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Collection

Public Choice

17 items in this collection

About this collection

In this collection

Key People

11 people central to Public Choice.

  • Lord Peter Thomas Bauer

    1915–2003

    Bauer was a Hungarian-born economist who emigrated to England in the 1930s. He is considered one of the leading free market theorists of…

  • Peter J. Boettke

    b. 1960

    Peter Boettke is University Professor of Economics and Philosophy at George Mason University and the BB&T Professor for the Study of…

  • Geoffrey Brennan

    1944–2022

    Geoffrey Brennan was a Professor of Economics at the Australian National University and one of the leading figures in the Public Choice…

  • James M. Buchanan

    1919–2013

    In 1986, James M. Buchanan (1919-2013) was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Universally respected as one of…

  • John C. Calhoun

    1782–1850

    Calhoun is one of the most important American politicians and political theorists in the first half of the 19th century. He served as a…

  • Ronald H. Coase

    1910–2013

    Ronald Coase (1910-2013) received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1991. His articles “The Problem of Social Cost” and “The Nature of…

  • Robert D. Tollison

    1942–2016

    Robert Tollison was a professor of economics at Clemson University.

  • Gordon Tullock

    1922–2014

    Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) and his 1962 coauthor, Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan, are widely recognized as co-founders of public choice,…

  • Richard Whately

    1787–1863

    Richard Whately (1787-1863), Archbishop of Dublin and Professor of Political Economy at the University of Oxford following Nassau Senior,…

  • Knut Wicksell

    1851–1926

    Knut Wicksell, Swedish economist, was one of the founders of modern macroeconomics. His work focused on real and nominal interest rates,…

In this collection

Essays and Publications

From The Reading Room, Liberty Matters and the library’s other publications.

Quotes

Passages on this subject, chosen by OLL editors.

  • Economics

    I want to argue that the “order” of the market emerges only from the process of voluntary exchange among the participating individuals. The “order” is, itself, defined as the outcome of the process that generates it. The “it,” the allocation-distribution result, does not, and cannot, exist independently of the trading process. Absent this process, there is and can be no “order.”…

    Individuals do not act so as to maximize utilities described in independently-existing functions. They confront genuine choices, and the sequence of decisions taken may be conceptualized, ex post (after the choices), in terms of “as if” functions that are maximized. But these “as if” functions are, themselves, generated in the choosing process, not separately from such process. If viewed in this perspective, there is no means by which even the most idealized omniscient designer could duplicate the results of voluntary interchange. The potential participants do not know until they enter the process what their own choices will be. From this it follows that it is logically impossible for an omniscient designer to know, unless, of course, we are to preclude individual freedom of will.

  • The State

    If, however, the collectivity is empowered to enforce individual rights, how is it to be prevented from going beyond these limits? What are the “rights” of the enforcing agent itself, the state? If we are able, conceptually, to discuss the enforcement of rights and of contracts involving exchanges of rights among persons apart from questions involving exogenous changes in the assignment of rights, we must also be able to specify, again conceptually, the rights of the collectivity to do things. We cannot simply move one step further back and conceive of the appointment or selection of some superior enforcing agent, one that will protect and limit the rights of both individuals and the state. The enforcement hierarchy must stop somewhere, and for our purpose it is well to restrict discussion to the first level. It is relatively easy to think of the collectivity fulfilling its role in protecting person and property from “unlawful” acts carried out by persons. It becomes much more difficult to think of means through which individuals can enforce and protect their rights from “unlawful” acts on behalf of the collectivity itself. How can Leviathan be chained? This problem has worried political philosophers of all ages, but no fully satisfactory answer has been advanced, either as an ideal to be approached or as a practical program to be experienced.

  • Class

    Another effect of public instability, is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the monied few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said, with some truth, that laws are made for the few, not for the many.