“But souls which are pregnant—for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well–nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?”
Philosophy
Aristotle and Virtue Ethics
"Men fancy that as it is in their power to act unjustly, so it is an easy matter to be just. But it is not so. To lie with your neighbour’s wife, or to strike your neighbour, or to pass certain coins from your hand to his is easy enough, and always within your power, but to do these acts as the outcome of a certain character is not an easy matter, nor one which is always within your power."* (FROM: 9.: Sundry questions about doing and suffering injustice) - Aristotle
Context
Aristotle, besides being one of the most influential ethical theorists historically, is also the main historical source of what is today called "virtue ethics." This passage comes from his discussion of the relationship of virtue to human nature.
Further thoughts
This statement comes from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the work generally regarded as the most mature statement of Aristotle's ethical theory. For the most part, Aristotle thinks of ethics in terms of virtue. Virtues are states of character that then lead to certain types of actions. For example, if honesty is a virtue, then to say one is honest one must be disposed to act honestly in all situations that call for it. A single act of honesty is all to the good, but that does not make one an honest person. That requires a fixed disposition to act honestly in all situations which in turn requires the building of a habit of honesty. This process of habituation is not easy as the first part of this quotation states. What is interesting about this quotation is that it suggests that having a fixed disposition to do wrong is also not easy. His point is not to suggest that we would want such a character, as we would for a virtue like honesty, but rather that human nature is not very consistent in itself in either direction, and thus character building requires discipline and training.
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Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury: Shaftesbury on Raillery and Truth
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, vol. 1


