like the former, indicate two periods connected by a growing civilization.

The unity of action that makes it simpler and clearer; a more lively and coherent narrative that concentrates the reader’s attention; these are the perfection of art. These perfections, however, are foreign to the Iliad.34 There the action is not 575 united; and the reader’s interest is divided from the beginning: each hero shines in turn. Diomedes, Ulysses, the two Ajaxes, the old Nestor, and the young Patrocles, share with Achilles our unfocused attention. We often even forget Achilles, idle in his tent, and follow the battles of the companions he abandons. There are entire books when his name is barely mentioned; there are those that can be left out without the reader noticing.35

Finally, the object of our habitual sympathy is Hector; and if, on one hand, we are led by the talent of the poet to desire the taking of Troy, we experience, on the other, a constantly painful sentiment, when we consider this defender of the ill-fated city, the only character to whom our refined and generous sentiments can attach themselves without any reservation. This defect—for it would have been one if the poet had had the aim of composing a whole with the sole purpose of celebrating the glory of Achilles—this defect, I say, has so struck critics that they have attributed to Homer the intention of elevating the Trojans above the Greeks; and the pity he sought to excite for the misfortune of the former seemed to them to confirm this view. However, it is undercut by the passages where the poet speaks, 576 we will not say in his own voice, because that is never the case, but in a descriptive form, which is more appropriate for letting the secret inclination of the author be seen, than a narrative or dramatic form. Thus, for example, in the depiction of the first battle offered by the Greeks, their profound silence, the strict order of their ranks, the regularity of their movements, are put in opposition to the tumult, the disorder, the indiscipline, and the almost savage cries of the Trojans.

But if the Iliad lacks unity, it still rises above all the works come from the hands of men by a constant increase of interest, vividness, grandeur, and force from its beginning to its end (with only a few episodes as exceptions). The movement becomes ever more impetuous, passions more violent, the characters more colossal, the action of the gods more marvelous and superlative. As a man of much intelligence36 and deeply versed in these sorts of investigation observed, this sort of development is much superior to that mechanical regularity that limits itself to subordinating everything to a single goal. However, does not this admirable progression make one suspect a succession of bards, each seeking to surpass his predecessors?

The character of the Odyssey, on the other hand, is a constant and perfect unity. Not only does everything relate to the return of Ulysses, but the poet, by attaching us from the very first book to Telemachus and Penelope, whom he shows to be quite weak and defenseless, oppressed by the suitors, forces us from the very beginning to hope for the arrival of the father and spouse they wait for, and who alone can deliver them. We desire this arrival, both by the interest the youth of the son inspires and by the respect the noble character of the mother commands, as well as by the hatred we have for the greedy and violent band of their assailants.

The superior art that shines forth in the Odyssey is also remarkable in some less important features, which still merit being discussed. Repetition is avoided much more carefully than in the Iliad. Seated with Alcinous, and having arrived at the place in his travels that the poet recounted in the previous book, Ulysses interrupts himself in order not to repeat something already said. In general, the idea of having the poem commence in medias res in order to give the hero the opportunity to recount his adventures, and to vary the tone of the narrative, is a progress in the art: all later writers have followed this method.

Thus, on one hand, the art of the poet is more developed in the Odyssey; on the other, the poetry of the Iliad is more brilliant, an indicator of a younger, more vigorous era.

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CHAPTER 2: A Question That Results from the Previous Observations

Are all these differences sufficiently resolved by the view that Longinus transmitted to us, which supposes that the author of the Iliad was young or in the prime of life when he wrote his first poem, but composed the Odyssey in his old age? We do not think so. With the present question, it is not a matter of more or less boldness of conception or brilliance of colors; rather it is a matter of a fundamental difference in the entire system of the two epics relative to religion, mores, customs, the condition of women, society, and even politics.

No individual, young or old, can shake off the yoke of his century. When this century has made progress, the past is imitated, but it is no longer animated by the same spirit. The impressions of the atmosphere that surrounds us become a part of us; they become identified with our very existence; each of our words is penetrated by them. The knowledge of ancient monuments and opinions is a matter of erudition; and erudition enlightens us without inspiring us; it provides us with developments that are more and less on point, with rapprochements that are more and less apt, as well as allusions and contrasts. But these things are infused with the present times and mores. Consider Virgil: he instructed himself by studying Homer, he studied Etruscan traditions; nonetheless he is neither Greek nor Etruscan; he is a Roman, a courtier of Augustus. We even dare to say that it would have been no more possible for the Homer of the Odyssey to compose the Iliad than for a Jew of Alexandria to write the Psalms or the Book of Job.

We therefore are obliged to devote a few pages to another hypothesis. Despite our efforts to shorten this digression, it will probably seem too long; but the poems attributed to Homer are the only ones that can be cited as historical records. All the poets who write at an advanced period of civilization write for effect. They know the taste of their times; they have before them the treasures of the past; 578 they draw from them at their convenience, according to the goal they propose to themselves, many without discernment, all without exactitude. The most faithful limit themselves to embellishing the mores they describe. But to embellish is to denature. The date of the works therefore is only a literary question. This date provides light on the state of literature at the time the authors write, but none on the veracity of their depictions, if they speak of a century not their own. Place the Aeneid one hundred years before or after its true time and your ideas of the literary merit of the century would change. However, you would know that one ought not seek a depiction of the mores of the Trojans in the Aeneid. This is not true of the poems of Homer. The Iliad exactly represents the mores of a people such as the Greeks contemporaneous with the Trojan War would have to be. But the Odyssey transmits details of an entirely different sort; if you suppose that these two works were written at the same time, or were separated by only a few years, the fidelity or accuracy of both becomes suspect. The dating of the Homeric poems therefore is not only important in connection with literary criticism, it is decisive for the history of the human race.

579

CHAPTER 3: That the Composition of the Odyssey, and Hence Its Mythology, Belong to a Period after That of the Iliad

If it were proven that the Iliad and the Odyssey do not come from the same author, but that the Odyssey belongs to a subsequent century, and to a period of civilization that is more advanced than that of the Iliad, all the difficulties we brought to light in the previous chapter would be easily explained. As a preliminary, let us see if the records and authors of antiquity should make us reject this view.

First of all, note that the view is not new. The authenticity of the two poems attributed to Homer has appeared doubtful to learned men of every century.1

However, some have wanted to make the solution of the problem depend upon an even more obscure question: to wit, whether the art of writing was in use in the time of Homer.

On the negative side there are many plausible reasons.2

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But even if one answers affirmatively, no proof of the poems’ authenticity results.

First of all, it still would remain doubtful that their author wrote them.3 Who cannot think of all the difficulties that had to present themselves to the dissemination of writing, or which had to arise from the lack of materials upon which to write? What a large interval had to unfold between a few inscriptions crudely sculpted in stone or bronze and the written redaction of works of an entirely different extent!

As a famous learned man observes,4 there is one fact that marks the period when the use of writing becomes general among a people: this is the composition of works in prose. As long as none exist, this is a proof that writing is barely in use. In the paucity of materials for writing, verses are easier to remember than prose, and they are also easier to get down. Prose arises naturally from the possibility that men acquire of entrusting themselves, as far as the life of their compositions, to another instrument than their memory. Now, the first prose authors, Pherecydes, 581 Cadmus of Miletus, Hellanicus, who belong to the century of Pisistratus, are very much later than Homer.5

For a rather long period of time, therefore, the two Homeric epics could have been transmitted only by memory.6 Memory is a faculty that is perfected to an astonishing point when it is needed, and is lost with an extreme rapidity when it is less necessary.

The example of bards, skalds, Druids,7 the Hebrew prophets, the Caledonian poets, and, finally, the improvisers of Italy do not allow us to call this point into question. The sagas, or traditions of Scandinavia, conserved and transmitted from father to son, were so long that one was able to fill libraries with them when they were finally written down. They enable us to see how the Homeric poems could have been orally preserved. The entire history of the North, says Botin,8 was preserved in unwritten poems. Whereas our social life, observes Mr. de Bonstetten,9 so disperses our faculties that we have no adequate idea of the capacity of memory of these half-savage men who were not distracted by anything and who made it a point of honor to recite the exploits of their ancestors in verse.10

One fact is certain: until the time of Pisistratus, the Homeric rhapsodies were 582 sung individually on the public squares by the rhapsodes;11 this usurper was the first who brought them together and put them in the order he felt was suitable.12 Charlemagne did the same thing with the ancient Germanic poems orally transmitted to him. And it was in this way that the Arabs in the seventh century formed the collections of the unwritten poetry of the previous ages, called Divans, and 583 Macpherson in modern times brought together scattered songs under the name of the son of Fingal.

But could not these rhapsodes—who for several generations sang the poems of Homer in unconnected pieces13—could not they have changed the order, or 584 corrupted the texts, or mixed the compositions of various authors during their recitations in the public assembly or on the stage? And the friends of Pisistratus, by making a whole of these scattered pieces, did not they choose, arrange, or correct at their pleasure? Among the friends of the tyrant we find Onomacritus of Athens, who only a little time before was convicted and punished for having inserted in the works of Orpheus and Museus lengthy and frequent interpolations,14 something that does not give a positive idea of his fidelity or scruples. He then sold himself to the tyrants expelled from his country in order to raise another tyrant against his countrymen. From Pisistratus to the Ptolemies, who can tell us how many times someone would have renewed these reworkings, whether in general or in details?15

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To the possibility that the Odyssey or the Iliad would have been, we will not say formed in their entirety from rhapsodies brought together at random, but considerably lengthened in this way, some oppose the uniformity of style and poetic coloring. But the style of all the epic poems of the Greeks is much the same, as well as their idiom.16 The language of Hesiod, that of the Batrachomyomachy, and of Quintus of Smyrna differ only slightly from Homer’s. The superior rank 587 of the latter owes to the vigor of the conceptions, the vivacity of an inexhaustible imagination, much more than what we could call the style.17

This conformity in the manner of expression is characteristic of the period of society during which the Homeric poems were composed. One cannot read the songs of Ossian without being struck by their uniformity, yet Ossian certainly was not one and the same bard. The individual character of writers develops only much later. As long as the human spirit battles, as it were, against barbarism, there will be a similar style. Here, as elsewhere, the extremes touch. The absence of civilization gives almost the same color to all individuals. In its progress, civilization develops differences; but with the excess of civilization, these differences disappear again. The only difference is that in the first case this is the natural effect of social circumstances, while in the second case it is the result of a premeditated imitation; and what was uniformity becomes monotony.

To these considerations one can add others derived from our ignorance of Homer’s life.18 What is told to us about his miserable vagabond existence does not fit at all with the epoch in which we place him. The Homeric poems themselves do not depict bards in such straits. This sort of condition could only be produced by the decadence and fall of the Greek monarchies. In the martial and barbarous times, as well as the heroic ages, of Greece, poets always enjoyed the greatest respect of the people and kings. We find the proof of this in every one of the historical records of the Scandinavians, who resemble the Greeks in many ways.19 But as civilization progresses, the life of men becoming more laborious and ideas 588 of utility gaining in ascendancy, the existence of poets loses its importance. They themselves sense their decline, and they deplore it.20 If one adopts the idea that Homer really existed, it would be impossible to explain how when he spoke about the rhapsodes, his predecessors, who were so well received and treated, that he would not have reflected upon himself.

No. Chance could not have brought forth, at the precise line that separated the two different civilizations, a single man capable of describing the civilization that no longer existed and the one that was coming to be. Homer is a generic name,21 like Hercules or Buddha.22

The Homeric poems are the work of several bards, each being the organ and representative of his century.23 Two or even three primitive poems could have arisen and served as the core;24 but these poems had to have undergone several important transformations; and around them were successively grouped several episodes; in each of them was inserted foreign material; as a result, the date of these parts and episodes, and of the two poems, cannot be determined except by moral proofs; we will see unimpeachable ones in the essential differences that distinguish the Iliad from the Odyssey; and because these differences would be inexplicable if one 589 attributed these two works to the same author and century; one must recognize them as products of two different centuries and authors.25

We therefore do not believe that one can oppose the mythology of the Odyssey to the portrait we presented of the original Greek polytheism. The Odyssey’s pertains to a period later than the polytheism.

In general, one must distinguish three species of mythology in the Homeric poems.

One notices, on an initial plane, a popular mythology, of the sort that had to belong to a people who emerged freely from fetishism. This mythology is that of the majority of the Iliad, and the first eighteen books especially, which embrace and complete the principal action. Then one finds the same mythology, but perfected, with religion having progressed and having united itself to morality; this sort dominates in the Odyssey; however, the three books in which Ulysses recounts his adventures depart from this second mythology, and belong to that of the Iliad.26 590 The description of the state of the dead is entirely unfitting to a religion that has morality in its belief and its precepts. On the other hand, the twenty-fourth book of the Iliad, which many critics regard as an addition,27 and whose last thirty verses on Hector’s funeral are in truth unworthy of Homeric poetry, appears to belong to the mythology of the Odyssey. There are ideas concerning the dignity of the gods that contrast with all of their previous conduct. Mercury leaves Priam at the entrance of Achilles’s tent, telling him that it would be unfitting for the gods to intervene too ostentatiously in the affairs of men.28 This reserve is hardly in keeping with the habits of these same gods who in a thousand other places do not believe they are degrading themselves by intervening, and fighting, protecting, or deceiving humans; and one cannot mistake a progress of religious ideas here, an increase in divine dignity. Priam says to Achilles: “Respect the gods and have pity on me”; this belongs to the Odyssey more than the Iliad.

We would be tempted to believe that with the march of civilization having softened the notions of the Greeks, that in order to preserve Achilles as their national hero they would feel the need to present him under less fierce and revolting traits than those that characterized many of his previous actions. Hence his belated pity and the restoring of Hector’s body to his father.29

Finally, there are traces in Homer of a third sort of mythology that is cosmogonic and allegorical, and that consists in the mysterious personification of the forces of nature. This mythology is not homogeneous with the two others, which are the same but at different periods. It appears to be entirely transplanted, with a foreign origin, the result of the communication of Greece with Egypt and Phoenicia. 591 It is principally found in the twenty-second book of the Iliad, the Theomachia,30 in the fable of Briareus31 (which is incompatible with what Homer says elsewhere about the power of Jupiter);32 in the metamorphoses of Proteus,33 which Diodorus said was a copy of those of an Egyptian god;34 in the marriage of Jupiter and Juno, which the same Diodorus recognized as a part of the cosmogony of Egypt;35 and, finally, in the island inhabited by Aeolus and his twelve sons and daughters.36 This third mythology, however, is found in only a very incomplete and fragmented manner in the Homeric poems.

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We, however, will leave these conjectures to those who are practiced in them, and who delight in reflecting upon such matters. What is important to us, and what we believe we have demonstrated, is that there are essential differences between the religion of the Iliad and that of the Odyssey, and that the two poems cannot be attributed to the same period or to the same author.

Some perhaps will ask, if the Odyssey belongs to a more advanced period of polytheism, why have we sometimes drawn passages from it to support our assertions concerning the original polytheism? This is because when we perceived in a few passages of the Odyssey the same views that we found in the Iliad, we thought that some fragments of the latter found their way into the former. However, when we found in the Odyssey different views, since these were always on the advanced or progressive side of the ledger, we recognized the effect of time and the necessary progress of ideas. When we recognized in a poem two contradictory opinions, this was not because the two coexisted, it was because the poet made use of each as demanded, according to the effect he wished to produce, and which would provide the most beauty. However, when in a long and even vast poem such as the Iliad, which embraces almost all aspects of human existence, you encounter only one teaching, compact, uniform, that is contradicted at most in only a few details, it is obvious that this view was the sole dominant one at the time described by the author. What the poet does not say can in this matter be a more telling proof than what he does say. In matters of chronology, positive proof can sometimes be less convincing than negative.

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CHAPTER 4: Conclusion

The Iliad and the Odyssey belong to different periods. During the interval that separated them, the social state had changed: mores were softened; the various sorts of knowledge increased; and by this very fact, religion had to change. The objections that seemed to overthrow our system in fact confirm it. The religious form that their original martial civilization had imposed upon the Greeks did not suffice for their descendants, who were less bellicose and more civilized. The religious sentiment continued its work, grew, and purified the form; and equilibrium was established between it and the social state.

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BOOK IX: ON THE PRIESTLY RELIGIONS COMPARED WITH INDEPENDENT POLYTHEISM

596 597

CHAPTER 1: The Purpose of This Book

In the preceding volume we saw the notions that human intelligence given over to its own forces and enjoying an entire liberty conceives concerning the figure and character of the gods, concerning destiny and the other life. Now we are going to examine how these notions are modified under the empire of priests.

598

CHAPTER 2: On the Form of the Gods in the Priestly Religions

In these religions, the form of the gods remains stationary. The Egyptians, says Synesius,1 did not permit either workers or sculptors to represent the gods as they wished, for fear that they would depart from the received form. According to Denis of Halicarnassus, the Gauls never allowed themselves the slightest innovation in their rites or in the images of their gods.2

The motive for this prohibition is easy to understand, and the precaution taken was not without its rationale. If the imagination could have exercised itself freely vis-à-vis the divine forms, it soon would have extended its ungovernable activity to their moral qualities or their metaphysical attributes; in this way, the slightest alteration in their appearance would have been the fecund source of other, more important and open-ended changes. For the priesthood, it was better that the imagination, enslaved and controlled, would hit its head against immutable idols. These gods, who suffered no changes while everything changed around them, thus seemed to defy time by their ancient appearance. The immobile monuments of bygone ages, they filled souls with respect, appearing to emerge from the darkness of a deep night.

As a consequence, while anthropomorphism replaces fetishism in independent 599 polytheism and erases almost all its traces, it is preserved as something of a baseline in priestly religions, and is prolonged even in the midst of civilization’s progress.3 Everywhere that the priesthood is the supreme authority, the embellishment of the divine forms is rejected as a sacrilege. The spades and the tree trunks adored by the Gauls in no period took on more elegant features.4 And even when the Gauls familiarized themselves with what we could call a barbarous luxury, the ancient figures always attracted greater veneration than the statues of gold erected next to them.5

Priests, moreover, do not like to give gods a human form. They always wish to put between worshippers and idols a greater distance. What we said earlier6 about the mysteriousness that resides in animals makes them more suitable to inspire religious sentiments, including terror, than would beings like us.

The Egyptians, who raised temples to almost all living creatures, never placed man among their divinities.7 Greek writers who spoke of men who were deified among the Scythians have fallen into an error that is nowadays well known.8

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Nonetheless, the priesthood sooner or later yields to the natural impulse of the human spirit. What is most perfect in the eyes of men is the human form:9 priests end by clothing their divinities in it.10 Still, in their ceremonies they recall vestiges of earlier times.11 Their gods always retain some remnants of their former deformities;12 and allegories or fables explain these persistent monstrosities. Shiva having in a fit of rage (as we saw in bk. VII, ch. 5) cut off the head of Daksha, his father-in-law; when peace was concluded he agreed to restore him to life. But the head cut off during the battle had fallen into the fire, and a ram’s head had been substituted for the human head.13 The restored Daksha was thus disfigured. In 601 order to explain the form of the goddess Ganga,14 half-female, half-fish, the Brahmins recount that Shiva had transformed an immense flood that had come from the sweat of his brow and placed it on her head, out of fear that it would flood the entire world.15

The priesthood therefore always protests against the attribution of the human form to the gods whose worship they control. In the religions they dominate, this form is only secondary; their mysterious significance is the essential thing. It is the opposite in independent religions.16

This constant struggle by the priesthood marks the form of the gods with a quadruple mark.

Ancient fetishism contributes various elements that are sacralized.17

More refined, the symbolizing spirit expresses divine qualities by images that suggest them.18

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Then come the scientific allegories, often a hidden part but inseparable from the priestly cults.19

Finally, these different elements are put to work and modified by the always-present inclination of the priesthood to fill the souls of the people with surprise and terror. The figure of Chandika or Cali, nicknamed in India the goddess with terrifying teeth, obviously had this purpose. When someone offers her sacrifices, says the Kalika Puran,20 he must place beside her two assistants who have three inflamed eyes, yellow bodies, red heads, enormous ears, long and menacing teeth, a necklace of human skulls, and who, armed with tridents and axes, hold in their right hand cut-off heads, and in the left, vases of blood. It was with the same intention 603 that the Vandal priests represented their Pustrich as a malevolent dwarf emitting waves of burning fire through torrents of smoke.21

Sometimes, however, the priesthood betrays a contrary desire. If it desires that the forms of the gods remain stationary, which maintains them in their monstrous state; if it desires that they remain terrible, which renders them objects of terror; it also regrets, when it compares them to mortals, not having clothed them with a superior beauty, and it attempts to hide the deformity under luxury. The Greek divinities are simple and elegant, the idols of barbarians are overcharged with ornaments and decoration; and it is by marvelous traits—by the immobility of their members and look, by the faculty of flying in the air without the wind aiding or their clothing being disturbed, that is, by features that do not come from the perfection of art—that the priests distinguish the celestial race. The Mahabharata shows us gods who compete with Nala for the hand of Damayanti, gods surrounded by a constant splendor, crowned with always fresh flowers because no breeze makes them stir; their gaze fixed, they walk above the ground without their feet touching it, while Nala, covered with sweat and dust, bears only a faded crown; his trembling feet rest on the earth, and his body projects a shadow that confirms his nature’s inferiority.22

The habit of offering public worship to strange or bizarre forms leads artists who work under the orders of priests to introduce parallels in the inferior ranks of the mythological hierarchy. Hence, that host of imaginary animals23 found in all the priestly mythologies, while there are none that are indigenous to Greek polytheism.24

Sometimes the religious sentiment, by means of an effort wholly disproportionate 604 to the times, experiences the desire and need of rejecting every likeness.25 The priests, however, take hold of it in order to direct it according to their will. It can be useful to them, in that it makes them more solidly established as the sole intermediaries between men and the invisible deities. But as this conceit is wholly disproportionate to the state of learning and understanding, it cannot be maintained; the use of simulacra has always triumphed.26 One cannot provide one example of a people who never had idols, even though one can cite several among whom the hatred of idols was a religious principle.

Those writers who have celebrated this repugnance to giving gods a material form, as proof of an élan toward more purified ideas, have not been simply mistaken; but the error began when they transformed a vague sentiment into a notion of the mind. Examining the question more closely, they would have seen that since the intellect was not strong enough to maintain itself at this height, there was no advantage for the priesthood to reduce this hatred of idols to a maxim. On one hand, this maxim would have been constantly violated in practice; and, on the other, invisible and immaterial gods were much less morally valuable in the hands of priests, as we will prove in the following chapter, than the visible and material gods of the free religions.

605

CHAPTER 3: On the Character of the Gods in the Priestly Religions

If, before having put forth for our readers the character of the gods in the religions that are subject to priests, we had proposed to them the following problem: there are two sorts of religion; one is the result of the conjectures, fears, and hopes of an ignorant multitude, one given over to all the errors its ignorance can inflict upon it; the other is the long-meditated work of the elite of the human race organized in corporations, who have gathered all the knowledge they could have acquired by tireless effort, profound reflection, the discoveries of science, the subtleties of metaphysics, and the refinements of contemplation: in which of these religions would the character of the gods be the purest, the most sublime, the most removed from all imperfection and vice? The preference would be given to the second. Nonetheless, when we query history, we see the facts range themselves against this answer.

If pride, venality, and perfidy are the distinctive traits of the Homeric gods, those of the priesthood, no less mercenary and no less proud, are a thousand times more capricious, vindictive, and deceiving. The priests need their cruelty, their capriciousness, and their capacity to defraud in order to subjugate in their name the credulous populace. Their esprit de corps instructs them concerning this necessary condition of their existence and power. From all this, wherever they rule, results a religion that is more extravagant and oppressive than in the countries they do not dominate.

Instruments of a corporation whose goal is an unlimited empire, the gods must will what this body wills, which is to subjugate man in small as well as large things, in his thoughts as well as his external actions. Thus, there is nothing that compares to the minutiae they require, to the arbitrariness of their will. Countless practices fill each instant of the day, and precede or follow all of life’s actions.

The forms of worship of priestly religion bear an imprint of abasement and 606 humiliation foreign to independent polytheism. One cannot enter into most of the sacred forests of Germany without being bound with irons. It was forbidden to stand erect, or even on bended knee, in these sanctuaries. No one dared to leave, except by rolling on the ground.1 Such displays of servitude were the only homage deemed worthy of the gods. However, the intercourse between these gods, whom the priesthood thus wishes to elevate, and the mortals who worship them, often degrades the former and corrupts the latter. The former imperiously demand victims and sacrifices;2 and these offerings are compulsory for the latter.

The gods of the priests, like those of Homer, have the mores of the people who worship them. Those of the Indians find their happiness in repose; those of the Scandinavians are bellicose and greedy for carnage.3 Idly lounging on brilliantly white waves, or retired on the mountain that serves as their Olympus,4 the Indian gods draw harmonious sounds from the vounéï,5 the rival of the lyre Apollo plays at the banquets of Jupiter. Odin, on the contrary, seated on the seas, holding a sword in his powerful hand, exudes only storms and devastation. His fiery hair is tossed by the wind. His eyes burn like lightning on his dark face, and his voice is like the sound of the far-off torrent.6

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The peoples of the North and the West assemble under great trees to conduct their civil and judicial affairs. Their gods render justice under an ash tree.7 In Homer, Minerva and Juno sometimes go on foot, sometimes in a chariot; the gods of India ride in chariots that move themselves.8 Shiva and Parvati would not have been able to cross the ocean and regain heaven if Daksa had not loaned them his chariot.9 But Skadi, wife of Niord, grasped her bow, and attaching her skates to her agile feet, jumped from heaven to race over the icy tops, hunting wild beasts.10 Women in the North practice medicine; therefore in the Edda the doctor of the gods is a woman.11 In general, among the people of the North, this sex enjoys a greater consideration than among the Greeks,12 and the goddesses in Valhalla have greater credit than in Olympus.

Among the Greeks, we have seen Apollo do penance for the murder of a serpent felled by his blows; Odin, who killed the giant Ymir in order to create the world, also needed such an expiation, and the death of Balder was explained in this way by the mythologists.13 In India, Indra, who sullied her guilty hands with the blood of her companions, plunged into the waters in order to atone for her crime.14

The foods of the gods are modeled on those of men. In Homer, wine gives them almost as much pleasure as nectar; Odin’s companions become drunk on beer, and among the Hebrews, who despite the efforts of Moses had adopted many of the customs and locutions of their neighbors, the altar is called the table of God, and the offering, his bread;15 and salt is necessary for all the offerings, because without it no aliment is tasty to man.16 These foods are eaten with an eagerness that betrays a devouring appetite. The gods of the Ramayana run in droves to take their 608 part in the sacrifice;17 and the peoples of Bohemia, in their complaints against Charlemagne, said: He forbade us from preparing their evening meals for our hungry gods.18

The gods of the priesthood are not endowed with unlimited force. Their efforts to draw the bow of Rama are in vain.19 Thor needs to put on his magical belt in order to regain his vigor,20 as does Juno to rest with her horses, after having split the clouds in order to hasten the taking of Troy;21 and Vidar, like Mercury, owes the rapidity of his flight to his miraculous sandals, which support him in the heavens and on the seas.22

Sad infirmities threaten these gods. Hother is deprived of the light of day.23 They succumb to fatigue. The meadow where Rama and his faithful spouse rest during their travels and bathe their tired feet24 still shades the mountain of Kimur. Misfortune strikes them. Often struck by an unforeseen calamity, with incredible speed they make seven circuits of the world, uttering piercing cries.25 Freya, sister and wife of Odin, desolated like Ceres or Isis, crosses all climes seeking her spouse—hence the different names she has among the different peoples. Shiva and Vishnu one day lost the beautiful Parvati, and shed so many tears that a lake was formed, to our day still called the lake of tears. These imperfect divinities are subject to fright. Sarasvati, lost in the desert and pursued by horribly shrieking demons, hid in terror in the depths of the earth, and only reappeared much later in the form of a flower.26 The greatest of evils, old age, does not spare these gods. An apple rejuvenates them; it is under the guardianship of the goddess Idun. Once it was taken from them, and soon their hair grew white and their hands trembled under the weight of their weapons.27 Their sight is weak and limited. When the 609 Ganges, leaving heaven, came to flow on earth, they abandoned their heavenly abodes in order to reassure themselves firsthand of this prodigious change;28 and when Jehovah wanted to survey the prophets, he got up in the night and rose in the morning, like a mortal master who checks on his lazy servants.29

Immortality, the dubious attribute of the gods of Greece, is not a more assured privilege of the priestly gods. They work constantly to acquire amrita, the marvelous potion that confers immortality upon them, which fate has hidden in the depths of the sea.30 Balder dies pierced by the bramble; the gods deliberate whether they should subject Loki to a painful death;31 and Freya trembles for the days of Odin.32

Thus limited in their physical forces, these gods are even more so in their moral faculties. Gna is their messenger when they wish to know what happens among men,33 as Iris is the messenger of the gods of the Iliad. Odin surveys the earth from the summit of his throne; but it is two crows perched upon his shoulders who recount to him all that they observe.34 A giant bothers him because of its renown. The god wishes to determine whether the knowledge of his rival surpasses his own. Freya restrains him: she counsels him against this dangerous contest. Imperfect gods, he answers her, often have need of human intelligence.35 She therefore willingly accompanies him. Can you, she exclaims, have enough knowledge?36 But the very source where one draws knowledge is not in her power. Mimir guards it; Odin cannot approach it without him allowing it, and he is forced to leave an eye as surety in order to disarm this jealous watcher.37 Error therefore is often the lot of these gods. In the first age, the aim of the Eternal was missed: its will was circumvented.38 This idea of a god who is mistaken or whom the ruses of the creature 610 succeed in deceiving recalls the tale of Prometheus and proves the resemblance of these two polytheisms in one of the most important aspects.39

But it is above all by their passions or their vices that these priestly divinities are similar to the gods of the Iliad: neither debauchery nor cruelty nor perjury gives them pause. You give yourself to the desires of human beings more than any woman, says Loki to the goddess Idun.40 Lakshmi, the wife of Vishnu, taken by an unbridled desire for Kamadeva, leaves her spouse and shamelessly pursues the lover, who rejects her ardent caresses with disdain.41 In the North, Odin dishonors the rank he occupies by his flighty loves; the other gods deprive him of rule and choose another master for themselves; and it is only after ten years that he regains their goodwill and, chasing away his rival, his authority.42 This tradition probably has a historical basis, and we will have occasion to return to it. But in the mind and heart of the people, it tended to convince them of the irregularities and license of their gods. In the South, Brahma was guilty of theft and suffered the penalty of a shameful theft, the loss of his heritage. These gods do not stop before perjury. Disdaining their own oaths, they kill the architect who built the citadel in which they live;43 and such is their reputation for perfidy that a warrior they called to their midst did not want to enter among them except fully armed.44 Bound by solemn engagements to Ravana, Brahma set about breaking them from the very moment he undertook them.45 This same Brahma, far from being touched by the sacrifices of a pious monarch, sought to discover some negligence or defect that would render the sacrifice useless.46 By means of his signs, Odin sows discord between a king 611 of Sweden and a king of Denmark,47 just as the son of Saturn deceived Agamemnon in order to avenge Achilles. While Indra, jealous of the austerities of a hermit, clothed a treacherous genius with the features of a courtesan in order to seduce him,48 the god of the Jews blinded the sons of Heli so that they would not listen to the counsel of their father because he had determined to bring about their ruin.49 He hardened the heart of Rehoboam in order to produce the division of his kingdom. He moved Pharaoh to disobedience, which caused his ruin.50 He sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the Shechimites: this is an expression exactly like those in Homer.51

It should be observed that the priesthood regularly makes it a merit of the gods that they possess and practice artifice and ruse.

Mohammed, who, despite the severity of his theism had borrowed his ideas on the divine nature from two religions elaborated by priests, calls God the most admirable of deceivers in more than one place.52 This is understandable when one reflects that gods suspected of lying make priests who protect men from being deceived by them even more indispensable.

Envy torments them even in the midst of their splendor and power. The greatest 612 crime, says the Ramayana, is pride,53 which is to say: man’s confidence in his own forces. Vishnu in his ninth incarnation mercilessly pursued a king whom he put to death despite his prayers; his sole fault was a too-constant prosperity. The followers of this god still celebrate this easy and cruel victory by a feast.54 The Brahmins of the seven pagodas recount that the jealous gods flooded the city of King Malecheren, who had lavishly decorated his residence and with its magnificence rivaled the heavenly abode.55 Do we not hear Neptune complaining to Jupiter of the wall raised by the Greeks around their vessels, and Jupiter reassuring him that he will destroy this proud work of men?56

Mexican idols fare no better. At the time of the great flood that submerged it, the country of Anahuac was inhabited by giants, a small number of whom sought refuge in the cavities of a mountain. Having emerged from this asylum, they wanted to celebrate their deliverance by the construction of a pyramid. The gods struck them with lightning. One sees in Serbian poems which are much more recent (although bearing the traces of an earlier mythology) traces of the envy of the gods. Maxim Zernojevitch is engaged to the daughter of the doge of Venice. His father, Ivan, announces in proud terms that he will come to see his daughter-in-law. “One will see me,” he says, “under the walls of Venice with a thousand men. Venice will also send a thousand elite men to celebrate the glory of my son. But none will equal, none will appear more magnificent and more handsome than Maxim, the beloved son of his father.” Destiny heard him, and suddenly a terrible disease disfigured the handsome Maxim. His father looked upon him, and the memory of his proud words came to his mind.

To envy and imposture is joined betrayal. The Mercury of the Germans allowed himself to be seduced by Marcus Aurelius.57 When Bomilcar, a Carthagenian traitor, wanted to overturn the government of his fatherland, he multiplied ceremonies to seduce the gods.58 We have already seen Xerxes, during his invasion of Greece, attempt to corrupt the tutelary divinities of this country by practicing the 613 rites of their cult. Thus priestly nations take against their gods the same absurd or injurious precautions that struck us among the Greeks.59

Besieged by Alexander, the Tyrians chained the statue of Apollo; and after mastering the city, the conqueror had its chains taken off, proclaiming him the friend of Alexander.60

To be sure, this custom of enchaining treacherous divinities, a custom whose popular meaning we will explore, also had a mysterious significance. What we have already said about the composition of priestly polytheism should have prepared our readers. The gods of these religions, symbols of the forces of nature, were chained in the periods when these forces seemed to decrease. These bonds were taken away when nature was deemed to take on new vigor. This double sense thus served the priesthood by satisfying learned men and contenting the people.

They said to the former that they by turns enchained and emancipated these symbolic simulacra in order to express the regularity of the seasons and the rebirth of the sun when, having defeated winter, it recommenced its annual course. They said to the others that divinities bound with chains could not desert them in order to aid their enemies.61 But this last opinion, suited to vulgar understandings, alone dominated the public religion.

Gods so imperfect in their physical nature, so vicious by their moral attributes, could no more than those of the Greeks inspire their worshippers with profound and sincere veneration. Priestly traditions no less than the Homeric mythology are filled with tales that show men ready to revolt against the gods. In Scandinavia, they live huddled in a citadel, and their porter Heimdallr62 closely watches the bridge63 that facilitates entrance into their abode. Hothar and Biarcon challenge the entire Nordic Olympus, and even Odin himself, to combat.64 Gylfus breaks the massive mace Thor holds in his hand. In India, the world is hardly created when a giant chases all the divinities from heaven and earth.65 A mere mortal pierces 614 their bodies with arrows.66 Later, struck with terror at the appearance of a king covered with glory, whose austerities rendered him invincible,67 they multiplied their eyes, their heads, and their arms—which brandished new weapons—in order to resist him.68 In Egypt, finally, the gods transformed themselves into animals, hiding from the mortals who surpassed them in audacity and strength.69 What a strange thing to say, yet true nonetheless! These absurdities, these extravagances, this degradation of the divine nature, prove—who would believe it!—the ascendancy of logic over priests, as well as over the people.70 Their interest constrained them to make the gods passionate beings and, hence, vicious and unjust. Reasoning then obliged them to conceive of them as unhappy because they are unjust and passionate. The religious sentiment fought in vain against the imperfections the priestly religions attached to these idols; the reason that enlightens essayed in vain to make their attributes less incoherent or their conduct less scandalous. The priests oppose themselves. They prefer to frustrate the religious sentiment rather than modify a tradition, no matter how revolting it may have become; they prefer to stifle reason rather than sacrifice a single dogma.

They believe that they escape the consequences that result by lavishing grandiose epithets upon these perverse beings, which every narrative belies. What truly results is that, despite their systematic arrangement, in these religions there are more contradictions—and more palpable contradictions—than in the simple and crude beliefs of the human spirit. Despite the limits that circumscribe the physical forces of the divine essences, the priests proclaim them to be all-powerful; despite the jealousy that torments these envious divinities, they attribute to them an unlimited goodness; despite the vices that stain their moral character and the errors that darken their intellects, they call them perfectly just and perfectly wise beings; and despite the inevitable misfortunes that follow from disordered passions, they assign them supreme happiness. Thus, in all times, in priestly religions man finds himself painfully assaulted by discordant claims. Far from having gained some benefit from his submission to the priesthood, far from having been led by this 615 privileged guide (the only one invested with the right to instruct him) to a better and purer doctrine, our blind and miserable race bent its head beneath fables that were a thousand times more extravagant than its imagination would have produced. It prostrated itself before beings who were more corrupt than the phantoms of its own dreams; it cast itself into a deeper abyss of superstitions and delirium, and the price of the abdication of its intelligence was, for centuries, slavery, error, and terror.

However, another reflection, one that has already occurred to us, presents itself. If man lavished his worship on gods who were imperfect, corrupt, and evildoing, is this not proof that the worship of some sort of divinity is a need of the soul? The Greeks, free from priests, perfected what they adored; the nations subject to the priesthood worshipped what was presented to them without being able to perfect anything. The absurdity of certain religious forms, far from being an argument against religion, is a demonstration that we cannot do without it. We find ourselves even less miserable under the most defective of these forms than we would if we were completely deprived. The history of the decadence of polytheism will prove it.

616

CHAPTER 4: On a Singular Notion Whose Traces Are Found in Greek Religion, but Which Is Found Developed and Reduced to a Dogma in Priestly Religions

Of all the opinions that the savage gives birth to in his ignorance, the first that seems to have to be discredited is the one that supposes that the gods can be punished by men when they deceive their hopes and betray the tacit engagement that is the basis of religion at this period.

In fact, this opinion, which is inherent in fetishism, weakens as polytheism progresses. If blacks destroy their fetishes when they think they have something to complain about in their regard, peoples who are becoming civilized renounce this foolish act of illusory vengeance. For a long time they believe (they perhaps always believe) that their gods allow themselves to be swayed, but they no longer imagine that one can punish them.

In a passage of Homer, when the son of Peleus accuses Apollo and says that he would revenge himself on this god if he could, he recognizes his impotence even while manifesting his anger. Pausanias reports1 that Tyndarus, imputing the adulteries and licentious life of his daughters to Venus, had her statue veiled and chained. Pausanias, however, sees only madness in this act. To be sure, in unforeseen calamities, in the midst of transports of despair, civilized man sometimes returns to this idea, because with passion subverting his entire being, the event causes him to relapse from his progress, as it were, and returns him to the savage state. He then launches himself against his gods, overturns their altars, and destroys their statues. After the death of Germanicus, one saw the people of Rome dragging the sacred idols through the streets, and lavishing upon them the insults and blows they wanted to give to Tiberius.2 After the murder of Caligula, one 617 also saw them punishing the gods for having allowed such a monster to reign. But this sacrilegious fury is not motivated by any particular teaching; it is not a calculation based on the character of the gods, or a punishment inflicted upon them in the hope of correcting them; it is a dying and disarmed victim who launches himself upon his tormenters, moved by a thoughtless impulse. The absolute power that overturns minds and reduces tyrants to the level of, or even below, the most ignorant populace led Augustus to the same excesses; at the time of the war with the young Pompey, having lost his fleet in a storm, he forbade that the statues of Neptune should receive the honors accorded the images of the other gods when they were led in pomp during the games of the circus.3 But what is only an accidental and aberrant movement in independent polytheism becomes a consecrated dogma, regulated by solemn rituals, in priestly beliefs.

Plutarch tells us4 that when excessive heat brought either a devouring pestilence or other misfortunes to Egypt, in the darkness of night priests would carry in silence some of the sacred animals that they worshipped and take them to remote places. There, they attempted to frighten them by threats; but if these gods were unyielding and the evil remained, the priests would sacrifice them. During storms, the Thracians would fire arrows against heaven in order to punish the god who dispensed the thunder;5 and the south wind having dried up the wells of the Psylles, a people of Libya, they resolved to declare war against the divinity who controlled the south wind.6 The Indians of our day, discontent with their gods, cover them with insults, and those among them who hold authority close the door of their temples with fagots of spines so that no one can enter and offer sacrifice.7

It seems bizarre that the same authority that labors with such sustained ardor and effort to put an ever greater distance between the gods and men would maintain practices that are so injurious to the divine majesty in the religions it controls. This singularity owes to two causes: on one hand, to persistence in all ancient customs; on the other, to the fact that by establishing itself as the sole intermediary between heaven and earth, the priesthood makes itself in a way responsible for the conduct of the gods. It therefore has a need to arrogate to itself a certain jurisdiction over them; otherwise it will be deemed a useless and powerless auxiliary; 618 and if one supposes stubborn gods, this jurisdiction, no matter how respectful the forms in which it is clothed or the subtlety with which it is disguised, has to end, and in fact does end, in violence done to the supernatural powers, and even with punishments inflicted upon them.

All the peoples subjected to priests have entertained more or less similar ideas. The Sabeans concentrated the influence of the stars in talismans and amulets by which they obliged the stars to hear them. Some Jewish teachers taught ways of constraining Jehovah.8 In India, the mantrams,9 and even more the two irresistible formulas Bala and Attibala, draw the immortals to the earth.10 In several species of sacrifice, and notably in funeral ceremonies, the priest asks the faithful if the gods should descend; he then commands these gods to be seated on the sacred grass; then he releases them and allows them to return to their customary abodes.11

For the priests, however, there is a danger they need to fear in the exercise of this mysterious jurisdiction. The gods can fail to be docile. Then the priesthood needs 619 an excuse. Hence the notion that an omission, a neglect, a stain can remove the effectiveness of the ceremony.12

If prayer coming from the mouth of priests is endowed with such a great influence, cursing is no less powerful. We have treated this subject in one of our preceding volumes,13 in connection with the action of the climate on Indian ideas. Here we will limit ourselves to what concerns the jurisdiction the priesthood obtains over gods by their curses. Buddha, cursed by one of his lovers because he had disdained her fires, was abandoned by all of his worshippers. The daughter of Taruka, a demigod or powerful genius, was transformed into a monster by the anathema of a sage.14 Another, by the same means, deprived Rama of the sublime knowledge that belonged to his heavenly nature;15 and Parvati saw his cult fall because an outraged penitent pronounced imprecations against it in his anger.16

The gods of Egypt are exposed to the same perils. We will stay the vessel of the sun, say their priests; we will expose the mysteries of the abyss to the light of day; our commands will be respected by the gods or we will cause them to perish if they resist.17

This jurisdiction that the priesthood arrogates to itself over the beings whose organs or ministers they are supposed to be reveals the cause of a celebrated fact in Greek history that has remained unexplained to our day. It was in the presence of magi, and probably by their counsel, that Xerxes had the Hellespont chained, after having it struck with rods.18 When they heard of this, the Greeks’ astonishment was great. This is because their polytheism, which had progressed along with their reason, had left far behind the polytheism of priests. But what was inexplicable to them can be explained by the doctrine of the magi, who claimed to dictate laws to the gods by their enchantments and to punish them when they disobeyed.19 Here we recognize fetishism prolonged by the influence of priests, and we also recognize 620 this fetishism in its fluctuations, when we see the king of Persia, after having insulted the sea, wanting to appease it by magnificent gifts cast into its depths.20

All these facts are so many proofs of a truth that is often repeated. The human spirit shows itself to be even more incoherent, more unreasonable, even less religious, when a class of men arrogate to themselves the privilege of guiding it than when it follows its natural course in freedom.

621

CHAPTER 5: On Priestly Notions of Destiny

We have seen the problems that man’s reason encounters, even in free beliefs, when it broaches the great question of destiny, and its relation with the gods.1 These problems are no less insoluble in the priestly religions. The priests, however, attempt to escape them with more complicated sophisms and more unintelligible subtleties.

Sometimes an immutable, irresistible destiny weighs over the gods and men.2 It was by the will of destiny that the rape of Sita occurred, despite the interest the immortals took in Rama.3 Tibetan fatalism, which created the world by a vortex and a flood, has fixed by invariable laws all the events since the beginning of beings to their end. All the gods of Scandinavia vainly attempt to resist the fatal decree that condemns Balder to death. In vain, Freya obtains from all the living or inanimate beings the oath to spare the days of the god she protects. He dies wounded by the bramble that the goddess had forgotten or disdained to address. This story, however, contains an obvious contradiction: without the negligence of Freya, fate’s decree would not have been accomplished.

622

Other times, the gods in principle have some authority over destiny. But once they have pronounced, they cannot go back over their own decrees. At the birth of each one, Brahma inscribes on his head the fate that awaits him, which nothing can then modify, and he then goes on to judge mortals according to their works—a contradiction that is reproduced everywhere. From the origin of the world, Odin has determined everything by irrevocable laws, nonetheless his warriors consume themselves in constant efforts to avoid a peaceful departure, which would deprive them of Valhalla.

Sometimes the glory of the gods takes the place of destiny. They have numerous duties vis-à-vis this glory, and they fulfill them at the expense of human beings.4 Despite this learned terminology, however, the meaning is the same. The glory of the gods, like destiny, is nothing but a limit to their power.

The prescience of the gods is yet another difficulty. Homeric polytheism leaves this question vague. It would be better to say that the inhabitants of Olympus are foresighted in our manner, for they are not endowed with an assured knowledge of the future. The prescience of God in the Bhagavad Gita, on the contrary, extends to all things, except, adds an Indian master, for the actions of beings that he created free. But the majority of the events that he is deemed to foresee being the result of free actions that he does not foresee, how can one harmonize his foresight of effects with his ignorance of causes?5 Thus, up against insurmountable obstacles, priests fail just as the rest of mortals do. Their impotent logic breaks against what is inexplicable, just as does the logic of the vulgar. They have only one privilege, that of forbidding examination, and thus to remain longer in their unseen contradictions: a temporary advantage that finds no support in sentiment and rests only on the torpor of the intellect.

623

CHAPTER 6: On the Priestly Means of Communication with the Gods in Sacerdotal Religions

The immediate communications of gods with men, even in the religions independent of priests, become less frequent as experience shows their opposition to facts, and more suspect as the priesthood, no matter how limited its power, has a vital interest in discrediting them.

The disfavor cast upon the communications of this nature is even more profound, and proceeds more rapidly, in priestly religions. In our third book1 we saw the countless imprecations of the bonzes, magi, and priests of Egypt against every effort on the part of the profane to open a direct path to heaven. But since one cannot take this hope away from the multitude without some compensating consolation, astrology and divination take on greater consistency and are more widely applied. Their rules are more fixed, their forms more mysterious, their pomp more imposing, and their rituals are often barbarous. We saw the empire of astrology in the hands of Egyptian priests.2 Its application extended to medicine, and we still have Greek manuscripts from a not-so-long-ago period that, while composed in Alexandria, contain obvious notions from ancient Egypt explaining the relations of the constellations with the planets.3 The same superstitions reign over the Indians. It is of the signs of the zodiac, and the star under which they were born, that they ask the secrets of the future.4 They kill or abandon the infants whose first hours occurred under a threatening planet,5 and love and marriage arrange themselves 624 according to signs.6 The Chaldeans placed the different professions under the protection of the stars.7 To each was dedicated a temple, whose structure symbolically signified the divinity worshiped therein. Invoked in the prescribed manner, honored by suitable sacrifices, this divinity descended into the sanctuary and granted his ministers the gift of prophecy.8

Mexican priests equally distinguish themselves by their attachment to astrology. To hear them, each period had a special character and a sign that was proper to it, which revealed to them every future event and the outcome of all enterprises.9

But however extended and diversified the application of astrology to human things, divination was subdivided into even more numerous and varied categories.10 It simultaneously contained both the interpretation of phenomena that, even though they apparently disturbed the order of the universe, were only less-known 625 combinations, and the arbitrary meaning attached to the most frequent of accidents.

The different modes of divination varied according to climate. The Etruscans, of whom we will speak in detail later, sought the future in meteors, and in the prodigies or monsters that arose among them; the Phrygians and the Cilicians, who lived in mountains, sought it in the songs of birds;11 the Egyptians and the Babylonians solely in the stars, not wanting to subject their predictions to chance or external events, claiming to have learned directly from the gods everything they revealed to them.12 But among other peoples, all material phenomena had a prophetic meaning.

When the earth trembled, it was to announce the decrees of the heavens. When the stars were covered with a veil, it was to announce some fate; and not only great calamities such as earthquakes, but phenomena manifest to all, such as eclipses, were the language of the gods; everything that we attribute to the laws of gravity, to the mechanisms of bodies, to the result of chance,13 or the instinct of animals,14 their movements, their cries, their encounters or their flight, the least accidents of inanimate nature, the shuffling of leaves, the color of flames, the direction smoke takes while ascending, the murmur of the waves,15 the strike of lightning, everything mechanical or involuntary in man, the beating of the pulse, sneezes, and above all dreams,16 which are so powerful with savages,17 dreams where our nature takes pleasure, as it were, in making us doubt ourselves, and in which reason seems to take part in order to humiliate and confound itself, all these things were so many manifestations of the divine will, because the gods—to hear their ministers—do 626 nothing without a reason, and all beings obey them as the bow and arrow in the arms of the archer. Confucius, whom our philosophers have strangely persisted in placing among themselves, taught his disciples several of these modes of divination.18 The Persians, as we have said,19 intermediary between the peoples of the North and the South, connected astrology with divination, in particular with pyromancy.

Scandinavian priests interpreted the cawing of crows;20 the Germans21 attached an extreme importance to all the words of women because, they said, being incapable of a constant will, and rarely governed by reason, they more easily received the subtle impressions of invisible powers; unwittingly or unwillingly, they were their organs.22

Thus antiquity, according to a remark of an author whose name escapes me, spied on nature in its smallest details, with much more attention than moderns; this was an effect of superstition, and this effect in its turn became a cause. For priests, a science resulted that, when applied to all the events of life and the interests of everyday life, had to immensely increase priestly power. Thus, the study of signs that we have recounted was the principal occupation of Druids;23 and the young nobility whose education was confided to them spent twenty years perfecting the art of understanding and interpreting these signs.24

A single people remained foreign to these superstitions, at least in its laws. This 627 people was the Jewish people.25 This fact confers additional force to an observation we already made, and which we will later recall for the reflection of our readers.26

Divination passed from priestly polytheism to nations free of the priesthood. The Greeks owed it to the Phrygians and the Carians;27 the Romans to the Etruscans.28 But as we observed earlier,29 it occupied a lower rank, especially among the Greeks. The late period of its introduction into the Greek religion explains why one encounters many fewer traces in Homer than in later writers. One also finds many fewer in the poets than in the historians. The poets, who sought only applause, remained as faithful as they could to the more splendid and poetic marvels they found in the Iliad and the Odyssey; while the latter, aspiring to the trust of their readers, dared not entertain them with fictions that were universally rejected, they did recount what we could call smaller prodigies that had retained favor among them. This is because divination as the ancients conceived it belonged to science rather than the imagination; when credulity lost its force, or imagination its agreeable character, divination could still be respected, and could even acquire new credibility because of the supposed-progress of the science.

The trials found among all the peoples dominated by priests, and which, transmitted from barbarous religions to Christianity took the name of judgments of God,30 were nothing else than the application of divinatory means to the relations that exist among men. These trials took place among the Scandinavians31 and the Germans. They gave preference to duels, which was a natural consequence of their love of war; but other sorts of trial were not unknown to them.32 We 628 find many kinds among the Indians, who, transporting to the heavens their own customs, subjected their divinities to them.33 Accused or suspected by Rama, Sita cast herself into a fiery pyre. A voice descends from the invisible spheres; a rain of flowers inundates the earth, and Rama, convinced by the word of Agni34 that Sita is pure and without stain, grants her his trust.35 One can consider as belonging to the same notion the opinion of the Persians, who expose the sick to fierce beasts; if the animals spare them, they are considered to be impure.36 The Hebrews, while rejecting divination, admitted trials,37 without noting the identity of principle. The Greeks, on the contrary, display not even the slightest trace of similar practices, with the possible exception of a passage in Sophocles’s Antigone where the guards accused by Creon of having assisted the princess in her pious disobedience want to justify themselves by placing their hands in a burning fire;38 however, one should see here only an energetic way of protesting their innocence or, what seems to be even more probable, an allusion to foreign customs that the Greeks knew but did not practice. Sophocles put these words referring to these trials in the mouth of Creon’s guards; like all the tyrants of Greek cities, Creon had only 629 barbarians for guards. Now, all these barbarians came from countries submitted to priestly religions.

If on certain important occasions these means of justification were admitted by the Romans, it was as an inheritance of Etruria.39

Meditating on what preceded, one is struck by a manifest contradiction in the priestly hypotheses. Astrology and divination should lead to the most absolute fatalism, since the destiny of man is determined by the planets at his birth, the direction or even color of a ray points out the unavoidable events of his entire life. Why did the priests never admit the direct and undeniable consequence of their teaching? It is because the uncertainty of the future is necessary to their influence. They validated divination and astrology in order to give themselves the merit of interpreting the decrees of heaven; then they denied its most obvious consequence in order to preserve hope for devotion, and for their own intervention, its necessity.

630

CHAPTER 7: On the Notions of the Future Life in Religions Dominated by Priests

We have seen the world of the dead and the destiny of those who inhabit it to be the constant objects of the thought of man, until, worn out by fruitless efforts, he determined to turn his gaze away from what can never be known. This is a violent and sad resolution that debases him without giving him peace. Until then, he interrogates both his reason which doubts and his interior sentiment which disturbs and causes him to tremble, as well as external nature that says nothing. He invents a thousand augurs, he has recourse to a thousand ceremonies. He attaches arbitrary meaning to a thousand petty circumstances in order to win the obstinate secret that always escapes him. Nothing satisfies him, and the priesthood profits from his uncertainties and impotence.

The future life is the priesthood’s domain, and it is toward it that the priesthood directs all eyes, all hopes, and all fears. The Egyptians place importance only in the existence that follows the passing on. The houses man builds on earth seem to them to be hostels for a day; tombs, in contrast, are man’s dwellings par excellence, eternal palaces.1 The bellicose inclinations of the Scandinavians and the Gauls, combined with priestly domination, depicted death not only as the end but as the goal of life. Impatient to attain it, they launched themselves into battle, less to defeat than to die.2 They did not attempt to overcome their adversaries except to fall in their turn, covered with even more glory. Each success invited them to seek more danger elsewhere; and the warrior who could not find a glorious demise under an enemy’s sword was reduced to give death to himself.3 631 The proof that this repugnance for old age and natural death was owing, at least in part, to the priestly religion of the people of the North, was that the Greeks, no less belligerent, entertained no such opinion. Among them old age was an honor and natural death held no opprobrium.

The Indians accorded the same preference to the future life as the Scandinavians or the Egyptians. The immortality of the soul for them is not a vague desire, an uncertain hope, but an absolute conviction, the determining motive of all actions, the source and aim of all laws, institutions, and practices;4 but with them this opinion takes another form. Neither the means they employ nor the prize they seek is the same. The means are not a warrior’s death, but a contemplative life; the prize is not an immortality of battle, of pleasures and feasts, but an eternal apathy, a complete absence of individuality.5

This fatigue before the activity of living when one lives under the most beautiful of skies and in the midst of all sorts of pleasures is a most remarkable thing. To reprise in eternity their this-worldly occupations is the greatest hope of the peoples who struggle here below against a strict destiny, and who acquire only with great effort an always-tenuous subsistence. Never to return to this world is the sole desire of those nations that appear to be most favored, whose fertile soil and mild climate 632 preserve them from all pain and dispense from all labor. This is because work, need, and danger attach us to life by presenting challenges at every moment that must be engaged, goals that must be pursued. Repose, on the other hand, by delivering us to ourselves, makes us feel the emptiness of an easy happiness and the insufficiency of our possessions. In order not to succumb to the burden that crushes him, man has need of being forced by obstacles to forget the sadness of his destiny, and to constantly develop his faculties and his forces.

In Indian literature, the ardent desire to be withdrawn from the human condition modifies even works that are not religious. They are out-of-sorts when someone retraces the infirmities of our nature. They wish to put offstage the representation of everything that would resemble too closely material life; and the doctrine of being absorbed in the Divinity also influences the denouement of their dramas. This resolution must never be unhappy: it would contradict the fundamental teaching, the certainty of a definitive reunion with heavenly quietude.

Greek and Indian notions are the two extremes concerning the state of souls after death. The Homeric netherworld presents these souls as individual beings weakened in soul and body, and the world of the dead as an image of this world but without the full reality. The Indian absorption is the negation of every faculty, of every memory, of all personality of the soul, which is reduced to an abstraction deprived of everything that would connect its existence with existence here-below.

Among the nations subject to priestly corporations, there is one that presents a singular exception when it comes to the future life. The Mosaic law maintains an absolute silence on the immortality of the soul. It encourages Jews with only temporal recompenses, and sometimes the prophets themselves seem to see in the tomb only nothing.6

We however believe that some have terribly exaggerated the absence of any 633 teaching on future existence in the Jewish religion.7 In Deuteronomy,8 Moses speaks of the evocation of the dead; and sacred writers make frequent allusions to the immortality of the soul.9

One can reconcile this apparent contradiction by means of a plausible conjecture. Among almost all peoples subject to theocratic government, the priests, even though clothed with an immense power, had to fight against kings and warriors; and the period of the books or traditions that have come down to us do not go back to the times when the priesthood ruled without rivals. The Hebrew annals, on the contrary, witness to a complete and uncontested despotism of priests until the 634 establishment of the monarchy. Now, when priests are invested with all power and directly employ divine authority, they have no need of delaying its intervention, they even, perhaps, fear weakening, by delay, the effect it should produce. But if they encounter rivals jealous of their authority in the temporal powers, they seek to regain the dominion that is disputed by means of fear for the future. When they reign in this world they are less solicitous of the other; but when the possession of this world is contested, they call the other to their assistance. The terrors of the other life are auxiliaries.

Therefore the priests, the immediate successors of Moses, would initially have neglected these views; but after the substitution of the royalty for the theocracy, they would have invoked them. In fact, it was at this period that the myth of the witch of Endor appeared. The foregoing explanation will not lack plausibility if one reflects that this teaching, which was never taught to the Jews as an article of faith, acquired special force with the prophets and the ministers of religion when they had to fight against tyranny, whether native or foreign, and were called upon either to frighten their oppressors or defend the weak.

But even leaving to one side this conjecture concerning a particular fact, one general fact is incontestable. In all the hypotheses that the priests wish to inculcate, in all the descriptions by which they wish to inspire hope or terror, they are constrained to follow the natural bent of the human spirit. These descriptions, these hypotheses, must have at their base a more or less exact imitation of real life. Its customs, its events, its occupations are the mold in which all the notions concerning the future life must be cast.

Egyptian women eager to please in Amenthes,10 just as in Memphis or Alexandria, had colors and brushes buried with them in order to refresh their makeup or darken their eyes. The Gauls wrote to friends whom death had taken from them and consigned their letters to the flames, adjourning to their reunion after this life the final tallying of their accounts with creditors and debtors.11 The Persians 635 surrounded the funeral monuments of their kings with everything needed for life on earth.12 The methodical and even minute ancestral worship of China is well known;13 it has transmitted priestly rituals to the Chinese of today even through periods of atheism. In a solemn feast that the inhabitants of Tonkin celebrate annually, they prepare their houses to receive those who have ceased to live, and to host them as celebrated guests.14

Indians place fruit and milk by caskets,15 and not only the occupations and needs of souls in the other world, but their travels, are borrowed from this one. According to the Garuda Purana, souls, reduced to the diminutive stature of an inch in height, are transported through the air by Yama’s servants to mountains where they live for a month. Then they walk to the banks of the western ocean, where Yama judges them. There are two paths, one beautiful and easy for the good, the 636 other, quite difficult, for the bad. Souls stop twice en route in order to take food and put on clothing.16

Finally, if the riches of Scandinavian warriors are burned on their pyres in honor of the gods, it is so that by means of this sacrifice a field of battle might be opened where new combat awaits them. Their dignity in Valhalla depends upon the treasure they have acquired. Admitted into this place of glory, they stroll among their comrades-in-arms, subject to envious gazes. Soon, though, they take up their glorious arms, mount their steeds, and attack one another. The air resounds with the clash of lances and swords. Their blood burns, and the celestial pavilions are littered with champions fallen a second time. The hour of the feast sounds, the combat ceases, the wounds are healed, the dead revive and come together at the table of their leader. There, served by Valkyrians with blond hair and snow-white skin, they devour the wild boar Skrimner, who is reborn each day, and drink delicious beer. Niflheim encloses the women, children, and old who have finished the course of an obscure life. They, too, relive the past, retaining their names, their rank, and their honors, and continue the renewed dream of life as peacefully as they had led it on earth.17

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CHAPTER 8: On the Abodes of the Dead, and the Description of Infernal Torments, in Priestly Religions

Homeric polytheism indicates only one abode for the dead, which is not a place of punishments reserved for crime, but a vast and lugubrious space where all the shades without distinction display the melancholy that overwhelms them, which is neither aggravated nor done away with by the moral conduct of their previous life.1 Priestly religions, however, have more numerous and more detailed netherworlds. The Edda counts two, Niflheim and Nastrond; the Indians sometimes three,2 sometimes fourteen,3 and a few sects have as many as twenty-four.4 Among the Persians there are seven;5 five among the Burmese, twenty-three among the Japanese, three in Tibet, but subdivided into nineteen regions where the pains are differentiated, because it is in the description of torments that the priesthood above all finds its pleasure.6

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The hells of the Zend books are placed on the banks of a fetid stream, dark as pitch and cold as ice.7 The condemned souls are troubled without end. A thick smoke emerges from this dark lair, and the interior is filled with scorpions and serpents.

The Ifurin of the Gauls is a country impenetrable by the sun’s rays. Venomous animals are the companions and tormenters of the inhabitants of this horrible abode. Hungry wolves devour them. They call for death, but in vain. After having served as prey for fierce beasts, they are reborn—to provide them new prey. The most guilty are stretched in a somber cavern in the midst of countless reptiles. Burning poison falls upon them drop by drop. Everywhere there is a cold so piercing that these miserable shadows would be turned into ice if they were not destined to eternal pains.8

Despite the mildness of their natural disposition, the Indians have no less terrible hells. Yama, judge of the dead, pronounces the sentence. Those who have neglected the precepts of religion are punished for a number of years that is equal to the hairs that cover their head. Atheists are pierced through and through by falling on sharpened weapons. Those who have exhibited contempt to Brahmins are cut into pieces and cast into the fire. The adulterer holds idols reddened by the fire. Crows with bronze beaks tear apart the faithless one who has betrayed his caste. The murderer of a man or an animal is plunged into a vile abyss. The sensual walk with bare feet over brambles. The calumniator is bound with chains and fed unclean food. The greedy is himself devoured by insatiable worms. The one whose sacrilegious hand sacrificed a cow becomes a living anvil struck with a burning hammer. The one who gave false witness slithers from rock to rock, leaving his blood on their sharpened points; and the bodies of these wretched, composed of an impalpable material, join together like quicksilver to suffer new tortures.9

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One sees premeditated calculation in these careful portraits, a will to make an impression, and methodical arrangement. This multiplicity of hells, overlapping one another, as it were, betrays the desire to render the impression produced by fear of the future even more profound. Priests never found this impression sufficiently strong; they diversified their conceptions; they expanded them. They treated the heavens and the netherworld like their own property. They invented new cadres so they could fill them in greater freedom. Often they create a new god to preside at the sentencing.10 In a word, they constantly rework religion while maintaining its ancient teachings, like a worker improves his tools or a soldier polishes his weapons.

They also mix hope with terror. They multiply paradises as well as hells. Among the Scandinavians, Gimlé comes after Valhalla, as Nastrond after Niflheim.11 The inhabitants of Ceylon count twenty-six paradises toward which the just are successively raised, returning each time to a human body until arriving at the place of complete felicity.12 The inferior paradises of the Indians are material. Their inhabitants give themselves over to love, to festivals, to crude pleasures. The superior paradises are devoted to purer pleasures, contemplation, and ecstasy. Finally, in the highest of all, the Chattia Logam,13 the soul is incorporated into the divine nature.14

Independently of these promises and threats, the priesthood employs other 640 means to spur the liberality of the faithful; it allows the subterranean abyss to open. Three times a year, Larunda Mania in Etruria leads her pallid subjects amid the living, whom they frighten by their pale aspect or pursue with their sharp cries.15 Invisible ancestors attended meals and sacrifices. Manes sat around the paternal foyer. Lares were the object of periodic veneration; and during the five epagomenal days, the feast of Apherina-Ghan led back to the bosom of Persian families the deceased held captive in the tomb, which then recalled them after a few hours, unless they were redeemed by gifts and sacrifices. If this was done, they would be separated from the unclean world by Oromaze, who opened the way to heaven for them.

An important observation must be made at this point for our readers. If in Homeric polytheism morality had no influence on the fate of the deceased, the priestly religions attributed a great influence to it.

Everywhere one sees judges of those who descend to the netherworld, and torments for the guilty.16 It is easy to assign the motive for this difference. The priests who do not tolerate the independence of any of our faculties or conjectures, or our relations, whether with heaven or earth, must hasten to submit the relations of 641 men among themselves to the yoke of belief. This fusion of religion with morality, a fusion that occurs slowly and by degrees in Greek belief, occurs more rapidly in the sacerdotal cults. But in this the human race loses more than it gains. The priestly morality is entirely artificial, founded not on the value of human actions but on the will of the gods. Submission to priests, gifts without measure, lavishness at the expense of justice or affections become the highest virtue;17 and since nothing ensures obedience better than the servile practice of ceremonies (which are often revolting and always detailed),18 the code of priests is overburdened with strange laws that are destructive of natural laws.

This observation was necessary, and for now it is sufficient, because later we will compare the moral influence of the perfected polytheism of Athens and Rome with the action of the cults of Brahma, Isis, Zoroaster, or Odin.

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CHAPTER 9: On Metempsychosis

We saw in our first volume1 that the doctrine of metempsychosis entered into the primitive’s conjectures on the state of souls after this life. As the intellect develops, the incompatibility of this notion with that of a world to come that is little different from our own acquires greater evidence, and metempsychosis seems to have to be rejected by the religions that become more regular and better coordinated.

Thus, we do not find it among any of the peoples who freely and progressively created their religious forms. Neither the Greeks nor the Romans admitted it in their public worship, even though it had penetrated into their philosophical systems and their mystery cults; but it was sanctioned in the most affirmative manner among all the priestly nations, and one would be wrong to place it in the scientific explanations of the priests.

To be sure, it formed some part of them, sometimes combining with metaphysical abstractions, sometimes with astronomical calculations. Thus, the Indians2 attached it to their subtleties on nature and the purification of souls, while 643 the Egyptians,3 without rejecting this system of gradual purifications, united metempsychosis to astronomy by means of the cycle of three thousand years they assigned to transmigrations.4

But independently of these scientific meanings, it is incontestable that metempsychosis was part of the public beliefs of the peoples ruled by the priesthood.

Favored in the southern climates by the sympathy and pity that these climates inspire for all living and suffering things,5 probably transplanted in the North by colonies, it was conserved everywhere, perhaps because offering the faithful the real spectacle of rewards and punishments, to the priests it appeared to be a more forceful lesson than the teachings that relegated to an invisible world these same punishments and rewards. We just saw it in India; it penetrated the religion of the Gauls,6 the Persians,7 the Getes, and it is not sure that it was always foreign to the mythology of the Hebrews.8

The maintenance of this teaching, given other hypotheses that ought to have excluded it, confirms what we established elsewhere concerning the double doctrine of the priests and its little influence on the public religion. Those of Egypt combined metempsychosis with the existence of a subterranean world by making them two branches of the same system, at once mysterious and scientific. This subterranean world was nothing but the place of repose where the dead destined to new purifications (which were attached to astronomy) awaited the signal for the transmigrations 644 that would purify them,9 and it was to this temporary waiting place that the practices that are incompatible with metempsychosis were connected.10

The multitude remained indifferent to these refined explanations and according to the scattered and partial teachings that they received, believed alternately in metempsychosis or in Amenthes, without being struck by the opposition of the two beliefs they did not think to bring together.11

In this way one of our most important assertions is confirmed. Everything that in independent polytheism strikes the imagination in only a vague and passing manner is recognized and enters into priestly polytheism. The most fleeting conjectures, those that appear to be admissible only by minds that are still plunged in the ignorance of the savage state, are combined with the less crude doctrines that 645 the progress of the intellect brings; and if one must not attribute the difference that exists between these two species of polytheism to the spontaneous inventions of the priesthood, one must still recognize that they come in large part from the care that it takes to gather everything together and make sure that nothing is forgotten.

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BOOK X: ON THE TEACHINGS PECULIAR TO PRIESTLY POLYTHEISM

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CHAPTER 1: The Object of This Book

In the preceding book we treated the teachings common to the two species of religion, and we indicated the differences that the priestly spirit introduced into these doctrines. But there are others that belong more especially to the religions controlled by priests. We are going to treat them.

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CHAPTER 2: On the Supremacy of One God over the Others in the Priestly Religions

Several passages of Homer prove that the gods of Greece were originally equal:1 Jupiter had acquired certain prerogatives, but the other inhabitants of Olympus braved his power and disobeyed his will.2

It is not the same in the priestly polytheism. Among the Indians Shiva, sometimes Indra,3 and Brahma in the Vedas;4 among the Persians, Zurvan-Akarana; among the Scandinavians, Alfadur; among the Egyptians, Cneph, all occupy a place apart and reign over the other gods who are sometimes inclined to rebel, but who are always inferior to their master in force and dignity.

Several causes impress this distinctive character on priestly religions.

First of all, since in the scientific teaching of the religion these gods are only personifications of certain parts of nature or symbols of hidden forces, they necessarily 651 lose their individuality. The general system that unites and coordinates them classes them as parts of a whole, and in the mythological language the whole becomes the supreme divinity. But with individuality being as necessary to devotion as metaphysics is to science, this supreme god becomes the link between the two doctrines, sometimes having a variable and active nature, adapted to the needs and desires of the people, sometimes an inactive, immutable nature, as demanded by philosophical meditation.

In the second place, when imagination has become overfamiliar with the objects of its homage, the religious sentiment demands something less-known, something more imposing. It is never entirely satisfied with what is presented to it. Every limit wounds it, and every description, every definition, is a limit. It tends to rise higher in order to find itself at liberty in vagueness. Priests then reveal new secrets to it, unveiling a superior essence that until then was unknown, flattering it by these heights and this mystery while they reawaken the imagination with the novelty.

Thus, the supreme god of the religions fashioned by priests is ordinarily a god different from those surrounded by vulgar adoration. In Scandinavia, it is not Odin but an invisible god who, when the centuries will be fulfilled, will emerge from his unknown retreat to plunge the world back into nothingness.5

In Egypt, Cneph came late to dominate not only over the popular divinities, Isis, Osiris, and Horus, but also over Phat, who previously was the first principle.6 It is from the mouth of Cneph that the mystical egg came, whose shell Phat breaks in order to show himself to the universe; he, however, is only a secondary god because he owes his birth to another god.7

Among the Persians, Zurvan-Akarana has nothing in common with Oromaze or Mithra. He is separated from the active divinities; and by a consequence of the complications that always inhere in priestly dogmas, he is at once a cosmogonic power and an astronomical symbol, on one hand, and endless time, creature of the word, on the other, the great period of twelve thousand years.8

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This is not all. By the fact that the active divinities of the mythologies take an interest in the destinies of men and associate themselves with their debates, they inevitably contract their imperfections and their weaknesses. There is a certain versatility in their character; their nature is not immutable, sheltered from every passion, untouchable by change.

In order to compensate for this species of degradation, the priesthood places at the peak of the celestial hierarchy a divinity of a nature that seems more elevated because it is vaguer and less definable. Its immobility has something majestic to it. Its complete apathy distinguishes it from variable beings. The god of the Bhagavad Gita, even though like the air it penetrates the diversity of beings, is alien to this diversity: no modification affects it.9 In Japan, Amida is separated from all the elements, indifferent to the world it moves, and whose movements it does not share. Among the Siamese, Sommonacodom is plunged into a repose that no thought, will, or action troubles; but in order to reconcile this conception with the exigencies of anthropomorphism, the Siamese add that their supreme god obtained this impassability only by unheard-of effort, and the violence it imposed on itself replaced the blood that flowed in its veins with a liquid that is white like milk and cold like snow.

This notion is not as developed in the northern regions. The northern peoples, given over entirely to the storms of life, could not admit a repose founded on the absence of all the emotions that were so dear to them, or a felicity similar to nothingness. Nonetheless, their supreme god plays no role in their mythology. It only appears to hover over its ruins.

Even though the Jehovah of the Hebrews was a national divinity, one who marched, fought, and struggled with his people, or against them, the rabbis, in their cabal, declared that any action was unworthy of the divine majesty. They called the supreme god the unknown father, the obscure Aleph.

We do not think that our readers need to be alerted to the intimate connection of these conceptions of the impassability of the supreme god with pantheism, the final term of the metaphysics of priests.

Thus, the priesthood simultaneously courts the religious sentiment that, as we said elsewhere,10 distances the object of its worship in order better to adore it, 653 and interest, which brings it closer in order to make use of it. It does the same with the ardent desire for abstraction that takes hold of human minds when they take up the insoluble questions they believe they can resolve by going from subtlety to subtlety, from abstraction to abstraction.

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CHAPTER 3: On the Inferior Gods or the Priestly Demonology

Placed outside the world and its interests, the supreme god seems to have entirely escaped from man. The religious sentiment that placed it at this height cannot attain it. The feeble mortal therefore directs sad gazes at heaven, astonished at the solitude in which he finds himself and at his powerlessness to reestablish bonds between him and the immutable being that his thirst for perfection sundered.

When religion is independent, these bonds reconstitute themselves. Free to abandon himself to his successive impressions, man is not chained to a system from which there is no departure; and following the needs of his soul, sometimes he plunges into a vague contemplation that paints the Supreme Being as beyond all proportion with his nature; sometimes he crosses the distance and recalls this being to himself, the better to enjoy its protection.

But in the religions controlled by the priesthood, since it records and saves man’s conjectures, it inhibits him in present ones by the sanctions attached to his past suppositions. It then must present to the imagination it holds captive some hypothesis that puts religion back at its disposal. From this comes the immense number of subaltern gods, genii, and intermediate beings who populate the beliefs subject to priests.1

Celsus says that the Egyptians have thirty-six demons that they call decans, or ethereal gods.2 Three are attached to each superior god, and each demon commands inferior intelligences, which brings their number to 360.3 These demons 655 are not at all absorbed in contemplation, as is the supreme god;4 they act ceaselessly, and their activity is tireless.5 Some are pure and benevolent; they protect mortals, warn them, help them. Their head is Osiris, who, covered with a resplendent cloak, holds the mystical Phallus.6 The nature of the others is impure and malevolent; a serpent’s tail betrays their malignity.7 This is the race of giants defeated by Horus or Hercules, whose blood mixed with the earth produced the vine, a dangerous gift that puts in the veins of humans the blood of a criminal race, causing a deadly delirium.8 The head of these evil genii is Typhon. Because of a reason that we will explain in a moment, the notion of evil divinities, which is foreign to free polytheism, is always a part of priestly polytheism; once malevolent divinities are admitted, a certain tendency of our minds to see or produce symmetry institutes a hierarchy in the netherworld, as in heaven.

However, this demonology, which on one side is connected with the popular religion because of the ability attributed to the demons to protect or harm men, on the other side enters into the scientific doctrine by means of relations established between the demons and the stars and planets. To subject three of them to each of the twelve superior gods was to combine them with the twelve signs of the zodiac, and their number of three hundred and sixty is obviously an astronomical division; then, however, the denominations change. The head of the perverse intelligences is no longer Typhon but Serapis, the winter sun, cold and pale, and exercising only a malign influence.9

But this same Serapis returns by another route to attach himself to the popular religion. He is the god of the netherworld, he presides over the subterranean world at Amenthes, the abode of the souls that live an earthly life, but under the earth.10 Thus, as we have said in a preceding volume, popular superstition and the science of priests constantly touch; they constantly enter into each other, borrowing from one another, exchanging reciprocal developments, and they form two systems that are so united, so interlaced (even though many of their details are irreconcilable) that it is impossible, at any moment, not to run the risk of confusing them.

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It is the same with the demonology of the Persians. It has a hierarchy of good and evil genii who, independently of the rank they occupy in the public religion, have astronomical, cosmogonic, and metaphysical meanings. All the measures of time are personified. The Fervers, prototypical ideas11 conceived in the mind of the first being, become living creatures12 because the divine thought confers life. Men, stars, and animals all have their particular Fervers; they are the source of all purity, of all abundance, of all beauty. The limpid stream descends down the mountain to water the plain? A Ferver directs it. The trees are covered with fruit or foliage, the prairies with flowers, the fields with grass? It is the work of the Fervers, for which man must pray, and at the same time must constantly invoke. Opposed to the Fervers, the evil genii work their mischief.

The Indian demonology13 is little different from that of Egypt:14 Indra replaces Osiris, Moisazur, Typhon, and the Devatas or the Daints (numbering several million, with monstrous features),15 the subordinate demons. At the same time, Indra is the mistress of the firmament; beside her are the elements and the stars, slaves of her will.

The Hebrews, too, have their demonology, especially since the Babylonian captivity.16 Their angels resemble the Indian Devatas. This demonology was principally founded on the system of emanations. Aeons, immaterial substances parallel to the intermediate beings of the Orphic, Pythagorian, and Platonic schools, had come from God: their number was eleven, Aziloth their name. Three of these Aeons—wisdom, the world, and the spirit—had created the world and communicated the divine decrees to men.17

Independently, and above this demonology, half-learned, half-religious, another 657 inferior order was distinguished by all the priestly nations that has fewer relations with religion and none with science, but nonetheless owed its origin to the belief taught by the priests, and is their imitation, or better put: their parody. It is composed of those spirits of the air, rivers, woods, springs, mountains, and caverns, capricious beings whom Germany still designates under a thousand strange names, and which employ their limited power in playing childish games with human beings, frightening girls, misleading the traveller; they are more playful than evil, but malevolent when they are irritated. In India, they are the genii who live near the sources of the Bhagarati, and who, full of an ardent love for youth and beauty, entice adolescents of both sexes into their wild retreats. The victims seduced in this way become similar to their victimizers, whose hope is thus dashed. A child who played close to their abode fell in their trap by hearing the voice of his father, a restless shade separated from its body. Fatherly love, however, overcame the charm and the father obtained the freedom of his son at the price of a promise of total silence on the part of his son. This promise was violated and the indiscreet youth was deprived of speech; as late as a few years ago, this was cited as a powerful proof of the power of genii, the frightful guests of the banks and waves of the Bhagarati.18 Here one clearly sees priestly traditions lowering to the ranks of fairy-tales.

The ancient Gauls had an almost identical demonology.19

All these notions are foreign to independent polytheism. We will seek for them in vain in the true belief of the Greeks.20 It was only during its decadence that they reappeared under the name of magic, in order to serve as nourishment for the credulity that did not know where to put them.

Hesiod, who speaks of subordinate gods and of demons watching over men,21 had drawn from southern traditions these ideas that he confusedly lumped together without understanding them.22 Later, the philosophers, admirers of teachings 658 borrowed from the barbarians, took over their demonology in order to purify and refound polytheism, but they always acknowledged that they owed these purported improvements to foreigners.

Plutarch, who praises the Boeotian compiler for having distinguished the different intelligent natures that unite us to the gods,23 adds that he does not know if this sublime discovery was due to the magi and Zoroaster, to Thracians and Orpheus, to the Egyptians, or the Phrygians.24 For a long time the popular belief of the Greeks rejected these exotic additions, and if they were secondary gods at rather advanced periods of their polytheism, these gods, abandoned by the public worship and given over as it were to individual superstition, never formed anything more than an anarchic and incoherent mass, without order or goal, without consistency or hierarchy. They only had accidental relations with humans; they never had any with the inhabitants of Olympus. Their number was never fixed. Their existence was uncertain, and their multiplication was spontaneous and fortuitous, depending on the caprice of individuals.

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CHAPTER 4: On Malevolent Divinities

Among the conceptions of the primitive savage is that of malevolent gods.1 This conception is not the work of the religious sentiment, but of interest. Because man wants his gods to be useful to him, when they refuse he accuses them of wickedness. A fortiori he will consider those he suspects of being harmful to him as perverse beings. But as his knowledge progresses, he will set aside this idea; even anthropomorphism rejects it. The gods of anthropomorphism are a mixture of vices and virtues because they resemble man; they gradually improve. No one does good without some interest, but no one does evil for evil’s sake. There are none, therefore, whose special vocation, and constant inclination, is to harm the inferior species by whom they wish to be worshipped.

Moreover, as nature is better observed and the connection of facts is better grasped, good and evil, pleasure and pain, by turns the cause and the effect of one another, seem more closely tied; and to be explained, they do not require that one attribute them to two distinct and separate principles. As a consequence, we find no essentially wicked divinity in Greek polytheism.2

Plutarch insinuates that the inhabitants of certain countries of Greece recognized two opposite principles;3 but he supports this assertion with no fact; and he restricts it to a few provinces where this teaching could have been introduced 660 from abroad.4 Moreover, he writes at a period when the different genres of polytheism were no longer distinct. The teachings, divinities, and practices of all the peoples bent under the yoke of a despotic people mixed, blended together, and composed an indistinct mass. Finally, Plutarch, in the curious but inexact treatise in which this assertion is found, had explicitly proposed to discover the doctrine of the double principle in all religions, as well as in all systems of philosophy; this desire had to lead him to twist and distort the opinions he reported.

At first glance, one could believe that the Titans and the Giants, the hideous monsters who were the enemies of the gods, occupied among the Greeks the place of the Egyptian Typhon or Loki of the Scandinavians. But these monsters play no role in the national mythology; they have no relations with men; they are offered no worship. Nor did anyone establish ceremonies to insult them, as was the case in Egypt. Typhon, in Egyptian belief the god of evil, source of vice and moral stain, exercising his noxious influence both in the universe as a whole and over men, in Greece became a monster who was defeated by the gods.5

The infernal divinities of the Greeks no doubt had something sinister and somber. The likeness of ideas naturally attached threatening and lugubrious attributes to the beings who presided over destruction and death. The gods of the netherworld, said Euripides, rejoice at our misfortunes.6 Pluto was pleased at the sight of funeral objects, and during his feasts Greek and Roman women scratched their cheeks and bruised their bosoms.7 But these infernal gods did not act on earth at all, unless it was to punish some great crime (and even this was at a much later period), and they did not pursue mortals any more than the other gods did.

Hecate clearly is a foreign divinity;8 moreover, she ceased being malevolent 661 when, subject to the action of the Greek genius, she took on the traits and the name of Diana.

Priestly polytheism, where all notions, once they are received, are maintained intact, does not allow the intellect that it oppresses to repudiate anything of the inheritance of ignorant times. The worship of wicked divinities is perpetuated, and several causes contribute to its continuation.

First of all, it is very simple that the same god who in the astronomical system is the representative of the evening star, of the harsh season, or, in the cosmogony, of destruction, becomes the evil principle in the popular mythology.9

In the second place, the religions submitted to the priests have yet another difficulty to battle than does independent polytheism. The latter does not have to reconcile respect for the justice of the gods with the events that appear to accuse them of injustice. Once these divinities are recognized as vicious and imperfect, everything follows in the rest of the system. Man does not seek to know why the character of these gods is the way it is presented. He conceives it to be similar to his own and takes it as a given. But the priests who control the belief cannot admit any imperfection in the beings of whom they are the sole interpreters and 662 ministers.10 They commence by giving their cruel or capricious dispositions honorable names.11 Their unlimited severity is only an inflexible equity; their merciless jealousy is the care they owe to their own glory—a strange glory, at once insatiable and solicitous over minutiae, that prides itself on the misfortunes it imposes, and is fed by the tears it causes. But even this does not end the various objections.12 Calamities fall equally on the faithful and the impious. It therefore 663 would be dangerous to always see them as the punishment for some secret fault.13 What would the pontiff say who was struck with some painful infirmity at the foot of the altar, or struck by one of the accidents that fate, thanks to heaven, reserves to power as well as to weakness? One must therefore attribute another cause to evil than divine justice. The evil principle, or a class of gods who do evil by inclination, by their nature, provides a momentarily satisfactory explanation.

One can observe that the necessity of this hypothesis becomes more pressing as belief represents their gods as more sovereignly just and powerful. According to the necessary conclusions of human reason, the doctrine of the evil principle is the inevitable result of divine perfections carried to the highest point the intellect can conceive. This assertion is so true that when the philosophers of Greece were led by the progress of learning to reject the fables of the common mythology in order to purify the character of the gods they went in the direction of dualism. One cannot fail to recognize this tendency in the works of the Platonists. In his treatise on the origin of evil, Maximus of Tyre says that evils and ills cannot descend from heaven, where there are no perverse natures, but that, as for physical evil, it arises from an intrinsic imperfection of matter, and for moral evil, from a depravation inherent in the soul. This depravation is a species of evil principle.

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Independently of these causes that have their root in the intellect, local circumstances and particular events had to favor dualism. The priests considered the warriors who fought against them to be agents of the malevolent divinities. The peoples threatened by hordes greedy for pillage rather naturally conceived the same thought. They placed the kingdom of evil on their borders. A mysterious tree separated the two empires; it covered the netherworld with eternal shadows. The children of the day and the children of the night warily observed and attacked one another; and the latter, often defeated, nonetheless constantly renewed their sacrilegious aggressions.

The impurity attached to the union of the sexes14 probably introduced the doctrine of the evil principle into religion by yet another route. The woman is always its victim or its agent, and often both. Eve seduced our first father; the rape of Sita by Ravana, of Rukmini by Shishupala, in the two Indian epics, and of Kriemhild by a monster in the Nibelungen, display the woman, whether guilty or innocent, as the cause of war and carnage, and the fatal source of all human ills. The story of Pandora, and the subject of the Iliad itself, have been related (although by an interpretation that is lacking in solidity) to this teaching common to the priestly mythologies; to be sure, the Greek rhapsodes, like Hesiod, separated this tradition from the religious meaning, of which they were unaware.

These different causes make dualism a fundamental teaching in the religions subject to priests. As Loki is the evil principle among the Scandinavians,15 and Typhon among the Egyptians,16 two planets exercise a pernicious influence among the Chaldeans.17 Finally, the Gauls18 and the Germans,19 and at the other extremity of the globe, the Mexicans,20 revered wicked divinities. If the pantheism of 665 the Indians led them to confound the destructive force with the Supreme Being in the person of Shiva, they nonetheless made the evil principle a separate being, Moisasour, leader of the rebel angels, who led them into revolt, and who was cast with them into Onderah, the place of darkness;21 half of nature is subject to his empire.22

The idea of an evildoing divinity is not at all foreign to the Jewish religion,23 and Christianity itself, every time that it was badly understood, could not prevent itself from granting the evil principle an eminent place. Christians named it the prince of this world, the god of this seculum.24

The notions of the Persians are in this respect shrouded in obscurity. These obscurities owe to a cause we discussed above.25 The first polytheism of the Persians was not a priestly religion, and it did not admit divinities who were malevolent by their essence. This teaching came from Media with the magi called by Cyrus; but the magi’s teaching was not entirely adopted by the nation. Hence, one finds a striking contradiction among authors who were more and less contemporaries. Some—Plato, Herodotus, Xenophon—do not say a word about Persian dualism. Others, however—Eudoxus, a friend of Plato and companion during his travels,26 Aristotle, and Theopompus, the disciple of Isocrates—affirm it and discuss it in detail. The silence of Herodotus can be attributed to his excessive fear of indiscreetly discussing the mysteries; Xenophon’s by the fact that he knew only the public part of Persian religion; and Plato’s because he treated it only in passing. But with no historian of the Macedonian wars saying that the Persians in their defeats had attempted to pacify Arimanes, while Plutarch describes terrible sacrifices celebrated in his honor, this would lead us to believe that the doctrine of the evil principle remained for a long time foreign to the religion of the people and was reserved for the order of magi. Its gradual entrance into the public religion was shown by the growing hatred of certain noxious animals. Initially reserved to 666 the priestly order, as dualism became the common belief this hatred was communicated to all the classes.

After having proclaimed the existence of malevolent gods, the priesthood has need of reassuring man against this frightful creation of theirs. Hence came fables, promises, and solemn ceremonies.

The fables are always based on the same thought, which is essentially sacerdotal: the first virtue of man is submission. The gods give him over to the evil principle so that he will resign himself to their will. This is the dominant idea of the Book of Job, of the episode of Nala and Damayanti in the Mahabharata, and above all of the story of King Harischandra. Cast from the throne, this prince falls to the condition of a tchandala. He buries the dead, sweeps the ways—unclean tasks that only the pariahs undertake; his faithful companion, his beloved son, dies. His despair extracts not a single complaint, his confidence is not at all shaken; and after these trials, the gods steal him from the perverted power, granting him not only his crown but also the beloved objects whose loss had broken his heart.

Promises announce that the god of evil will be defeated, and that while awaiting the moment one can disarm him. Oromaze is to win a definitive victory, and until then Arimanes is contained by the imprecations of the magi.27 But the priests always let doubt and uncertainty hover over this mystery. No one knows, says the Edda, if Thor killed the great serpent.28 Typhon, bound in chains and tossed into a marsh where he is hidden, seeks the means of escape,29 and once already he has succeeded because of the imprudence of Isis.30 It is therefore necessary to constantly guard man from the malevolent divinity, and the precautions taken for the purpose are so many new supports of priestly power.

Nonetheless, one can see the resistance and efforts of the religious sentiment against a doctrine that afflicts and disorients it. It cannot admit the equality of the good and evil principles. It therefore seeks to give the former a supremacy that 667 dualism denies. Indra strikes with lightning the magnetic mountain, the work of evil genii, and from that come the aerolites that fall from the sky.31 To the good alone, the magi often say, belongs eternity. Evil is circumscribed in time and has only a transitory existence.32

But here appears a new difficulty. The eminently just and good being becomes the author of infernal malice. Since the latter is but its instrument,33 in good logic the agent, not the instrument, is responsible.

Expelled from this post, the religious sentiment takes over another where its defeat is less evident. The god whose boundless goodness it is pleased to conceive, as well as its power, cannot condemn any of its creatures to an endless misery. Thus, the evil principle must be harmonized with the benevolent principle.34 At the time 668 of the general resurrection, after burning metals will have purified Arimanes in their liquid fire, he will rise, purified of all his previous corruption; and praising the creative being and Oromaze, the longtime object of his envy, he will intone celestial hymns and pronounce the sacred words.35

Sometimes simple ceremonies tend to soften the harsh notion of the evil principle. As god of the subterranean world, of death, and of destruction, Serapis was merged with it. In order to disarm his malevolence, one would bring the sick into his temples and he was implored to spare them. Soon this practice suggested another idea, that he heal them. As a result, he became a benevolent god. It could have been the same with the Nile, a wicked divinity when, before the discovery of agriculture, his flooding was entirely harmful, and a protective god after this discovery, because he fertilized the cultivated earth.

Other times, the religious sentiment not being able to entirely remove perversity from the divine natures, preferred them being capricious rather than thoroughly wicked. See the Varuna of the Indians36 or the Vila of the Serbians, whose long hair and robes with a thousand folds float in the air, distributing roses but also bringing dark clouds together; she casts blood on the plains, sites of future battles, alternately helpful or harmful to lovers, revealing herself to young virgins in order to lead or mislead them.

The activity of the religious sentiment is thus quite manifest. It introduces modifications into the character of the malevolent gods, and inconsistencies, which mitigate their hostile inclinations; it points toward the time when these regenerated beings will be united to the appeased divinity. It thus wrests from the priesthood more or less limited concessions and places hope alongside discouragement, consolation next to terror.

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CHAPTER 5: Consequences of This Teaching in the Priestly Religions

The assumption of one or several malevolent divinities entails important consequences. These divinities, who are essentially hostile to man, work to make him not only miserable but also criminal. They surround him with traps, they lay ambushes for him, they trouble him by their seductions, they pervert him by their temptations. The Eternal, says the Shastabad, permits the rebellious debtahs to enter into this world in order to tempt the creatures that must be tested.1 Among the Egyptians, the souls that, instead of having purified themselves, were corrupted, inclined the new bodies in which they entered to evil.2

Greek mythology sometimes shows us gods instigating crimes, but for their personal interest, and in particular circumstances. The hypothesis of spirits who devote themselves to tempting man and leading him to evil out of the sole pleasure of corrupting him belongs exclusively to religions subject to priests. The demonology we have spoken of favors the development and extension of this view. The imagination must occupy itself with the beings it created. As long as man did not exist, says a theologian, the devil had nothing to do.3

This assumption influences morality in a harmful way. Man never knows if the movements of his heart, the élans of his soul, the activity of his spirit are not the suggestions of a malignant power. Science can be a criminal curiosity; the testimony 670 of a clear conscience can be condemnable pride,4 pity, a revolt against the decrees of Providence.

This threat hovers over the most innocent heads, and threatens the most correct of intentions. It is even more inevitable as the corrupting divinities are often clothed in pleasant forms. Mohammaya, perfidious illusion, is decked in the most attractive of features. The figure of Loki is full of grace. Even though Arimanes himself is hideous,5 Dsye, the evil genius who accompanies him, is an adolescent of unblemished beauty; and the brilliant colors of the serpent captivate the eyes, his eloquence charms the ears.6

In this doctrine everything is danger; everything is a trap on the part of the divinity itself. The best sentiments, the noblest passions are a source of doubts and of terrors. It belongs to the priesthood to calm the terror and to resolve the doubts.

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CHAPTER 6: On the Notion of an Original Fall1

Let man enter into himself, and he is informed of a double tendency and the constant struggle that goes on in his own heart, the theater of always-arising battles, of which he is both the surprised spectator and the miserable victim. It is in vain that he works to reestablish a harmony he is not destined to enjoy on earth. While he abandons himself to one of these discordant halves, he cannot impose silence on the other. Innocence succumbs to temptation, the guilty to remorse. The opposition of good and evil in the external world gave rise to the doctrine of the evil principle. The opposition of good and evil within man gave rise to the idea of a fall, of a transgression, of an original sin. We find traces of it in all the mythologies. They all speak of a fault whose stain is transmitted from the first individual of the human race to the present generation, or even of a crime that having preceded creation itself, explains our depravity and justifies our present misery.

However, it is only in the priestly religions that this hypothesis acquires importance and lasts.

This notion entered into the philosophical systems of the Greeks. The disciples of Orpheus, says Plato,2 call the body a prison, because the soul there is in a state 672 of punishment until it has expiated the faults it committed while in heaven; and the same view was received in the mysteries, marked with foreign doctrines. But in the public belief this opinion cannot be seen except in a few rather confused traces. The story of Pandora and that of the four ages of the world (whose idea was transported into Greece from the East)3 are not connected with the popular cult except by some traditions that in no way modify it. Expiations were not in use except for crimes directly committed by those who had to perform the expiation, and they had no connection with a previous crime, or a natural depravation. From the spectacle of the evils and ills of the human condition, the Greeks were only led to the jealousy and passions of the gods.

However, in all the climates where the theocratic empire was established early on,4 not being able to reconcile their sufferings with divine justice, men imagined an original offense, whether it was before the creation of our race,5 or transmitted by our first father to his unfortunate children,6 or committed by them in a previous life and in another sphere.7

Priests have a powerful interest in accrediting this notion. It motivates the purifications, penances, mysterious duties, and supererogatory rigors imposed on man by the god who placed him in this world, not as an innocent being who has a right to justice, but as a guilty party for whom misfortune is only a punishment. And the priesthood is the organ, the representative, of this vengeful divinity.

An hypothesis that seems even more strange, but which is explained by a penchant 673 in man that we have already often noted, that of attributing to the gods his own adventures, is the assumption of a fall incurred by the divinity itself because of a crime it would have committed. Seized by love for his own daughter Sarasvati, Brahma could not resist her charms, and subject to the reproaches of the Brahmins, his creatures, he abandoned the body he had defiled; or, according to another legend conveyed by the Puranas, filled with pride at his works, this creator god wanted to be the equal of the supreme god whose will he had worked; but he sank into matter, dragging all of creation with him into Naraka.8

The Ramayana and the Mahabharata are the development of this doctrine. Their basis is the incarnation of the divine principle, expiating his fault.

The hypothesis of an original fall is easily combined with metempsychosis. The passage of the soul into different bodies is a punishment, and we have already seen in our chapters on the composition of priestly polytheism in Egypt and India the path that souls punished in this way took in order to atone for their crimes and regain heaven.9

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CHAPTER 7: On a Mediating God

Given over without any defense to the capricious and malevolent action of beings who take pleasure in harming him, the victim of ambushes laid for him by superior intelligences seeking to deceive and corrupt him, or vitiated in his nature by an original fault whose crime was attributed to him, and whose punishment was imposed on him, man would fall into despair if he did not cleave to a teaching by which he could reconnect with the divinity. The priesthood who created the evil because it was in their interest also senses that it is in their interest to provide the remedy. A new combination offers itself to them and they put it to work. A supernatural mediation reconciles heaven and earth. Among all the peoples subject to priests we encounter mediating gods. Fohi fulfills this function in the ancient Chinese religion,1 Mithra in that of the Persians.2 Several incarnations occupy the same place in the mythology of the Indians; and even though the North is naturally little inclined to refinements of this nature, Thor is sometimes considered a mediator between the divine and the human race.3

Greek polytheism admits subaltern gods, but not mediating gods, properly speaking. A lost tragedy whose main idea is known to us, Prometheus Unbound by 675 Aeschylus, contains in certain respects the notion of a mediating god. Hercules, son of Jupiter and liberator of Prometheus, reconciling the immortals and the terrestrial race, is an intermediary rather similar to those of several priestly religions. But Aeschylus had borrowed his traditions concerning Prometheus from sources foreign to Greek religion, whether by country or date.4

676

CHAPTER 8: On Triple or Ternary Divinities

These different notions, encouraged and saved by the priesthood, have probably given rise in almost all the religions they have dominated to those triple or ternary divinities that are placed at the head of the supernatural hierarchy.1

Among the Indians, this notion is reproduced under a host of different forms. The three letters of their mystical word correspond to their three gods, Brahma who creates, Vishnu who preserves, and Shiva who destroys.2 The one whose name is unknown to us, say the Vedas, awakens and contemplates the world enclosed in his bosom. He wishes to project it outside himself; his will is love,3 and the Trimurti is composed of God, love, and the world. Other times, it is fire, product of the eternal being, who is all light; the water that engenders fire; and the earth that rises above the surface of the waters;4 or the fire, the terrestrial globe, and the air, in which Prajapati, master of everything that was created,5 resides, and the trident of Shiva is the emblem of this triple energy.6 Finally, the secondary divinities themselves are sometimes included in the Trimurti. The Puranas reveal to us the triple nature of Sweta-Devi, the white goddess; and Kumari, the divine virgin, was born on Mount Kailash of the reunion of three gods.7 Among the Persians, Oromaze 677 is Brahma, Mithra is Vishnu, and Arimanes is Shiva, and Mithra, whom we have seen is the mediator, absorbs the other two in his triple essence.8 In Phoenicia, it is light, fire, and flame; in Tibet, the supreme god, the divine law, and the universe created by this god and coordinated by this law;9 in Egypt, intelligence, the world, and the image of the world, Amun, Phat, and Osiris.10 The tripod, transmitted to the Chinese by obscure traditions as the object of their oldest worship, presents a Trinity composed of the principles of good and evil and a mediator who converts one and pacifies the other.11

All these almost identical forms, despite the diversity of names, are means, sometimes of eluding the immutability of the first being, who is inaccessible to our desires and for whom mediation is necessary, sometimes to counterbalance the perversity of malignant natures by opposing a power that intervenes and intercedes for us to them, sometimes raising us from our own fall by means of a protector who pays for that fall on our behalf and for our salvation.

The triple gods then combine into a single one,12 because the religious sentiment is pleased with unity and because meditation leads the spirit toward pantheism.

Taken strictly, as its author intended, the Law of Moses appears to offer no trace of a trinity; however, an analogous idea was introduced to the Hebrews by their demonology.13

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The public polytheism of Greece did not know any of these subtleties; its gods sufficed as long as it could improve them. When it arrived at the final limit of their possible improvement, it collapsed with them, without taking in the foreign conceptions that its priests appealed to in order to shore up a ruined belief, and which even its philosophers had sometimes adopted as a solution to insoluble questions.

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CHAPTER 9: On the Doctrine of the Destruction of the World

We saw in our second book1 the effect that the memory of physical calamities and upheavals of nature produces on the religious notions of the savage. This effect is prolonged among civilized peoples. Everywhere, there are festivals—whether public or secret, horrifying rituals or mysterious commemorations—that recall these terrifying catastrophes. But here too appears a difference between the cults independent of priests and those the priesthood has fashioned. The first only preserved confused traces of these convulsions, disguised by ceremonies whose meaning was hidden.2 Legislators attempted to turn minds from the useless terror of an inevitable danger. On the contrary, nations governed by the priesthood have seemed to take a sad pleasure in augmenting these lugubrious souvenirs; they have often connected them to malevolent divinities whom they taught men to fear. Their rituals were at once commemorative of former misfortunes and prophetic of new ones. Their feasts announced the return of terrible events, whose memory they perpetuated. All their mythologies depict gods resisting destructive force, but only by constant efforts and ruses, destined to fail sooner or later.

The scientific and metaphysical portions of the priestly religions give the priests a great advantage in this regard.3 The learning and knowledge of which they are 680 the sole proprietors, their astronomical calculations and observations of natural phenomena, a study they reserve exclusively to themselves, allow them to connect the revolutions they predict either to the return of these phenomena or the course of the stars; their philosophy then inserts itself, and pantheism (which is its final stage) combines the destruction of the world with the infinite being—motionless, unseen, inactive—that they have placed above all the visible and active gods.4

At the end of 12,000 divine years, which are equal to 4,390,000 of our years, and which make but a day of Brahma, this god fell asleep and everything that he created disappeared. On waking, he created all things once again; but at the end of a hundred years he died, and his death was followed by the destruction of all the beings.5 Thick darkness enveloped the globe. Vishnu alone remained as a resplendent point in space. The seas covered the three worlds. The white horse that carried the tenth incarnation put its fourth hoof on the earth, and the weight cast the dwelling of men into the abyss. The tortoise that held it up withdrew. The serpent with a thousand heads, Adiseshan, belched out flames that reduced everything to ashes. Shiva puts aside his various forms and rages like a living flame over the ruins of the broken world.6

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Among the Burmese, a mysterious being descends to earth; its black apparel floats in the air; its hair is thick; it utters sharp cries in a trembling voice. Torrents of rain swell the seas and the lakes. Then a terrible dryness follows these inundations. Plants wither, the earth opens. Men fight one another, but without motive or end. Two suns dart burning fires on the globe. The last tree perishes, totally withered. A third sun dries up the rivers; a fourth and a fifth the seas and the Ocean; a sixth causes bolts of flame to emerge from the abyss; a seventh consumes the dwellings of gods and men, and finally is itself extinguished, lacking the wherewithal to fuel it.7

Mexicans also recognize four ages of the world: the first ended by a flood, the second by an earthquake, the third by a windstorm, and the end of the fourth is not far-off. In this expectation, when each century ended (or each period of fifty-two years), they extinguished all fires in temples and houses, and broke furniture and vessels. Bearing the attributes of their gods, the priests went to a high mountain and declared to the standers-by that all the divinities had left the city, perhaps never to return; but in order to know the divine intentions, they were going to try to reignite the fires they had extinguished. Women and children covered their faces with aloe leaves, and the multitude fixed anxious eyes upon the torch that held their destiny. At the moment when the flame appeared, cries of joy hailed the gods, thanking them for the mercy they had shown to men.8 According to Tibetans, the duration of the world was divided into ninety-nine periods. Seven fires, followed by a flood, were repeated seven times, and at the last catastrophe poisoned arrows filled space; the wellsprings of the universe were broken, and all beings became the prey of nothingness.9

The universal fire of the Egyptians was to take place every three thousand years, at the vernal or autumnal equinox. In place of the fruitful floods came a deluge of fire. The entire world was subject to flame, and the sacred land of Hermes vanished in smoke; but this was less a destruction than a renewal of nature. At the solstice of the following summer, with the sun being in Leo, the moon at its right in Cancer, the planets in their respective places, and Aries in the midst of the firmament, 682 Sothis reappeared and saluted the new order of things at its dawning and the new times that began. A solemn feast recalled and announced these revolutions. In them, flocks and trees were painted the color of blood; this color expressed the extreme heat that was to devour everything.10

The sacred books of the North are filled with no less lamentable descriptions. The twilight of the gods,11 says the Voluspa, will begin with three terrible winters12 that no spring, no summer, will interrupt. Old and decrepit, nature will oppose only a feeble resistance to the forces that conspire for its ruin. All the elements will transgress their boundaries. A monster raised by a magician who is the enemy of humankind will emerge from the forest in which he lives; impetuous winds will sigh on all sides. Flapping its black wings, the prophetic cock will answer the echoes with his sinister cries. Night will cover the rainbow, the mysterious bridge between heaven and earth. Surtr, the king of fire, will come from the south with his invincible cohorts. He will be mounted on a steed whose nostrils will emit flames. The funeral vessel13 that ever since Hela14 assumed her reign is slowly built by the bones of her victims, will head to the east, guided by the giant that serves as its pilot;15 there it receives the genii who are impatient to complete the great work of destruction. Loki and Garmr, the Cerberus of the North, will join the children of Galea. The wolf Fenris has broken his chains. The serpent Mitgard rises like a dark phantom, emerges from the waves, and slithers on the bank. Trembling on their foundations, the mountains hit one another with a terrible cracking. The sun pales, the earth sinks. Surtr approaches, the sky cracks. The companions of Surtr advance to the immense plain dominated by the citadel of the gods. Heimdall16 blows a horn at the top of the tower. At the entrance of their caves, the Nains weep and shed tears. Men die in large numbers, and the eagle devours them while uttering joyful cries. The gods take up their arms; the heroes that Odin assembled in Valhalla go forth and pass in review. On his head is a helmet of gold; his body 683 is covered with sparkling armor. He brandishes his spear, until then always victorious; but he knows the decrees of fate. His defeat is inevitable. He will fight no less valiantly. Fenris opens his enormous mouth. The serpent spits huge streams of venom. Thor gives him a mortal blow; but he swallows his vanquisher and suffocates him. Frey succumbs to the blows of Surtr. The dog Garmr and the god Tyr destroy one another. Fenris devours Odin and falls beneath the sword of Vidar. Loki and Heimdall kill one another. The end of the ages is fulfilled. The unknown god pronounces his decrees. Separated, the good and the evil will live in different dwellings in the future.17 A new earth will rise from the midst of the waves; a young couple, children of the sun, will repopulate it. While withdrawing, the eagle will carry to the peaks of mountains fish cast up by the storm. The gods will build a resplendent palace where henceforth their felicity will be unbroken, and Loki will foreswear his revolt and identify with the infinite being.

No doubt our readers will notice that in this picture all the priestly ideas are brought together: the supreme god different from the active gods, the struggle of malevolent powers against the preserving force, the introduction of mortality, the division of the dead into two classes, finally, the defeat and conversion of the evil principle.

Everywhere, the same doctrines and the same descriptions are reproduced. The Persians expected a universal fire.18 A general flood was announced by the Druids.19 The prophecy of a similar event contained in the Yî-King is probably a remnant of the priestly cult that existed formerly in China. The passages relative to this catastrophe in Christian writings are well known:20 more than once the Church has renewed these somber predictions, and the power or the wealth of priests has always profited from them. What is more likely to give religious terrors an unlimited ascendancy than the permanent expectation of a terrible upheaval that will cause all earthly interests to disappear? The approach of death ordinarily leads individuals to devotion. The dogma of the destruction of the world maintains the entire species in a long agony.

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CHAPTER 10: On the Phallus, the Lingam, and Hermaphroditic Deities1

Finally, in the priestly religions we encounter a class of gods who seem strange, even bizarre to us, and who by degrees will become revolting and scandalous, but with which the independent religions are only sullied, as it were, in their secret rites, rejecting them in their public rituals. We speak of the Phallus, the Lingam, and the hermaphroditic divinities.

First, recall that from the most remote times we have seen priests place a secret doctrine in the religions they take over, where they deposit their cosmogonies, which are expressed in symbols. Recall too that these symbols were most often borrowed from the notion of engendering, of being born, applied to the productive force and to the world it created. What is more natural than to seek the image of this force in the generative organs?

The union of the sexes has to attract the utmost attention of man as soon as he reflects upon himself. It is by it that, on one hand, he belongs to previous generations, and, on the other hand, that he connects with future ones. He ceases to exist in isolation; he removes a part of his being from the ravages of time and takes possession of eternity. But everything that pertains to the union of the sexes is enigmatic and inexplicable. This complete forgetting of our individuality, which otherwise is so pronounced and dominant, this momentary overturning of all the barriers that always separate us from others, and which makes each one of us his 685 own center and proper aim; this mixture of moral affection and physical ecstasy, this suspension or confusion of all our faculties, this imperious, boundless love for the most vivid yet briefest of our pleasures, everything makes the union of the sexes the great mystery of nature. It required the corruption of society to disenchant and degrade this mystery.

It is not astonishing, therefore, that the priests of ancient peoples who were strangers to this effect of civilization took the union of the sexes as the symbol of what they imagined concerning the origin of this universe. Hence the worship of androgynous gods.2

Aphrodite3 and Adonis4 of Syria; Adogous, revered by the Phrygians;5 in Egypt, Phat and Neith;6 in Persia, Urania Mithra;7 Freyr, hermaphrodite, in his temple of Upsal;8 Chenrezi in Tibet;9 in India, Ishvara, who, passionately in love with the 686 beautiful Parvati, gave her half of his body and from this time on was half male and half female;10 Brahma, whose statue, male on one side and female on the other, was described by Porphyry;11 Shiva,12 who in one incarnation is one with Vishnu, becomes his wife named Ardhanari,13 or Ardhanarishvara;14 Rahula, son of Buddha, passing from one sex to the other several times a month because of an imprecation; Ila, daughter of Manu and wife of Buddha, first a young hunter, then transformed into a girl by Shiva, under the name of Savitri15; the Gayatri, an ineffable prayer by which a husband becomes a wife, as in the Scandinavian tale recounted above;16 Krishna, who declares himself to be both the father and the mother of all that exists;17 Vishnu, to whom a division of his followers18 attribute this double quality; elements like the fire in the Zend books, the moon in several nations of Asia;19 all these objects of worship combine the two sexes.20 As a consequence of this symbolic notion, priests change vestments and put on the clothes of women in the ceremonies established in honor of these gods in order to express their double nature.21

But a much more common symbol, because it is simpler and easier to explain to the people, was the separate generative organ.22 Thus we everywhere encounter 687 the Phallus,23 or the Lingam,24 sometimes adored alone under a monstrous form, sometimes combined with the statues of gods, animals, and stones.25

At the beginning, this worship contained no indecent idea. In Indian fables there are traits of modesty strangely associated with the homage rendered to the symbols that wound our gaze and run counter to our habits. The Brahmins of the temple at Perwattum recount that a woman having approached the Lingam nude in order to worship it, an arm emerged from it to repel her, and a voice was heard that forbade her from presenting herself to the gods in this immodest condition.26 But as the simplicity of mores disappeared, the cult of the Lingam and the Phallus had to further shock the more refined ideas of modesty and shame that came with the development of social life; thus, it was rejected by the peoples whose independent institutions were not characterized by stasis. Not only did the Greek philosophers, notably Heraclitus and Xenophon, always reject the cult of Phallus,27 688 but the public religion did not admit either this cult or androgynous divinities.28 Adonis, hermaphrodite among the Syrians, in Greece was only a handsome young man.29 It was different in the mystery cults. The androgynous Eros;30 Misé, male and female; Minerva;31 the moon;32 Bacchus;33 the Cabiri,34 who, as we have seen, were the connecting point of all the priestly teachings, appear in this secret worship with the attributes of both sexes. The Orphic hymns celebrate them, the author of the Argonautica sings of them,35 and Plato, whose fertile imagination took hold of everything in order to purify it, drew from it the subject of an allegory. But the Phallus carried in pomp in orgies rarely profaned the public temples; neither the hymns of Pindar nor the choruses of Sophocles ever celebrated this hideous idol; neither the brush of Apelles nor the chisel of Phidias ever offered it to the gaze of the Greeks. The priesthood, on the contrary, combined this inheritance of ancient times with a principle we will treat shortly and made it an instrument to control, in two ways, the inclinations of man.

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BOOK XI: ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF PRIESTLY RELIGIONS

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CHAPTER 1: Exposition of This Principle

Up to this point, the differences we have noticed between the two species of polytheism are only partial; it is time to go back to the principle that makes these two beliefs two entirely different systems. In order to discover this principle, we have to take up again an idea we have already dealt with, but now we are required to develop all of its consequences.

The notion of sacrifice, we said in our first volume,1 is inseparable from religion. Initially exempt from any and all refinement, this notion leads man to share with his idols everything that is agreeable or useful to him in this life. If, as civilization progresses, man possesses more precious items and offers his gods a portion of them, it is always on the basis of the assumption that they have need of them, and that they really use the things he consecrates to them, just as he himself uses the part that he retains for himself. But with the advent of a form of civilization that we could call material, a moral civilization is also introduced. The notions concerning the divine nature are modified and purified: man rises to less crude ideas; he no longer supposes that the beings he adores have physical needs similar to his own; he conceives of them as all-powerful, he cannot offer them anything that does not already in fact and in justice belong to them. They are beyond him; they have their felicity, pleasures, and enjoyments totally apart from him.2 Then, sacrifice shows itself to the human spirit under a new point of view: it is no longer meritorious because of the intrinsic value of the offerings; it can only be meritorious as the witness of his submission, devotion, and respect.3

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In the independent religions, this manner of conceiving sacrifice only has advantages. Man concludes from it that the gods attach more value to the interior disposition of those who surround their altars than to the number of victims. Morality profits from this nobler, more elevated appreciation; ceremonies lose their importance; virtue, purity of heart, the triumph over vicious inclinations or imperious passions, become the best means of obtaining celestial favor and protection. It was this teaching that the polytheism of Greece endorsed in the succession of writers following the Homeric period, whether they were historians or philosophers, prose writers or poets.

But the priesthood has its particular logic, which, by supplanting that of the human mind, knows how to profit from the latter’s errors and accredit itself by means of its aberrations. From the belief that the gods—endowed with unlimited power, unlimited perfection, and unalterable felicity4—have no need of men, their ministers do not conclude that ceremonies are superfluous and that virtues suffice. They conclude that these sacrifices have no merit except in virtue of what they cost those who offer them; therefore, one must refine the pain and suffering they cause in order to increase their merit. This is the dominant principle of priestly cults; and every enlightened mind should easily foresee its consequences. First of all, it imposes on man the renunciation of what he has that is most precious; soon it prescribes the sacrifice of what these affections hold most dear; it then imposes a duty to painfully resist his most imperious and legitimate inclinations; finally, it condemns him to violate what is most sacred in the virtues themselves. Then, by a deplorable necessary development, follow human sacrifices, an exaggerated continence that causes nature itself to suffer, licentious rituals that offend modesty, fastings, penances, mutilations, voluntary tortures, suicide, and injurious homages lavished by delirious men on gods they insult while believing they honor them.

To be sure, there was never a more striking example of wholly contrary consequences of the same principle than when intelligence discovers and develops 693 it in freedom, and when a caste takes hold of it and makes it an instrument of power. The priesthood of antiquity even turned man’s own progress against him. What makes religion purer, more disinterested, more sublime when it remains free, served those who called themselves its ministers to stain it with the most barbarous ferocity, the most revolting debauchery. As crude as it was, Homeric polytheism is a thousand times better than the much-vaunted cults of the eastern and southern nations. Egoistic, proud, passionate gods demanding worship that flatters their vanity and victims that stimulate their senses still leave the moral part of man free. The priestly religions violate this sanctuary, make the religious sentiment their slave and accomplice; and what is purest in this sentiment, the need to sacrifice to what it adores, is transformed in the hands of priests into a cause of delirium, brutalization, and cruelty.

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CHAPTER 2: On Human Sacrifices

In our second book,1 we put forth the principal causes that introduced the horrible practice of human sacrifices among all peoples;2 we repeat: among all peoples, be they civilized or savage, ancient or modern (if we class among the moderns those among whom Christianity, to whom we owe the abolition of these terrifying ceremonies,3 made inroads only a long time after its triumph in the civilized West and East). But, just as we said in the same chapter,4 these sacrifices rapidly fell into disuse in the countries independent of priests, while they were perpetuated where the priesthood exercised its empire.5 A succinct exposition of incontestable facts will convince us of this important truth.

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The Mexicans immolated prisoners, women, and slaves.6 The Gauls honored in the same manner Teutates, Taranis, and their Mercury, whom they named Hesus.7 The Scandinavians dedicated to Odin those whom the fate of battle delivered to them.8 When they celebrated the memory of heroes, they informed their manes by envoys put to death on their tombs.9 This was done by lot, and kings themselves were not exempt.10 At the time of the Romans, the forests of Germany were an object of fear for travelers, whose sight was constantly struck by trees covered in blood and skeletons hanging from branches.11 The inhabitants of Sicily appeased 696 the Palici, sons of a nymph and Jupiter, by similar offerings.12 Diodorus tells us that Hamilcar, following a Carthaginian custom, when besieging Agrigentum sacrificed a child to Saturn.13 To the present day, the Chinese cast their children in rivers in honor of the spirit of the river.14 At Tonkin, they are poisoned;15 in Laos, they are buried.16 The Phoenicians practiced no less barbarous rites.17 In their invasion of Greece, the Persians buried alive nine young men and nine young women; and the queen Amestris, come to a very old age, put to death in the same way fourteen shoots of the most honored families as a sign and act of thanksgiving to the infernal gods.18

In the ruins of Persepolis one sees bound figures ready to receive the mortal blow.19 The Ethiopians immolated men in honor of the sun and the moon,20 697 the Egyptians out of hatred for Typhon; and the bas-reliefs of their temples represented these cruel practices in various symbols.21

The pleasure experienced by the divinity at the sacrifice of a turtle lasts only one month, say the Indians; the one who receives the sacrifice of a crocodile, three months; a human sacrifice causes a pleasure that lasts a thousand years; three human victims, a hundred thousand years. The chapter on blood of the Kalika Purana contains quite lengthy precepts concerning the rituals to observe,22 and the sculptures of Elephanta, near Bombay, trace their images.23

In Araby, the tribe of the Koreishities sacrificed young girls to its divinity Alura, and the Dumatians, an adolescent at the beginning of the year.24 A captive king was slaughtered with religious pomp by the chief of the Sarrasins whom the Romans took as auxiliaries.25 The father of Mohammed himself had been bound to 698 this sort of death, and a hundred camels had purchased his release.26 Finally, in order to shorten this list of terrible incidents, in a few words: among the Scythians, captives;27 among the Taures, all foreigners;28 among the Herules, the aged;29 among the Thracians, virgins;30 among the Frissons, infants perished at the foot of the altars;31 the one who offered sacrifice among the Sarmatians drank the blood of victims;32 and the same horrors were found among the Bretons33 and the Spanish.34

Now, let us turn our gaze to Greece. In the most ancient times, no doubt, we will see its inhabitants give themselves, like all other peoples, to the abominable practices that we just described. We will not speak here of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, or that of the daughters of Erechteus by their own father. These events, which go back to the mythological period of the Greeks’ annals, could be dismissed by being placed in the ranks of fables;35 but it is certain that the Arcadians and the 699 tribes of Achaia put men to death on the altars of Jupiter36 and Diana.37 During the most remote centuries of Athens, a man and a woman were sacrificed at the time of the city’s expiation.38 In the first times of Sparta, the Lacedaemonians put to death children and prisoners of war.39 This was the fate of the three hundred Messenians fallen into shackles. The Argiens, masters of Mycenae, offered a tenth of their captives to the gods.40 These facts are, unfortunately, incontestable. But it is equally demonstrated that the Greeks early-on rejected these barbarous practices, and always held them in horror. To be sure, the stubborn persistence of ancient superstitions constrained them to commit them from time to time in difficult circumstances. Thus, the soothsayer Euphrantides forced Themistocles to shed the blood of three young princes on the altar of the Omestes Bacchus,41 relatives of the king of Persia who had fallen into Greek hands on the eve of the battle of Salamis.42 But Themistocles resisted the orders of the bloody prophet for a long while, and it was only so as not to cast his soldiers into dark despair that he, with regret, permitted this horrible execution. Human sacrifices continued in Arcadia longer than in other countries of Greece.43 Greek civilization surrounded Arcadia and yet did not enter into it. Several traces of the religion of the first Pelasgians were preserved there. In the rest of Greece, the divinities whose worship demanded human sacrifices had foreign origins. The bloody rituals of Saturn had been brought by the Phoenicians.44 We have seen that Diana had the form of the priestly divinities;45 she had crossed the earth with the head of a bull.46 By their own account, the Lacedaemonians had borrowed her from Tauris,47 and the first result of her appearance 700 had been a frenzy that had stirred fierce combats and countless murders. Everyone who had approached her became furiously enraged, so much did she frighten the imaginations of those not accustomed to these monstrous forms or these revolting ceremonies.48

Pausanias recounts in great detail how human sacrifices were established in Arcadia, and how they were abolished there.49 The tradition that attributes their origin to the loves of Menalippus and Cometho, and the adventure of Eurypyle that brought them to an end by bringing a statue of Bacchus from Troy, are irrelevant to our subject. What does interest us is that they ceased almost entirely at the return of the Greeks from the siege of Troy; which is to say, from the first times of their history. The same Pausanias, speaking of the Lycaon who immolated an infant to Jupiter Lycaeus, adds that in the middle of the ceremony this guilty prince was changed into a wolf.50 The Greeks therefore believed that their gods were unworthy of such barbarous rites.

It is not entirely implausible that the eighth labor of Hercules, causing Diomedes, king of Thrace, to be eaten by the horses that this prince fed with the flesh of strangers, is a garbled tradition of the abolition of these sacrifices.

In truth, however, it rests on an anachronism because it links this abolition, which for Lacedaemonia only dates to the time of Lycurgus, to a much more remote period. But this anachronism only better demonstrates the desire the Greeks had to cast into a legendary antiquity rituals that they were ashamed their ancestors performed.51

All the sacrifices that from time to time are encountered in Greek history are explained by national hatreds, by pressing dangers, in a word, by circumstances that 701 departed from the habitual.52 Everything demonstrates that it was not a sanctioned institution but rather sometimes a deplorable imitation of foreign practices, sometimes a sudden and momentary flight of fanaticism. The horror of the Greeks for these customs shines in all the narratives of their historians. Menelaus is blamed by Herodotus for having offered two Egyptian children to the contrary winds.53 Agesilaus is praised by Plutarch for having offered a doe to Diana rather than a virgin, even though the inhabitants maintained that the goddess demanded humans and not animals.54 The signs having been threatening before the battle of Leuctra, the soothsayers of Thebes proposed to Pelopidas to appease the gods by human victims; he, however, rejected their counsel.55 Everywhere, the Greeks substituted less bloody rituals for these practices. The children of Achaia went to the banks of a river dressed as victims and laid at the feet of Diana crowns of hair that decorated their heads.56 At Sparta, young men were struck with rods on the altar of the same goddess, who, they said, being accustomed to bloody homages, wanted to preserve at least a pale image of them.57

Other tribes of the Doric race reddened the tomb of Pelops with a small amount of blood.58 Bacchus had approved that the Thebans would replace the human victim they had previously offered59 with a goat, and we would not be far wrong to recognize a softening of the same nature in the annual ceremony of Leucadia, where a man was cast from the height of a promontory, but was saved by attaching wings to him and preparing boats for his landing.60

We see among the Greeks, as well as the Romans, acts of voluntary devotion that are falsely likened to human sacrifices. When Epimenides purified Athens, Cratinus, the handsomest of the youth, offered himself to redeem by his blood the 702 faults of his fellow citizens;61 Pausanias, the general of the Spartans,62 obliged his warriors to remain motionless until Callicratidas had perished. Thrasybulus ordered the Athenians to wait for one of theirs to perish before attacking the Thirty Tyrants.63 Codrus had himself killed for the salvation of his people. Two Lacedaemonians offered themselves to be handed over to Xerxes as expiation for the assassination of the envoys of Darius by the Greeks.64 At Rome, Curtius cast himself into an abyss,65 and Decius called upon his own head the dangers with which the republic was threatened.66

But these acts of devotion are the accidental and spontaneous effects of a patriotism worthy of admiration even in its excesses, the heroic and voluntary act of an enthusiasm carried to an excess by extreme danger to the republic. There are no victims dragged to the altar following a regular custom, or a duty whose fulfillment was part of the legal worship.

On the contrary, among the Gauls, who were subject to priests, these sacrifices were always maintained despite the severity of Roman laws forbidding them.67 In perpetuating them, the Druids profited from the independence given to the subjugated peoples by the civil wars.68

This custom was prolonged among the Franks and the Goths until the eighth century,69 and what is even more horrible—but undeniably attested to—Christians sold them their slaves to be sacrificed.70 Even until our days, despite the efforts of the English conquerors, the Indians cast into the Ganges men who are devoured by sharks. Families greedy for posterity commit themselves to give back to the gods in this way a fifth of the children granted them; and European sailors have recently seen pitiless parents push back into the water a young boy who saved 703 himself by swimming.71 It seems to us that one must conclude from these facts that, even though human sacrifices have had causes other than the priesthood’s calculations, it was always in the mind and interest of the priests to introduce these sacrifices where they did not exist and to maintain them where they did.

First of all, as we have already proved, the priesthood does not renounce any ancient custom. In the second place, the priests to whom the task of designating the victims was naturally confided found themselves thereby invested with the right over life and death; we have already noted this.72 They could designate the sovereign on his throne,73 the victorious general in the midst of his army. One can easily conceive the advantage that results from such a right. What indicates both the priestly calculation in this regard and its influence is that ordinarily it placed itself out of harm’s way by a special exception. “Let no Brahmin offer his own blood,” says the Kalika Purana. “One must never sacrifice a Brahmin or the son of a Brahmin.”74 To be sure, great calamities sometimes triumphed over this privilege. In times of war, pestilence, or famine, the Indians, following the very principle that we are discussing here, chose to sacrifice Brahmins as the most precious of victims.75

The scientific and cosmogonic allegories that appear at first glance to be profound and imposing have contributed (and this has not been noticed enough) to the prolongation of human sacrifices; those that connect to the forces of nature, to the creative or destructive power, have frequently united these two forces in a single divinity.76 Then, in order to express this combination, homicide has become 704 a symbol. Thus, despite the simplicity of its origin,77 the cult of the Lingam has produced everywhere not only obscenity but murder.78 In the Greek fables, Medea resuscitating Aeson by making him boil in a cauldron, which recalls that of the Breton bards;79 in the mysteries, the rites that commemorate the slaughter of Bacchus and Camilla;80 in India, the legend of Shiva, who cuts in pieces his spouse Sati and scatters her torn members, are an offering of life to the mysterious power that alternately gives life and death. This is rebirth by sacrifice.

Another dogma that could motivate these frightful rituals was that of the original fall.81 What is more simple, when one conceives man as being guilty before his birth, than to offer this guilty party to the vengeful divinity as expiation?82

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Sometimes a simple likeness in words, or a deplorable desire to imitate, have equally noxious results: Hercules, representing the year, devoured his children, the months and the days. Carthaginians and Tyrians offered him theirs as a holocaust.

But the principle that we have pointed out as essential to priestly religions had to favor the prolongation of these rituals more than any other cause. Among almost all peoples, this principle led the most fiercely pious parents to bring their children to the altar. The more the paternal heart was broken, the more value the offering possessed. Haquin, king of Norway,83 and Dag, the eleventh successor of Odin,84 immolated their sons. Aun the ancient85 offered nine of his to the sacred knife in order to obtain a longer life.86

An evident proof of the importance the priesthood attached to these practices is that it always associated them with knowledge of the future. The Druids judged future things as much by the fall of victims as by the palpitations of their members and the flow of their blood.87 The Peruvians multiplied their number until the signs were favorable to them.88 The Cimbri dissected them in order to read 706 their entrails.89 The Lusitanians trampled them underfoot in order to provoke prophetic convulsions.90 The Scythians smeared their blood over a sword, and fate was made known by the way in which the blood ran.91 In this way, agony had mysterious significance, and curiosity become ferocious armed itself against nature.92

We will not deny that in all these countries human sacrifices tended to become milder;93 no power can successfully resist the necessary march of the human spirit. Interest and pity combine against a barbarous custom, and even in priestly religions it gradually fell into disuse. At the time of the conquest of America, the Peruvians had renounced it.94 They were content to draw a little blood from the forehead of children, which they smeared over the wheat they used to make cakes, which were distributed in a solemn manner to the people. The Syrians had substituted a doe for the virgin they previously sacrificed.95 The tradition of the Guebres recounts that the Persians presented their sons to the sacred fire; this ceremony recalls the victims burned in honor of the gods.96 The king of Egypt, Ahmose, ordered that waxen idols be cast into a furnace.97

The Egyptians preserved the custom of delivering to the Nile an image of a 707 virgin on the day when the dam was opened to facilitate flooding.98 The majority of the reformers of the Indian religion disapproved of human sacrifices.99 In the Ramayana, Ombourischa wants to offer one: Indra saves the victim.100 The Brahmins made use of straw-figures, and then continued the ceremony as if they were immolating living beings.101

Thus, the priestly power, despite itself, bends before the work of nature and time; but not without obstinate resistance to these two adversaries, nor without winning several victories over them. It was in vain that a king of Mexico102 prohibited human sacrifices; he was constrained to reestablish them, and all that he really achieved was to limit them to prisoners of war. In vain, the people asked Centeotl103 to deliver them from these cruel rituals. The goddess promised, but the priests delayed the accomplishment of her promises. Despite the laws of Ahmose, Egptians offered humans as victims for a long time. Despite the Indian reformers, and despite the authority of incarnations, the Ganges today still swallows infants and women; and the priesthood profits from all these circumstances to fight against the innovations that hamper it and to reestablish the rituals of antiquity. The relaxation is only momentary. As soon as people, no matter how miserable they are from being subject to the priestly empire, experience some reverse or an extraordinary phenomenon frightens them, this neglect of human sacrifice appears to be a criminal attempt to defraud the gods of their due, and men foreswear what 708 they believe is an impious respect for human life, and what fathers now consider to be sacrilegious pity for the lives of their infants.104

The funeral sacrifices that one can regard as of the same nature as human sacrifices gradually disappeared among the Greeks. It would be ignorant to point to a few scattered facts to infer the existence of a permanent custom. When Achilles slaughtered twelve Trojan prisoners on Patroclus’s funeral pyre,105 this barbarous act was neither motivated nor justified by religion, and the horror the poet exhibits proves that it conformed to neither the opinions nor the mores of the nation.

Virgil, all of whose descriptions of religious rituals are borrowed from Homer, except for the inexactnesses introduced by contemporary philosophy or the desire to produce a special effect, shows the Trojans—to whom he always ascribes Greek mores—burning the clothes, trumpet, and weapons of Misenus on his pyre; the idea of bloody sacrifices is not present at all in Virgil’s thought.106 If in another book of the Aeneid107 he speaks of the captives that his hero wishes to offer to the manes of the son of Evander, it is an imitation of Homer. But the imitator does not add that the sacrifice took place.

The priesthood still opposes itself to this effect of the progress of ideas. Under its empire, the fierceness of the savage and the superstition of the ignorant man continue in the subsequent periods of civilization, which unburden themselves of them without being wholly freed of them. Among the Scandinavians, not only was the wealth of princes consumed with the weapons that had served to acquire them, but their slaves were slaughtered and their wives buried or burned with them.108 Those of the caciques of Saint-Domingo suffer the same fate, either voluntarily or 709 by constraint that forces them to obedience.109 In Persia and Ethiopia, the courtiers invested with certain dignities have to die with the monarch.110 In Mexico and Peru, the brothers of the king perish with him, and despite the exception ordinarily made by priests on their behalf, the one who presided over the private worship of the prince was enclosed in his tomb.111 Buried with the king of the Scythians were his concubine, his cook, his food-taster, his minister, his riders, and his horses; and at the end of the year, fifty of his strangled servants were placed on horseback around his sepulcher.112 The Hephtalites enclosed a certain number of warriors in the tomb of their generals who died in battle.113 The Japanese, who carefully preserve the forms of a priestly religion whose substance has disappeared, buried soldiers and slaves with the heads of the army and the court.114 The custom that compelled wives to die with their husbands had been in vigor among the Gauls; Caesar tells us that in his time it had just been abolished;115 it remained among the Heruli,116 and we find it in India.117

The two wives of the Indian Cetes, officer of the army of Eumenes, after the death of Alexander were the prey of the flames.118 This practice defies European laws in Benares and Bombay;119 and it is the Brahmins who lead the unfortunate victims to the pyre, sometimes intoxicating them with perfumes and spirits, and deafening them with overwhelming music, sometimes shaming them with the idea of opprobrium, and even employing violence to effect this frightful sacrifice; for if the widow draws back when the ceremony has begun, force is permitted to compel her to continue.120

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CHAPTER 3: On Privations against Nature

We have already observed that there is something mysterious in the sentiment of modesty or shame inherent in the union of the sexes;1 we have indicated by what very natural transition this inexplicable sentiment could suggest to man the idea of something criminal in the pleasures he blushes at. Even today, when religion and society have sanctified by solemn forms the reproduction of beings, a notion of stain remains attached to it. When our imagination depicts the embraces she just left, the spouse that quits the arms of her spouse seems to us to have lost her purity, and maternity is necessary to return this purity, albeit under a different form. It is not surprising, therefore, that priestly polytheism, steeped in the idea of sacrifice, based itself on modesty in order to command the renunciation of the pleasures of the senses.

Independent polytheism itself has sometimes sanctioned these rigorous injunctions. The majority of the priestesses of Hercules, Minerva, Diana, and Ceres2 in Greece were constrained to a more or less lengthy abstinence. But the Greeks ordinarily softened the privations prescribed by religion, either by assigning a term to them or by imposing them at an age when the needs of the senses were weakened. Only the priestesses of Hercules at Thespiae were subject to perpetual virginity.3

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Priestly polytheism enforces even more severely these privations.4 Each pagoda in India has a grand-priest to whom marriage is forbidden.5 The yogis and the sannyasis make a vow of continence,6 and the monks of Tibet and Siam, arrived at the higher ranks of their hierarchy, make the same commitment; and its infraction is punished with death.7 Celibacy was ordained for the priests of the goddess Centeotl in Mexico; and in their pilgrimages, the Japanese are obliged to abstain from the pleasures of love even with their legitimate spouses. The same artifice that, in order to reconcile men to human sacrifices, made knowledge of the future depend upon these sacrifices, attached chastity to the same knowledge. From the earliest times, it was an indispensable condition of divination among a class of gynosophists, and the semnai who observed the stars and forecast the future were sacred virgins. Peruvian provinces sent to the court a certain number of young girls, some of whom were sacrificed and the others vowed to virginity.8 The terrible punishments that awaited them if they were moved by temptation are well known. Fire consumed them alive, or the earth opened to swallow them. The same fate threatened the three hundred virgins of Carangua.9

The Persian religion appears to be an exception. The Zend Avesta expressly forbids fasts, privations, and, above all, abstaining from the pleasures of love. However, some passages of the Boundehesch present the union of the sexes as the first cause of the fall of man and the depravation of his nature.10 This contradiction can only be explained by the traces of a religion older than that of Zoroaster, which this reformer was unable to make disappear completely.11

Since the principle that leads man to this exaggeration is not susceptible of limitation, the faithful soon persuaded themselves that their privations had not been 712 sufficiently painful. They have stimulated their senses so that their resistance would be more meritorious. They have sought out temptations so that their gods would grant them more favor to combat them. The fakirs of India, obscene mystics, grow proud in the midst of the caresses of women who are devoutly shameless, that they were not simply continent but totally unmoved.12 And who would believe it? A distorted Christianity in the Middle Ages renewed these shameful and ridiculous trials.13 “In the South of Europe,” says Montesquieu,14 “where by the nature of the climate the law of celibacy is more difficult to observe, it has been retained. In the North, where passions are less lively, it has been proscribed.” This is because the renunciation of the pleasures of the senses seemed to be meritorious only where it was painful. And it is so true that the priestly religions recommended continence as a sacrifice, as a victory over nature, rather than because of its intrinsic value, that in the same countries sterility was a curse and a shame.15 But to refuse what one desired and to trample on one’s inclinations was a meritorious act of abnegation and of piety.

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CHAPTER 4: On Licentious Rituals

Our observations on the duty of renouncing the pleasures of the senses, and on the privations contrary to nature that are imposed by the priestly religions of the nations that profess them, are applicable to rites of a totally different sort. We mean licentious rites, practiced in the South, in the East, and sometimes entering into the West and the North. These rituals go back to the savage state; they disappear in the independent polytheism, while they are perpetuated under the empire of priests.

In Egypt, women perform lascivious dances around a bull, a divinity of Lycopolis.1 The religious prostitution of the Babylonians has been contested in vain;2 vestiges of this custom can be seen in Lydia,3 in Phoenicia,4 and in Carthage.5 714 The Jewish prophets frequently complained that the priests of false gods seduced the Israelites by shameful practices.6 Ezekiel rose up against the fabrication of a Phallus, and reproached the Jews for giving to this idol worship that belonged to Jehovah.7 In fact, we see it erected in pomp in the temple of Jehovah himself.8 At the time of the apostasy of Osias, king of Judah, the worship of Priapus was introduced into the kingdom. Josias destroyed the huts of the effeminates who were in the house of the Lord, and these effeminates were idolatrous priests who celebrated obscene rituals.9 Similar ceremonies stained the religion of Mexico.10 Among the festivals that the reception of Bourroutta gives rise to according to the Ramayana,11 in first place were the dances of courtesans. Young female Indians thus dance with their breasts exposed before pagodas.12 Newly married women offer to these hideous images the first fruits of the virginity that they are going to lose; and—a remarkable thing—this practice is in everything similar to the one that the Romans adopted when all the various polytheisms were mixed together. In the cult of Kali, human sacrifices, illicit pleasures,13 and obscene chants are simultaneously commanded.

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The harshness of the northern climates does not preserve their inhabitants from the shameful excesses of a superstition refining itself. At the festival of Thor, during the longest night of the year, the Scandinavians, say several sagas, give themselves over to debauchery of all sorts, and the young priestesses of Frey serve the pleasure of the god or his ministers.14

In this regard, as in what relates to human sacrifices and the privations against nature, the religion of the Persians appears to merit fewer reproaches than the others. However, on the day of the feast of Mithra, the Persian monarch had either the freedom or the duty to become drunk, and to dance in public the national dance,15 which could be a remnant of crude or licentious rites that the reform of Zoroaster had abolished, while making a rare concession to previous customs.16

Like human sacrifices, the shameful feasts had their scientific explanations. The story of Attys, the loves of Cybele, the disappearance of her mutilated lover, the orgies celebrated by the faithful who sought him, and the indecencies that characterized their frenetic joy when they found him; all these things are connected to astronomy.17

Also like the bloody rituals, the obscene rites tended to fall into disuse. The Indian sects that paid homage to the generative organs divided into two branches, one of which admitted, while the other rejected, immodest practices.18 Public opinion scorned the first, but the priesthood resisted; and the purest of reformers, Krishna, is still honored today by the indecent ceremonies he sought to banish.19

We see nothing similar in the independent religions as they are publicly professed. 716 There were many festivals in Greece where women appeared nude; but these women were only courtesans,20 while the licentious rituals of the priestly religions forced women of all conditions into indecency or immodesty.

The girls of Sparta danced without clothes with the young men; however, even though we are far from admiring the half-monastic, half-savage laws of Lycurgus, we cannot find any affinity between these laws and the rituals of Egypt or Syria.

The licentious practices introduced into Greece were always connected with foreign gods.21 In the mysteries themselves, Greek women, when adoring the Phallus, never prostituted themselves like those of Ecbatana or Heliopolis. Diogondas had prohibited obscene feasts at Thebes, and to banish them more completely he proscribed nocturnal rites.22 In one of his comedies, Aristophanes proposes expelling the gods who prescribed such practices. We will see that it was the same in Rome during the period of the purity of Roman polytheism.23 This difference between the two species of polytheism can be explained only by the principle whose applications and consequences we are examining here. The priesthood had ordained chastity, the sacrifice of nature. It also commanded indecency, the sacrifice of shame.24

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CHAPTER 5: On the Sanctity of Pain

In the beginning of the chapter relating to the dominant principle of priestly religions, we said that when man begins with this principle he cannot stop. He is not satisfied with any of the numerous and varied sacrifices that he prescribes for himself; his heart does not seem to be sufficiently rent by the loss of what he holds most dear. His senses seem incompletely tested by the deprivation of his most lively pleasures. He does not believe he has done enough by abandoning purity itself in the temples of the gods, before whom he has imposed silence on the most imperious of his inclinations. He must have positive, visible pains that cannot be misunderstood, that leave no doubt as to his intentions. The tendency to painful physical mortifications is therefore in the heart of man.1 One can even say that it draws from a true idea. It is by pain and sorrow that man improves. It is like a principle of activity, or a means of perfection, that Providence has given us with such abundance, that any other system would make it a gratuitous and inexcusable cruelty. Pain sometimes awakens what is noblest in our nature, courage; sometimes what is tenderest, sympathy and pity. It teaches us to battle for ourselves and to feel for others. Alerted by the instinct that reveals to it so many truths that logic cannot discern, the religious sentiment sometimes seeks pain in order to draw purity or strength from it. But the priesthood takes hold of this movement and imparts a false and deplorable direction to it.

In all priestly cults, the ministers, and those of the followers of these cults who wish to elevate themselves to the highest degree of perfection, condemn themselves to fasts, mortifications, and torments that inspire in us an astonishment close to doubt. Some cut their arms with knives, other strike themselves 720 with whips2 or place a burning wick on their chest. Others mutilate themselves, believing they thereby delight the gods by ceasing to be men; sometimes they walk barefoot across burning coals;3 sometimes they are suspended on iron hooks; sometimes they carry enormous weights, which they have riveted to their neck to avoid the temptation of discarding them.

Other times, raising their arms in the air, which they do not lower toward the ground, they wait for a pious hand to bring food to their mouth, or they receive the waters of the skies and the snow of winter on their bare heads.4

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By a consequence of the same principle, no more than a hundred years ago one still admired Saint Simeon Stylites atop his column, Saint Francis of Assisi holding in his arms statutes of snow, and so many others whose sole merit was having sought out pain and hardship;5 and the letters of our missionaries in China and Japan manifest the same avid desire for suffering.6

From this sanctity attached to pain naturally arises the idea of a mysterious effectiveness in the torments that man inflicts upon himself. Hence the prodigious power of austerities among the Indians. Hence those epithets upon which we have 722 already fixed our readers’ attention, and that constantly return in the sacred prayers and poems of India: “powerful by suffering, rich with austerities”; and these austerities are in fact wealth, because they are the arsenal from which the mortal draws weapons in his struggle with the immortal gods. It was by his austerities that Dasaratha constrained heaven to grant him children.7 Ravana, hero, genius, or rebellious incarnation, by his austerities forced Brahma to make him invulnerable.8 The starvations of Gautama put him on a par with the gods, with whom he contested victory.9 Vashistha, the famous penitent of the Ramayana, places austerities among the means of combating and defeating his enemies.10 But the least relaxation, the least weakness toward pleasure, deprives mortifications of their merit. Vishwamitra, seduced by a woman that the gods had sent, loses the fruit of a thousand years of austerities.11 He begins them anew, and the defeated gods cry out: Your austerities have been without limit; your energy will be immeasurable.12

Sometimes licentious rites are combined with austerities and penances: the same young Indians who dance half-nude before the temples inflict cruel and refined sufferings on themselves.13 The priests of Cybele who mutilate themselves also give themselves over to impurities with women, impurities which their impotence renders even more horrible,14 and this double triumph over suffering and shame makes the crowd respect them even more.

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This refinement in sufferings often goes to the point of suicide. It was common among the Brachmanes to cast themselves into the flames.15 As the prologue to his drama attests, Sudraka, prince and poet, author of the drama of Mricchatika, burned himself on a pyre at the age of one hundred; and while profiting from the abolition of this custom, modern Brahmins say that it has fallen into disuse only in the Kali Yuga, the age of corruption and impiety. The devotées of Arakan act the same way. The worshippers of Amida have themselves crushed beneath the wheels of his chariot; and in our day, two English sailors witnessed the religious delirium of thirty-nine Indians who cast themselves into the Ganges together.16

The idea we have already seen, the supposition of an original fall, one of the causes of human sacrifice, doubtless contributed mightily to the merit attributed to pain and suffering.17 All the affections,18 all earthly bonds, have seemed to be a consequence of the degradation that the human race suffered. The desires for the things of this world, says the Neadirsen, are an offense to God; one must control them by mortifications and penance.

The notion of the division into two substances could equally strengthen the penchant of man for austerities. In this system, matter is the enemy and the tyrant, as it were, of the spirit, which is imprisoned in its thick envelope. One must defeat this enemy, dethrone this tyrant. Everything that makes it suffer or that weakens it—fasts, abstinences, resistance to the needs or attractions of the senses, voluntary tortures—are triumphs that free the spiritual substance from its crude bonds; and the pure spirit, returned to its freedom, rises to God, to merge and lose itself in him.

The refinements of cruelty that one sees in the human sacrifices of certain peoples owe to the teaching of the sanctity of suffering. Among the Mexicans, sometimes the victims were dragged by their hair to the top of the pyramid on 724 which they were to die; sometimes they were flayed alive and priests covered themselves with the bloody skins; sometimes they were cast into a burning furnace, then removed with hooks while they were still breathing, in order to slaughter them on the altar.

We need to observe, however, that in order to be profoundly imprinted in the religion, the idea of the sanctity of pain must always be seconded by the climate. One would be wrong to confuse the spontaneous mortifications and torments of southern nations with the frequent suicides in the North. These suicides draw their source from martial habits, according to which only a violent death was honorable; impatient heroes grew indignant at the thought of waiting for the slow and gradual degeneration of old age.19

Montesquieu, whose observation concerning the merit of continence we recalled earlier, makes another no less apt observation concerning the contradiction that appears to exist between the soft laziness of the South and the way in which its inhabitants run toward death, brave it, and defy it. But he saw only one of the causes of this contradiction, and a secondary one at that. The principal one is the religion that transforms pleasure into a crime, and suffering into merit. The fear of pleasure becomes a furious passion in the climates that imperiously incline men to physical pleasures. Since the senses are tormented rather than subjugated by austerities, and abstinences constantly reassert their empire, weak consciences are horrified to see everywhere the pleasure that they flee; and in order to better fight this stubborn adversary they pile rigor upon rigor, torture upon torture. It is the people who are the most susceptible to lively affections, the most inclined to sensual pleasure, who give themselves over to the most refined austerities and are in the grip, as it were, of the love of pain. Exhausted by an always unsuccessful struggle, they make the excess of suffering a rampart against their weakness and the seductions of nature.

The Greeks always kept mortifications as well as licentious rites out of their public religion. Until the second century of our era, the philosophers, nourished on Greek literature, had such great difficulty in explaining the austerities of the hermits of the Thebaid, as well as the iron chains they put on themselves, that they believed they were struck with delirium as punishment for abandoning the worship of the gods.20

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Nor should anyone object that these same philosophers—the Stoics, the Neopythagorians, and the Platonists of Alexandria—imposed hardship and austerities on their disciples.21 Some imitation of their practices could be found in Pythagoras, who, we are told, was obliged to subject himself to torments of every sort in order to be admitted to the knowledge of the secret teaching of the priests of Egypt; but his school considered them to be tests of the courage and discretion of those who did them, rather than attaching any religious merit to them. The Stoics wanted in this way to show that pain was not an evil; and, as for Platonists, the half-defeated auxiliaries of a religion into which they introduced foreign extravagances, believing thereby to fortify it against the rivals they parodied, they cannot be usefully consulted about the true spirit of a religion that their efforts tended to denature.

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CHAPTER 6: On Some Doctrines That Could Have Been Introduced into the Priestly Religions as Consequences of Those We Just Discussed

Before ending this book, we must treat some singular effects of a disposition that we have often noticed in man, whether civilized or savage: we mean his penchant to attribute to the gods his inclinations, sentiments, and even his adventures. This tendency was most clearly manifest in all the religions subject to priests, and it causes the most bizarre doctrines to enter them. Thus, the Egyptians believed Apis was born of a heifer impregnated by the sun.1 The Scythians identified their origin with a virgin who miraculously gave birth to a child they named Scytha.2 A virgin was the mother of Tages.3 The Chinese, whose traditions manifestly owe to ancient priestly doctrines, say that the birth of Fo-Hi was miraculous, in that he did not have a father. Xaca, in one of his apparitions, in Tibet,4 and Mexitli and Vitzliputzli, in Mexico, emerged from the bosom of a young girl who knew nothing of the mysteries of hymen. The Aslomi, the Indian Dioscuri, who, endowed with beauty as well as eternal youth, cross the globe on horseback healing the ills of body and soul; they are born of a mare that the day star impregnated with his rays. Sita, the spouse of Rama, had a furrow for a cradle;5 and the most glorious 727 incarnation of Vishnu is the one in which, under the name Krishna, he saw the light of day without his mother having felt the caresses of a man.6

Would not this idea have come from the importance attached by priestly peoples to the sanctity of abstinences and privations running counter to nature? The seed, no doubt, is found in the human heart. We have pointed it out in the savage; but the priests developed this seed; they made a dogma of it that they inserted in their mythological accounts. The union of the sexes, both in heaven as well as on earth, was disapproved; and divinity, even when it became incarnate, did not want to owe its birth to an impure act.7

It should be noticed that the desire to spare the gods the stains of a mortal birth sometimes impelled the priests to fictions that were even more indecent than the popular notion they wished to avoid. The beautiful Amogha became pregnant with Brahma by means that we cannot describe; and the virginal ear of the young Anjani enabled her to conceive in a way that was as obscene as it was strange the son of Shiva, Hanuman, the satyr of the Indians, and the active and intelligent auxiliary of the gods in their wars.

What confirms the conjecture we hazard is that no similar notion appeared among the Greeks at the time when their mythology became a regular system. If Hesiod or Nonnus transmit a few fables of the sort that we just considered in India, they are before the reign of Jupiter, or only recount adventures of his youth. This god wishing to do sexual violence to Venus, and his ardor disappointed by the resistance of the goddess, he impregnates a stone that gives birth to a son at the end of ten months.8 This myth goes back therefore to the cosmogonic period that we have proved many times was foreign to Greece. Minerva emerges fully armed from Jupiter’s head, and Vulcan is the fruit of the solitary wrath of Juno against her unfaithful husband. But we have explained how these two fables—the first of which goes back to the Phoenician Onga and the second to the Egyptian Phat9—entered into Greek mythology. At most, the pride that prompts Diana to remain a virgin and her severity toward her weaker companions would appear to come 728 close to the priestly rigors; but this myth, borrowed from Hertha, never had any influence on religion, and even ended by being a subject of mockery by the poets, so little analogy did it have with the received and revered teachings of the people.

It was not only in regard to virginity and divine births without the intervention of sexual union that the priests wanted their gods to conform to the notions of men. It was the same relative to human sacrifices and to the mysterious value attached to suffering. The worshipper, considering the offering to be more effective as the object was more precious, first of all preferred animals to plants, then his fellows to animals, finally, the gods to his fellows. From this it resulted that several nations believed that their gods were immolated on their own altars.

This idea, at least such as it is presented in the cults of Egypt, Phoenicia, and India (because it has no relation to a dogma that we must respect as an object of veneration for several Christian communions), brought back the view that even the gods are not exempt from death,10 a supposition that independent polytheism hastened to relegate to obscure traditions; and it was supported by the cosmogonic allegories.

In the Indian cosmogonies, which are founded on pantheism, creation is a sacrifice. The god who exists alone sacrifices himself by violently dividing, and drawing the world from his own essence.11

Such is one of the meanings of the legend of Bacchus torn to pieces by the Titans; of Osiris, whose members were dispersed throughout the universe; of Mithra, under the name Iresch, eaten by his brothers;12 Chenrezi in Tibet also breaks his head against a rock in order to create the world.

Other times, imitating the practices of their most scrupulous worshippers, the gods sacrifice what they hold most dear, their children, like them belonging to the divine race.13

This notion of a divine sacrifice gave rise among the Mexicans to a strange custom. In one of their most solemn feasts, the priests struck the heart of the god 729 whom their worship had honored and distributed the broken heart to those in attendance, a mystical food that obtains the protection of heaven.14

To this fiction of the death of the gods is joined the merit of voluntary suffering. Sommonacodom descends to the netherworld in order to suffer for five hundred consecutive generations;15 Eshmun and Attis mutilate themselves;16 Vishnu, in his fourth incarnation, emaciates himself in the depths of a desert.17 Diti, his spouse, practices terrible austerities during a thousand years. It is the divine suffering, the penitence of God, the tapasya as the Vedas say, that produced the world; this same suffering is necessary to save it. At all times the Indians have believed that the divine nature enters into sacrifices as a suffering part.18 In immolating themselves, their gods expire in a long and cruel agony. The principle that inspired the worshippers to engage in so many austerities that we shudder at them, led them to imagine the objects of their worship imposing upon themselves, according to their more sublime essence, even more astonishing and painful sufferings. But since the intellect, even when it errs, loves to connect conceptions among themselves and to give them a sort of unity, the hypothesis of the original fall is ordinarily the connecting knot of this sort of drama. By their sufferings the gods bestow a supernatural assistance on the fallen human race. The mediating god reestablishes 730 the broken communication. The purification of man is effected by the torments of the god who atones for him.19 The necessity of such an expiation was transmitted from century to century and entered Christianity, maintaining itself until our day.20 “The faith teaches us,” say very modern authors, “that to efface the sin inherent in the nature of man, it was necessary to have a theandric victim, that is, at once divine and human. Perhaps the inventors of human sacrifices among the idolatrous nations had learned this truth by some vague tradition, and the rituals that revolt us were only an attempt to find the victim destined to deliver the human race by his death.”21

There is nothing equivalent in the independent religions. If the gods of Homer are vulnerable to suffering, it is a consequence of their imperfect and limited nature. Their pain has nothing mysterious and brings no profit to the mortal race.

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CHAPTER 7: A Demonstration of the Previous Assertions, Drawn from the Composition of the Polytheism of Ancient Rome

The composition of the polytheism of ancient Rome presents the most complete demonstration of the assertions contained in the chapters one has just read. One sees among the Romans, during the three centuries during which their religious beliefs were gradually formed, the manifest struggle of the priestly spirit against the Greek spirit, that is, against the spirit free of priestly direction.

At the moment of the foundation of Rome, Etruria,1 which held under its yoke several peoples of ancient Italy, and which exercised authority over several others, was governed neither by a single monarch, nor by an assembly of the people, nor by a senate. It obeyed an oppressive caste, like the priestly caste of Egypt;2 and it 732 was so similar to the latter that up to the time of Cicero the young nobles of Rome were sent to Etruria to be instructed in the sacred science of divination.3

We do not need to examine if this division into castes was indigenous to Etruria, a country whose climate favored priestly power,4 or if it came from the South, perhaps from Egypt itself, with whom the maritime commerce of the Etruscans had early on entered into contact and communication. An incontestable fact is that the colleges of priests were spread throughout Italy,5 and their power was unlimited. The study of astronomy6 and medicine7 was reserved for them. They were the sole historians of Etruria.8 The education of the youth was confided exclusively to them.9 The worship of stars and the elements constituted, we have already proven, 733 the ancient Latin or Etruscan religion.10 The inhabitants of all of Italy offered sacrifices to rivers, to lakes, to fountains.11 In this religion, as among all the priestly peoples, fetishism had been placed under astrolatry.12

All the teachings, all the rituals, all the usages characteristic of cults subject to priests were part of Italian worship. There one found gods with monstrous figures, the result of the priestly spirit, which is always immobile. Juno Lanuvina bears a goat-skin and horns;13 Janus is famous for his double face;14 Cherilus, son of Feronia, the Proserpina of the Sabines, and simultaneously the tutelary god and king of Preneste, owes to his triple body the honor of being sung by Virgil.15 Tages, the author of the Acherontic books, is a dwarf god,16 like the Vulcan of Memphis, whom Herodotus compares to the Cabiri.17 The Penates of Lavinium are little caducei;18 and these gods bring together in priestly forms the other qualities characteristic of the divinities that the priests reveal. Tages, born from the still-virgin earth, astonishes peoples with his wisdom, teaches man how to rise from the fall that degraded him, teaches him bloody sacrifices that connect him 734 to the divine nature, as well as the progressive purifications that place him on the rank of heroes.19

The keys that Janus holds,20 the vessel in which he stands, the doors of the night and the day that are confided to his care; Vesta, his spouse, who is sometimes the moon and sometimes fire; the privilege in virtue of which he (along with some other divinities of Etruria) enjoys the faculties of both sexes;21 his incestuous hymen,22 735 his expiatory death,23 form a mixture of science, astronomy, and mysticism typical of religions subject to priests.

The host of these diverse and enigmatic gods recognizes a head,24 whose supremacy often is identified with destiny, and always ends in pantheism.25 This host grows with demonology;26 malevolent divinities enter in;27 they deprive man of his innocence, they darken him with indelible stains, they plunge him into terrifying abysses from which his efforts—all in vain—cannot extricate him, and from which he can be delivered only thanks to the intervention of a mediating 736 god;28 this god is at once triune and one, because the Etrurian priesthood also had its trinity.29 These same unremitting powers threatened our globe, and Tuscan prophets constantly announce the destruction of the world.30 Joined to these doctrines painted in funereal colors, the results of the refined calculations of the priesthood are the cruel or obscene rituals we have already encountered among all the peoples who suffer its yoke. Here the blood of men floods the altars;31 737 further along, severe laws proscribe pleasure32 while licentious rituals outrage shame,33 and terrible torments cause nature to shudder.34 Finally, divinations, this means of empire that is so carefully cultivated, so minutely developed by priests,35 and always accompanied by a kind of jurisdiction it arrogates to itself over the 738 gods,36 was brought into ancient Italy with the highest degree of solemnity and pomp. It was traced back to Picus, the first king of the Latiums.37 All the elements are prophetic. The air reveals the future by the sound of thunder; the movement, color, and fantastic forms of clouds; birds who fly in all directions.38 The sound of waves has a divinatory meaning, and prophets and gods emerge from the bottom of the liquid abyss. The bosom of the earth is no less fecund. From a furrow cut by a plow, Tages appears, all at once, to the people. In all directions caves allow supernatural inspirations to rise to man; finally, the fire that burns on the altar, the flames that consume the victim, express the mysteries of destiny by their waves and flickerings. The auguries and aruspices of Tuscany are famous in history. Dionysius 739 of Halicarnassus and Diodorus praise their art;39 and the superstitious Julian, even in the third century of our era, still consulted the aruspices that he had brought from Etruria.

Such was the religious state of Italy when the Greek colonies arrived. Here we will not enter into discussions concerning these colonies; all the historians recount in detail their arrival and establishment. We will simply observe that one must not reject these accounts with a too proud disdain. The author who has given himself most assiduously to understanding this subject, even though he himself is little favorable to the testimonies of a period when information was rare, the critical method and spirit imperfect, and minds were distorted by the claims of national vanity, nonetheless agrees that before the foundation of Rome there were wealthy and flourishing Greek colonies.40 The first of these colonies apparently did not bring to the cities they constructed the religion of Greece, such as Homer made it known to us.41 They had left their country before the revolution wrought in their polytheism by Egyptian or Phoenician seafarers;42 740 and their arrival in Italy had no other effect than to establish more frequent communications between this country and Pelasgian Greece.43 But later, other Greek colonies having debarked on Latium, they began to reform the cruel rituals of the natives. They had left Greece after the formation of Greek polytheism;44 they built several cities;45 along with many other customs they brought all those that had to do with religion.46 At Falerii, there was a temple of Juno47 built on the model of that of Argos. There, one performed the same ceremonies for sacrifices. Priestesses officiated following Greek rites;48 and young women called canephora, as in Greece, carried sacred baskets in the religious ceremonies.49 These colonies preserved such close connections with their former country that every year they sent a tenth of their revenue to Delphi.50 They inspired the natives with enough respect for the Greek gods that Arimnus, king of Etruria, believed he had to pay the homage of a golden throne to Jupiter Olympian.51 Finally, they communicated to the Etruscans the knowledge and taste for 741 the arts.52 Their leaders made incursions in different places that were more and less successful, and everywhere they entered successfully, they introduced some changes in the Italian worship.

It was only at Rome, however, that the influence of the Greek colonies worked a complete and decisive revolution. Until the foundation of this city, the two cults subsisted alongside one another. The reason was simple. The Etruscan priesthood opposed itself, as must always happen, to all innovation. The differences between the monuments of Etruria that have come down to us and the same works of art in Greece have often been noted. These differences perhaps owe to the fact that the Greek colonies had left their country before the arts there had arrived at their perfection; but the static, prohibiting priestly spirit was no doubt the greatest cause. In the towns they dominated, the theocratic corporations successfully battled the action of the Greek colonies. It was not the same in Rome. Its inhabitants brought together by chance, and fugitives from all countries, had no preexisting or established institutions, and the disdain of the opulent and peaceful cities that cast them from their midst in fact protected a collection of warrior brigands, preserving them from the ascendancy of the all-powerful corporations of priests found in the cities.

As a consequence, at the moment when their worship assumed a stable form, the Romans drew equally from the religions of ancient Italy and Greece. For a certain time, the two religions contested for the Roman people, which meant disputing for the empire of the world.

In order to describe this memorable struggle, we will cite facts to which, out of a desire to be brief, we will be forced to attach the names of individuals who perhaps never existed; but we will do so in order to designate periods or epochs, and even if the individuals are legendary beings or generic names,53 our assertions will not be thereby undermined. That Romulus, Numa, Tatius, even Tullus Hostilius (although 742 there is a bit more history in his regard)54 did not exist; that the colonies called Herculean did not land in Italy in the year or the manner indicated by writers, some who were credulous like Titus-Livy, others, compilers like Dionysius of Halicarnassus; that Tarquin the Elder was neither the grandson of a fugitive from Corinth nor from the family of the Bacchiads, all that matters little to us. We still see that all that is priestly comes from Etruria and everything that belongs to independent polytheism arrives from Greece. We grant as fictional everything that the new critics claim; but this concession does not in any respect weaken truths that cannot be contested. We will begin, therefore, with Romulus, or the moment his name designates.

Already the inclination for the Greek cult manifests itself. Ceremonies in honor of Jupiter are substituted for the worship of the sacred oak.55 But Tatius, king of the Sabines, associated with empire after the combining of the two peoples, has temples built to the sun, moon, fire, and earth.56 Numa, Sabine like Tatius, transports his paternal gods to Rome. He places a lance in his palace, an ancient simulacrum of the god of war.57 He forbids his subjects to attribute human form to the immortals.58 This is a priestly interdiction. When philosophy came to the Romans, they gave the honor of this prohibition of Numa’s to philosophical ideas.

It was perhaps because of the favor this prince gave to the ancient religion of Italy that when the books attributed to him were unearthed by a flood, four hundred years after his death, the Senate wanted them to be cast into the flames. The 743 care taken in burning them upon a pyre lit by the very officers who served in the sacrifices proves that the books continued to be respected even as they were destroyed.59 Whatever may be true of this particular fact, the worship reestablished at Rome after Romulus by Tatius or Numa was manifestly one that was professed by all nations subject to priests.60

In the history of Tullus Hostius, the rivalry between the monarchy and the priesthood stands out in unmistakable features. But this was not by favoring the Greek religion at the expense of the Etrurian religion; it was by seeking to take over the mysterious forces of the latter that the third king of Rome appears to have wanted to resist the spiritual power. He declared himself the imitator of the Tuscan priests; he claimed to have penetrated the secrets of their magic; he stole their formulas61 in order to be able to evoke thunder as they did; and they punished him by attributing his death to a sacrilegious omission during the ceremonies he had presided over with a profane hand.62 Tarquin the Elder63 rejected even more 744 directly the Etruscan religion in order to introduce the spirit of the Greek religion. He called to Rome Greek families from all parts of Italy where they had sought asylum.64 He ordered the construction of a temple of Jupiter on Mount Tarpeian; his son completed it, and as there were several altars devoted to Italian divinities on this hill, they were solemnly expelled.65 Thus, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, emerging Rome saw the two species of polytheism do battle within its walls. The entirety of the struggle escapes us, but undeniable details reveal it.

This struggle had to have its vicissitudes and its phases. The rivalry of the kings and priests probably more engaged the former, whether because they sought support against the latter in the foreigners they welcomed, especially because they brought the antipriestly spirit of Greece, or simply to negotiate with rivals they always had to fear. Romulus had had pontiffs from Etruria come to Rome in order to learn from them the rituals necessary to gain the gods’ protection for the newly founded towns.66 Despite his anathema against the gods of Italy, Tarquin the Elder borrowed from the Tuscans the sacred games, and some religious ceremonies;67 and his son, initially disdainful of the Sibylline books, then rendered solemn, if barbarous, homage68 to these pages gathered by Etruscan soothsayers, repositories of Rome’s destinies.69

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What appears to have put an end to this oscillation between the two cults, and determined the victory in favor of Greek polytheism, was the expulsion of the kings and the establishment of the republic. Quite remarkably, this revolution was probably the work of priests! It turned against them. Without it, the pontiffs would probably have allied with the monarchs. The priests would have made the monarchs receive their teachings and their rituals, while lending a sacred sanction to their temporal power; but political liberty, no matter how different what we call liberty in modern times is from what it was among the ancients, political liberty, I was saying, opposed a powerful barrier to the encroachments of priestly power. Popular governments, or even aristocracies that call many individuals to participate in public affairs, balance spiritual authority by means of the interests of this world. Despotism, though, lavishly pouring all sorts of misfortunes and opprobrium upon its slaves, puts them at the mercy of whoever promises them an asylum elsewhere; unless, being able to degrade everything, it also degrades religion; but this only happens in very corrupt nations, by a combination of circumstances that happily is rather rare.70

To be sure, the military expeditions of the Romans also contributed to the diminishment of the authority of priests. A French author rightly notes that if the martial reign of Tullus Hostilius had not immediately followed the peaceful reign of Numa, the crudest superstition would have weighed on fledgling Rome. However, the warrior spirit would not alone have saved Rome. More bellicose than the Romans, the Scandinavians suffered the yoke of priests at a late period. Without liberty, peaceful Rome would have experienced the same destiny as the Egyptians; martial Rome, with the differences that climate introduces, would have had the same destiny as Scandinavia. What proves this is that all the reforms that decided the character and tendency of the Roman religion took place in the century that followed the abolition of the monarchy.

The gods then took on more elegant forms. In adopting the human figure, they did away with the monstrosities with which the symbolic spirit, grafted onto fetishism, had overloaded it.71 The Penates, for example, instead of being rather shapeless vases surrounded by serpents, were adolescents armed with spears.72 Human sacrifices were also suppressed.73 Junius Brutus replaced the children sacrificed 746 to Larunda with the heads of poppies, and the thirty sexagenarians who were thrown into the Tiber, with thirty idols made of straw.74 Solemn games were established in memory of this triumph of humanity.75 Henceforth, these ceremonies only recurred as sad exceptions in extraordinary circumstances;76 and even when such circumstances brought back this deplorable superstition, the Romans always turned their gaze away in horror. The death of a man, even though ordered by the gods, did not appear to them, as to other peoples, to be an occasion for feasting, but of lamentation, mourning, and regret.

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Plutarch, while recounting that in the hope of deflecting the calamities that the incontinence of the vestal virgins, as well as the Sibylline books, made them fear, the Romans buried alive a male and a female Greek and a male and a female Gaul, adds that an expiatory sacrifice was offered annually to the manes of these victims.77 Ovid denies that such rituals ever existed in Rome. It is natural that a poet writing at the time of Augustus did not want to believe in the barbarous practices of his ancestors. But in the same poet there is a dialogue between Jupiter and Numa78 that is quite remarkable in this regard; and this dialogue, which under the appearance of a witticism contains an exact history of this revolution in the worship, proves that Ovid’s denial was not correct.

From the time of its liberty, Rome’s power was always employed to forbid human sacrifices among its allies or conquered peoples. She first of all purified Italy, and then worked to deliver Spain and the Gauls from them.79 Caesar, praetor in Iberia, abolished this custom, which the Phoenicians had brought to Cadiz.80 748 And, finally, seeing the obstinate perseverance of the Druids, Tiberius and Claudius pursued and destroyed them.81

Some writers have considered the gladiator fights of Rome as a form of human sacrifice; especially in the latter centuries of Rome they had become an essential part of the games and pleasures that were lavished upon a restless, corrupt, and redoubtable people. But these combats were barbarous entertainments, not religious ceremonies. The spirit of conquest, always arrogant and always fierce, in the eyes of the victors stripped the unfortunate victims who had fallen into captivity of all the rights of the human condition. Disdaining their own blood on the field of battle, the Romans were pleased to see the blood of their enemies flow in the amphitheater. It is not their religion, however, but their martial habits that one should accuse. The proof of this is the privilege that the spectators had reserved for themselves to pardon the fighter who distinguished himself by his courage. They would not have deprived the gods of a victim their piety had offered. Finally, it was prisoners that the Romans forced to fight, and Rome would have risen up against the insolent pontiff who attempted to compel a citizen to fight.

Licentious rituals were similarly kept away from the polytheism of Rome. History transmits an attempt by the Tuscan priesthood to introduce some indecent practices into the religion. The Sabine women who had been taken had remained sterile. Their anxious spouses consulted Juno in the sacred forest of Mount Esquiline. The tops of ancient trees suddenly shook, a disturbing oracle made itself heard.82 Happily, superstition could not defeat the national horror. A soothsayer, the interpreter of the oracle, proposed avoiding the order of the gods by a less ghastly ceremony, which became part of the Lupercalia, in which nude, or almost nude, young men armed with a whip that was made of goat hair struck the women who presented themselves before them. It is impossible not to see in this account the priestly tendency that had dominated Italy until the arrival of the Greek colonies, a tendency that was overcome by the good sense of these colonies. The ordinances that prohibited obscene rituals all came from the Senate after the firm 749 establishment of the republic.83 We will see them fall into disuse, and licentious practices reappear, with the approach of the empire.84

At the same time that the Romans rejected obscene rites, they mitigated, albeit slightly, the privations against nature. At Alba, the vestals were constrained to a perpetual continence; at Rome, they could be freed after thirty years.85

Voluntary tortures were introduced quite late into the polytheism of Rome, either as a foreign custom or as a souvenir of ancient practices, a type of souvenir that was easily recalled in calamities and times of danger.86

As a result, we see in Rome, in a way more evident than anywhere else, the fundamental opposition between priestly polytheism and independent polytheism. If the inhabitants of nascent Rome were inclined by some earlier habits and traditional memories toward the religion of Italy, which was the cult of their ancestors, and toward the history of Italy, which was their history, the respect that the descendants 750 of the colonies had preserved for their original homeland hovered, as it were, over these memories and habits. The Italian religion furnished the Romans with an infinite number of divinities,87 many legends, usages, and rituals.88 But the genius of the Greek religion took control of these things and modified them,89 and as the Athenians had nationalized Minerva,90 the Romans identified Jupiter Stator with their history: a scientific symbol became a protective god of the city. The sun that halted rallied the fleeing legions. The sun that was reborn was Veturia.91 The Romans retained from the first of these polytheisms everything they could preserve; their policy filled the colleges of pontiffs with the most eminent citizens in the State and army, thus stripping these colleges of the theocratic spirit.92 The same policy made divination an instrument (which sometimes could run counter to it).93 It borrowed from the Etruscans something of the division into castes, in order to add a religious sanction to the relation between patrons and clients.94 As long as Rome was a monarchy, its kings on their elevation to the throne were clothed in Etruscan forms, the signs of their dignity.95 But the spirit of the priesthood, the teachings that belonged to it apart from the people, human victims, 751 licentious rites—all these things were banished from the worship, and only reentered accidentally when terror took hold of souls,96 or later, when corruption had degraded them.

We will stop here. The truth that we promised to prove seems to us to be beyond doubt; we will not have to return to Roman religion until we treat the later modifications of polytheism.

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BOOK XII: ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT POLYTHEISM TO ITS HIGHEST POINT OF PERFECTION1

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CHAPTER 1: How the Progress of the Social State Introduces Morality into Religion

We have established, as the principal truth to demonstrate in our work, that each revolution that takes place in the situation of the human race produces one in religious ideas, and we have already seen polytheism substitute for fetishism by the passage from the primitive to the barbarous state. Polytheism suffers other important changes in the passage from the barbarous state to one that is more civilized; and the notions of a distributive justice, of an equitable and infallible recompense, become fixed and affirmative doctrines instead of being the expression of impotent wishes and confused hopes.

This revolution takes place in a very obvious way among the peoples who are not slowed or shackled by any accidental circumstance, any natural calamity, any religious or political tyranny.

Vigorous with the youthful liveliness of all their impressions, excited by the novelty of what they experience, men do not yet have to defend themselves from inner fatigue or external routine, the sad and inevitable results of lengthy civilization. No second thought weakens them, no skepticism troubles them; they are exposed to many evils, but experience is not there to warn them that there are evils without remedy. They see only obstacles to overcome in what appears to us a necessity to suffer. Where we resign ourselves, they fight; and their activity grows from the difficulties that discourage ours.

In the passage from purely bellicose life to civil life, from a state that is solely martial to the agricultural state, peoples experience needs of a wholly new sort: that of work,2 which has replaced the use of force by substituting exchange for 756 conquest; that of property, without which work would be nothing but a series of vain efforts; that of security, without which property would be insecure.

In order to satisfy these until now unknown needs, fixed institutions are indispensable. Soon, they assume the place that necessity assigns to them; a public force is formed that tends to preserve the association from the violence of its members, and its members from their reciprocal attacks. The irregular force of individuals retains for a while its dreadful privileges, but they are increasingly contested. Injustice, which previously encountered obstacles only in those it harmed in an immediate way, now encounters them in the coalition of all those who do not profit from its success. Earlier, there were only offenses that cried out; now, all those who are impartial cry out. The majority bases its calculations on the observation of the laws, that is, on justice and morality. Morality and justice become the center of the majority of interests, the point around which the majority of forces unite.

This revolution in ideas and institutions produces one in religious notions, even when it is only interest that changes them. Interest always wants to employ the authority of the gods for its own purposes. As long as the social state, barely established, influences individuals only in a partial and episodic way, interest principally occupies its gods with the protection of individuals. Now, however, it is a matter of a more general protection; the authority of the gods is devoted to it.

These invisible powers, as we have observed previously, modeling themselves on human beings, and once-isolated fetishes now composing a celestial people, once again follow the example of men. When the latter only occupy themselves with constant war, and their amusements are crude pleasures, with only their vigor or their cunning for means of safety or success and the boldest and most violent men as leaders, the objects of their worship lead an entirely similar way of life atop the heavens. Without distinction, they protect innocent endeavors and culpable designs, unbridled desires and legitimate endeavors. Sacrifices and gifts interest them in any and all causes, and virtue as well as crime are obliged to buy them off. But as soon as men have laws, judges, tribunals, and public morality, then the gods preside over the execution of these laws, monitor the conduct of the judges, themselves compose a supreme tribunal, and give supernatural assistance to morality. All their relations with men are changed in keeping with this tendency. The means of gaining their benevolence are no longer what they were before;3 homages, vows, and 757 offerings lose their effectiveness. While still necessary so that the gods do not become angry at the negligence of mortals, they no longer suffice to assure injustice the assistance of heaven. Faithful to the customs of the first period of polytheism, the people who enter the territory of their enemy seek to gain the favor of the tutelary divinities of this territory, but they believe they cannot better succeed than by making these divinities witnesses of the justice of their cause. Man no longer dares to ask the assistance of the gods for the crimes he wishes to commit; he at most tries to obtain from them forgiveness for the crimes he committed. They no longer are basely envious of all human prosperity, but they are strict enemies of the prosperity of the wicked. Their lightning bolts are no longer directed against the happy, but against the guilty; they no longer persecute, they punish. When some great calamity happens to the powerful of the earth, it is no longer attributed to the jealousy of the gods but to their justice.

The religious sentiment associates itself enthusiastically with this change in religious ideas. These new notions respond to all its desires; they permit it to esteem what it worships; they give a more elevated, nobler character to the gods; they render them more worthy of being honored. Confidence succeeds to fear. Even at the sight of triumphant crime, mortals expect to soon see misfortune fall upon its head. If sometimes an undeniable evidence forces man to recognize that despite the providence of the gods virtue can suffer and iniquity reign, he persuades himself that sooner or later the days of reparation and revenge will come.4 Thus the idea enters into his heart of an appeal of the present to the future, of earth to heaven, the solemn recourse of the oppressed in all situations, the last hope of the weak who are trampled underfoot, of virtue that is sacrificed; this is a consoling and proud thought that philosophy has never tried to renounce without being immediately punished by its own debasement.

This is therefore the period of the formal introduction of morality into religion. We have proven that even before this, religion favored morality. As a general proposition, the gods must always prefer good to evil, virtue to crime. The love of order is inherent in man as long as he reasons abstractly. The same tendency is therefore inherent in the gods, as soon as instead of being paid individually (if we 758 can put it this way), the fetishes are recompensed collectively by society as a whole. The interest of every community is found in morality. Gods who protect the community cannot fulfill their task except by preventing individuals from offending against morality, that is, putting the community in danger.

But as long as they are moved by mercenary motives in the exercise of these functions, as long as they act only out of personal interest, as long as the rewards and punishments that are assured to men in this life and the next have no necessary connection with their conduct vis-à-vis their fellows, morality, properly speaking, is no part of religion. For it to be a part, it is necessary that the injustice of man toward his fellow man attracts the severity of the gods, even though the criminal has not merited their anger by any negligence, or offense, that could have directly injured them.

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CHAPTER 2: On the Contradictions That Characterize This Period of Polytheism, and the Way in Which These Contradictions Disappear

The passage from the barbarous to the civilized state is a moment of great fermentation. Justice struggles against violence, the spirit of property against the spirit of theft, the principles of morality against the habit of force. For a long time men seek in vain for a fixed setting. They see themselves simultaneously assailed by the inconveniences of the situation they are leaving and those that are no less great—and are more unforeseen—of the situation they are entering.

Religion experiences this fermentation. The maxims that are introduced run against those that memory consecrates. The opinions that begin to be forgotten, those that begin to be established, encounter one another and clash.1

But as civilization progresses, morality identifies more with religion, and the confusion ceases and the contradictions disappear; the venality of the gods is still recognized; egoism cannot renounce this teaching, of which it makes so great use, and in various guises this opinion runs through the epochs. But it has suffered an important change. The gods have not yet become disinterested beings, but they have become honest men, in the ordinary meaning of the phrase. They insist that they be paid for doing good, but they no longer permit anyone to pay them to do evil.

The steps of this improvement are slow; many vestiges of the older notions mix with it and slow it. Even when more honorable opinions concerning the present conduct of the gods are adopted, their previous crimes are still recalled.

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By stages, however, the traditions that are unfavorable to them are relegated to an obscure past. One is hesitant to recount them, and soon one arrives at calling them into question.

Thus, by a fortunate reaction, morality, which has found a guarantee in religion, purifies and improves the religion that sanctions it.

There is an interesting observation to make concerning the men who at this period stubbornly recall the demeaning traditions. This apparent return to primitive opinions is often a beginning of unbelief. In the polytheism sans morality, it was to honor the gods, to exalt their power, that their jealousy and implacable vengeance were spoken of. After the introduction of morality into polytheism, however, it is to insult them and to lower them in men’s estimation. What believers once recounted in good faith, as acts worthy of respect, unbelievers later repeated with irony, as scandals. Thus Bossuet and Voltaire meet, and entertain their readers with Samuel hacking to pieces Agag. The first extols this ferocious action, the second denounces it. The faithful of the seventeenth century see in it a model to follow; the philosophes of the eighteenth a misdeed to detest.

Unbelief in fact is always found close to the complete triumph of morality in religion. As soon as men have been thoroughly convinced of the necessity of morality, their logic forces them to compare the facts that religion reports, and the doctrines it teaches, with the new principles it is called upon to sanction. It follows that when these facts or teachings seem to them contrary to these principles, they call the former into doubt; they are even more obliged to do so insofar as the habit of reflection makes progress in all minds, the fables that were previously adopted without any difficulty suddenly serve as a defense of the guilty.2 Struck by this danger, man no longer accepts the belief except under the express condition that it will protect morality. As the price of not contesting their existence, he demands from the gods that they make themselves useful; and far from recognizing, as previously, that they have absolute rights, he imposes duties upon them. Morality therefore becomes a sort of touchstone, a test, for religious notions, 761 which cannot fail to contest a part of them, and to weaken the confidence one has in the rest.

This is a consequence of the intervention of this third faculty about which we have previously spoken: reasoning, constituting itself as the judge of the debates that arise between sentiment and interest, in turn calling into question the desires of the former and the calculations of the latter.

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CHAPTER 3: That the Poems of Hesiod Are Contemporaneous with the Revolution We Are Describing

The poems of Hesiod,1 like those of Homer, have come to us thanks to the rhapsodists who, performing them from city to city on the public squares, transmitted them from one generation to another, until the point when the copyists assembled them, putting them into writing while introducing numerous interpolations that 763 have often called their authenticity into question.2 But the period in which these poems had to be composed is no less indicated by their very nature. These are didactic works, subsequent to the primitive epic; works in which reflection dominates in place of inspiration, in which the desire to produce artistic effects replaces 764 the spontaneous élan and naïve candor of the most ancient poets; finally, in which individuality leads authors to digressions on their personal situation, hopes, and fears. At different times, Hesiod speaks of himself, his position, his private relations, while, whether in the Iliad or the Odyssey, everything relates to the subject, nothing to the writer.

The different parts that enter into the composition of the poems of Hesiod have no proportion among themselves. Sometimes a dry abbreviator, sometimes an expansive orator, he does not subordinate the extent of particular developments to the measure of the whole; what determines him is the quantity of material that he was able to gather from the most discordant traditions; this is a second symptom that the social state was already more complex and that poetry was a means rather than a goal.

If needed, the style of Hesiod would be a third proof that he wrote at a moment of crisis and social agitation. This style, even though his sweetness has been noted by Quintilian, is somber, serious, often sad; and what demonstrates that this character pertained to his period and not him alone, is that he seized upon all the occasions he encountered or manufactured to give himself over to poetical descriptions and digressions. But in the midst of his efforts to be only a poet, he constantly returned to being a thinker. The earth is full of ills, he says, the sea as well.3 The description of the different ages of the human race ends with the most ominous prophecies.4 It is with regret that the Fates allot mortals a few happy days, and Sadness, seated near them, also walks on their spindles, her eyes wet with tears. The complaints of Hesiod against the tyranny of the great and kings are but the expression of the disorders of a social state that is still imperfect, troubled by the 765 very ones charged with making it respected.5 Reflection, the inevitable product of this agitation and malaise, constantly resurfaces, indefatigable and disconsoling. Man has taken the irreversible step, this return to himself and to the misfortune of his condition. He has discovered the pitfalls with which he is surrounded, the dangers of trust, and the deceptions of enthusiasm. After this discovery, no illusion lasts for long. The purity of the soul, the élan of sentiment, sometimes lessen the burden that weighs over the imagination and heart. Some privileged geniuses liberate themselves (we will see an example in Sophocles), but the majority of writers remain bent under the weight: poetry drags after it a second-thought that is against its nature, from which it seeks in vain to be freed. It struggles for several centuries, it varies its forms, it calculates its efforts, it resumes at least the appearances of life, but it carries within itself the seed of death.

The contradictions that the social state under whose influence Hesiod wrote introduces into religious ideas strike the attentive reader at each moment. One first sees, as in Homer, Jupiter consumed by love for a mortal,6 Minerva encouraging Hercules to wound Mars;7 Mars, as a consequence, wounded and overturned by Hercules.8 Olympus is established only by the victory of the gods over the Titans, their rivals, who attack them with equal forces;9 Typhoeus would have seized the empire of the universe if Jupiter had not prevented him, by striking him with lightning.10 Hesiod’s Tartarus11 is similar to that of the Odyssey in all things. The defeated are confined there;12 Gyges, Cottus, and Briareus are its wardens,13 with their one hundred arms and fifty heads.14 The crimes that men commit against other men are not punished there.

The Works and Days contains this fundamental idea of the first period of polytheism, that the gods and the mortals were originally one race, and they were born 766 at the same time;15 in other words, that the gods do not differ from men except by force and power.16

Their perversity is still a received view. Jupiter envies the human race the use of fire because humanity is an object of his hatred.17 He takes away the warning signs of diseases for fear that the mortals who are thus alerted will avoid them.18 He condemns them to eternal discords.19 All the gods agree to make Pandora more attractive in order to cause men to perish.20 Prometheus knows Jupiter so well that he forbids his brother Epimetheus from receiving any gift from this treacherous god.21

But alongside these vestiges of a religion that attributes to its idols all the imperfections and vices, the maxims announced by the poet prove that the gods are already improved. Jupiter, he says, fills just kings and peoples with good things.22 He punishes the deceitful and deflates the proud.23 He gave Equity to man as his supreme law.24 This goddess is seated next to him.25 Thirty thousand gods constantly cross the earth, strict observers of vices and virtues.26 The Furies have emerged from the depths of the netherworld to punish perjury.27 Adultery, incest, the robbing of orphans, and ingratitude toward parents merit severe punishments,28 and these punishments extend to the posterity of the guilty,29 because it was sensed early on that for the honor of divine justice, the execution of its decrees 767 should be placed in another world, or in the future of this one. Finally, the gods reward work, condemn sloth,30 and take away ill-gotten wealth.31

It is not only in these general ideas that Hesiod combines contradictory notions; the same combination is reproduced in his descriptions of particular divinities. Here, Jupiter, subject to error, is the plaything of Prometheus.32 Elsewhere, he is twice called “he who knows the eternal decrees,”33 and the poet exhausts himself in theological subtleties to harmonize the omniscience of the god with the success of the artifices of man. The first god, he says, knows ruse, and lets himself be deceived only because he wished ill to mortals.34 Anthropomorphism has introduced similar sophisms into all mythologies.

In the “Shield of Hercules,” the hideous, terrifying Fates are only malevolent and bloody genii.35 They drag the dead through the mêlée; they dispute over the wounded; they even sacrifice those who have not received any wounds. In the Theogony, they are the daughters of Justice;36 they pursue only the guilty, but are unbending in their severity against the crimes of gods and of men.37 This expression “the crimes of gods” in the same verse where punishment is entrusted to avenging divinities seems to us to clearly indicate the mixing of ideas of different epochs.38

We would be able to infinitely extend this list. Hesiod twice calls the Styx an incorruptible divinity,39 and a few verses later he calls it a horrible, abominable monster.40 In the Theogony, Nemesis is the daughter of Night, the scourge of mortals; she indiscriminately showers evils on them and enjoys the spectacle of their miseries.41 In Works and Days, it is a divinity that lives in the height of the heavens 768 with Shame or Modesty.42 Venus herself, like Bhavani of the Indians, has two characters. She appears on the Ocean, having in her train love, fecundity, an entourage full of seduction, charm, and joy;43 but soon she engenders necessity, death, and hatred.44 Medusa gives birth to Echidna, an admirable, beautiful virgin, whose features the sun loves to display with its rays.45 Two verses later this beautiful virgin is a frightful serpent.46

Here is therefore realized what we said about the characteristics that distinguish the transition from one period to another. Opinions are mixed, men appear guilty of inconsistencies and contradictions that in truth are found in things; but these inconsistencies are going to disappear, these contradictions will be harmonized, as the present triumphs over the past.

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CHAPTER 4: On Pindar1

Pindar writing, at least according to the popular chronology, more than five hundred years after Hesiod, almost never falls into the inconsistencies with which the latter is filled. As much as he can, he rejects everything in the ancient traditions that does not accord with the maxims that have become an essential part of the public belief of his time.

Not only are all his general claims conformed to this tendency. Justice is seated beside Jupiter.2 All virtues come from the gods.3 The felicity of the irreproachable man is alone assured, that of the wicked vanishes like a dream.4 These general assertions would not be sufficient proof of a change in religion, since we see similar ones scattered here and there in the Iliad and the Theogony, alongside features that belie them; but Pindar makes a positive and explicit principle of the necessity to purify mythology in the direction of morality. It becomes men, he says, only to say 770 honorable things about the immortals; then, even when they invent something, they will commit no fault.5

This passage is remarkable in two respects. It indicates the progress that had caused the tales that are unfavorable to the gods, and even to heroes,6 to be rejected; and, moreover, it contains the acknowledgment by the poet that he chose among the established traditions, according to certain moral criteria, those that were most in keeping with the new ideas of dignity, order, and justice that had entered the religion.

It should be noted that this moral critique that guides Pindar, even though it ought to end in unbelief, does not yet lead the poet to that conclusion; it is not the reality that he calls into doubt; the marvelous is not what angers him; he does not seek to undermine belief in what really constitutes the mythology—that is, the action of gods vis-à-vis men. He merely thinks that the reality has been disfigured, either by inadvertence or malevolence. Envy and perversity, he says, have secretly accredited this erroneous account.7 He adds8 that dazzling lies have often misled men and disguised the truth from them. In this way, the sweet words of Homer and his enchanting verses have clothed deception with an imposing authority, and his genius has captivated the imagination of credulous mortals.9 Pindar recognizes therefore that the core of the fables is true, that the place occupied by the supernatural ought to remain, but he is distrustful of the later inventions and embellishments; he examines them, not like a mocking or hostile skeptic, but as a serious and orthodox believer; he is attached to the belief even as he purifies it. The tales are not in his eyes materials that one has the right to draw from as he wishes; they are facts from which he has the duty of stripping additions that pervert them.

If he speaks of Tantalus, it is by substituting a more decent fiction for the popular teaching; I cannot regard, he adds, the gods as intemperate and voracious. 771 Far from us be this wicked thought!10 If he was often moved by the instability of human things,11 and if he allowed himself to be overcome by that melancholy that is so natural to meditative spirits, he never once uttered a word that would accuse the gods, or tax them with base and cruel jealousy.12 If we find in one of his odes, as we do in Hesiod, the fundamental axiom of Homeric mythology, the race of gods and that of men declared to be one and the same,13 elsewhere he speaks of the gods and their superiority over the human race, of their universal knowledge, in a way to indicate the immense distance that, quite recently, had separated the two races.14 In his ninth Olympian ode, following the example of previous poets, he begins by recounting the battles of the gods; but suddenly stopping, he exclaims: Far from me to insult the celestial majesty with my verses; and he brings these profane accounts to a halt.15 The author of the Iliad was very far from experiencing similar scruples. Thus, Pythagoras said that he had seen Homer in the netherworld, tormented like Hesiod for having slandered the immortals.

Finally, in the two places where Pindar speaks of Nemesis, between the two characters16 that Hesiod gave to this goddess, he chooses the most instructive and moral. It is no longer Nemesis, scourge of mortals, it is Nemesis who punishes the abuse of power, and Pindar invites his hero not to anger her;17 it is Nemesis who judges the actions of men and whom the Hyperboreans are happy to have never provoked.

We will briefly note here how much the progression of Greek religion lets itself be clearly seen in this conception of Nemesis; in Homer, it is not at all a goddess but an exclamation, a sort of invocation that deflects evil signs and scandal; in Hesiod, she appears doubly, by turns daughter of the abyss or inhabitant of the heavens. Pindar rejects those of her attributes that make her a malevolent force;18 he 772 does so just in the way that the tragedians will invoke her;19 and, later, her justice will not be limited to material punishments, by means of a new refinement, by a new delicacy of expression and thought, she will become the companion of moderation; even her statue will recall to the Greeks how dangerous are the errors of a pride without limits and the intoxications of power. The block of marble employed by Phidias will be the one that the Persians, believing themselves assured of victory, destined to immortalize the success of their arms and the enslavement of the Greeks by means of a magnificent monument.20 Marathon, however, saw them flee, perish in the swamps, or redden with their blood the waves in which they cast themselves, and the marble recouped from them became the goddess who presides over fairness in endeavors and modesty in one’s hopes.

This idea is transmitted, refined from century to century, and six hundred years after Pindar,21 Mesomedes still celebrates it in his verses.

“O Nemesis!” he says, “winged goddess, who decides concerning human life; goddess with stern look, who holds in a strong hand the reins of our destinies, we miserable mortals, prompt to error; you see the pride that destroys us, the envy that devours us; the wheel of fate always turns without leaving a trace, you follow it, invisible, lowering the proud brow that excessive prosperity raises, moderating the abjection of the unfortunate, entering into all hearts to calm them, and always having a finger on the scales in order to reestablish equality; be favorable to us, you who distribute justice, winged Nemesis, with the meditative look, inaccessible to error, never deceiving humans, and only having Fairness as companion, Fairness, which extends its white wings in the air, powerful Fairness, who preserves us from ourselves, and from your severity, and from Tartarus.”22

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CHAPTER 5: On the Underworld of Pindar Compared with That of Homer and Hesiod

The comparison between the underworld of Pindar and that of Homer and Hesiod is singularly helpful in casting light on the subject of our investigations; but in order to be truly useful, this comparison demands steady attention and sharp eyes; the differences easily escape superficial inspection.

For the one who looks on the empire of the dead only from afar, nothing seems to be significantly changed. The topography of the future world (if one can use this phrase) remains in many respects the same. The same names are used, the same great divisions continue. Everything, however, has taken on a different destination; everything contributes to promoting the new goal of religion.

We have seen in the primitive netherworld a place of torments where only the personal enemies of the gods groan. By a natural and facile transformation, when the gods declare themselves the defenders of morality, this place of torment is no longer devoted to their particular vengeance but to the punishment of all crimes. The idea of punishment entails that of judgments and sentences. As a consequence, the imagination seeks something from which to form a tribunal among the dead. What is simpler than to extend the jurisdiction of kings and elders exercised over the actions committed during life, a jurisdiction already recognized in Homer’s netherworld, but which was exercised only on the particular quarrels of those who live there?1 Before these judges, therefore, appear, no longer the dead to resolve momentary differences, but each deceased at his arrival at the dark river. He presents himself, burdened with the weight of his faults or accompanied by the memory of his virtues; and this inflexible tribunal, holding the fatal urn in hand, 774 unmasks ruse and cunning, condemns injustice to atone for its ill-gotten successes, and punishes the arrogant power that the tomb has disarmed.

Rigor exercised against the guilty dead necessarily changes the destiny of the innocent or virtuous dead. They no longer make the place in which they dwell resound with sighs and complaints; they no longer regret life; they no longer give themselves over to crude or sullen pleasures. Their abode becomes one of the purest felicity. Earlier, everything there was sadder, darker, more somber than on earth; now everything takes on more pleasant and beautiful colors; the winds are scented, the grass softer, the sun more resplendent. Commerce with the gods, contemplation of the stars, the revelation of the secrets of nature, all the elevated and refined pleasures are the eternal share of the blessed shades.

Let us see if this is not in fact the underworld of Pindar.

In one of the Fortunate Isles, sweetly refreshed by the ocean winds and decorated with sparkling flowers,2 live those who, lit by an eternal sun and free of pains and fatigue, three times in this life3 have rejected the temptation of crime and injustice. They do not laboriously plow the rebellious earth, nor dangerously cross the treacherous sea.4 Exempt from tears, their days are spent in communion with the favorites of the immortals. Their occupations are songs, hymns, competitions, concerts, games; or in the shadow of the groves scented by the incense offered on earth to the gods, in their conversations they recall the memories of the past. Saturn governs them, assisted by Rhadamanthus, and perhaps Aeacus, who earlier had pronounced on the disputes of the gods themselves. In Erebus, on the contrary, where perpetual darkness reigns, criminals handed over to eternal oblivion are subject to the torments of a restlessness that will never end.

Who cannot recognize the progression of ideas here? The entire kingdom of shadows in Homer is a place of groans and sighs. Pleasures and pains there are entirely physical. There are no judges for the actions of this life. Aeacus is not named there; Rhadamanthus inhabits the Elysium that is not the dwelling of the dead,5 and the jurisdiction of Minos is only an incidental judgment over passing 775 disputes. Pluto punishes the assaults that are denounced to him, but his function is not to punish crime; he only yields to the demands of those who implore him; he grants them their request, not as being equitable, but as he would hear any other prayer. He does not wait for humans in the underworld, he sends the Furies against those living on earth, like Jupiter and Juno make Iris or Mercury descend to earth to pursue their enemies.

The netherworld in Pindar, on the contrary, is a place of merited punishments and rewards; punishments and pleasures there are intellectual and moral. There is an established tribunal; Saturn presides over it, Saturn, whom Homer presents as deposed by Jupiter and wearing chains.6

Let us further observe how much more clearly and explicitly than Homer the poet affirms the intellectual and almost divine nature of the soul. The body, he says, is the prey of all-powerful death; but the soul, which comes from a divinity, cannot die.7

Pindar, however, despite his efforts to escape the law that always influences his descriptions of the world to come, is despite himself subject to this law. In painting the occupations of the just, he is forced to return to the pleasures of this life, choosing, however, only the purest and noblest of them. The imagination is so impotent in its conceptions of happiness that it is reduced to borrow, for the pleasures of the future world, those of here-below that are insufficient for it. Thus, as perfect as it is, a certain sadness hovers over Elysium; but this sadness is different from that of primitive polytheism. The shadows in Homer are sad with the sadness of barbarism; in Pindar, their sadness is that of civilization. The former are children who cry and pout; the others are old people who, casting a calm, but serious, gaze on their past life, still have something melancholic underneath a happy exterior.

Let us end these short observations on Pindar with a reflection pertaining to the steady changes in the situation of poets, observations that the reading of Hesiod has already suggested to us and which Pindar confirms. The poets of the time of Homer, wandering about but welcome in all palaces, seated next to princes, do not speak of their fate because they could only congratulate themselves on their lot. At the time of Hesiod, their ideal existence gave way to the common and painful features of life. The fall of kings deprived them of protectors; the birth of republics 776 is accompanied by storms; they now tell us about their lot because they have something to complain about. From the time of Pindar they forbid themselves from even complaining. It is not that they are happier but that they are more timid. The elegant and superficial author of the Anacharsis—we say superficial because profundity is not in the learning that compiles, but in the perceptiveness that appreciates—raised in the literature of the masterworks of Greece, but never entering deeply into their spirit, extols, it is true, the long prosperity of Pindar, his statue that bears a crown,8 the honors granted him at Delphi,9 the oracles given in his favor, the sacred banquets he attended; but it suffices to read the poet himself to detect the error of the panegyrist. Pindar is constantly occupied with begging for mercy. Everything frightens him. He exhausts himself in constant efforts to disarm malevolence; he does not succeed. Struck with a fine by his fellow citizens,10 defeated five times by Corinna,11 he crawls to the feet of the tyrant of Syracuse, fearing his anger, begging his favors, and in exchange lavishing praise that history belies.12 A few attempts to repulse the arrows of envy by appearing to disdain it, the sincere, or affected, regret for the days when interest did not sully the language of poetry,13 the praise of mediocrity,14 commonplaces of all those who have not been able to acquire power or wealth, do not deprive the songs of Pindar of their striking character of dependency that pains us in the midst of the beauties that dazzle us, and we sigh to see such talent resign itself to occupying a subordinate rank, and hence to become greedy and flattering.

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CHAPTER 6: That the Same Progression Can Be Seen in the Historians

The progression we just noticed in the poets ought to exist in the historians, albeit with different indicators.

When the poets feel the need to purify religion, they modify the facts, while historians change the causes.

We do not have a Greek historian who is contemporaneous with Homeric polytheism. Greece then only counted poets; but we have a historian who by his religious notions corresponds well enough to the period represented by Hesiod.

This historian is Herodotus. As he is later in date than Pindar, while his polytheism is nonetheless much less refined, one must explain the reasons for this anachronism in his opinions, and therefore we have to look at his character for a few moments, as well as his circumstances, and the influence of these two things on the portrait he transmitted to us.

Herodotus, a man who was simultaneously curious, gullible, and timid, maintained an equal respect for all traditions and beliefs, at whatever time and to whatever people they belonged; his goal, as he himself tells us, was to write down what each had told him.1 In this endeavor he appears to have abstracted completely from any personal judgment. When he dares to avow that this-or-that anecdote appears doubtful to him, he carefully adds that another may perhaps find it plausible.2 His superstition is well known; proof is found on every page. Does Hippias announce to the inhabitants of Corinth that they will have much to suffer from the Athenians? No man, adds Herodotus, had a more perfect knowledge of the 778 oracles.3 But Hippias, expelled with all of his family by the citizens of Athens, had an obvious interest in representing them to the Corinthians as dangerous enemies. However, Herodotus preferred to honor a supernatural language rather than recognize the discourse of a fugitive tyrant slandering (as they all do) his fellow citizens. The inhabitants of Potidea besieged by Artabazus, do they attribute an accident that caused many Persians to perish to Neptune’s anger, in this way avenging himself on those who had insulted his statue? Herodotus hastens to give his agreement to this explanation.4 He thinks that if none of the defeated after the battle of Plataea tried to find refuge at the altars of Ceres, it was because this goddess had denied entrance to them because they had delivered her temple at Eleusis to the flames.5 He does not speak about worship and the various fables except with constant fear; he asks pardon of everything that he writes about the gods, the heroes, and priests;6 he scrupulously omits nothing, rejects nothing, deepens nothing, explains nothing. Such a historian must confuse all teachings, without distinguishing their dates and without noting their contradictions. He must be the Herodotus of history, and he was.

We first of all find in his histories the character of the Homeric gods. Minerva employs prayers and reasons (these are his own words) with Jupiter, and cannot sway him.7 On the pyre, Croesus implores Apollo to save him from the danger that threatens him and recalls his many rich offerings.8 The discourse of this prince is nothing but the translation in prose of Chryses in the first book of the Iliad. Jupiter pursues the descendants of Phrixus with implacable anger because Cytissorus, his son, saved an unfortunate man that the Achaeans wanted to sacrifice.9 The gods legitimate the murder of Candaules by Gyges, and receive with pleasure the gifts of the murderer.10 They attach the success of endeavors not to justice, but to indifferent things, and to obedience to their arbitrary commands; 779 for example, in the war of the Lacedaemonians against the Tegeans, at the transferring of the skeleton of Orestes to Sparta.11 Their oracles are deceptive and ominous, and even the surnames that are given to several of their divinities allude to their perfidy. In reporting these surnames, Herodotus does not at all attempt to explain them, as later authors did. When he speaks of Jupiter Apatenor, it is Jupiter the Deceiver he indicates.12 His statements on the jealousy of the gods are explicit and precise, even though modern scholars had wanted, in this regard, to be his apologists.13 Not only does he attribute to Solon an opinion harmful to divine justice, when he has him respond to Croesus that the gods envy the happiness of men and are pleased to trouble them,14 but he adds in his own name that the anger of the gods manifested itself in a terrible manner in connection with this prince by punishing the one he judged to be the happiest of mortals.15 He returns frequently to this idea. God in his jealousy, he says, sends terrors to humans, or strikes them with blindness;16 and if life has its pleasures, this is to make their loss more painful.17

If we compare this opinion of Herodotus to that of Plato,18 who says that envy is not found among the gods, or that of Plutarch,19 who declares that the divine nature is incompatible with jealousy, fear, anger, and hatred, or later, that of Ammien Marcellin,20 who regards the fall of the great as an act of heavenly justice, we cannot mistake the change that progress has brought.

At the same time, Herodotus almost always offers a double explanation of the facts that he reports. This is a new, and striking, similarity of the historian to Hesiod. Thus, for example, after having said that Croesus was punished by the gods because of the overconfidence that his prosperity had inspired in him, he 780 says elsewhere that he bore the punishment of his ancestor, who had murdered his legitimate master;21 in this way, in the first view it is jealousy, in the second, divine justice, that accounts for the fall of Croesus. This is a quite singular justice, because the same gods had ordered the subjects of Candaules to submit to the murderer, who in this way rewarded the crime for which they punished his posterity.22

In several stories of Herodotus, religion is perfected by the development of human ideas.

Sometimes, the gods receive lessons in morality from humans that they are forced to receive out of shame, as it were; sometimes, they punish their worshippers for having insulted them by questions or prayers that presuppose they are wicked or mercenary.

Pactyas, a Lydian who revolted against Cyrus, having sought refuge in Cyme, a city of Aeolia, its inhabitants consulted the oracle of the Branchides to know if they ought to return the fugitive to the king of Persia, who demanded him. The oracle having counseled the extradition of this unfortunate man, one of their principal citizens who disagreed with this response took away the nests of the birds of the temple. The god indignantly complained that those who had sought refuge near him had been mistreated. Behold! said Aristodicus, you protect suppliants, and you order us to give over ours! Yes, said the god, in order that being guilty of an impiety, you will perish more promptly because of it, and no longer consult the oracles to know if it is permitted to you to commit a crime.23 Who can fail to recognize here an amalgam of two opposed, and successive, opinions? The first counsel of the oracle had been simple and affirmative; and without the ruse of Aristodicus the inhabitants of Cyme would have followed this barbarous counsel. The second response of the god is but a belated justification which had become necessary and was invented after the fact.

Another anecdote shows us the gods improving by degrees, but in a way to still allow men to count on their venality and perfidy. Cleomenes, marching against Argos at the head of the Spartiates, arrives on the banks of a river in the territory of the Argives. Soon, according to custom he offers sacrifices to the god of this river, that he would protect the Lacedaemonians. But his sacrifices are rejected, 781 and he pays homage to the loyalty of the god who does not want to betray his compatriots.24 In this narrative, the attempt of the Spartan general to seduce a god by his sacrifices proves the conventional opinion that these means of seduction were effective. The resistance of the god proves that this opinion was beginning to weaken.

The story of Glaucus is of the same kind. Glaucus, consulting the oracle of Delphi in order to know if he ought to return a deposit he received after taking an oath; the oracle in turn declaring the infamy of perjury; Glaucus, terrified, renouncing the iniquity that he was contemplating; but the gods punishing his mere intention, did so to his most remote posterity25—all this indicates a phase of religion in which men still thought that the gods could approve crime, but the gods began to be angry at this assumption, taking it to be an insult.

The conduct of the inhabitants of Chios, who had acquired a small province in Mysia by a violation of hospitality, announces yet another step. They did not dare offer in their sacrifices any of the products of this territory. They did not dedicate to any god any of the cakes made of the wheat of that province; they did not sprinkle over the head of any victim the barley they harvested there. In a word, everything that came from an impure source is unclean and is banished from the temples and sacred places.26

In this way Herodotus felt the pressure of the atmosphere that began to surround him. He bent every effort to place next to facts, despite traditions, some cause that did honor to the justice of heaven. He was pleased to show us Cleomenes punished by the loss of his reason for having toppled Demaratus from the throne by corrupting the Pythia. He does not want anyone to assign another cause to the madness of Cleomenes.27 The Spartans attributed it, he said, to the habit he had contracted among the Scythians of getting drunk, but I think rather that he paid this price for Demaratus.28 Arcesilaus, king of Cyrene, received death 782 as the price of his cruelty against defenseless enemies;29 Pheretima, his mother, for having avenged her son with too much inhumanity:30 so certain is he, continues the historian, that the gods hate and punish those who carry their resentment too far.31

These assertions of Herodotus more clearly bear the imprint of the revolution operated in the religious notions as they contrast with the preceding legends. In the story of Arcesilaus, for example, it is not for having committed a barbarous action, it is for not having understood an oracle, that this prince is the object of the gods’ anger.32 Herodotus himself recognizes it. He was the victim, he says, of his disobedience, whether voluntary or involuntary.33 But, after having paid this tribute to previous opinions, the historian returns to the opinions of his time and sees justice there where previous generations only saw power.

Let us move on from Herodotus to the historians who followed him; we will see between him and them the same distance that to us seemed to separate Pindar from Hesiod.

Among these historians we will not place Thucydides; this famous Athenian hardly deals with religion in his work, and when he speaks of it, it is with a good deal of disdain. He seems to have advanced his century in terms of unbelief.

But Xenophon in his Hellenica, which he wrote about a hundred years after Herodotus, constantly attributes good and bad fortune to the anger of the gods, based on the virtues and vices of humans. He recognizes that it is in the divine natures to cast down the powerful and raise up the weak,34 but he does not speak of the envy of the gods, and one must conclude from his words that Xenophon knew more than twenty centuries ago, as we know today, that injustice and power are found together. When Tissaphernes declares war against the Spartans in violation of treaties, Xenophon shows us Agesilaus being happy over this event. Why? 783 Tissaphernes, he says, made the gods his enemies and his betrayal indissolubly links the gods to the Greek party.35 When, in the Anabasis, the Persians imprison Clearchus, Xenophon promises victory to his compatriots because justice is on their side.36 This doctrine is developed still more clearly in the story of the conspiracy that delivered Thebes from the Lacedaemonian tyranny. After having recounted the success of this conspiracy hatched by the Theban exiles, the Spartans, he says, were punished by those against whom they had been unjust. Until then, no mortal force could have defeated them. The gods overthrow their empire without employing any other hands than those of the exiled in order to provide a memorable proof of their power and their fairness. We can, he continues, bring forth many similar examples, among both the Greeks and the barbarians. One would see in them that the gods never neglect to strike those who execute or even plan crimes.37 If the opinion that the gods were the protectors of morality had not been the conventional opinion, Xenophon would not have professed it, because he of all men was the most subject to the teachings, as well as practices, of the religion of his country. We will demonstrate this truth later, when we consider him as a philosopher.

The introduction of morality into religion places all facts in a new light; this is because now the facts are in the historians’ hands, and receive their stamp. The writers subsequent to Herodotus assign moral causes to events to which they previously had assigned no causes. In speaking of the destruction of Sybaris by the Crotonates, he simply says that the latter took this city.38 Heraclidus of Pontus, disciple of Plato and Aristotle, claims that the Sybarites, having massacred the suppliants, drew the celestial anger upon themselves.39 Herodotus sees in the tragic death of Polycratus only an effect of the envy of the gods. Amasis, he tells us, learning that the tyrant of Samos had recovered his ring, broke off all communication with him, foreseeing that a felicity that was so complete would infallibly draw the anger of the gods, who are always the enemies of human prosperity.40 Diodorus, writing at another period of religion, attributes to the king of Egypt a more 784 moral and honorable motive. Amasis, according to him, was not unaware that a prince who governs unjustly cannot avoid the punishment destined for tyranny by heaven.41 Thus, in this passage of Diodorus (who, however, is not consistent in his religious opinions, because in his time religion was already very much weakened), in this passage of Diodorus, as we were saying, the gods are equitable; in Herodotus, they are only jealous.42

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CHAPTER 7: Of the Same Progression among the Greek Tragedians

One perhaps will be surprised that we seek to discern a progressive development in three authors who lived pretty much at the same time; the Greek tragedians all died within a span of twenty years. But if the first steps of intelligence are slow because of the obstacles it encounters when it begins to walk,1 the changes it effects in religious ideas soon become much more rapid. When the first occurs, the second becomes a necessity; they follow in this way with an accelerated speed, and writers who are almost contemporary often mark two different epochs.

In a certain respect, it would enter into our subject to go back to the origin of tragedy. The invention of dramatic representations had to precede the pleasure they cause in spectators; nonetheless, the hope of this pleasure is the sole cause independent of religion that one can assign to these representations. It is a vicious circle from which the priesthood helps us escape; its festivals, its ceremonies, opened a career to genius upon which it eagerly entered, but which ended by excluding those who had first given the example. These, in order to revenge themselves, later proscribed what they themselves had invented.

In Greece as in India, tragedy was first a religious form and the act of attending one was an act of worship; this spectacle imported from abroad was then at once terrifying and grotesque, a mixture that eminently belongs to the spirit of priests, some traces of which we perceive in the buffooneries of Aristophanes, which have seemed inexplicable to moderns for a long time. Animals figured in the festivals of Rama, often half-god and half-human; and in the first attempts of the Greeks, in the feasts of Bacchus the Satyrs occupied the place of bears and apes in India.

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The genius of the Greeks did not wait long to reject this rather chaotic amalgam.

A little after Thespis, the Satyrs no longer appeared on the Greek scene. Mythology continued to furnish the content of dramas; but what was priestly: the monstrosity of the gods, the orgies, the cosmogonic struggles, was increasingly effaced. One still finds them in one of the works of Aeschylus; one does not find them any-more in the works of Sophocles. The mystery cults we will speak about in the following book are for these two poets, as for Euripides (who is in a separate category), the occasion for numerous allusions; but the part of the mystery cults that is especially priestly enters much less than their moral part, and even this part is shown in a different light. The tragedians purify it without doubting it, taking its maxims and its theory, and separating it from the practices and artificial duties that denature and sully it in the mysteries.2 The great bases of religious morality, submission to the gods, the necessity of a spotless life, the teaching of devotion and sacrifice, were corrupted in the mysteries by the alloy of the priestly spirit. The tragedians, not being dominated by this spirit, emancipated both morality and tragedy from this admixture.

Unfortunately, such investigations would lead us too afar; we cannot forget that we are principally occupied with the popular influence of beliefs, and the way this influence is modified by progress. If we gave ourselves to investigations of the facts that were borrowed, especially by Aeschylus, from foreign mythologies, we would needlessly repeat what has already been said3 of the triumph of the Greek spirit over the teachings brought by the sailors and colonies, and concerning the elements that constituted the polytheism of Greece.4 We also ought to reject everything that is only related to the philosophic sects that the tragedians adopted.5 Elsewhere, we will have to treat this subject extensively when in another work we recount the fall of polytheism, and the part that the philosophers played in this great intellectual event, starting with the Ionian school. Now, however interesting these digressions might appear, whether under a historical or philosophical or literary point of view, we have had to forbid ourselves from pursuing them. We can say nothing that is superfluous when time and space barely suffice for the necessary.

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There must be more contradictions concerning the character of the gods in tragedy than in epic poetry. In the latter, character lets itself be known by actions, while in tragedy it is manifested by the axioms that, in the mouths of interested or passionate interlocutors, vary according to their passions or interests; sometimes they want to deceive those who listen to them, sometimes they themselves are deceived; other times they say something other than what they believe, or seek to believe only what they desire. The character of the gods is practical in epic and theoretical in tragedy.

Another feature renders the testimony of the tragedians more or less suspect: their allusions to intrigues, customs, and abuses that are present in the mind of the spectators. Eager to elicit immediate applause, the dramatic poets ascribe opinions to their heroes that are in advance of their time. Thus we see in Aeschylus a constant effort to elevate Athens above Delphi, even in religion, an attempt that was hardly consonant with the respect this holy city inspired in all of Greece as the center of its belief, toward which all its tribes competed in displaying deference and veneration; later, the poet lavished praises on the Areopagus that the subject of the play did not naturally raise but which were the expected defense of this august tribunal, whose authority, already shaky, was soon to succumb under Pericles.6 Among the traditions relative to Oedipus, Sophocles preferred to choose those that most bring to light the piety of the Athenians, the gentleness of their mores, and their respect for suppliants.7 One of his tragedies8 has for its goal nothing but to celebrate Theseus, the favorite hero of Athens, and to better justify his praises the poet puts maxims of moderation and morality in the mouth of the son of Aegeus that the Theseus of ancient fables most assuredly did not profess.9 This is not to say that the unsuitability did not have its advantages. If these allusions 788 that alter the historical truth reflect badly on the century of the hero, they present the century of the author quite positively.

Aeschylus flourished about the same time as Pindar. Religion, however, appears much less improved in the tragedies of the former than in the odes of the latter. If we grant an implicit faith to his Prometheus, we would go back to the Iliad. The dominant thought of this drama, which sparkles with severe beauties and is so frightening in its conception, is the hatred of Jupiter for man.10 This master of thunder is cruel, pitiless, ungrateful, treacherous, and brutal, even in his loves.11 Olympus is represented as his prey.12 He governs it by terrible laws that he alone has made, threatening with his spear the gods he has overturned.13 He is a usurper newly established on a throne he attained by parricide;14 he is detested by the other gods;15 antiquity yields to his arbitrary decrees and bends while groaning under his culpable will,16 because, says Aeschylus, a new master is always harsh.17 The gods in this play are so similar to mortals that the fall of Jupiter is announced as desirable and possible.18 The language of Prometheus is that of a defeated faction in a political revolution.19 He defies the son of Saturn as able to rule only temporarily.20 The times will change, he cries, they will teach Jupiter himself to know unhappiness.21 Have I not seen two sovereigns chased from the empire of the heavens?22 Jupiter, bearing the burden of the paternal curse,23 will lose in turn this empire at the hand of one of his children,24 and I prefer to suffer, chained on this rock, than to be his slave.25

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Even in the other tragedies of Aeschylus, the gods are always ready to betray their worshippers.26 They employ ruse and lying against man.27 They leave cities when they are taken;28 and they are retained only by the force of sacrifices.29 When he puts on his cloak of purple, Agamemnon fears that so much splendor might excite their jealousy.

But to judge Aeschylus properly, one must bring his personal character into the discussion. His impetuous, sometimes wild genius naturally orients him to the most stormy periods of religion and, consequently, the most dramatic. He seems to regret the chaos from which he is sadly compelled to depart. Those cosmogonic forces, teeming in the abyss, impatient to bring forth, as well as to engulf, what they have produced, those terrifying shocks, those struggles of nature, those unbridled passions, transported into the moral world as a legacy of the former disorder of the physical world, please this powerful imagination, which feels strong enough to dominate them; a Titan himself, Aeschylus loves to measure himself vis-à-vis the Titans.

Add republican ideas to these personal traits. Aeschylus composed his tragedies at the time when the king of Persia at the head of a million slaves once again threatened to invade Greece; and the poet whose arm had fought valiantly for his country at Marathon reproduced in his verses that horror for servitude and that love of liberty that had inspired his own exploits.

Hence that proud and restless disposition that influenced his private life as well as his works, and which led him far from that Athens which he had defended when a literary defeat rendered that place hateful to him.30 This attitude manifests itself not only in his conceptions but in his abrupt, staccato style, often harsh and even bizarre. The aftershock of the storm continued even when the storm began to ebb. The same character marks the splendors with which Aeschylus accompanied his dramatic representations. These colossal splendors bear the mark of a gigantic universe. The terrible effect produced by the appearance of the Furies upon the women who attended the spectacle is well known.31

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And yet, one should note, his century obliges our poet to depict a gentler religion and gods who are more just. These Titans, these monsters with one hundred arms and one hundred heads, contemporary opinion forced him to disarm them and to offer to the Greeks who heard him less hideous forms and better idols. Almost despite himself, he made these longtime unconquered powers serve the triumph of eternal justice; and these divinities, once terribly feared, become benevolent toward the men they previously pursued with unbridled hostility.

One must not consider each tragedy of Aeschylus in isolation. The combination of several is necessary to form a complete whole.

Agamemnon, for example, the Libation Bearers, and the Eumenides composed a trilogy destined to show, first of all, crime triumphant, then this crime punished by another crime; finally, the expiation of this last one putting an end to the calamities and misdeeds of the family of Atreus.

In the same way, the Prometheus that we possess is only one-third of the story of Prometheus. Aeschylus had presented him as the benefactor of the human race, then as persecuted by the gods, angry at the favors he had granted mortals, and Prometheus Unbound ends this drama by showing this hero set free by Hercules, and with him making peace with Jupiter and with men, those he protected.

These trilogies seem to us the obvious expression of the development of Greek polytheism, since in the same poet traditions succeed one another, always less crude than the previous, because of the mores that grow gentler and the ideas that become more refined. In this way, what was a contradiction in Hesiod is a progress in Aeschylus, and we understand that after having offered to our eyes the acts of violence of the Homeric gods in their frightening starkness, the same author places morality under the aegis of these improved gods. The divinity that mortals call Justice is the daughter of Jupiter.32 In vain do the guilty flatter themselves that the gods neglect human affairs;33 on the contrary, their Providence watches over the house of virtuous men;34 and the prayers of the wicked are powerless to alter them.35 It is an ancient and sacred law that blood that darkens the earth demands 791 and obtains blood.36 No one exchanges innocence for crime with impunity.37 Finally, the song in which the Furies announce the evils that will be spread over the world if someone disheartens them and they no longer punish misdeeds, is a poetic plea in favor of the support that religion gives to morality, because, says the poet, crimes against men are the inevitable consequence of impiety toward the gods.38

If it is true, as Quintilian recounts, that the Athenians, still finding some revolting things in Aeschylus, had authorized later poets to correct his plays, when they allowed them, thus corrected, to compete with those of living authors,39 this would be another explanation of the different maxims that are found in them; but this explanation would lead to the same result.

Study attentively the Minerva of Aeschylus in order to compare it with previous ones and you will see the progression. There are three Minervas in Greek religion: that of the Iliad, that of the Odyssey, that of Aeschylus in the Eumenides. The latter is the ideal-type of the gods, such as the progress of knowledge had constructed it, as Theseus in Sophocles is the ideal-type of the hero.

When one passes from Aeschylus to Sophocles, one believes he has come to a more serene sky and breathes purer air. One experiences a confidence in the immortals not found until then. Sophocles is the most religious poet of antiquity: he has all the grace of India, with the purity of taste of Greece. In reading Oedipus at Colonus and Antigone, one feels reconciled, as it were, with polytheism, so majestic are his forms, his morality noble and elevated, his teachings useful and, we would say, almost reasonable.40

Nature in Sophocles extends her harmony and calm; order and measure reign everywhere. If, despite himself, the poet is sometimes led to traditions that are 792 injurious to the gods, he hastens either to soften them or to add some words that excuse or apologize for them. Hercules still kills his host, but Jupiter grows angry.41 We have previously noted42 that the crime of Hercules had only provoked the indignation of Homer, not of Jupiter, in the Iliad.

The chorus, which is always the organ of public opinion, in Sophocles never fails to celebrate the fairness of the gods while exalting their omnipotence.43 It promises Electra that Jupiter, whose eye nothing escapes, will punish her oppressors;44 the guilty, it says, are infallibly struck by the vengeance of the celestial Themis;45 Pluto, Proserpina, Mercury, the Furies with foaming dogs everywhere pursue homicide and adultery.46 Jupiter is the father of the laws that make the happiness of men.47 As soon as the immortals, vigilant and just, perceive misdeeds, they prepare their punishment;48 and if Polynices is unpunished, it is because their gaze has not yet turned toward this rebellious son.49

If Sophocles sometimes seems to return to less refined opinions, this step back applies more to rituals than to maxims. The same as in Aeschylus, Clytemnestra mutilates the body of Agamemnon, whom she just murdered, in order to avoid the anger of his manes;50 in Sophocles she wipes the bloody iron she withdrew from his breast with the hair of her spouse so that his blood would fall upon his head;51 Oedipus plucks out his eyes so as not to see his father and his mother in the other life.52 In these details one recognizes the customs of primitive tribes. In the Alcestis of Euripides the infernal gods still drink the blood of funeral victims,53 which is only a slight modification of Homer’s description, which makes the shadows drink blood. Finally, an even stranger thing, in Virgil, Deiphobus, 793 whose nose, ears, and hands the Greeks had cut off, hides himself, ashamed of appearing thus disfigured in the underworld.54 In man there is a constant struggle: habits, memories, the entire past attach to him, obstructing his path to the future; but he nonetheless follows this path, and the prolonging of rituals, material forms that are preserved after opinions are modified, only apparently belies the change that has occurred.

At first sight, nothing appears more revolting than the second scene of Ajax, where Minerva basely scorns his misfortune, and where Ulysses, whom she protects, shows the most ignoble signs of a laughable cowardice. But with what admirable art the poet effaces this impression, to replace it with a more satisfying and more moral lesson, when Ulysses, the enemy of Ajax, demands from the angered Greeks the burial of the fallen hero, his own victim! This is moderation, the forgetting of injury, pity for the unfortunate, respect for the dead; these are all the generous sentiments personified and sanctioned by religion, under the auspices of Minerva.

This remarkable measure, these subtle improvements, shine forth even more in the depiction of the Furies. Aeschylus presents them to the spectators’ eyes as fierce and covered in blood, and it is not until after expiation has disarmed them that the human race breathes safely.55 Sophocles hides them from the spectators’ eyes. He even spares their ears these frightening names. Poetic circumlocutions replace them. In Aeschylus, these divinities emerge from the netherworld, inexorable and pitiless. In Sophocles, they retire to the depths of a sacred wood. The scented breath of the wind appeases them; they rest in silence until new duties rouse their activity against the inhabitants of the earth.56

The received notions concerning the justice of the gods, even though admitted and professed by Aeschylus, enter less well into his works and compose much less of a uniform whole than in the tragedies of Sophocles. The poet speaks without any scruple of the crimes of the gods. Morality is a theory that practice still contradicts. 794 The formidable tribunal that we have sought in vain in Homer and which we have seen established in Pindar is also sanctioned by the two tragedians; but everything is frightening in Aeschylus. Pluto, the powerful judge of mortals, exercises a belated vengeance in the underworld.57 It is always only a matter of the torment of the perverse. In Sophocles, Antigone hopes for the felicity of the just: the friendship of the shades, she says to the timorous Ismene, will be more lasting to me than the favor of the living.58

In Aeschylus, the gods make themselves feared; in Sophocles, they make themselves loved; this is incontestable progress, this movement from fear to love. Religion identifies itself with the poetry of Sophocles much more than that of Aeschylus. The latter makes it emerge threatening from the dark night; it casts sudden flames in the midst of thunder and lightning. The former by means of harmonious shades associates it with the day-star; the blue of the sky is more brilliant, without being less serene. If we could dare to venture a rather profane comparison, we would say that Aeschylus is the Old Testament of polytheism, while Sophocles is the Gospel.

Even when the goal of the two poets is identical, their means differ. Aeschylus in Eumenides, as much as Sophocles in Oedipus at Colonus, works to represent Athens as the guardian of the laws, the privileged residence of a superior race, the boulevard before which unjust power halts, the sanctuary where involuntary crime is expiated or crime repents. But in the first, the gods pronounce a decree cast in nearly judicial forms; in the second, the supremacy of the city of Minerva penetrates more slowly, but more profoundly, to the depths of the soul by a series of religious sentiments and emotions, which a miracle completes, without interrupting and troubling them.

Aeschylus appears to be the rebellious slave of his century. Sophocles is its noble interpreter, always faithful and scrupulous; and by a privilege that unfortunately is too rare, the career of this great poet was worthy of his talent. Citizen of the most enlightened country of the ancient world, endowed with the advantages of birth, fortune, and beauty, he attained all honors, he conquered all glories. Chosen in his adolescence to celebrate, at the head of his young companions, the victory of Salamis; in his maturity, he was pontiff and general, colleague of Pericles and Thucydides; he defended, hallowed, and glorified his country. While the irascible 795 Aeschylus, like the greedy Pindar, sought the patronage of a tyrant, Sophocles rejected the invitations of barbarous kings.59 When it reached him, old age itself seemed to respect him. It came alone, without the ugly entourage of infirmities that usually accompanies it. For Sophocles, the ingratitude of his children was only the occasion of a new triumph. One would say that the gods of this polytheism that he rendered so noble and so pure expressed respect and gratitude to him, so much did they lavish their favors upon him. The most striking of these benefits was, doubtless, to spare him the painful spectacle of the decline of his homeland: hardly had his eyes closed when liberty perished in Athens at the hands of foreigners, and the fierce Spartans prevented the body of the poet being buried in the tomb of his ancestors.

To judge polytheism in its childhood, one must turn to the Iliad;60 in order to see its first developments, one must read Hesiod. Aeschylus shows us religion in its successive purifications, although still contested, and if we want to know it in its perfection, it is above all Sophocles who must be consulted.

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CHAPTER 8: On Euripides

At first, we had intended not to speak of Euripides: he is such an unfaithful painter of Greek religion, an author so foreign to all precision and scruple, that we believed we should not invoke his testimony on almost any point. As a consequence, far from being pleased with the perfections of religion, he loves to exaggerate its weak sides. Nonetheless, the reader would have reproached us with leaving a lacuna, and we have not wished to merit this criticism. But in order to show with how much distrust one must consider this third Greek tragedian, and what sorts of light he can shed on some details, we first of all have to speak of his individual character, the circumstances of his private life, of the talent that nature had given him, and the application of this talent to tragedy.

The history of dramatic art in Greece, even though confined, as we have observed earlier, to a very short span of time, can be divided into three periods. During the first, genius advanced rapidly and impetuously in its career, but without a determinate direction. During the second, it profited from the experiences and mistakes of its predecessors. During the third, the need for novelty making itself felt, it worked haphazardly, seeking for ways of display. Aeschylus and Sophocles correspond to the first two periods, Euripides to the third.

By itself alone, this circumstance must make his portraits unfaithful, but his particular character adds to the influence of this general cause.

Euripides possessed several brilliant qualities: eloquence, imagination, an extreme mobility, which often resembled sensibility, a remarkable flexibility, a powerful and profound irony: under this last aspect, Medea is a chef d’oeuvre. Her scene with Jason,1 her bitterness with the old man that a confused instinct 797 warns to protect her children against her,2 her return to maternal love when she is ready to seize the iron that is to sacrifice them,3 even today move the reader to the depths of his soul, even in the absence of dramatic representation. But to these gifts of nature Euripides joined a restless spirit, an unlimited vanity, an excessive appetite for applause, a not-so-sure and not-so-delicate sentiment of appropriateness. The truth of mores, opinions, and customs seemed to him to be subordinate objects. The ancient traditions seemed to him the poet’s property; and more than once he treated them as such.4

We would be tempted to believe that he at first wanted to devote himself to public affairs, even though antiquity tells us nothing specific in the regard. He was practiced in the art of oratory, and his constant allusions against the orators, demagogues, democracy, the people of Athens—in a word, against all the institutions of his homeland—bespeak a pride that has been crossed. The defects, the pretensions, even the qualities of Euripides opposed themselves to success in the career of political ambition. But he probably renounced it only with difficulty; and, in fact, who in a free State can painlessly renounce the suffrages of his fellow citizens, the pleasures of power, the pleasures of popularity? It is something else entirely when a single man governs. Then it is only the opinion of a single man that one resigns oneself to not winning, and one is consoled by that thought.

Whatever may be the case with these initial desires and first regrets of Euripides, what is sure is that before devoting himself to literature properly speaking, he appears to have wanted to devote himself to philosophy. For some time he was the disciple of Anaxagoras and Archelaus; but he soon enough left abstract (and exhausting) studies, either because he was frightened by the persecutions that Anaxagoras had experienced or because he was seduced by the hope of more immediate and boisterous applause, which dramatic compositions promised to earn him. He retained from his philosophical studies only the habit of formulating axioms, which he placed in the mouths of his characters at every opportunity. For the rest, he brought into his literary works a constantly bitter and discontented disposition; equivocal successes confirmed him in it. Author of at least seventy-five 798 plays, he won at most four or five times.5 Not only was he crushed by the memory of Sophocles’s superiority, but he encountered rivals who often defeated him.6 The biting mockeries of Aristophanes pursued and humiliated him. It is said that domestic embarrassments added to the sufferings of his vanity, and that the infidelity of a wife was the cause of his hatred and invectives against women. Finally, he died far from his country,7 which rendered only a belated and useless homage to his memory.

The march of the human spirit is always the same; one finds the same three periods of tragedy among us, with Corneille, Racine, and Voltaire. But Corneille is nonetheless quite different from Aeschylus, Racine from Sophocles, and Voltaire is not Euripides.8

Euripides and Voltaire always have a goal different from perfection in their works. Both generously sow misplaced generalities.9 At every opportunity, they allude to contemporary customs, religion, and politics. In a play whose subject precedes by eight centuries the Peloponnesian War, the Greek author alludes to the alliance of the Argives with the Spartiates;10 later, he insults the orators,11 demagogues, and democracy, things that did not yet exist when Adrastus reigned over Argos. Elsewhere, he enters into an unexpected digression on popular power and monarchy.12 Also elsewhere, the same Theseus that Sophocles had already embellished, and who, victor over monsters and brigands, could only have known the barbarous state, retraces in splendid verses the philosophical history of civilization.13

Euripides could have made a tragedy like the Tancrède; that is, in the same play he could have combined a passionate sensibility with the rage for maxims and declamations that led Voltaire to put in the mouth of a girl when she learns that her lover seeks death in the midst of battle, a dissertation on the rights of women 799 and on the injustice that produces, at the end, independence. It is thus that in Hecuba,14 this unfortunate mother asking Ulysses for the life of her daughter, and later crying over the death of Polixena, she stops to examine the influence of education on youth.15

If we did not fear to depart too much from our subject, we would notice many other connections between Euripides and Voltaire; both end their tragedies with moral reflections, which indicate the need to declare a result suited to capture applause.16 In the French author, as in the Greek, the characters do not speak to and between themselves, but for the public. Nature and truth are constantly sacrificed to this aim. Menelaus in Egypt, bringing the false news of his own death to the king of this country, never answers his questions in the way that he reasonably should. His language is full of affected equivocations that run counter to his situation. He only has in mind the spectators who listen to him; and in order to please them he risks his own safety, which is to say, all plausibility.17 Orestes in Electra, arriving disguised (because outlawed) on the stage, meditating the revenge of his father and killing his mother, and in thirty verses covering the different states of life,18 recalls for us Alzire and the treatise she uttered on suicide when her lover had just murdered her husband.

Sophocles having composed, as had Euripides, an Electra, the comparison of the two plays is quite suitable to show the difference between the two poets. In Sophocles, parricide is the effect of an irresistible destiny. In Euripides, this parricide is premeditated; one discusses it on the stage, because Euripides never can turn down a discussion, and this preliminary examination makes the crime a thousand times more revolting.

Voltaire and Euripides have, in general, attacked religion, and both have sought tragic effects in religion itself, the object of their mockeries. Euripides seems to have composed his Bacchae19 to solidify the triumph of the most fanatical superstition, forgetting that elsewhere he touted unbelief. This is how Voltaire made Alzire and Zaïre; and, for the comparison to be even more complete, the Greek 800 poet in a play destined to show how terrible the punishments of the gods against impiety are, cannot stop himself from irreligious references;20 in the same way Voltaire begins his Christian tragedy by these famous verses, so philosophical and so out of place:

  • By the Ganges, I was a slave to false gods,
  • Christian in Paris, Muslim in these environs.

The plays of Euripides, like those of Voltaire, most of the time are only pretexts for his dominant idea; even his sensibility is subordinated to his systematic intention. The philosopher constantly does battle with the poet, and from it result the implausibilities that destroy all poetic illusion, and, more often, a certain monotony in the characters, as well as constantly returning to the same ideas; in a word, the absence of that dramatic impartiality without which art never arrives at its perfection. All literature that has a goal outside itself is perhaps more useful, more effective, as a means, but it is always less perfect than literature that has itself as its own goal.

The tragedy of Oedipus the King in Sophocles, and that of the Bacchae in Euripides, have the same tendency. Their outcome is to give an example of the infallibility of oracles and the danger of lacking in respect for the immortals. Destiny attests to the veracity of the gods, says Creon to Oedipus; this is the moral of the play. The same conclusion emerges from the fortune of Pentheus in the Bacchae. But these tragedies differ because the character of their authors differs. Sophocles had fulfilled the most important functions, both military and civil, and this practice of life had taught him measure and had imposed gravity. He was thoroughly imbued with respect for religion and love for the constitution of his country. Euripides, whose spirit had not received the education of affairs, grasped only the inconveniences of all institutions. Unbeliever, he could not take up religious language without falling into fanaticism. Sophocles brings to Oedipus the King all the seriousness, all the calm, of conviction. Not having conviction, Euripides has no measure. In the Bacchae he gives himself to ardor, to inconsistency, to the exaggerations of a man who was never instructed by the sentiment he experiences, of the effect it produces. One can note, albeit to a lesser degree because Voltaire had more taste than Euripides, the same difference between Athalie and Zaïre.21 A 801 quite strange thing! The unbelief of Euripides does not preserve him from abusing the miraculous. Of the eighteen tragedies that remain to us, nine end with the appearance of a god on the scene.

The defects of Euripides do not owe, as do those of Aeschylus, to ignorance of the art or the remnants of a barely subdued barbarism. They essentially belong to his ambitious and affected conceptions. They are digressions without connection with the subject, descriptions of a length that destroys all plausibility, allusions that deprive his plays of all historical or local color, epigrams that become absurd in the mouth of his characters. It is against the orators that Hippolyta utters a sally.22 Orestes loses himself in round-about attacks against the government of Athens.23 In the midst of her lamentations Andromache interrupts herself and declaims: it is always the obsession of women to have on their lips the pain that torments them, and to fill the air with their woes.24

When Aeschylus disappoints us, he has his defense in the memories of mores that once existed. But what shocks us in Euripides belongs to the customs of no nation. Hecuba describing the caresses that Cassandra, her daughter, the slave of Agamemnon, lavishes upon this destroyer of Troy,25 Admetus with ignoble harshness reproaching his father for not wanting to die in his place,26 are inexcusable things, whether as depicting nature or depicting manners.

One would believe that the more that authors aim to please the public, the more they ought to perfect the entirety of their works; this, however, is not true. When their sole aim is to cause an effect, they work with only half a pen, as it were, and take care only over the parts that immediately captivate the audience. This, however, is a false move. In order to durably dominate the multitude in literature (as well as in politics), often the surest path is to disdain them.

Like the poems of our day, the plot is sacrificed to episodes and descriptions; like ours, in the tragedies of Euripides the essential is sacrificed to the accidental. The expositions are almost always wretched. I make an exception only for Andromache, 802 which in other respects is one of the weakest tragedies of this writer. But the exposition is clear and natural, and from the first verses lets it be known what the different characters are to contribute. The choruses, however, hardly have any relationship to the subject. One would say that the poet himself felt this. Euripides displays more defiance toward them than Sophocles. Sometimes the characters threaten them with death if they betray them, sometimes they make them a thousand promises to win them to silence. Sophocles does none of this, because his choruses are an integral part of his plays. Euripides, on the contrary, without even knowing it, constantly puts himself on guard against them because they are intruders, as it were, who appear on the stage only to declaim.27

If here were the place to prove how much Euripides departs from the true character of antiquity, we would limit ourselves to citing some aspects of his play Cyclops. This play is a collection of impieties, indecencies, intellectual witticisms, and revolting immorality.28 In a way, it is the Jeanne d’Arc of the Greeks, and this is a new similarity of Euripides to Voltaire.

The defects of Euripides do not inspire that curious interest that buoys us in reading the ancient authors, whose very imperfections are instructive because they bear the imprint of their century and their country. The defects of Euripides are shocking, like those of a modern author.

However, it is perhaps for this very reason that we judge Euripides more favorably than he appears to have been judged in his own time. As often happens in the world, this is one more vice that earns him our indulgence. Of all the Greek tragedians he is the least national, and consequently the most like our ideas.

With talent, spirit, alacrity, learning, and verve, one can equal Euripides. But one could put together all the writers who have existed since the rebirth of letters, and probably all those who will exist, and you would not produce a Sophocles. We do not mean to say, as some writers today claim, that the human race deteriorates; but the circumstances of moderns do not produce in them the exquisite sentiment of ideal beauty with which the climate, institutions, and religion of Greece filled all its inhabitants. Our languages are more imperfect, our social order less natural, our calculations narrower, our existence simultaneously more monotonous in its march and more troubled in its egoism: in a word, the entirety of our nature is less 803 poetic. To be sure, this is not an evil: the Greeks owed a part of their poetry to their leisure, their leisure to slavery, which trampled underfoot a proscribed race and denigrated mechanical labor. We prefer to have fewer poets, and not to have more slaves.

The reader will pardon us this digression on Euripides if he reflects that it was necessary to explain the confusion relating to religious opinions that reigns in his works; he covers the entire circle of these opinions, mixes them, and combines them without any regard for the truth of the custom, or for the integrity of characters. If in order to understand Antiquity we possessed only the tragedies of Euripides, it would be impossible for us to see any light in such chaos.

This poet is inexact in small as well as large things. He attributes the usages of his contemporaries and compatriots to all peoples and all times. To take an example at random, he has Medea say that a woman who wants to have a spouse ought to bring him a dowry of considerable riches.29 This was the Athenian custom at the time of Euripides; but in the heroic ages, hence the time of Medea, men did not obtain their wives except by magnificent gifts. In his tragedy of Rhesus, the catastrophe is connected to the presumption of Hector;30 while in the Iliad, Hector is anything but presumptuous.

Sophocles also sometimes changes the character of ancient heroes; but he does so in order to improve and ennoble them. In Oedipus at Colonus, Theseus speaks of himself with a reserve and modesty that are in contrast to the self-vaunting of Homer’s heroes. Finding in Homer a noble and consistent character, Euripides was unable to remain faithful to this character. What Sophocles did well, Euripides did poorly.

Therefore, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, Euripides is a very unsure witness to the real state of Greek religion at the time when he composed his numerous tragedies. However, in analyzing them carefully one can see in them, through the inconsistencies and inexactnesses of the poet, incontestable proof of the progress of this religion. “I would believe the gods are mad,” says Clytemnestra, “if I dared to beseech them for a murderer. What prayer would the murderer of her children dare address to the immortals?”31 Behold: the efficacy of prayers subordinated 804 to the moral value of actions. When Helen wants to justify her adultery to herself by blaming it on destiny, and on the omnipotence that Venus exercises over the gods themselves, Hecuba accuses her of calumny: “The gods,” she says to her, “are not at all the authors of your errant ways; they have not given you a pernicious example. The divinity that seduced you is your own treacherous heart and your mad passion.”32 This is almost Socrates’s response to Euthyphro when the latter justified himself for having accused his father, saying that Jupiter punished Saturn.

In this way, reason struggles at each instant against the ancient fables. Hercules rejects all the traditions that are unfavorable to the gods.33 Euripides recalls them, however; but it is not out of respect, but from hostility: “Phoebus commanded you to murder,” says Menelaus to Orestes, “you counted on his assistance. He delays now, following the custom of those that are named the immortals.”34 Apollo, whom Pyrrhus has offended, causes him to die at Delphi; and the messenger who recounts this event observes that the god recalled an old quarrel and, like a wicked man, revenged himself. “Can we,” he adds, “after this action, regard him as just or wise?”35 “O gods!” cries Hecuba, “I invoke, it is true, treacherous allies; but there is a shadow of hope in praying to the immortals when misfortune has struck.”36 Polynices asks Juno, Eteocles, and Minerva to kill his brother.37 The heart of Jupiter is full of envy against Rhesus,38 and in the Oresteia this same envy is mercilessly unleashed against all the happy.39

But these reminiscences are not a step back toward belief; they are a step forward toward irreligion. The works of Euripides are the first in which unbelief took on public and popular forms. And in the same way that Aeschylus shows us the struggle between the ancient fables and morality in original polytheism, Euripides presents us the struggle between a polytheism that has become moral and unbelief. In the Phoenician Women, he attributes impious words to the most virtuous character of the play, Antigone.40 Sophocles never would have committed this mistake.

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The three periods are displayed well enough by the three Electras of the tragedians. In the Electra of Aeschylus,41 fate dominates religion; in Sophocles’s, morality allies with it; in Euripides’s, this morality becomes a counterargument.

Let us briefly summarize: Euripides, like Hesiod, brings together or confuses doctrines of different times, but for a different reason. Hesiod had found himself between two periods of the religious belief of his country. Euripides wrote when this belief was heading toward its fall. As a consequence, the first drew indiscriminately from opinions that were not yet destroyed and those that were not yet established; the second made use indifferently of all these opinions, because all were equally discredited.

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CHAPTER 9: A Few Words on Aristophanes

Aristophanes, the sole Greek comic poet who has come down to us, is no less necessary to study than the tragedians. Taken literally, or badly understood, his plays would provide powerful objections to the perfections effected in religion. He represents the gods of Greece as vicious, depraved, ridiculous; and these outrageous portraits, tolerated by the magistrates, received popular applause.

Several causes explain this singularity.

First of all, Greek tragedy had drawn its origin from the serious part of the religion; comedy owed its birth to the grotesque part of the worship, a part transmitted to the Greeks, as we have already said, by the importation of priestly orgies. For we have already noted that buffoonery and license were a characteristic trait of religions subject to priests; they deprive their slaves of all elevated pleasures, and as compensation, brutalize them.

There is something similar in the mystery plays of the Christians of the Middle Ages. Nothing is more audacious, more satirical against the most revered objects; devotion, however, reigned without rival and did not see in these burlesque dramas a profanation of sacred things.

Perhaps a more profound idea presided over these imitations that seem sacrilegious to us. The evil principle, impure matter, struggling against heaven, in these parodies became clownish beings, misshapen in form, vicious in their irony, gay, but of a treacherous or obscene sort.

One must acknowledge this: in gaiety, when it is not the simple development of childish joys, in irony especially, there is something that approaches vice; everything that is good is grave; virtue, affection, courage, the happiness that comes from peace of the soul, are serious things. In the priestly religions, gaiety has often represented the principle of evil. In our civilized societies today, does it not more than ever represent it?

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We do not directly apply these observations to the poet with whom we are now occupied. He himself probably did not know what heritage he employed; but we think that these memories of foreign borrowings, even though rejected by the popular worship, could have prepared the Athenians to be somewhat indulgent toward a senseless gaiety that had the authority of a tradition.

Let us add to this preservation of ancient usages the character of the Athenian people, for whom mockery was a need and who believed that the gods, like them, enjoyed wit. No less than the poets, sculptors and painters added features to the mythological accounts that undermined their gravity. On an ancient vase we see Jupiter and Mars in satirical masks, climbing into Alcmene’s chamber by means of a ladder.

In second place, the plays of Aristophanes were for the most part parodies of some tragic work, principally the works of Euripides. His comedy Frogs, for example, which treats Bacchus with the greatest irreverence, is a burlesque imitation of Semele,1 in which this god descends to the underworld to seek his mother. In Peace, sharp mockery is directed against the inhabitants of Olympus, but Peace is a parody of Bellerophon.2 The Clouds, invoking the Aether, is a parody of Helen.3

Sometimes Aristophanes mocks Pindar at the same time as Euripides.4

The spectators in whose memories the lyrical, and especially tragic, verses were engraved5 as a result found that Aristophanes was mocking these poets rather than the gods.6

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Finally, the main truth that we have established in our work—that is, the progression of religious ideas—ought to powerfully contribute to the fact that the sarcasms of the comic author were pardoned and applauded.

From what traditions did he draw the tales that seemed to expose the main objects of worship to derision? Was it not in the ancient mythology, which recounted the imperfections and vices of the gods? Why had these vices and imperfections not shocked the Greeks of Homer’s time, while they wounded them under Pericles? It is because an immense disproportion separated the earlier notions from the ideas that had replaced them. Far from the success of Aristophanes leading us to deny the various progresses of the Greek religion, his success proves that undeniable improvements had occurred in this religion. The Greeks could no longer tolerate gods without morality, mercenaries, self-interested protectors of crime, bought-off by sacrifices, favoring fraud and injustice; their religious sentiment rose above the initial notions of polytheism, and when they were led back to them, according to the way in which these outdated notions were presented to them, it was either controlled by the need to purify them, and then Sophocles was its guide, or struck by their absurdity; then they applauded Aristophanes.

These explanations seem more natural and satisfying to us than the one some have sought in the purported pleasure the Athenians took in seeing what was above them brought down. This disposition would have protected Aristophanes from the vengeance of powerful men; but the people could not have been pleased at the abasement of their gods. A democratic people loves to see those who dominate them brought low, but no people are pleased when someone denigrates the beings they adore, unless, of course, they have ceased worshipping them; the Athenians, however, were not now at this point. To be sure, the success of Aristophanes indicated a seed of decadence in the religion: the comedy of his play was founded on the disproportion that existed between the unchanging character of the teaching and the capacity for improvement of the idea. A similar disproportion, when the form remains the same, is a principle of death for a belief; each improvement prepares another and, as a consequence, brings closer the moment when the form must be broken.

But one must not conclude that it was broken yet: at the time of Aristophanes, it was not. After having laughed, the people went no less to the temples, respected no less the mysteries. The seed of destruction, which an attentive eye could detect, had not yet developed.

Some will ask, how did the causes that obtained pardon for Aristophanes’s attacks against the ancient mythology not preserve from persecution, exile, and death the philosophers who attacked the same beliefs by their reasoning?

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It seems to us easy to explain this phenomenon.

Passionate lovers of license and novelties, enthusiasts for the arts that were their delight and that made their glory, the people of Athens had removed the poets from the jurisdiction of the Areopagus and from ordinary judges.7 A special tribunal exercised jurisdiction over them. The positive laws against impiety were easy to elude, as they always will be in what pertains to thought and the expressions with which it clothes itself. Judgment alone can restrain misdeeds of this sort; and if this is an advantage, it is amply counterbalanced as well; for judgment, while attaining everything, stifles everything, the good as well as the evil, use as well as abuse. And this tribunal, judge of poets, treated them with indulgence. Euripides, guilty of a famous defense of perjury in his Hippolyta, was prosecuted but absolved.8

Jealous of their liberty, the people of Athens always feared that an authority that they only impatiently tolerated might encroach on their rights; and when they were not led by a political passion, out of instinct and inclination took the part of the accused to whom they owed their amusements; in a certain sense, their own boisterous approbation had made them accomplices.

Aristophanes, moreover, made use of adroit subterfuges against legal strictures. The very traditions he took advantage of served him as a safeguard; they were literally in the ancient Homeric mythology. If in the mouth of his characters they stirred the good humor of the people, no one could accuse the poet of having denied or disgraced them. He took great care to place praises of justice and encomia to the dignity of the gods alongside his harsh witticisms. See in Plutus how he rises up against the idea that men can engage them to favor crime by offerings;9 and how in The Clouds he speaks affirmatively of heavenly punishments of the wicked and the impious.10

It was not the same with the philosophers. In declaring themselves against ancient polytheism they enjoyed neither the support of the crowd, whose suffrages they did not win, confined as they were in the sanctuary of their schools or the 810 groves of the Academy, nor the resource of praising fables they otherwise attacked; they denied them or interpreted them, neither of which appeased the devout. After the performance of a comedy of Aristophanes, what remained? The memory of a spectacle that had provoked the good humor of those who attended, but to which one could not attribute positive results or formal conclusions. The teachings of Anaxagoras or the lessons of Socrates, on the contrary, led to direct consequences, which were indifferent to the multitude and offensive to the priests.

Despite their limited authority, the priests possessed enough to persecute the philosophers, who as critics of demagogy were odious to the people, as well as wearisome to the enlightened class because they denounced their corruption; and as reformers they were impertinent to all.

Aristophanes wanted to reform nothing: everything was subject to his mockery; he attacked philosophy as well as religion, although in this regard he became religion’s useful assistant, and he seemed to have harmed it only out of inadvertence. The priestly spirit treats the enemy of its enemies with a good deal of indulgence; it willingly forgives his license, provided that, along with it, he turns against reason.

Nonetheless, this tolerance always has its limits and its end. Authority suffers impatiently the independence of its instruments. Antagonist of philosophers and orators, raising the suspicions of the multitude and the hatred of power against them, Aristophanes was nonetheless struck by the very power to whom he had denounced philosophy and liberty. This poet who had handed over eloquence to laughter and reasoning to persecution, was gagged by the aristocracy that was triumphant toward the end of the Peloponnesian War. The same tyranny that had punished Socrates’s opinions suppressed Aristophanes’s wit. He then could judge what masters he had served.11

811

CHAPTER 10: Why We Do Not Speak Here of the Greek Philosophers

In this book we do not at all treat the progress of morality in polytheism, such as the Greek philosophers conceived it. Far from working to destroy the popular religion, for a long time these philosophers attempted to reconcile it with morality and to purify it. But since despite their intentions, which were so irenic at the beginning, their efforts led only to the fall of the public belief, it is when we will describe this memorable revolution and the causes that brought it into being, that we will be able to place more suitably some investigations into the march of philosophy and its relations with religion.

812

CHAPTER 11: On the Relations of Morality with the Two Religious Forms

The improvements of independent polytheism reveal themselves in all its parts. The form of the gods, their character, their adventures, their conduct in heaven, their modes of acting on earth, everything bears the mark of amelioration; but it is above all in what pertains to morality that this improvement is the most obvious and the difference between the two genres of polytheism is most manifest.

Morality introduces itself by degrees into the polytheism independently of the priesthood’s direction. It enters and perfects itself as civilization progresses and enlightenment expands. The gods thus do not appear to be the authors, but rather the guarantors of the moral law; they protect it, but they do not change it. They do not create its rules; they sanction them. They reward the good, punish the wicked; but their will does not determine what is good and what is evil; human actions derive their merit from themselves.

To be sure, there are circumstances in which individuals, and sometimes entire nations, place more importance on pleasing the divine power than on the strict rules of morality. Thus the Athenians wanted to banish Oedipus—blind, weak, a fugitive—because this unfortunate old man was the object of celestial wrath.1 Neptune grows angry against the Phaeacians because they fulfilled the duties of humanity vis-à-vis Ulysses. He changes into a rock the vessel that had transported the hero to the coasts of Ithaca so that this people, he says, would no longer be tempted to lend their ships to strangers who ask for help.2 Alcinous draws the consequence from this that one must abstain from rendering such service to one’s guests.3 It is by 813 obedience to the gods that Orestes plunges the iron into the bosom of his mother; and in exhorting him to this murder, Pylades says to him that it is better to brave the indignation of men than the animosity of the immortals.4 Finally, much later, the Lacedaemonians violate the rights of hospitality in order to obey the oracle at Delphi; this is what they did, adds Herodotus,5 because the orders of the gods were more precious to them than any human considerations.

Nonetheless, even then morality does not change its nature; it is sacrificed in the particular occasion, but as a general principle it remains independent.

Hospitality, despite the difficulties that it entails for the Phaeacians, is not considered to be a crime. The Athenians, when they hesitate over whether they will expel Oedipus, feel that even in doing something they believe is agreeable to the gods they will not be doing a virtuous action. It is in vain that Orestes, after having killed Clytemnestra, justifies himself with Menelaus, saying that he only fulfilled the will of Apollo; this god, the king of Sparta answers him, did he not know what is just?6 And the parricidal son, even though he is the executioner of the decrees of heaven, is no less detested by men and pursued by the Furies.

For morality to cease to be independent in the polytheism that is not subject to priestly direction, two things are required which this belief does not admit: all-powerful gods and unanimous wills among them; but in all the versions of this polytheism, the power of the gods is always more or less limited. One cannot conceive of a great number of beings who are equally invested with an unlimited power; their plurality places an invincible obstacle to their omnipotence; this plurality also suggests the idea of different interests; and to decide between these interests, man has recourse only to his reason. For how can he recognize as competent judges gods who are not in accord? He is therefore never subject to the gods between whom he judges. The protection of one defends him from the hatred of another;7 and if all the supernatural beings betray him, he retains the right to appeal their decisions to his own conscience. When morality and religion come tightly together in the polytheism left to itself, it is religion that submits to the authority of morality and declares its own dependence. “If there are gods 814 who protect what is equitable, and who interest themselves in noble projects,” says the consul Horatius, “we are sure of their protection; if, on the contrary, hostile divinities oppose themselves to our success, nothing will be able to deter us from a glorious and legitimate enterprise.”8 These are the celebrated verses of the author of the Pharsalia;9 but these words are more remarkable in a religious historian, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, than in a sententious and philosophical poet.

Thus the gods form a species of public, not infallible, not incorruptible, but more impartial and more respected than the vulgar among human beings. The presumptive opinion and the recognized force of this celestial public are not without advantages. Man suffers before these august witnesses; he disarms them with his virtue; he gains their respect by his courage; and the idea of offering to beings of a superior nature and reason the magnificent spectacle of an irreproachable man, struggling against evil, contains something that exalts the imagination and elevates the soul.

In priestly polytheism, on the contrary, the priests, masters of the people, hasten to give it a code of laws. Morality, instead of spreading through the different fables and fusing itself, as in Greece, with that part of the belief that one can call historical, morality instead composes a body of doctrine. It is produced under this form in the Vendidad of the Persians, the Havamal of the Scandinavians, the Samaveda of the Indians, and in the Laws of Manu.10 Similar codes do not exist in the Greek religion.

Now, when morality joins in a premature way, and, as it were, violently, with religion, it is inevitably more imperfect than when it is introduced naturally. In the latter case, it enters during an advanced period of society; it enters purified, improved, 815 enriched with all the improvements that a people have made while becoming civilized. The priests, in rendering religion changeless, maintain morality as it was in the time of barbarism; hence, with religion having sanctioned it, religion opposes itself to the enlightenment that ought to correct it; in this way, religions that at a particular time could be a relative good, only do evil in later times; their conservative force is exercised in favor of what ought not to be conserved.

This is not all; the gods in the name of whom the code of priestly morality is promulgated are not only judges, they are also legislators; they create the moral law, they can change it, they declare what is evil and what is good. The rule of the just and the unjust is overturned;11 an incalculable revolution is thus produced in man’s conscience. Actions draw all their value from the merit that the gods ascribe to them; they do not please them because they are good; they are good because they please them; hence, two species of crimes and two species of duties: those that are such because of their nature and those that religion declares to be so. A thousand useless things become virtues; a thousand things without any harmful effect are transformed into crimes.12 What provides no profit to men can be demanded by the gods; what harms no human can offend them. Artificial misdeeds are punished with more rigor than true ones. The first are sins while the second are only faults.

Among the Persians, to bury a dog, to throw water on the fire;13 among the Egyptians, to involuntarily cause the death of a sacred animal;14 in India, to violate the prescribed distance when approaching the member of another caste, or to break the branch of a fig tree,15 or to kill a serpent,16 are actions that are no less severely forbidden than physical violence, tyranny, and murder. Armenian priests 816 pardon the worst assaults rather than the infraction of required abstinences.17 A traveler recounts that Illyrian brigands killed the leader who for a very long time led them in battle, and whose fierceness they had admired and imitated, because he had drunk milk during a day of fast.18 No misdeed, say the Turks, closes the doors of heaven to the one who dies while fasting.19 According to the code of Gentoo, the man who reads a heterodox Shaster is as guilty as if he had killed his friend. The Bhagavad Gita places the love of work and industry on a par with intemperance and irregular desires.20

Greek polytheism in general is a stranger to artificial duties. If we find in Hesiod some innocent or indifferent actions that are forbidden as offending the gods,21 and if the precepts of this poet in this regard have, both in substance and form, some relation with those that are inculcated in the priestly religions, it is because these precepts were probably borrowed, even without his awareness; but they had no influence on the morality of Greek religion as it was conceived by the people.

In priestly religions, muzzled by a host of commandments and arbitrary prohibitions,22 man labors blindly in the inadequate space that is left to him; wherever 817 he turns, he is hampered in his freedom. Soon, he no longer distinguishes good from evil, nor law from nature.

What preserves the majority of men from crime is the feeling of never having crossed the line of innocence; the more that one narrows this line, the more exposed he is to violate it; and however light may be the infraction, by the mere fact that he has overcome his initial scruple, he has lost his most assured safeguard.

Several writers have noted this danger. The laws that make what is indifferent necessary, says Montesquieu, soon make what is necessary indifferent.23

Nonetheless, since to arrive at the full truth one must consider questions in all their facets, we will recognize that this demand of religion has its advantage; it accustoms man to sacrifice; it accustoms him not to propose an ignoble goal in anything he does. It is useful that man sometimes prescribes to himself useless duties, if only to learn that everything that is good on earth does not reside in what he calls utility.

But it is with this as with everything that pertains to exaltation, enthusiasm, and the interior sentiment. This sentiment, this enthusiasm, this exaltation, which are sublime when they are spontaneous, become terrible when others abuse them. The power to create virtues and crimes with a word, when it is placed in the hands of a class of men, is but one more terrible means of despotism and corruption.

This class does not limit itself to placing at the first rank of misdeeds any and all resistance to its authority; it does not limit itself to commanding indifferent, 818 or useless, actions; it prescribes harmful and criminal ones. Pity for the enemies of heaven is a weakness that is disapproved or proscribed: in contempt of the strongest bonds or the most tender affections, it is forbidden to give assistance to the one who is the object of divine indignation. Cruelty against the impious and infidels is a sacred duty; treachery toward them is a virtue; and, just as the theory of devotion pushed to an extreme makes the most painful sacrifice the most meritorious, when actions have no merit other than because they are in accord with the order of the gods, religious virtues have even more merit when they are the opposite of human virtues.24 We see in the annals of Egypt a king punished for his gentleness and beneficence. The oracle having indicated to Mycerinus that he only had six years to live: “Whence came it,” he asks, “that my predecessors, the scourge of their subjects, came peacefully to an advanced old age and the gods treat me with so much severity, I who have devoted myself to the happiness of my peoples?” “These gods,” answered the oracle, “condemned Egypt to one hundred and fifty years of misery and slavery. The monarchs who preceded you fulfilled their decrees; you violated them. Your death is the punishment of your disobedience.”

Almost always in priestly polytheism, the interdiction of crimes is accompanied 819 with an explicit reservation for the case when these crimes are commanded by the gods. Whoever commits a murder on his own, say the Brahmins, will never enjoy heavenly happiness; but if God orders one man to kill another, he does it and lives happily and content.25

Religious morality thus conceived can have another inconvenience. Man imagines himself elevated above all duties. The heretics of the fourteenth century, and long before them some Gnostics, thought that, being saved by divine intervention, they were no longer subject to the law, and as a consequence several of them gave themselves over in public to the most revolting libertinage.26 The bonzes reasoned in the same way. Xaca and Amida, being distressed by the crimes of men, in order to atone for them suffered mysterious pains. Repentence and good works are now so many offenses against these divinities, whose sacrifices have sufficiently erased all our faults.27

We have said that in general in polytheism the personal character of the gods had little influence; but this assertion is not completely true, except when morality is independent of religion. The relations of human societies being the same everywhere, the moral law, which is the theory of these relations, is also everywhere the same. When the gods are only charged with the application of this law, their individual character matters little, because in the exercise of this function they abstract from this character. But when the will of the gods decides the moral law, since their character influences their will, every imperfection in this character produces a vice in the law. Man then esteems himself in doing evil. When he obeys religion at the expense of morality, he applauds himself for this, and in violating the holiest of natural laws, not only does he flatter himself that he is making himself agreeable to the gods he worships, but he believes himself morally virtuous, which is yet another grave problem. To subordinate morality to religion in this way is to produce the same revolution in morality that the axiom “if the king wills, so wills the law” does in politics.

The practical consequences of this inversion of ideas are not always equal to its dangers in theory. The priesthood, like every authority established among men, is forced in ordinary circumstances to maintain the great laws of morality so that the 820 society it dominates does not perish; but the door is always open to exceptions, and natural morality is constantly threatened by an artificial one.

This latter morality, at once inexorable and capricious, pursues man in the smallest details and leaves him asylum in neither the sanctuary of his soul nor the secret of his thoughts; it makes ignorance an offense and punishes involuntary actions. From the moment they are born, infants can be criminals. Brahmins present theirs to the moon at the age of eight days in order to obtain absolution for their faults. One’s intention is no more than a fragile protection. Remorse announces crime; but peace of soul does not attest to innocence. No longer having the right to consult his conscience, man is never certain that he has not offended the Divinity. Often disfigured by the priestly spirit, Judaism and Christianity furnish several examples. “Lord,” says the Hebrew Psalmist, “forgive me those of my sins that are unknown to me.”28 “I reproach myself for nothing,” writes an apostle, “but this is not a proof of my innocence.”29

This uncertainty can be a good thing in a very perfected religion. The man who has very pure ideas concerning the Divinity never knows if his efforts are enough to render him worthy of pleasing him. He works ceaselessly on his own heart, in order to eradicate everything that separates him from the perfect being he adores; his anxiety is, moreover, alleviated by the notion of goodness united to that of wisdom and power. But in a cult whose gods are imperfect and wicked, such anxiety, far from being an encouragement for virtue, is a constantly recurring cause of discouragement and despair.

To escape from it, man adopts a thousand bizarre expedients. Sometimes, exhausted from giving himself to always doubtful actions, over which hover a discouraging obscurity, he condemns himself to a complete inertia; he puts activity, work, and beneficence in the rank of condemnable passions. After the axiom of one of the founders of a priestly religion, when in doubt he abstains; that is, he remains immobile, for fear of rendering himself culpable by a movement, and to 821 escape from crime he forbids virtue to himself; other times, he casts himself at the feet of the priesthood, which arrogates to itself alone the important privilege of expiation. This means of reconciling man with his conscience has its advantages when its effectiveness rests on the interior disposition and future conduct of the one whom religion thus saves from the abyss into which his vices have plunged him. But in priestly religions, expiation changes character. The absolution of the darkest crimes is attached to an implicit credulity,30 to minute,31 and even arbitrary32 practices, to rituals that suppose neither amelioration, reparation, nor repentance:33 to the sight of a temple,34 the shadow of a tree,35 the touch of a stone, washing in the waters of certain rivers,36 the mechanical repetition of certain words,37 the reading of certain sacred texts; or what is even more degrading for 822 religion and corrupting for men, expiation is obtained by money,38 and the indulgence, or rather the connivance of the divine, becomes the object of shameful trafficking. Thus in these religions morality is corrupted both by the dependence in which it finds itself vis-à-vis the will of the gods and by the arbitrariness that is introduced into the number and classification of offenses, and by the means that this arbitrariness provides the guilty to appease heaven and regain innocence. For one must not disguise this: in its relations with morality, religion is always placed between two dangers. If it declares that there are inexpiable crimes, it casts men into despair. If it offers atonement for all crimes, it encourages the guilty with the hope of immunity.

But this danger is much less in the free religions than in the priestly ones. When morality remains itself, it keeps expiations within just limits; when it is subjugated, it has neither rule nor brake. With expiations, it is like the right to pardon under absolute governments and constitutional ones.

One therefore always arrives at this result: with liberty, morality improves religion; with slavery, religion falsifies morality.

823

CHAPTER 12: On the True Relations of Religion with Morality

In granting this preference to the cults free of all domination, we do not at all mean to say that in antiquity there were any in which the true relations of morality with religion were adequately established.

Those who have written on this subject, whether in the past or today, appear to us to have committed a great mistake.

The ancient legislators did not distinguish between vulgar morality, which limits itself to maintaining order by prohibiting gross misdeeds, and the more refined and elevated morality that prevents crime by inspiring man with a disposition of soul that does not allow him to commit it.

The moderns have followed the ancients on this false path. Let us attempt to depart from it.

To prevent the grossest misdeeds by punishing them, laws and punishments suffice. However, to change the interior of man instead of merely staying his hand, the religious sentiment is indispensable. By restricting religion to a kind of material, and limited, usefulness, one lowers it from its true rank. In this way its dignity, its sanctity, and its noblest influence have always been misunderstood.

The evil did not stop there. Religion has been made into a penal code and as soon as it is a penal code, it is close to becoming an arbitrary code. Hence all the dangers we have described in the preceding chapter. These dangers would be even more terrible in theism because the power of the god of theism is always unlimited.

The most salutary teachings, the purest precepts, cannot repair the evil that every doctrine that thus weakens the eternal rule entails. A worship whose divinities would be cruel and corrupt, but which would leave virtue as the judge of its own heart, would be less pernicious than a religion whose god, invested with the most admirable qualities, could by an act of will change morality.

824

Religion is not a penal code, it is not an arbitrary code, it is the relation of the Divinity with man, with what makes him a moral and intelligent being, that is, with his soul, his thought, his will. Actions do not belong to its sphere, except as the signs of his interior dispositions. Religion can change nothing in their merit. The work of God like the religious sentiment itself, having come from the same source, morality is uncreated, independent. Its rule is placed in all hearts. It reveals itself to all minds, as they become enlightened. The being that sentiment makes us to know cannot be served or satisfied by any exception to this rule. This would be to want to serve it as we serve the powers of the earth, by flattering their momentary interest, for a given period, in an exigent circumstance.

To be sure, when a religion is excellent, its morality is much gentler, more nuanced, more conformed to all the refinements of sensibility, and thereby more equitable than human justice can be. But it is not the rule, it is only the application that varies because religion distinguishes what the gaze of man cannot perceive. The latter pronounces only on actions; it knows only them; it sees only their exterior, and by that alone its judgments are imperfect and unjust. The same action committed by two individuals in two different circumstances never has the same value. But the social law cannot acknowledge these nuances. Similar to the bed of Procrustes, it reduces unequal sizes to an equal measure. Religion, however, quashes its verdicts for the sake of another world. But this is not because its foundations differ, it is not because religion can innovate in any way; it is only because it is better instructed; and in this respect, it is no less often a recourse against the imperfections of human justice than it is a sanction of the general laws this justice aims to maintain.

Considered under this point of view, the religious sentiment cannot ever harm morality. In the name of the divinity they teach, the ministers of religion can never decide the value of action. Religion leaves to the laws their jurisdiction over effects; it limits itself to improving the cause.

In this way it does the good that human laws have always attempted to bring about, but in vain. The often-repeated axiom that it is better to prevent crimes than to punish them is an inexhaustible source of vexations and arbitrariness when temporal authority wants to determine its interventions accordingly. But the religious sentiment that penetrates to the bottom of souls can attain this goal without arbitrariness or vexation. Laws, in their risky ventures and what they blindly do, are forced to pronounce according to appearances, to govern themselves according to isolated details, to listen to suspicions that prove nothing; and to prevent what 825 could be criminal, they punish what is still innocent. The sentiment in contrast embraces the whole, purifies instead of constrains, and ennobles instead of punishes.

It is only then that one can resolve a problem that has stymied all philosophies. At all times, morality had barely entered into religious belief when all enlightened men, struck by the difficulties we described above, saw themselves forced to go back and try to separate morality from religion. They took to the task in various ways. They disguised their intentions. But the result of their efforts was always the same.

Compare the axioms of the Roman Stoics with the discourses of Homer’s heroes. What Hector responds to Polydamas is precisely what Seneca wrote. Thus, at the period when morality was most united with polytheism, the language of the philosophers became similar to that uttered by virtuous men when morality had barely entered this belief.

In the religions founded on theism, the most religious philosophers gave morality the name of religion, leaving to the side and sacrificing everything that constituted religion properly speaking, and everything that gave it a dangerous supremacy to morality. This recently was the endeavor of the most enlightened theologians of Germany. It was another path to the same goal.

But by envisioning religion as we do, placing its jurisdiction at the height that is proper to it, leaving to human justice what is its province, that is, details and effects, in order to subject to religion what is its proper sphere, the ensemble and causes, you will escape all dangers. You will inhibit its ministers, faithless interpreters of its laws, from denaturing it: you will assure morality of divine sanction while confirming its original and inviolable independence.

Here a consideration strikes us. It is so true that the march of the human spirit is progressive; it is so true that despite its apparent steps backward and its deplorable aberrations, it always rises to more refined notions, that religion conceived in this way leads to new perfections in the most admirable teaching man has attained, a teaching that under polytheism was the center that reunited all noble and proud souls, the asylum of all elevated virtues, and which under theism was often envied by the most distinguished thinkers of Modern times,1 to wit: Stoicism.

Stoicism was a sublime élan of the soul, a Soul tired of seeing morality in the charge of corrupt men and egoistical gods, and, by breaking all its bonds with these gods and these men, attempting to place itself in a sphere above all the injustices 826 of earth and even of heaven. But in Stoicism there was a sort of very labored effort that rendered its influence less salutary and less durable. To arrive at that internal liberty that braved all the blows of fate, it was necessary to stifle in oneself the beginnings of many sweet and profound sentiments. The religious sentiment, however, such as we have attempted to make it understood, ensures the same harbor to man by preserving these emotions that are inseparable from his nature and that make for the charm and consolation of his life. Morality is not at the mercy of either legislators who speak in the name of heaven or those who command on earth. Man is independent of all that can cross or pervert the most noble (or better put: the sole noble) part of himself; but he enjoys this independence under the aegis of a god who understands him, approves him, and esteems him. He is strong, like the Stoic, with the force of his own soul; but he is also strong with the force of a constant and intimate appeal to the Center of all that is good.

This idea brings into Stoicism the life and warmth that were lacking to it. It satisfies that portion of our soul that rejects impassivity, and that Stoicism was forced to try to destroy because it was unable to satisfy it. Resignation becomes the companion of courage. Hope is at once its guide and its reward. With it, resignation is firmer and courage, sweeter.

827

BOOK XIII: THAT THE GREEK MYSTERY CULTS WERE INSTITUTIONS BORROWED FROM FOREIGN PRIESTHOODS, AND WHICH, WHILE CONTRADICTING THE PUBLIC RELIGION, DID NOT MODIFY IT AT ALL IN ITS POPULAR PORTION

828 829

CHAPTER 1: How Much the Subject of This Book Is Beset with Difficulties

More than once in our exposition of priestly doctrines and practices, while demonstrating that they were foreign to independent polytheism, we have recognized that almost all of them were reproduced in the mystery cults that became associated with this polytheism. Here is the place to explain the origin of the Greek mystery cults, and the cause of the identity of what was revealed to initiates with the rituals and doctrines imposed by priests on the peoples they governed. The matter we enter into is beset with difficulties. Men of distinguished knowledge and sagacity have proposed different systems among which it is impossible to choose because all of them had a core of truth mixed with many errors. Here we will only offer some general ideas, which we will support with some facts, but avoiding as much as we can purely historical discussions.1

830

CHAPTER 2: What the Mystery Cults Were among the Nations Subject to Priests

In the human heart there is a tendency to erect barriers around what one knows and what one possesses. The spirit of property shows itself to be egotistical, just as much for what pertains to science as for what belongs to wealth. If this tendency was not combated by others, man would refuse his fellows everything that he could keep from them; but nature has placed the remedy for our defects in our defects themselves. As she forces us by our needs to share what we have, she constrains us by our self-love to make a mutual exchange of what we know; however, the original disposition subsists, and exerts itself with as much force as the interest is important or the science more elevated.

The philosophers of Antiquity had a hidden part in their philosophy, independent of all religious dogma, that was designated in Greek by the same word as the mysteries of the religion.1 Pythagoras expelled Hipparchus from his school because of some indiscreet revelations and replaced him with a column,2 and did not leave his books to Damo, his daughter, except with the explicit injunction not to make them known to the profane, a prohibition she respected despite her indigence and the treasure that was offered to tempt her.3 Zeno, Plato, and—who would believe it?—the Epicureans, superficial and even crude philosophers, had secrets that they did not communicate to their disciples except after trials that were very similar to 831 initiations.4 Christianity had barely formed, and Christians divided the public part from the secret part of worship.5

It is therefore not surprising that corporations, accustomed to treat with disdain the people they had subjugated, always held the people far from what was most precious and forbade all participation, either in the discoveries that constituted their pride and founded their power or in the theories they had built on these discoveries. Thus we encountered mysteries among all the nations. Diodorus6 extols those of the Chaldeans, Diogenes Laertius7 those of Ethiopia. Suidas8 instructs us that Pherecydes had drawn some of his opinions from the mystery cults of Phoenicia. Herodotus9 transmits details to us that are more numerous than instructive on those of Egypt. Caesar10 speaks, although with much less admiration, of those of the Druids. The magi of Persia11 celebrated theirs in obscure dens; and those of the Hebrews, contained in their kabbalah, served as a pretext for the extravagances of the rabbis and are the despair of modern commentators. Without adopting their reveries, it seems to us proven that from the most remote Antiquity this unfortunate and discontented people deposited in the mysteries their hopes for this life and, perhaps, for the next, by which I mean: expecting a conquering liberator in this world, and some vague notions of a future world.12

However, in our opinion it is not under this point of view that the mysteries to which the priestly castes admitted members of others castes by way of initiation rites should be envisaged. Some have erroneously believed that they were made up of the secret doctrine of the priests. To be sure, following a tendency we have already noted,13 these priests always combined the popular part of worship with their hypotheses and discoveries: fetishes first of all, then less crude gods, 832 became symbols for them; but these symbols were their particular language, their particular property. It in no way entered into their intention, because it was in no way in their interests to communicate their meaning to the profane.

As a consequence, the admission of the initiates to the knowledge of what the priesthood called “the mysteries” did not at all imply the teaching of that doctrine (or better put: these secret doctrines, because as we have seen, there were several).14 Everything attests that these mysteries revealed by initiation were only dramatic representations, stories put into action, descriptions replaced and rendered more sensible by images; as such they were celebrated on the lake of Sais.15 The priests had thought that by striking the senses they would produce stronger impressions than by simply addressing the imagination and memory; but the initiates had no other advantage over those who were not initiated but to contemplate a spectacle that the others did not.

Herodotus, admitted into the mysteries of the Egyptians, acquired no knowledge of their hidden theology. He explicitly says that the thing that these people called the mysteries was the nocturnal performance of the gods’ adventures; and one can see that the silence to which he had sworn concerned only the names of these gods and a few particulars of their adventures. The priests could recognize allusions to their philosophy in these representations; but the people saw only fables of the popular mythology, offered in a more vivid and animated way to their gaze.

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CHAPTER 3: How These Mysteries Were Transported into Greece, and What They Became

The period of the establishment of the mystery cults in Greece is irrelevant to our investigation. For us, it suffices that writers who are the most divided on other points take them back to the arrival of the colonies that civilized this country.1 The Eleusinian mysteries, they say, were brought from Egypt or Thrace by Eumolpus. Those of Samothrace, which served as the model for almost all those of Greece, were founded by an Egyptian Amazon.2 The daughters of Danaus established the Thesmophoria,3 and the Dionysian mysteries were taught to the Greeks by the Phoenicians4 or the Lydians.5 The truth of these traditions matters little to us; their unanimity demonstrates the principal fact, which is the foreign origin of these first mystery cults. We will add that long after the formation of Greek polytheism institutions of this nature continued to come from abroad. The mysteries of Adonis entered from Assyria by way of the island of Cyprus in the Peloponnese.6 The dance of the Athenian women at the Thesmophoria is not a Greek dance;7 and the name of the Sabazian rituals takes us to Phrygia.8

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We have elsewhere proven that the members of the colonies that landed in Greece for the most part could have only known the external and material part of the religion of the former homeland. But in this material portion there were dramatic representations. The colonists brought these representations into their new establishments; these representations were rejected from the public religion, however, because they did not fit with its spirit, and naturally became mystery rituals, copied on what they had been elsewhere. The mysteries were composed of ceremonies, processions in the interior of temples,9 and pantomimes. If in the sacred dramas of Egypt Typhon had kidnapped Horus, Pluto in the Thesmophoria kidnapped Proserpina. Plutarch displays the resemblances between the Egyptian stories of Isis and Osiris and the Greek stories of Ceres.10 The death of this Osiris was based upon that of Cadmillus in the Cabiric mysteries.11 These dramatic representations probably began by being representations of known fables; then there was nothing mysterious but the performance. Next, new fables were invented that remained secret, and then there was mystery in both the fable and performance. Along with these religious dramas certain names were transported into Greece, exotic formulae, and by that fact unintelligible and unexplainable. That the names of Ceres and Proserpina in the language of the Cabiri are precisely the same as those of the queen of the underworld and her daughter among the Indians can only be the result of chance.12 The three mysterious words with which, at the end of the great Eleusiniae, the initiates were dismissed,13 three words which for two centuries have exercised the sagacity of scholars,14 turn out to be three Sanskrit words 835 whose meaning applies perfectly to the ceremonies that one brought to a close by pronouncing them.15

Thus, the more we enter into the antiquities of India, into that country that seems destined to give us the key to so many unsolved enigmas, the more similarities we perceive between the priestly religions and the mysteries of Greece that were impossible to recognize previously.

Finally, the memory of the dangers of a long and uncertain crossing had to suggest to the sailors who landed in Greece the idea of reunions where they celebrated the memory of the difficulties they had suffered together; and history verifies that these foreigners, founders of the mysteries, added to their local recollections the commemoration of the dangers inherent in long-distance sailing. One of the Cabiri had discovered the art of fighting against the waves;16 the mysteries of Samothrace had procured a refuge against the storm for the Argonauts.17 This tradition is a vestige of oriental expeditions combining with Greek expeditions in the stories. In memory of this tradition, the great-priest received on the river those who wanted to be initiated;18 and many centuries after, the mysteries of the Pelasgian or maritime Isis were celebrated at Corinth.19

The mysteries therefore were originally only ceremonies in Greece, as in the countries where they were born, in which initiates were permitted to participate, without obtaining by this admission knowledge of any occult doctrine or philosophy; but gradually they changed nature; here is how.

As civilization progressed, the Greek priesthood, without ever acquiring the authority that this order possessed elsewhere, nonetheless acquired more consistency. Now, in obtaining some power, the priests must have felt even more how limited this power was. Already constituted political authority, the ascendancy of warriors in heroic times, the imagination of the Greeks, active, insolent, and brilliant, the 836 attachment of these peoples to liberty, an attachment that grew from generation to generation—all these circumstances did not permit the priests to take control of the public religion; but outside of this religion they noticed still little-known institutions come from the very countries where the priesthood dominated. We say that these institutions were little known: in truth, it had to be the case that at the period of their introduction they had not made a great impression on the mass of Greeks, since we can find in neither Homer nor Hesiod any allusion to the mysteries, no trace of mysterious customs.20

The less general attention that these institutions had attracted, the easier it was for the priesthood to take them over. Their source, their nature, even their separation from everything that existed seemed to invite the priests to take over their ownership, which could not be disputed; or, better put: this ownership had already devolved to them because, by a very simple effect of the establishment of the colonies, several families who descended from these foundations, whom we have spoken about already,21 already presided over the rituals of the national worship and the celebration of the mysteries.22

As a consequence, the priesthood worked23 diligently to raise the importance of these institutions of which it was the master, while in the national worship it was only a subordinate agent. The mysteries were also multiplied; it was probably in the parts of Greece where foreigners had not brought them that the priests, 837 informed of the use they could make of them by the advantage their Egyptian brethren had derived, established some, even before having determined what their content would be. Their mysteries were similar to those sanctuaries where a thick veil hid an empty enclosure from the eyes of the profane. For lack of anything better they closed the entrance of their sacred woods and their temples; certain chapels opened only one time a year and then for a single day.24 Statues of the gods only appeared veiled;25 their names could not be revealed without committing a crime.26 As every type of exclusion shares in mystery, often certain classes were excluded from certain ceremonies; sometimes an entire sex was forbidden. In the same way that the women of the Germans and the Scandinavians had rituals that were reserved to them, the female Greeks had their Thesmophoria where males did not dare enter under penalty of death, the female Romans their festivals of the Bona Dea, the Good Goddess, which became famous by the violation of this rule and the sacrilege of Claudius.

All these mysteries originally consisted in dramatic performances. In the Thesmophoria (to which later people would attribute quite varied, and very profound, significance), Ceres appeared veiled, served and consoled by women. Triptolemus brandished his spear and Celeus measured the earth. At the feet of the goddess were the tripod, a ternary emblem, the boiler, which recalls the cauldron of the Druids, and the mystical mirror (to which we will return), all foreign priestly symbols.27 But in thus attempting to hide under splendors borrowed from elsewhere the emptiness of the institutions they founded in Greece, the priests applied themselves with filling the void; they worked to have enter these institutions, which depended upon them, everything that was rejected by the independent spirit of the national worship; in other words: priestly customs, rituals, and doctrines.

To describe their efforts in connection with each particular object would be to enter into a path that would exceed all the boundaries of this work; for example, to simply determine the date of the introduction of each opinion or ceremony in the different mystery cults of the Greeks would require discussions with no end 838 and probably no conclusion. We will limit ourselves, therefore, to proving the fact by showing that in the mysteries all the priestly hypotheses as well as practices are found. But to better grasp this connection, let us observe two things: first, when in proof of the identity of some doctrine or some custom, we cite the meaning it seems to have contained; this is not to say that it did not also have other meanings. Each symbol, each ritual had more than one. Second, several of the facts that we will report occurred, we acknowledge, only toward the last days of the religion. This is because the mysteries, destined by the priesthood of Greece to receive everything that it could borrow from priestly polytheism, only gradually filled up with these borrowings. The composite whole will not be found together except at the fusion of the two polytheisms, that is, toward their fall; but the tendency of the mysteries is shown by this result itself, and the effect, even though late, attests to the cause.28

839

CHAPTER 4: The Conformity of the Teachings of the Greek Mysteries with the Priestly Rituals and Teachings

We have seen that the priestly religions, preserving traces of fetishism in the bosom of civilization, sometimes attributed crude, sometimes monstrous, forms to their gods;1 the divinities worshipped in the mysteries of Samothrace were, according to Herodotus, shapeless trunks. Bacchus, who in the early times of Greece had borne, as in the East, the head of a bull, but whom the sculptors and poets had separated from this hideous emblem, reprised it in the secret cult that was rendered him under the name Zagreus.2

The priests of sacerdotal polytheism adopted the dress of their gods in the dramatic performances, and, going through the entire scale of their accumulated conceptions, sometimes presented themselves as animals, sometimes imitated as best they could the splendor of stars. We find costumes of the same sort in the mysteries of Samothrace and elsewhere.3 Those who are received at the Leonitica,4 840 Porphyry tells us,5 wore the different forms of wild beasts, or traced them on their clothes.6

The character of several mysterious divinities is double, like that of Indian divinities. Ceres, the same as Bhavani, is sometimes protective under the name Leucothea,7 sometimes raging under that of Ceres Erynnis.

The human sacrifices practiced in the mysteries have been denied, and some have suspected the calumny of Christians who imputed these odious rites to their adversaries. But independently of the testimony of historians and the Fathers of the Church,8 that of Porphyry,9 whom no one can suspect of any motive of hatred, is explicit and undeniable. In the Dionysia at Chios and Tenedos, he says, a man was immolated in memory of the fable of Bacchus, cut into pieces by the Titans. It was so notorious at the time of Hadrian that the Mithraica were stained by such rites that it was necessary to forbid them expressly. They continued, however, despite this prohibition, and victims served at the extispicies.10 An ancient tradition to which Euripides refers fixes the sacrifice of a daughter of Erechtheus precisely at the period when the Eleusinian mysteries were established.11 If we can admit the assertion of Lamprides,12 who offered only a portrait of these sacrifices without any shedding of blood, this would be no less of a striking conformity with priestly polytheism, where these sorts of performances had always taken place when the softening of mores no longer permitted the reality.

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Purifications, so customary among the nations subject to priests, were no less so in the mystery rituals transplanted in Greece, and these purifications were of the same sort. Sometimes the profane were made to pass between burning coals or lit pyres;13 sometimes they were suspended in the air so that the winds could carry away their stains;14 sometimes they were washed with consecrated water.15

The idea of purifications is naturally accompanied by the prohibition of certain foods considered to be unclean.16 This interdiction is found equally in the priestly religions and in the mysteries.17

Among the peoples governed by priests, there were animals it was forbidden to eat, not because they were impure but because of certain teachings that had come to shore up the respect the peoples had already conceived for these animals when they were fetishists. The Syrians abstained from fish because fish had been their fetishes;18 and their priests giving, as always, an abstract motive for a vulgar superstition, explained this abstinence by their cosmogony, which made the sea a sacred element, and fish, its inhabitants, a sacred race like it.19 The same privation was commanded at Eleusis.

The renunciation of the pleasures of the senses, homage that priestly polytheism everywhere renders to its jealous gods, was one of the prescribed duties for the initiates, as well as the hierophants who received them: the initiate of Eleusis was obliged to practice continence from the moment he entered the process.20 The 842 priestesses of the Dionysian mysteries at Athens swore between the hands of the wife of the king-archon that they were pure, even from all intercourse with their spouses. Demosthenes has preserved for us the formula of the oath they swore.21 The female Athenians who prepared themselves for the Thesmophoria absented themselves from the conjugal bed, and this separation from their husbands had to be of some length,22 since Athenaeus indicates to us what herbs they made use of to support it with less difficulty.23 Those who had the superintendence of the ceremonies must never have been touched by a man.24 Celibacy was commanded in the higher levels of the Mithraic mysteries;25 and, finally, an inviolable chastity was enjoined at Apulia by Isis.26

By a natural consequence of this duty imposed on humans, several of the gods honored in the mystery cults were born of a virgin.27

The value attached to continence did not exclude the worship of generative organs. Their simulacra had been introduced to Samothrace by the Pelasgians:28 the representation of Cteis was shown at the Thesmophoria.29 The canephorae of the Dionysian mysteries carried in the sacred basket the phallus that was brought 843 near to the lips of the newly received member;30 and, by a minute conformity, but even more important to notice, this phallus was of fig wood,31 while dry figs in a similar form were a religious symbol among the Persians.32 It was by means of the Lernaean mysteries, which were celebrated in the Argolid in honor of Bacchus, that the custom of planting the phallus on tombs was introduced;33 as in Egypt, it was the emblem of the productive force, which draws life from destruction, and at the same time the symbol of the immortality of the soul, and of metempsychosis.34

This secret cult was accompanied in Greece, as the public religion in other nations, with the most licentious ceremonies.35 Young women, their bosom uncovered, conducted obscene dances at the festivals of Adonis.36 The debauchery that soiled these feasts is described with pleasure by Ovid,37 bitterly by Juvenal,38 and that of the Sabazian mysteries is strongly deplored by the first Fathers of the Church.39

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The hermaphroditic divinities who in the scientific language of priests are the emblems of the creative force, or the reunion of the two active and passive principles, reappear in the mysteries. The Dioscuri at Samothrace,40 Bacchus in the Dionysian mysteries, are invested with the attributes of the two sexes;41 and the hare, to whom the ancients attributed the same privilege,42 as the symbol of Bacchus always figures at the entrance of his grotto on the vases that were used at, or alluded to, the Bacchanalia. Adonis was invoked as being at once a young virgin and an adolescent.43 The combination of these two principles is also represented in another symbol, that of a marriage between a brother and a sister, and we have seen44 that the two highest divinities of peoples subject to priests almost always had this relationship. It is plausible that the popular mythology had borrowed the fable of the marriage of Jupiter and Juno from these traditions; but what is sure is that this cosmogonic incest was the basis of the Dionysian mysteries. Jacchus and Proserpina, Coros and Core, Liber and Libera are both brother and sister and husband and wife.

Let us move on from rituals45 to opinions.

845

Among priestly nations, all the sciences, all the discoveries, all the decisive improvements in the situation of the human species were attributed to gods. The priests of the mystery cults hastened to assign to all these things an origin that ascribed to religion the merit of everything that was useful in these métiers, as well as beautiful in the arts and wise in the laws. The mysteries of the Corybantes retraced the invention of agriculture,46 those of the Curetes, the first efforts at navigation,47 those of the Dactyls, metallurgy.48 The Bacchants in their frenzy tore the animals they encountered and devoured the scraps of their still-palpitating flesh.49 This horrible meal became the commemoration of the passage from the savage state to the social state. The initiates at the Dionysian mysteries ate raw flesh at a particular feast in memory of the barbarism to which men had been reduced before priests had civilized them.50 The establishment of laws gave Ceres the epithet legislatrix,51 which was given to Themis in other mysteries.52 The union of medicine and religion was celebrated.53 The horns of Bacchus were the symbol of bulls yoked to the plow,54 and his mangled body that of the grape torn from the vine and crushed in the press.55

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Astronomy, which occupied in the polytheism subject to priests a place such that it appeared to many scholars to constitute by itself a religion, could not fail to obtain a similar rank in the mysteries. The Sabazian dances were a pantomimic representation of the movements of the sun, the moon, and the planets.56 The ladder with eight rungs was an astronomical symbol because it revealed that the souls passed from one planet to another in ascending the heavens.57

Demonology is also found in them.58 The entourage of Bacchus which in the popular religion was unbridled, licentious, and boisterous—Silenus, Pan, the satyrs, the nymphs of Nysa, wet-nurses of the god, like the shepherdesses who fed Krishna—became intermediary genii; even the initiation was personified under the name Telete; daughter of Bacchus and Nicaea, she was the night dancer, rejoicing in the festivals and pleasing herself with the sound of timpani.59 The Orphic 847 hymn sung in the Dionysian mysteries, of which we have some fragments in Clement of Alexandria,60 contains all the oriental traditions concerning the genii hovering at the peak of heaven and descending to the bowels of the earth in order to govern the stars, elements, metals, plants, and protecting pure souls, announcing the future to them,61 and punishing corrupt souls.62

Metempsychosis, an opinion, as we have proven, foreign to the popular religion of Greece but inherent in the religions of Egypt and India, was one of the most fully developed teachings, revealed with the greatest solemnity, in the mystery religions. It was designated symbolically in the Mithraic mysteries by the ladder of eight rungs we spoke about earlier, the most secret, and last, of the symbols that the initiates were allowed to see.63 In the Dionysian mysteries it was combined, as in Egypt, with the notion of the return of souls to the Divinity.

Among the priestly solemnities, the commemoration of the upheavals of nature occupies an important place. In the mysteries, these formidable convulsions are retraced under the symbol of Vulcan, twice cast from heaven into the sea, occupied with subterranean labors for nine years, and reconciled with Olympus by Bacchus, who got him drunk and who, mounted on a mystical ass, saved the central fire, or soul of the world, from destruction.64 The killing of the same Bacchus symbolized natural revolutions in the Dionysian mysteries.65

To the scientific teachings were successively joined fragments of theogonies and cosmogonies.66 Silenus presents to Bacchus the cosmogonic egg; in the mysteries, 848 as in Phoenicia, this egg is the great whole which contains all beings; and the son of Night, the organizer of the elements, the prime mover of all existence, Eros, who according to the priests plays such a large role in the engendering of the world, is found in the mystery teachings.

By means of a legend, the mysteries of Samothrace affirm the trinity, always inseparable from priestly cosmogonies. The two Corybantes or Cabiri kill their 849 brother, place a crown on his head, and cover him with a purple veil, then place him on a bronze shield and bury him at the foot of Olympus; then separating the phallus from the body, which they carry to Tuscany,67 these two Corybantes form, we would say, a Samothracian trinity with this incarnate God, whom his worshippers, their hands red with blood, invoke in memory of his death.68

To have the identity of these doctrines and those of priestly nations stand forth more vividly, let us stop for a moment on the symbol of the cups and the mirror, a symbol that served as a text for the allusions of Aristophanes69 and the eloquence of Plato.70 The Demiourgos, Bacchus, the Creator and Redeemer, has two cups. One is the cup of unity; the soul of the world is formed in it. The other is the cup of division, from which partial souls emerge, condemned to birth and rebirth. They cannot escape individuality, either because they have to cooperate in the ordering or preservation of this universe and have not yet taken part in this common task;71 or because, having already lived in this world, they have committed faults and are reborn in bodies in order to atone for them; or because a fatal curiosity drove them.72 They cast a glance at the mysterious mirror. The Demiourgos also has contemplated himself it in; he saw his image in it and the desire to create had taken hold of him. Souls look at themselves in it; a mad desire for individuality disturbs and misleads them. They want to know what happens outside the celestial precinct; they want to exist by themselves, another mad desire because individuality is only a wrenching separation. They take their flight toward earth;73 they drink from the cup of oblivion and become intoxicated; the memory of their noble origin leaves them and they more and more bury themselves in matter.74 The best resist this temptation for a long time; at the height of heaven they beat their wings,75 holding them apart from bodies so as not to be cast into them. Finally succumbing, they recommend themselves to their good genius who protects them, whom they understand despite the distance. They drink only a measured 850 amount from the intoxicating cup and preserve a bit of memory of their previous state. The less pure attach themselves to the earth, a place of misery, which appears to them to be full of charms. They no longer listen to the voice of the tutelary daemon.76 Their bodies become thick and heavy burdens, but which they cherish. They resemble the sea god, Glaucus, who in the depths of the sea attracted to himself shells, stones, and plants, which covered him, but with which he identified, and thus remained crushed under their weight.77

However, return is available to these miserable souls. In his pity, the Demiourgos does not want their degradation to be without end.78 Death, a beneficent god, begins their deliverance and frees them from their ancient evil,79 and offers them the cup of wisdom.80 If they drink from it, their misguided desire ceases and the desire to return is awakened; but it is not enough. New appearances in the world, migrations,81 and purifications are still necessary. The mysteries hasten these migrations, render these purifications more effective, and grant the living before their passing-on, and on this earth, what they would not obtain in the underworld except after death. All these symbols—the cups, the mirror, the misguided distraction of the deceived souls, the repugnance, then the love, then again the exhaustion, of individuality, the terror of rebirth, the efforts to escape from it—the priesthood aids these efforts by revelations, lustrations, penances, and prayers; the definitive deliverance, the supreme good consisting in no longer reentering a mortal body,82 heaven regained, the Demiourgos receiving the exiles in his bosom, whence they will never depart: all these notions are Egyptian, Persian, and above all, Indian.83

851

The mysterious mirror is the necklace of the Maya of India, and it should be noted that, in her quality as creator or nurse of individual beings, Proserpina is also called Maya.84

At the same time, these teachings on the souls are connected to the system in which Bacchus is the sun, hence a double explanation results, at once astronomical and metaphysical, and by means of a chain of subtleties that we will omit, the astronomical system once again is applied to the destiny of souls.

Under a certain aspect, this purifying teaching, both in priestly religions and in the mystery cults, has something beautiful to it; but let us not forget that, on one hand, it does not prohibit the priests, everywhere they dominate, from maintaining their slaves brutalized and ignorant, and, on the other, that it was embellished by the Greek imagination, against which the Greek priesthood, despite its efforts, could not always defend itself.

Finally, all the ancients speak of the austerities, the voluntary torments that the initiates imposed upon themselves or those who aspired to initiation. Fasts preceded the celebration of the Thesmophoria. Those just admitted to the mysteries of Isis had to abstain for ten days from all food that flattered their senses, from the flesh of all animals and from every drink other than water.85 In the solemnities of Eleusinian Ceres at Phenea in Arcadia, the hierophant struck those who attended with multiple blows,86 as did the priests of Isis at Busiris in Egypt.87 Eighty degrees of trials were necessary to participate in the Mithraica.88 Weakened by hunger, wounded with rods, covered with mud, plunged into foul mire, or thrown into frigid water, for several days or even months the candidates were subject to torments that placed their life in danger.89 These practices cannot fail to recall the doctrine of the sanctity of pain and suffering that we have seen established in priestly polytheism, and whose source and nature we have attempted to explain; and note well that in the mysteries, as in the priestly religions, the gods, who imitate 852 mortals, aspire like them to sanctification by torments; like their priests, they mutilate themselves,90 and while popular belief had attributed these mutilations only to gods who fell outside the national mythology, in its secret conferences the priesthood attributed them to divinities worshipped by the people. Jupiter, they said to the initiates, had mutilated himself in his repentance for having violated Ceres.91 Eshmun, who in Phoenicia, tired of the love of the goddess Astronoë, had abjured his sex, commits the same assault in the mysteries of Samothrace and becomes the eighth Cabiri, who, under the name Aesculapius or Paean, presides over medicine.

The teaching of a god dead and resuscitated, a doctrine taught by all the priestly religions without exception, contrasts so much with the Greek conceptions that the Cretans who display the tomb of Jupiter on their island92 were accused of lying by all of Greece;93 and this tradition of which they made a point of honor, initially a subject of shame, later became the object of the mockeries of unbelievers. Thus the points of view change with the times. In the priestly religions, the death of the gods is a dogma, in the popular religion, an impiety; and from the time of Lucan, only irony recalls it, in order to ridicule it. But in the mysteries the legend continued and was expanded. Attis, Adonis, Bacchus, and Cadmillus are gods who die94 and are reborn.95 Juno, jealous of Proserpina, caused Zagreus to die by stirring the Titans96 against him, in the way that an Egyptian queen, Aso, joins with Typhon and killed Osiris. Turbulent regrets and frenzied lamentations, scrupulously 853 based upon foreign rituals, announce the passing-on of these sacrificed gods; but soon overcoming a temporary death, they again see the light of day and bring to the souls of those present a joy as disordered and boisterous as had been their sadness.

To these doctrines perhaps joined some political ideas, as an effect of circumstances peculiar to Greece’s location. One sees in Hesiod, we have already noted, the hatred of the oppressed against the oppressors: Hesiod wrote at the time of the destruction of the Greek monarchies. The mysteries, however, had been brought to Greece before this destruction; some of these had perhaps covered with their veils sacred conspiracies in favor of liberty. Obscure insinuations, scattered here and there in the ancients, make it rather probable that men indignant at the yoke of kings, in imitation of the mysteries, or in the mysteries themselves, formed secret societies to overthrow tyranny.97

This is not all.

We have shown unbelieving opinions becoming a part of the secret teaching of priests in countries submitted to their empire, but always remaining hidden from the profane. This provides an additional proof that in these countries the priests alone composed the enlightened class.

In independent polytheism, on the contrary, an enlightened class existed alongside the priesthood. Thus the priesthood did not feel strong enough to maintain itself, as its colleagues in Egypt or India, in an isolated position, in a remote camp, as it were; it found itself in a society that not being subject to it, examined its rights and contested its prerogatives. The mystery cults furnished it with a means of calling the profane to its assistance, and to form a body of auxiliaries, by attaching them to itself by means of its revelations; but it was necessary that these revelations be important. It was not a matter of captivating a stupid populace, distracted from all meditations by constant labors, whose faculties were kept within a narrow circle by a priestly caste and who came to attend ceremonies where their eyes were dazzled but their minds did not seek out the meaning; these were men versed in all the sciences, habituated to reflection, men revolted by the crudeness or license of popular fables which in their obvious imperfections needed to be harmonized.

Philosophical doctrines had entered too deeply into the Greek spirit not to have 854 attracted the attention of the priesthood. It had to conduct itself in their regard as it had conducted itself vis-à-vis the foreign religions. History shows it persecuting philosophy in public and enriching itself with its victims in secret. The different systems of philosophy had to simultaneously, but separately, become parts of the mysteries.

All these systems were subversive of the public belief. Irreligion was therefore introduced into institutions destined to strike men with religious terror and respect. Not only were the apotheoses of deified heroes called into doubt, but this doubt was carried to the divinity of the higher gods; sometimes one taught, like Euhemerus, that these gods were only mortals; sometimes, like Varro, that they were only personified elements. The ancients, says the latter,98 in their mysteries have so arranged the idols, the external marks and ornaments of the gods, that at first glance one can recognize the soul of the world and its parts, the true divinities.

Dualism, an essential element of priestly polytheism, was one of the explanations of the Eleusinian mysteries.99 Julian100 says that one celebrates these august ceremonies at the autumnal equinox in order to obtain from the gods that the soul does not experience the malign influence of the dark power that is going to prevail in nature; and the fable that says that Venus, having wanted to take the place of Minerva and work like her, feeling the thread break in her fingers, indicates the corruption of matter, resisting the hand of the creator.101 The same hypothesis is found in the Mithraic mysteries.102

Theism103 depopulated the heaven of its innumerable divinities to replace them 855 with a single invisible, incorporeal, ineffable, all-powerful being, but who was inaccessible to vows and prayers; or pantheism, depriving the god of theism of his separate existence, made him reenter the substance of which all beings are formed.104 Atheism itself became part of the mysterious revelation, as a final communication, 856 a mark of deepest confidence, the result of profound study, a secret, finally, that was transmitted only to a small number of elect, with so many ceremonies, after such preparations, that it was surrounded with an almost sacred obscurity.

What at first glance appears to be inexplicable and contradictory is that these irreligious hypotheses were presented to initiates with all the pomp of religion. The phenomenon of a class that, devoted to the maintenance and celebration of the cult, calls to itself in the midst of festivals, into the very sanctuary of the gods, men in large number in order to reveal to them that the religion that it teaches to the people is only a tissue of puerile fables, this phenomenon will appear less surprising if one reflects that this revolution was not the original goal, nor the sole aim, nor at any time the general goal of the mysteries.

Two motives encouraged the priests to allow opinions into their hidden teaching that daily acquired greater credit: on one hand, the interest of their order; on the other, individual self-love.

In allowing philosophy into the mysteries, they rendered it more indulgent toward external practices that it was important to them to preserve. Fighting publicly against its progress, they secretly connived with it. They disarmed it by adopting it. They congratulated themselves on making an ally of it by granting it the privilege of initiation. Privileges generally corrupt those who receive them. It therefore was not a bad calculation for the priesthood to associate this formidable class with itself, recognizing that in reality nothing was less remote from philosophy than religion rightly understood. It then added that these explanations ought to be carefully hidden from the people; and the human heart contains such an insolent and absurd pride that persuades each individual that he alone possesses a reason strong enough not to abuse what he knows. Each one thinks that the others will be blown away by the light that simply enlightens him. Thus the priests, who because of their estate proscribe irreligion, sought by craft to enroll it under their banner, and as a condition for peace, asked only for silence.

At the same time, individual self-love favored the transaction between unbelief 857 and the mystery cults. Like all men, priests are subject to the irresistible impulse imprinted on human intelligence by nature. When doubt enters into minds, it is also seen in the priestly order;105 now, opinions, and above all vanity, are stronger than interests. Have we not, toward the end of the last century, seen unbelief professed by the ministers of the altars?106

In the same way, the priests of polytheism obeyed this tendency and this calculation in their mystery cults; these institutions rendered their role less awkward by dispensing them from fulfilling two contrasting roles on the same stage, before the same spectators.

One would rightly think that morality would enter into the mysteries as soon as it became an integral part of polytheism. Even before, at Samothrace, there was an ancient tribunal that pronounced on crimes, and sometimes condemned the guilty to death; but it appears that this tribunal of purely sacerdotal origin only judged perjury and murder committed at the foot of altars, that is, that were aggravated by sacrilege; now these two assaults were insults against the gods; and we have distinguished between these offenses that every religion from the beginning forbids and the support that religion gives to morality, but only at a later date. For the mysteries, we would place this period at the time of Epimenides. Our readers know that he was charged by Solon with purifying Athens, and Solon, at once a philosopher and a legislator, had to feel the importance of basing the laws and morality on religion.

At that time the exposition of the duties that unite men among themselves was one of the revelations to the initiates;107 justice was recommended to them,108 piety toward parents, moderation in desires.109 A general confession was required from 858 the newly initiated,110 and the exclusion leveled against the guilty was the first punishment inflicted on them.111

But since the morality of the mystery cults was taught by the priests, it differs more or less from that of the public polytheism and took on several characteristics that we have noted in the priestly morality. Initiation became an indispensable condition for felicity after this life; at this price, the Corybants promised their adepts an eternal happiness.112 It was the mysteries, says Proclus, that liberate souls from this material and mortal prison, to unite it with the gods.113 The goal of initiation, adds Arrian to Epictetus,114 is to prevent the divine part of man from being plunged into the dark bog, and to prevent obstacles to its return toward the Divinity. Aristophanes,115 Aeschines,116 and Sophocles (as cited by Plutarch)117 represent the initiates as being blessed by this fact alone; they alone could hope for the rewards of another world. Punishments are the exclusive and inevitable lot of the profane.118 The broken jug from which they try to drink was the symbol of their misery. In vain they sought refreshing water, that is, the revelation that could have saved them.119 One sees in a painting of Polygnotus at Delphi two women condemned to eternal torment because they had not been received into the mysteries of Ceres;120 this is obviously the introduction into free polytheism of the dominant idea of priestly polytheism, the idea that crossed the centuries to enter into a Christian sect, and which proclaims the terrible axiom: outside the Church there is no salvation, which created a kind of intolerance unknown to 859 previous periods. Athenians considered themselves obliged to be initiated before they died;121 infants of the tenderest years were initiated,122 as well as those on their deathbed; one even put the vestments of the initiated,123 as well as those of hierophants,124 on the dead. The priestly spirit is the same, whatever the difference in its forms. In the Middle Ages, Christians wanted to be buried in monks’ habits.

To engrave this opinion more deeply on souls, one once again had recourse to dramatic performances. Troupes of initiates appeared before the eyes of the newly chosen on meadows dotted with flowers, like the happy inhabitants of Elysium, surrounded with a brilliant and pure light, crowned with laurels, and clothed with robes of shining white.125

Expiations acquired a wonderful efficacy, and these expiations were sometimes bought in a way that recalls the selling of indulgences. The Orphic ministers sat at the door of the wealthy, promising to whoever would participate in their ceremonies an immortality during which they would wear crowns and drink delicious wines;126 while the profane, covered with mud, had to share the punishments of the Danaids. The Orphics added, to be sure, that such treatment would be the reward of justice, or the punishment of iniquity; but in their language, an initiate was always a just man, and no one was unjust except the one who had disdained initiation.127

It is not surprising that the philosophers rose up forcefully against this part of the mysteries. Plato, who provided us with what we have reported concerning the Orphics, allows himself the bitterness of a virtuous indignation against it. Diogenes said that it was absurd that brigands and murderers could acquire eternal 860 felicity by participating in some rites, while Epaminondas and Agesilaus, for not having been initiated, would be cast to the bottom of Tartarus.128 Demosthenes and Theophrastus similarly castigated them.129 As the same circumstances suggest the same ideas to men, whatever might be the distance between the periods, Voltaire seems to have put Diogenes’s objection into verse when he says in a poem that is famous in so many ways:

  • You roast there, wise and learned Cato,
  • Divine Socrates, eloquent Cicero.

The testimonies reported here are important in that they prove that this theory concerning the efficacy of initiations was already known before the decadence of polytheism. The religions that are collapsing, unfortunately sell morality fairly cheaply; and later we will see polytheism call all the vices to its assistance in order to maintain itself. But here, it is the priestly spirit that alone seeks to make morality dependent upon practices and to pervert it for its own interest.

Other features help us to recognize this influence of the priesthood on morality. All priestly religions condemn suicide, and this disapproval is rather remarkable, for these religions inculcate much more expressly than polytheism free of the priests’ direction detachment from this world and indifference to all the interests of life. But suicide is a means of independence, and in this regard all authorities hate it. We do not claim to justify it as a general proposition. One must judge it by its motives, as all other human actions. It is often a crime, almost always a weakness, but let us dare to acknowledge: sometimes it is a virtue. It is a crime when, serving as a refuge from the disdain that one wants to merit but without actually incurring, as well as from the punishments that one hopes to brave without actually feeling them, it encourages men to culpable acts by offering them shelter against punishment; it is a weakness when, yielding to one’s own pains, one forgets that by doing the good one can mitigate the evils that one experiences; it is a virtue if, hardly reassured about one’s physical or moral force, one fears that one will succumb to seductions or fail to resist threats. He who feels that at the sight of torture he will betray friendship, denounce the unfortunate, or violate secrets confided to him fulfills a duty in committing suicide; it is precisely because of this that all tyrannies 861 proscribe it absolutely.130 We see it condemned in the mysteries;131 and Virgil, who had based his depiction of the underworld on what he knew of these institutions, mentions the punishments inflicted on those who have taken their own life; however, suicide was not at all considered a crime by the Greeks, and the Romans saw in it a sign of strength and magnanimity.132

862

CHAPTER 5: On the Spirit That Reigned in the Mysteries

The mysteries being the property of the priesthood, its spirit presides over them, it extends its somber black bunting over them; a profound melancholy rules over them. Plutarch1 and Proclus2 speak to us, the former about sad and somber ceremonies, the other of the sacred lamentations prescribed at the Eleusinian mysteries. Almost all the adventures attributed to the gods in the mysteries were tragic. Everywhere one saw funerary rituals. At the Thesmophoria, women seated on the earth as a sign of mourning uttered groans, as in Egypt;3 even their dance announced discouragement and sadness; but since everything had to be symbolic, the slowness of this dance, and the dejection that it expressed, also indicated the fatigue of the animals employed in work. The misfortune of living, a dogma inherent in Egypt and in India, was inculcated in all the Orphic mysteries; life’s brevity and its nothingness were taught in those of Thrace. The expressions of the Bhagavad Gita,4 that the earth is a sad and limited place, are perfectly parallel to the picture given in the Dionysian mysteries to initiates.5 Although we have adopted the rule of avoiding as much as possible conjectures that rest only on etymologies and grammatical studies, we find in a modern scholar6 a very intriguing observation, one that directly applies to the subject that occupies us here, so it merits being reported. Our readers already know that the Greeks had borrowed from the Egyptians the topography of their underworld, the subterranean rivers, the crossing of 863 the shades, and the name of the pilot who received them in his bark; this name, according to Jablonsky, in Egyptian alluded to silence, or, according to others, to the darkness that reigned in the kingdom of the dead. Wanting to naturalize the word in their language, the Greeks made it come from a verb that in Greek means rejoice.7 This derivation contrasted with all the notions of Homeric polytheism, notions according to which death is always a dreadful event and the shades an inconsolable troupe that envies the living and terribly misses the light of day. It was therefore necessary to find another explanation and Homer’s commentators claimed that by a customary euphemism, the ferryman of the underworld had been named Charon because he distresses mortals, and he himself always groans. But in the mysteries, where the priestly teaching of the misery of life prevailed, and the felicity of death as a deliverance, the idea that Charon in fact rejoiced in transporting the unfortunates who suffered in this world to a better one, a melancholic idea that the natural genius of the Greeks had rejected, was welcomed, and the etymology was one of the secrets revealed to the initiates.

Boisterous buffoonery, quite different from the brilliant and lively gaiety of the Greeks, also passed into the mysterious rituals. The Bacchants were subject alternately to a somber and silent melancholy and a frenetic joy.8 Everywhere, grotesque characters provoked laughter with base and ignoble jokes:9 the old Silenus drunk on his ass was the amusement of the Dionysian mysteries; a buffoon appeared in Samothrace alongside the Cabiri;10 and the Eleusinian mysteries show us Ceres distracted from her pain by the immodest poses of two old women.11 A strange anecdote! One that proves the authority of the traditions even when they depart from the goal proposed by those who respected them. At the festivals of Saturnalia, Julian12 believed himself obliged to mock the gods. It was by devotion that he did so, nonetheless his mockeries tended to render them ridiculous. It matters 864 little to us that these strange customs had signified the satisfaction of the Supreme Being after the arrangement of the universe and the triumph of harmony;13 it suffices that they were common to priestly polytheism and the mystery cults.

Finally, in them one finds hatred and jealousy vis-à-vis any and all personal distinction. Everything was collective and anonymous in the corporations of Egypt and Phoenicia. Everything had to be the same in the mystery cults where, being unable to expand without, the Greek priesthood had established its empire. Lucan speaks of an Athenian dragged to justice for having named the hierophant and the other priests of Eleusis.14

865

CHAPTER 6: Summary of the Composition of the Greek Mysteries

The beliefs of the East and the South thus passed entirely into the Greek mysteries, which in this way contained both the public worship and the secret doctrines of these beliefs.1 But unlike the nations governed by priests, where these two things were in reality two separate cults because the masses of the nation were never admitted to the knowledge of the hidden doctrine, in the Greek mysteries they were brought together, and the crude and material portion became a vestibule where the initiates were retained for a shorter or longer period of time, and then entered more or less deeply into the sanctuary. All the rituals, all the severe or indecent practices, all the doctrines (and in this number the most impious as well as the most religious) composing the secret doctrine of the priests in the East: the supremacy of one god over the others; the mediating or dying god for the salvation of the human race;2 the trinity;3 the hypothesis of the degradation of the soul before its inhabiting a mortal body, because of the impurity of matter; the hope of its gradual reascending to the Divinity; theism as principle and result of the system of emanation; or losing oneself in the depths of pantheism; dualism; atheism: all these Persian, Egyptian, and Indian doctrines were consigned to the mystery cults of the Greeks. They were at once the priestly apocalypse and the encyclopedia, 866 and their language was often word for word that of the cults that had served as their model.

One would be wrong to object to this the resistance of Greek priests to foreign priests and doctrines. Individuals can very well fight against individuals; that is, the Greek priests could have invoked the severity of the laws against the incursions of the foreign priesthood onto their own ground and even repelled their teachings and rituals from the public religion; but thus rejected, the rituals and doctrines were transported into the mystery cults, and all the priestly doctrines were there received and consecrated.

The priests of the independent polytheism that Greece professed did not differ from those of the East and the South except by success, not by their efforts. Both tended to the same goal; but the first, limited in their power, controlled only the secret part of the religion. The latter, all-powerful, controlled the entire religion without exception. As a consequence, the first transported into the mysteries everything that characterized priestly polytheism and, as much as they could, they created a separate domain for themselves to compensate for the empire that civil society contested with them. The mysteries were the property of the priesthood in the polytheism of the priesthood that had no property.

Of these doctrines and rituals with which the mysteries were successively enriched, none was replaced by another, all coexisted; and not only did they coexist, no matter how contradictory they were, but each of them was itself forged of several heterogeneous and incoherent elements.4 The most advanced philosophical doctrines were combined with the most abject anthropomorphism. In the pantheistic fable (which therefore is quite refined) of the slaughter of Bacchus by the Titans who burn him in a cauldron, Jupiter is attracted by the smoke of the meal that is being prepared; it is not until he recognizes the victim that he throws lightning at the Titans and has the scattered members of Bacchus interred by Apollo.5 The slightest ritual was susceptible of several senses; the branches carried in the Thallaphoria sometimes signified the memory of the first foods of 867 man, sometimes the discovery of the olive by Minerva, sometimes the rapid decline of life, figured by a dried branch. In the Cabiric mysteries, the first two Cabiri were popular gods, priestly gods, and symbols, sometimes metaphysical, sometimes cosmogonic.6 It was for this that it was said that one of the secrets of the mysteries consisted in revealing that Castor and Pollux were not gods. Those of Adonis were astronomical,7 agricultural,8 metaphysical,9 and, moreover, alluded to dualism.10 At the period when it is unquestionable that the initiates were engaged in the most subtle speculations, the grossest means of acting upon the populace’s imagination were still practiced. At the end of the first century ad, Dion Chrysostom speaks to us of voices that the initiates heard, of light and darkness that passed in succession before them, the dances they witnessed; in a word, he depicts the mysteries as a spectacle.11

This is not the place to treat the other sorts of influence they exercised over the philosophical spirit of the Greeks. We will show elsewhere how, even though naturally inclined to a precise and rigorous dialectic, this spirit was imprinted with gigantic conceptions and threw itself into the indefinable subtleties characteristic of the East, and how Greek philosophy lost in logic and clarity what it appeared to sometimes gain in elevation and profundity.12

In our opinion, from all that we just laid out, the existence of the Greek mysteries, far from invalidating our assertions concerning the difference between priestly religions and those that remain independent of priests, on the contrary, supports these claims and corroborates them. It is precisely because the Greek priesthood did not have the monopoly of the public religion, as was the case elsewhere, that it created a secret empire in the mystery cults. But as long as the public religion retained some strength, it rejected the opinions and rituals that the priesthood had gathered and, as it were, naturalized in its mystery cults.

868

CHAPTER 7: On Gradual Initiations, as the Initiation into the Priestly Hierarchy

The Greek priesthood, master of the mystery cults, did not content itself with introducing priestly opinions, doctrines, rituals, and customs; it attempted to establish a priestly hierarchy in them. There were different orders of initiates, as in Egypt there were different orders of priests.

The Eleusinian mysteries were divided into great and small mysteries.1 In the latter, almost the entirety of the Greeks were initiated. They consisted in pantomimes that portrayed several religious fables. Those initiated into the great mysteries were a much smaller group and the teaching was more abstract. In them, the priests combined allegorical or metaphysical explanations with the necessity of hiding these explanations from the people.2 They were not communicated at a single time.3 The initiates were more or less instructed according to the level they had attained; no one was sure of being completely initiated. When it comes to trust, it is always useful to be able to say that one has not yet said everything. The 869 imagination is struck by the unknown; curiosity is captured by the hope of learning. When a doctrine has weak aspects and one shows only half of it, one can say that the answer to objections is found in the hidden half.

Both sorts of mysteries, the great and the small, were further subdivided and in each subdivision the teaching changed, without these variations destroying respect and trust in the minds of the initiates. The barriers that separated the different classes placed an obstacle to their mutual communication, and the allegorical explanations avoided the contradictions they did not resolve. Each notion that was taught, each practice that had as its purpose rendering the teaching more solemn, had (as in priestly polytheism) a double, often a triple, meaning. What was only a ritual in the first level was a tradition in the second, and in the third, a promise. The present admission was transformed into a commemoration of the past; commemoration became prophecy. The priests had found a pretext for delaying initiations and prolonging trials. It did not depend upon them, they said, to admit candidates; they needed an order, a particular manifestation of the gods; for example, access to the temple of Isis Tithorea was opened only to those summoned by a dream.4 They compared premature initiation to suicide, and just as mortals did not have the right to leave this life in order to hasten to a better world, but must await the signal of the divine will, in the same way one could not grant the regeneration of the mysteries to the profane, except after having received miraculous authorization from heaven.5 Apuleius recounts that a year after he had been received into the mysteries of Isis, it was revealed to him that he must present himself to those of Osiris;6 he sold his clothes to defray the costs of this new initiation, and soon he was initiated a third time. As these initiations were at first free, but then later occurred when one paid the fee,7 some have considered the mysteries as a means used by the priesthood of enriching themselves. This calculation could have been that of a few individuals, but not the principal aim of the order. We rather see in these pecuniary conditions an effort to keep out the class of the poor without directly rejecting it; in the republican States of Greece, this would have wounded the proud spirit of equality, which was unhappy with even this indirect exclusion.8

870

CHAPTER 8: On the Real Object of the Mysteries

In the midst of this accumulation of incoherent teachings and revelations, it has often been asked, what was the purpose of secrecy in the mystery cults? This secret, we do not hesitate to say, did not reside in the traditions or the fables or the allegories or the opinions or the substitution of a purer teaching, replacing a cruder one:1 all these things were already known. Facts they had heard elsewhere were confided in those who had been initiated, fictions they had read in all the poets, hypotheses that were in the mouth of all philosophers. The travels of Ceres, the misfortunes of the gods, the battles of the Titans, all were represented on the stage, engraved in marble, sung in public hymns. The cosmogonic systems were contained in works open to all the profane. In the initiations, one did not learn philosophic opinions, but when one was philosophic, one recognized them. What was secret, therefore, was not the things that were revealed; it was because these things were thus revealed, that they were revealed as the teaching and practices of an occult religion, and that they were revealed progressively, in a way to always allow future revelations that would at the appropriate time dissipate all objections and remove all doubts. What they had fixed was not at all their doctrines, but the signs and words 871 of coming together communicated to the initiates, and the ceremonies that accompanied these communications.2

The impious who were persecuted for sacrilegious indiscretions—Diogoras,3 Aristagoras,4 Alcibiades,5 Andocides6—were never accused of having divulged a teaching, but of having profaned the ceremonies. The same accusation weighed over Aristotle. No portion of his philosophy was alleged against him by the hierophant, his persecutor, but a sacrifice to the manes of his wife employing rituals reserved to the Eleusinian Ceres.7

872

CHAPTER 9: On the Explanations That Have Been Given of the Mysteries

It is now easy, it seems to us, to understand the error of the majority of those who have preceded us in these inquiries. This error is of the same nature as that of the scholars we have spoken about in the first volume.1 Theism, pantheism, the crises of physical nature, the discovery of the arts, the progress of civilization, all these things were found in the mysteries; but none of them was the sole doctrine, none was taught exclusively in them, none was revealed to everyone in them. The priesthood of independent polytheism acted vis-à-vis the profane as we have seen the priests of sacerdotal polytheism act toward foreigners.2 From the least-instructed faithful to the philosopher most in love with the most abstract speculations, all were found there because of their intellectual instruction and their satisfying revelations.3 The hierophants of Greece let Plato believe that the mysteries contained precepts of morality;4 Varro, that truths of nature were contained in them;5 they let Diodorus recognize historical facts in them;6 with Plutarch, doctrines, sometimes dualism,7 sometimes the sufferings and rewards to come;8 873 to others they revealed the human origin of the gods and the apotheoses of legislators.9

Thus the ancients were mistaken like the moderns when they arbitrarily chose what accorded with the system they preferred, and when they rejected explanations that did not comport with this system. When Plutarch rose up against those who, like Euhemerus, attributed historical meanings to the mysteries, or who, like Varro, interpreted them by physics, agriculture, or allegories, he was no more wrong than Warburton, Villoison, or Boulanger.

874

CHAPTER 10: That Our Way of Envisaging the Mystery Cults Alone Explains the Often Contradictory Attitude of the Greeks toward These Institutions

The hypothesis that we have presented, with evidence that it seems to us can hardly be contested, is the only one that places the mysteries in their proper light. It is also the only one that explains the contradictions that astonish us when we consider the Greeks’ conduct vis-à-vis these institutions. On one hand, rigorous laws threatened anyone who displayed the least irreverence toward them. These laws could not be repealed, or even relaxed:1 a redoubtable tribunal composed of priests who were simultaneously judges and parties pronounced capital punishments against the indiscreet and against impiety. Sacrilege was punished with death; one’s confiscated goods were put up for auction. A price was put on Diagoras’s head2 and Aristagoras’s.3 The most eminent services rendered to the homeland, the most merited glory in arms and in the sciences, did not serve as a shield. Athens equally failed to recognize what it owed to Alcibiades’s arms and Aristotle’s meditations; the people grew angry at the slowness of the judges and went ahead of their judgment. In the midst of the applause that his tragedies had obtained, Aeschylus was ready to see himself torn apart by the multitude for having put on the stage objects from the mystery cults, or by some allusion having betrayed a secret of the same.4 More obscure victims, two young Acarnanians, are murdered as punishment for a fault of the same nature.5 Despite his hatred for the institutions of his country, and his irreligious intentions, Euripides carefully distinguishes the mysteries of Bacchus from the Dionysian ones so as not to incur an accusation that was inevitably harmful.6 In 875 this regard, the philosophers did not distinguish themselves from the vulgar; they lavished the greatest praise upon the mysteries.7 Both Socrates, who paid with his life for his public disapproval of the popular mythology; and Plato, all of whose writings tended to flatter this mythology, expressed themselves with a profound respect for the secret cult.

On the other hand, not only is the participation in certain mysteries sometimes a subject of blame,8 but Aristophanes insulted those that the Greeks revered the most, the Thesmophoria and the Dionysian mysteries.9 The people of Athens subjected them to the inspection of civil magistrates.10 It reserved for itself, despite formal declarations disallowing them from any softening of the strict laws of the mysteries, the right to annul the judgment of the Eumolpidae against profaners; and the sages who offered lavish praise of the sublime significance of these institutions nonetheless refused the honor of being initiates.11 The Romans, who in a previous book offered us the spectacle of the resistance opposed by the Greek genius to the rituals and doctrines of the priesthood, acted toward the mysteries with a more sustained and implacable defiance. This grave and suspicious people promulgated severe edicts against their introduction. The Bacchanalia were forbidden by the Senate;12 the Eleusinian mysteries were never allowed; even the foreigners who wanted to celebrate the Sabazian Bacchus with occult rituals were prohibited by the praetors, despite Roman tolerance;13 and when the arms of the republic had subjected Greece, the penalties against profaners were significantly mitigated.14

These contradictions will appear to be explained if one reflects that one part of the Greek priesthood employed on behalf of these mysteries all its influence, all 876 the means of acting on the imagination of a restless and credulous nation, and that the general spirit of polytheism, always disposed to receive all gods and celebrate all rites, favored the efforts of the priesthood. The Greeks adopted ceremonies that came from abroad out of the same motive that caused them to raise altars to unknown gods; but the national genius also rose up against all that bore the mark of barbarism and the priesthood.15 For their part, the philosophers, impatient with the crudeness of the vulgar beliefs, were favorably disposed toward institutions that claimed to purify them. They found their own subtle doctrines in them, the discoveries or conjectures that had cost them so much effort: theism, which alone absolved the Supreme Being of the presence of evil; pantheism, which gives rest to the imagination by realizing that infinity, its promised land, which it perceives through the clouds but without ever being able to enter. But on the other hand, as the philosophers entered into the mysteries’ secrets, they saw joined with the opinions that could please them a strange and unnatural mixture of views and practices that gave the national worship an apparently less irrational meaning, but in reality corrupted it with more fantastic hypotheses and scandalous practices.

Hence this mixture of repulsion and attraction, admiration and condemnation, respect and horror. When one said to the Greeks that in the mysteries gods were liberated from their vices, their imperfections, their jealousy toward weak mortals; and always the friends of the human race, always protectors of justice, lending favorable ears to the priests and generous support to the innocent, the religious sentiment of the Greeks believed it saw in these improvements the fulfillment of its hopes, the seal of its stubborn labor concerning the character of these gods; but when in the depths of temples came forth disheveled Bacchants, half-naked, injuring men’s sight with the obscene Phallus and filling the air with wild howling, these same Greeks asked where these frenetic hordes could have come from and what terrible prodigy could thus disfigure the cult transmitted by Homer and purified by Sophocles, which such orgies seemed to desecrate.

877

BOOK XIV: ON THE SCANDINAVIAN RELIGION, AND ON THE REVOLUTION THAT SUBSTITUTED A PRIESTLY BELIEF FOR INDEPENDENT POLYTHEISM IN SCANDINAVIA

878 879

CHAPTER 1: Preliminary Observation

Our readers probably expect to encounter among the Scandinavians a very different polytheism from the beliefs of the East and the South, and even from the Greek religion, be it primitive, such as Homer presents it, or purified, as Sophocles allows us to know it. This assumption is natural. The character, habits, mores, and passions of the peoples of the North distinguish them in many aspects from the nations that live in happier climes and more fertile territories. We have already recognized this truth;1 but we added that if the South was the domain of the priesthood, the North was its conquest. Now the interest of the priesthood being the same, the laws to which its intelligence is subject2 being identical in all climates, similarities in the religions, whether public or secret, popular or scientific, must occur that would be inexplicable if we did not go back to their cause. In fact, we will see that Scandinavia, which existed only for war and pillage, nonetheless had the same practices, teachings, and cosmogonies, although under harsher forms, as did India, where mildness, softness, and peacefulness reigned. Once the facts prove that all these things were imported, the problem is easily resolved.

Let no one be astonished, therefore, if we do not first see in Scandinavian polytheism a belief that is rather parallel to that of the Homeric Greeks, and later a religion that is not much different in its bases to oriental and southern opinions. We do not maintain that all these peoples were once together; we do not contest that the religion was modified in accordance with climate and circumstances. If instead of limiting ourselves to the history of religious forms, we had undertaken to do a universal history, we would have had the duty and task of entering into 880 the details of all these differences; but obliged as we are to keep to our subject and to follow the path marked out for us, we have only been able to indicate these somewhat summarily, while calling more general and essential agreements to the reader’s attention. Thus we have noted that religion, warlike in the North, was peaceful in the East; but this diversity of character did not change much in the action of the priests; it only accidentally, and from time to time, limited the power they exercised, and did not at all prevent them from introducing into the people’s belief teachings that were favorable to them and, in the hidden doctrine, notions to which their meditation had led them.

This preliminary explanation being well understood, we will no longer fear being accused of an error that we have often reproached other authors with committing (who otherwise are to be recommended) while taking the greatest care not to commit it ourselves. And we will faithfully paint the authority of the priesthood among the Scandinavians following their second religious revolution as being almost as extensive as it had been among the Egyptians. We will do so without fearing any suspicion of having a blind partiality for an exclusive system.

881

CHAPTER 2: How the Scandinavians Passed from Fetishism to Polytheism

Before beginning this work, we had proposed to combine in a single book everything that pertains to the religion of Scandinavia. But we have been forced on several occasions to draw facts from this religion aimed at proving our assertions concerning the cults subject to priestly direction.

As a result, many things that ought to find their place here are already spread throughout our four preceding volumes. We have had to leave them aside, and we will not treat the composition and the development of the polytheism of the North except in a general way, and in a considerably abbreviated manner.

Scandinavia includes especially Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.1

We have proven by numerous facts that the first religion of the inhabitants of these countries was fetishism.2 We will therefore leave aside details. We will simply briefly recall that the first gods of the Scandinavians appeared in the form of animals, of bulls, cows, serpents, lizards, for which these people had a particular affection; they carefully nourished these domestic gods, offering them sacrifices. The gods let themselves be seen in dreams in the appearance of inanimate things; they protected their protégés from danger and revealed their future destiny to them. This, certainly, was fetishism.

Scandinavians passed from this belief to polytheism in the same way as the Greeks; that is to say, by the arrival of one or several colonies.

882

It appears certain that the oldest of these colonies had only military leaders as their guide and that no priesthood took part, in the same way that the priesthood of Phoenicia or Egypt had no part in the Egyptian or Phoenician migrations that landed in Greece.

The sole difference one notes is that the colonies to which Greece owed its civilization mixed with the natives without subjugating them, while the people we are dealing with here were subjugated by the bellicose tribes that overran them.

According to tradition, these tribes were under the leadership of the first Odin, king of the Scythians,3 according to Snorri; king of the Getae,4 according to Botin; king of the Vandals,5 according to Eckard.6

We say the first Odin; there were several others. Odin, or Wodin, as we know, was only a generic name, like Hercules, Brahma, and Osiris. This generic name appeared in the midst of the obscurity of the northern mythology like a great shadow, around which the various fables were gathered. All the tribes of the North make their origins go back to Odin; their kings said they were his descendants. To him were attributed the discovery of all the arts, the merit of all civil and religious institutions.

This same name, designating at once several stages of the social state and several individuals who succeeded one another over a long interval, has led several writers occupied with the subject we are treating into a serious error.7 They have not reflected that if it was a matter of different periods, the religion of each one could have been different, and if it were a question of only individuals, each Odin could also have differed from his predecessors in his means, his aim, his doctrines; in all 883 of them, they have seen a reunion of the prophet and the warrior; they have made the first Odin like the second or the third, because it perhaps is necessary to count as many as three, an armed Mohammed founding a religion and having made it ascendant by his victories. The first Odin, however, was not someone who was inspired and who established his belief by the sword. He was a conqueror whose success earned him apotheosis. He did not become a warrior, as did Mohammed, because he was a prophet; he later passed for a prophet because he had been a conquering warrior and because later prophets took the same name.

Like the Egyptian colonies that had brought together the fetishes of the Pelasgians, Odin, while civilizing (at least up to a point) the savage tribes of Scandinavia, assembled the idols that these hordes worshipped separately, even individually.8 A mountain was their Olympus, a huge ash tree provided their shade; and brought into a citadel, like the gods of Greece, they divided the functions that the fetishes previously had exercised indiscriminately. Balder directed the chariot of the sun. Thor presided over the exploits of battle, Freya the pains and pleasures of love.

This revolution did not occur as peacefully as in Greece. The legend of Regnar Lodbrog, to whom the pagan Skald9 who composed it obviously attributes many of Odin’s exploits, alludes to the fierce wars against the worshippers of cows and bulls. Two virgin heifers and the cow Sibylia, whose name recalls the one who in India put the warriors of Vishvamitra to flight,10 for a long time rebuffed the efforts of Regnar, and his sons were not victorious until after his death.11

Because of a circumstance that had not existed in Greece and which was a natural consequence of the victories of the first Odin, the conqueror who had effected a religious revolution had to be placed at the head of the gods.12

884

The glory that surrounded him, the terror inspired by his triumphs, gave him the ability not to impose opinions upon the defeated that were different from those analogous to the ideas of the period: this is beyond all human power, but to bring to these barbarians his cult, which was appropriate to barbarism; he profited from the enthusiasm of his brothers-in-arms to preside over the feasts of the brave after their death, as he presided over their exploits and banquets during this life.

It followed that in Scandinavia the first polytheism was the transplantation in a conquered country of the religion professed by its conquerors but in keeping with the natural development of the belief of the conquered, while the first polytheism of the Greeks had been the peaceful amalgam of the fetishism of primitives with the polytheism of more civilized colonists.

Moreover, the gods of the Edda, like those of Greece, are only powerful and strong beings, protectors or enemies of mortals according to their fancies or interests, and often left to bear the burden of their preferences or their capricious animosities. They come down from heaven, greedy for blood and taking pleasure in carnage. In turn they are victors or vanquished; heroes defy them; mere warriors, above all giants, wound them or force them to flee.13 Magicians manipulate them with their enchantments.14

If one agrees that one must attribute what distinguishes the Greeks from the inhabitants of Scandinavia to accidental differences; if one substitutes a harsh climate15 for the most beautiful one, sterile and uncultivated land for blessed and 885 fertile soil, senses tormented by a hostile nature for senses flattered by a gentle and friendly nature, the necessity, then the habit, and, soon, the love of war, the thirst for blood,16 and the ardor for pillage, for the mixture of repose and action that among the Greeks simultaneously favored the development of the physical faculties, the brilliance of the imagination, and the progress of thought; if one then makes a precise comparison, one will still recognize that the polytheism of the two nations was the same polytheism, establishing between the gods and men precisely the same relations.

The spirit of pillage is more emphasized in the sagas of the peoples of the North than in the Homeric poems, and their Odin, head of the victorious horde, departs Valhalla to participate like a mortal in battles, the prime occupation of the time; Jupiter, on the contrary, limits himself to contemplating from the height of Olympus, deciding but without taking part in the success of the struggle. As for the rest, everything is identical in the two religions.

If the Scandinavian gods, mercenary, cruel, and treacherous like those of the Greeks, are more bellicose, the character of their worshippers is the cause; but these inhabitants of heaven equally have the same direct communication with these warriors. Ingrid and Haquin are soldiers and augurs, like Helenus and Polydamas. The heroes manifest hatred and disdain for the priests, like Agamemnon for Calchas and Chryses; they revolt against the gods and fight against them, like Diomedes. Common morality has nothing to do with the religion. There are no judges of the dead. Niflheim is an imitation of life; Valhalla, a place of pleasure for the companions of Odin. In a word, it is Homeric polytheism but harsher, more somber, and stormier.

886

CHAPTER 3: Revolution in the Scandinavian Polytheism

Such was the religious state of Scandinavia when, by an event about whose causes the annalists differ, the priestly power established itself.

Some believe that it was by a domestic revolution. One of the first Odin’s successors, they say, having wanted to engage his people in a war against the Romans, was expelled from the throne and a council of priests took over control.

Others attribute this revolution to the arrival of a second Odin, not, like the first, simply a military leader, but a priest at the head of a priestly colony.1

They recount in detail the great change that was his work.2

At his arrival, they say, Sweden was governed by a king named Gylfi,3 who at the news of Odin’s exploits went in disguise to consult with him. Their conversations bore upon questions of cosmogony and metaphysics, which would indicate the revelation of symbolic and scientific teachings. Gylfi gave his daughter to Skiold, son of the conqueror; but he disappeared suddenly. Would this not be an indication of a revolution wrought against the political power by the foreign priest?4 In a saga, Gylfi is precisely he who congratulated himself for having 887 broken the mace of a god. Several traditions in fact betray a struggle. Saxon the Grammarian recounts that in the absence of Odin, a competitor who usurped his name and his power overturned the established worship, abolished the festivals where the assembled gods were worshipped, and replaced them with special rituals in honor of each divinity.5 Do we not recognize in these features an effort of free polytheism (which adores its idols individually) against the priestly tendency to make an assembly of the gods? Odin returned, continues Saxon,6 killed his rival, degraded the gods whose altars he had erected, and banished the magicians, their accomplices. Now, we have already noted that victorious cults always proscribe the pontiffs of defeated cults as being magicians.

The memory of this struggle seems to have passed from history into the mythology; this is what happens with all peoples. Chased by another god, Odin reenters Valhalla at the end of ten years, puts his rival to flight, and regains the reins of the universe.7

Can we not also discern in the giants and dwarfs to whom the legends assign a subordinate, and malevolent, place at the bottom of dens and caverns the adherents of the former religion seeking asylum on mountaintops and in the cavities of rocks?

Whatever might be the case with these two hypotheses, one of which must be admitted, the council of the gods again became a corporation similar to that of Persia and Egypt. The Drottes were at once priests, judges, and legislators;8 they were called gods, and their words, divine words.9 They dominated kings, deposed them, took their life,10 ruled in their place, extended their own authority over individuals, 888 fixed the belief, maintained it by severe punishments, struck unbelievers with exile or death.11 Initially paid by a tax levied on the entire people,12 they soon took over vast domains.

Like the Druids among the Gauls, they established a monopoly over poetry. The Skalds, who from the time of the first Odin freely sang the actions of the gods and the exploits of the brave, henceforth were subject to the order of Drottes by subaltern initiations, and were subdivided into several classes, each of which had a distinct sphere, its determinate revelations, its special rung, without being able to rise higher. The heroic songs became religious chants; but since the subjection of the Skalds did not deprive them of their memory, they often ran together the two worships, hence the mixture of traditions, dogmas, and teachings that confuses us.

However, despite these poetical memories, the Scandinavian religion changed nature. It did not lose its bellicose cast; the first Odin had engraved it too deeply on the soul of his followers, and the harshness of their climate, their greed for wealth, which they could only obtain sword in hand, did not allow them to forget the lessons of their master. Thus the god who orders combats, and whose son was especially charged with war (Thor), Odin continued to maintain the universe under his control. He presided over births, marriages, death. His priestesses with prophetic voices rushed into the mêlée. But the warriors are no less subject to the pontiffs, and the latter decide on enterprises, give the signal for expeditions, and conclude peace treaties, which are but truces.

At the same time they introduced into Scandinavia—that is, they taught and imposed—all the rituals, all the symbols, all the doctrines that we have encountered among the nations subject to priests.13

Astrolatry served as the basis of their religion. Odin is the sun, Freya the moon. 889 Another goddess, who also presides over this planet, or who is another name of Freya, Ostara, recalls the priestly Astarte. Night and day, which follow each other, while making the circuit of the heavens without burning out; the dawn, which is but the spume with which the courier of the night lathers his frenum; the sparks of the luminous world formed by the stars, the dwarf gods who represent the growth and decrease of the moon; Hati, the morning-star; Sköll, the evening-star; the bridge Bifröst, which is the rainbow; Asgard, the city of the gods, which is the zodiac, the twelve thrones that are its signs;14 Thor’s belt, the reversal of the cuirass of Amasis:15 all these symbols are astronomical. The festivals are celebrated at periods that also belong to astronomy.16

The ancient fables feel this new character. The gods in Valhalla played at dice in order to win the riches each had brought with him while mounting to heaven. Now, these dice, which roll on the celestial table, express the splendor of the stars by their sheen, and by their movement, which is no longer fortuitous, the regular course of the planetary bodies.

One sees hermaphroditic divinities appear.17 Respect for virginity combines with virgins giving birth,18 and the North receives with surprise but without resistance the dark and bizarre cosmogonies of the East.19 The supreme god alone, then with the giants of the Gelae, meditates on creation, like Brahma with the nine rishis. The members of these giants formed the world, like the divided body of the 890 goddess Omorca; this world must be destroyed, and we have already reported the frightening portrait the Eddas present of this destruction.20

But there is more. Independent of this teaching, inherent in all the beliefs taught by priests, there is a notion that is subtler and no less sacerdotal which hovers over certain parts of the Edda. Creation is only an illusion, the creator gods only apparently exist; the time that contains creation no longer has reality, and only where one and the other vanish do the true, the eternal, the unique begin.21 All this is identical with the Bhagavad Gita.

The world being created, a superior god dominates all the other gods;22 beside him is found a rival, but inferior, head of the malevolent divinities.23 A mediator god attempts to reestablish the destroyed harmony.24 A dying god atones for the universe, and one must observe that this god, Balder, is the gentlest, the most irenic, the most virtuous of all; therefore he does not mount to Valhalla. It is in Niflheim that he is going to continue his peacemaking career. Ideal of the divine perfection, heavenly lamb without spot, he dies by a mysterious consequence of his very perfection in order to purify Odin of his first murder, that of the giant Ymir. Who can fail to see here a priestly doctrine?25

A demonology no less regular than that of Egypt or Persia populates the deep blue of the heavens, the surface of the earth, and the profound caverns where humans do not enter: the Woles, interpreters of the runic literature, traverse the fields where the brave fight; the inexorable Fates, breaking the thread they have spun, or the charming Valkyries, compensating the heroes struck with premature death with their charms, still other times swans or crows, or invisible, identified with the murmuring wave and the air they stir. The Elves, children of light and brilliant like the sun, populate a kingdom that bears their name,26 and they come down from it to serve men. Others, black like pitch, remain under the earth.27 Laboring 891 dwarfs, born of the night and dust,28 or the union of the gods and giants, because the moment to create man had not yet come, work metals, forge weapons, extract gold from the heart of the depths, thus defending it against mortals who were then growing into formidable giants, or more treacherous, lavishing upon humans this fateful gold, which sows discord, engenders hatreds, and occasions murders.29

It should be noted that in the Scandinavian fables, gold holds the place that women occupy in Indian fictions. All the faults of the gods of India, beginning with Brahma taken with Sarasvati, all the weaknesses of the penitents, almost all wars, have as their cause illicit loves or abductions. In the North, without being totally absent, love plays a smaller role. It is treasure that one desires, that one seizes, that one snatches; and sometimes to reestablish peace, this cursed gold, which had misled greedy rivals, is cast into the sea as the source of all evils.

The trinity is found in the three gods full of love, who finally want to manifest themselves (almost an Indian expression); two trees languished sterile and lifeless, the three gods gave them life.30

Metempsychosis can be presumed in the virgins who become swans after their death, by heroes changed into wolves, by giants transforming into she-wolves.

Alongside doctrines are cruel rituals, human sacrifices,31 funeral immolations; Brynhildr, or Brunhild, before burning herself, had eight faithful servants burned on the tomb of Sigurd. Further along there are traces of obscene rituals.32 Trials by water and fire end judicial proceedings.33

892

The effectiveness of invocations, imprecations, talismans, and magic letters, so wonderful in Persia and India, is proclaimed by the second Odin.34 The power of his predecessor was the sword; his was the word, or writing, which is but the written word, and this difference separated the pontiff from the warrior. “Do you know,” it is said in the Havamal, “how one writes the runes, how one explains them, how one ensures their effects? I know those that queens and the sons of men do not know. They chase away maladies, calm storms, heal wounds. I charm the storms in the atmosphere and they cease. If I pronounce them while pouring holy water on a new-born, he becomes invulnerable. Gods, genii, mortals, nothing escapes my sight. I awaken the love of virgins, and my beloved loves me forever.” Freyr, recounts the Edda, taken with the beautiful Gerdor, whose marvelous splendor spread throughout the universe, and whose round arms shone with a brightness that dazzled sight, went with a faithful servant to conquer the object of his desires. Gymir, father of Gerdor, held her confined in a palace surrounded by fires that nothing could extinguish. The magical sword of the hero overcame this obstacle. He made his way to the beauty he wanted to possess; he painted in harmonious language the flame that consumed him. It was in vain. He offered her eleven apples of the purest gold, diamonds of inestimable worth, but again in vain. He threatened her with a dazzling sword; a useless threat. His companion, finally, uttered powerful words and the beautiful Gerdor yielded.

Philosophical teachings complete the priestly work. “How will I worship you?” the president of the celestial council asks the supreme god. “Shall I call you Odin, Thor, or This? Alfadur is your name. Under this name our ancestors honored you, before foreign gods had been brought to them.” These are sayings characteristic of the work of priests, always attributing to theism, when they insert it into their teaching, a fanciful priority.35 It is equally impossible to mistake dualism36 and pantheism.37

893

Finally, morality takes its place. Gimli and Nastrond, without supplanting Niflheim and Valhalla, offer rewards to the virtuous that the first Odin had accorded only to valor, not assigning to vice and crime any punishment because it was only a question of taking up the occupations of this life again.

Several writers have committed the same error with respect to Niflheim that French scholars committed who introduced morality into the underworld of Homer. The texts of the Eddas are clear: the inhabitants of Niflheim preserve their ranks, their dignities, their habits, enjoying terrestrial pleasures, getting drunk with hydromel. They arrive at this dwelling by passing over the bridge, Gjallarbru, on foot or on horse, often in the number of five times five thousand. We have spoken above38 of the gods who were even confined there because they had not died in fighting. One only sees Hela, who reigns over Niflheim, punish the guilty. All the dead are brought together, the heroes excepted; there they live peacefully, and yet they end even this second career with a battle in which they, like the warriors of Valhalla, perish. It was not until the priests had transformed Gimli, formerly the abode of genii, into a place of rewards above Valhalla, and had invented Nastrond, carefully separated from Niflheim, it was not until then that they assumed a judgment that cast the wicked into a place of torments. It is of Nastrond that the prophetess speaks when she sees the murderers, the perjurers, the seducers who whisper of love when they furtively approach virgins promised to another, struggling in the poisoned waves, and torn apart by wolves and serpents.39 It is also about Nastrond that these two strophes of the Havamal speak, which are not lacking in poetic beauty: “Riches perish, friends perish, you will perish, but the renown that one acquires will not perish at all. Treasure disappears, brothers-in-arms are defeated, you yourself will be; but one thing lasts always: the judgment pronounced on each of the dead.”40

Nastrond is the underworld of Pindar succeeding Homer’s, only with priestly colors. However, because of the unwillingness of priests to remove anything, the original underworld and paradise subsist alongside those that were just created. Among the Greeks, because of the progress of ideas the same underworld is differently employed. Among the Scandinavians, there are two underworlds for different purposes, and in the description of the latter underworld the priestly imprint cannot 894 fail to be seen.41 The palace of Hela is sadness, her table famine, her sword hunger, her slave slowness, her vestibule the precipice, her bed suffering, her tent curses. The black waters of ten rivers flow through this place of horror; the names of these rivers are anxiety, chagrin, nothingness, despair, the gulf, the tempest, the vortex, moaning, howling, and the abyss.42

If from these general features we wish to enter into almost minute details, we would show similarities between the Eddas and the sacred books of other nations subject to priests that would prove the origin and mission of the second Odin. Thus, when Yggdrasil is proclaimed the first of the trees; Skithblathnir, of vessels; Odin, of gods; Sleipner, of horses; Bifrost, of bridges; Bragi, of poets; Habrok, of hawks; Garmr, of dogs, who does not think of Krishna, proclaiming himself the first of each species?43 The Siegfried of the Nibelungenlied, an unmistakable tradition from the Eddas, cannot be wounded except between the shoulders, like the Indian divinity who is vulnerable only on the heel. The cow Oedulma is the fruitful cow created by the reunion of all the gods.44 The fable of the theft of the poetic potion by Odin and his battles with the giant Suttungr is obviously based on that of amrita and the quarrels of the gods and giants for the possession of the treasure that confers immortality. Odin, who at the time of the Ragnarökkr regenerates himself in the midst of flames, differs little from the Brahmins who, from the time of Alexander, were avid for this means of purification, and whose sacrifice was frequently renewed by Buddhists.

The arrival of a second Odin—priest, prophet, and conqueror all at once—explains (and we will add that it alone explains) the contradictions that strike us while reading the Eddas.45 One then understands how Odin, constantly called 895 the father of all things, the supreme god, the eternal being, is, however, condemned to perish one day while giving death to the evil principle. This teaching is irreconcilable with the foundation of the previous cult by the first Odin, and does not accord at all with his apotheosis. Would he have announced himself to be a transitory divinity? Would he have predicted the overturning of his own empire? Would he have invented this terrible Ragnarökkr, or twilight of the gods, which must annihilate him along with the universe? But the doctrine of the destruction of the world is a favorite teaching of the priesthood, and we have explained why the religions that it dominates always envelop the active divinities in this destruction.46

One also understands why, while the first Odin had so expressly, so emphatically, recommended martial courage and directed all hopes and all fears toward a central point, the love of glory and combat, characterizing every natural death as infamous and peace as hateful, the second Odin, undoing the work of his predecessor, lavished the price of valor upon qualities that until then were secondary. The priesthood had to want to replace teachings that influenced only a portion of human activity with opinions suitable to influence all actions, and thus to ensure it a more extensive and regular power.

We have said that morality did not enter gradually, but all at once, under the form of a code in the religions subject to priests;47 this is how it appeared among the Scandinavians. It is entirely contained in the Havamal, or the sublime song of Odin. “My father sang me this canticle,” says a hero in a saga; “this canticle which makes warriors human and just. The one who does not know it offends the weak, 896 robs travelers, violates women, devours children. But the one who observes its precepts protects the peasant, the travelers, the senior, the child, as well as the honor of women;48 and as his reward, after his death he is transported to Gimli, where he lives eternally happy.”

Of all the poems that comprise the Eddas, the Havamal is the one that the Skalds especially attributed to the first Odin, and in our view this is additional proof that this canticle was the work of the priesthood. What priests must with the greatest care make go back to their legendary founder was precisely what they had added to his doctrine.49

Let us now try to determine to which of the two periods of northern religions the traditions and records that remain to us pertain. The Eddas are divided into four parts.50 We will ignore the subdivisions.51

The first is the Voluspa, the song of the great female magician: it contains the fables. The second is the Havamal, of which we just spoke; to it one must join the Lokfafnismal, or the song of wisdom. The third is the Runatal, and treats magic. The fourth, which is not found except in the oldest Eddas, that of Soemund, is the Lokasenna. Finally, we cannot exclude from this enumeration either the Nibelungenlied or the Book of Heroes,52 which were composed by Christian authors a long time afterward and cast in a Christian form; but the features of paganism poke 897 through this form at every moment. The catastrophe of the Germanic poem is obviously borrowed from the twilight of the gods, and the name alone of Sigfried or Sigurd recalls among the Scandinavians the father of one of the Odins.

The Voluspa belongs to both periods. In it the priests deposited all the tales that had successively become parts of their legends. Thus the contradictions that attest to the coexistence of several doctrines are piled on top of one another in the work. In certain respects, for the mythology of the North it is what Hesiod is for the Greeks.

The Havamal and the Runatal (or runic chapter) are from the period of the second Odin. We have shown that the former contained a different doctrine from the original teaching, recommended other virtues, promised other rewards—in a word, established an entirely different religious and moral system. The chapter that treats of magic betrays the precautions of the priesthood against rivals, and by that very fact indicates a moment when the priests were in a position to persecute those who competed with them on their own ground.

The Lokasenna is the banquet where Loki, after having caused the death of Balder, came to berate the angered gods. The festival hall is an inviolable haven. Because of the sanctity of the place, Odin himself protects Loki; and the latter, sure of being unpunished, reproaches the inhabitants for their culpable actions and vicious inclinations. This poem must be contemporaneous with the most ancient Scandinavian polytheism and prior to the second Odin.

No doubt, these poems could and must have suffered various transformations. The priestly caste was the sole possessor of them; it transmitted them orally, and partially, to a people lacking entirely in literature and for whom examination was a sacrilege.

As for the Nibelungenlied and Book of Heroes, what we have said above indicates well enough that one ought to consider them with caution. The memories of two mythologies, reported by writers who professed a third belief, have necessarily been quite disfigured, and the ideas of the two periods find themselves quite mixed together and, moreover, merged and amalgamated with the Christianity that had replaced them, and still attacked them with its hatred and reproaches.

If, despite the moral proofs that we believe have clearly demonstrated our point, one persisted in asking another sort of proof from us, founded on historical witnesses and certain dates, we would respond that because the records of these far-away times were not collected until after their authenticity had become doubtful and their times unknown, the rules of ordinary chronology cannot serve as guides.

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The Scandinavians did not have historians until the eleventh century.53 The use of writing was forbidden in everything that had to do with religion, history, and the laws. Hymns, legends, and mythological narratives were only orally transmitted. If we find in some poems that are still pagan some runic letters attributed to Odin, they were only employed for magical purposes.

Saemund Sigfusson, the first who dared to put the sagas and poems that formed the Eddas into writing, lived in 1057. A century and a half later, his collection was abridged by Snorri Sturluson.

Thus, collected twice at one hundred and fifty years’ distance, after the triumph of a new religion, by men who had as their goal inspiring their contemporaries with a high idea of the ancient poetry of the North,54 rather than retracing the development of religious opinions in this part of the globe, the records of Scandinavian polytheism were simply placed alongside one another rather than classed in their original order. In addition, before being assembled they had suffered many transformations. When for the first time they received a stable form by writing, the opinions they contained were not presently dominant. Those who transcribed them had no interest in seeing if they contained contradictory notions from different periods which had been replaced, or at least succeeded one another, in the spirit of the peoples.

It is therefore impossible to distinguish by precise dates the records that were collected and brought together by compilers, and therefore there is an obvious need to replace an unavailable positive chronology with a moral chronology.

899

CHAPTER 4: That the Question Whether There Was a Third Religious Revolution in Scandinavia Is Irrelevant to Our Subject

We could be tempted to resolve another problem. Did Scandinavia experience, subsequent to the second Odin, a new revolution that destroyed or at least greatly diminished the power of priests?

Many scattered facts reported by writers who are extremely careful students of ancient traditions would have us believe so.

A third Odin appears to have destroyed the authority of the council of the gods that the second had established. Initially allied to Gylfi,1 the president of this despotic council, he soon had him put to death and erected a temporal monarchy on the rubble of the priestly power.

According to this hypothesis, the Scandinavian religion would have changed three times, and each time because of the arrival of a colony. The first would have introduced a polytheism independent of priests, in which the priesthood exercised only a very limited influence; the second would have substituted for this polytheism a religion subject to priests; the third, breaking this yoke, would have put the Scandinavians back into their original independence.

What can give some plausibility to this assumption is that the heads of the government of the island in later times exercised a superintendence over the priests that assigned to them a very secondary rank.2

This question, however, is irrelevant to us. What we needed to demonstrate was the existence and succession of the two earlier revolutions. The following chapter will prove how important this demonstration was.

900

CHAPTER 5: That the Two Revolutions of Scandinavian Polytheism Confirm Our Assertions Concerning the Nature and Differences between the Two Polytheisms

One of the truths we have tried to establish is that religion is different according to whether it is freed of priestly domination or subject to this domination.

We have presented this truth under four perspectives, and in each we have found the proof incontestable.

At the time of Homer, in Greece there was no astrolatry, and hence no priests; no priests, consequently in the public religion no bloody or obscene rituals, no theogonies or dark cosmogonies, no subtle teachings such as dualism or pantheism, which would end in a disbelief covered with a mysterious veil, and adversely affecting the solemnity of religion. Later, a priesthood without any influence, and consequently the popular worship remaining without any priestly refinement, gradually improving by the sole effect of the progress and developments of the human spirit; but a secret religion borrowed from abroad and introduced into Greece, almost against the laws, by a priesthood that wanted to compensate itself for the little amount of power it possessed in the State, and this occult religion calling for, invoking, and incorporating all the priestly rituals and teachings.

Throughout the East, in the South, and among the Gauls, there were all-powerful priests, and with them everything whose absence we have noted among the Greeks: a condition of stasis, immobility of intelligence, and servitude.

Among the Romans, the struggle of the priestly spirit against independent polytheism; the preservation of everything that characterizes priestly religions as long as their traces were perpetuated; but the disappearance of all these things as soon as the power of priests was defeated.

Now, we just saw in Scandinavia an opposite movement: first, a polytheism free 901 of the priestly domination, more bellicose than that of Greeks but resting on the same bases, only allowing the same anthropomorphism; then a colony of priests which won a sudden and harmful victory. Simple, natural anthropomorphism, proportionate to the period, was replaced straight away by all the errors, all the barbarisms, and all the subtleties inherent in priestly polytheism.

902 903

BOOK XV: RESULTS OF THE WORK

904 905

CHAPTER 1: Question to Resolve

We have ended our investigations, at least for the first half of the path we intend to traverse. We have described the progressive changes of the first religious form that man created for himself, and we have followed this form to its highest point of perfection. The second half of our researches will embrace its fall. We will indicate the causes of its decadence, the efforts of the religious sentiment when, having improved the form, it finds it resistant to its subsequent needs; its attempts to bend the form to its new needs, and the destruction that follows from them; the fate of philosophy, first of all unthreatening, then soon persecuted, therefore hostile, finally victorious; the apparent immobility of priestly religions, inwardly troubled by an invisible disturbance, their exteriors remaining unchanging, until their foundations crumble. In the midst of the chaos that results from this universal collapse, a new form triumphing over that which had been broken, which the mortal race seemed not to be able to replace or reconstruct, will rally this errant and disheartened race. Around this young and pure form will gather everything that was able to survive the great shipwreck, everything that remained of generous sentiments and consoling hopes; but we will also see arrive all the memories and traditions of the priesthood: corporations, monopolies, tyrannies, impostures, ancient frauds, all eager to reconquer the sanctuary.

However, let us not anticipate the future, let us recollect what the past teaches us.

We will not repeat the facts. For attentive readers this would be superfluous; for the inattentive, useless.

The religious forms are of two species.

Some, subject to corporations that maintain them immobile; others, independent of all corporations, gradually perfect themselves.

Man can find himself under the dominion of one or the other of these forms.

906

A third hypothesis would be where both forms would be rejected.

Is this hypothesis admissible, though? We do not think so. Historically, we see no example anywhere. Psychologically, the existence of the religious sentiment seems to place an obstacle to it.

The Romans believed they were in this situation toward the first century of our era.1

Three hundred years later, religious convictions had once again penetrated all spirits, faith had reconquered all souls.

In France, fifty or sixty years ago, we also thought that we had arrived at a state of disdain for all that was not susceptible of demonstration; many circumstances had conspired to bring us to this point.

A devotion that had had for its object not so much the Divinity as the monarchy expired on the latter’s tomb, covered with the people’s invectives. These were no longer the times when Madame de Sevigné would have wanted to die for the real presence because she had danced with the Great King.2 The still established doctrines and the already victorious new ideas clashed, because all proportion was broken. The memories of persecutions (of persecutions mitigated by caprice) angered intellects. Power in contradiction with itself, out of habit raged against principles to which it was attached out of vanity. Liberty of thought was the need of elevated minds; the license of mores tempted corrupt souls; and since one had asserted a positive religion as the basis of morality the fall of this religion favored license.

A clergy that was intolerant in its actions but insouciant in its teachings, and discredited by the conduct of a large number of its members, impressed a complexion that was at once hateful and frivolous on the dominant cult, an incoherent mixture that gave license to ridicule while also giving rise to indignation. Ministers of the altars wrote obscene novels and flattered themselves on their worldly life at the time when Raynal and Rousseau were proscribed, Helvetius was troubled, and the priesthood threatened Voltaire, as well as cast an unhappy look on Montesquieu and a defiant one at Buffon, whom it would have willingly treated like Galileo.

No one should overemphasize the actual mitigations that were made to apparent severities. This inconsistency harmed religion. It was disdained even more 907 without being hated less. Contempt was united with hostility. All conviction was lost when one saw that nothing was serious for anyone, that professions of faith and practices, even rigors, were only lying forms, with indifference at their core.

The Revolution came. One would have said: the triumph of disbelieving philosophy. In what is related to religious ideas (we will not speak of crimes, of which one must not accuse any teaching, because religion itself would often be accusable), it was a loudly proclaimed unbelief, one received favorably. Forty years have passed: let us examine where we are. What was customary is doubtless gone; what is dead can no longer be reborn; but a mysterious agitation, a desire to believe, a thirst for hope are everywhere manifest. Everywhere you see peaceful sects, because the century is peaceful, but enthusiastic, because the need for enthusiasm belongs to all times. Consider the English Methodists, the Swiss Momiers; in Geneva, those inhabitants of churchyard cemeteries, wanting at all costs to reestablish communication with the invisible world and communion with the dead; in Germany, all the philosophies impregnated with mysticism. Even in France, where the most positive generation, upon taking control of the earth seemed to want to devote itself entirely to the earth; today, in the midst of this grave and studious generation, rise isolated, imperceptible efforts, which protest against the tendency toward materialism, today a tradition rather than a system.

This disposition of mind casts many into strange incoherences. Full of respect for any religious opinion whatsoever, they praise Maecenas for having exhorted Augustus to honor the gods and have them honored, even though these gods were pagan gods and one way of honoring them was to deliver Christians to the wild beasts. They speak with almost the same veneration about holy water and lustral water, of Memphis and the Vatican.

In all this there are elements of extravagance; but the extravagance has a cause. The movement that survives the apparent death proves that the seed is not deprived of life.

And notice how the instinct of this renovation takes hold of our prose-writers and our poets. Where do they look for their effects? To irony, to philosophical apothegms, like Voltaire? No: to vague meditations, to reveries, whose gaze is always turned toward the unbounded future and toward the infinite. Many lose themselves in the clouds; but their élan toward the clouds is an attempt to approach heaven. They sense that it is in this way that a relationship with a new public will be established, a public tired of unbelief and which wants something else, without perhaps knowing what it wants.

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The absence of every conjecture, of every sentiment, of every religious hope—that is, dogmatic unbelief—is therefore impossible for the mass of human beings.

Please observe that we speak here only of dogmatic unbelief. We do not equate it with doubt. We esteem doubt as much, and more, than anyone;3 but doubt does not exclude religious sentiment. Doubt has its recompenses, it has its desires and its hope; it does not confine man to an iron circle where he struggles with terror and anguish. From the midst of the obscurity that surrounds him, doubt sees luminous rays break through, it gives itself to presentiments that revive and console it. Far from rebuffing, it invokes. It does not deny, it simply does not know; and sometimes warmed by desire, sometimes marked with resignation, its ignorance is not without its sweetness. But the denial of all power superior to us, of all communication with that power, of all appeal to its goodness and justice against injustice and perversity, the renouncing of a world better than ours, a world of reparation and purity, no society will be satisfied with that.

One therefore must return to one of the two estates compatible with our nature: imposed religion, free religion.

Which of the two is better?

India, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Persia offer the example of the first of these states. All progress is forbidden to the intellect, all advancement is a crime, all innovation a sacrilege. Religion does not get rid of the hideous vestiges of fetishism, the form of the gods remains vague, their character vicious. Morality is falsified, liberty proscribed, crime commanded. At once venal and threatening, religion that is lavish with terrors is sparing with consolations. Those that it grants, it sells. Crumpled in the hands of its masters, abased in the soul of its slaves, for the first group it is an instrument that they degrade, for the second a yoke that weighs upon them. Object of calculation without any good faith, or obedience without examination, it corrupts those who profit from it as well as those who are oppressed by it. It condemns fear to hypocrisy, and drags sincerity to the torture chamber, giving a bonus to whatever is base and reserving punishment for courage.

An oppressive caste successively demands from man the renunciation of his penchants, his affections, his virtues, his intelligence. It applies the same principle to belief as to all other kinds of offerings. Faith becomes even more meritorious as 909 the teaching that demands it is more difficult to believe or understand. In its exaltation, the religious sentiment favors this demand of the priesthood. It is pleased to immolate its most precious faculties to its gods. The same fanaticism that obtained the holocaust of his son from a father, her modesty from a virgin, obtains from reason the suicide of abjuring itself. Error or truth, it matters not, are equally imposed. Man and his faculties disappear; what remains is the priest and his calculations.

Add the spirit of persecution to all these scourges, the inevitable consequence of such a system. See the massacre of Buddhists among the gentlest people on the earth; among the Egyptians, the oppression of the Hebrews.

In ancient times, this has been the effect of the stationary principle in religion.

We do not wish to exaggerate. We do not claim that the priesthood has been the author of all the evils that have weighed upon the world. Numerous causes of different sorts, external and internal, accidental or permanent, have often, and powerfully, operated. Up to a certain point the aristocracy of warriors has counterbalanced the power of priests, as the despotism of kings later dethroned the warrior aristocracy, and as today industry overturns the despotism of kings. But is it still not true that the priesthood has always hampered that extension of rights and enjoyments that go from one caste to another, and finally from all those who enjoy privileges to the entire species? This is what we affirm; this is what history proves. We grant to all the causes that have determined the lot of man their part in influencing him; but devoting ourselves to describing one of the most active ones, we have had to depict its effects truly.

Distinguished literary men have objected to us that at the period when the priests were the most enlightened portion of societies, it was natural and just that they served as guides. We do not deny this at all. We have recognized that among the savages the priesthood sometimes did good.4 But the writers to whom we respond, it seems to us, have considered only one side of the question. Doubtless, it is natural and just that superior intelligences march at the head of human associations, even though we would consider the thing to be a fact rather than a right; if one made it a right, the strongest will always call themselves the most intelligent and oppress the others. In order for the intellectual aristocracy not to become as noxious as all other aristocratic systems, its power must be limited to persuasion, to the sharing of its learning without political or coercive means. When the superiority of intelligence calls for the support of authority, it departs from its sphere, 910 it attributes to itself contestable rights. With this sort of superiority always being disputable, it arrives at various ways of vexation that render it no less odious than material and blind forces. We recognize that when the multitude is plunged into ignorance, the most instructed must direct it; but if, to this faculty that nature has confided in them and which has no need of the law to sanction, they wish to join the right to arrest the progress of future generations, they sacrifice the future to the present; and, in order to prematurely ripen some limited and imperfect knowledge, they strike with sterility improvements that are nobler and more real. Now, this tendency has always been, it will always be, that of a priesthood brought together in a body and invested with temporal power. The priesthood of Antiquity could, sometimes, possess good faith and believe in the legitimacy of its prohibitions as well as the truth of its doctrines. It could be sincere, even in its ruses; to serve God by means of fraud, like one serves a human master, is a rather natural movement in the conceptions of anthropomorphism; but the tendency to which the priesthood obeys has also motived all the tyrannies that have overwhelmed man. It is against this tendency, and not against the legitimate influence of the superiority of knowledge, and consequently the men who in each social period are invested with it, that we have risen.

Now, alongside the priestly immobility, let us consider Greece, free and progressive.

Starting from a crude fetishism, the religious sentiment soon arrives at polytheism, frees it from all the vestiges of barbarism, perfects it and purifies it. Everything is ennobled in its teachings and public rituals. The Greeks borrow from everywhere whatever seduces their active and curious imagination, but they embellish everything they borrow.

They took from the theocratic corporations of the East and the South the elements of the sciences, which these corporations kept captive. From imperfect and languishing as these sciences were in the darkness of the sanctuary, they were revived, expanded, and developed in broad daylight; and the intellect, following its bold march and moving from hypothesis to hypothesis, through a thousand errors, no doubt, nonetheless arrives, if not at the absolute truth, at least to those truths that are the needs of each period, and that are so many rungs to attain other truths, always of a superior order and higher importance. Religion feels this activity of the intellect. Torrents of light inundated it, to enter into and rework it.

Morality, gentler and more refined, because the religious sentiment spreads its refined nuances over it, remains independent of the dryness and harshness of positive 911 dogmas. No capricious will, no arbitrary power, no mystical autocracy5 transforms good into evil, evil into good. What is virtuous remains virtuous; what is criminal remains criminal. No proud pontiff would dare to order what is culpable, or justify what is atrocious, in the name of heaven. No mercenary priest would make purchased immunity the gage of future impunity (which one would also have to buy). The gods, like humans, submit to eternal laws, and conscience, inviolable and respected, pronounces on the wills of the former as well as the conduct of the latter.

After this comparison, the question is certainly resolved.

And yet the progressive state, the noblest and most worthy of religion, the most salutary for the human species, does not appear to us free of every hindrance even in Greece, and this leads us to demonstrate the disadvantages of a corporation whose interest is that religion be unchanging, even when this corporation does not have the power to maintain it so.

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CHAPTER 2: On the Disadvantages of the Principle of Stasis, Even in the Religions That Do Not Confer an Unlimited Power on the Priesthood

Even though the Greeks were the sole people of antiquity who had not suffered the yoke of priestly power, there nonetheless was a priesthood in Greece; and this priesthood had some authority. As much as the independence of the national spirit allowed, it had arrived at acquiring a legal place for religion and its teachings in the constitution of the State.

What resulted from this? Enlightenment had spread and rejected absurd fables. Mores that had become gentler opposed themselves to more-or-less barbarous traditions. The character of the gods suffered the changes that this revolution had to entail. It occurred in fact before it was proclaimed in theory. Sages, philosophers, and moralists declared the truth that already existed before their declaration.

Soon, because religious belief was part of the constitution of the State, the priesthood exclaimed that the constitution of the State was being undermined.

Anaxagoras proves that crude and inert matter, which is how the intellect conceived it initially, when it believed it understood what matter and pure spirit are, could not make up the substance of the immortal gods; the Athenian priests accused him of denying their existence, and he was exiled.

Socrates affirms that the divine natures are neither limited nor imperfect nor vicious, that one offends them in wanting to seduce them,1 that they have neither committed crimes nor protected them. The Athenian priests referred Socrates to the Areopagus, and he was put to death.

It is so true that this attack was due much more to the principle of stasis than to a fervent or passionate fanaticism, that even in this very famous trial, until the moment 913 when he drank the poison, the enemies of Socrates allowed him easy means of disarming their attack. But in order to escape, it was either the laws of the homeland that he had to violate or the principle of stasis that had to be recognized by its disavowal. It would have been necessary to reject all the improvements acquired by the noble emotions or by studious meditations; to go back to the times of ignorance and once again adopt their teachings; to renounce all the progress made by reason and morality. Socrates did not want to do this; let us acknowledge his choice. His death was useful to his century and his country. It is still useful today.

Some have strongly protested against one of our cleverest writers because he dared to say that in the given state of the institutions of Athens, the death of Socrates was inevitable and legal. However, the claim is perfectly true. I say it with him: “In an order of things whose basis is a State religion, one cannot think, like Socrates, of this religion, and make public what one thinks about it, without harming this religion, and, therefore, without troubling the State. . . . Socrates did not stand up as a philosopher, except on the condition of becoming guilty as a citizen. His death was required, the necessary result of the struggle he had conducted against religious dogmatism.”2

914

Nothing is more evident. But from this another thing results: as long as religion serves as a pretext for the existence of a body charged with teaching and maintaining it, depending upon the country and the time, religious dogmatism will have its exiles, its dungeons, its poison, or its pyres.

From this point of view, the reasonings that justify the death of Socrates go much further, if one wishes. The author of the treatise on the laws of Moses has launched himself on this path full of pitfalls; we will not follow him there. But the principle admitted, the religion of the State transformed into law, the consequences he deduces are incontestable. To escape them, one must suppose judges recognizing the divine mission. Then they themselves would have been the enemies of the established order, rebels punishable by law. It would not be on them, but on these laws that reproach would fall. It would be the laws that would have to be abolished.

If we could have treated the entirety of Roman polytheism here, we would have shown even more clearly the harmful consequences of the principle of stasis, which was more solemnly established at Rome than in Greece. To be sure, and we will demonstrate this elsewhere, in its moral part Roman polytheism was superior in more than one respect to Greek religion. But everything that was vicious, oppressive, and cruel3 in this aristocratic republic must still be attributed to the religious traditions that were perpetuated despite the march of civilization.

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The servitude of the plebeians, wandering without any patrimony, deprived of asylum, even on the soil they had conquered, deprived of all real right, and having snatched from their tyrants only a few defensive institutions; who rose up against laws sanctioned by priestly memories—the forbidding of marriage between the two orders, which was the barely softened continuation of the division into castes, and being deprived of an equal part in the ceremonies of the cult—everything that by running counter to interests, and wounding legitimate pride, prepared the endless convulsions that had no remedy: all this was the consequence of the principle of stasis. Thanks to the patriotism of these so mistreated plebeians, Rome had its period of glory; thanks to the Machiavellian energy of a Senate that was despotic without, formidable within, but whose deliberations, even though concentrated in a monopoly still served to maintain the salutary movement of political liberty, Rome had its time of strength and stability.

But the principle of stasis had deposed a seed of destruction in its religious and civil constitution.

Precisely because Roman politics had taken over religion and denied all novelty to it, so that the instrument would more surely remain in its dependency, insofar as it was static religion lost its vital principle, perfectibility, and inasmuch as it was enslaved it lost its real power, conviction.

One no longer believed in anything, because everything had to be believed. Nothing was respected, because calculation was recognized everywhere. It was because the augurs employed a discredited art of divination to govern Rome that they could never encounter each other without a wry smile; and this smile was the infallible precursor of the loss of religion.

We, however, have had to forbid to ourselves these developments and limit ourselves to what we have said earlier concerning the mixture of the Etruscan heritage and the Greek influence. The periods that followed belong to a second work.

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CHAPTER 3: That the Purity of Doctrine Diminishes Nothing in the Dangers of the Principle of Stasis in Religion

Doctrine, or humanity in its precepts, would extract the poison it contains from the principle we are combating. This would be an error.

The forced preservation of a religious doctrine, rendering it fixed and immutable, entails identical consequences, whatever be the doctrine in itself. Under a form much more purified than polytheism, Catholics have shown themselves implacable against the Reformers, the Reformers against the Socinians, and Socinians, no doubt, would not have been more indulgent toward those who would have denied the human mission of the prophet whose divinity they denied. The cardinal of Lorraine had Coligny killed; Calvin, who would have had the cardinal burned, did have Servetus burned.

To consider a religion as never being able to be improved is to declare it the only good, the only salutary religion. Hence, it becomes an imperious duty to make it adopted by everyone. Not only is it permitted, but it is commanded to employ force in this pious work if the means of persuasion do not suffice.1

917

If political authority joins with religious zeal to perpetuate the faith, and this principle is once admitted, the political authority must embrace it; it must necessarily invest the priesthood with its means of force. Hence, the introduction of a material power into the domain of conscience; hence, persecutions and tortures.2

But this is not the only danger.

As soon as the priesthood has arrived at forming an alliance with political power, it applies itself to fortifying that power, to freeing it from any other resistance than what would come from it; and temporal despotism is the inevitable consequence of the despotism of priests. Consulted by the kings of Persia, the magi applauded their incests and proclaimed them above the laws. Every time the priesthood has had the aristocracy or monarchy as its accomplice, it has pronounced anathema against all the liberties and rights of the peoples.3 And even in our days, read the works of those who would like to revive theocracy. The mildness to which the century compels them only serves as a thin veil for their regrets, their defenses, and their appeals to the Inquisition.4 See how much the independence of thought, 918 liberty of discussion, everything that can spread enlightenment beyond the privileged precinct, wounds and angers them.5 Listen to Bossuet: Why command men, if it is not that God might be obeyed?6 Listen to a more modern author: The Church is the true sovereign; it judges the temporal, condemns or absolves it, binds or loosens in heaven as on earth.7 Today these writers, if they could, would be what priests were six hundred years ago.

So be it. Let them exhaust themselves in emphatic or pathetic lamentations; let them call the servitude from which, after so many centuries, man began to be freed, “the primordial time, the primitive legislation”; let them deplore the cessation of this time when, they say, the world was but a temple; we do not see in this primordial period anything but slavery, in this primitive legislation anything but a revolting inequality, a flagrant usurpation, which no lapse of time can legitimate. These writers consider only the usurping caste; they give them their admiration. We fix our gazes on the oppressed castes; we give them our interest and our pity. They think only of a few hundred men monopolizing the intellectual and material treasures that nature gave to all. We think of the hundreds of thousands groaning in nakedness, ignorance, and irons; and if in this scaffolding of craft and tyranny we see a temple, it is the temple of those maleficent divinities, where the sacrificers are a few, the victims, the immense number. But when these victims no longer bowed down, the sacrificers disappeared.

919

CHAPTER 4: How Harmful to Religion Itself Is Every Obstacle to Its Progressive Perfectibility

When one claims to maintain intact a doctrine born at a period when men misunderstood all the laws of physical nature, one sets against this doctrine all the discoveries relative to these laws. The more the material world is unveiled to us, the more the doctrine is undermined. Do we need to recall the advantage that unbelievers have derived from the physics and astronomy of the Bible?

In the same way, when mores have become gentler, when morality has been improved, is it not clear that if one wants to perpetuate in the religion the rituals and practices that existed before this improvement and gentling, a struggle has to arise; and that despite the more or less longer maintained triumphs that an external assistance can lend to the cults whose end has arrived, these cults can only emerge from this struggle discredited and disdained?

It is therefore a grave error to think that religion is rightly interested in remaining stationary; on the contrary, its real interest is that the progressive faculty, which is a law of human nature, should be applied to it.

It ought to be applied to teachings, as well as to rituals and practices. What, in fact, are dogmas? The redaction of the ideas conceived by man concerning the Divinity. When these notions are purified, the dogmas ought to change. What are rituals and practices? Conventions that are supposed to be necessary to the intercourse of mortal beings with the gods they adore. Anthropomorphism serves as the basis of this idea. Men not knowing one another’s secret dispositions, their hidden intentions, they remedy this ignorance by attaching a conventional meaning to external manifestations. This artificial language would be useless to them if they could read into others’ hearts. Supposing the necessity of this language to address themselves to the infinite Being, however, is to circumscribe his faculties, it is to lower him to the human level, it is to transport into the heavenly abode an 920 imitation of human customs. But with anthropomorphism disappearing, rituals are condemned to follow.

If religious beliefs remain behind the general march of the human sprit, they become adverse and isolated, having transformed their erstwhile allies into adversaries; they then see themselves besieged by enemies they themselves have created. The authority that would like to disperse these enemies cannot defeat them. Each day they grow in number and force; they recruit new members by their very defeats, and they stubbornly renew attacks that cannot fail to end with a victory that will be even more complete, the longer it has been contested.

Henceforth, if one wants to render religion the sole homage that is worthy of it, and to base it on the only foundations that are solid and unshakeable, one must respect its progress.

The human species has no principle that is dearer and more precious to defend. Therefore no other principle has been defended at the price of more sacrifices and more blood. Parallel to the metempsychosis of Brahmins, where souls traverse eighty thousand transmigrations before arriving at God, religion indefinitely regenerates itself; only its forms, subject to death, are in a way like the mummies of Egypt, which serve only to preserve past existences.

This does not at all imply that a people ought to change their religion every time that they have changed. When it comes to politics, it is fortunate that a nation believes it always has the same constitution, even when the constitution improves. For a long time, this made the strength of England, and this persistence in the name is not a lie. A constitution signifies the laws according to which a nation rules itself. That a detail is changed in the law does not mean that the constitution no longer subsists. Religion signifies the ensemble of relations that exist between man and the invisible world. That a dogma is modified does not mean that the religion is destroyed. In general, one must avoid proclaiming these changes unless the necessity is urgent. This would be to stir up resistance. Everything by nature occurs gradually and, as it were, imperceptibly. Men ought to imitate it. Provided that no constraint is exercised on consciences and no obstacle is placed to the practice of different worships, it is useful to preserve the name. It does not harm the substance of things and it reassures spirits susceptible to being scandalized.

Also, let no one fear to injure the divinity of the religion, or better put: the intimate sentiment upon which religious convictions rest. The more one believes in the goodness and justice of a Providence that created man and serves him as a guide, the more it is natural to admit that this beneficent Providence proportions its teachings to the state of the intellects destined to receive them.

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This doctrine alone reconciles the ideas that religious men conceive of this Providence with the nature of the human spirit. One cannot deny that the human spirit has an invincible penchant for investigation and examination. If its most imperious duty, its greatest merit, was found in implicit credulity, why would heaven have endowed man with a faculty that he cannot exercise without committing a crime? Why would it have subjected him to a need that he cannot fulfill without making himself culpable? But this sacrifice would reduce him to the rank of a pure machine; this would be, as we have said, a moral suicide; the God who would impose it on man would more resemble the Amida of those idolaters who have themselves crushed under the wheels of a chariot in which their idol is placed, than that pure and benevolent Intelligence offered to our worship and our love.

This implicit credulity, this stasis in doctrines, this static character in beliefs, all these things that are against nature but are recommended in the name of religion, are the things most opposed to the religious sentiment. What in fact is this sentiment? The need to grow close to the beings whose protection one invokes. It is of its essence to try, in order to satisfy itself, each religious form that it creates or that is presented to it; but it is also in its essence, when these religious forms no longer satisfy it, to change them in a way to escape what injures it. To limit it to the present, which never satisfies it, to forbid it that élan toward the future to which the insufficiency of the present invites, is to strike it with death. Everywhere it is thus chained, everywhere it is impossible to successively modify it, there can be superstition, because superstition is the abnegation of the intellect; there can be fanaticism, because fanaticism is superstition become furious; but there cannot be religion, because religion is the result of the needs of the soul and the efforts of intelligence, and because static dogmas put one and the other out of the question.

This system does not at all exclude those supernatural communications about which many minds become indignant, and so many hearts in secret implore. For example, that the idea of theism suddenly appeared as an inexplicable phenomenon in the midst of an ignorant tribe when the religious sentiment, misled by absurd forms, was not able to blaze a better path for itself; that later, an unforeseen assistance came to the human spirit, which, having elevated itself to the idea of divine unity, nonetheless did not have the strength to transform this abstract idea into an animated and living doctrine, each can believe; this does not change anything in what we have affirmed: the tendency existed, and the additional support was exercised only in conformity with this tendency. That man left to himself then recommenced his labor following his nature, that he struggled concerning this great discovery, that he gave it crude forms that veiled its sublimity, he nonetheless 922 will have preserved the ineffaceable memory of it, and, by stages, purer forms and more adequate conceptions would have allowed him to enjoy the inestimable benefit without any alloy.

But whatever is the case with divine assistances, let us not mix human hands with these mysterious and impenetrable means. Theologians have said a thousand times that the abuse of religion does not come from it, but from men. To remedy these abuses, it is necessary that men—that is, power, material force—do not mix with religion. Leave it to God and to itself. Always commensurate, it will march with ideas, learn with reason, purify itself with morality, and at each period it will sanction what is best.

At each period, too, let us call for religious liberty, one that is unlimited, infinite, and personal; it will surround religion with an invincible force and guarantee its perfectibility. It will multiply religion forms, each of which will be more refined than the preceding. Each emerging sect aspires to the excellence of morality, and the abandoned sect reforms its own mores. For a time, Protestantism will improve the Catholic clergy; and if we wanted (which we would hardly like to do) to address ourselves to authority, we would prove that religious liberty is in its interest. A single sect is always a formidable rival. Two hostile sects are two camps under arms. Divide the torrent, or better put: allow it to divide into a thousand streams. They will fertilize the ground that a torrent would have devastated.

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Constant, Benjamin. On Religion Considered in Its Source, Its Forms, and Its Developments. Translated by Peter Paul Seaton Jr. Introduction by Pierre Manent (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2017).

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