Lord Peter Thomas Bauer
1915–2003
Bauer was a Hungarian-born economist who emigrated to England in the 1930s. He is considered one of the leading free market theorists of…

Collection
17 items in this collection
According to William F. Shughart II in his entry on Public Choice Theory in the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics at Econlib "Public choice theory is a branch of economics that developed from the study of taxation and public spending. It emerged in the fifties and received widespread public attention in 1986, when James Buchanan, one of its two leading architects (the other was his colleague Gordon Tullock), was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics. Buchanan started the Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, and it remains the best-known locus of public choice research. Others include Florida State University, Washington University (St. Louis), Montana State University, the California Institute of Technology, and the University of Rochester.
Public choice takes the same principles that economists use to analyze people's actions in the marketplace and applies them to people's actions in collective decision making. Economists who study behavior in the private marketplace assume that people are motivated mainly by self-interest. Although most people base some of their actions on their concern for others, the dominant motive in people's actions in the marketplace whether they are employers, employees, or consumers is a concern for themselves. Public choice economists make the same assumption that although people acting in the political marketplace have some concern for others, their main motive, whether they are voters, politicians, lobbyists, or bureaucrats, is self-interest. In Buchanan's words the theory "replaces... romantic and illusory... notions about the workings of governments [with]... notions that embody more skepticism.""
In allocating individuals to this school of thought we have taken a broad perspective and have included some 18th and 19th century theorists who contributed to the formation of this school's special insights into the connection between political behavior and economics.
In this collection
2 titles, earliest first.

James M. Buchanan · 2001
The Nobel Prize winning economist, James M. Buchanan, discusses in part 1 of a two part conversation, the theory of public choice, his exchange theory of economics, and constitutional thought. Watch the video and…

James M. Buchanan · 2001
The Nobel Prize winning economist, James M. Buchanan, discusses in part 2 of a two part conversation, the work ethic, the logic of free markets, subjectivism, anarchy, federalism, the influence of philosophy, and the…
In this collection
11 people central to Public Choice.
1915–2003
Bauer was a Hungarian-born economist who emigrated to England in the 1930s. He is considered one of the leading free market theorists of…
b. 1960
Peter Boettke is University Professor of Economics and Philosophy at George Mason University and the BB&T Professor for the Study of…
1944–2022
Geoffrey Brennan was a Professor of Economics at the Australian National University and one of the leading figures in the Public Choice…
1919–2013
In 1986, James M. Buchanan (1919-2013) was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Universally respected as one of…
1782–1850
Calhoun is one of the most important American politicians and political theorists in the first half of the 19th century. He served as a…
1910–2013
Ronald Coase (1910-2013) received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1991. His articles “The Problem of Social Cost” and “The Nature of…
1743–1794
Condorcet was a mathematician, a philosopher, permanent secretary of the French Academy of Sciences (from 1776), and a politician during…
1922–2014
Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) and his 1962 coauthor, Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan, are widely recognized as co-founders of public choice,…
1787–1863
Richard Whately (1787-1863), Archbishop of Dublin and Professor of Political Economy at the University of Oxford following Nassau Senior,…
1851–1926
Knut Wicksell, Swedish economist, was one of the founders of modern macroeconomics. His work focused on real and nominal interest rates,…
In this collection
From The Reading Room, Liberty Matters and the library’s other publications.
James M. Buchanan · Mar 12, 2013
Passages on this subject, chosen by OLL editors.
I want to argue that the “order” of the market emerges only from the process of voluntary exchange among the participating individuals. The “order” is, itself, defined as the outcome of the process that generates it. The “it,” the allocation-distribution result, does not, and cannot, exist independently of the trading process. Absent this process, there is and can be no “order.”…
Individuals do not act so as to maximize utilities described in independently-existing functions. They confront genuine choices, and the sequence of decisions taken may be conceptualized, ex post (after the choices), in terms of “as if” functions that are maximized. But these “as if” functions are, themselves, generated in the choosing process, not separately from such process. If viewed in this perspective, there is no means by which even the most idealized omniscient designer could duplicate the results of voluntary interchange. The potential participants do not know until they enter the process what their own choices will be. From this it follows that it is logically impossible for an omniscient designer to know, unless, of course, we are to preclude individual freedom of will.
If, however, the collectivity is empowered to enforce individual rights, how is it to be prevented from going beyond these limits? What are the “rights” of the enforcing agent itself, the state? If we are able, conceptually, to discuss the enforcement of rights and of contracts involving exchanges of rights among persons apart from questions involving exogenous changes in the assignment of rights, we must also be able to specify, again conceptually, the rights of the collectivity to do things. We cannot simply move one step further back and conceive of the appointment or selection of some superior enforcing agent, one that will protect and limit the rights of both individuals and the state. The enforcement hierarchy must stop somewhere, and for our purpose it is well to restrict discussion to the first level. It is relatively easy to think of the collectivity fulfilling its role in protecting person and property from “unlawful” acts carried out by persons. It becomes much more difficult to think of means through which individuals can enforce and protect their rights from “unlawful” acts on behalf of the collectivity itself. How can Leviathan be chained? This problem has worried political philosophers of all ages, but no fully satisfactory answer has been advanced, either as an ideal to be approached or as a practical program to be experienced.
Another effect of public instability, is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the monied few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said, with some truth, that laws are made for the few, not for the many.